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Leadership in Counter-Terrorism - Dichotomy or Congruence

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Abstract:
A large number of world's political leaders have at one time or other were baptised through the fires of militancy. Others, who opposed the militants have also appeared in the political battlements. Comparing the leadership strategies, tactics and styles employed by these leaders to conventional leadership thoughts gives us patterns to learn and emulate. In a course covering 300 slides, this presentation goes through the gamut of militancy, terrorism, counter-terrorism, communication, leadership and lessons we can learn from the past to meet today's global challenges.

JEL Classifications: A10, D20, D40, D70, D90, E20, L10, L80, M10, M31, P13 L00, M1, M12, M14, D70, D74, D78, D79, L14, M1

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  • 1. Leadership in Counter- Terrorism Dichotomy or Congruence A course prepared for the Institute of Defense Studies (IDSS), Nanyang University, Singapore, 1st Digitally signed by ARUNA KULATUNGA Q. 2008 ARUNA DN: cn=ARUNA KULATUNGA, o=Comunicamos.eu, ou=AD, email=aruna@mac.com, c=ES By KULATUNGA Reason: I attest to the accuracy and integrity of this document Location: Murcia, Spain Aruna Kulatunga, MBA, MHRM (Monash University) Date: 2008.06.24 19:01:52 +02'00' Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Senior Consultant - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.Eu www.comunicamos.eu Tuesday, 24 June 2008 1 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
  • 2. Course Outline 11:00 - 9:00 - 10:45 10:45-11:00 12:30-13:30 13:30-15:15 15:15-15:30 15:30-17:00 17:00-17:15 12:30 Course Lessons Introduction Lessons Concepts Day Coffee Lunch from the Coffee Day's / Setting from the of 1 Break Break past. Break Discussion Outcomes, past leadership Cont. expectations Leadershi p Styles / Negotiati Benchma on and rking Communi cation profiling Change Bringing it Management Applying together - Day / Coffee Lunch Breakout Coffee Day's the Reinforcing 2 Communicat Break Break Activity Break Discussion lessons the ion & outcomes Negotiation Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 2 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 2 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150865
  • 3. Introduction World Country Principles Ideas Beliefs The Threat Signal The threat level: its directed at you! Religion Family You The why’s of gathering knowledge Concepts of COIN, CT & linking with leadership Lessons from the past - lessons for the future What we take back - practical tool sets for achieving self-efficacy in leadership Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 3 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 3
  • 4. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations Benchmarking best practices in CT How to relate the BM’s to leadership traits, theories and knowledge Difference between tactics & strategy The leader & manager - a necessary dichotomy The essence of leadership - Managing Change Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 4 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 4
  • 5. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 5 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 5
  • 6. Unit delivery From 11:00 - 12:30 Looking at history, learning from the past People, incidents, tactics & strategies Malaya, Kenya & Vietnam, Successes and failures Eating Soup with a Knife... Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 6 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 6
  • 7. Leadership profiles Lawrence of Arabia Chairman Mao Ernesto Guevara Gerald Templer David Galula Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 7 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 7
  • 8. Unit delivery From 13:30 - 15:15 - Breakout Activity Strategies and personalities - Lessons from the past continued... Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 8 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 8
  • 9. Unit delivery From 15:30 - 17:00 Concepts of Leadership Theories and Styles The Unexpected Leader The Johari window The three lenses of leadership Who moved my cheese? Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu The Flight of the Buffalo 9 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 9
  • 10. Unit delivery Day 2 - 09:00-10:45 The difference between management and leadership: legitimate power and control vs. empowerment and change - Jooste.K (2004) What is Change? Theories of Change Management The two legs of Change - Communication & Negotiation Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ More on empowerment... www.comunicamos.eu 10 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 10
  • 11. Unit delivery Day 2 - 11:00 - 12:30 Taking a look back at Day One’s lessons from the past Can we apply what we know in Day Two, from concepts of leadership, change management, communication and negotiations, to these “incidents from the past”? What toolkits do we need to apply our theories into practical realities? Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Can we benchmark and identify best www.comunicamos.eu practices in contextual leadership? 11 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 11
  • 12. Unit delivery Day 2 - 13:30 - 15-15 Realigning ourselves - lets take some quizzes - what’s my leadership style & how well do I communicate Lessons on feedback Double loop learning A short introduction to knowledge management and its importance to leaders Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ Group activity - !to be decided! www.comunicamos.eu 12 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 12
  • 13. Unit delivery Day 2 - 15:30 - 17:00 Reinforcing the outcomes from group activities Bringing it together - Organizations must rely on the knowledge, skills, experience and judgement of all its people..not a select handful... Leadership is an enabler - not a barrier Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 13 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 13
  • 14. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Take away a Toolkit for Leaders Change Management Communication Negotiation Concepts of permeability Access, Trust, Confidentiality, Consistency, Continuity Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 14 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 14
  • 15. Introduction Setting the outcomes & expectations con-td. Participation..Participation...Participati on Respect to all No disturbances - mobile phones must be off! Questions and queries at any time Enlightened debate & contribution Aruna Kulatunga (aruna@mtaconsult.com) @ www.comunicamos.eu 15 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 15
  • 16. Lessons from the past Session II (11:00 - 12:30) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 16
  • 17. BBC Documentary 10 minutes 17 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 17
  • 18. History of Guerilla warfare Diminutive form of the Spanish word for war “Guerra” Derived from Spanish partidas actions against French in 1808-14 First documented guerilla activity in a Hittite parchment, 15 Century B.C. Mao Tse Tung’s writings not much different to Sun Tzu’s “Art of War” first written in 400 BC Continuous evidence of guerilla warfare through out history Terrorism - a form of guerilla warfare with actions targeting civilian life and property ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.1 18 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 18
  • 19. History of Guerilla warfare... All guerilla actions, insurgency, terrorism, small wars, urban revolutions, have one constant, a single thread, through out history A degree of support from some sections of the population who was willing to provide the combatant refuge in time of need, provisions and succor information Johannes Most Considered a pioneer of both modern urban revolution and international terrorism - Published a work on the systematic use of terror by small groups of activists utilizing the most modern technology available in 1884 (Beckett.p.15) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.1 19 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 19
  • 20. Thomas Edward Lawrence Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base. Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically sophisticated enemy. Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July. interlocking fortified posts. Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement. Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical independence. Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and signals vulnerabilities. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34. 20 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 20
  • 21. T.E. Lawrence... Personal credibility and role remains controversial Propaganda Does not desist from original guerilla theory “the greatest espoused by Lawrence weapon in the armory of a Perceived the importance of popular support with modern 2% active support could achieve victory given the commander” remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized Defined command as a function of - Algebraic - biological - psychological (motivation, morale) impetus Followers include Mao Wingate ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20 21 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 21
  • 22. Orde Wingate... Helped to train the Haganah Enlisted Haganah help to run clandestine attack groups to protect oil pipeline from Iraq to Port of Haifa The Gideon Force Chindits ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47 22 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 22
  • 23. Mao Tse Tung... “The richest source of power to Born in Hunan Province wage war lies in the Son of a farmer who provided the son with a masses of high school education people” After a series of defeats relating to attacks on Nationalists held cities, Mao changes direction from an urban proletariat led revolution to rural peasant led insurgency in 1930. Shift in emphasis termed the “single most vital decision” in the history of the CCP. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20 23 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 23 Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
  • 24. Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks Rules All actions are subject to “The Unity of command Spirit” Do not steal from the people between Be neither selfish or unjust the troops Remarks and the Replace the door when you leave people the house Roll up the bedding on which you have slept Be courteous Be honest in your transactions Return what you borrow Replace what you break Do not bathe in the presence of women Do not without authority search those you arrest ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22 24 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 24
  • 25. The fish swimming in the water... “To gain territory is no cause for joy and to lose territory is no cause for sorrow. To lose territory or cities is of no importance. Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the The important thing people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the is to think up ways of water” destroying the enemy” (Becket, 2005, p.73) While the fish can be killed by polluting the water, this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson Trading space for time, first enumerated by Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina “Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28 25 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 25
  • 26. Ho Chi Minh... Nguyen Tat Thanh - (Ho Chi Minh) Wrote a chapter on guerilla warfare in a 1928 soviet guide to insurrection. http://encarta.msn.com/media_461526436_761558397_-1_1/Ho_Chi_Minh.html (It was the only chapter on guerilla warfare) Controversial...but no dispute of his influence over the 20th century world events ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. , p.60 26 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 26
  • 27. Viet Minh vs the French... Widespread and systematic use of terror by VM Elimination of old administrative structures killing village elders and officials in guerilla zones LTTE in Sri Lanka eliminated nearly 70% of elders, some of whom nurtured the LTTE in its early days Repeated indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.50 27 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 27
  • 28. COIN in early USSR... Mikhail Tukhachevsky Executed later by Stalin, considered by some to be a father of modern COIN Stressed the need to take account local values and culture Emphasized on single point of control over all aspects of the COIN response Suggested pseudo-gangs BUT, also was in favor of gulags, large scale evictions, assumption of collective guilt and collective punishments ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.50 28 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 28
  • 29. Mistaken identities.. “True power of Antoine Henry Jomini the armies rest in the Prescribed annihilation of the enemy people and force as best route to achieve victory their Destruction of the enemy force on governmen the field t” Carl Von Clausewitz Victory is when the political objectives on which the war is being fought are accomplished ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.18 29 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 29 In most small wars and insurgencies, the Clausewitz principle has stood in favour of the insurgents, a point to remember. Mau Mau is a classic example. Kenyatta - Kenya Nagl states one person who leveraged Clausewitz was Mao Tse - Tung
  • 30. Tache d'huile - Stain of oil Concept developed first by Thomas Bugeaud in French Algeria in 1840 Refined further by other Frenchmen in 1890 and in 1912 Extending French control more effectively through a dual military - political strategy Solider - administrators with a dual role Systematically spreading influence Conquest not by mighty blows, but as patch of oil spreads Reassuring local leaders France will uphold traditional authority Soldiers acting as administrators, farmers, teachers, workshop managers... Aim of assimilation rather than subjugation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.40-41 30 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 30
  • 31. 31 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 31
  • 32. David Galula - a personal war... “ Outwardly treat every civlian as a friend; inwardly Commanded troops for two years in Kabliya, East of consider him a rebel Algiers till you have proof to the contrary” First hand experience serving as military attaché in China at the beginning of Mao’s government and subsequently in Hong Kong, observing Huk insurgency in the Philippines, the Malayan emergency and French efforts to maintain its empire in Indochina Need for doctrine - (disputed by Kitson and Nagl) Recognition of FNL urban terrorist strategy as ’s driven by force multiplication efforts of propaganda - more effect in the cities ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii) 32 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 32
  • 33. David Galula - a personal war... Imperative of not alienating the local population Emphasis on policing rather than military tactics to defeat insurrection Fallacy of a decapitation strategy Propaganda, propaganda, propaganda ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., (From Bruce Hoffmanʼs foreward to the new edition (2006) p v-vii) 33 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 33
  • 34. The Philippines - 1898 Spanish American War USA’s most successful instance of counterinsurgency theory and practice In addition to military measures Propaganda Cash Bounties for surrendered weapons Comprehensive public works program Military measures included the imprisonment, deportation and “defeating” insurgents who maintained antagonism against the ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.46 34 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 34
  • 35. British in Malaya... Background... ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 35 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 35
  • 36. Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs Unusual grasp of the political nature of insurgency and of measures required to defeat it. “In the early days we didn't grasp how Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis.P. 56 important the support of the local people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that we understood that the CTs got all of their support - food, supplies, intelligence - from the local people” - a veteran of the Malaya emergency. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71 36 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 36
  • 37. Harold Briggs... Promoted cooperation between military, police and civil arms of the government Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom, pervading across all hierarchies through a system of integrated committees - Solving the problem of pulling in opposite directions Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small- scale operations Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56 37 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 37
  • 38. Harold Briggs... Flexibility of operations in the jungle - key note Battalion commanders being reconciled to devolve leadership to where it matters, NCO’s taking responsibility to make decisions on the spot “New Villages” stopped the fish from moving in the water and when the CT came into replenish his supplies, he ran the risk of being caught in the shallows! ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74 38 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 38
  • 39. Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya Traveling light and knowing the land; the coming of the Ferrets The Jungle war fare school in the old asylum...Determined personal leadership...pushing the boundaries of hierachy “For training only” Flame throwing cartridges - using available resources ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 68-70 39 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 39 Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric? Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
  • 40. Walter Walker... Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly oriented towards positive change - Walker not an isolated case) Walker’s superiors were generally available but not quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the open top transport lorries Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling over the results ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 79-80 40 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 40
  • 41. Walter Walker... “It is ..(because) of this handbook...we got militant Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions - communism in Malaya Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in operations by the throat” - Templer (Nagl. p.98) Operational innovations through learning from the CTs - crossing streams walking backwards - Purposefully leaving footprints (Practices later abandoned in COIN operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt quickly to identify false trails by weight patterns) Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti- terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Jungle School ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97 41 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 41
  • 42. Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial Secretary “You cannot win the war without the help of the population and you cannot get the “Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a support of the military task” population without at least beginning to win Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- the war” propaganda starting from the school- “Children coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some day be entrusted with self- government within the British commonwealth” Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer: - “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self- governing nation” (p. 88) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 76-77 42 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 42 Converting Prabhakaranʼs children UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony, http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
