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    037 037 Document Transcript

    • Irma SlomczynskaPersisting Threats for Security – New Space Tools for the Global EU First draft, please do not quote
    • The EU becomes increasingly a global actor what requires acquisition of newinstruments, including space assets to fully and autonomously realize all EU aims and values.Therefore the EU tries to exploit space for civilian and military purposes, but we must stillbear in mind that the EU as an international actor lacks common defence policy. CSDP1 is justa mechanism for crisis prevention and management, although some military solutions cannotbe excluded. That is why European space policy focuses on peaceful exploration andexploitation of space not weaponization which is widely perceived as a main threat for theEU, its member states as well as every EU citizen. Most scholars agree that the EU establishing space policy focuses its attention on thespace security and not on the space defense. This approach is tightly connected with theoverall strategic culture of the EU. R. E. Johnson points out, that the EU needs space policy“(...) to enable Europe to benefit from a more effective coordination of technologies andassets for the purposes of enhancing European and international security, while preventingdestabilising developments, such as the testing, deployment or use of anti-satellite weapons orweapons in and from space.”2 The EU and its member states would like to acquire new spaceassets yet it is very clear that these capabilities will be civilian ones although having securityimplications. All European space assets should therefore be perceived as dual-use whatconstitutes both new advantages and new challenges. R. E. Johnson warns that “there is adanger that in the rush to ensure that Europe’s space assets are better geared to serve ESDPgoals, not enough consideration is being given to the countervailing implications of an overlynarrow and militarised concept both of ESDP and of space potential and uses. Europe’s spacepolicy needs to balance the requirements of ESDP with the overarching need to supportEuropean security objectives and CFSP. Much of the current debate appears to have lost sightof this fundamental obligation.”3 T. Hitchens and T. Valasek underline that the EU has adopted a multidimensionalapproach towards security, quoting European Commission’s document in which it is clearlystated that “the Council of the EU has recognized that space assets could contribute both tomaking the EU more capable in the field of crisis management and to fighting other security1 The CSDP acronym is used in the paper interchangeably with the previous one – ESDP, yet they both refer tothe security and defence policy of the European Union.2 R. E. Johnson, Europe’s Space Policies and their Relevance to ESDP, Brussels 2006, p. 6.3 Ibid., p. 7. 2
    • threats. It has approved the idea that requirements identified and agreed upon ESDP should bereflected in the global EU space policy and European space programme.”4 A preliminary overview of a complex and wide-ranging subject will be presented inthe paper. I will concentrate on basic premises of the European Space Policy, its currentposture as well as its prospects concerning the evolution of the EU’s global role withinsecurity and defence. The main hypothesis of the article is as following: the EU as anemerging space power tries to exploit and explore space to realize efficiently its global powerrole. Dual-use, non-aggressive and common/joint space assets are indispensable for therealization of EU pragmatic external policies and are only partially linked with the need forprestige. Cooperation between the EU, particular member states and other actors concerningspace seems to be the only option to get real capabilities since the pooling of resources is aprecondition for the success. Moreover, the EU entering space will acquire new capabilitiesbut in the same time it will be exposed to new challenges and threats. To succeed as a spacepower the EU will have to use cross-pillar approach and find a clear, straightforward way ofcoordination of all space activities at their every stage.European Space policy – a theoretical framework As it was written above, the EU has adopted the multidimensional approach towardssecurity. According to “Copenhagen school” there are five dimensions of security: military,political, economic, environmental, and societal one. In order to analyze the European spacepolicy another dimension should be added – space security, which encompasses all abovedimensions. It could be defined as a security in space (safety of all systems and objects inspace), as well as security from space (to avoid of the weaponization of space and using ofspace weapons and to determine legally binding principles of using space for militarypurposes) and security via space (using space systems for civilian purposes). According to J. C. Moltz, space security involves both preserving from man-made andnatural threats. He defines it as “the ability to place and operate assets outside the Earth’satmosphere without external interference, damage, or destruction.”5 There are four main4 T. Hitchens, T. Valasek, The security dimension of European collective efforts in space, “SIPRI Yearbook”2006, p. 567.5 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security. Strategic Restraint and the Pursuit of National Interests, Stanford2008, p. 11. 3
