09/22/11: ARTBA District Court Complaint
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09/22/11: ARTBA District Court Complaint Document Transcript

  • 1. 1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMERICAN ROAD & TRANSPORTATION BUILDERS ASSOCIATION, 1219 28th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20007, Plaintiff, v. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, Ariel Rios Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20460, LISA P. JACKSON, ADMINISTRATOR, in her official capacity Ariel Rios Building 1200 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W. Washington, DC 20460, and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Civil Action No. __________________ COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF Plaintiff American Road & Transportation Builders Association (“ARTBA”) seeks declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Environmental Protection Agency and its Administrator, Lisa P. Jackson, in her official capacity (collectively, “EPA”) and the United States (collectively with EPA, the “Defendants”) based on the following allegations. NATURE OF THE ACTION 1. Plaintiff ARTBA brings this action under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), the Clean Air Act’s citizen-suit provision, and this Court’s equity jurisdiction to challenge EPA’s final agency action with respect to two ARTBA rulemaking petitions pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §553(e) and two accompanying rulemakings, 73 Fed. Reg. 59,034, 59,130 (2008), Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 1 of 15
  • 2. 2 and 76 Fed. Reg. 26,609, 26,611-12 (2011), all of which relate to the preemptive scope of Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e). 2. As set forth in more detail below, ARTBA seeks declaratory and injunctive relief to compel EPA to comply with applicable laws and to conform EPA rules and policies to Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e). PARTIES 3. Plaintiff ARTBA is a nonprofit trade organization based in the District of Columbia with state and regional chapters across the nation. ARTBA represents the collective interests of the U.S. transportation construction industry before the national executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government. Through its state and regional chapters and its members, ARTBA serves as an umbrella group for more than 5,000 members from all sectors and modes of the transportation construction industry (including without limitation roads, public transit, airports, ports, and waterways). Protecting its members and their member from preempted and otherwise-unlawful emission standards and other emission-related requirements is central to ARTBA’s mission and charter. 4. Defendants are the federal Environmental Protection Agency together with its Administrator in her official capacity and the United States of America. EPA is an executive- branch agency, and the United States is the federal sovereign. 5. ARTBA and EPA were parties to ARTBA v. EPA, No. 06-1112 (D.C. Cir. filed Mar. 29, 2006), and ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 8, 2008), and are bound by the jurisdictional holdings and issues decided in that prior litigation. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 2 of 15
  • 3. 3 JURISDICTION AND VENUE 6. This case arises out of Defendant’s violation of 5 U.S.C. §§553(e), 555(e), 706 and 42 U.S.C. §7543(e). ARTBA’s claims, therefore, raise federal questions under acts of Congress, over which this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1361, 42 U.S.C. §7604(a)(2), the Acts of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 762, and June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921 (as amended), and D.C. Code §11-501. 7. The 1976 APA amendments waived the United States’ sovereign immunity – and that of its executive-branch agencies and officers – for actions that seek prospective injunctive or declaratory relief. Specifically, the 1976 amendments to 5 U.S.C. §702 “eliminat[ed] the sovereign immunity defense in all equitable actions for specific relief against a Federal agency or officer acting in an official capacity.” S. REP. NO. 94-996, 8 (1976) (emphasis added). 8. Clean Air Act §304(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. §7604(a)(2), authorizes federal district courts to order EPA to “perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.” 9. The statutes referenced in Paragraphs 7-8, supra, independently waive the United States’ sovereign immunity for all the relief that ARTBA seeks in Paragraph 54. 10. For timely actions in equity filed before a plaintiff can file a timely action at law, the subsequent arising of an action at law does not extinguish the previously filed action in equity. In enacting 5 U.S.C. §704 and in subsequently amending the APA, Congress intended to preserve this principle of equity jurisdiction and pre-APA judicial review. 11. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1391(e), venue is proper in the District of Columbia, where ARTBA and EPA are headquartered. 12. The allegations raised herein constitute good cause to expedite this action under FED. R. CIV. PROC. 57 and 28 U.S.C. §1657(a). Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 3 of 15
