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  • 1. | 55 |Unholy Terror: Bosnia, al-Qa’ida, and theRise of Global Jihadby John R. Schindler, Zenith Press, 2008, 368 pp.Marko Attila HoareAlso under review: Christopher Deliso, The Coming Balkan Caliphate: The Threatof Radical Islam to Europe and the West, Praeger Security International, 2007; ShaulShay, Islamic Terror and the Balkans, Transaction Publishers, 2007.The role of al-Qaeda and the foreign mujahedin in the wars in the formerYugoslavia of the 1990s remains controversial, but the controversy is not overwhether the phenomenon was a positive one or not. Reading some of the coverageof the subject, one might be forgiven for thinking that the wars fought in Bosniaand Kosova were merely individual fronts in something much bigger: the globalstruggle between the warriors and opponents of radical Islam. Yet as is so oftenthe case, it is the smaller, local struggle that is more bitter and protracted than theglobal one, and that inspires the greater loyalty and commitment. The recentlypublished books by John R. Schindler and Christopher Deliso, Unholy Terror:Bosnia, al-Qa’ida, and the Rise of Global Jihad and The Coming Balkan Caliphate:The Threat of Radical Islam to Europe and the West respectively, are really booksabout the Balkans more than about radical Islam; and it is the rights and wrongsof the Balkan conflicts, more than the threat posed by radical Islam, that motivatethe authors. Schindler and Deliso share a hostility to Islam and to the politics ofWestern liberal interventionism which goes far beyond any mere concern with thealleged Islamist threat in the Balkans.Deliso’s thesis of a ‘coming Balkan caliphate’ embraces Bosnia, Albania, Kosova,Macedonia and Turkey. Deliso’s animosity in particular is directed against theAlbanians, and he faithfully upholds anti-Albanian stereotypes popular amongthe Balkan Christian peoples. He writes of ‘the opportunism they [the KosovoAlbanians] have shown in siding at various times with the Turks, the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Mussolini, Hitler, and, most recently, NATO’ (p. 51), therebyrepeating the myth popular among Serbian nationalists, of the Albanians as stoogesof repeated foreign invaders, though the Kosova Albanians’ record in this regard isabsolutely no worse than that of other Balkan peoples. He attributes the emigrationof Serbs from Kosova in the decades before 1999 to the fact that they were fleeing
  • 2. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 56 |‘from a culturally and socially incompatible land dominated by clan-based MuslimAlbanians’ (p. 37). He complains of the high birthrate of the Balkan Muslims,writing ‘it seems that Muslims, already outright majorities in some countries andpolitical“kingmaker”minoritiesinothers,arestillexpandingandwillthuscontinueto enjoy all of the political, social, and economic benefits that this position entails.’And while Deliso recognises that the Balkan Muslim birthrate may eventually fall,he fears that ‘these processes take considerable time and may take effect only afterit is “too late” for the Christian populations to avoid returning to their Ottomanstatus – that is, second class citizens in their own countries.’ (p. 113). Deliso alsocomplains about mosques being too noisy, on account of the call to prayer from theminaret: ‘Although it is not terribly politically correct, the term “sonic cleansing”is an apt one to describe the process by which aggressively visible and audible Islamgradually grinds away at non-Muslims, who gradually move out of what become,essentially, ghettoes by choice.’ (p. 86)Deliso makes many sweeping statements about the dangers allegedly posed by theBalkanMuslimpeoples,whicharethenrefutedbyhisownaccount.Hence,hewritesthat ‘the most fundamentally surreal dimension of the West’s Balkan misadventuresmust be that specific policies have directly benefited Islamic fundamentalism, asattested by the Western support for Muslim-dominated secessionist movementsand paramilitaries with demonstrable ties to terrorists and mafia groups in Bosnia,Kosovo, Albania, and Macedonia.’ Indeed, it is self-determination and democracythat are themselves apparently to blame for the alleged Balkan Islamist threat:‘Ironically, the creation of liberal democracies in docile, pro-Western nation-statesalso enables the rival development of radical Islam within them.’ (p. 143)However, throughout his book, Deliso mentions that the fundamentalist versionof Islam, as put forward by the Wahhabites, was rejected by ordinary Muslims inBosnia, Kosova, Albania and Macedonia and by their political leaders, and wasout of keeping with their native tradition (e.g. pp. 54-5, 58, 84-5). In one passage,he describes bearded Islamists in the Kosovar town of Pec attacking Albaniansholding a candlelit vigil to mourn the American victims of 9/11 (p. 60). Deliso’saccount of the aggressive way in which the Wahhabite movement is attempting topenetrate the Balkans, and the lack of receptivity on the part of native Muslimsto it, is not uninteresting or uninformative. This is an important subject, and it isa pity that it is drowned in a sea of unsubstantiated propaganda directed againstthe Balkan Muslims and against Western policy, propaganda which his account ofWahhabite activities actually undermines. For why should self-determination for
