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Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
Continuity Planning
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Continuity Planning

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Continuity Planning portion of Lawyers Training Module for 2010 Elections

Continuity Planning portion of Lawyers Training Module for 2010 Elections

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Transcript

  • 1.
    • CONTINUITY
    • PLANNING
    PLN
  • 2. Primary Objectives
    • Protection of Client’s interest at all stages of the election process
      • If winning
      • If losing
      • If being cheated
      • If cheating(?)
    • Enable Client to exercise all available legal options
      • Evidence gathering supervision
      • Documentation (affidavits and pleadings)
    • Render a final report to client on all activities
    • Availability in case of litigation
    PLN
  • 3. Objectives of this segment:
    • Identification of problem timelines
    • Identification of problems in given timeline
    • Identification of action(s) to address problems
    PLN
  • 4. Critical Points in Election for Legal Contingencies :
    • Pre-election day (COC- campaign end)
    • Election day- (May 10 to 6:00 p.m.)
    • Counting
    • Transmittal
    • Canvassing- (BOC convenes 12:00 p.m.)
    • Proclamation
    PLN
  • 5. Pre-Election Scenarios
    • Vote Buying
    • Preliminary Disenfranchisement of voters
      • Physical displacement of command votes
    • Terrorism
      • To vote for opponent
      • Not to vote at all
    • Other Cheating Tactics
    • Others
    PLN
  • 6. Election Day Scenarios
    • Failure of Election Scenarios
    • Massive disenfranchisement in bailiwicks
    • Targeted operations- cheating tactics
    • Failure of AES systems
      • Failure of Software
      • Failure of Hardware
      • Failure of Peopleware
    • Others
    PLN
  • 7. Counting Scenarios
    • Systems Breakdowns
      • Failure to scan
      • Failure to print ER
    • Snatching
    • Terrorism
    • Cheating (Cyber or otherwise)
    • Others
    PLN
  • 8. Transmission Scenarios
    • PCOS Failure of Transmission
      • Physical (e.g. snatching, destruction of PCOS, etc.)
      • Cyber (e.g. software or network problems, etc.)
    • PCOS Failure of Consolidation
    • Cheating (Cyber or otherwise)
    • Others
    PLN
  • 9. Consolidation/Canvassing Scenarios
    • Non-transmittal of ERs
    • Non-consolidation
    • Failure to make timely protests per ER
      • Lack of ground
      • Lack of timely evidence
      • Breakdown in communications/coordination
    • Cheating
    • Others
    PLN
  • 10. Proclamation Scenarios
    • Failure to stop a flawed/illegal proclamation
      • Lack of ground
      • Lack of timely evidence
      • Coordination breakdowns
    • Failure to stop a flawed/illegal protest
    • Cheating
    • Biased BOC
    • Others
    PLN
  • 11. Addressing Contingencies
    • Proper training and coordination with watchers
    • Timely and Efficient gathering of evidence
    • Communications
      • Internal, including maj./min. party with CCS Server
      • External (Media, Citizen’s Arm, etc.)
    • Employment of Appropriate Remedies
    • Timely employment of Remedies
    • Others
    PLN
  • 12. COMELEC’s Continuity Plan
    • PCOS/BEI Problems
      • BEI PINs not available
      • Ballot Jam
      • Printer Jam
      • Power Supply Interruption (Battery)
      • PCOS Hang or Hardware failure
      • PCOS Unable to print Elections Returns
      • Lost/Stolen/Defective Main Memory Card or iButton Security Keys
      • WAN Access Failure
      • Catastrophe (fire, flood, earthquake, etc.)
      • Sabotage
    PLN
  • 13. COMELEC’s Continuity Plan
    • Problems in Provincial/District/City/Municipal CCS
      • CCS Hardware Failure
      • Power Supply Interruption
      • WAN Access Failure
      • Catastrophe (fire, flood, earthquake, etc.)
      • Sabotage
    PLN
  • 14. COMELEC’s Continuity Plan
    • Problems in National/Central Canvassing Service
      • Data Storage Unavailable/Service Interruption
      • Server Hardware Failure
      • CCS/REIS Listener Service Interruption
      • Power Supply Interruption
      • Network Access Failure
      • Critical Weather/High Temperature Conditions
      • Catastrophe (fire, flooding, earthquake, etc.)
