Private Browsing: A Window of Forensic Opportunity
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Private Browsing: A Window of Forensic Opportunity

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This is a seminar presentation and the paper is selected because of closed relation to my research.

This is a seminar presentation and the paper is selected because of closed relation to my research.

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Private Browsing: A Window of Forensic Opportunity Private Browsing: A Window of Forensic Opportunity Presentation Transcript

  • Private Browsing:A window of Forensic Opportunity1 Howard Chivers Presented by Aung Thu Rha Hein (g5536871) [1] H. Chivers,Dept. of Computer Science, University of York “Private browsing: A window of forensic opportunity,” Digit. Investig., 2013.
  • Outline ■ Introduction ■ Background ○ Digital Forensic ○ Browser Architecture ○ Private Browsing ■ Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity ■ Conclusion ■ References
  • Introduction Motivation ■ Browser is the most used application ■ Digital artifacts from browsers are valuable ■ Private browsing becomes barrier in forensic analysis
  • Introduction Problem Statements ■ Is it possible to discover digital artifacts from private browsing sessions? ■ Different browsers have different architecture… ■ Is it possible to develop a common forensic methodology for all browsers?
  • Introduction Research Objectives ■ To analyze the possibility of browser forensic ■ To measure the privacy level & capability of private browsing ■ Propose a methodology for analyzing public & private browsing artifacts
  • Background Digital Forensic ■ Basic methodology ■ 3 methodologies & the detailed process varies ○ Basic Forensic Methodology ○ Cyber Tool Online Search For Evidence (CTOSE) ○ Data Recovery UK (DRUK)
  • Background Browser Architecture
  • Background Browser Architecture/2
  • Background Private Browsing ■ no traces of browsing activity after session ends ■ architecture and capability varies from browser ■ Goal & Threat model: ○ Local attackers ○ Web attackers
  • Background Private Browsing/2 Browser (Private Mode) Private Browsing Indicator Browsing History Usernames/E mail accounts Images Videos IE 8.0 X Google Chrome 23.0.1271.95 X X Mozilla Firefox 17.0.1 X X Apple Safari 5.1.7 X X [1] D. Ohana and N. Shashidhar, “Do private and portable web browsers leave incriminating evidence?: a forensic analysis of residual artifacts from private and portable web browsing sessions,” EURASIP J. Inf. Secur., pp. 135–142, May 2013.
  • Background Related Works [1]Keith J. Jones, “Forensic Analysis of Internet Explorer Activity Files.”,2003 [2]Gaurav Aggarwal and Collin Jackson, “An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers,” USENIX Security Symposium, 2010. [3]Aditya Mahendrakar and James Irving, “Forensic Analysis of Private Browsing Mode in Popular Browsers,” 2010.
  • Background Related Works/2 [4]H. Said, N. Al Mutawa, I. Al Awadhi, and M. Guimaraes, “Forensic analysis of private browsing artifacts,” in 2011 International Conference on Innovations in Information Technology (IIT), 2011, pp. 197–202. [5] D. J. Ohana and N. Shashidhar, “Do Private and Portable Web Browsers Leave Incriminating Evidence? A Forensic Analysis of Residual Artifacts from Private and Portable Web Browsing Sessions,” 2013, pp. 135–142. [6] H. Chivers, “Private browsing: A window of forensic opportunity,” Digital Investigation, 2013.
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity Objectives ■ Forensic capability of IE 10’s Inprivate browsing ■ architecture changes in IE 10 ○ replace binary historical formats with with new database technology, Extensible Storage Engine(ESE) ■ To study the internal behaviour of InPrivate browsing
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/2 Extensible Storage Engine (ESE) ■ allow applications to retrieve data via Indexed & Sequential Access The Propagation of Transaction Data into Disk Files
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/3 HTTP/HTML Data Storage ■ each datatypes store in separate database tables ■ also separated by integrity level(private or public) Data Type Description Cookies maintain stages of HTTP exchanges Web Storage allows to store name:value data Indexed Database Storage store large arbitrary objects with indexes (internet.edb)
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/4 Windows 8 pro IE 10.0.9.. FTK Imager E01.img ESECarve Result python script Method Analyzed Result ■ 3 Inprivate experiments: scoping exercise, A controlled comparison with ample system memory & a mixed load scenario VMWARE
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/5 Browser Data Structures ■ Users%USERPROFILE%AppDataLocalMicrosoftWindowsWebCache ■ contains containers table ■ index to container_nn ■ Metro App have several containers
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/6 Identifying InPrivate Browsing records ■ records are stored in same database ■ identify private browsing records by marker (type field) ■ browsing records are deleted after session overs ■ records still remain in log file (xxx.log) ■ log files removed when browsers opens again
  • Private Browsing: A window of Forensic Opportunity/7 Recovery Success Disk Map of Recovered Inprivate browsing records
  • Conclusion ■ research works on browser forensic ■ possibility of forensic analysis on private browsing ■ InPrivate browsing and internal behaviour Thank You & Questions?
  • Reference Research papers [1] H. Chivers, “Private Brows. A Wind. forensic Oppor. Digit. Investig., 2013. Digital Investig., 2013. [2] G. Aggarwal and E. Bursztein, “An Analysis of Private Browsing Modes in Modern Browsers.,” USENIX Secur. …, 2010. [3] Aditya Mahendrakar and James Irving, “Forensic Analysis of Private Browsing Mode in Popular Browsers,” 2010. [4] D. Ohana and N. Shashidhar, “Do private and portable web browsers leave incriminating evidence?: a forensic analysis of residual artifacts from private and portable web browsing sessions,” EURASIP J. Inf. Secur., pp. 135– 142, May 2013.
  • Reference Web Resources 1. http://www.html5rocks. com/en/tutorials/internals/howbrowserswork/#The_browsers_we_will_talk_about 2. https://archrometects.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/assignment-01-conceptual- architecture-of-google-chrome-archrometects.pdf 3. http://www.chromium.org/developers/design-documents 4. https://docs.google. com/document/d/1aBYEBd4b70YThMbuYskLIIyxltwlNxJTae89F1ULGcc/edit? usp=sharing