Alicia PhD Conference 2012

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Alicia PhD Conference 2012

  1. 1. AMERICAN  AID  TO  PAKISTAN  IS   DOOMED  TO  FAIL     THE  PARADOXICAL  ATTITUDES  OF  THE  U.S.  POLICY  ELITE  TOWARDS  AID   CONDITIONALITY  AND  ITS  IMPACT   Alicia  Mollaun   alicia.mollaun@anu.edu.au  
  2. 2. U.S.  Aid  to  Pakistan     2001   2002   2010   Military  Aid   0   US$1.7  billion   US$2.5  billion   Economic  Aid   US$46  million   US$228  million   US$1.9  billion   Total   US$46  million   US$1.9  billion   US$4.4  billion  
  3. 3. U.S.  Aid  to  Pakistan     •  Today,  economic  and  military  aid  heavily  condiEoned   •  Military  and  economic  aid  condiEoned  on  Pakistan  meeEng   security  outcomes  including  on  :   •  Dismantling  supplier  networks  relaEng  to  the  acquisiEon  of   nuclear  weapons-­‐related  materials;   •  Ceasing  support  for  terrorist  and  extremist  groups;   •  PrevenEng  AQ,  Taliban  and  LeT  from  operaEng  in  Pakistan;   •  Strengthening  CT  and  AML  laws;  and   •  Ensuring  the  security  forces  of  Pakistan  are  not  materially  and   substanEally  subverEng  the  poliEcal  or  judicial  processes  of   Pakistan.     •  U.S.  also  condiEons  aid  to  achieve  economic  reform  
  4. 4. Research  Gap  and  Question   •  Breadth  of  literature  on  economic  condiEonality  (poliEcal   economy,  development  economics  and  poliEcal  science).   •  Gap:  security  condiEonality,  security  condiEons  on  economic   aid;  elite  a[tudes  (donor  and  recipient)  towards  condiEons.   Few  in-­‐depth  case  studies.   •  This  research:   •  Case  study  –  U.S.  aid  to  Pakistan  post  9/11   •  Elite  a[tudes  towards  economic  and  security  condiEonality   •  Elite  a[tudes  towards  economic  condiEonality  and  economic   reform   •  Elite  a[tudes  towards  aid  and  foreign  policy  leverage.  
  5. 5. Research  Design   •  38  ‘policy  elite’  interviewed  in  Washington  D.C.  and  New  York   in  March  2012.   •  Policy  elite:     •  Academics:  Georgetown,  JHU,  Columbia,  NYU   •  Think-­‐tanks:  Brookings,  AtlanEc  Council,  New  America,  CGD,  AEI…   •  Bureaucrats:  State,  USAID,  Senate  and  House  Foreign  Affairs   •  IFIs:  World  Bank,  IMF   •  Semi-­‐Structured  Interviews.   •  Also  interviewing  Pakistani     elite  
  6. 6. Attitudes  towards   conditionality   A6tudes  towards  security  and  economic   condi?onality   Number  of  Responses   (%)   Agree  –  Security   Agree  –  Economic   17  (59%)   Agree  –  Security   Disagree  –  Economic   4  (14%)   Disagree  –  Security   Agree  –  Economic   1  (3%)   Disagree  –  Security   Disagree  –  Economic   5  (17%)   Agree  –  Economic   Silent  on  Security   1  (3%)   Disagree  -­‐  Economic   Silent  on  Security   1  (3%)   Agree  –  Security   Silent  on  Economic   0   Disagree  –Security   Silent  on  Economic   0   Sample  Size  =  29  
  7. 7. Attitudes  towards   conditionality   •  Why  do  the  elite  support  condiEons?   •  (a)  Concerns  about  Pakistan   •  (b)  DomesEc  poliEcs  in  the  U.S.   •  But  what  about  that  minority  that  don't  support  condiEons?   •  (a)  It  doesn't  work   •  (b)  It  is  counter-­‐producEve  (an  irritant).    
  8. 8. Attitudes  towards  conditions   and  economic  reform   Number  of  Responses  (%)   CondiEonality  can  achieve  economic   reform   7  (35%)   CondiEonality  cannot  achieve   economic  reform   13  (65%)  