  • 3. | 57 |Hoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in BosniaMuslim peoples, or their high birth-rates, be a problem if they anyway popularlyreject radical Islam?Deliso manages to overcome such contradictions and construct his bogey of a‘coming Balkan caliphate’ through multiple conflation. He conflates nationalismwith religious chauvinism; moderate Balkan Muslim national leaders with theradicals operating in their midst; Sunni al-Qaeda with Shiite Iran; al-Qaeda withthe regimes of Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates; quiet SaudiWahhabite proselytising with al-Qaeda terrorism – all these diverse, conflictingelements are thrown together to make a single indeterminate green Islamic stew.Thus, we get passages such as this one, concerning the involvement of the Islamicworld in the ‘Bosnian jihad’ of the 1990s:According to a former Sudanese intelligence agent, Osama bin Laden’soperations in Sudan during the early 1990s involved an ‘advisory council’made up of some 43 separate Islamic groups, contraband arms depots,and several terrorist camps. Since the Saudi government preferred tokeep its hands clean, supplying mostly money and logistical supplies, Iranwould play the key role in importing the fighters and military equipmentthrough the Iranian Revolutionary Guard and the national intelligenceservice, SAVAMA... Weapons shipments from Iran via Sudan, overseen byintelligence officials of both countries and utilizing al-Qaeda-linked charitieslike the TWRA, also picked up in 1993 and 1994. (pp. 8-9)Out of this stew, Deliso draws multiple non-sequiturs, such as this one:...Alija Izetbegovic’s single dream was the creation of an Islamic state inEurope. This vision was honored in December 2001, when he was awardedone million dirham ($272,480) prize for his services to Islam by the CrownPrince of Dubai. Only two months earlier, however, the terrorist attacks onAmerica had revealed how complicit he and his government had been inallowing al-Qaeda to expand in Europe, through the Bosnian jihad.’ (p. 5).Or this one:...the Clinton administration was planning for a second war to save yetanother allegedly endangered Balkan Muslim population, this time theAlbanians of Kosovo, and thus could not openly admit that it had already
  • 4. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 58 |made a huge mistake in Bosnia – despite a reality of increasingly spectacularIslamic terrorist attacks against American interests globally, like the June1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and the East Africa embassybombings of August 1998. (pp. 10-11).As the reader will note, the various assertions of motive and causality in these twopassages are neither substantiated with evidence nor support each other, while theassertion that al-Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia, East Africa and New York were theresult of the ‘Bosnian jihad’ is completely out of the blue.Deliso conflates the mainstream Bosnian Army struggle against Serb and Croatforces with the activities of al-Qaeda and the foreign mujahedin to create a single‘Bosnian jihad,’ ignoring the fact that existing works on the Bosnian Army and themujahedin, by authors such as Evan Kohlmann, Esad Hecimovic and myself havecomprehensively demolished the case for such a conflation. Yet Deliso admits thatit was the police of Izetbegovic’s supposedly ‘Islamist’ state that arrested a terroristcell on 19 October 2005 that had allegedly been planning to blow up the BritishEmbassy in Sarajevo (p. 14). He interviews a military intelligence analyst who tellshim that, apart from the US embassy, ‘nearly all diplomatic facilities in Sarajevolack even the most rudimentary protection against attack... all the others remainvulnerable to truck bombs or determined individuals wearing suicide vests’ (p. 23),making the failure of the Islamists to carry out a single successful terrorist attackagainst a Western target in the supposed Bosnian centre of world jihad all themore remarkable. Even Deliso’s questionable ‘expert’ witnesses admit that Islamistterrorist training camps ‘mostly don’t exist’ in Bosnia (p. 161). The facts simplydo not fit Deliso’s thesis. In scraping the bottom of the barrel to find some thatdo, he complains that ‘Bosnian President Sulejman Tihić assured a gathering ofdignitaries in Qatar that his country considered the American occupation of Iraqillegal,’ something that Deliso attributed to the ‘Islamic factor’ in Bosnian politics(p. 22). But an ‘Islamic factor’ was scarcely a prerequisite to considering the Iraqinvasion to be illegal.Deliso draws upon some highly dubious sources in support of his thesis about theimportance of Bosnia in the development of the global jihad. One such is ‘terrorismexpert’ Darko Trifunović of Belgrade University, whom Deliso quotes aboutten times in support of his argument. The ‘terrorism expert’ Trifunović makesstatements such as ‘what the West seems to have forgotten is that long before the[2001] terrorist attacks against America, the Bosnian Serbs were fighting against