    PLN
  • 15. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • BEI PINs unavailable:
      • BEI informs PCOS Technician
      • PCOST informs Supervisor
      • PCOS Supervisor Informs National Support Center Office
      • NSCO advises Supervisor to provide the PINs to BEIs
      • Supervisor provides the PINs to the BEI
    PLN
  • 16. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Ballot Jam:
      • If ballot visible, the BEI IT-capable member gently pulls out the ballot
      • If not visible, BEI calls PCOS Technician who shall remove the PCOS from the ballot box and retrieve the jammed ballot
      • Chairman re-feeds the ballot to PCOS
        • If rejected because already counted, Chair directs PCOST to remove PCOS again from ballot box so Chair can deposit the ballot there.
          • Not applicable if rejected for other causes (ambiguous, misread, invalid, follow General Instructions).
    PLN
  • 17. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Ballot Jam because of improper stacking:
      • BEI allowed to open ballot box and press down on ballots
    PLN
  • 18. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Printer Jam
      • PCOST (under BEI supervision) shall open printer door and gently pull the paper back towards the roll to remove jam
      • PCOST reloads paper when jam is removed
    PLN
  • 19. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Power Supply Interruption (Battery)
      • PCOS Supervisor or Technician advises NSCO of need for replacement battery
      • NSCO locates and delivers a replacement battery
      • PCOST replaces battery under BEI supervision
        • Disconnect old battery
        • Connect new
        • Connect inverter to external source (if applicable)
        • Turn PCOS on
        • BEI resumes power on procedures
    PLN
  • 20. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • PCOS Hang or Hardware Failure or other cases:
      • PCOST calls Supervisor
      • Supervisor informs NSCO
      • NSCO asks PCOST (under BEI) to turn off and turn on the PCOS machine and other general troubleshooting instructions
      • If problems persists NSCO arranges for delivery of replacement PCOS
    PLN
  • 21. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • While waiting for PCOS replacement:
      • Turn off defective PCOS
      • Remove PCOS from ballot box
      • Open ballot box
      • Retrieve ballots, if any
      • Count ballots
      • Place in envelope
      • Seal
      • Record in minutes
      • Put envelope in ballot box
    PLN
  • 22. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • While waiting for PCOS replacement:
      • Close and lock ballot box
      • Under EO supervision, continue voting without passing PCOS and just deposit ballots in box
    PLN
  • 23. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • When PCOS replacement arrives:
      • Chairman opens ballot box and retrieves ballots (counted and uncounted)
      • Returns counted ballots envelop in ballot box
      • Places uncounted ballots in envelope and seal
      • Break memory card compartment seals of defective PCOS and remove main memory card (Poll Worker compartment)
      • Insert this Memory Card in replacement PCOS
      • Same procedure for back-up memory card (Administrator slot)
    PLN
  • 24. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • When PCOS replacement arrives:
      • Replug and initialize replacement PCOS
      • Chairman feeds uncounted ballots one at a time
      • Follow General Instructions to the end (counting, etc.)
      • Reinsert original back-up memory of replacement PCOS
      • PCOST calls NSCO through PCOS Supervisor and inform about the replacement
    PLN
  • 25. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • When voting over and no PCOS arrives:
      • Use PCOS of next or nearby precinct after their counting is over
      • Follow same procedure as in replacement PCOS
    PLN
  • 26. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • When NSCO confirms there is a replacement but time to replace exceeds time to just wait to use PCOS of next or nearby precinct:
      • NSCO through Supervisor arranges transfer of next/nearby PCOS to be used as replacement
      • After that PCOS has finished its own activities
      • Follow instructions for replacement PCOS
    PLN
  • 27. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • No available replacement at all (and no available PCOS from next/nearby precinct)
      • BEI follows procedure while waiting for replacement PCOS (until end)
      • BEI asks authority from EO to transfer ballot box to Municipal/City Canvassing Center with the contingency PCOS
      • Transport Ballot Box and defective PCOS main memory card to Municipal/City Canvassing Center
      • BEI opens ballot box and feeds uncounted ballots, one at a time in contingency PCOS then close polls
    PLN
  • 28. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • PCOS unable to print Election Returns
      • Troubleshooting procedures
      • If problems persist, replacement procedures
        • Replacement PCOS coming
        • Next/Nearby PCOS
        • Municipal/City Canvassing Center with contingency PCOS
    PLN
  • 29. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Defective/Lost Memory Card or iButton keys:
      • BEI informs PCOS Technician and DepEd Supervisor
