Leadership in
                                                                                 Counter-
                  ...
Course Outline
                                        11:00 -
          9:00 - 10:45   10:45-11:00              12:30-13:...
Introduction                                     World

                                                              Coun...
Introduction
                 Setting the outcomes &
                       expectations
         Benchmarking best practi...
Introduction
                 Setting the outcomes &
                   expectations con-td.




                         ...
Unit delivery

         From 11:00 - 12:30
         Looking at history, learning from the
         past
         People, i...
Leadership profiles

         Lawrence of Arabia
         Chairman Mao
         Ernesto Guevara
         Gerald Templer
   ...
Unit delivery


         From 13:30 - 15:15 - Breakout Activity
         Strategies and personalities - Lessons
         f...
Unit delivery
         From 15:30 - 17:00
         Concepts of Leadership
         Theories and Styles
         The Unexpe...
Unit delivery
         Day 2 - 09:00-10:45
         The difference between management
         and leadership: legitimate p...
Unit delivery
         Day 2 - 11:00 - 12:30
         Taking a look back at Day One’s
         lessons from the past
     ...
Unit delivery
         Day 2 - 13:30 - 15-15
         Realigning ourselves - lets take some
         quizzes - what’s my l...
Unit delivery
         Day 2 - 15:30 - 17:00
         Reinforcing the outcomes from group
         activities
         Bri...
Introduction
                 Setting the outcomes &
                   expectations con-td.
         Take away a Toolkit ...
Introduction
                 Setting the outcomes &
                   expectations con-td.

         Participation..Part...
Lessons from
                                                                             the past
                       ...
BBC Documentary 10 minutes
17
©Aruna Kulatunga

Tuesday, 24 June 2008                                17
History of Guerilla warfare

                Diminutive form of the Spanish word for war
                “Guerra”

       ...
History of Guerilla warfare...


                All guerilla actions, insurgency, terrorism, small wars,
                ...
Thomas Edward Lawrence
              Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency
                               Fi...
T.E. Lawrence...

                Personal credibility and role remains controversial                                     ...
Orde Wingate...



                Helped to train the Haganah
                Enlisted Haganah help to run
              ...
Mao Tse Tung...
                                                                                                          ...
Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks

               Rules
                                                           All actions a...
The fish swimming in the water...                                                                                          ...
Ho Chi Minh...



                Nguyen Tat Thanh - (Ho Chi Minh)
                           Wrote a chapter on guerilla ...
Viet Minh vs the French...

                 Widespread and systematic use of
                 terror by VM
              ...
COIN in early USSR...


                Mikhail Tukhachevsky

                                                Executed lat...
Mistaken identities..
                                                                                                    ...
Tache d'huile - Stain of oil

                Concept developed first by Thomas Bugeaud in
                French Algeria i...
31
©Aruna Kulatunga

Tuesday, 24 June 2008   31
David Galula - a personal war...
                                                                                         ...
David Galula - a personal war...




             Imperative of not alienating the local
             population
         ...
The Philippines - 1898 Spanish
                     American War
                 USA’s most successful instance of
      ...
British in Malaya...




          Background...




                                               ©Aruna Kulatunga - mta...
Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs


                Unusual grasp of the political nature
                of insurgency and of measur...
Harold Briggs...


                Promoted cooperation between military, police and
                civil arms of the gov...
Harold Briggs...

                Flexibility of operations in the jungle
                - key note
                Batta...
Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya



                Traveling light and knowing the land;
                the coming of the ...
Walter Walker...



                 Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the
                 top appealing for...
Walter Walker...
                                                                                                         ...
Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial
                               Secretary
                                                     ...
Gerald Templer...

                 Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood,
                 merging the Br...
Templer’s six laws...


                                                 Get the priorities right
                        ...
Gerald Templer...




                 Entrusting responsibility to junior
                 officers and backing them up wit...
Gerald Templer...
                                                                                                        ...
Gerald Templer...


                Effective Feedback Loops in place..
                           Giving time to “Belly ac...
Hugh Green...