    • schools of thought concerning space security: 1. space nationalism; 2. technologicaldeterminism; 3. social interactionism; 4. global institutionalism.6 Space nationalism started after the II World War period, was marked by the large,government-run military space programmes realized by both the U.S. and the USSR. Realisticapproach, great power rivalry and hostility between them gave a spur towards spaceexploration and exploitation. J. C. Moltz describes that era quoting McDougall: ”theinternational system absorbed space just as it absorbed the atom.” Powers did not want tolimit themselves as far as space exploration and exploitation are concerned, that is why theyperceived international treaties and agreements as useless. Therefore cooperation was limitedand possible only in that areas, which needed huge costs or very complicated technical assetsand both sides were not interested in their deployment. “The end result of this competitionconcerning space, therefore, is viewed as an increasingly militaristic drive by the leadingspace powers to secure geostrategic advantages over their rivals, as during the age of seapower” Moltz adds.7 Global institutionalism is an extremely opposing approach to space nationalism. Spaceis perceived as a “sanctuary from world political conflicts”. The main assumption of thatapproach is belief in the possibility of international cooperation concerning the exploration of“another unknown environment”. Moreover, shared scientific thinking and internationalnorms and treaties would bring security in space rather than a new arms race: “(…) humansmight be able to live peaceably in space through new methods of transnational governance.”8 Technological determinism focused on technological determinants not political ones.In the U.S. during fifties many scientists believed that space exploration, like nuclear energy,could raise standards of living. Pessimists from the other hand underlined the fact that themilitary space technologies could lead to conflict and even space destruction (in space andfrom space). Therefore costs and complexity would make different states cooperate within therealm of space exploration/exploitation. Technological challenges were almost the same forstates having “space ambitions”. Technological determinism stresses the special role of6 Ibid., p. 23.7 Ibid., pp. 24-27.8 Ibid., pp. 27-31. Thinking in the spirit of the global institutionalism, German scholar D. Wolter has proposedsigning of the new treaty concerning Cooperative Security in Outer Space and then establishment of the newinternational organization to implement that agreement. Main provisions of the new treaty provide for: theprohibition on destructive space weapons, including ASAT, space-strike weapons, as well as antiballistic missiletechnologies; the international system of monitoring and verifications of provisions. 4
    • military-industrial complex as well as “scientific-technological” elite in the process of spaceexploration/exploitation.9 At seventies and eighties European political economy produced a variation oftechnological school thinking – theory of “collective (public) goods”. States interested inspace activities were perceived as “self-interested rational actors making decisions accordingto shifting economic and strategic calculations.” Commercial and military benefits from spaceexploration/exploitation could even lead to the “privatization of space”. It could be possiblebecause apart from the U.S. and the USSR different states and organizations interested inspace activities have appeared in this time. Nowadays technological determinism issometimes used by the military scholars who refer to space as to another important RMA.Some of them share the view that space militarization is inevitable, but it should not have theform of an aggressive arms race. Negotiations with other space powers are still important toreduce the probability of space conflicts.10 The newest approach towards space security is social interactionsim. It is based on theassumption that new cooperative initiatives are possible, and less military-oriented approachtowards space exploration/exploitation is visible. “Social interactionsits rejected the notion ofthe inevitability of space weapons, given the availability of policy tools among space-faringstates to interact with one another, bargain, and prevent the deployment of harmful weapons,which could damage other priorities they have in space.” Sometimes social interactionism islinked with concepts of cognitive change (learning) at the individual, organizational, and statelevels.11 Regarding the EU space ambitions, social interactionism seems to suit better thanother approaches, because it puts pressure on “the loose coupling of national and internationalgoals for safe access to space, with new commercial and other non-state actors graduallybecoming major actors and joining international efforts to make and establish space ‘rules’.“12 D. Lupton gives another theoretical approach towards space power. Firstly, space canbe treated as “sanctuary”, because of the principle of “peaceful purposes”. Yet it does notpreclude the use of space in a non-aggressive way to support some military activities andgoals like for example navigation, weather observation, communications, warning etc. Yetspace should not be weaponized. Secondly, “survivability” doctrine perceives space not as astrategic asset, but as an operational and tactical one. Space support a warfighter thereforegiving an opportunity to gain additional advantage over an opponent. “Space begins to be9 Ibid., pp. 31-37.10 Ibid., p. 34.11 Ibid., pp. 37-40.12 Ibid., p. 313. 5