  • 5. | 59 |Hoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosniajihad, a literal jihad ordered and funded by Osama bin Laden, in their own country.Former mujahedin have told me that bin Laden personally ordered them to fightChristians in the Balkans – and later, to expand in Europe, especially Italy andSpain. The West is now paying the price for supporting the mujahedin against theSerbs.’ (p. 143) A comment of this kind might raise suspicions as to its author’sobjectivity in even the most naive observer – even one who did not already knowthat Trifunović had been expelled from participation in the 11th European PoliceCongress after the organisers learned that he was a Srebrenica denier who reducedthe figure for the Srebrenica massacre to less than one hundred, and who, in anemail correspondence with two Bosnian Muslims posing as a Serb, said of theSrebrenica Muslims that ‘I wish Mladić had killed them all.’Another of Deliso’s sources is a certain Nebojsa Malic, whom Deliso describes as a‘nativeBosnianpoliticalanalyst.’DelisoquotesMalicassaying:‘Izetbegovic’svisionof Bosnia was not a multi-ethnic democracy, but a multi-caste hierarchy of the kindthatexistedundertheOttomanEmpire,thememoriesofwhichwerestillfreshathisbirth in 1925.’ (p. 25) Deliso does not mention that this particular ‘native Bosnianpolitical analyst’ was a signatory of the petition of the ‘International Committeeto Defend Slobodan Milošević’ which describes Milošević as a ‘Serbian patriot’whose ‘crime was to set an example to the world by resisting NATO aggression.’Malic supported the neo-Nazi Tomislav Nikolić in this year’s Serbian presidentialelection; after Nikolić’s defeat, he complained that the Serbs had just proven thatthey ‘don’t have the guts’ to fight over Kosova.While quoting the most raving Serb bigots as though they were objective experts,DelisohasconsultedfewgenuinescholarlyworksontheBalkans,andhisreferencesto Balkan history contain some real howlers. Thus, he writes: ‘Both Croatia andMuslim Bosnia had served as fascist puppet states for the Nazis, during the SecondWorld War’ (p. 7) – there was, of course, no Bosnian fascist puppet state duringWorld War II. Deliso describes Yugoslavia as a country that had ‘sided with theUnited States in two world wars’ (p. 41) – unlikely, given that Yugoslavia did notexist until after World War I, whereas in World War II, Yugoslavia signed an alliancewith Nazi Germany but was then invaded and occupied by it – all while the US wasstill neutral.Deliso’s account of recent events in the Balkans is no more accurate. He describesIzetbegovic’s close ally Hasan Čengić as ‘a veteran of the World War II SS HandzarDivision who reincarnated the unit while serving as Bosnia’s deputy defense
  • 6. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 60 |minister in the early 1990s.’ (p. 8) It is unlikely that Čengić was a veteran of the SSHandzar Division or of World War II – given that he was born in 1957. Nor doesDelisoprovideanyevidenceatalltosupporthisassertionthatČengić‘reincarnated’the SS Handzar Division in the 1990s. As I have written elsewhere, claims that a‘Handzar Division,’ named after the SS unit from World War II, was ‘reincarnated’by Bosnian Muslims in the 1990s appear to rest on a single piece of ‘evidence’:an article by British journalist Robert Fox, published in Britain’s Daily Telegraphon 29 December 1993. Fox’s article is based solely on second-hand informationand contains factual inaccuracies. Fox himself did not actually meet anyone whobelonged to the alleged ‘Handzar Division,’ but merely reported its existence on thebasis of what unnamed UN officials on the ground told him. But even this weaksource, which Deliso cites, does not implicate Čengić in the Handzar Division’salleged ‘reincarnation.’Deliso’s book is not merely a piece of bad scholarship – although it is undoubtedlythat. He engages in the sort of atrocity denial and conspiracy theorising thatcharacterises supporters of the former regime of Slobodan Milošević. Thus, inwriting of the Serbian massacre of Albanian civilians at the village of Račak inJanuary 1999, Deliso writes: ‘An alleged Serbian “massacre” at the Kosovo villageof Račak, later proved by a UN forensics team to have been a place of legitimatebattle, provided the necessary justification for Clinton to start the bombing.’ (p.43) The nonsense statement ‘proved by a UN forensics team to have been a place oflegitimate battle’ is a case of Deliso fluffing his denialist lines.Schindler’s subject matter is narrower than Deliso’s, being confined essentially toBosnia. It is less a study of the role of al-Qaeda and the mujahedin in Bosnia andmore a diatribe against the Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian cause. Despite theauthor’s claim to having had a youthful flirtation with Islam (p. 13), he is clearlyhostile to the religion and views the Bosnian war on this basis: ‘Bosnia’s Muslimswere really Muslims, and some of them adhered to a faith that was deeply hostile toWestern concepts of freedom, democracy, and human rights.’ (p. 19) Furthermore,‘Muhammad himself endorsed, and practiced, the violent spreading of the faith andconsideredittheobligationofeveryMuslim’;consequently,‘AsdevouttraditionalistMuslims, Izetbegovic and the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] leadershipadhered to the ideology of jihad that stands at the center of their faith.’ Schindlerconsiders the term ‘fundamentalist’ meaningless when applied to Islam, because‘[a]ll truly believing Muslims are, from a Western viewpoint, “fundamentalists”’