  • 43. Gerald Templer... Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood, merging the British objective with that of the local population. Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence in the bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was assassinated just days before on arrival in Malaya Corbet, 1986, p57-59 Cuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants in the decision making process “The Malayan people Starts at the bottom - first things first - make political can count on the progress at local level powerful and continuing assistance Involves local leadership in taking responsibility for of His Majesty’s directing the war effort government not only Listens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior in the immediate task officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs. of defeating the terrorists, but in the Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly longer term objective ©Aruna forging a United Comunicamos.eu of Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Malayan nation” NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 88-89 43 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 43 discourse of war symbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc. Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who provided the information
  • 44. Templer’s six laws... Get the priorities right Get the instructions right Get the organization right Get the right people into the organization Get the right spirit into the people Leave them to get on with it Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch to collect and collate Dividing responsibility efficiently Energized the situation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 90-91 44 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 44 Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
  • 45. Gerald Templer... Entrusting responsibility to junior officers and backing them up with personal authority Unconventional behavior - Issuing orders from the bathtub (Orde Wingate was also known for his eccentric bath routines...) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 95-96 45 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 45 Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
  • 46. Gerald Templer... “Military Force cannot change opinion, it can only Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized and create a framework in carried out throughout in an identical pattern which economic Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into reform and good surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were no government can take other options effect” Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we want them to handle weapons and lay ambushes”- (Negative impact in today’s warfare - untrained and undisciplined units - operational nightmares) Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social, political, economical, civilian - police and military ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98 -100 46 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 46
  • 47. Gerald Templer... Effective Feedback Loops in place.. Giving time to “Belly ache” Subordinates offered substantiated criticism Suggestions incorporated The final version is owned by all, but had the personal authority of Templer Never being afraid of bad news ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 104 47 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 47
  • 48. Hugh Green... Providing a credible alternative - Cash rewards and rehabilitation for surrenders Persuading the people that the government is capable of providing essential services and defeating the CTs. Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93 48 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 48 Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
  • 49. British in Malaya... Spirit of Innovation No single doctrine - Freedom, and Wingate - Gideon Force, Chingits the necessity to create own answers Calvert -Malayan Scouts Recognition that situations differ and Walker-Ferrets are dynamic There is no right answer to all the questions Recognition that there is little assistance from the center Therefore, the need to adopt, make do ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 194-195 49 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 49
  • 50. British in Malaya... Implement locally Feedback Loops Monitor effectiveness Open to suggestions from below Innovate Change if necessary Getting the decision making authority to allow innovation, monitor effectiveness, transmit new ideas with requirements that it be followed throughout the organization Transmit globally Monitor continously Organization is not global Can be divisional Rarely more than country No risks to social standing of superior officer to accept suggestion from junior British organization culture, club, old school, etc, helps ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 195 50 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 50
  • 51. Implement locally Monitor effectiveness Innovate Change if necessary Transmit globally Monitor continously 51 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 51
  • 52. British in Malaya... “The solution (to the Malaya Strategic and shared vision Emergency) ...is in the hands of all of us, the Briggs peoples of Malaya and the governments Putting the campaign in proper perspective which serve them” - Templer (Nagl p.197) Military component vis-à-vis political and economic components Templer / Lytellton Continued to put into effect the Briggs plan Shared vision Templer insisting all subordinates share the vision ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 195-196 52 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 52
  • 53. British in Malaya... Use of strict doctrine discouraged Each theater is different and needs its own policy Shaping the respond to local and immediate need Experience teaches what works and what does not Doctrine is only as basis for training and equipping Training to be up to date, effective and extremely flexible- Troops informed immediately of changes in training ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 204 53 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 53
  • 54. British in Malaya... Difference between Westmoreland and Templer Templer makes Walter Walker write a field manual based on local experiences and tactics used Westmoreland requests doctrine from Washington ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.210 54 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 54
  • 55. Thompson’s Five principles of counterinsurgency The government must have a clear political aim; to establish and maintain a free, independent and united country which is politically and economically stable and viable. The government must function in accordance with the law The government must have an overall plan The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerilla In the guerilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its base areas first ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.29 55 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 55 Nagl states that what will determine the final outcome of COIN theory and practice is whether or not the national objective has been attained. Taking Thompsonʼs first principle as the ultimate national objective, how many governments has been successful in applying COIN theory? Thompson served in Malaya and Kenya, and is senior to Kitson
  • 56. Fighting for the right reasons? Clausewitz - War must always be subordinate to the political goals for which it is being fought Analyze current conflicts based on this percept ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.31 56 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 56 Iraq - Afghanistan Indonesia Eastern Timor
  • 57. Intellectual Soldiers... “The Defence of Duffer’s Drift” by Maj. Gen. Ernest Swinton An intellectual soldier in an un- intellectual organization The importance of thinking, reading, writing and learning based on your own experiences and passing it down to the future generations. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.37 57 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 57 Link it with learning organisation
  • 58. Did the British fail in Ireland... Lack of good police intelligence - which is at the heart of counterinsurgency and; The nonexistence, from the government side, of an “hearts & minds” exercise, which the IRA was abundantly involved in ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.40 58 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 58
  • 59. 250 Years of Learning... John Adams (c.1818) - The Revolution was in the Hearts and Minds of the people Gerald Templar (c.1950) - The answer lies not in pouring more troops to the jungle, but in hearts and minds of the people Marqués de Santa Cruz (Spain c. 1724-30) - Cautioned against trying to alter the traditions and customs of people under occupation, recommending amnesties granted soon after ceasing hostilities (Becket, 2005, p.26) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Clutterbuck, Richard L.(1967)The Long Long War : The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. London: Cassell., p.3 59 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 59
  • 60. Situation in Vietnam from a US perspective End goal never clear - Were the French genuine in devolving power back to the Vietnamese post WWII? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.118 60 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 60 Nagl talks of French making empty promises
  • 61. Vietnam from... “I consider it a Questions of credibility from the beginning - victory, we took the General Paul Harkins - 1st Commander of the objective” - Gen. Military Assistance Command (MAC-V) - Harkin in Ap Bac Known to be liberal with the truth debacle Admiral Harry Felt - CINC-PAC - Overly optimistic Killing the messenger - Lt. Col. John Paul Vann Col. Daniel Porter Brig. Gen. Robert York Honest review of Ap Bac battlefield debacle dismissed by Harkin York was not inside the chain of command at MAC- V. Lack of authority may have led to York’s inability to create an institutional consensus that change was needed ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.134 61 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 61
  • 62. Vietnam from ... Westmoreland vs Lew Walt - Marine Corps Combined action platoons (CAPS) program focussed on village- based pacification “The only successful American project of any kind whatsoever in Vietnam” - Journalist William Lederer Utilized the “oil spot” concept Too little CAPS, too late! ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 156-157 62 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 62
  • 63. Vietnam from... A change in perspective “Strategy begins where politics ends” 1936 Staff Manual “In this era, a soldier fights alongside the statesman to maintain the peace” 1985 Staff Manual ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 201 63 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 63
  • 64. Vietnam from.. If you only have a hammer to use, all problems will begin to look like nails.... Using firepower - seeing all wars as military problems No use for a political - military - economic screw driver ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 203 64 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 64
  • 65. Robert Comer... “It wasn’t tried seriously until too late...” Komer on CORDS Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development “Everything ran its own Support (CORDS) - 1967-71 compartment. ...Vietnam Vigorous Interventions ( The Blow was a tragedy of Torch) bureaucratic inability to Creative Bureaucratic infighting adapt to unconventional Had access to the President - by situations” Komer, (Nagl p.180) passing command Key to the war was local security Pulling together all military and civilian pacification programs under one command - shades of Briggs and Templer Encouraged innovation from its personnel - Phoenix programme (p.166) to destroy VC infrastructure Inflexible, Compartmentalized, not permeable Westmoreland screened by his his staff, bad news prevented from reaching the top (Nagl p.180) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p. 164-166 65 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 65
  • 66. Nagl’s main conclusion “Building learning organizations entails profound It is the organizational culture of the cultural shifts” - military institution that determines Peter M. Senge whether innovation succeeds or fails Holds true for any organization ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 66 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 66
  • 67. Mau Mau in Kenya... Major disparities in land distribution and income between white settlers and indigenous Africans Kenya African Union Jomo Kenyata’s National Front Mau Mau Corbet, 1986, p.59 Made up of Kikuyu tribesmen, majority in KAU Command structure not effective - But bound by secret oath and superstition Estimated one million tribesmen taken oath Brains of the movement in Nairobi, not in rural areas ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.59 67 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 67
  • 68. Mau Mau in Kenya... Use of “turned” informers and systematic cordon and search (Operation Anvil) breaks urban and rural links and MM cell structures Superior intelligence as a result of Anvil Program of “Villagisation” , but not as successful as in Malaya Extensive use of pseudo gangs result in arrest of Dedan Kimathi, Execution of Kimathi signals end of emergency Kenya gains independence and Jomo Kenyatta becomes first leader of independent Kenya Bronze statue of Kimathi erected by Kenyan government in Nairobi in December 2006 (Mwai, 2006) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.59 Mwai, Elizabeth. "Headlines | Government to put up Kimathi statue." TheStandard online 12Dec2006. 27 Mar. 2007 <http:// eastandard.net/hm_news/news.php?articleid=1143962407>. 68 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 68
  • 69. Mau Mau in Kenya Pseudo gangs comes in for criticism Use of indiscriminate force Final resolution came through strengthening hands of local leaders and accelerating political, economic and social reform As in Malaya, where CTs did not receive outside help, Mau Mau insurrection limited to Kenya, making the British job easier ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.65 McGhie, John. "British brutality in Mau Mau conflict | The Guardian | Guardian Unlimited." British Brutality in Mau Mau conflict Internet 9NOV2002. 27 Mar. 2007 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,3604,836653,00.html>. 69 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 69 Smith, Graham. "Blind Eye to the Butcher (Torture in Bahrain) - Google Video." Carlton ITV 1, Special Report on the Butcher of Bahrain 2002. 27 Mar. 2007 <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=8207296200885546643>.
  • 70. Pseudo Gangs... Desertion of Algeria’s Force Z to FNL 200 pseudo gang members cross over with weapons Freds in Ireland Operating under Military Reconnaissance Force (Hoffman & Taw, 1992, P.98) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Galula, David. Pacification in Algeria :1956–1958. Santa Monica: Rand, 2006., p.97 Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992. 70 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 70
  • 71. Pseudo Gangs... Using turned terrorists Turning through carrot and stick approach Not as successful as the hooded informants in Kenya Some became double agents, while others executed by IRA Kitson’s laundry, set up to spot telltale signs of blood or explosives, blown by a Fred, killing the soldier-driver of the laundry delivery van and nearly costing the lives of the other “laundry” workers (Hoffman & Taw, 1992, p.108) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992. 71 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 71
  • 72. Revolution in warfare Napolean’s Nation in Arms Mao’s Armed Nation AQ - 1.2 Billion Strong Muslim Ummah (Nation) that transcends state and ethnic boundaries (See Ramakrishna, Kumar. "Countering the New Terrorism of Al Qaeda without Generating Civilizational Conflict: The Need for an Indirect Strategy." The New Terrorism - Anatomy, Trends and Counter Strategies. Eds. Andrew Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2002. 254.) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.27 72 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 72
  • 73. New Lessons from Iraq water - Separating the fish from the Enemy can be defeated only if his name and address, and of his extended family, is known Dynamically adjusting to changing situations - Intelligence staff analyzing HumInt, trained for artillery range Creating Link Diagrams - depicting who talks with whom - Shades of the Algerian war Localized intelligence - collected and processed on- the-spot, not relying on Washington as in Vietnam war Developing Long term relationships and cultural awareness ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.XIII 73 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 73
  • 74. Why you need awar mustache to win a Capt. Travis Patriquin's powerpoint presentation Provide lucid, easy to understand, basis for action ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Raddatz, Martha. "Army Captain's Simple Demonstration: How to Win in Iraq". 2006. ABC News International. (15 Dec. 2006). 20 March 2007. <http:// abcnews.go.com/International/story?id=2729584>. 74 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 74
  • 75. 75 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 75
  • 76. Dedicated and reliable local partnerships The ultimate objective in achieving the final goal in Iraq. Achieved in Malaysia Not in Vietnam other than isolated Marine Corps operations that were called off by high command ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.xiv 76 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 76
  • 77. A Day When Other Side - Showed Mahdi Army Its Militia Seen as Heroic in Aiding Bomb Victims Terror Fighters or the local government? Take the initiative out of the established government Provide essential services and a sense of immediate security to the people ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Raghavan, Sudarsan. "A Day When Mahdi Army Showed Its Other Side - Militia Seen as Heroic in Aiding Bomb Victims". 2006. (27 Nov. 2006): Washington Post. 20 Mar. 2007 2007. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/11/26/AR2006112601242.html? nav=hcmodule> 77 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 77
  • 78. Wars of attrition Playing chess Has poor record of success while enemy is playing Pouring in Men, Money and Material poker... is an escalating and indiscriminate use of firepower - results in upward spiral of civilian alienation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.27 78 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 78
  • 79. Hoffman and Taw... Examined COIN/CT operations in Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus, Rhodesia, N.Ireland, W.Germany and Italy Uses Julian Paget’s taxonomy Paget examined 32 campaigns in colonial countries - Paget, Julian. Counterinsurgency Campaigning. London: Faber and Faber, 1967 Four elements that augment COIN/CT operations Effective overall command and coordination structure Confidence building measures and anti-terro legislation to weaken support for Terrorists and strengthening public support for the government Coordination within and between intelligence services Foreign collaboration amongst governments and security forces ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 79 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 79 Hoffman, Bruce. Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq. Santa Monica: Rand, 2004 June. - Netwar - changing constituencies in COIN/CT - Nebulous organisation, no identifiable leadership or unifying ideology (except for anti-western sentiment?) - Represents new form of warfare “for a new, networked century” - Imperative to be a learning organization, agile, flexible and change oriented to proactively and dynamically engage the “new enemy”
