1. DISARMAMENT<br />Disarmament: Concept<br />It is elimination or reduction of armaments to preserve international peace and security by averting wars.<br />Morgenthau: “Disarmament is the reduction or elimination of certain or all armaments for the purpose of ending the armament race”. <br />Charles P. Schleicher: Disarmament “means of reducing or eliminating the material and human instrumentalities for the exercise of physical violence”.<br />V.V. Dyke: “Any regulation or limitation having to do with armed power is treated as a measure of Disarmament”.<br />
2. ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS<br />The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): The NPT was signed simultaneously in London, Moscow and Washington on 1 July 1968 and came into force on 5 March 1970.<br />Aim: limiting the spread of nuclear weapons globally.<br />About 189 countries are till date party to the treaty. Five members among these have nuclear weapons. They are the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea are not signatories to this Treaty. India and Pakistan both possess and have openly tested nuclear bombs. Israel has adopted a policy of deliberate ambiguity regarding its own nuclear policy. North Korea acceded to the Treaty, violated it, and later withdrew itself.<br />
3. The Treaty consists of a Preamble and eleven articles and is considered as having three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology.<br />(a) Non-proliferation: Under Article I, the five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) agree not to transfer “nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” and “not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce” a Non-Nuclear Weapon State (NNWS) to acquire nuclear weapons. Article II contains that NNWS parties to the NPT agree not to“receive,” “manufacture” or “acquire” nuclear weapons or to “seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons”. Article III states that NNWS parties also agree to accept safeguards by the IAEA to verify that they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.<br />(b) Disarmament: Article VI urges all state Parties to the NPT, both nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states, “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”.<br />(c) Peaceful use of nuclear energy: The NPT allows for and agrees upon the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to NPT signatory countries for the development of civilian nuclear energy programmesin those countries, as long as they can demonstrate that their nuclear programmesare not being used for the development of nuclear weapons. The Treaty recognizes the inalienable right of sovereign states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but restricts this right for NPT parties to be exercised “in conformity with Articles I<br />and II”.<br />
4. Criticisms <br /><ul><li>The language of the Treaty--- especially from the countries interested in developing their nuclear capabilities. India, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina are among the many countries who refused to sign the Treaty because they thought that the Treaty was discriminatory.
5. The Treaty, while on the one hand was aiming to limit the vertical expansion was, on the other hand, silent on horizontal expansion. In other words, it was silent about the control of possessions of the nuclear capabilities of the states belonging to the Nuclear Club. Creating a division between nuclear haves and have nots.
6. The Treaty was viewed as being aimed at perpetuating nuclear dependence of non-nuclear states on the nuclear states and, therefore, increased the gap between them. The NPT failed to bring about any positive disarmament and arms control.</li></ul>Indefinite Extension of NPT, On 11 May 1995, at a Global Conference held to review the NPT, the state Parties to the Treaty agreed by consensus and without formal dissent that the Treaty would continue in force permanently and unconditionally. The extension of NPT, however, legitimized the possession of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear powers. India, Pakistan and Israel still rejected the Treaty as discriminatory.<br />
7. Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)<br />The Treaty was opened for signature at New York on 24 September 1996 and it is yet to come into force. It bans all nuclear explosions in all environments, for military or civilian purposes. <br />The CTBT was negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament (CD)between January 1994 and August 1996, and adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 1996. The CTBT has not entered into force, although all the five declared nuclear powers are currently observing testing moratoria. In order to bridge the period until the Treaty's entry into force, on 19 November 1996 the Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO PrepCom) was established. <br />The general obligations:<br />ARTICLE I: BASIC OBLIGATIONS Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control.  Each State Party undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion. <br />ARTICLE-II – Organization--a forum for consultation and cooperation among States Parties,- THE CONFERENCE OF THE STATES PARTIES, THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL, THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT.<br />