  • 4. 4 13. In ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir. filed Dec. 8, 2008), the U.S. Court of Appeals held that ARTBA has standing to challenge EPA’s refusal to revise EPA’s preemption rules, and that holding is preclusive against the Defendants. The ARTBA v. EPA decision dated December 11, 2009, and ARTBA’s allegations and evidence related to ARTBA’s standing and ripeness from ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.) are incorporated herein by reference. 14. The regulation of greenhouse gases as pollutants under the Clean Air Act imposes direct compliance costs on ARTBA members’ equipment and regulatory burdens on ARTBA members’ projects. Revising EPA regulations to exclude greenhouse gases from the Clean Air Act’s definition of pollutant would eliminate these costs and burdens. If this Court grants the relief requested in Paragraph 54(A)(viii), ARTBA will petition EPA to revise the Clean Air Act’s definition of pollutant. Without that relief, EPA would contend that the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120 (U.S.), binds EPA to deem greenhouse gases to constitute pollutants under the Clean Air Act. ALTERNATE REMEDIES 15. Under the circumstances outlined in the Regulatory Background, Paragraphs 19- 32 infra, the alternate remedy provided by 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) is inadequate because it provides for piecemeal review in regional courts of appeal, which provides for a multiplicity of actions between EPA and ARTBA on preemption issues and defeats the congressional intent that this Circuit to address Clean Air Act issues to ensure nationwide uniformity. 16. In Engine Mfrs. Ass’n. v. EPA, Nos. 94-1558 to 94-1561, 94-1564, and 94-1566 to 94-1569 (D.C. Cir.) (“EMA v. EPA”), no petitioners faced a constitutionally or prudentially ripe threat of a state’s or local government’s adopting or attempting to enforce non-federal standards Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 4 of 15
  • 5. 5 or other requirements related to the control of emissions against nonroad vehicles and engines subject to EPA regulation under §213 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7547. 17. Between November 15, 1990, and the conclusion of EMA v. EPA, neither ARTBA nor its members faced a constitutionally or prudentially ripe threat of a state’s or local government’s adopting or attempting to enforce non-federal standards or other requirements related to the control of emissions against nonroad vehicles and engines subject to EPA regulation under §213 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7547. 18. Notwithstanding that EPA’s 2008 rulemaking, 73 Fed. Reg. 59,034 (2008), addressed the impact of the 2004 “Bond Amendment,” Pub. L. No. 108-199, §428, 118 Stat. 3, 418-19 (2004), on the preemptive scope of Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), and that ARTBA could not have commented on the Bond Amendment in pre-2004 rulemakings, ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), held that ARTBA cannot seek review of EPA’s 2008 rulemaking or EPA’s 2008 petition denial under Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1). To the extent that §307(b)(1) does not provide such review directly in the Court of Appeals, it cannot represent an alternate remedy that could displace review under 5 U.S.C. §704 or analogous equitable principles. REGULATORY BACKGROUND 19. In its initial rulemaking to implement Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), EPA bifurcated locomotives from all other nonroad vehicles, deferring locomotives for future action. 59 Fed. Reg. 31,306, 31,329 n.21 (1994); 59 Fed. Reg. 36,969, 36,973 n.8 (1994). 20. Applying to all nonroad vehicles except locomotives, EPA’s 1994 nonroad- preemption rulemaking defined “new” as “showroom new” (i.e., new until they leave the showroom floor), 40 C.F.R. §85.1602 (1995); accord 40 C.F.R. §1074.5 (current version), but Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 5 of 15
  • 6. 6 otherwise merely restated the statute, 40 C.F.R. §85.1603 (1995); accord 40 C.F.R. §1074.10 (current version). For these non-locomotive, nonroad vehicles, EPA indicated its belief that “states are not precluded under section 209 from regulating the use and operation of nonroad engines, such as regulations on hours of usage, daily mass emission limits, or sulfur limits on fuels.” 40 C.F.R. Pt. 89, subpart. A, App. A. 21. Only after successfully defending that narrow interpretation in EMA v. EPA in 1996 did EPA propose and finalize its broad preemption for locomotives. 62 Fed. Reg. 6,365 (1997); 63 Fed. Reg. 18,978 (1998). The locomotive rules expressly preempt “fleet average standards,” 40 C.F.R. §85.1603(c)(2) (1995); accord 40 C.F.R. §1074.12(b) (current version), backdate locomotive “newness” to 1972, and extend it for decades, 40 C.F.R. §§85.1602, 92.2 (1995) (new extends 1.33 times the engine’s useful life); accord 40 C.F.R. §§1074.5, 1033.901 (same under current version). 22. On or about 2000, ARTBA’s Texas members first faced state controls of non-road fleets and in-use vehicles that ARTBA’s understanding of Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), preempts, but that EPA’s interpretations purport to allow in a State Implementation Plan (“SIP”). 25 Tex. Reg. 4,059, 4,073 (2000); 25 Tex. Reg. 4,080, 4,101 (2000). 23. ARTBA successfully challenged those controls as preempted under §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. Huston, 190 F.Supp.2d 922 (W.D. Tex. 2001) (“[t]he legislative history and plain language of §209(e) are clearly inconsistent with EPA’s offered interpretation”), vacated as moot, No. 01- 50819 (5th Cir. 2002), and Texas repealed its regulations, 26 Tex. Reg. 6,935, 6,936-37 (2001). Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 6 of 15