  • 80. 80 ©Aruna Kulatunga Hoffman, Bruce, and Jennifer Morrison Taw. A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Insurgency. Santa Monica: Rand, 1992 p.119 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 80
  • 81. Hoffman and Taw... Netwar - changing constituencies in COIN/CT Nebulous organization, no identifiable leadership or unifying ideology (except for anti-western sentiment?) Represents new form of warfare “for a new, networked century” Imperative to be a learning organization, agile, flexible and change oriented to proactively and dynamically engage the “new enemy” ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 81 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 81
  • 82. The importance of being a learning organisation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 82 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 82
  • 83. A succession of small wars... Second Anglo-Boer War (United Kingdom [U.K.]vs. Boer separatists, 1899-1902).Philippine Insurrection (United States [U.S.] vs. Filipino nationalists, 1899-1902 [1916])Arab Revolt (Ottoman Turkey vs. Arab rebels, 1916-1918). Iraq 1920 (U.K. vs. Iraqi rebels, 1920) China (Nationalist Party [KMT] vs. Communists, 1922-1949). Nicaraguan Intervention (U.S. and Government of Nicaragua [GoN] vs. Sandinistas, 1925-1932). France, World War II (Germany vs. French resistance and Special Operations Executive [SOE]/Office of Strategic Services [OSS], 1940-1945).Balkans, World War II (Germany vs. Tito’s partisans and SOE/OSS, 1940-1945). Greek Civil War (U.K., then U.S. and Government of Greece [GoG], vs. National Liberation Army [ELAS], 1944-1949). Indonesian Revolt (Netherlands vs. Indonesian rebels, 1945-1949). French Indochina (France vs. Viet Minh, 1945-1954). Palestine (U.K. vs. Jewish separatists, 1945-1948). Hukbalahap Rebellion (Philippine Islands [P.I.] vs. Hukbalahap, 1946-1954). Malayan Emergency (U.K. vs. Malayan Communist Party [MPC]/ Malayan Races Liberation Army [MRLA],1948-1960). Kenyan Emergency (U.K. vs. Mau Mau, 1952-1956). Algerian Revolt (France vs. National Liberation Front[FLN], 1954-1962). Cyprus (U.K. vs. Ethniki Organosis Kyprios Agoniston[EOKA] (a Greek terrorist organization), 1954-1959). Aden (U.K. and Aden vs. Yemeni insurgents, 1955-1967). Cuban Revolution (Cuba’s Batista regime vs. Castro,1956-1959). France (France vs. Secret Army Organization [OAS],1958-1962). Venezuela (Venezuela vs. urban-based Armed Forces for National Liberation [FALN], 1958-1963). Vietnam War (U.S. and Government of Vietnam[GoVN] vs. National Liberation Front [NLF] and Democratic People’s Republic of Vietnam [DPRVN],1958-1975). Guatemalan Civil War (Guatemala vs. Marxist rebels,1961-1996). Angola (Portugal vs. Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola [MPLA], 1961-1974). Guinea-Bissau (Portugal vs. Marxist rebels, 1963-1974). Uruguay (Uruguay vs. Tupamaros, 1963-1972). Mozambique (Portugal vs. Front for the Liberation of Mozambique [FRELIMO], 1964-1974).Colombian Civil War (U.S. and Government of Colombia [GoC] vs. Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia [FARC] and National Liberation Army[ELN], 1964-present). Northern Ireland (U.K. vs. Irish Republican Army [IRA],1968-present). Weather Underground (WU) (U.S. vs. Students for a Democratic Society [SDS]/WU, Black Panthers, Symbionese Liberation Army [SLA] et al., 1968-1980). Spain (Spain vs. Basque Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna [ETA](Basque fatherland and liberty), 1968-present). Oman (U.K. and Oman vs. Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf [PFLOAG],1969-1976). Germany (Germany vs. Baader-Meinhof Red Army Faction [RAF], 1970-1992). Philippines (P vs. New People’s Army .I. [NPA] and Moro National Liberation Front [MNLF]/Moro Islamic Liberation Front [MILF], 1970-present). Sri Lanka (Sri Lanka vs. Tamil New Tigers [TNT],1972-present). Palestine (Israel vs. Palestine Liberation Front [PLF]et al., 1973-present). Rhodesia (Rhodesia vs. Zimbabwe African People’s Union [ZAPU] and Zimbabwe African National Union[ZANU], 1974-1980). Western Sahara (Morocco vs. Western Sahara Freedom Movement [POLISARIO], 1975-1991). Soviet- Afghan War (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics[USSR] and Government of Afghanistan [GoA] vs. Mujahideen, 1979-1988). Salvadoran Civil War (U.S. and Government of El Salvador [GoES] vs. Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front [FMLN], 1979-1991). Senderista Insurgency (Peru vs. Sendero Luminoso, 1980-1995; vs. Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement [MRTA], 1996-1997). Nicaragua (Frente Sandinista Deliberacion Nacional[FSLN] vs. National Guard [GN]/Contras, 1980-1990). Kashmir (India vs. Kashmiri Muslim separatists,1988-present). Algeria (Algeria/National Liberation Front [FLN] vs. Islamic Salvation Front [FIS]/Armed Islamic Group[GIA], 1992-present). Somalia Humanitarian Relief Mission (U.S. and UNvs. armed factions, 1992-1994). Chechnya (Russia vs. Chechen separatists, 1994-present). Nepal (Nepal vs. Maoists, 1996-present). Afghanistan (U.S. and GoA vs. Taliban, 2001-present). Iraq (Government of Iraq [GoI] and U.S.-led coalition vs. jihadists and insurgents, 2003-present). ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.8 83 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 83
  • 84. Sepp - Best practices in CT... Successful Operational Practices Adherence to Human Rights Law enforcement Honest, trained police able to gather first-rate intelligence supported by uncorrupted Judiciary Population Control Political process to engage root causes Counterinsurgent warfare Securing Borders ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5. 84 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 84
  • 85. Sepp - Best practices in CT... Emphasis on intelligence. Focus on population, their needs, and security. Secure areas established, expanded. Insurgents isolated from population (population control). Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader). Effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) campaigns. Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents. Police in lead; military supporting. Police force expanded, diversified. Conventional military forces reoriented for counterinsurgency. Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous forces. Insurgent sanctuaries denied ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.10 85 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 85
  • 86. Sepp - Best Practices in CT... Unsuccessful CT Practices Primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency. Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not on engaging population. Battalion-size operations as the norm. Military units concentrated on large bases for protection. Special Forces focused on raiding. Adviser effort a low priority in personnel assignment. Building, training indigenous army in image of U.S. Army. Peacetime government processes. Open borders, airspace, coastlines. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Sepp, Kalev I. "Best Practices in Counterinsurgency." Military Review May-June (2005): 5., p.10 86 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 86
  • 87. Trait Theories Traits Theories of Leadership consider Leadership Traits: personality, social, Extraversion physical, or Conscientiousness Openness intellectual traits Emotional to differentiate Intelligence leaders from non- (qualified) leaders. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 87 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 87
  • 88. Trait Theories Limitations: No universal traits found that predict leadership in all situations. Unclear evidence of the cause and effect of relationship of leadership and traits. Better predictor of the appearance of leadership than distinguishing effective and ineffective leaders. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 88 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 88
  • 89. Behavioral Theories Behavioral Theories of Leadership Theories proposing that specific behaviors differentiate leaders from non-leaders. Behavioral theory: Leadership behaviors can be taught. Vs. Trait theory: Leaders are born, not made. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 89 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 89
  • 90. Behavioral Approach Ohio State Studies/U. of Michigan Initiating Structure/Production Orientation Consideration/Employee Orientation Assumption: Leaders can be trained Goal: Develop leaders Problem: Effective behaviors do not generalize across situations ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 90 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 90
  • 91. University of Michigan Studies Employee-Oriented Leader Emphasizing interpersonal relations; taking a personal interest in the needs of employees and accepting individual differences among members. Production-Oriented Leader One who emphasizes technical or task aspects of the job. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 91 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 91
  • 92. Path-Goal Theory Premise Leader must help followers attaining goals and reduce roadblocks to success Leaders must change behaviors to fit the situation (environmental contingencies & subordinate contingencies) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 92 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 92
  • 93. The Path-Goal Theory ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 93 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 93
  • 94. Leader-Participation Model Premise: Rule based decision tree to guide leaders about when and when not to include subordinate participation in decision making Considers 12 contingency variables to consider whether or not to include subordinates in decision making ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 94 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 94
  • 95. Leader-Participation Model Importance of the decision Importance of obtaining follower commitment to the decision Whether the leader has sufficient information to make a good decision How well structured the problem is Whether an autocratic decision would receive follower commitment Whether followers “buy into” the organization’s goals Whether there is likely to be conflict ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 95 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 95
  • 96. Transformational and Transactional Leadership (Bass and Avolio, 1990, Transformational Leadership: Idealized attributes - encourages follower trust Idealized behaviors - sharing a common vision Inspirational motivation - inspiring a vision Intellectual stimulation - questions status quo Individualized consideration - coaching, mentoring ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 96 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 96
  • 97. Transformational and Transactional Leadership Transactional Leadership: Contingent Reward - reward for meeting expectations Management by Exception (Active) - focuses on mistakes and exceptions Management by Exception (Passive) - only takes action when things go wrong Non-Leadership: Laissez-faire - avoidance of responsibility ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 97 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 97
  • 98. What is the best leadership style? The one which works for the individual leader in a specific time and in a specific environment ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 98 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 98
  • 99. Leadership Some are born great, some achieve greatness, and some have greatness thrust upon them. Malvolio, Twelfth Night, Act 11, Scene V William Shakespeare ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 99 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 99
  • 100. Leadership Lead, follow, or get out of the way Plaque on Ted Turner’s desk ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 100 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 100
  • 101. Leadership Primus inter pares (First among equals) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 101 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 101
  • 102. Management Creates consistent and orderly results. Helps an organization run efficiently, on-time and on-budget Planning and Budgeting Establish detailed steps and timetables for achieving specific results Organizing and Staffing Creating the structure of jobs needed to implement the plan Controlling Monitoring results, spotting deviations and making corrections ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 102 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 102
  • 103. Leadership Creates change, often dramatic change & helps the organization adapt to the changing environment. Direction Setting Creates a vision of the future for a product, activity or organization Aligns People & Systems Communicates the vision and strategies through words & deeds so that relevant people understand and accept direction Motivates and Inspires Energizing individuals so that they achieve the vision despite bureaucratic constraints ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 103 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 103
  • 104. 10 Commandments for Successful Leaders A sound ethical compass Ability to make unpleasant decision Clarity and focus Ambition Effective communication skills Ability to identify the right work role for people A knack for developing talent Emotional self-confidence Adaptability Charm ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) The Economist. (2003). Higher Education Special Report, The Australian, 12 November, 6-7. 104 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 104
  • 105. Who is a leader... MANAGERS: Plan and Control LEADERS: Inspire and Motivate “The very essence of leadership is that you have to have a vision.” Theodore Hesburgh “..is the art of getting someone else to do what you want done because he (or she) wants to do it.” Dwight Eisenhower “Effective leadership is putting first things first. Effective management is discipline, carrying it out.” Stephen Covey “Leadership, like swimming, cannot be learned by reading about it.” Henry Mintzberg “.. effective leadership is not about making speeches or being liked; leadership is defined by results not attributes.” Peter Drucker “.. The function of leadership is to produce more leaders not followers.” Ralph Nader ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 105 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 105
  • 106. Influences on leadership mythology culture religion family of origin readings media education observations role models ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 106 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 106
  • 107. Reflections Tao a paradox:by being selfless, the leader enhances self leads from behind mentors & develops others focuses on the benefit of all role is to become redundant wise leader (spiritual ) Tao means how ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 107 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 107
  • 108. Reflections Machiavelli focus on self-interest the end justifies the means the goal is everything appearance is useful dishonesty is acceptable the ultimate pragmatist ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 108 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 108
  • 109. Reflections Aristotle focus on equity and justice all citizens should take their turn in governing & being governed how - the old & the young values being “honourable” disturbed by the lack of virtue from those who want to be leaders ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 109 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 109
  • 110. Reflections Plato the ideal leader of the ideal State - the philosopher king values intellect and wisdom leaders should be selected & educated anti-democratic, authoritarian philosopher ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 110 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 110
  • 111. Reflections Thomas Carlyle the Ablest Man true-hearted, justest the Noblest man one supreme person to lead the “hero” don’t need a ballot box - have the perfect state ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 111 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 111
  • 112. What is leadership... In the context of the study of Organizational Behavior (OB), Leadership is about change. “An empowered organization is one in which individuals have the knowledge, skill, desire and opportunity to personally succeed in a way that leads to collective organizational success.” Stephen Covey ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 112 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 112
  • 113. Is leadership innate or can it be learnt? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 113 In answering this question we will present a number of different theories that argue that there are core traits necessary for effective leadership. We will ask you to identify those traits you feel are most important to effective leadership and to consider whether you regard them as innate or learnt. When we went through this exercise we found that the answer is more complex than first envisaged. Anne to hand out work sheets???
  • 114. Is leadership innate or can it be learnt? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 113 In answering this question we will present a number of different theories that argue that there are core traits necessary for effective leadership. We will ask you to identify those traits you feel are most important to effective leadership and to consider whether you regard them as innate or learnt. When we went through this exercise we found that the answer is more complex than first envisaged. Anne to hand out work sheets???
  • 115. The “Great Man Theory” Cawthorn, D.L. (1996) Prior to 1950’s the ‘Great Man Theory’ was generally accepted 1950-90 Behavioural Scientists suggested that the born leader is a myth Only ingredient necessary is a desire to learn Cawthorn suggests that the desire to learn is one of many required traits ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 114 In our readings we find that Cawthorn revisits the Great Man Theory which up until the 1950’s was the popular theory on leadership. •Revolved around the Hero Leader concept where the leader was out in front leading the charge (John Wayne concept) •For the past 50 years concept of leadership dominated by behavioural scientists. In 1986 Warren Bennis & Burt Nanus suggest that: •born leader is a myth •only ingredient required is a desire to learn •Cawthorn refutes this view, •it is more probable that the desire and ability to learn are some of a number of traits required for effective leadership.
  • 116. The “Right Stuff ” Not equally present in all people (Kirpatrick & Locke) Some are marked for subjection, others for rule (Aristotle) Natural aristocracy (Jefferson) Linked to one’s personality (Zaleznik) Intimately connected to biological characteristics ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 115 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 115 So what are these traits and how do they distinguish some people for the general masses? •Kirpatrick & Locke describe these characteristics as the “Right Stuff”and see them as some special ingredient that seperates leaders from followers (Fleur will expand on this later) •Aristotle identified a unique distinction between leaders and followers, stating that ……… •In his 1813 leter to John Adams, Thomas Jefferson described it as a natural aristocracy ….. •Define aristocracy •Distinguish between hereditary & natural • Incl genius & virtue •Zaleznik links these differences to ones personality (charisma) •Life sciences link it to a special brain chemistry between leaders & followers.