    • considered a military center of gravity that needs protection to survive.” Thirdly, “Control”doctrine which focuses on assuring access to space, protecting space infrastructure, andpossessing the capability to deny space adversaries. Space in that particular approach isperceived as a strategic asset as well as vulnerability. Fourthly, “High-ground” approachwhich envisages that war can be waged “mainly through the application of space as theultimate high-ground, controlling the territory below.” It means weaponization of space inother words.13 The EU perceives space as “sanctuary” using Lupton’s wording, yet analyzingthe prospects of the European space policy, we could observe a “silent shift” towards“survivability” doctrine by stressing the importance of space assets for the effectiverealization of the CSDP14. According to the report of the Assembly of the WEU concerningGMES and Galileo, “if European defence is one day to emerge, it must have the means ofimplementing the ESDP, and these include autonomous space-based earth observation andsatellite navigation capabilities. We are currently in a transition phase during which thefoundations in terms of organization and governance for Europe to become a space power arebeing laid.”15 Space activities, previously marked by the competition and the need for prestige, isnowadays based on the requirement for information in a globalized world. Economicdevelopment, and national and international security will be a key directions of the futurespace exploration/exploitation. Therefore some scholars suggest the need to define a theory ofspace power, which “will provide an opportunity to maximize the benefits of space for globalsociety.”16 J. E. Oberg notices in his book entitled Space Power Theory that “space power,alone, is insufficient to control the outcome of terrestrial conflict or ensure the attainment ofterrestrial political objectives. For the next several decades, the control of space, or even warin space, is important only in that it is important to terrestrial events. Space power must becombined with its emerging sibling, information power, and the older, purely terrestrial,expressions of national power.”17 The EU can be therefore perceived as “real space power”,because it posses lot of important instruments which allows it to influence its environmentand space assets are treated as the means not ends. Yet Oberg points out that “theweaponization of space is inevitable, though the manner and timing are not at all predictable”.13 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives: The Political Will for Increasing European Space Power,“Astropolitics” 2006, no. 4, pp. 13-14.14 See: A. Kolovos, The European Space Policy – Its Impact and Challenges for the European Security andDefence Policy, “ESPI Perspectives” 2009, no. 27.15 Space systems for Europe’s security: GMES and Galileo – reply to the annual report of the Council, EuropeanSecurity and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, 4 June 2008, p. 20.16 P. L. Hays, Ch. D. Lutes, Towards a theory of spacepower, “Space Policy” 2007, no. 23, p. 206.17 J. E. Oberg, Space Power Theory, Colorado Springs 1999, p. 127. 6
    • It means that the EU as a space power should be somehow prepared for that and as a first stepit should establish situational awareness in space as a key to successful application of spacepower.18 According to G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, the EU should particularly focus on theweaponization of space which “will, in the long term, constitute a real threat to our own spacesystems. Europe should thus take this new dimension into account in its future plans for theuse of space, whether the applications are essentially civil or concern its defence directly.”Therefore the protection of space systems should be a key concern for the future EU spacepolicy, although it means at the same time that some increasing of cost could be expected.19European Space Policy – premises laid behind and challenges ahead The EU entering space had to take into account some challenges linked withcontemporary space activities like electromagnetic pulse radiation, orbital space debris,increasing population of operational satellites and space statecraft and the fact that politicaldecisions sometimes prevail over the cost-effectiveness and technological obstacles.20 J. C.Moltz underlines that space powers should focus their policy on space “traffic control” toavoid domino-effects crashes between different objects, especially within really crowdedgeostationary orbital realm; possible future use of nuclear reactors in space, especially forpropulsion; to develop space surveillance systems in order to collect and distributeinformation concerning orbital spacecraft and debris; decreasing availability of useful radiofrequencies for space communications and limited