  • 7. 7 24. In a post-Huston rulemaking on a portion of the Texas SIP inapplicable to ARTBA’s members, EPA rejected Huston as an “inappropriate collateral attack on [EPA’s] regulations.” 66 Fed. Reg. 57,223, 57,224-25 (2001). 25. To avert further expensive and duplicative litigation and to end the uncertainty over the Clean Air Act’s preemptive scope after EPA’s locomotive rulemaking and Huston, ARTBA petitioned EPA on July 12, 2002 (hereinafter, “ARTBA’s 2002 petition,” incorporated herein by reference), to amend or repeal the preemption rules on which EPA would act on SIP revisions and waivers of preemption. 26. By email dated April 30, 2004, addressed to the EPA staff who were reviewing ARTBA’s petition, ARTBA’s counsel advised EPA of the decision in Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. South Coast Air Quality Management Dist., No. 02-1343 (2004), and its favorable impact on ARTBA’s petition. 27. By letter dated June 22, 2004, EPA acknowledged receipt of the email referenced in Paragraph 26, supra, and advised ARTBA that EPA intended to join action on ARTBA’s petition with EPA’s rulemaking under the “Bond Amendment.” This EPA letter cited the Bond Amendment as an “additional intervening event after the filing of ARTBA’s petition.” 28. Although EPA sought and received comment on ARTBA’s petition as part of EPA’s Bond Amendment rulemaking, EPA denied ARTBA’s petition and addressed it in a companion document published in the docket for the Bond Amendment rulemaking. See 73 Fed. Reg. at 59,130; Response to the Petition of American Road & Transportation Builders Association to Amend Regulations Regarding the Preemption of State Standards Regulating Emissions from Nonroad Engines (Aug. 21, 2008). ARTBA’s comments and EPA’s related documents from that rulemaking are incorporated herein by reference. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 7 of 15
  • 8. 8 29. ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), dismissed ARTBA’s petition for review because ARTBA allegedly (and conclusively under principles of res judicata) failed to file within the jurisdictional 60-day window of an after-arising ground, which the Court held to exclude EPA action to deny an administrative petition. 30. In the interval between the decision in ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), and the denial of ARTBA’s petition for a writ of certiorari, EPA issued its notice of proposed rulemaking on an “indirect source” SIP rule by the regional air district for California’s San Joaquin Valley. By letter dated July 6, 2010 (hereinafter, “ARTBA’s 2010 petition”), and incorporated herein by reference, ARTBA commented on EPA’s notice of proposed rulemaking and simultaneously petitioned EPA to amend or repeal the preemption rules on which EPA’s final action on that San Joaquin SIP rulemaking would hinge. 31. EPA denied ARTBA’s petition and rejected ARTBA’s comments, relying instead on EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), in EPA’s response to comments and technical support documents, 76 Fed. Reg. at 26,611-12, which are incorporated herein by reference. 32. ARTBA and its members contend that so-called greenhouse gases are not pollutants pursuant to the Clean Air Act. On behalf of its members affected by EPA’s regulatory actions related to greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act, ARTBA intends to petition EPA administratively to reconsider whether greenhouse gases qualify as “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act. If the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120 (U.S.), controls on that question, however, EPA could not lawfully grant ARTBA the relief that ARTBA will request. Before expending the effort and cost to finalize and serve its petition on EPA, ARTBA Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 8 of 15
  • 9. 9 first seeks to declare the law set forth in Paragraphs 34-36, 54(A)(viii), infra, to conserve ARTBA’s resources. LITIGATION BACKGROUND 33. ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), conclusively settles the question that the U.S. Courts of Appeals lack jurisdiction under Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), to hear petition-denial claims where the only after-arising ground within the 60-day window is EPA’s final action on an administrative petition. 34. In Massachusetts v. EPA, Nos. 03-1361 to 03-1368 (D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 23, 2003), several petitioners sought review of EPA’s final agency action (dated September 8, 2003) to deny an administrative petition (dated October 20, 1999) that sought to designate so-called greenhouse gases as “pollutants” under the Clean Air Act. The after-arising information in that action consisted of 1998 temperature data and a 1995 report. 