              Providing a credible alternative -
                         Cash rewards and rehabilitation...
British in Malaya...
                                                                                                     ...
British in Malaya...
                                                                                                     ...
Implement locally



                         Monitor effectiveness

                                                 Inno...
British in Malaya...
                                                                                                     ...
British in Malaya...

                Use of strict doctrine discouraged
                           Each theater is differe...
British in Malaya...




                 Difference between Westmoreland
                 and Templer
                    ...
Thompson’s Five principles of
                  counterinsurgency


                 The government must have a clear poli...
Fighting for the right reasons?




                 Clausewitz - War must always be
                 subordinate to the p...
Intellectual Soldiers...



                 “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift” by
                 Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton
 ...
Did the British fail in Ireland...




                Lack of good police intelligence
                            - whic...
250 Years of Learning...



                John Adams (c.1818) - The Revolution was in the
                Hearts and Min...
Situation in Vietnam from a US
                      perspective




                 End goal never clear - Were the
    ...
Vietnam from...
                                                                                                          ...
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence
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Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence

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A large number of world's political leaders have at one time or other were baptised through the fires of militancy. Others, who opposed the militants have also appeared in the political battlements. Comparing the leadership strategies, tactics and styles employed by these leaders to conventional leadership thoughts gives us patterns to learn and emulate. In a course covering 300 slides, this presentation goes through the gamut of militancy, terrorism, counter-terrorism, communication, leadership and lessons we can learn from the past to meet today's global challenges.

JEL Classifications: A10, D20, D40, D70, D90, E20, L10, L80, M10, M31, P13 L00, M1, M12, M14, D70, D74, D78, D79, L14, M1

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Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence

  1. 1. Leadership in Counter- Terrorism Dichotomy or Congruence A course prepared for the Institute of Defense Studies (IDSS), Nanyang University, Singapore, 1st Digitally signed by ARUNA KULATUNGA Q. 2008 ARUNA DN: cn=ARUNA KULATUNGA, o=Comunicamos.eu, ou=AD, email=aruna@mac.com, c=ES By KULATUNGA Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Location: Murcia, Spain Aruna Kulatunga, MBA, MHRM (Monash University) Date: 2008.06.24 19:01:52 +02'00' Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Senior Consultant - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.Eu www.comunicamos.eu Tuesday, 24 June 2008 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
  2. 2. Course Outline 11:00 - 9:00 - 10:45 10:45-11:00 12:30-13:30 13:30-15:15 15:15-15:30 15:30-17:00 17:00-17:15 12:30 Course Lessons Introduction Lessons Concepts Day Coffee Lunch from the Coffee Day's / Setting from the of 1 Break Break past. Break Discussion Outcomes, past leadership Cont. expectations Leadershi p Styles / Negotiati Benchma on and rking Communi cation profiling Change Bringing it Management Applying together - Day / Coffee Lunch Breakout Coffee Day's the Reinforcing 2 Communicat Break Break Activity Break Discussion lessons the ion & outcomes Negotiation Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 2 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 2 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
  3. 3. Introduction World Country Principles Ideas Beliefs The Threat Signal The threat level: its directed at you! Religion Family You The why’s of gathering knowledge Concepts of COIN, CT & linking with leadership Lessons from the past - lessons for the future What we take back - practical tool sets for achieving self-efficacy in leadership Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 3 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 3
  4. 4. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations Benchmarking best practices in CT How to relate the BM’s to leadership traits, theories and knowledge Difference between tactics & strategy The leader & manager - a necessary dichotomy The essence of leadership - Managing Change Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 4 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 4
  5. 5. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 5 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 5
  6. 6. Unit delivery From 11:00 - 12:30 Looking at history, learning from the past People, incidents, tactics & strategies Malaya, Kenya & Vietnam, Successes and failures Eating Soup with a Knife... Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 6 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 6
  7. 7. Leadership profiles Lawrence of Arabia Chairman Mao Ernesto Guevara Gerald Templer David Galula Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 7 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 7
  8. 8. Unit delivery From 13:30 - 15:15 - Breakout Activity Strategies and personalities - Lessons from the past continued... Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 8 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 8
  9. 9. Unit delivery From 15:30 - 17:00 Concepts of Leadership Theories and Styles The Unexpected Leader The Johari window The three lenses of leadership Who moved my cheese? Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu The Flight of the Buffalo 9 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 9
  10. 10. Unit delivery Day 2 - 09:00-10:45 The difference between management and leadership: legitimate power and control vs. empowerment and change - Jooste.K (2004) What is Change? Theories of Change Management The two legs of Change - Communication & Negotiation Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ More on empowerment... www.comunicamos.eu 10 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 10
  11. 11. Unit delivery Day 2 - 11:00 - 12:30 Taking a look back at Day One’s lessons from the past Can we apply what we know in Day Two, from concepts of leadership, change management, communication and negotiations, to these “incidents from the past”? What toolkits do we need to apply our theories into practical realities? Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Can we benchmark and identify best www.comunicamos.eu practices in contextual leadership? 11 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 11
  12. 12. Unit delivery Day 2 - 13:30 - 15-15 Realigning ourselves - lets take some quizzes - what’s my leadership style & how well do I communicate Lessons on feedback Double loop learning A short introduction to knowledge management and its importance to leaders Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Group activity - !to be decided! www.comunicamos.eu 12 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 12
  13. 13. Unit delivery Day 2 - 15:30 - 17:00 Reinforcing the outcomes from group activities Bringing it together - Organizations must rely on the knowledge, skills, experience and judgement of all its people..not a select handful... Leadership is an enabler - not a barrier Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 13 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 13
  14. 14. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Take away a Toolkit for Leaders Change Management Communication Negotiation Concepts of permeability Access, Trust, Confidentiality, Consistency, Continuity Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 14 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 14
  15. 15. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Participation..Participation...Participati on Respect to all No disturbances - mobile phones must be off! Questions and queries at any time Enlightened debate & contribution Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 15 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 15
  16. 16. Lessons from the past Session II (11:00 - 12:30) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 16
  17. 17. BBC Documentary 10 minutes 17 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 17
  18. 18. History of Guerilla warfare Diminutive form of the Spanish word for war “Guerra” Derived from Spanish partidas actions against French in 1808-14 First documented guerilla activity in a Hittite parchment, 15 Century B.C. Mao Tse Tung’s writings not much different to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” first written in 400 BC Continuous evidence of guerilla warfare through out history Terrorism - a form of guerilla warfare with actions targeting civilian life and property ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.1 18 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 18
  19. 19. History of Guerilla warfare... All guerilla actions, insurgency, terrorism, small wars, urban revolutions, have one constant, a single thread, through out history A degree of support from some sections of the population who was willing to provide the combatant refuge in time of need, provisions and succor information Johannes Most Considered a pioneer of both modern urban revolution and international terrorism - Published a work on the systematic use of terror by small groups of activists utilizing the most modern technology available in 1884 (Beckett.p.15) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.1 19 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 19