  • 117. Serotonin ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 116 Suggest that high levels of the brain chemical Serotonin promotes leadership. WOW! Could this be a magic elixir for leadership? I searched the WEB to find out more (Advance Slide) People using smart drugs to enhance study or memory. What’s in Serotonin? (Read WEB page) So what produces Serotonin? Sugar So if we pump ourself full of sugar we could all be better leaders. The down-side is that we will put on weight. So we can be Fat Leaders or Thin Followers. The choice is yours. (Name a few Fat Leaders) Here is your opportunity to leave tonight a better leader. Hand out marshmallows (one now or two later) Important point. Before you pump yourself full of sugar it is possible that Serotonin is produced in the brain as a result of doing leadership rather than promoting leadership.
  • 118. Serotonin Liquid Serotonin (Homoeopathic) When the serotonin level in the brain is depleted from stress, anxiety, depression, hyperactivity or A.D.D, communication in the brain through neurotransmitters is decreased. Neurotransmitters is the chemical language of the brain. For a quick boost, use Liquid Serotonin. 1 oz. bottle $15 OR 3 for $40 +P&H ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 116 Suggest that high levels of the brain chemical Serotonin promotes leadership. WOW! Could this be a magic elixir for leadership? I searched the WEB to find out more (Advance Slide) People using smart drugs to enhance study or memory. What’s in Serotonin? (Read WEB page) So what produces Serotonin? Sugar So if we pump ourself full of sugar we could all be better leaders. The down-side is that we will put on weight. So we can be Fat Leaders or Thin Followers. The choice is yours. (Name a few Fat Leaders) Here is your opportunity to leave tonight a better leader. Hand out marshmallows (one now or two later) Important point. Before you pump yourself full of sugar it is possible that Serotonin is produced in the brain as a result of doing leadership rather than promoting leadership.
  • 119. Situational Forces Linkage between leadership and the situation in which leaders find themselves. Churchill Martin Luther King Princess Diana ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 117 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 117 In addition to those traits already identified Cawthorn recognises that the situation in which leaders find themselves may draw out their leadership traits. Go through list: (acknowledge James’citation of Weary Dunlop) Although their situation may have drawn out these people’s leadership traits a further traits they possessed was the vision, purpose and determination to do something about the situation that would make a difference.
  • 120. Leadership Traits (Cawthorn) Learning Knowledge Wisdom Competence Talent Ability Genius Virtue Chemical make up Personality Vision/purpose ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 118 So what are the traits identified by Cawthorn Learning (Cawthorn) Knowledge (Aristotle) Wisdom (Aristotle) Competence (Aristotle) Talent (Aristotle) Ability (Aristotle) Genius (Jefferson) Virtue (Jefferson) Chemical make up Personality (Zaleznik) (linked to charisma) Vision/purpose (Cawthorn) So Do Traits Really Matter? To answer this I’ll now handover to Fleur.
  • 121. Leadership: do traits matter? Early 20th century, evolution of Trait Theory Trait defined as: People’s general characteristics, including capacities, motives or patterns of behaviour (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). Did not make assumptions about whether leadership traits were inherited or acquired Leaders’ characteristics are different from non-leaders ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 119 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 119 Early 20th century, evolution of Trait Theory. Trait Defined as: People’s general characteristics, including capacities, motives or patterns of behaviour. (Kirkpatrick & Locke, 1991). Trait theories did not make assumptions about whether leadership traits were inherited or acquired. Simply asserted that leaders’ characteristics are different from non-leaders.
  • 122. Core traits do matter! Drive : Reflecting a high level of effort Achievement, motivation, ambition, energy, tenacity & initiative Achievement: Better ways of doing things Ambition: ‘Dogged determination to succeed’ (Walt Disney) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 120 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 120 Drive : Trait reflecting a high level of effort. Achievement, motivation, ambition, energy, tenacity & initiative. Achievement: Developing better ways of doing things. Ambition: Walt Disney calls it ‘dogged determination to succeed’
  • 123. Core Traits (cont) Energy: Active, lively and often restless Tenacity: Overcoming obstacles, will & perseverance Initiative: Pro-active, make choices, & take action! ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 121 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 121 Energy: Active, lively and often restless. Tenacity: Overcoming obstacles, will & perseverance. Initiative: Pro-active, make choices, & take action!
  • 124. Core Traits (cont) Leaders must be achievement orientated, ambitious, energetic, tenacious and proactive Effective leaders must not only be full of drive & ambition, they must want to lead others! Leadership Motivation: Equated with the need for power Influencing others, assuming responsibility ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 122 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 122 Trait theory is suggesting that leaders must be achievement orientated, ambitious, energetic, tenacious and proactive. But, effective leaders must not only be full of drive & ambition, they must want to lead others! Leadership Motivation: Often equated with the need for power. Influencing others, assuming responsibility.
  • 125. Core Traits (cont) Honesty & Integrity Self-confidence Emotional Stability Cognitive Ability Knowledge of the business ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 123 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 123 Honesty & Integrity Self-confidence. Emotional Stability. Cognitive Ability. Knowledge of the business
  • 126. Is leadership innate or learnt? Certain traits are less changeable or trainable: Cognitive Ability: the least trainable of all traits Knowledge of industry: can be developed through experience and training Honesty: Does not require skill building A virtue one achieves or rejects by choice ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 124 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 124 Certain traits are less changeable or trainable. Cognitive Ability: the least trainable of all traits.(As Anne will discuss) Knowledge of industry: can be developed through experience and training. Honesty: Does not require skill building. It is a virtue one achieves or rejects by choice.
  • 127. Evidence: Traits do matter! (Kirkpatrick & Locke) Drive Achievement Ambition Energy Tenacity Initiative Leadership Motivation Honesty & Integrity Self Confidence Emotional Stability Cognitive Ability Knowledge of Business ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 125 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 125
  • 128. Asian Leadership 12 Principles of Asian Leadership Importance of strategies Transforming adversary’s strength to weakness Deception to gain advantage Understanding contradiction Compromise Striving for total victory Taking advantage of adversary’s misfortune Flexibility Gathering information Seeing interdependence of relationships Patience Avoiding strong emotions ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 126 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 126
  • 129. References Cawthorn, D.L. (1996). Leadership: The great man theory revisited. Business Horizons. 39 (3), 1-4. Conger, J.A. (1991) Inspiring others: the lanaguage of leadership. Academy of Management Executive, 5(1), 31-45. Goleman,D (1998).What makes a leader? Harvard Business Review,76(6),November -December,92-102 Kirkpatrick, S.A. and Locke, E.A. (1991) Leadership: do traits matter? Acadamey of Management Executive, 5(2), 48-60. Sarros, James C. and Oleh Butchatsky. (1996). Leadership: Australias Top CEOs - Finding out what makes them the best.Sydney: Harper Collins. Goleman,D. (2000).Leadership that gets results. Harvard Business Review,78(2), March -April,78-93 Senge,P.M., (1990)The leader’s new work Sloan Mangement Review 30(1) fall1-7 Zohar, D.& Marshall, I. (2001) Spiritual Intelligence The Ultimate Intelligence. Bloomsbury Publishing London ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 127
  • 130. COMMUNICATION "The motto of communication theory ought to be: Dialogue with the self, dissemination with the other. ~John Durham Peters (1999, p. 57) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Peters, John Durham. Speaking into the Air : A History of the Idea of 128 Communication. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 128
  • 131. 129 ©Aruna Kulatunga Documentary clip on Dr Martin Luther King Tuesday, 24 June 2008 129
  • 132. Jihad ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 130 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 130
  • 133. Jihad means struggle - for example the struggle for self-improvement - and only occasionally in Muslim history has it meant doing battle with non-believers. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 131 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 131
  • 134. Fatwa ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 132 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 132
  • 135. Many in the West think “Fatwa” means a death sentence. It does not. It is simply a religious ruling - and in order to be binding, a fatwa must be issued by a Muslim who is qualified to do so. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 133 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 133
  • 136. Culture ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 134 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 134
  • 137. Artifacts, Legends, Myths, Wise persons ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 135 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 135
  • 138. 136 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 136
  • 139. Communications = Language? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 137
  • 140. Written Expressions ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 138
  • 141. Verbal Instructions ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 139
  • 142. Nonverbal communication Transmission without words Body language- gestures, facial expressions and other body movements that convey meaning Verbal intonation- emphasis someone gives to words or phrases that convey meaning Every oral communication is accompanied by a nonverbal message 7 Nonverbal component usually carries the greatest impact ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 140 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 140
  • 143. Communication Process Sender Receiver Meaning Interpretation Encoding Decoding Transmission Feedback 141 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 141 THE EARLIEST MODELS OF COMMUNICATION IN ORGANSIATIONS EMPHASISED COMMUNICATION BEHAVIOURS AND ADOPTED A PIPELINE VIEW OF COMMUNICATIONS. IN THIS VIEW COMMUNICATIONS FLOWED BETWEEN THE SENDER AND THE RECEIVER. THIS IS A VALID PROCESS, DRAWS ATTENTION TO CERTAIN ASPECTS, BUT OBSCURING OTHERS. YET THE PROCESS OF HOW MEANING IS CONSTRUCTED IN COMMUNICATIONS IS MORE PROBLEMATIC. IT EXPLAINS THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMWHICH ARISES WHEN DESPITE EVERYONE RECEIVING THE SAME MESSAGE, THEY UNDERSTAND IT IN DIFFERENT WAYS. PEOPLE COMMUNICATE FROM A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE WORLD. CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES EMPHASISE COMMUNICATIONS IS: - AN EVER CHANGING DYNAMIC PROCESS - INVOLVES THE CREATION/RECREATION OF MEANING WHICH RESIDES IN PEOPLE AS WELL AS THE MESSAGE, AND - A SYMBOLIC ACTIVITY THAT SERVES MANY FNCTIONS, AND ONE SHOULD EXAMINE THE RELATIONSHIPS B/W INDIVIDUALS
  • 144. Your Voice - An asset or Liability? Confidence Trust Authority Warmth Firmness Sincerity Power Believability Professional characteristics Human characteristics A Balanced Voice ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 142 Hi or Low Pitch: Out of Balance
  • 145. Hearing and Listening Hearing is not listening. The former is a physical process, while the latter is a mental process. Listening involves comprehending and retaining what was heard. Failure to listen is a common barrier to successful oral communication. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 143 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 143
  • 146. Hearing and Listening One reason that listening is challenging is that most people speak @ 100-200 words a minute, but we are capable of listening to material of average difficulty @ 500 or more words a minute (Krizan et al., 2002). This difference allows a listener's mind to wander to topics other than the message. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 144 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 144
  • 147. Active listening Make eye contact Exhibit affirmation Avoid distracting actions All help Ask questions develop Paraphrase effective Avoid interrupting active Don’t over talk listening Smooth transitions skills ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 145 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 145
  • 148. Dialogue and Discussion Reveal feelings, explore Long-term, innovative assumptions, suspend solutions, shared opinion, build common meaning, transformed ground mindset Conversation Dialogue (lack of understanding, diverging views, evaluate others) Results Discussion State positions, advocate Short-term resolutions, views, convince others, agreement by logic, and build oppositions mindsets held onto 146 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 146
  • 149. Feedback skills Impersonal Specific Goal-oriented Developing effective feedback skills Well-timed Control Understanding 147 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 147
  • 150. Making Feedback Effective Give immediate feedback don’t delay feedback discuss performance while the memory is vivid Make feedback specific focus on definite behavior and time- frame make sure behavior was controllable Make feedback problem-oriented focus on behavior not personality ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 148 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 148 In order for feedback to be constructive rather than destructive, it must be immediate, focused on specific behaviors, and problem oriented. Because the mistake or incident can be recalled more accurately and discussed in detail by the manager and the worker, immediate feedback is much more effective than delayed feedback. Specific feedback focuses on particular acts or incidents that are clearly under the control of the employee. Furthermore, specific feedback isn't very helpful unless employees have control over the problems that the feedback addresses. Indeed, giving negative feedback about behaviors beyond someone's control is likely to be seen as unfair. Similarly, giving positive feedback about behaviors beyond someone's control may be viewed as insincere. Last, problem-oriented feedback focuses on the problems or incidents associated with the poor performance rather than on the worker or the worker's personality. Giving feedback does not give managers the right to personally attack workers. While managers may be frustrated by a worker's poor performance, the point of problem-oriented feedback is draw attention to the problem in a nonjudgmental way, so that the employee has enough information to correct it.