35. The administrative petition referenced in Paragraph 34, supra, was filed in excess of 60 days of the after-arising factual information and report on which the petitioners requested EPA to act. The petition for review in the D.C. Circuit was filed within 60 days of EPA’s petition denial, but not within 60 days of after-arising action or information on which the petitioners requested that EPA act. 36. Under the circumstances outlined in Paragraph 34-35, supra, and the holding of ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), the D.C. Circuit and the U.S. Supreme Court in Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361 to 03-1368 (D.C. Cir.), and Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120 (U.S.), lacked jurisdiction to decide any merits questions presented by the parties in that litigation. Consequently, any discussion of the merits by the Massachusetts v. EPA courts constitutes dicta and ultra vires action that is not binding as either law of the case or precedent. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 9 of 15
  • 10. 10 37. In ARTBA v. EPA, No. 11-1256 (D.C. Cir. filed July 8, 2011), ARTBA has filed a petition-denial claim in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit for EPA’s denial of ARTBA’s 2010 petition in conjunction with a reviewable EPA final agency action other than EPA’s petition denial. EPA has moved to dismiss ARTBA v. EPA, No. 11-1256 (D.C. Cir.) for the same reasons set forth in ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.). 38. If EPA is correct in its jurisdictional analysis that Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), does not provide review for EPA’s action on ARTBA’s 2010 petition, then ARTBA lacks an alternate remedy to challenge EPA’s final agency action. COUNT I EPA UNLAWFULLY DENIED ARTBA’S PETITION TO REPEAL EPA’S UNLAWFUL RULES IMPLEMENTING CLEAN AIR ACT §209 39. Plaintiff ARTBA incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 38 and Paragraphs 43 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 40. For the reasons set forth in the two ARTBA petitions identified in Paragraphs 25 and 30, supra, EPA’s preemption rules exceed EPA’s authority under Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), and EPA therefore had a nondiscretionary duty to grant ARTBA’s petitions. 41. This action is not a “civil or criminal proceeding[] for enforcement” as that phrase is used in Clean Air Act §307(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(2), and no provision of law or equity precludes ARTBA’s seeking review of the challenged EPA actions based on arguments that ARTBA could previously have raised under Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), if the Court of Appeals had had jurisdiction to hear an action under that section or otherwise. 42. For the foregoing reasons, EPA’s denial of ARTBA’s petitions was arbitrary, capricious, in excess of EPA’s authority, and not in accordance with the law. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 10 of 15
  • 11. 11 COUNT II EPA’S FAILED TO DESIGNATE THE EPA RULEMAKING ON THE SAN JOAQUIN SIP RULE AS HAVING NATIONWIDE SCOPE AND EFFECT 43. Plaintiff ARTBA incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 42 and Paragraphs 48 through 53 as if fully set forth herein. 44. EPA’s final action on the San Joaquin SIP set EPA policy nationwide on a novel issue not covered by EPA’s preemption rules. EPA’s approval binds the agency’s discretion to reject such rules as preempted by Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), in future proceedings for other geographic areas. In addition, EPA’s final action on the San Joaquin SIP rule enables third-party plaintiffs to reference that action as an authoritative interpretation of the Clean Air Act and thus to impose such rules as “reasonable further progress” for nonattainment areas in litigation over failure to attain Clean Air Act standards by an attainment deadline. 45. EPA’s final action denies regulated entities and the public the national uniformity that Congress intended to achieve by having nationally applicable EPA rules reviewed under Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1), face such review exclusively in the District of Columbia Circuit. 46. Under both Paragraphs 44 and 45, supra, EPA’s final action is reviewable in this Circuit, and the EPA action has nationwide scope and effect. 47. For the foregoing reasons, EPA’s failure to designate its rulemaking on the San Joaquin SIP as having nationwide scope and effect was arbitrary, capricious, in excess of EPA’s authority, and not in accordance with the law. COUNT III EPA’S 2008 PREEMPTION RULEMAKING VIOLATED §209 48. Plaintiff ARTBA incorporates Paragraphs 1 through 47 as if fully set forth herein. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 11 of 15
