Controller's Perspective Ifatca
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Controller's Perspective Ifatca





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Controller's Perspective Ifatca Controller's Perspective Ifatca Presentation Transcript

  • Anthony Smoker IFATCA ASAS-TN2 Second Workshop Roma, 3rd-5th April 2006 Controller's Perspective INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS’ ASSOCIATIONS
    • Introduction
    • Some laws about “Cognitive Work” in Human-Machine systems
    • Controllers’ Perspectives - the view from Taiwan
    • ASAS and the controller - a cornucopia of thoughts
    • Conclusions
  • Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 1
    • “ Every system is stretched to operate at its capacity. As soon as there is some improvement, some new technology, we exploit it to achieve new intensity and tempo of activity”
    • Ahhhh - controller workload
      • reduced - per flight but increased overall?
      • What is the balance of TOTAL controller workload going to be?
    • What will be the effect of ASAS?
  • Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 2
    • “ All systems are balancing distant plans with local adaptations to cope with the potential surprise”
    • We are changing system dynamics and interactions
    • Introducing tighter coupling and brittleness?
    • Do we want “local” adaptations?
  • A Systemic View
    • Iterations of future system development to be deployed, are dependent on increasing use of technology, and increasing the actors in the ATM system
    • System attributes will change:
      • Tighter coupling
      • More complex interactions
    INTERACTIONS Coupling Linear Complex Loose Tight SOURCE: Perrow (1984) Normal Accidents
    • How does this affect:
      • Our understanding of system safety?
      • Behaviours of human actors in the system and how to support them?
  • Wood’s Laws of Adaptation - 3
    • “ Multiple, but potentially conflicting goals, apply to all systems”
    • Are we creating, and embedding these, in ASAS operations?
    • Are some of the philosophies being espoused currently inducing conflicting goals?
    • Do we understand the compound effect of ASAS on operations?
  • Woods 1st Law(s) of “Co-operation”
    • “ It’s not co-operation if either you do it all, or I do it all”
    • “ Co-operative problem solving occurs when the agents co-ordinate activity in the process of problem solving”
    • Can we afford to have hybrid solutions that create stressors on the system (stressing safety and capacity)?
    • What is the system cost of co-ordination activity?
  • Woods 2nd Law(s) of “Co-operation
    • “ Co-operating agents have access to partial, overlapping information and knowledge relevant to the problem at hand”
      • What does ASAS provide? - because this raises concerns for controllers
      • “ you can’t co-operate with another agent if you assume they are incompetent or…
  • Mr Weasley’s Rule
    • “ Never trust anything that can think for itself if you can’t see where it keeps its brain”
    • Harry Potter and The Chamber of Secrets (pg 329)
  • The View from Taiwan
    • IFATCA Conference last week debated ASAS and ADS-B applications
    • Controllers find the term ASAS misleading
    • The transposition of “ADS-B” and ASAS is confusing
    • IFATCA views:
      • ADS-B as surveillance
      • Surveillance = ground based or airborne applications
  • The View from Taiwan
    • Airborne surveillance applications grouped into three classes
      • Information
      • Instructions (Clearances)
      • Separation (Flight deck based)
    • All three can have an affect and influence upon clearances and instructions , and as a consequence separation
    • All three can have an impact on separation anyway
  • The View from Taiwan Surveillance Applications Ground Air Information Separation Instructions
  • The View from Taiwan
    • Surveillance - Airborne - Information
    • This will increase the situational awareness for the flight crew. It will affect ATC in two main ways
    • Firstly, information provided to pilots today will not have to be passed at all, or when passed may need to be passed in a different manner
    • Secondly, controller and pilot behaviour will change because of this increased “situational awareness”
  • The View from Taiwan
    • Surveillance – Airborne - Instruction
    • This is the use of surveillance information by the flight crew in order to comply with an ATC instruction
    • Compare this with an instruction to fly a particular (radar) heading. The pilot uses information on-board the aircraft in order to comply with the instruction
    • Importantly, instructions do not change the airways clearance (except to the extent required to comply with the instruction) and separation still remains the responsibility of the controller .
  • The View from Taiwan
    • Surveillance – Airborne – Separation
    • This is the use of surveillance information by the flight crew to separate themselves from one or more aircraft (or hazards)
    • This may be delegation of separation from the controller or a situation where the flight crew is already responsible for separation
  • The View from Taiwan - Headlines from the debate
    • What do we, as controllers want the future profession to look like?
    • How are pilots reacting to this, and what do they want?
    • How can ASAS be useful in approach control?
    • Need to develop conditions when to use ASAS - when it is useful to controllers
  • In Conclusion
    • The IFATCA view is that ASAS is a variant of Airborne Surveillance
    • The provision of “Information” to the flight deck will have an affect upon the control process for controllers and pilots
    • In some respects, ASAS is just a different way from doing what we do today
    • In other respects it is not as above, and this is a major shift in operations
  • In Conclusion
    • Responsibility for separation must be unambiguous
    • There is confusion as to what is “Separation” and what is “spacing”
    • Do not Underestimate the amount of training that will be required - and do not forget recurrent training
    • Thank you for listening