  • 151. The Johari Window Open Area Blind Area Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 152. The Johari Window Self Open Area Blind Area Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 153. The Johari Window Self Known to self Open Area Blind Area Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 154. The Johari Window Self Known Not known to self to self Open Area Blind Area Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 155. The Johari Window Self Known Not known to self to self Open Area Blind Area Other Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 156. The Johari Window Self Known Not known to self to self Known Open Area Blind Area to others Other Hidden Area Unknown Area Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 157. The Johari Window Self Known Not known to self to self Known Open Area Blind Area to others Other Hidden Area Unknown Area Not known to others Joe Luft and Harry Ingham 149 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 149
  • 158. Two Processes That Enable You To Build a Large Free Area Self Known Not known to self to self Known to others Other Not known to others 150 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 150
  • 159. Two Processes That Enable You To Build a Large Free Area Self Known Not known to self to self Known to others DISCLOSURE Other Not known to others 150 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 150
  • 160. Two Processes That Enable You To Build a Large Free Area Self Known Not known to self to self FEEDBACK Known to others DISCLOSURE Other Not known to others 150 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 150
  • 161. Intonations: It’s the Way You Say It! Change your tone and you change your meaning: Placement of the emphasis What it means Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? I was going to take someone else. Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of the guy you were going with. Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? I’m trying to find a reason why I shouldn’t take you. Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Do you have a problem with me? Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of going on your own. Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Instead of lunch tomorrow. Why don’t I take you to dinner tonight? Not tomorrow night. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Kiely, “When ‘No’ Means ‘Yes,’ ” Marketing, October 1993, pp. 7–9. Reproduced in A. Huczynski and D. Buchanan, Organizational Behaviour, 4th ed. (Essex, England: Pearson Education, 2001), p. 194. 151 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 151
  • 162. Any other forms of communications ? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 152
  • 163. Visual and Auditory cues ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 153
  • 164. Without credible communications, the hearts and minds of the troops are never captured - Kotter, 1995 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Kotter, J.P., “Leading change: why transformational efforts fail”, Harvard Business Review on Change, HBS Press, Boston MA, 1995 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 154
  • 165. Strategic Communications Model 155 ©Aruna Kulatunga Barret, D.J., Using Strategic employee communications to facilitate major change, Corporate Communications Vol 7, 4, 2002 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 155
  • 166. Assume 600 Soldiers Ambush ahead: all 600 will be killed if they enter the ambush The general can lead his men out by one of two routes Route 1: 200 soldiers will be saved Route 2: 1/3 chance that all 600 will be saved and 2/3 chance that none will be saved Which route would you choose? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 156 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 156
  • 167. Assume 600 Soldiers Ambush ahead: all 600 will be killed if they enter the ambush The general can lead his men out by one of two routes Route 1: 400 soldiers will die Route 2: 1/3 chance that no soldiers will die and 2/3 chance that all 600 will die Which route will you choose? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 157 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 157
  • 168. Choices we have ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 158
  • 169. Language of change ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 159
  • 170. Language of Opportunity ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 160
  • 171. Discourse Vs Communication ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 161
  • 172. 162 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 162
  • 173. Barriers to communication ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 174. Barriers to communication Selective Perception ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 175. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 176. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 177. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 178. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 179. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 180. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 181. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 182. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 183. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 184. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 185. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering Sender’s manipulation ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 186. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering Sender’s manipulation Size & complexity ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 187. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering Sender’s manipulation Size & complexity Organization Structure ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 188. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering Sender’s manipulation Size & complexity Organization Structure Status & authority ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 189. Barriers to communication Selective Perception Based on own experiences Information Overload Inflows exceed individual’s capacity Emotions Noise, interference Language Different meanings of words Climate Tension, anxiety Filtering Sender’s manipulation Size & complexity Organization Structure Status & authority Democratic or Authoritative Mngt. ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 163
  • 190. Improving the way we communicate... ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 191. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 192. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 193. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 194. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 195. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 196. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 197. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 198. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 199. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 200. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 201. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 202. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs Working in groups ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 203. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs Working in groups Motivation ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 204. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs Working in groups Motivation Respect and feel valued ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 205. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs Working in groups Motivation Respect and feel valued Communication Plans ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 206. Improving the way we communicate... Feedback Inquiring Dialogue Discussion, Message Schemas Symbols Active listening Vs.Hearing Medium Trust, Space Training programs Working in groups Motivation Respect and feel valued Communication Plans Accurate and timely information ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 164
  • 207. Information Richness of Communication Channels Low channel richness High channel richness Routine Nonroutine ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) R.H. Lengel and D.L. Daft, “The Selection of Communication Media as an Executive Skill,” Academy of Management Executive, August 1988, pp. 225–32; and R.L. Daft and R.H. Lengel, “Organizational Information Requirements, Media Richness, and Structural Design,” Managerial Science, May 1996, pp. 554–72. Reproduced from R.L. Daft and R.A. Noe, Organizational Behavior (Fort Worth, TX: Harcourt, 2001), p. 311. 165 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 165
  • 208. Three Common Formal Small-Group Networks ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 166 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 166
  • 209. Conflict Management Styles (illustrated) High concern for Others’ needs High concern for Others’ and Own needs Accommodating Collaborating Passive Assertive You win, I lose You win, I win Negotiating Assertive You win some I win some Avoiding Forcing Passive Aggressive You lose, I lose You lose, I win High concern for Low concern for Own needs Others’ and Own needs 167 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 167
  • 210. Suggestions for Reducing the Negative Consequences of Rumors 1. Announce timetables for making important decisions. 2. Explain decisions and behaviors that may appear inconsistent or secretive. 3. Emphasize the downside, as well as the upside, of current decisions and future plans. 4. Openly discuss worst-case possibilities—it is almost never as anxiety-provoking as the unspoken fantasy. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) L. Hirschhorn, “Managing Rumors,” in L. Hirschhorn (ed.), Cutting Back (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1983), pp. 54–56. 168 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 168
  • 211. Knowledge Management (KM) A process of organizing and distributing an organization’s collective wisdom so the right information gets to the right people at the right time. Why KM is important: Intellectual assets are as important as physical assets. When individuals leave, their knowledge and experience goes with them. A KM system reduces redundancy and makes the organization more efficient. It makes knowledge available to the right person at the right time ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 169 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 169
  • 212. Understanding the Learning Organisation concept The core is based on the five learning disciplines – Personal mastery – expanding your personal capacity – Mental models – reflecting & continually clarifying internal pictures that shape our actions – Shared vision – building a sense of group commitment – Team learning – transforming conversational & collective thinking skills to get true synergy – Systems thinking – a way of thinking about & understanding behaviour in systems ‘The Fifth Discipline’ presents the conceptual underpinnings to building learning organisations A discipline is not a subject of study, it is to be a lifelong learner on a never ending developmental path ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 170 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 170
  • 213. A Learning Organisation What is it? L >= EC (environmental change) Single Loop Learning Double Loop Learning Note: all too often ‘proactiveness’ is reactiveness in disguise (see how you contribute to your own problems) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 171 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 171
  • 214. Single and Double Loop Learning Based on Action science that assumes a “theory-in-use” – that behind every action is a logical process inside the mind. The story exists in our rational, and our emotions as well. Learning that stays at process level (singe-loop), or learning that questions deep assumptions Case for discussion: Look at finances (the language of business) as a reflection of our mental models: “When all is said and done, the bean counters win” Fred Kofman, Professor of Managerial Accounting at MIT So, if we want to create a different business world, then we had better find new ways to count beans > the language of double-loop accounting ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 172 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 172
  • 215. Learning Organisation • How does an organisation learn? – Maintenance learning (survival/adaptive/first order change) – Innovative learning (Generative, second order change) • Case of Vision • Both levels of learning are needed ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 173 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 173
  • 216. Organisational Learning • What facilitates organisational learning – Openness and trust – Culture that supports widespread participation in decision making – Creative thinking & entrepreneurial learning – Diversity of skills and viewpoints – Feedback through monitoring and tracking of the vision ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 174 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 174
  • 217. Developing a Learning Culture • 3 Phase culture development – Phase 1: delayering the organisation – Phase 2: Implementation of continuous improvement – Phase 3: Greater delegation of authority to strategic business units ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 175 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 175
  • 218. Distinguishing a Learning Organisation • The culture encourages creativity, reward success, but is not afraid of failure • Dialogue amongst workers and managers • It is an ‘empowered organisation’ • Management commitment to learning continuously • Achievement of strategic balance between discipline and support ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 176 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 176
  • 219. Managing Learning • At every level of the organisation, leaders must: – transfer ownership of work to those who execute the work – coach the development capability and competence – learn faster by learning themselves – create an environment of ownership ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 177 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 177
  • 220. Building Ownership • Align organisational systems and • Paint a clear picture of great structures performance for the organisation and individual • Engage individuals in the business • Focus individuals on the few • Energise people around the focus factors that create performance of the business • Develop the desire to win (to be responsible for their performance) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 178 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 178
  • 221. The Learning organisation... Transformational leadership Egalitarian culture Dispersed strategy Integrating mechanisms Horizontal structure Knoweldge workers ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 179 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 179
  • 222. The Learning Organization Shared Vision Discard Preconceived Ideas System Thinking Open Honest Communication Team Commitment ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 180 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 180
  • 223. A Learning Organization Horizontal structure Empowered Roles Adaptive culture Personal Networks Linked strategy ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 181
  • 224. A Learning Organisation An organization that has developed the continuous capacity to adapt and change. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 182 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 182
  • 225. CHANGE An alteration in people, structure or technology It is ongoing: an unchanging principle of life For organisational survival change must be managed ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 183 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 183
  • 226. Three types of change Incremental – fine-tuning, fixing problems, modifying procedures Developmental – changes over time Transformational – major restructuring, cultural overhaul ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 184 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 184 Fine Tuning - org change which is an ongoing process. It’s usually at departmental level and deals with: Refining policies; Developing personnel through training and development; Increasing quality; fostering commitment to the company mission; clarifying established roles and so on. Incremental Adjustment - incremental adjustments to the changing environment. It may mean: Expanding the sales territory; shifting emphasis among products; innovations in technology; modifying the mission statement; adjustments to org structures to achieve better service or product delivery. Modular Transformation - Or change which is characterised by major re-alignment of one or more departments. The focus is on these sub-parts. Eg major restructuring of departments; changes in key executives and managerial appointments; reduced workforce numbers, reformed departmental goals; Significantly new technologies. Corporate Transformation - Radical shifts in strategy, revolutionary changes throughout the whole organisation involving: new mission and core values; altered power and status; reorganisation in structures, systems and procedures; new work flows, communication networks and decision making; new executives in key managerial positions from outside the organisation.
  • 227. Responses to change take many forms Obey Resistance/Opposition Silence Acceptance with accommodation Giving in (not really agreeing) Feelings of loss Cynicism Leaving the organisation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 185 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 185 Acceptance = people who want the change to work do so often working long hours, dealing with problems, helping and reassuring others. Ritualistic response - rejection of the change and defence of the status quo becomes the norm, almost like a SFP. Acquiescence - people see that change is inevitable and give in to it. Leave the organisation -
  • 228. What causes individuals’ resistance? Loss of control More work Threat Uncertainty Breaking tradition Surprise Changing habits Resource limits & Fear of the unknown competition Confusion Conflicts with values Concerns about competence ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 186 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 186
  • 229. Levin and Kotter, an integrated change model Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3 Unfreezing Changing Refreezing Establish a Form a powerful Institutionalize sense of guiding coalition changes urgency in the culture Develop a compelling vision Communicate the vision widely Empower employees to act on the vision Consolidate Generate short-term gains, create wins greater change 187 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 187
  • 230. Helping unfreezing – Creating a readiness for change Communicate, explain Top level communication, support Change reward system Link to something happening already Consult & allow participation by those affected Train Restructure Allow time - Denial Resistance Exploration Commitment ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 188 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 188
  • 231. Prevention..better than a cure? Establishing a sense of Urgency: Examining situational realities Identifying and discussing crisis, potential crisis, all major opportunities Forming a powerful guiding Coalition: Assembling a group with enough power to lead the change effort Encouraging the group to work together as a team Creating a Vision Creating a vision to help direct the change effort Developing strategies for Achieving that vision ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 189 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 189
  • 232. Change...leaders and followers Communicating the Vision Using every vehicle possible to communicate the new vision and strategies Teaching new behaviors by the example of the guiding coalition Empowering others to Act on the vision Getting rid of obstacles to change Changing systems or structures that seriously undermine the vision Encouraging risk taking and non traditional ideas, activities and actions Planning for and creating short time wins Planning for visible performance improvements Creating those improvements Recognizing and rewarding employees involved in the improvements ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 190 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 190
  • 233. Change...being on top of the game Consolidating improvements and producing still more change Using increased credibility to change systems, structures and policies that don’t fit the vision Hiring, promoting and developing employees who can implement the vision Reinvigorating the process with new project, themes, and change events Institutionalizing new approaches Articulating the connections between the new behaviors and corporate success Developing the means to ensure leadership, development and succession ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 191 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 191