  9. 9. Attitudes  towards  conditions   and  economic  reform   •  CondiEons  don’t  achieve  economic  reform.  Why?   •  (a)  Pakistan  actually  has  more  leverage   •  Pakistan’s  importance  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  ‘war  on  terror’  and  war  in  Afghanistan   •  (b)  Pakistan's  problems  too  deep-­‐rooted   •  poliEcal,  vested  interests     •  However,  the  minority  believe  that  condiEons  can  achieve   economic  reform.   •  Success  of  mulElateral  aid  condiEonality  rather  than  bilateral   condiEons  
  10. 10. Attitudes  towards  aid  and   foreign  policy  leverage   •  Majority  believe  aid  can’t  achieve  leverage  over  foreign  policy.  Why?     •  (a)  credibility  of  U.S.  demands   •  (b)  conflicEng  goals   •  (c)  the  size  of  the  U.S.  aid  program   •  (d)  Pakistan  vs.  U.S.  leverage   •  (e)  trust   •  (f)  strategic  calculus   Number  of  responses  (%)   Aid  can  achieve  foreign  policy  leverage   5  (17%)   Aid  can  achieve  foreign  policy  leverage   (but  the  U.S.  has  lost  its  leverage)   10  (33%)   Aid  cannot  achieve  foreign  policy   leverage   15  (50%)  
  11. 11. Attitudes  towards  aid  and   foreign  policy  leverage   •  Minority  argue  that  aid  could  achieve  leverage:   •  (a)  through  military  aid  during  Pakistan’s  military  rule   immediately  aqer  9/11   •  (b)  through  provision  of  military  equipment.   BUT  –  with  Pakistan’s  civilian  government,  it  is  much  more  difficult   to  achieve  aid  through  either  economic  or  military  assistance.    
  12. 12. The  Paradox   Condi?onal   approach  works   Condi?onal   approach  does   not  work   Total   Support   condiEonal   approach   11   12   23   Do  not  support   condiEonal   approach   4   2   6   Total   15   14   29  
  13. 13. The  Paradox   The  U.S.  elite  support  a  condiEonal  approach  but  don’t  think     it  works.  
  14. 14. Why  do  conditions  persist?   •  For  signaling  reasons      DomesEc          InternaEonal  (Pakistan)   •  Domes?c:   •   CondiEons  for  U.S.  audience  –  makes  aid  to  Pakistan  more  poliEcally  palatable  in   the  U.S.   •  Interna?onal  (Pakistan):     •  U.S.  long-­‐term  commitment  to  Pakistan   •  U.S.  focus  on  civilian  issues,  not  just  security/strategic  issues   •  Problems     •  U.S.  is  not  credible  in  its  condiEons   •  U.S.  doesn’t  trust  Pakistan   •  Given  the  need  for  signaling,  and  the  U.S  strategic  need  for  Pakistan’s   cooperaEon,  condiEonal  aid  is  given   •  Despite  negaEve  percepEons  of  the  uElity  of  condiEonality  
  15. 15. Conclusion   •  Academic  studies  skepEcal  of  condiEonality,  yet  it  sEll  persists.   •  This  paradox  is  exemplified  in  the  views  of  the  U.S.  elite   towards  the  imposiEon  of  condiEonality  on  American  aid.   •  This  research  sheds  light  on  why  condiEonality  persists   •  Aid  may  be  condiEonal  for  domesEc  poliEcal  reasons   •  CondiEonality  has  a  signaling  role   •  Aid  has  to  be  given  –  aid  has  to  be  condiEonal   •  Aid  remains  condiEonal  even  if  condiEons  don’t  influence   •  Ongoing  research  will  explore  the  percepEons  of  the  Pakistani   elite  towards  condiEonality  
  16. 16. Q&A  

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