8. ARTICLE III: NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION MEASURES<br />ARTICLE IV: VERIFICATION - (a) An International Monitoring System; (b) Consultation and clarification; (c) On-site inspections; and (d) Confidence-building measures.<br />ARTICLE V: MEASURES TO REDRESS A SITUATION AND TO ENSURE, COMPLIANCE, INCLUDING SANCTIONS<br />ARTICLE VI: SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES. Disputes that may arise concerning the application or the interpretation of this Treaty shall be settled in accordance with the relevant provisions of this Treaty and in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.<br />ARTICLE VII: AMENDMENT PROCEDURE<br />ARTICLE VIII: REVIEW OF THE TREATY. Unless otherwise decided by a majority of the States Parties, ten years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty, with a view to assuring itself that the objectives and purposes in the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.<br />ARTICLE IX: DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL<br />Articles X-XIV- STATUS OF THE PROTOCOL AND THE ANNEXES, SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCESSION, ENTRY INTO FORCE.<br /> <br />
9. Seventy-one states, including five of the eight the then nuclear-capable states signed the Treaty. At present, the CTBT has been signed by 180 states and ratified by 145 states. India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) did not sign. In fact, India and Pakistan conducted back-to back nuclear tests in 1998, while North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003. US Senate has not yet ratified it yet.<br />India and CTBT:From the beginning India was a vociferous proponent of a nuclear test ban. In 1954, India initiated a global call at the U.N. Disarmament Commission for an end to nuclear testing and a freeze on fissile material production. Likewise, in 1978 and 1982 at the Special Sessions on Disarmament, India proposed measures for banning nuclear testing, and in 1988, it introduced the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan for the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons. However, after co-sponsoring a resolution for a test ban treaty in November 1993, India reversed course and tried to block the treaty text that was negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament. <br /><ul><li> Given the strategic security environment in South Asia, India has limited options as a non-nuclear weapon state to deal with the lurking challenges from China's nuclear arsenal and Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. By signing the CTBT, India would have foregone the right to test nuclear devices, yet its primary nuclear-armed adversary, China, would be able to retain its nuclear weapons under the treaty and could even upgrade them through subcritical experiments.</li></li></ul><li><ul><li>CTBT was inadequate in terms of securing disarmament commitments from the nuclear weapon states under declared deadlines. It saw this as a discriminatory replication of the imbalance inherent in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
10. Much has changed since then. India's 1998 nuclear tests, growing nuclear arsenal, and partial integration into the nonproliferation regime via the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver that was part of the 2008 U.S.-India nuclear deal--along with the Obama administration's moves to revive the treaty, have caused New Delhi to reconsider its approach to the CTBT. Although opposition to the treaty remains, several domestic justifications for a nuclear test ban have emerged.
11. India rejected the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996 as a non-nuclear weapon state. But today, as a de facto nuclear weapon state, it is reevaluating its position.</li></ul>Apprehensions : prospective nuclear technology supplier states will stipulate India's commitment to the CTBT as a precondition for nuclear trade. <br />However, it will still be difficult for India to support the treaty unless it adopts a time-bound disarmament process and New Delhi's security establishment certifies the Indian arsenal as a credible minimum deterrent.<br /><ul><li>Chinasigned the CTBT on 24 September 1996 (the second country to do so after the United States), but has not yet ratified it. China's last nuclear test (its 45th) was conducted on 29 July 1996. After the test, China adhered to the voluntary international moratorium on testing.</li></li></ul><li>Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)<br />The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a set of guidelines regulating the export of missiles, unmanned air vehicles (UAVs), and related technology for those systems capable of carrying a 500 kilogram payload at least 300 kilometers, as well as systems intended for the delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The MTCR was originally concerned only with nuclear capable delivery systems. In January 1993, the Partners extended the guidelines to cover delivery systems capable of delivering all WMD (nuclear, chemical, and biological). During the August 2002 meeting in Warsaw, parties to the MTCR decided on greater clarity in the definitions of "range" and "payload." Members agreed that the current range of 300 kilometers would be the distance achieved at "range maximizing" capability. The definition of payload was expanded to include the cover support structures and countermeasures. <br />The MTCR was formed in 1987 by the G-7(Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Great Britain, and the United State) partners, and is an informal voluntary arrangement, not a treaty or an international agreement.The MTCR has 34 members.<br /><ul><li>"missiles" to include: ballistic missiles, space launch vehicles (SLVs) and sounding rockets. Unmanned Air-Vehicles(UAVs) include: cruise missiles, drones, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs).