  • 234. Dolphins and change whales...incremental Breaking change into its parts Enhancing credibility with small and continous delivery Minimising tension, disruption and conflict ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 192 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 192
  • 235. Change Readiness “Reflected in organizational members’ beliefs, attitudes, and intentions regarding the extent to which changes are needed and the organization’s capacity to successfully make those changes” ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 193 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 193
  • 236. Culture change Successful change needs a supportive organisational culture to sustain its results ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 194 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 194
  • 237. Motivation...is it relevant? Is motivation major lever in change management ? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 195 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 195
  • 238. Motivation Theories ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 196
  • 239. Herzberg’s Motivation Theory of Two-Factor Motivator Factors Intrinsic (job autonomy, recognition, consideration) Satisfied or not satisfied Maintenance (Hygiene) Factors Extrinsic (salary increase, promotion) Dissatisfied or not dissatisfied ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 197 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 197
  • 240. Kubler-Ross Grief Cycle Anger Acceptance Denial Bargaining Depression ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 198 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 198
  • 241. (employees areNeeds Theory their Acquired motivated by Power Affiliation Achievement ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 199 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 199
  • 242. If we could shrink the earth’s population to a village of precisely 100 people with all existing human ratios remaining the same, it would look like this:  There would be 57 Asians, 21 Europeans, 14 from the Western Hemisphere, and 8 Africans:  51 would be female, and 49 would be male;  70 would be non-white and 30 white;  70 would be non-Christian and 30 Christian;  50% of the world’s wealth would be in the hands of only 6 people, and all 6 would be citizens of the United States;  80 would live in substandard housing;  70 would be unable to read;  50 would suffer from malnutrition;  1 would be near death, and 1 would be near birth;  Only 1 would have a college education, and no one would own a computer. ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 200
  • 243. Cultural maps or frameworks • Trompenaars • Hofstede: 4 basic value – Universalism vs patterns: particularism Individualism: – Collectiveism vs individualism Vs collectivism - (preference to act) – Affective vs neutral relationships Power distance – Specificity vs ascription Distribution of power – Orientation towards time unequally – Internal vs external control Uncertainty avoidance Preference for structure Quantity v Quality of life Value assertiveness/money vs relationships/concern 5th added value: Long term v short term (Confucian dynamism) – value thrift, persistence, look to future v past & present, respect tradition & social obligation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Henry Land et al., International Management Behaviour, Blackwell, 2000 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 201
  • 244. Examples of Cultural Dimensions Power Quantity of Uncertainty Long Country Individualism Distance Life Avoidance term China HIGH LOW MOD MOD HIGH France HIGH HIGH MOD HIGH LOW Indonesia HIGH LOW MOD LOW LOW USA LOW HIGH HIGH LOW LOW W Africa HIGH LOW MOD MOD LOW ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 202
  • 245. Six Cultural Dimensions - Hofstede Hofstede’s research concluded organizations could be distinguished from each other on the basis of six factors: Process oriented vs. Results oriented [means or goals] Employee oriented vs. Job oriented [people or job] Parochial vs. Professional [organization or person identity] Open system vs. Closed system [clear or secretive] Loose vs. Tight control [structured or unstructured] Normative vs. Pragmatic [procedural or customer oriented] Linking cultural values to managerial behavior, Hofstede also concluded that, “leaders’ values become followers’ practices.” ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 203 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 203
  • 246. Key CharacteristicsCulture an Organisation’s Defining Innovation & Risk Taking Attention to Detail Outcomes Orientation People Orientation Team Orientation Aggressiveness Stability ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 204 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 204
  • 247. Do Organisations Have Uniform Cultures? Dominant culture Expresses the core values shared by a majority of the organization's members Subculture Multi-cultures within an organization, typically defined by department designations and geographical separation Core Values Primary or dominant values that are accepted throughout the organization ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 205 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 205
  • 248. Culture as a Liability When shared values do not contribute to organizational effectiveness Barrier to change Barrier to diversity ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 206 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 206
  • 249. How Employees Learn Culture Stories Rituals Material symbols Language They did that? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 207 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 207
  • 250. How Organisational Cultures Form Top management Philosophy of Selection Organisation organisation’s criteria culture founders Socialisation ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 208 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 208
  • 251. Two Models of Organization Efficient performance (Hard, rational model) Vertical structure Routine tasks Rigid culture Learning Organization (Soft, intuitive model) Horizontal Formal Competitive structure systems strategy Empowered roles Adaptive culture Personal networks Linked strategy ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 209 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 209
  • 252. FACTORS FOR STRONG CULTURE Strong founder or leader develops principles, practices, & behavior for: Strategic requirement Competitive environment Total organizational commitment To operating under these values Unwavering commitment from: Employees Other stakeholders ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 210 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 210
  • 253. Leadership and Culture For an organizational culture to become more transformational, top management must articulate the changes that are required . . . The behaviors of top level leaders become symbols of the organization’s new culture (Bass, 1999:16). ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Bass, B.M. (1999). Two decades of research and development in transformational leadership. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, 8(1), 9-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 211
  • 254. ETHICS The code of moral principals and values that govern the behavior of a person or group with respect to what is right or wrong ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 212 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 212
  • 255. Three Domains of Human Action Domain of Domain of Codified Law Domain of Free Choice (Legal Ethics (Personal Standard) (Social Standard) Standard) Amount of High Explicit Control Low ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 213 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 213
  • 256. ETHICAL DILEMMAS An ETHICAL DILEMMA occurs every time a person must choose whether or not to pursue a course of action that, although offering the potential of personal and/or organizational benefit, is also unethical and/or illegal in the broader social context. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 214 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 214
  • 257. ETHICAL DILEMMAS You made a costly error, but one of your peers was blamed for the mistake. You’re quite certain the false accusation won’t harm him or her career; however, the truth could hurt you. Do you admit your guilt? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 215 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 215
  • 258. UTILITARIAN APPROACH Decisions are made on the basis of their outcomes or consequences Moral or ethical behaviors are those that produce the greatest good for the greatest number of people ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 216 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 216
  • 259. INDIVIDUALISM APPROACH Acts are moral or ethical when they promote the individual's long term interests ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 217 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 217
  • 260. MORAL RIGHTS APPROACH Human beings have fundamental rights that cannot be taken away by an individual’s decision Respect for rights e.g., to privacy, free speech, due process ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 218 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 218
  • 261. JUSTICE APPROACH Moral or ethical decisions must be based on standards of equity, fairness and impartiality distributive justice procedural justice compensatory justice ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 219 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 219
  • 262. How Unethical Practices Develop Ethical behavior is a function of context Acceptance of ethical erosion may develop over time Over emphasis on conformity with an organization culture may promote complacency Short term considerations may override long term ones Justify unethical behavior by drawing distinction between personal and professional ethics ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 220 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 220
  • 263. Ethics Check Is it legal? Is is balanced? Fair to all concerned? win-win relationships How will it make me feel about myself ? proud? if published in the newspaper? if my family knew about it? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 221 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 221
  • 264. The Elephant & the blind men Session VI (11:00 - 12:30) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Tuesday, 24 June 2008 222
  • 265. From the movie “Braveheart” 223 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 223
  • 266. In t h e i r s e a r c h f o r a n dimension containing a integrative definition of number of leadership leadership, Professors Bruce constructs/statements, Wi n s t o n a n d K a t h l e e n totaling over 1000, gleaned Patterson, investigated over from their original database. 26,000 articles, selecting 160, The Winston and Patterson stopping when information (2006) database was used to started to become redundant. correlate exhibited personal Describing their search as leadership attributes of some following the example of the of the personalities whose three blind men and the leadership has contributed to elephant, where each blind the CT/COIN body of man gave an accurate but knowledge. insufficient description to understand the whole, Wi n s t o n a n d Pa t t e r s o n (2006) built a model of 90 dimension, with each Winston, Bruce E., and Kathleen Patterson. "An Integrative Definition of Leadership." International Journal of Leadership Studies, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, 2006, pp. 6-66 1.2 (2006): 6-66. 224 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 224
  • 267. Thomas Edward Lawrence Miscellaneous : Charisma (Danzig, 1998; Lawrence’s Six Fundamental Principles Of Insurgency Whetten & Cameron, First, a successful guerrilla movement must have an 1983) unassailable base. Courage : Second, the guerrilla must have a technologically Passion and courage sophisticated enemy. (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998) Third, the enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in Resources : depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts. Art and process of Fourth, the guerrilla must have at least the passive acquiring, energizing, support of the populace, if not its full involvement. linking, and focusing Fifth, the irregular force must have the fundamental resources of all kinds qualities of speed, endurance, presence and logistical (Bradshaw, 1998) independence. Direction of the vision: Sixth, the irregular must be sufficiently advanced in Process of giving purpose weaponry to strike at the enemy’s logistics and signals (meaningful direction) to vulnerabilities. collective effort (Jacobs & Jaques, 1990) Schneider, James J.(2005) "T.E.Lawrence and the Mind of the Insurgent." Army July: p 34. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 225 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 225
  • 268. T.E. Lawrence... People oriented: Nurture the right Personal credibility and role remains controversial relationship processes (Barnes, 1996) Does not desist from original guerilla theory espoused by Lawrence Knowledge : Superior intelligence Perceived the importance of popular support with (Crabb, 1839) 2% active support could achieve victory given the Challenge the status remaining 98% acquiesced or sympathized quo: Defined command as a function of - Algebraic - Challenging the process (Kouzes & Posner, 1995) biological - psychological (motivation, morale) impetus Communication: Influence exercised in a Followers include situation and directed Mao through the communication process Wingate (Tannenbaum, Weschler, & Massarik, 1961) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge., p.19-20 226 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 226
  • 269. Orde Wingate... Miscellaneous : Unconventional behavior (Conger & Kanungo, 1998) Influence : Helped to train the Haganah Influence outside of formal authority (Blank, Enlisted Haganah help to run 1995) clandestine attack groups to protect oil Fresh thinking: pipeline from Iraq to Port of Haifa Think in new and fresh ways (Lombardo & Eichinger, 1997) The Gideon Force Direction of the vision: Chindits Leadership revolves around vision-ideas- direction (Bennis, 1989) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) Beckett, Ian. F. W.(2005)Modern Insurgencies and Counter-Insurgencies Guerrillas and Their Opponents since 1750. London ; New York: Routledge. p.47 227 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 227
  • 270. Mao Tse Tung... Stamina : Perseverance (Danzig, Born in Hunan Province 1998) Son of a farmer who provided the son with a Dedicated : high school education Principal dynamic force (Davis, 1942) After a series of defeats relating to attacks Plans/guides/directs: on Nationalists held cities, Mao changes Employs dynamic direction from an urban proletariat led planning (Napolitano & revolution to rural peasant led insurgency in Henderson, 1998) 1930. Inspires and motivates: Shift in emphasis termed the “single most Conceptualization vital decision” in the history of the CCP. (nurture abilities to dream great dreams, think beyond the day today) (Spears & Lawrence, 2002) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.20 228 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 228 Mao developed Clausewitz theory and utilised it on the ground. The same theory applies in CT. As much as the Terrorist uses the masses or his/her own purposes, by acknowledging and identifying the power of the people, turn it against the Terrorist
  • 271. Mao’s 3 Rules and 8 Remarks Deals with change in organizations: Rules Enable continuous All actions are subject to command change and movement Do not steal from the people toward some desired Be neither selfish or unjust destination (Bradshaw, Remarks 1998) Replace the door when you leave the house Togetherness : Roll up the bedding on which you Builds an sense of unity have slept (Daft & Lengel, 1998) Be courteous Inspires and motivates: Be honest in your transactions Comprehend that Return what you borrow humans have differing Replace what you break motivation forces at Do not bathe in the presence of different times and women situations (Koontz & Do not without authority search Weihrich, 1990) those you arrest ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.22 229 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 229
  • 272. The fish swimming in the water... Sells the vision: Ability to get members of the organization to accept ownership of vision as their own (Oakley & Kurg, Mao description of a revolutionary as relying on the 1994) people for support - “Like a fish swimming in the Communication: water” Articulate vision-values- strategy (Yeung & Ready, While the fish can be killed by polluting the water, 1995) this is not a desirable course of action -Frank Kitson Communication: Trading space for time, first enumerated by Align people by Lawrence, leaving the Turks in Medina communicating (Kotter, 1990) “Politics is war without bloodshed. War is politics Knowledge : with bloodshed” (Becket, 2005, p.73) Critical thinking skills (Harung, Alexander, & Heaton, 1999) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.28 230 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 230
  • 273. Lt. Gen. Harold Briggs Inspires and motivates: Inspires people to understand the social, political, economic, and technological givens Unusual grasp of the political nature of (Crosby, 1997) insurgency and of measures required to Problem-solver: defeat it. Make decisions that solve problems (Bergman, Hurson, & Russ-Eft, “In the early days we didn't grasp how 1999) important the support of the local Sells the vision: people was. It wasn’t until Briggs that Energizes and attracts we understood that the CTs got all of people to enroll in a vision their support - food, supplies, of the future (Bennis & Goldsmith, 1997) intelligence - from the local people” - a veteran of the Malaya emergency. Visionary : Has a long-range perspective (Bennis, 1997) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.71 231 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 231
  • 274. Harold Briggs... Influence : Influencing people toward cooperation (Tead, 1935) Promoted cooperation between military, police and civil arms of the government Fresh thinking: Cooperation extended from the top to the bottom, Conceptual skills (Bennis, 1997) pervading across all hierarchies through a system of integrated committees - Solving the problem of Miscellaneous : pulling in opposite directions Ensures that boundaries are porous and Emphasized the importance of intelligence gathering permeable (Bennis, 1997) Used intelligence in targeted, intensive, but small- Togetherness : scale operations Builds an sense of unity (Daft & Lengel, 1998) Concentrated full attention on fringe Chinese villages, improving, consolidating and isolating the Knowledge : villages from the CTs. - The draining the water process Superior intelligence (Crabb, 1839) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 232 Corbett, Robin, and Francis Toase.(1986)Guerilla Warfare - from 1939 to the Present Day. London: Orbis., p.56 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 232
  • 275. Harold Briggs... Flexible : Flexible about people and organizational structure Flexibility of operations in the jungle - (Maccoby, 1981) key note Empowerment : Effective delegation by Battalion commanders being reconciled setting goals and trust to devolve leadership to where it staff (Essex & Kusy, 1999) matters, NCO’s taking responsibility to Empowerment : make decisions on the spot Empower each individual team member to take “New Villages” stopped the fish from actions that are needed to moving in the water and when the CT achieve vision (Beck & Yeager, 2001) came into replenish his supplies, he ran the risk of being caught in the shallows! ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.74 233 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 233
  • 276. Lt. Col. Walter Walker..Malaya Self-confident: Determination (Cox & Hoover, 1992; Snyder, Dowd, & Houghton, 1994) Traveling light and knowing the land; Goal-oriented : Adopt personal-active the coming of the Ferrets attitudes toward goals (Zalenznik, 1989) The Jungle war fare school in the old asylum...Determined personal Values : Resourcefulness (Giblin, leadership...pushing the boundaries of 1986; Napolitano & hierarchy Henderson, 1998) Challenge the status “For training only” Flame throwing quo: cartridges - using available resources Breaks down hierarchy (McGee-Cooper & Trammell, 1995) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.68-70 234 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 234 Lawrence, Wingate, Calvert - unorthodox, eccentric? Walker, Kitson, De La Billiere, - exceptional leaders Paul, James, and Martin Spirit. "General Sir Peter De La Billiere". 2005. www.britains-smallwars.com. 16 Mar. 2007. <http://www.britains-smallwars.com/gulf/Billiere.html>.