      • DepEd Supervisor informs Election Officer
      • EO authorizes depositing of ballots without passing through PCOS
      • If replacement does not arrive upon voting and closing of polls, EO directs BEI to deliver ballot box to Municipal/City Treasurer for safekeeping
        • Watchers should be present
      • EO shall send notice to reconvene BEI for counting
    PLN
  • 30. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • WAN (wide area network) access failure
      • PCOS Technician repeats turn-off turn-on procedure to check network link indicator
      • If problems persist, PCOST through Supervisor shall inform NSCO who shall:
        • Arrange delivery of replacement modem or BGAN device; or
        • Direct PCOST to inform BEI to take the removable main memory to the nearest precinct/polling center or Municipal/City canvassing center
    PLN
  • 31. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • WAN (wide area network) access failure
      • When replacement modem/BGAN device arrives:
        • Reconnect to PCOS
        • Re-transmit the information
    PLN
  • 32. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • WAN (wide area network) access failure
      • If another PCOS is used:
        • Print the results
        • Remove the main memory
        • Put in envelope and mark as “NOT TRANSMITTED”
        • Wait for other PCOS to finish
        • Transfer to other PCOS and re-transmit
        • If transmission successful, put in envelope and mark as “TRANSMITTED”
        • Replace original memory card of the replacement PCOS
    PLN
  • 33. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • WAN (wide area network) access failure
      • If results still cannot be transmitted:
        • PCOS Technician shall inform NSCO and await further instructions
      • No alternative transmission available:
        • BEI completes printing of 30 copies of ER
        • Retrieve PCOS Main Memory Card
        • Put in envelope and mark as “NOT TRANSMITTED”
        • Transport to M/CBOC RCG for manual consolidation
          • Watchers to accompany
    PLN
  • 34. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Catastrophe: fire, flood, earthquake, etc.
      • Evacuation, upon advise of Polling Place Security Personnel
      • BEI to secure all election materials and equipment
      • BEI informs Election Officer for further instructions
      • Election Officer advises on further actions
    PLN
  • 35. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Sabotage, robber or others:
      • If polling place safe, BEI shall direct personnel to stay and continue proceedings
      • If not safe, stop all proceedings and leave polling place
      • PCOS Technician to inventory all equipment
        • If equipment missing, call NSCO
        • Applicable replacement procedures
    PLN
  • 36. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • CCS Machine/Hardware Failure:
      • BOC informs CCS Technician of failure
      • CCST informs NSCO
        • Indicate name of server and location
      • Turn-off, turn-on procedure, upon BOC authority
      • If problems persists, NSCO arranges for replacement CCS
    PLN
  • 37. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • When replacement CCS laptop arrives:
      • CCS Technician, under BOC Supervision:
        • Turns of defective CCS
        • Remove memory from defective CCS
        • Store CCS in original packing
        • Install memory into replacement CCS
        • Power on procedures
        • Call NSCO and inform on status of replacement CCS
    PLN
  • 38. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • Power Interruption (Brownout/Blackout)
      • BOC/CCST shall check on status of generator set, fuel level and cable connections
      • Use generator set
      • BOC authorizes CCST to unplug CCS from external source and plug to genset
      • CCST informs NSCO of system status
      • CCST continually monitors external power source
      • If power back on after more than one hour, CCST must request authorization from BOC for switchback
    PLN
  • 39. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • Power Interruption (Brownout/Blackout)
      • BOC authorizes switchback
      • CCST unplugs UPS from genset and plugs to external power
      • CCST calls NSCO to inform of new power status
    PLN
  • 40. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • WAN Access failure, interrupting CCS service
      • BOC informs CCS Technician of inability to send and receive
      • BOC authorizes CCST to:
        • Check status of network device
        • Plug/unplug device and test connection
        • If no connection, use alternative network device(s)
        • If still no connection, call NSCO
      • NSCO records status and check status of network providers
    PLN
  • 41. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • WAN Access failure, interrupting CCS service
      • NSCO calls network technicians to supply back-up device
      • BOC authorizes network technician to plug back-up device into CCS
      • If CCS does not connect, BOC check network device and availability
      • If connection is ready, network technician must call NSCO indicating status of system, if not, inform BOC
      • If no connection, BOC must inform Commission and request further instructions
    PLN
  • 42. BOC-Level Contingencies
    • Catastrophe: fire, flood, earthquake, etc.
