1. HUMAN ACTS
ACTS OF MAN
CONSTITUENTS OF HUMAN ACTS
KINDS OF VOLUNTARINESS
DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY
IMPEDIMENTS TO MORALITY
NORMS OF MORALITY

2. MAN AS THE ACTING PERSON
CONCEPT AND NATURE OF HUMAN ACTS
ACTUS HUMANI
ACTS THAT PROCEED FROM REASON AND FREE WILL
RIGHTLY CALLED PERONAL ACTS

3. ACT OF MAN
ACTUS HOMINIS
ACTIONS WHICH ARE PERFORMED WITHOUT THE
INTERVENTION OF THE INTELLECT AND THE FREE
WILL
THEY COMPRISE ALL SPONTANEOUS
BIOLOGICAL AND SENSUAL PROCESSES

4. CONSTITUENTS OF HUMAN ACTS
KNOWLEDGE
The faculty of thought. The intellect discerns in a given object
both perfection and imperfection, both good and evil, and
therefore presents it to the will as desirable in one respect and
undesirable in another

5. FREEDOM
the ability to act without
restraint.
In the context of internal control,
freedom is also known as self-determination,
individual sovereignty, or autonomy.

6. when an object is proposed, the will, on account of its
unlimited scope, may love or hate, embrace or reject it.
Whenever there is deliberation in the understanding,
there is freedom in the will, and the consequent act is free;
vice versa, whenever an act proceeds from the will without
deliberation, it is not free, but necessary.

7. FREE WILL
EVERY VOLUNTARY ACT OF MAN INCLUDES A
ECESSSARY ELEMENT: THE QUEST FOR GOOD
AND A FREE ELEMENT: THE CHOICE OF THE CONCRETE
OBJECT IN WHICH THE GOOD IS SOUGHT
IF A MAN IS NOT FREE TO CHOOSE WHAT HE WOULD
LIKE ACCORDING TO HIS INSIGHT AND WILL BUT HAS
TO ACT AGAINST HIS WILL, HIS ACTION IS NOT FREE
AND CONSEQUENTLY NOT A HUMAN ACT

8. KINDS OF VOLUNTARY ACTS
PERFECTLY VOLUNTARY ACT
IS AN ACT WHICH IS PERFORMED WITH FULL
ATTENTION AND FULL CONSENT OF THE WILL.

9. IMPERFECTLY VOLUNTARY
IS AN ACT IF ATTENTION OR CONSENT OF THE WILL
OR BOTH TOGETHER ARE IMPERFECT

10. DIRECTLY VOLUNTARY
IF THE ACT IS INTENDED AS AN END IN ITSELF OR
IF IT IS INTENDED AS A MEANS FOR ANOTHER END

11. INDIRECLTY VOLUNTARY
IF AN ACT IS NOT INTENDED BUT MERELY PERMITTED
AS THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF AN OBJECT DIRECTLY
WILLED.

12. PRINCIPLES:
INDIRECTLY WILLED ACT
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
THE MORAL OBJECT MAY NOT BE EVIL IN ITSELF

13. THE GOOD AND EVIL EFFECT MUST PROCEED AT
LEAST EQUALLY DIRECTLY FROM THE ACT

14. THE INTENTION OF THE AGENT MUST BE GOOD
THE AGENT MAY NOT INTEND OR APPROVE OF THE
EVIL EFFECT

15. THERE MUST BE A PROPORTIONATELY GRAVE REASON
IN ORDER TO PERMIT THE EVIL EFFECT.

16. BRIEFLY
UNDERTAKING AN ACTION FROM WHICH A GOOD AND EVIL EFFECT
ARE FORESEEN IS PERMISSIBLE :
IF THE ACTION IN ITSELF IS NOT EVIL,
IF THE BAD EFFECT IS NOT INTENDED
IF THERE IS SUFFICIENTLY GRAVE REASON TO PERMIT THE EVIL.

17. POSITIVELY VOLUNTARY ACT
THE WILL EFFECTS SOMETHING POSITIVELY
BY EXERCISING ACTIVE INFLUENCE ON THE
CAUSATION OF AN OBJECT
FOR EXAMPLE, INJURING A NEIGHBOR BY
SETTING HIS HOUSE ON FIRE

18. NEGATIVELY VOLUNTARY ACT
THE WILL EFFECTS SOMETHING NEGATIVELY BY
VOLUNTARY OMISSION OF AN ACT WHICH COULD
HAVE AVERTED AN EVIL TO ANOTHER PERSON OR
HELPED HIM TO SECURE A GOOD FOR EXAMPLE, NOT
TO EXTINGUISH A FIRE ALREADY STARTING IN A
NEIGHBOR’S HOUSE

19. DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY
THE OBJECT
FINIS OPERIS
THE OBJECT OF THE HUMAN ACT IS THAT EFFECT WHICH AN
ACTION PRIMARILY AND DIRECTLY CAUSES
THE OBJECT CHOSEN IS A GOOD TOWARD WHICH
THE WILL DELIBERATELY DIRECTS ITSELF

20. CIRCUMSTANCES
THE PARTICULARS OF THE HUMAN ACT WHICH ARE
NOT NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE HUMAN ACT
BUT WHICH AFFECT THE MORALITY OF THE ACT
KINDS OF CIRCUMSTANCES
WHO, WHAT, WHERE, WHEN, WITH WHAT MEANS, HOW

21. CIRCUMSTANCES CAN INFLUENCE THE MORALITY OF AN ACT
IN THE POSITIVE SENSE:
A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE BETTER AN ACT GOOD IN ITS OBJECT
A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE GOOD AN INDIFFERENT ACT IN ITSELF
IN THE NEGATIVE SENSE:
A CIRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE WORSE AN ACT EVIL IN ITS OBJECT
A CRCUMSTANCE CAN MAKE EVIL AN ACT INDIFFERENT IN ITSELF

22. THE END INTENDED BY THE AGENT
FINIS OPERANTIS
THE REASON FOR WHICH THE AGENT UNDERTAKES THE ACT

23. THE END OR EFFECT INTENDED BY THE AGENT IN AN ACTION
MAY BE THE SAME AS THE OBJECT OF THE ACTION
IN WHICH CASE, FINIS OPERIS AND FINIS OPERANTIS ARE THE SAME
IN PLACE OF END, THE TERM INTENTION IS ALSO OFTEN USED TO
NAME THE THIRD SOURCE OF MORALITY
INTENTION RESIDES IN THE ACTING SUBJECT

24. IMPEDIMENTS TO MORALITY
IMPAIRMENTS TO HUMAN FREEDOM ARE REALITIES
WITH WHICH ETHICS AND JURISPRUDENCE
HAVE TO RECKON CONCERNING THE MORALITY OF THE HUMAN
ACT
IMPAIRMENTS OF REQUIRED KNOWLEDGE:
IGNORANCE
ERROR
INATTENTION
IMPAIRMENTS TO FREE CONSENT:
PASSION
FEAR AND SOCIAL PRESSURES
VIOLENCE
DISPOSITIONS AND HABITS

25. IGNORANCE
Ignorance is lack of knowledge
about a thing in a being capable of knowing.
Ignorance is divided as invincible and vincible.

26. INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE
THAT IGNORANCE WHICH A MAN IS NOT ABLE TO DISPEL
BY SUCH REASONABLE DILIGENCE
THIS COMPLETELY TAKES AWAY THE VOLUNTARINESS OF
THE MALICE AND HENCE ITS RESPONSIBILITY TOO.

27. VINCIBLE IGNORANCE
IGNORANCE THAT CAN BE DISPELLED
THIS DOES NOT TAKE AWAY CULPABILITY AS IT IS VOLUNTARY IN
CAUSE OR IS PROVOKED BY CONSCIOUS NEGLIGENCE OR EVEN
BAD WILL

28. VINCIBLE IGNORANCE GENERALLY
DIMINISHES VOLUNTARINESS AND RESPONSIBILTY,
SINCE ACTUAL INSIGHT AT THE TIME OF ACTING IS
LACKING
THREE KINDS OF VINCIBLE IGNORANCE
SUPINE, SIMPLY VINCIBLE, AFFECTED IGNORANCE

29. PRINCIPLES THAT APPLY TO IGNORANCE AND ITS RESPONSIBILITY:
INVINCIBLE IGNORANCE PREVENTS THE HUMAN ACT
FROM BEING VOLUNTARY IN REGARD TO THAT WHICH IS NOT KNOWN
VINCIBLE IGNORANCE
DOES NOT TAKE AWAY THE VOLUNTARINESS
DIMINISHES VOLUNTARINESS,
AS LONG AS THE IGNORANCE IS NOT AFFECTED
SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE OR LAZINESS
DOES NOT USUALLY IMPLY A FULL CONSENT
TO ALL THE POSSIBLE EVIL CONSEQUENCES WHICH MAY COME
THEREFROM
SUPINE IGNORANCE IN A SERIOUS MATTER
GENERALLY MAKES THE SIN GRAVE
AFFECTED IGNORANCE DOES NOT DIMINISH GUILT
BECAUSE THERE IS FULL CONSENT THERE IS FULL CONSENT
TO THE SINFUL EFFECTS WHICH RESULT FORM SUCH IGNORANCE