  • 277. Walter Walker... Challenge the status quo: Challenges the status quo positively (Caroselli, 2000) Bypassing command hierarchies, going direct to the Knowledge : top appealing for change(Other officers also similarly Analytical thinking (Ulrich, oriented towards positive change - Walker not an Zenger, & Smallwood, isolated case) 1999) Walker’s superiors were generally available but not Culture : quite open to analytical thinking: - the case of the Integrate different cultures, open top transport lorries sectors, and disciplines (Drucker, 1997) Different cultures in the field and at the HQ - Field wants innovative techniques implemented - HQ Communication: keeping records, looking for patterns and puzzling Actively communicate a over the results wide range of information to employees (Covey, 1996) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.79-80 235 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 235
  • 278. Walter Walker... Listening : Listens (accepts ideas, Inviting feedback and implementing suggestions criticisms, feedback) - Surrendered CTs used to evaluate units in (Smith, 1996) operations Culture : Operational innovations through learning from Creates an environment the CTs - crossing streams walking backwards that encourages trust, freedom, and innovation - Purposefully leaving footprints (Deming, 1986) (Practices later abandoned in COIN operations in Vietnam, VCs learnt Knowledge : Learn from mistakes and quickly to identify false trails by weight successes (Kanter, 1995; patterns) Kouzes & Posner, 1995; Introduction of ATOM (The Conduct of Anti- McGee-Cooper & terrorist operations in Malaya) to codify and Trammell, 1995) indoctrinate COIN practices learnt through Training : Jungle School Willing to teach skills (Smith, 1996) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.97 236 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 236
  • 279. Oliver Lyttelton - Colonial Secretary Visionary : Has a long-range perspective (Bennis, 1997) “Emergency is in essence a Police rather than a Plans/guides/directs: military task” Articulate strategy (Yeung & Ready, 1995) Creating and arming a Chinese home guard- propaganda starting from the school- “Children Influence : Influence behavior toward coming back $om school convert the parents to our way of desired end (by word or thinking in the long term war of ideas, which we must win deed) (Engstrom, 1976) if we are to see a peaceful country and one which can some day be entrusted with self- government within the British commonwealth” Goal-oriented : Successfully marshals his Sets the end-game clearly in instructions to Templer: human collaborators to - “Malaya should in due course become a fu'y self- achieve particular ends governing nation” (p. 88) (Prentice, 1961) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.76-77 237 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 237 Converting Prabhakaranʼs children UNP government in 2003 issues Passport to Charles Anthony, http://origin.island.lk/2003/02/26/news09.html
  • 280. Gerald Templer... Communication: Use language to touch the heart (Heskett & Sclesinger, 1996) Suborned the fight against CTs to achieving nationhood, merging the British objective with that of the local population. Courage : Uses symbolic language in the discourse of war Passion and courage Shows resilience and personal courage- Travels to residence in the (Napolitano & bullet-ridden car in which his predecessor was assassinated just Henderson, 1998) days before on arrival in Malaya Cuts across hierarchies and involves younger civil servants in the Visionary : decision making process Physical stamina Starts at the bottom - first things first - make political progress at (Roberts, 1990) local level Involves local leadership in taking responsibility for directing the Challenge the status war effort quo: Breaks down hierarchy Listens to and incorporates suggestions from Junior officers - a secret ballot to collect information on CTs. (McGee-Cooper & Trammell, 1995) Physical Stamina- Tours the country unceasingly Empowerment : Distributes ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu responsibility (Gastil, (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 1997) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.88-89 238 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 238 discourse of war symbols, legends, repetitive messages, the just war, futile war etc. Secret Ballot - remedied the situation where householders were scared of giving information. Given the secret ballot was enforced, i.e., balloting was compulsory, there was no indication who provided the information
  • 281. Templer’s six laws... Listening : Listens (accepts ideas, criticisms, feedback) (Smith, 1996) Get the priorities right Get the instructions right People oriented: Identify, evoke, and use Get the organization right the strengths of all Get the right people into the resources in the organization organization-the most important of which is Get the right spirit into the people people (Batten, 1989) Leave them to get on with it Plans/guides/directs: Dividing the intelligence functions - Director of Sets purpose/direction Intelligence to analyze and report - Special Branch (Jaques & Clement, 1994; to collect and collate Kotter, 1990; Ulrich, Dividing responsibility efficiently Zenger, & Smallwood, 1999) Energized the situation Plans/guides/directs: Establishes direction ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (Conger, 1992) (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.90-91 239 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 239 Incident of Templer’s boots (with Templar in them) suddenly standing on he paperwork on top of a policeman’s desk.
  • 282. Gerald Templer... Energy: Energizes (Bennis & Goldsmith, 1997; Nanus, 1989; Senge, 1990) Empowerment : Entrusting responsibility to junior Effective delegation by setting goals and trust officers and backing them up with staff (Essex & Kusy, 1999) personal authority Power: Unconventional behavior Power of the authority of the office (Deming, 1986) Issuing orders from the bathtub (Orde Miscellaneous : Wingate was also known for his Unconventional behavior eccentric bath routines...) (Conger & Kanungo, 1998) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.95-96 240 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 240 Wingate rarely bathed..prefered to scrub himself with a rubber brush...jungle warfare teaches soldiers to disguise body smell with mud and leaves, never to use soap, enemy trackers use smell to identify spoor
  • 283. Gerald Templer... Influence : Expanding “oil spots” of security - Standardized Influence outside of and carried out throughout in an identical formal authority (Blank, pattern 1995) Use of pseudo Gangs- Mainly to trick CTs into Resources : surrendering- CTs eliminated only if there were Focus on resources no other options (Bradshaw, 1998) Focussing on priorities - “To hell with drill, we Values : want them to handle weapons and lay Show tolerance of ambushes”- diversity and intolerance of performance, (Negative impact in today’s warfare - standards, and values untrained and undisciplined units - (Fitz-enz, 1997) operational nightmares) Deals with change in Ability to coordinate all of the efforts - Social, organizations: Coordinating leadership political, economical, civilian - police and tasks in change cycles military (Crosby, 1997) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.98 -100 241 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 241
  • 284. Gerald Templer... Feedback : Advocates feedback (Napolitano & Henderson, 1998) Effective Feedback Loops in place.. Listening : Listens (accepts ideas, Giving time to “Belly ache” criticisms, feedback) (Smith, 1996) Subordinates offered substantiated criticism Empowerment : Transfers ownership of Suggestions incorporated work to those who execute the work (Belasco & Stayer, 1994) The final version is owned by all, but had the personal authority of Templer Power: Ability to use power in a Never being afraid of bad news responsible manner (Koontz & Weiheich, 1990) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.104 242 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 242
  • 285. Hugh Green... Miscellaneous : Credibility (Roberts, 1990) Persuade : Providing a credible alternative - Persuasion (DuBrin, 1997; Hollander 1978; Spears & Cash rewards and rehabilitation for Lawrence, 2002) surrenders Persuading the people that the government is capable of providing essential services and defeating the CTs. Using ex-CTs in the PsyWar effort ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.93 243 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 243 Propaganda head.. (later DG/BBC)
  • 286. Robert Comer... Culture : Creates an environment Civil Operations and Revolutionary that encourages trust, Development Support (CORDS) - 1967-71 freedom, and innovation Vigorous Interventions ( The (Deming, 1986) Blow Torch) Challenge the status Creative Bureaucratic infighting quo: Had access to the President - by Busts the bureaucracy passing command (Shelton, 1997) Key to the war was local security Pulling together all military and civilian Influence : pacification programs under one command - Influence outside of formal shades of Briggs and Templer authority (Blank, 1995) Encouraged innovation from its personnel - Inspires the vision: Phoenix program (p.166) to destroy VC Marshalling, energizing, infrastructure and unifying of people Inflexible, Compartmentalized, not permeable toward the pursuit of Westmoreland screened by his his staff, bad news vision (Kent, Crotts, and prevented from reaching the top (Nagl p.180) Aziz, 2001) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) NAGL, J. A. (2005) Learning to eat soup with a knife - Counterinsurgency lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, Chicago, USA, University of Chicago Press., p.164-166 244 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 244
  • 287. Bringing it together... Some points to ponder! ©Aruna Kulatunga 245 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 245
  • 288. Documentary clip- Shackleton 246 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 246
  • 289. The unexpected leader... The unexpected situation The unexpected time The unexpected .... ©Aruna Kulatunga 247 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 247
  • 290. Permeability and the onion skin Onion skin - Osmosis Territorial scanning - active osmosis Is that enough... Communicating intelligence Specific information No damage to sources Intelligence Challenge Credible, targeted, actionable 248 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 248
  • 291. Can permeable communication make leaders better... Strong listening skills Projection of empathy Onward distribution / Management of knowledge 249 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 249
  • 292. What is BATNA The Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement The lowest acceptable value to an individual for a negotiated agreement Credible alternatives - Hugh Green in Malaya ©Aruna Kulatunga 250 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 250
  • 293. Leadership lenses ©Aruna Kulatunga 251 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 251
  • 294. Who moved my cheese... Maze, Cheese, Hem, Haw, Sniff and Scurry Disappearing cheese Anticipating, Reacting, Denying, Responding Different strokes for different people Johnson, Spencer. . Who Moved My Cheese? . New York: G.P. Putnamʼs Sons, 1998. ©Aruna Kulatunga 252 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 252 Four Responses to Change In his book, Who Moved My Cheese?1 Spencer Johnson uses a lighthearted, metaphorical story to illustrate four different responses that we can have to change. In the story, four characters⎯two mice (Sniff and Scurry) and two “littlepeople” (Hem and Haw)⎯reside in a maze, where they have amassed a great store of cheese. The cheese represents whatever each individual wants to have (the nature of which varies from one individual to the next), and the maze represents where they spend time looking for their cheese. As the story unfolds, the four characters initially have their cheese and then respond differently when their cheese disappears (that is, when change happens). The four characters represent different ways of responding to change⎯all parts of ourselves, simple and complex. Sniff “sniffed” out the situation and realized that the cheese was diminishing. He saw the change coming early on. ! Scurry immediately went into action to find new cheese. ! Hem denied the change, wanted to stay where he was, and waited for the cheese to come back. ! Haw at first was reluctant to look for new cheese. Eventually, he overcame his fear of going into the maze, found new cheese, and recognized that change could present opportunities.
  • 295. Buffaloes and Geese Flight of the Buffalo Herd of Geese Belasco, James A. , and Ralph C. Stayer. Flight of the Buffalo: Soaring to Excellence, Learning to Let Employees Lead. New York: Warner Books,, 1994. ©Aruna Kulatunga 253 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 253 A herd of buffalo is solely dependent on one leader. Wherever the leader goes, the herd will follow⎯even if it’s over a cliff. Without the leader’s instructions, the herd cannot function either as a group or individually. In a flock of geese, every single bird within the group knows exactly where it is headed and is ready and able to take over the leadership position at any given moment. The goose in the front of the formation leads for a while, but as it tires it will drop back and another goose will take its place in front. Leadership and responsibility are shared by all.
  • 296. Leadership... The Geese style As each goose flaps its wings, it creates an “uplift” for the birds that follow. By flying in a “V” formation, the whole flock adds 71% greater flying range than if each bird flew alone. Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4 ©Aruna Kulatunga 254 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 254
  • 297. Leadership... The Geese style When a goose falls out of formation, it suddenly feels the drag and resistance of flying alone. It quickly moves back into formation to take advantage of the lifting power of the bird immediately in front of it Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4 ©Aruna Kulatunga 255 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 255
  • 298. Leadership... The Geese style When the lead bird tires, it rotates back into the formation to take advantage of the lifting power of the bird immediately in front of it. Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4 ©Aruna Kulatunga 256 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 256
  • 299. Leadership... The Geese style The geese flying in formation honk to encourage those up front to keep up their speed Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4 ©Aruna Kulatunga 257 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 257
  • 300. Leadership... The Geese style When a goose gets sick, wounded, or shot down, two geese drop out of formation and follow it down to help and protect it. They stay until it dies or is able to fly again. Then, they launch out with another formation or catch up with the flock Program, FEMA Independent Study. "Leadership and Influence Independent Study." Ed. USA Department of Homeland Security (FEMA), 2005 December. P. 6.4 ©Aruna Kulatunga 258 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 258
  • 301. Lead or manage... Effective leadership is about enabling ordinary people to produce extraordinary things in the face of challenge and change and to constantly turn in superior performance to the long-term benefit of all concerned (Charlton 2000, p. 30). Definition of difference between management and leadership: legitimate power and control vs. empowerment and change JOOSTE, KARIEN. "Leadership: A New Perspective." Journal of Nursing Management 12 (2004): 217-23. ©Aruna Kulatunga 259 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 259
  • 302. Pulling together... To compete in the information age, firms must increasingly rely on the knowledge, skills, experience, and judgment of all their people. The entire organization, collectively, must create and assimilate new knowledge, encourage innovation, and learn to compete in new ways in an ever changing competitive environment. DESS, GREGORY G., and JOSEPH C. PICKEN. "Changing Roles: Leadership in the 21st Century." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Winter (2000): 18-34. 260 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 260
  • 303. Strategic Frameworks... Albert Szent-Gyorgyi, who knew a lot about maps according to which life is on its way somewhere or other, told us this story from the war due to which history is on its way somewhere or other: The young lieutenant of a small Hungarian detachment in the Alps sent a reconnaissance unit out into the icy wasteland. It began to snow immediately, snowed for two days and the unit did not return. The lieutenant suffered: he had dispatched his own people to death. But the third day the unit came back. Where had they been? How had they made their way? Yes, they said, we considered ourselves lost and waited for the end. And then one of us found a map in his pocket. That calmed us down. We pitched camp, lasted out the snowstorm and then with the map we discovered our bearings. And here we are. The lieutenant borrowed this remarkable map and had a good look at it. It was not a map of the Alps but of the Pyrenees. Goodbye now. Miroslav Holub’s (1977) poem ‘Brief Thoughts on Maps’ as it appeared in the Times Literary Supplement, Feb. 4, 1977, translated by Jarmila and Ian Milner, Used by Karl Weick to illustrate the necessity for a strategic framework ©Aruna Kulatunga 261 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 261 The vignette above is extremely popular in courses that deal with strategy.The analogy is immediately recognizable.The notion that the value of a map, just like the value of a strategic framework,model or image,comes not just from its ability to represent the environment objectively in all its detail, but from its ability to focus minds and help people take a particular course, strikes a chord. This analogy, indicating the relation- ship between a map and the individual process of mapping a particular journey, is the key to understanding the unique philosophy of images of strategy
  • 304. Distributed leadership... AQ - model for distributed leadership and networked Knowledge Management (KM) COIN/CT networks with distributed leadership and networked KM The “not my fault” syndrome Allocating individual responsibilities in a networked culture ©Aruna Kulatunga 262 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 262
  • 305. Quick takes on buzz words RMA 4GW Netwar Guerilla COIN CT ©Aruna Kulatunga 263 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 263 In brief, the theory holds that warfare has evolved through four generations: 1) the use of massed manpower, 2) firepower, 3) maneuver, and now 4) an evolved form of insurgency that employs all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince an opponent’s decisionmakers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly The first generation of modern war was dominated by massed manpower and culminated in the Napoleonic Wars. The second generation, which was quickly adopted by the world’s major powers, was dominated by firepower and ended in World War I. In relatively short order, during World War II the Germans introduced third-generation warfare, characterized by maneuver. That type of combat is still largely the focus of U.S. forces . . . [4GW is an] evolved form of insurgency [that] uses all available networks—political, economic, social, military—to convince the enemy’s decision makers that their strategic goals are either unachievable or too costly for the perceived benefit 12 September-October 2004 MILITARYREVIEW R ATHER THAN commenting on the specif- ics of the war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for under- standing that and other conflicts. I call this frame- work the Four Generations of Modern War. I developed the framework of the first three gen-