      • Evacuation, upon advise of Canvassing Center Security Personnel
      • BOC to secure all election materials and equipment
      • BOC informs Regional Election Director/Provincial Election Supervisor for further instructions
      • RED/PES advises on further actions
      • CCST to check all network devices and servers
        • If equipment missing, inform NSCO, replacement procedure
      • RED/PES issues order on action of Canvassing Center
    PLN
  • 43. BEI-Level Contingencies
    • Sabotage, robbery or others:
      • If polling place safe, BOC shall direct personnel to stay and continue proceedings
      • If not safe, stop all proceedings and leave polling place
      • CCS Technician to inventory all equipment
        • If equipment missing, call NSCO
        • Applicable replacement procedures
    PLN
  • 44. Random Manual Audit
    • Technical Working Group on Random Manual Audit (TWG-RMA)
      • Amb. Henrietta de Villa (PPCRV)- Chair
      • Agnes Carreon (OIC, Comelec IAD)- Member
      • Representative from NSO
    • Random Manual Audit Team (RMAT)
      • 1,145 teams, 3,435 members
      • 229 substitute members
      • 5 precincts per congressional district
    PLN
  • 45. Random Manual Audit
    • Qualifications of RMAT (same as BEI)
    • Powers of RMAT
      • Conduct the RMA
      • Deputies of TWG-RMA
      • Peace and order during RMA
      • Other functions prescribed by TWG-RMA
    • Random Selection of Precincts subject to RMA
      • PICC, by tambiolo
    PLN
  • 46. Random Manual Audit
    • Proceedings
      • Lawyers, pollwatchers or representatives of political parties/candidates shall have no involvement except as observers
      • Conducted continuously until terminated, except for occasional 15-30 minute breaks
      • Security personnel assigned in precincts extend deployment
    PLN
  • 47. Random Manual Audit
    • Minutes and Audit Returns
      • 3 copies of minutes
      • 6 copies of audit returns
        • Ballot box
        • Commission, through PES
        • TWG-RMA
        • Dominant Majority Party
        • Dominant Minority Party
        • KBP
    PLN
  • 48. Random Manual Audit
    • Venue- in randomly selected clustered precinct
    • Time- immediately after the shutdown PCOS
    • Conducted in presence of pollwatchers, etc.
    PLN
  • 49. Random Manual Audit
    • Procedure:
      • RMAT arrives at precinct
      • Informs BEI it will be subject of RMA
      • Proceeds to separate room to wait for poll closing
        • RMA cannot witness electronic canvassing
        • BEI proceeds as trained except leaves the ballot box
      • Announcement to start RMA (2 members quorum)
      • Noting of ballot box condition, seals and locks
      • Breaking of seals and locks
    PLN
  • 50. Random Manual Audit
    • Procedure:
      • Minutes of Voting and Couting
        • Verify if serial numbers of seals match
      • Ballots
        • Physical count of ballots if matches in minutes
          • Note the discrepancy if any
          • If ballots exceeds number of votes cast in minutes, random take out of excess ballots
          • Place excess in sealed envelope
      • Manual Counting of Votes (for national positions only)
    PLN
  • 51. Random Manual Audit
    • RMA gives watchers unimpeded view
    • Watchers, lawyers, public cannot touch any RMA documents
    PLN
  • 52. Random Manual Audit
    • Effects of discrepancy between AES and RMA
      • “Any difference between the automated and manual count will result in the determination of root cause and initiate a manual count for those precincts affected by the computer or procedural error.”
      • But in no case will delay any proclamation
    PLN
  • 53. Random Manual Audit
    • Post Audit Procedures:
      • Return of ballots in ballot box
      • Resealing of BEI forms by new RMA seals
      • 1 copy of audit return and tally board in ballot box
      • Chairman to lock box
      • Turn over to City/Municipal Treasurer for safekeeping.
    PLN
  • 54. Other Contingency Measures
    • Brainstorming session:
      • Peculiar/Unusual Activity indicating cheating attempt
    • Forms:
      • Watcher’s Checklist
      • Poll Watcher’s Receiving Checklist
      • Blank Affidavit Forms
    PLN
  • 55. Communication Protocols
    • Watcher
    • Supervisor
    • Area/Assigned Lawyer or QRT
    • Handling/Appearing Lawyer
    • Core Group (CVG Law HQ, IT Consultant)
    • Client/Campaign Bosses
    • Media
    PLN
  • 56. PLN
  • 57. Protocol Override
    • Threats to Safety
    • Scale of Emergency Activity
    PLN
  • 58.
    • CONTINUITY
    • PLANNING
    PLN

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