availability of slots in GEO forcommunications satellites.21 He is right noticing that as far as future of space exploration isconcerned a wide set of factors should be taken into account: military developments; threatperceptions; commercial pressures; environmental issues; globalization trends; and nationaland international political pressures.22 There were some external and internal factors which impacted the EU to establishspace policy. Firstly, the crisis in the commercial space launch sector, which threatenedArianespace in 2003, made Europeans aware of the fact that their sole asset for independentaccess to space is threatened in the same time. That is why in May 2003 European Guaranteed18 Ibid., pp. 129-130.19 G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, Space for defence : A European Vision, “ Space Policy” 2006, no. 22, p. 97. Theyeven call for a “space dissuasion” capability. “If the weaponization of space is taking place, it will be necessaryto study the means to neutralize satellite systems in order to build a ‘space dissuasion’ capability.”20 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security ..., p. 55.21 Ibid., pp. 309-312.22 Ibid., p. 312. 7
    • Access to Space (EGAS) programme was adopted. Secondly, another crisis in the Europeancommercial space sector occurred between 2001 and 2003. The lack of demand made thissector hard to sustain, which threatened according to ESA wording “basic” activities. Thedecline of leading space companies linked with decline of space power capabilities wereenlisted as the main threats in the White Paper on Space issued by the European Commissionin 200323. Thirdly, Europeans would like to get an independent access to information throughspace application. There is no possibility to perform the global role by the EU so long as it isdepended on the American strategic information.24 N. Peter thinks in this regard that, “spaceis now seen as an essential asset for European integration and for non-dependence in thecurrent geo-strategic context, since space-based systems and derived information can bringnecessary capabilities for autonomous decision making. The development of an integratedEuropean space capability for security is at an early stage, but it is an ongoing processpresenting some opportunities to enhance European independence and security.”25 J. Nyamuya Maogoto and S. Freeland claim, that American, Russian and Chineseinitiatives aimed at weaponization of space have spurred the EU to rethink its role as a spaceactor seeking new assets to be used for civilian and security purposes.26 T. Hitchens and T.Valasek point out that several reasons laid behind the establishment of the EU space policy:multilateralism as a principle of common action as well as requirements of modern warfareplus an urgent need to build an autonomous capabilities to reduce European dependence onAmerican assets in that area.27 “Like many other elements of European power, however,space capability is not a fully unified project, but rather arises through the accumulation of aconfused mixture of national and multinational entities and efforts.”28 European space activityis linked with its political goals like in the U.S., but there are many different actors engaged:the EU at the European level, European Space Agency and Eumetsat at the intergovernmentallevel and national space agencies at the national level. ESA is responsible for developing and23 F. Slijper urges the EU to “cut the influence that corporate business has on policy making and instead investmuch more energy in addressing new policies to the general public. Not only is this a democratic duty, it is also anecessity for a clear public understanding of the way Europe is developing, especially in the politically sensitivearea of foreign and defence policies.” The author is afraid that EU officials claiming that European space policyis a civilian undertaking are slowly realizing military ambitions thus blurring the line between civilian andmilitary realms. He additionally thinks that such steps could expose the EU to accusations of being a militarizedspace power. See: F. Slijper, The EU should freeze its military ambitions in space, “Space Policy” 2009, no. 25,70-74.24 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives ..., p. 16.25 N. Peter, Space and Security: The Emerging Role of Europe, “Astropolitics” 2005, no. 3, p. 265.26 J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars – The Next Strategic Frontier: Paradigms toAnchor Space Security, “Air & Space Law” 2008, vol. 33, no. 1, p. 11.27 T. Hitchens, T. Valasek, The security dimension of European collective ..., p. 565.28 Ibidem. 8