  • 306. Feed Before... Feed Back Leader Feed before Feed back Team Learning Organization 264 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 264
  • 307. The Red Army Factions To follow ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 265 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 265
  • 308. PKK in Turkey... To follow ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 266 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 266
  • 309. Stolen Laptops... FBI lost over 200 laptops... Why keep sensitive information in an insecure laptop... Data to be stored in secured central (can be distributed like Akemi or Google systems) servers What if you are not connected... Download a only the necessary subset ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 267 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 267
  • 310. Changing rules of warfare... War for nation building Eliminate corruption, waste inefficiency Improve distribution, access, communication ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 268 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 268
  • 311. Concepts Counter terrorism Leadership Benchmarks / Examples Application Toolkits Theory Practical Knowledge 269 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 269
  • 312. Intelligence Constant territorial Intel. scanning Knowledge Human Intel. Signal Intel. Constant Books Learning Magazines Internet Newspapers 270 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 270
  • 313. A KM owchart... Constant Scanning Sharing Info. Permeability Access Motivation Communication Essential Leadership Skills 271 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 271
  • 314. 272 ©Aruna Kulatunga TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 272
  • 315. Doctrine and the future The map to the future cannot be drawn in advance. We cannot know enough to set forth a meaningful vision or to plan productively. ...engaging in such activities in the belief that we can predict the future and, to a degree, control it, is probably both illusory and dangerous, in that it allows a false and potentially debilitating sense of security. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 273 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 273
  • 316. Without doctrine...chaos? The focus of chaos is the web of feedback loops present in every system. In some systems, the feedback loops are linear; in others, nonlinear. ...organizations, because they are made up of people and, hence, are highly complex, are nonlinear feedback systems. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 274 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 274
  • 317. Chaordic Organizations... Chaos + Order = Chaordic Coined by Dee Hock ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 275 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 275
  • 318. Visa Southeast Asia | Visa Cards. 30 Mar. 2007 <http://www.visa-asia.com/ap/sea/mediacenter/imagelibrary/visa_cards.shtml>. 276 ©Aruna Kulatunga Tuesday, 24 June 2008 276
  • 319. Chaordic Organisations... US$4.4 Trillion Sales 1.51 Billion cards in circulation Operating in 170 Countries Owned by over 20,000 of world’s leading financial institutions HQ in San Francisco, US CEO - Kenneth Somme ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Visa Corporate Information | Fact Sheets | Newsroom | Visa Corporate. 30 Mar. 2007<http://www.corporate.visa.com/md/fs/corporate/ (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 277 corporate.jsp?topic=corp>. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 277
  • 320. Chaordic Organizations... ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 321. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 322. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 323. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical Evolving ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 324. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical Evolving Self-organizing ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 325. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical Evolving Self-organizing Self-regulating ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 326. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical Evolving Self-organizing Self-regulating Does this remind you of ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 327. Chaordic Organizations... Decentralized Non-hierarchical Evolving Self-organizing Self-regulating Does this remind you of AQ ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 278 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 278
  • 328. Chaordic Organizations... Knowledge and Information Sharing Innovation and Creativity Teamwork and Project Orientation. Diversity. Strong Core Values. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 279 TETENBAUM, TOBY J. "Shifting Paradigms: From Newton to Chaos." ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS.Spring (1998): 21-32. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 279
  • 329. Integrity and Credibility... The front page test - What will my child / spouse / parents / friends say when they see this news in the front page of the newspapers Positive - Do it! Negative - Search for alternatives ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 280 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 280
  • 330. Sharing information... The front page test... What are the possibilities that this information may be published in the newspapers If there is more than one in three chances of the information being public in the near future, disseminate it, credibly, correctly and lucidly, immediately ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 281 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 281
  • 331. Pyramids and Silos Organizations connected at top - thin information pipe lines Organizations connected at bottom - thick information pipe lines ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 282 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 282
  • 332. Pyramids and Silos Information takes time to trickle down, fill up and disseminate Information available uniformly, wider range of critical analysis ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 283 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 283
  • 333. Pyramids and Silos More control of information, less chance of leakage Less control of information, more chance of leakage ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu (aruna@mtaconsult.com) 284 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 284
  • 334. Terror meme... a method of communication Pech, Richard J., and Bret W. Slade. "Religious Fundamentalism and Terrorism: Why Do They Do It and What Do They Want?" 285 ©Aruna Kulatunga Foresight, Emerald Group Publishing 8.1 (2006): 8-20. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 285
  • 335. The terror meme... 286 ©Aruna Kulatunga Pech, Richard J., and Bret W. Slade. "Imitative Terrorism: A Diagnostic Framework for Identifying Catalysts and Designing Interventions." Foresight 7.1 (2005): 47-60. Tuesday, 24 June 2008 286
  • 336. Insurgency “Illegal measures including the use of force to overthrow a government or to persuade or force people to do things they do not want to do.” - British Military Doctrine, 1987 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 287 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 287
  • 337. Counterinsurgency “A coordinated attempt to defeat insurgents, usually relying upon both civilian and military authorities either of the afflicted government or of its allies.” - U.S. Field Manual 100-20, Low Intensity Conflict, 1994. ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 288 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 288 American definition of counterinsurgency.
  • 338. Military Forces Hate COIN “The long list of unsuccessful operations conducted against guerrilla activities is a product of the inflexibility of many military leaders as well as their intransigent attitude concerning the abandonment of conventional tactics. This military arteriosclerosis has existed down through the ages...” LTC Joseph Kutger, USAF, 1960 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 289 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 289
  • 339. Organizational Culture “Every organization has a culture, that is, a persistent, patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.” - James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 290 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 290
  • 340. U.S. Army Organizational Culture “The American view of war emphasizes combat, set-piece battles between organized units as the centrality of conflict. Americans also put a high priority upon the use of firepower and high mobility...The desirable aim of combat has been seen as the destruction of the enemy’s army in the field, with the inevitable consequence being that the enemy must submit.” - Larry Cable, Conflict of Myths ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 291 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 291 The U.S. Army’s organizational culture is derived from the history of the United States Army and the perceptions of those who lead and who have led America’s Army.
  • 341. British Army Organizational Culture “Historical experience has taught [the British officer] not to expect a flood of assistance from Britain--there was usually little to be spared--nor to look to some sacrosanct body of ‘doctrine’ for advice; there was none. Instead he must make do...In short, he must adapt.” - David Charters, (“From Palestine to Northern Ireland”) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 292 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 292 The British Army’s strategic culture is rather different, not least because of the different level of resources available to it.
  • 342. Organizational Learning “A process by which an organization uses new knowledge or understanding gained from experience or study to adjust institutional norms, doctrine and procedures in ways designed to minimize previous gaps in performance and maximize future successes.” Richard Downie, (The U.S. Army as Learning Institution) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 293 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 293 Organizational Culture affects the ability of that organization to learn.
  • 343. “Was the Army a Learning Institution?” Bottom-Up Input? Superiors Questioned, Available? Theoretical Thinking? Local Doctrine Development? Local Training Centres? Small, Responsive Staff? ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 294 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 294 Next, I will determine whether the armies were able to learn during the course of the war in which they were engaged. 1) Does the Army promote suggestions from the field? 2) Are subordinates encouraged to question superiors and policies? 3) Does the organization encourage theoretical thinking about the problems it faces? 4) Are doctrine and training centers developed locally in response to local conditions? 5) Is the high command assisted by a a small, responsive staff or isolated by a large, unresponsive one?
  • 344. Initial British Response War of the Big Battalions “Can’t Miss, Old Boy.” “At this stage it has become a military problem to which we have not been able to find the answer.” Colonial Secretary James Griffiths, 27 Oct 1950 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 295 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 295 The initial British response was the war of big battalions, based on a lack of solid intelligence about the guerrillas location in the jungle and their methods of warfare. Richard Clutterbuck describes the resulting scenario so well that I will quote him at length :“The predeliction of some army officers for major operations seems incurable. Even in the late 1950’s, new brigade commanders would arrive from England, nostalgic for World War II, or fresh from large-scale maneuvers in Germany. On arrival in Malaya, they would address themselves with chinagraphs to a map almost wholly green except for one red pin. ‘Easy’, they would say. ‘Battalion on the left, battalion on the right, battalion blocking the end, and then a fourth battalion to drive through. Can’t miss, old boy.’ Since it took the better part of a day, with more than a thousand soldiers, to get an effective cordon even a half-mile square around a jungle camp, the guerrillas, hearing the soldiers crashing through the jungle into position, had no difficulty getting clear before the net was closed. Except for a rare brush with a straggler, all the soldiers ever found was an empty camp, but this enabled the officers to claim they had ‘cleared the area of enemy.’ This would be duly marked on the maps, and the commanders would go to bed with a glow of satisfaction over a job well done. The soldiers, nursing their blisters, had other words for it.” (Richard Clutterbuck, The Long Long War) British efforts were also hampered by a confused chain of command which put the military effort under the nominal command of the Police Commissioner, and by the lack of a unified intelligence collection and analysis organization. These flaws were put right by LTG Sir Harold Briggs, appointed Director of Operations in April 1950; Briggs immediately created a Joint Intelligence Advisory Committee, established a Federal War Council to coordinate civil-military efforts, and focused on the need to separate the insurgents from their source of supplies and recruits - the Chinese squatters - through the creation of fortified “New Villages”. By the end of 1951 some 400,000 squatters had been resettled in over 400 New Villages.
  • 345. A Modern Lieutenant General Templer Takes Over ATOM Operational Research Section (Malaya) Intelligence as Basis for Operations “Hearts and Minds” ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 296 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 296 These innovations provided many of the tactical steps necessary to defeat the CT’s; note the influence of Burma and of senior officers encouraging tactical innovation. However, it remained to put the campaign in some sort of strategic framework; this was the task of General Sir Gerald Templer, the very model of the modern Lieutenant General, who became Director of Operations after the assassination of Sir Henry Gurney on 6 October 1951. Templer continued the tactical innovations, ordering the creation of a manual that would ‘encapsulate the wealth of jungle fighting experience in such a way as to fit in the pocket of a soldier’s jungle greens.’ ATOM became the bible of British COIN. It was written by the same Walter Walker who had created FARELF Training Center and the Ferret Force. Templer also established an operations research training center to collate information on the progress of the COIN effort and to focus all efforts on the collection of intelligence on the abilities. locations, and intentions of CT leaders. This was done in conjunction with the most important of Templer’s innovations: a strategic focus on improving the responsiveness of the government of Malaya to the needs of all of the people. The Army and the military effort was secondary to the political effort of winning support for the government. Templer knew that only by winning the support of the inhabitants could he gain a flow of information about the insurgents. This information would allow him to move away from fruitless jungle bashing to actually find and defeat the insurgents. As Templer said, “In the jungle, most of the battle is finding the enemy.”
  • 346. Institutional Culture over Leaning “The solution in Vietnam is more bombs, more shells, more napalm...till the other side cracks and gives up.” MG William E. DePuy, 1st Infantry Division, 1966 “We’d end up shooting at everything- men, women, kids, and the buffaloes.” LTC John Paul Vann, 1965 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 297 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 297 When JFK was assassinated in 1963 there were already 17,000 US Armed Forces in Vietnam. The numbers escalated quickly. Vann had foreseen the resulting problem: “The Viet Cong were so intermingled with the peasantry that the Saigon troops had difficulty distinguishing friend from foe. Then, Vann said, how much more difficult it would be for Americans. The American soldiers would soon start to see the whole rural population as the enemy. The Army and the Marine Corps would create a bloody morass into which they and the Vietnamese peasantry would sink. “We’d end up shooting at everything - men, women, kids, and the buffalos,” Vann said. (383)
  • 347. USMC and the Combined Action Platoon Regional Coordinating Council Combined Action Platoons “You cannot win militarily. You have to win totally, or you are not winning at all.” Marine LTG Krulak, July 1966 ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 298 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 298 MG Lew Walt, commander of the III MAF from mid-65 on, took advantage of the USMC’s organizational culture of pacification and small wars in I Corps, the northernmost part of South Vietnam,. Walt created a coordinating council of the regional civilian agency heads in sector, ARVN and US military commanders, and a Vietnamese government representative. He also integrated Marine rifle squads into Vietnamese Regional Forces platoons. These Combined Action Platoons lived in the villages of I Corps and focused on pacification, while regular Marine BTNs divided their time between squad and platoon sized patrols and ambushes, and civic action programs. The US Army did not approve of pacification programs. LTG Krulack, CG Marine Force Pacific, appealed to SecDef McNamara that the safer roads and more secure hamlets in I Corps, while “harder to quantify”, were a better measure of success than MAAC-V commander Westmoreland’s body count: “The raw figure of VC killed...can be a dubious index of success since, if their killing is accompanied by devastation of friendly areas, we may end up having done more harm than good.” (Sheehan, 636)
  • 348. The U.S. Army in Iraq: Bottom-up Learning Innovative Junior Officers/NCO’s Empowered by Chain of Command (Bosnia Experience?) Division Commanders understood/ encouraged innovation Power of the Internet Army not capturing/controlling innovation Doctrine trailing indicator of change ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 299 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 299
  • 349. The U.S. Army in Iraq: Intelligence Innovation Local Source Development CI/HUMINT Teams on Patrol IPB of Networks Police Work for Warfighters Force protection through targeted patrolling Every soldier an intelligence platform (implications for language/culture skills) ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 300 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 300
  • 350. The U.S. Army in Iraq: Training Local Forces “Better the Arabs do it tolerably than you do it perfectly.” Embedded trainers Equipment fielding TOE Chain of Command Schools LEADERSHIP MATTERS ©Aruna Kulatunga - mtaCONSULT / Comunicamos.eu Nagl, John A. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife - Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya (aruna@mtaconsult.com) and Vietnam. Paperback 2005 ed. Chicago, USA: University of Chicago Press, 2005. 301 Tuesday, 24 June 2008 301

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