  20. 20. Thomas Edward Lawrence Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base. Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy. Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July. interlocking fortified posts. Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement. Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence. Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34. 20 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 20
  21. 21. T.E. Lawrence... Personal credibility and role remains controversial Propaganda Does not desist from original guerilla theory “the greatest espoused by Lawrence weapon in the armory of a Perceived the importance of popular support with modern 2% active support could achieve victory given the commander” remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized Defined command as a function of - Algebraic - biological - psychological (motivation, morale) impetus Followers include Mao Wingate ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20 21 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 21
  22. 22. Orde Wingate... Helped to train the Haganah Enlisted Haganah help to run clandestine attack groups to protect oil pipeline from Iraq to Port of Haifa The Gideon Force Chindits ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47 22 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 22
  23. 23. Mao Tse Tung... “The richest source of power to Born in Hunan Province wage war lies in the Son of a farmer who provided the son with a masses of high school education people” After a series of defeats relating to attacks on Nationalists held cities, Mao changes direction from an urban proletariat led revolution to rural peasant led insurgency in 1930. Shift in emphasis termed the “single most vital decision” in the history of the CCP. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20 23 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 23 Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
  24. 24. Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks Rules All actions are subject to “The Unity of command Spirit” Do not steal from the people between Be neither selfish or unjust the troops Remarks and the Replace the door when you leave people the house Roll up the bedding on which you have slept Be courteous Be honest in your transactions Return what you borrow Replace what you break Do not bathe in the presence of women Do not without authority search those you arrest ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22 24 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 24
  25. 25. The fish swimming in the water... “To gain territory is no cause for joy and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow. To lose territory or cities is of no importance. Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the The important thing people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the is to think up ways of water” destroying the enemy” (Becket, 2005, p.73) While the fish can be killed by polluting the water, this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson Trading space for time, first enumerated by Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina “Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28 25 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 25
  26. 26. Ho Chi Minh... Nguyen Tat Thanh - (Ho Chi Minh) Wrote a chapter on guerilla warfare in a 1928 soviet guide to insurrection. http://encarta.msn.com/media_461526436_761558397_-1_1/Ho_Chi_Minh.html (It was the only chapter on guerilla warfare) Controversial...but no dispute of his influence over the 20th century world events ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. , p.60 26 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 26
  27. 27. Viet Minh vs the French... Widespread and systematic use of terror by VM Elimination of old administrative structures killing village elders and officials in guerilla zones LTTE in Sri Lanka eliminated nearly 70% of elders, some of whom nurtured the LTTE in its early days Repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.50 27 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 27
  28. 28. COIN in early USSR... Mikhail Tukhachevsky Executed later by Stalin, considered by some to be a father of modern COIN Stressed the need to take account local values and culture Emphasized on single point of control over all aspects of the COIN response Suggested pseudo-gangs BUT, also was in favor of gulags, large scale evictions, assumption of collective guilt and collective punishments ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.50 28 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 28
  29. 29. Mistaken identities.. “True power of Antoine Henry Jomini the armies rest in the Prescribed annihilation of the enemy people and force as best route to achieve victory their Destruction of the enemy force on governmen the field t” Carl Von Clausewitz Victory is when the political objectives on which the war is being fought are accomplished ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.18 29 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 29 In most small wars and insurgencies, the Clausewitz principle has stood in favour of the insurgents, a point to remember. Mau Mau is a classic example. Kenyatta - Kenya Nagl states one person who leveraged Clausewitz was Mao Tse - Tung
  30. 30. Tache d'huile - Stain of oil Concept developed first by Thomas Bugeaud in French Algeria in 1840 Refined further by other Frenchmen in 1890 and in 1912 Extending French control more effectively through a dual military - political strategy Solider - administrators with a dual role Systematically spreading influence Conquest not by mighty blows, but as patch of oil spreads Reassuring local leaders France will uphold traditional authority Soldiers acting as administrators, farmers, teachers, workshop managers... Aim of assimilation rather than subjugation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.40-41 30 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 30
  31. 31. 31 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 31
  32. 32. David Galula - a personal war... “ Outwardly treat every civlian as a friend; inwardly Commanded troops for two years in Kabliya, East of consider him a rebel Algiers till you have proof to the contrary” First hand experience serving as military attaché in China at the beginning of Mao’s government and subsequently in Hong Kong, observing Huk insurgency in the Philippines, the Malayan emergency and French efforts to maintain its empire in Indochina Need for doctrine - (disputed by Kitson and Nagl) Recognition of FNL urban terrorist strategy as ’s driven by force multiplication efforts of propaganda - more effect in the cities ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii) 32 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 32
  33. 33. David Galula - a personal war... Imperative of not alienating the local population Emphasis on policing rather than military tactics to defeat insurrection Fallacy of a decapitation strategy Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii) 33 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 33
  34. 34. The Philippines - 1898 Spanish American War USA’s most successful instance of counterinsurgency theory and practice In addition to military measures Propaganda Cash Bounties for surrendered weapons Comprehensive public works program Military measures included the imprisonment, deportation and “defeating” insurgents who maintained antagonism against the ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.46 34 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 34