  • 7. | 61 |(pp. 116-17). This hostility to Muslims and Islam appears to be the guiding motivebehind Schindler’s book.In this book, al-Qaeda and the mujahedin play only supporting roles. After theintroduction, the first third of the book makes no mention of them; it insteadconstitutes a polemic against the former regime of Bosnia’s Alija Izetbegovic andagainst the supporters of Bosnia in the West. Indeed, Schindler follows the welltrodden revisionist road that was long ago laid down by supporters of the regime ofSlobodan Milošević and of the Great Serbian cause – of which the British magazineLivingMarxismwasperhapsthemostnotorious–ofaWesternmediaconspiracytodemonise the Serb side in the war and fabricate Western atrocities. Schindler putsthe term ‘concentration camps’ in quote marks when referring to the Serb campsof Omarska, Manjača and Trnopolje, claiming that all media reports of such campswere ‘poorly sourced and based on second- and third-hand information, much ofwhich was flat wrong’ (pp. 83-4); and he accuses the Bosnians of staging massacresof their own civilians in order to incriminate the Serbs (pp. 92, 186).Schindler revises the death-toll of the Srebrenica massacre downward to ‘as manyas two thousand Muslim men, mostly soldiers’ (p. 231) – although, in one ofseveral internal contradictions in this book, he earlier put the figure at about seventhousand (p. 227). He argues that ‘[w]hile this was unquestionably a war crime,it is difficult to term it genocide’ (p. 231) – though it was not so difficult for theInternational Court of Justice and the International Criminal Tribunal for theformer Yugoslavia, both of which formally described the Srebrenica massacre as‘genocide.’ Instead, Schindler portrays the Srebrenica massacre as Serb revenge forearlier Muslim attacks on Serb civilians, and employs a gross racial stereotype inthe process: ‘To Mladić’s troops, who like all Bosnians believed in blood feuds andpayback, this was simple revenge.’ (p. 231).Schindler describes the siege of Sarajevo as a ‘siege manqué’ (p. 189) and as a ‘faux-siege,’ where ‘conditions were much more normal than the Western media waswillingtoportray’(p.203),despitetheSerbbesiegers’killingofthousandsofpeoplein Sarajevo during the war. Perhaps most tellingly of all, he claims (erroneously):‘Ethnic cleansing, though unpleasant, was no more than the counterinsurgencydoctrine learned by three generations of JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] officers,who were trained in hunting down “fifth columnists” and “terrorists” by expellingsympathisers as well as fighters.’ (p. 82) He then endorses a CIA report, accordingto which: ‘The Bosnian Serb Army undertook these ethnic cleansing operationsHoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosnia
  • 8. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 62 |because it believed the Muslim population posed an armed threat or could act as a“Fifth Column” during the war with the Bosnian Government.’ (p. 82).If the above citations suggest whose side Schindler is on, they do not properlyconvey the sheer extent of the deception in which he engages. He writes: ‘Miloševićwanted Bosnia and Hercegovina to remain in Yugoslavia, but failing that he wouldsettle for a partition that would leave the ethnically Serbian parts under Belgrade’(p. 63). Anyone who has looked at a map of the areas of Bosnia occupied by Serbforces in the early weeks of the Bosnian war, while they were still under the controlof Belgrade and Milošević, knows that this is untrue; they occupied huge areasin eastern and northern Bosnia in which the Muslims and/or Croats were in themajority. Schindler writes that ‘the [Yugoslav] army in the months leading to war inmost cases tried to place itself between Serbs and Muslims and defuse tensions’ (p.66), suggesting he has not read, or has simply ignored, the books by authors suchas Norman Cigar, James Gow, Smail Cekic, myself and others that detail the unityof purpose between the JNA and the Bosnian Serb nationalists in the preparationsfor war.Schindler writes that ‘Belgrade sought to arm the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia,fearing that Yugoslavia was headed for dissolution’ (p. 68) – ignoring the factthat Belgrade was itself engineering Yugoslavia’s dissolution, as revealed in sourcessuch as the published diary of Milošević’s close collaborator Borisav Jović, formerpresident of Yugoslavia and of the Socialist Party of Serbia. Schindler then writes:‘TheJNAGeneralStaffwasnotbroughtintotheplan’ofarmingtheSerbsinCroatiaand Bosnia (p. 68) – again, he has either not read, or has ignored, the memoirsof Veljko Kadijević, the most senior figure in the JNA during the war in Croatia,who describes in detail the JNA’s role in arming Serb forces in Croatia and Bosnia.Schindler continues, ‘Belgrade saw this concept [of arming the Serbs] as defensive, aplan to protect Serbs outside Serbia – and, in extremis, to prevent another genocideagainst Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia’ (p. 68) – leading one to ask why Belgradeshowed so little interest in protecting the substantial Serb populations of cities suchas Zagreb and Split, while devoting so much energy to conquering territories suchas eastern Slavonia, where Serbs were a small minority.Schindler portrays the ‘Muslim’ (i.e. Bosnian) side as being the one that wasinitiating preparations for war, while the JNA was merely responding (p. 72). Inorder to make a case for this blatant falsehood and the arguments that flow fromit, Schindler simply avoids mentioning almost all the acts of aggression carried out