  • 12. 12 49. In the Bond Amendment, Congress recognized that “the authority of any State under section 209(e)(2)(B) of the Clean Air Act” relates to state action “to enforce standards or other requirements.” Pub. L. No. 108-199, §428(e), 118 Stat. at 418-19. 50. In the 1990s, before the Bond Amendment’s enactment, EPA and EMA v. EPA relied on the fact that Clean Air Act §209(e)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e)(2)(B), specifically uses only “standards” and “such other actions” – and not the broader “any … other requirement” language then urged by the EMA v. EPA petitioners (who lacked a ripe challenge) and now urged by ARTBA – to adopt a narrow reading of Clean Air Act preemption. 51. ARTBA could not possibly have either litigated or commented upon the 2004 Bond Amendment’s impact on EPA’s 1994 rulemaking on nonroad preemption. If ARTBA lacks an opportunity for review under §307(b)(1) – as ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), conclusively held – ARTBA has an action for review in this Court, under some or all of the APA, Clean Air Act §304(a)(2), and this Court’s equity jurisdiction. 52. For the reasons set forth in ARTBA’s comments and the administrative record, EPA’s rules implementing Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), as amended by the Bond Amendment, Pub. L. No. 108-199, §428, 118 Stat. at 418-19, purport to allow state and local actions that those statutes preempt. 53. For the foregoing reasons, EPA’s 2008 rulemaking was arbitrary, capricious, in excess of EPA’s authority, and not in accordance with the law. PRAYER FOR RELIEF 54. Wherefore, plaintiff ARTBA respectfully requests that this Court enter the following relief: Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 12 of 15
  • 13. 13 A. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §706(2), 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1361, 1651(a), 2201-2202, 42 U.S.C. §7604(a)(2), the Acts of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 762, and June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921 (as amended), D.C. Code §11-501, FED. R. CIV. PROC. 57, and the court’s equitable powers, a Declaratory Judgment that: (i) Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), preempts as “standards” any fleetwide averaging, early retirement, and purchase-sale requirements imposed on federally regulated vehicles or fleets; (ii) Clean Air Act §209(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e)(1), prohibits EPA’s disparate treatment of new locomotives versus new construction and farm equipment under 175 horsepower, including disparate treatment with respect to the ability of state and local government to impose any emission-related requirements on federally regulated in-use vehicles; (iii) Clean Air Act §209(e)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e)(1)(A), preempts California and any other state from imposing any emission-related standard and any other emission-related requirement on construction equipment under 175 horsepower during its federally regulated useful life; (iv) Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), preempts as “standards or other requirements” any state restrictions on the use, hours of operation, and fuel of both new and non-new nonroad vehicles; (v) State or local requirements subject to the federal or California environmental statutes’ civil and criminal enforcement mechanisms are not eligible for any market-participant exception to federal preemption; Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 13 of 15
  • 14. 14 (vi) Because Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), preempts the foregoing types of state and local regulations, EPA regional offices lack the authority to approve such measures in SIPS due to the lack of the enforceability required by Clean Air Act §110(a)(2)(E)(i), 42 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2)(E)(i); (vii) EPA’s final action on the 2010 San Joaquin SIP is an action of nationwide scope and effect within the meaning of Clean Air Act §307(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1); and (viii) The courts in Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 03-1361 (D.C. Cir.), and Massachusetts v. EPA, 05-1120 (U.S.), lacked jurisdiction for the reasons set forth in ARTBA v. EPA, No. 08-1381 (D.C. Cir.), and the discussion of the merits in the decisions rendered by those courts is dicta and is neither controlling on EPA or any other party nor precedential in any federal court. B. Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §706(2), 28 U.S.C. §§1331, 1361, 1651(a), 2202, 42 U.S.C. §7604(a)(2), the Acts of March 3, 1863, 12 Stat. 762, and June 25, 1936, 49 Stat. 1921 (as amended), D.C. Code §11-501, and the court’s equitable powers, an Order that (i) EPA amend its rules implementing Clean Air Act §209(e), 42 U.S.C. §7543(e), consistent with the foregoing declaratory relief; and (ii) EPA’s regional offices identify and commence rulemakings to remove any preempted measures previously incorporated into a SIP. C. Award Plaintiff its costs, including attorneys’ fees. D. Such other relief as may be just and proper. Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 14 of 15
  • 15. Dated: September 22. 2011 LAW OFFICE OF LAWRENCE J. JOSEPH 1250 Connecticut Avenue, NW, Suite 200 Washington, DC 20036 Telephone: (202) 669-5135 Telecopier: (202) 318-2254 Email: Jjoseph@larryjoseph.com Counselfor American Road & Transportation Builders Association 15 Case 1:11-cv-01713-JDB Document 1 Filed 09/22/11 Page 15 of 15