  35. 35. British in Malaya... Background... ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 35 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 35
  36. 36. Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs Unusual grasp of the political nature of insurgency and of measures required to defeat it. “In the early days we didn't grasp how Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis.P. 56 important the support of the local people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that we understood that the CTs got all of their support - food, supplies, intelligence - from the local people” - a veteran of the Malaya emergency. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71 36 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 36
  37. 37. Harold Briggs... Promoted cooperation between military, police and civil arms of the government Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom, pervading across all hierarchies through a system of integrated committees - Solving the problem of pulling in opposite directions Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small- scale operations Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56 37 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 37
  38. 38. Harold Briggs... Flexibility of operations in the jungle - key note Battalion commanders being reconciled to devolve leadership to where it matters, NCO’s taking responsibility to make decisions on the spot “New Villages” stopped the fish from moving in the water and when the CT came into replenish his supplies, he ran the risk of being caught in the shallows! ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74 38 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 38
  39. 39. Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya Traveling light and knowing the land; the coming of the Ferrets The Jungle war fare school in the old asylum...Determined personal leadership...pushing the boundaries of hierachy “For training only” Flame throwing cartridges - using available resources ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 68-70 39 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 39 Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric? Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
  40. 40. Walter Walker... Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly oriented towards positive change - Walker not an isolated case) Walker’s superiors were generally available but not quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the open top transport lorries Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling over the results ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 79-80 40 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 40
  41. 41. Walter Walker... “It is ..(because) of this handbook...we got militant Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions - communism in Malaya Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in operations by the throat” - Templer (Nagl. p.98) Operational innovations through learning from the CTs - crossing streams walking backwards - Purposefully leaving footprints (Practices later abandoned in COIN operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt quickly to identify false trails by weight patterns) Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti- terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Jungle School ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97 41 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 41
  42. 42. Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial Secretary “You cannot win the war without the help of the population and you cannot get the “Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a support of the military task” population without at least beginning to win Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- the war” propaganda starting from the school- “Children coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some day be entrusted with self- government within the British commonwealth” Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer: - “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self- governing nation” (p. 88) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 76-77 42 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 42 Converting Prabhakaranʼs children UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony, http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
  43. 43. Gerald Templer... Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood, merging the British objective with that of the local population. Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence in the bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was assassinated just days before on arrival in Malaya Corbet, 1986, p57-59 Cuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants in the decision making process “The Malayan people Starts at the bottom - first things first - make political can count on the progress at local level powerful and continuing assistance Involves local leadership in taking responsibility for of His Majesty’s directing the war effort government not only Listens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior in the immediate task officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs. of defeating the terrorists, but in the Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly longer term objective ©Aruna forging a United Comunicamos.eu of Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Malayan nation” NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 88-89 43 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 43 discourse of war symbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc. Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who provided the information
  44. 44. Templer’s six laws... Get the priorities right Get the instructions right Get the organization right Get the right people into the organization Get the right spirit into the people Leave them to get on with it Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch to collect and collate Dividing responsibility efficiently Energized the situation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 90-91 44 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 44 Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
  45. 45. Gerald Templer... Entrusting responsibility to junior officers and backing them up with personal authority Unconventional behavior - Issuing orders from the bathtub (Orde Wingate was also known for his eccentric bath routines...) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 95-96 45 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 45 Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
  46. 46. Gerald Templer... “Military Force cannot change opinion, it can only Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized and create a framework in carried out throughout in an identical pattern which economic Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into reform and good surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were no government can take other options effect” Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we want them to handle weapons and lay ambushes”- (Negative impact in today’s warfare - untrained and undisciplined units - operational nightmares) Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social, political, economical, civilian - police and military ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98 -100 46 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 46