12. The MTCR's annex of controlled equipment and technology is divided into "Category I" and "Category II" items. Category I includes complete rocket systems, unmanned air-vehicle systems such as cruise missiles, target and reconnaissance drones, specially-designed production facilities for these systems; and certain complete subsystems. Category II covers a wide range of parts, components and subsystems such as propellants, structural materials, test equipment and facilities, and flight instruments.</li></li></ul><li>INDIA and MTCR<br />The Indian Navy is set to carry Shipboard Supersonic Missiles on most of its ships and submarines. <br />The Indian Navy has always been ‘missile savvy’ and ‘pro missilery’ since both its historic attacks on Karachi on 4th Dec (Op Trident) and 8th December, 1971(Op Python) which were path breakers in missile warfare for the world to emulate.<br />In the Indian Navy, a band of Soviet-trained officers nicknamed ‘The Killers’ led the campaign for the fitting anti-ship SSMs, and ship to land missiles on ships. <br />After several successful trials, at least two vessels, INS Rajput and INS Ranvir, have already been fitted with the BrahMos supersonic missiles while efforts to put it on board submarines, as well as naval and Indian Air Force (IAF) aircraft is also on.<br />The Indo-Russian BrahMosis the first operational supersonic missile in the world and the Indian Navy, which has always been missile savvy, is the first to carry any supersonic cruise missile.<br />The range of the missile is limited below 300 km and the payload is also restricted to less than 500 kg in accordance with the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) which India has observed without being a signatory. Notably though, the other equal partner in the BrahMos venture, Russia, is a signatory to the MTCR, and therefore obliged not to cross these limitations.<br />
13. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). <br />Background<br />Since the entry into force of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), a significant issue for the disarmament and arms control has been the continued production of fissile materials—the key ingredient for producing nuclear weapons. Many states have long been calling for a ban on the production of these materials. The issue has been on the UN’s agenda since 1957 and on the proposed agenda of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) for many years.<br />In December 1993, the UN General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 48/75 recommending the negotiation of a non-discriminatory, multilateral, and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. This treaty is commonly known as a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). <br />On 25 January 1994, the CD appointed a Special Coordinator, Ambassador Gerald Shannon of Canada, to investigate the views of member states on the most effective way to negotiate a fissile materials treaty which met the requests of the UN General Assembly. The resulting report, CD/1229, came to be known as the “Shannon Mandate” and proposed that an ad hoc committee be convened to pursue negotiations and settle several of the outstanding issues—including whether existing stocks should be included in the treaty or not. Ultimately, efforts to establish the committee failed, but many states continue to refer to the Shannon Mandate as the basis for future negotiations.<br />
14. Critical issues of FMCT<br />The concept of a cut-off of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons has been discussed for a long time, and the agreement on a mandate (known as the Shannon Mandate) to begin negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) broke down in 1995. Since then, there has been very little formal progress.<br />There are three draft treaty texts which have been presented as documents of the CD, one presented by the United States in May 2006, another submitted Greenpeace International in April 2004 and a third in September 2009 by the International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM). <br />Differences on the question about existing stocks were one of the main reasons that negotiations stalled in 1995. There are still great differences between positions on this matter. The United States and the Russian Federation have the largest stockpiles, and most other states are waiting for these two to take the lead.<br />While the non-nuclear weapon states that are party to the NPT have already agreed to accept comprehensive safeguards by the IAEA, the nuclear weapon states and the states which are not party to the NPT are not legally obligated to accept such safeguards. Many states believe that a cut-off verification regime should be used as a means to rectify this situation and impose a more equal safeguards standard on the nuclear weapon states<br />
15. An FMCT will require many technical issues to be resolved, from actually defining fissile material to ensuring that the treaty is effective by developing specific procedures for verification. <br />Six Nation Initiative:<br />In the first week of the 2005 UN General Assembly First Committee meetings, Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden introduced a non-paper, with an explanatory note outlining elements of a draft resolution that would establish four open-ended ad hoc committees on the four priority issues of the Five Ambassadors (A5) proposal for a programme of work in the CD. These committees would meet in Geneva with resources from within the regular CD budget, and be open to the 65 CD member states as well as any interested UN member state. The initiative was squashed by the United States, which circulated a memo to member states' capitals calling the proposal a "divisive proposal" that would "likely spell the end of the CD.“<br />Canadian initiative<br />In 2007, the Canadian delegation to the General Assembly attempted to garner support for “a strictly procedural draft decision that would have added the issue of the prohibition of the production of fissile material to next year’s First Committee agenda." However, it was unable to reach consensus in prelimintary consultations and withdrew the draft decision<br />
16. Indian and FMCT<br />Whether India will be unable to acquire enough weapon-grade fissile materials for its perceived credible minimum deterrent requirement after it concludes the 123 Agreement with the United States and frees itself from the technology apartheid is at the heart of the debate on the civilian nuclear deal with the US.<br />Some have focused, as often happens, on US policies and raised the question whether India concentrating on the verification issue would be considered a breach of understanding between Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and US President George W Bush that the two countries collaborate on progressing towards the conclusion of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty.<br />The consequences of not signing the NPT are well known. India is being subject to technology apartheid. India did not suffer very much for not joining the CTBT, thanks to the US Senate action the treaty did not come into force. However, India should be prepared for the consequences of not going along with US on the discussions leading to the FMCT<br />If India stays out of FMCT, then India will have to devise a strategy to reach the stage III of the Bhabha plan. Otherwise the shortage of indigenous uranium will slow down and bring to a halt our nuclear programme unless new discoveries of uranium ore are made in the country. China too will depend upon imported uranium for its nuclear reactor requirements. But China already has a significant arsenal and has accepted all conditionalities imposed by the US 123 agreement, the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the recent agreement with Australia for supply of uranium ore.<br />
17. In 2002, the MTCR was supplemented by the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC), also known as the Hague Code of Conduct, which calls for restraint and care in the proliferation of ballistic missile systems capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and has 119 members, thus working parallel to the MTCR with less specific restrictions but with a greater membership.<br />