  • 9. | 63 |by the JNA in the first weeks of the war: the conquest of Zvornik, Foça, Višegrad,Kupres, Doboj, Derventa, Brčko and other towns; and the shelling of Mostar andSarajevo. He consequently portrays the Bosnian military’s action as coming outof the blue, enabling him to portray it as the aggressor – not very convincing toanyone who knows the history of the war, but enough to deceive an uninformedreader. Having failed to mention all these coordinated Serbian acts of conquest, hethen describes ‘two unprovoked Muslim attacks on the JNA that fatally poisonedrelationsbetweenthearmyandtheSDA’:theBosnianattackontheJNAinSarajevoon 3 May and in Tuzla on 15 May. Well, yes, the attacks were ‘unprovoked’ if you donot consider a military assault on your country, the conquest of many of your townsand massive atrocities against your civilian population to count as a ‘provocation.’Schindler claims the attack on the JNA in Sarajevo ‘caused lasting bitterness amongthe Serbs,’ and describes the attack on the JNA in Tuzla as a ‘killing spree’ and a‘massacre’ (pp. 80-1). Yet the JNA was a military target, and attacking a militarytarget was, presumably, a reasonable thing to do in war. By contrast, Schindlerdoes not mention the Serb and JNA massacres of Muslim civilians that had beentaking place all over Bosnia, or whether they might have ‘caused lasting bitterness’among the Muslims. Similarly, Schindler mentions attacks on Serb civilians carriedout by Naser Orić, the Bosnian Army commander in Srebrenica, between Mayand December 1992, claiming that it was ‘[s]mall wonder that the Bosnian Serbsthirsted for revenge against the Muslims of Srebrenica’ (p. 228). But he does notmention the Serb attacks on Muslim civilians all across East Bosnia that precededOrić’s actions.While whitewashing the role of the Milošević regime and Yugoslav army inengineering the war, Schindler suppresses or misrepresents evidence in orderto make his case: that Izetbegovic and his fellow SDA politicians were radicalIslamists. He therefore makes claims against the Bosnian leadership that anyonewith a cursory knowledge of the subject knows to be untrue. This involvesattempting to portray Izetbegovic and his SDA as being unwilling to share powerwith the Bosnian Serbs. He claims that following the fall of the Communist regimein Bosnia in 1990 and the emergence of free political parties, the Serb nationalistleader Radovan Karadzic offered Izetbegovic and his party a coalition, but thatthe ‘Muslims expressed no interest’ (p. 63). In fact, Izetbegovic and the SDA didindeed form a coalition with the Karadzic’s Serb nationalists, and with the Croatnationalists, that resulted in posts in the Bosnian government, presidency andadministration being equally divided between the three groups of nationalists, withkey posts going to the Serbs – including the command of the Bosnian TerritorialHoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosnia
  • 10. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 64 |Defence. Schindler then misrepresents the plan negotiated between Karadzic andthe dissident Muslim politician Adil Zulfikarpašić in August 1991 as a ‘power-sharing plan’ (p. 71), omitting to mention that Serbs and Muslims already sharedpower in Bosnia, and that the plan was in fact aimed at keeping Bosnia withinMilošević’s Serbian-dominated rump Yugoslavia. Schindler, indeed, argues thatIzetbegovic and his party wished to deny the Bosnian Serbs full citizenship – butproduces no evidence to back up his claim, other than an unsupported assertion bythe Belgrade historian Aleksa Djilas (p. 64).Schindler relies on extremely dubious source material to make his case againstIzetbegovic and the SDA. One eyewitness whom Schindler quotes approvinglyseveral times is Fikret Abdic (pp. 198, 203, 217). Abdic is certainly very liberalin his denunciation of Izetbegovic, but Schindler fails to mention that Abdicis a convicted war-criminal who staged an armed rebellion against his owndemocratically elected government, and fought against it on the side of Serb forcesinvading from outside Bosnia, from Serb-occupied Croatia. Another eyewitnessin support of Schindler’s case against Izetbegovic is Aleksandar Vasiljević, headof Yugoslav military intelligence (p. 72-3) – Schindler takes everything he saysabout Izetbegovic at face value. A third is the former US State Department officialGeorge Kenney (p. 86), who resigned in protest at US inaction over Bosnia, butthen changed sides, becoming one of the most vocal enemies of the Izetbegovicregime. Schindler does not mention the extent of Kenney’s conversion, or the factthat Kenney wrote to Milošević, while the latter was in prison in The Hague, toassure him that he considered him innocent of all charges against him, and that heconsidered his trial to be a ‘show trial.’So dubious, indeed, is Schindler’s source material, that it is difficult to believe thathe is using it innocently, or that he is attempting to convince anybody but themost naive of the merits of his case. He claims that Bosnian Prime Minister HarisSilajdžić declared an ‘Islamic holy war’ on Bosnian TV in July 1995 (p. 200) – hissource for this is the Belgrade news agency SRNA. He claims that the BosnianArmy murdered the Bosnian Croat commander Vlado Šantić (p. 214) – his sourcefor this is the Bosnian Croat newspaper Dnevni list, which is linked the nationalistCroat Democratic Union. He tells of mujahedin snuff videos, in which BosnianArmy commander Sakib Mahmuljin allegedly boasts of having sent a gift of twenty-eight severed Christian heads to Izetbegovic and twenty-eight more to Iran, and ofSerb prisoners being made by the mujahedin to kiss the severed heads of other Serbsthat were nailed to trees (pp. 166-67) – but Schindler has not actually seen any of