    • implementing space and ground segments while the EU identifies its needs as far as therealization of political goals is concerned. It is worth adding in that context, that “only a smallnumber of European countries own civilian or space-based military systems (Britain, France,Germany, Italy and Spain). The space based military systems cover two main areas: Earthobservation and telecommunications.”29 All actors are involved in the space activity whichcould be basically divided into three functional areas: space science and exploration(including human spaceflight); space utilities (including space commerce); and militaryapplications.30 K. Madders and W. Thiebaut aptly point out, that “the EU is more than astakeholder, or ‘federator of user needs’ vis-a` -vis ESA, because its obligations extendthroughout vast areas of European society and to each citizen; it hence needs to assume amore basic responsibility and take ‘ownership’ at the highest political level in order to ensureits obligations are exercised to full effect.”31 Moreover, the European space policy shouldconsist of the following elements: a vision referring to the values, goals and policies of the EUthat will be addressed by the space policy; a clear exposition of the political context; astatement of direction which indicates how the vision can become a reality; the establishmentof the priorities within European Space Programme and EU flagship projects – Galileo and29 N. Peter, Space and Security ..., pp. 271-276. He notices that, “until 2008, the following national dedicatedmilitary and dual-use systems for Earth observation will continue to exist alongside each other in Europe:  France: Helios I (defense, operational), Helios II (defense, operational in 2005), Pleiades (dual-use operational after 2008), Jason-1 (dual-use, operational), Jason-2 (dual-use, operational after 2008) the Spot IV and V (dual-use, operational);  Germany: SAR Lupe (defense, operational after 2006) and TerraSAR-X (dual-use, operational after 2006) Rapid Eye (dual-use, operational after 2007);  Italy: Cosmo-SkyMed (dual-use, operational after 2006);  Spain: SpainishEOSystem (defense, project under development);  United Kingdom (UK): TopSat project (defense, operational in 2006), DMC (dual-use, operational);  ESA: Envisat (dual-use, operational), ERS-2 (dual-use, operational), Proba (dual-use, operational) and five sentinels missions (dual-use, operational after 2008);  EUMETSAT: MSG-1 (dual-use, operational), Metop (dual-use, operational after 2006).Current and future telecommunications systems available for security include among other:  United Kingdom: Skynet IV (military, operational), Skynet V (military, operational after 2007);  France: Syracuse II (military, operational), Syracuse III (military, operational);  Italy: Sicral 1 (military, operational); Sircal 1 bis (military, planned ) and Sircal 2 (military, planned)  Spain: Hispasat (dual-use, operational), XTAR-EUR (military, operational) Spainsat (military, operational after 2006);  Germany: SatcomBw Stufe 2 (military, operational after 2008);  Greece: Hellas Sat (dual-use, operational);  NATO: NATO IV (military, operational), NATO Satcom Post 2000 (military, operational after 2008);  ESA: Artemis (dual-use, operational);  EUTELSAT series (dual-use, operational);  SES Global series (dual-use, operational);  INMARSAT series (dual-use, operational).”30 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security ..., p. 57.31 K. Madders, W. Thiebaut, Carpe Diem: Europea must make a genuine space policy now, “Space Policy” 2007,no. 23, p. 10. 9
    • GMES; a clear mechanism of overseeing the policy; a financial orientation; an affirmation ofcompetence on the basis of already existing ones within the EU/ESA.32European Space Policy – institutionalization The process of institutionalization of the European space policy has started in latenineties, yet there is still much to be done. “European Strategy for Space” from November2000 focused on the recognition of space as a strategic asset enabling Europe’s political andeconomic strength as well as contributing to achieve common goals. Mainly, the strategyhighlights the importance of space capabilities as far as economic and political growth inEurope, the European strategic independence, the global competitiveness of Europeanindustry and efficient use of the European space infrastructure are concerned.33 Anotherimportant step was taken in September 2002: “ESDP and Space” – a study of military needsof space capabilities has been presented to the EU Military Committee. In 2003 severalimportant documents were published: joint EC/ESA Green Paper on European Space Policy;ESA International Report on Space and Security Policy in Europe; Framework Agreement oncooperation between the EC and the ESA.34 In November 2003 the European Commissionreleased its White Paper entitled ‘Space: a New European Frontier for an Expanding Union –An Action Plan for Implementing the European Space Policy.” As a result the Panel ofExperts on Space and Security (SPASEC) was established in March 2004. One of the maintasks of this panel is “to identify where security requirements can or cannot be met by existingcivilian space assets. Four SPASEC working groups were set up: Operational Requirements,Capability Gaps, Programme Options, and Financial Planning.”35 In 2004 the first meeting ofthe Space Council comprising of the EU and ESA Councils of Ministers and theestablishment of the European Space Policy Institute took place. In 2005 Report of the Panelof Experts on Space and Security was published. Moreover, the Space Policy Unit under theDirectorate-General for Enterprise and Industry has been set up. It was important because itovercame obstacles emanating from the EU’s three-pillar nature. The Unit was indispensablefor “the EC coordination of space policy within the EC first pillar, between the first andsecond pillars, between the EC and ESA, and between the EC and industry. Working-level32 Ibid., p. 11.33 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives ..., p. 1934 Ibid., p. 18.35 N. Peter, Space and Security ..., pp. 286-288. 10