30. ERROR
FALSE JUDGMENT OR CONVICTION
IT ARISES FROM DEFICIENT EDUCATION,
BAD COMPANY OR MISLEADING INFORMATION
ONE IS NOT RESPONSIBLE
FOR THE CONSEQUENCES OF ERROR MADE IN GOOD FAITH

31. INATTENTION
REFERS TO MOMENTARY DEPRIVATION OF INSIGHT
IF ATTENTION IS COMLETELY LACKING, THERE IS NO HUMAN ACT
BUT ONE IS RESPONSIBLE TO THE EXTENT
THAT THE ACT IS VOLUNTARY IN CAUSE

32. PASSION OR CONCUPISCENCE
A MOVEMENT OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE WHICH IS MOVED
BY THE GOOD OR EVIL APPREHENDED BY THE IMAGINATION
MOVEMENT OF THE SENSITIVE APPETITE
THAT PRECEDES THE FREE DECISION OF THE WILL

33. DIVISIONS OF PASSIONS
CONCUPISCIBLE:
PASSION THROUGH WHICH THE SOUL IS SIMPLY INCLINED TO
SEEK WHAT IS SUITABLE ACCORDING TO THE SENSES, AND TO
FLY FROM WHAT IS HURTFUL.
IRASCIBLE:
WHEREBY AN ANIMAL RESISTS THE ATTACKS OF ANY AGENTS
THAT HINDER WHAT IS SUITABLE AND INFLICT HARM
ITS OBJECT IS SOMETHING ARDUOUS,
BECAUSE ITS TENDENCY IS TO OVERCOME AND RISE ABOVE
OBSTACLES.

34. CONCUPISCIBLE
SIMPLE INCLINATION WITH RESPECT TO SENSIBLE OBJECT
ATTRACTION REPULSION
TOWARDS OBJECT AWAY FROM OBJECT
(GOOD OBJECT) (EVIL OBJECT)
LOVE JOY DESIRE HATRED SADNESS AVERSION
GOOD PRESENT ABSENT EVIL PRESENT ABSENT
AS SUCH GOOD GOOD AS SUCH EVIL EVIL

35. IRASCIBLE
INCLINATION IN VIRTUE OF AN ARDUOUS OBJECT
GOOD EVIL
DIFFICULT TO ATTAIN DIFFICULT TO AVOID
NO HOPE DESPAIR ANGER COURAGE FEAR
PRESENT ABSENT ABSENT PRESENT THREATENING THREATENING
GOOD BUT UNATTAINABLE EVIL BUT INCONQUERABLE
DIFFICULT ATTAINABLE GOOD CONQUERABLE EVIL
TO ATTAIN GOOD EVIL

36. FEAR:
IS MENTAL TREPIDATIONDUE TO AN
IMPENDING EVIL
IT IS FEAR OF THE SENSES AND NOT INTELLECTUAL FEAR
WHICH IS ONE OF THE PASSIONS
INTELLECTUAL FEAR (FOR EXAMPLE THREAT OF TORTURE DOES
NOT JUSTIFY DENIAL OF FAITH)
THE EMOTION OF FEAR WHICH COMPLETELY DARKENS THE
MIND OR PARALYZES THE WILL EXCUSES FROM IMPUTABILITY

37. VIOLENCE
COMPULSIVE INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR UPON ONE
AGAINST HIS WILL BY SOME EXTRINSIC AGENT.
VIOLENCE IS CAUSED BY SOME PHYSICAL OR PSYCHIC AGENT
THERE IS NO IMPUTABILITY,
EXCEPT INSOFAR AS THE INNER WILL MAY HAVE CONSENTED
OR EXTERNAL RESISTANCE HAVE FALLEN SHORT
OF THE DEGREE NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCE

38. INTERNAL RESISTANCE IS ALWAYS
NECESSARY
WHILE EXTERNAL RESISTANCE MAY NOT ALWAYS BE
CALLED FOR IT IS REQUIRED ONLY TO THE EXTENT
THAT IT IS FORESEEN TO BE EFFICACIOUS
IN PREVENTING ACTION OR FORESTALLING SCANDAL

39. HABITS :
FACILITY AND READINESS OF ACTING IN A CERTAIN
MANNER ACQUIRED BY REPEATED ACTS

40. DELIBERATELY ADMITTED HABITS DO NOT LESSEN
VOLUNTARINESS, AND ACTIONS RESULTING THEREFROM
ARE VOLUNTARY AT LEAST IN THEIR CAUSE

41. OPPOSED HABITS LESSEN VOLUNTARINESS
AND SOMETIME PRECLUDE IT COMPLETELY.
THE REASON IS THAT HABIT WEAKENS INTELLECT AND
WILL IN A CONCRETE SITUATION IN A SIMILAR WAY.