  • 11. | 65 |Hoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosniathese videos; his only source is one Croatian and one Serbian newspaper article.Schindler even endorses the view of the intelligence services of Franjo Tudjman’sCroatia concerning the alleged Islamic threat, arguing that ‘the unheeded warningsfrom the Croatian intelligence services about the unwisdom of entering an alliancewith radical Islam and the likes of al-Qaeda had been prescient.’ (p. 215).Schindler describes Osama bin Laden as having been one of Izetbegovic’s ‘friends’(p. 239), though he has no evidence for this. He cites several sources in support ofhis claim that bin Laden was in Bosnia during the war; the one he describes as ‘mostcredible’ being the German journalist Renate Flottau, who claims to have met binLaden in the foyer of Izetbegovic’s office in the early 1990s (p. 123). Izetbegovic’sstaff told Flottau that bin Laden was ‘here every day and we don’t know how tomake him go away’ (p. 124). As I mentioned in my own book on the BosnianArmy, Izetbegovic himself never ruled out the possibility that he may have metbin Laden, but stated that he had no recollection of having done so; he pointedout that he met thousands of foreign Muslim visitors during the war. Izetbegovicwas, of course, visited by many people during the war who were certainly not his‘friends,’ and many who were not Muslims, but Schindler jumps from providingevidence that bin Laden may have visited Izetbegovic to claiming that bin Ladenwas Izetbegovic’s ‘friend.’ Other evidence that he produces on this score is similarin character: e.g. the claim of one of Izetbegovic’s domestic opponents, the SocialDemocrat Sejfudin Tokić, who ‘attested that photos exist of Izetbegovic and binLaden together’ (p. 125) – photos which, needless to say, Schindler has not seen.Most of Schindler’s case against Izetbegovic and the SDA is based upon this sortof unsubstantiated rumour. Like Deliso, Schindler claims that Bosnian Muslimradicals during the war established a military unit named the ‘Handzar Division,’named after the Nazi SS division of the same name that had existed during WorldWar II. And like Deliso, he bases this claim on the solitary, tendentious newspaperarticle by Robert Fox.One of the more amusing of Schindler’s blunders concerns the scientific calculationof the figure for Bosnian war-dead carried out by Mirsad Tokaca’s Research andDocumentationCentreinSarajevo,whichplaceditataboutonehundredthousand.Schindler seems to endorse this figure wholeheartedly, seeing it as proof that earlierestimates of Bosnian war-dead had been ‘grossly exaggerated,’ and complaining thatTokaca’s result ‘got minimal attention in Bosnia or abroad’ (p. 317). The reason thisis amusing is that Tokaca’s figures disprove several of the figures for Serb dead at thehands of Bosnian forces that Schindler himself cites. Thus, Schindler claims that
  • 12. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 66 |‘more than 3,000 Bosnian Serbs, some soldiers but at least 1,300 unarmed civilians,had been killed by Muslim forces based in Srebrenica’ (p. 228). Yet according toTokaca’s calculation, only 849 Serb civilians were killed in the whole of Podrinje– the region that includes Srebrenica, and where Oric’s alleged crimes occurred –in the whole of the war. Likewise, with regard to the Serb victims of the SarajevoMuslim warlord Mušan Topalović-Caco, Schindler claims: ‘By the war’s end, it wasclear that at least two thousand Sarajevo Serbs had fallen victim to Caco’s gang,though the civic association representing the city’s Serbs claimed the true figurewas closer to five thousand’ (p. 105). Yet according to Tokaca’s figures, only 1,091Serb civilians were killed in the whole of the Sarajevo region during the war, andthis includes those killed by the Serb siege. Schindler claims that ‘at least 1,500Croatian civilians were killed in the fighting’ between Muslims and Croats (p. 99),yet according to Tokaca’s figures, in the two regions of Bosnia encompassed bythe Muslim-Croat conflict, Central Bosnia and Neretva, only 786 Croat civilianswere killed during the entire war, including those killed by Serb forces. So whenSchindler writes that Tokaca’s figures ‘got minimal attention in Bosnia or abroad,’he is probably referring to himself.Schindler claims that the SDA had ‘helped establish the beginnings of an Islamiststatelet in Europe’ (p. 253), but scrapes the bottom of the barrel to find evidencefor this. He admits that ‘Izetbegovic and the party leadership, for all their waxingKoranic to improve public morality, were careful to never speak openly about theirplan for implementing a fully Islamic society.’ (p. 196) But if Schindler is unable tofind evidence for Izetbegovic’s alleged Islamist plans in what he said, neither is heable to find it in what he and his party did. He mentions an SDA election posterof 2000, entitled ‘Beautiful like Sarajevo girls,’ showing three female faces – ‘two inWesternmakeup,oneinhijab,’andnotes:‘ThiswastheSDA’snewBosnia,forgedina terrible war, and it had many wondering which worldview – Western and secularor Islamist and radical – the party really stood for.’ (p. 274). Yet an election posterthat shows two Western-style women coexisting with a woman in hijab cannot byany stretch of the imagination be taken as evidence of a radical Islamic world-view.Likewise, concerning the unproven allegation that Izetbegovic collaborated withthe Nazis during World War II, Schindler writes: ‘Even out of office, the SDAfounder continued to deny allegations that he had been a Nazi collaborator as ayoung man and had served in the Bosnian Muslim 13th Handzar Division of theWaffen-SS. Though no evidence emerged to tie him directly to the Nazis, it wasnevertheless significant, observed a Sarajevo pundit, that Izetbegovic continued to
  • 13. | 67 |feel the need to publicly deny rumours that had existed for many years.’ (p. 276)– an argument so feeble that it defies comment. Schindler admits that Bosniaengaged in a ‘modest participation in the American-led war on Islamist terrorism’but complains that this provoked ‘open resentment among Bosnian Muslims,’ andthat ‘local newspapers regularly carried attacks on America and its leader “the stateterrorist Bush.”’ (p. 293). Damning evidence indeed – most of Christian Europewas probably ‘Islamist’ by this standard.Most instances of supposed ‘Islamist terrorism’ in the post-Dayton period thatSchindler cites in his book turn out simply to be cases of former mujahedinattacking Croat or Serb civilians, above all refugees trying to return to their formerhomes (pp. 263-64), much as Serbs and Croats likewise attacked returning refugeesfrom other communities – though Schindler does not mention the latter. Schindlerexplains away the absence of genuine Islamist terrorism in Bosnia by claimingthat ‘most mujahidin were wary of targeting US or Western interests in Bosnia –anywhere else was fair game – because they appreciated that NATO gave them ade facto safe haven after Dayton.’ (p. 266). So Bosnia was free of Islamist terrorismbecause the type of Islamist terrorists based there did not like to attack Westerntargets. It therefore perhaps did not matter so much that, according to Schindler,‘the Muslim police underperformed when it came to tracking down wanted holywarriors.’ (p. 262). Yet Schindler, like Deliso, mentions the Bosnian police arrestingon 19 October 2005 an armed terrorist cell that was planning to attack the BritishEmbassy (p. 318) – somehow the police of the ‘Islamist statelet’ had managed toovercome their reluctance to act against Islamists and staved off an attack against aWestern target.There are so many factual errors and internal contradictions in Schindler’s bookthat it is impossible to list them all, so what follows are just some examples.Schindler claims that ‘reliable analysis concludes that between five thousand andsix thousand Islamic fighters came to Bosnia during the war’ (p. 162) – havingpreviously written that ‘there were probably four thousand foreign Islamists whofought for Sarajevo during the civil war’ (p. 119). He claims that the Bosnian Serbs‘made up most of the agricultural population in Bosnia, and therefore controlleda disproportionate share of the land to be cleared of non-Serbs,’ which is simplyrubbish – more agricultural land in Bosnia was owned by Muslims than by Serbsbefore 1992. Schindler claims that ‘Ustasha’ means ‘uprising’ (p. 33), when in factit means ‘insurgent.’ He claims that Džafer Kulenović was made vice-president ofthe ‘Independent State of Croatia’ in November 1941 (p. 33); in fact, he was madeHoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosnia
  • 14. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 68 |deputy prime-minister. Schindler claims that during World War II ‘the Serbs ofBosnia and Croatia were also the only Yugoslav nation exposed to actual genocide’(p. 60) – he is either unaware, or chooses to ignore, the work by two leadingYugoslav historians of the World War II genocide, the Serb Vladimir Dedijer andthe Croat Antun Miletic, entitled Genocide of the Muslims,1941-1945: Collecteddocuments and testimony (Svjetlost, Sarajevo, 1990), which provides evidence of thewartime Serb Chetnik genocide of the Muslims.Schindler claims that ‘alone among Bosnia’s peoples they [the Muslims] had madeno real contribution to Allied victory, and their collaboration with the Nazis hadbeen unsurpassed’ – another fabrication, since nearly a quarter of all BosnianPartisans had been Muslims; their readiness to join the Partisans comparedfavourably with that of the Bosnian Croats; their contribution to the anti-Nazistruggle was, for a nationality of their size, a significant one; and their readinessto speak out against Nazi crimes in 1941, and protect the victims of genocide, wasvirtually unparalleled in Nazi-occupied Europe. Schindler claims that the seniorBosnian Muslim Communist Osman Karabegović was expelled from the League ofCommunists of Yugoslavia in 1972 for Muslim ‘exclusivism’ and ‘nationalism’ (p.43); this is the opposite of the truth – Karabegović was expelled because he was toomuch of a Yugoslav centralist; he would later become one of the most prominentBosnianMuslimstosupportMilošević.Thetext‘VirtuousMuslimState,’publishedin Tuzla in 1993, was not the ‘SDA’s manifesto,’ as Schindler claims (p. 95), butmerely a proposal put forward by a senior SDA member from Tuzla. Schindlerwrites of the Bosnian Serb JNA officer Jovan Divjak, that he ‘sided with Izetbegovicand the SDA when war broke out. It was a decision he would regret.’ (p. 102).This is again untrue: Divjak never supported the SDA; he supported his country –Bosnia – in the war, and would never regret having done so. Nor is it true that theanti-nationalist Bosnian Serb journalist Gojko Beric had been ‘an ardent supporterof the SDA’ during the war (p. 310).When all the rumours, unsubstantiated allegations and outright falsehoods aretaken away, Schindler’s case against Izetbegovic and the SDA evaporates. We areleft with a picture of a secular Bosnia-Hercegovina under an SDA regime thatwas undoubtedly highly corrupt and frequently brutal to its political opponents,but that supported the US-led ‘War on Terror,’ arrested Islamist terrorist suspectsand was essentially free of genuine Islamist terrorist outrages on its soil – certainlymore free than the US, Britain, Spain or Turkey. The most that can be said forSchindler’s portrayal of Bosnia as a centre of global jihad is that, yes, some of the
  • 15. | 69 |Hoare | Three Books on al-Qaeda in Bosniaforeign mujahedin who fought in Bosnia would subsequently go on to engage inacts of terrorism and jihad elsewhere, some with the dubious benefit derived frompossession of Bosnian passports – scarcely a free pass throughout the Westernworld, as anyone in the West who has Bosnian friends knows. In other words, noneof the evidence presented here suggests that the global Islamist jihad would looksignificantly different today had the Bosnian war never taken place.One other malevolent error of which both Deliso and Schindler are guilty is theirportrayal of the Clinton Administration as being hawkishly pro-Muslim and anti-Serb. You would not know, from reading either of these books, that Clinton hadenforced the arms embargo against Bosnia for the best part of the war; that he hadcome under massive fire from Congress for his unwillingness either to break thearms embargo or to carry out air-strikes against Serb forces; that he had forced theBosnian Army to halt its victorious advance against Serb forces in the autumn of1995, leaving half of Bosnia in Serb-rebel hands; that the Clinton-imposed DaytonAccords engineered the recognition of the ‘Republika Srpska’ incorporating nearlyhalf of Bosnia, with a much smaller share of territory going to the Muslims; and thatafter Dayton, the Clinton Administration avoided arresting the Serb war criminalsRadovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. Authors incapable of properly analysingIslamism are equally incapable of analysing US foreign policy.After reading two such inaccurate, unscholarly, poorly researched and politicallymotivated works of propaganda, it actually comes as a relief to read a book that ismerely very bad. Shaul Shay, unlike Deliso and Schindler, has no Balkan agenda oraxe to grind; he is a former Israeli intelligence officer, and he genuinely comes atthe Balkans from the perspective of someone primarily interested in radical Islamand the Islamic countries, rather than vice versa. His book contains some ratherendearingly naive sentences, such as ‘Yugoslavia is [sic] a mountainous country inthenorthernBalkans’(p.19)and‘Bosnia-Herzegovinaisamountainouscountryinthe Balkan [sic] that is divided into two historical geographic regions – the Bosniaregion in the north and the Herzegovina region in the south’ (p. 39); he elsewheredescribes Bosnia as having ‘a Muslim majority and a Serb minority’ (p. 24).Shay’s run-of-the-mill-first-year-undergraduate-quality potted history of theBalkans repeats some of the historical and other factual errors made by Delisoand Schindler, in particular at the expense of the Bosnian Muslims, and there arenumerous misspellings of names (Alija becomes ‘Ilia,’ Čengić become ‘Kengic,’Vojvodina becomes ‘Wivodena’), and so on. Having gone into the errors of Deliso
  • 16. Democratiya 13 | Summer 2008| 70 |and Schindler in detail, I’m not going to bore the reader further by listing Shay’s;his are by far the most innocent of the three. In fact, he appears to be the sort ofperson that books of the Deliso-Schindler variety might be written to target. If onesimply ignores everything Shay’s book has to say about Balkan politics, then onecan glean a few nuggets of information from it concerning the politics of radicalIslam globally and of the Muslim states of the Middle East. But this is not enoughto recommend this book when there are much better treatments of these topicsavailable.Radical Islam is a genuine problem facing Europe, and although it is actually lessof a danger in the Balkans outside of Turkey than it is in Western Europe, thisdoes not mean it is not a problem facing the Balkans as well. We need objective,scholarly analyses of the activities of Wahhabites and other radical Muslims in theBalkans if we are to understand and confront the problem. Unfortunately, this willnot happen so long as writers simply use the issue to make propaganda to fightBalkan wars that, ultimately, have little to do with radical Islam.Marko Attila Hoare is an Advisory Editor of Democratiya. Formerly a ResearchFellow in the Faculty of History, University of Cambridge, he is now a SeniorResearch Fellow at Kingston University, London. His latest book is The History ofBosnia: From the Middle Ages to the Present Day (Saqi).