  47. 47. Gerald Templer... Effective Feedback Loops in place.. Giving time to “Belly ache” Subordinates offered substantiated criticism Suggestions incorporated The final version is owned by all, but had the personal authority of Templer Never being afraid of bad news ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 104 47 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 47
  48. 48. Hugh Green... Providing a credible alternative - Cash rewards and rehabilitation for surrenders Persuading the people that the government is capable of providing essential services and defeating the CTs. Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93 48 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 48 Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
  49. 49. British in Malaya... Spirit of Innovation No single doctrine - Freedom, and Wingate - Gideon Force, Chingits the necessity to create own answers Calvert -Malayan Scouts Recognition that situations differ and Walker-Ferrets are dynamic There is no right answer to all the questions Recognition that there is little assistance from the center Therefore, the need to adopt, make do ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 194-195 49 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 49
  50. 50. British in Malaya... Implement locally Feedback Loops Monitor effectiveness Open to suggestions from below Innovate Change if necessary Getting the decision making authority to allow innovation, monitor effectiveness, transmit new ideas with requirements that it be followed throughout the organization Transmit globally Monitor continously Organization is not global Can be divisional Rarely more than country No risks to social standing of superior officer to accept suggestion from junior British organization culture, club, old school, etc, helps ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 195 50 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 50
  51. 51. Implement locally Monitor effectiveness Innovate Change if necessary Transmit globally Monitor continously 51 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 51
  52. 52. British in Malaya... “The solution (to the Malaya Strategic and shared vision Emergency) ...is in the hands of all of us, the Briggs peoples of Malaya and the governments Putting the campaign in proper perspective which serve them” - Templer (Nagl p.197) Military component vis-à-vis political and economic components Templer / Lytellton Continued to put into effect the Briggs plan Shared vision Templer insisting all subordinates share the vision ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 195-196 52 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 52
  53. 53. British in Malaya... Use of strict doctrine discouraged Each theater is different and needs its own policy Shaping the respond to local and immediate need Experience teaches what works and what does not Doctrine is only as basis for training and equipping Training to be up to date, effective and extremely flexible- Troops informed immediately of changes in training ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 204 53 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 53
  54. 54. British in Malaya... Difference between Westmoreland and Templer Templer makes Walter Walker write a field manual based on local experiences and tactics used Westmoreland requests doctrine from Washington ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.210 54 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 54
  55. 55. Thompson’s Five principles of counterinsurgency The government must have a clear political aim; to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable. The government must function in accordance with the law The government must have an overall plan The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerilla In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.29 55 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 55 Nagl states that what will determine the final outcome of COIN theory and practice is whether or not the national objective has been attained. Taking Thompsonʼs first principle as the ultimate national objective, how many governments has been successful in applying COIN theory? Thompson served in Malaya and Kenya, and is senior to Kitson
  56. 56. Fighting for the right reasons? Clausewitz - War must always be subordinate to the political goals for which it is being fought Analyze current conflicts based on this percept ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.31 56 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 56 Iraq - Afghanistan Indonesia Eastern Timor
  57. 57. Intellectual Soldiers... “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift” by Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton An intellectual soldier in an un- intellectual organization The importance of thinking, reading, writing and learning based on your own experiences and passing it down to the future generations. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.37 57 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 57 Link it with learning organisation
  58. 58. Did the British fail in Ireland... Lack of good police intelligence - which is at the heart of counterinsurgency and; The nonexistence, from the government side, of an “hearts & minds” exercise, which the IRA was abundantly involved in ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.40 58 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 58
  59. 59. 250 Years of Learning... John Adams (c.1818) - The Revolution was in the Hearts and Minds of the people Gerald Templar (c.1950) - The answer lies not in pouring more troops to the jungle, but in hearts and minds of the people Marqués de Santa Cruz (Spain c. 1724-30) - Cautioned against trying to alter the traditions and customs of people under occupation, recommending amnesties granted soon after ceasing hostilities (Becket, 2005, p.26) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Clutterbuck, Richard L.(1967)The Long Long War : The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. London: Cassell., p.3 59 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 59
  60. 60. Situation in Vietnam from a US perspective End goal never clear - Were the French genuine in devolving power back to the Vietnamese post WWII? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.118 60 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 60 Nagl talks of French making empty promises
  61. 61. Vietnam from... “I consider it a Questions of credibility from the beginning - victory, we took the General Paul Harkins - 1st Commander of the objective” - Gen. Military Assistance Command (MAC-V) - Harkin in Ap Bac Known to be liberal with the truth debacle Admiral Harry Felt - CINC-PAC - Overly optimistic Killing the messenger - Lt. Col. John Paul Vann Col. Daniel Porter Brig. Gen. Robert York Honest review of Ap Bac battlefield debacle dismissed by Harkin York was not inside the chain of command at MAC- V. Lack of authority may have led to York’s inability to create an institutional consensus that change was needed ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.134 61 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 61

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