    • consultation and coordination among the various actors within the EC occur regularly via theSpace Coordinating Group and progress toward harmonization is being made. Besides pullingtogether the space activities from the various Directorate-Generals mentioned earlier, thisgroup pulls together such disparate EC actors as External Relations, Judge Advocate, LegalDivision, Environmental Affairs, Fisheries, Agriculture, and others, along with ESA.Observers from the second pillar actively participate in these meetings.”36 European SpacePolicy, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,issued in 2007 and European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document,from 2008 are other steps towards the crystallization of the EU space policy. The FrameworkAgreement between the European Community and ESA has been extended in 2008 for afurther four years until 2012 and the European Space Programme will be further developed,through the High Level Space Policy Group, based on recommendations from a dedicated adhoc working group composed of Member State representatives.37 Lisbon Treaty institutionalizes the role of the EU regarding the space policy and placesthat policy at the very top of the political level, therefore underlined its importance. Thatshould be perceived as an important shift, because for the first time space issues have been onthe top of the EU political agenda and not only within ESA. Thus the EU defined itself as amajor space actor within Europe. Moreover, Lisbon Treaty envisages explicitly theestablishment of the European Space Policy as well as European Space Programme “meaningthat for the first time the European space sector firmly resides within the auspices of the EU,positioned to support both EU civil policies, and the EU CFSP and ESDP.”38European Space Policy – security challenges36 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives ..., p. 25.37 European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, pp. 10-11.38 Ibid., p. 18. Article 189 of the Lisbon Treaty envisages:“1. To promote scientific and technical progress, industrial competitiveness and the implementation of itspolicies, the Union shall draw up a European space policy. To this end, it may promote joint initiatives, supportresearch and technological development and coordinate the efforts needed for the exploration and exploitation ofspace.2. To contribute to attaining the objectives referred to in paragraph 1, the European Parliament and the Council,acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall establish the necessary measures, which maytake the form of a European space programme, excluding any harmonisation of the laws and regulations of theMember States.3. The Union shall establish any appropriate relations with the European Space Agency.4. This Article shall be without prejudice to the other provisions of this Title.” Source: Consolidated Version ofthe Treaty On The Functioning Of The European Union, Part Three Union Policies and Internal Actions, TitleXIX: Research And Technological Development And Space, “Official Journal of the European Union” 9.5.2008,pp. C 115/131-132. 11
    • According to international law an outer space should be used in a peaceful way in thename of whole humankind what in the same time means that weaponization is prohibited39.Yet space-faring powers claim that some military supporting technologies and activities inspace such as observation, surveillance, communications are passive thereby not underminingthe principle of peaceful exploitation of space.40 EU decision-makers seem to share thatapproach. Nevertheless J. Nyamuya Maogoto and S. Freeland predict, that there will be aserious legal deficit as far as space legal regime is concerned. Because of ambitions of space-faring powers and possibilities which new technologies give them, an outer space couldbecome a direct battlefield in a near future41. It poses a real challenge for the EU and otheractors, because space can become weaponized without any rules and limitations. Thereforethe EU should develop non-aggressive rather than non-military space assets, because somemilitary applications of space capabilities are indispensable during peace-keeping or peace-making operations.42 Some scholars call even for space-enable warfare approach to be takenregarding security and space. It embraces capabilities needed to increase the precision andoverall effectiveness of different systems of weapons, which at the same time can reducecasualties and collateral damage.43 G. Brachet and B. Deloffre stress “the importance ofintelligence gathering before a crisis, thanks in particular to the discretion of space systemsand their capacity to investigate any region of the globe with impunity.” Moreover, they notethat space assets “make it possible to set up well-adapted communication networks for verymobile ground forces operating in enemy territory, and provide navigation and guidanceaides, in particular for ever more efficient weapon systems.” Therefore, space systems seemto be indispensable during war-time and in stable security environment.44 Furthermore authorsstress that “it is no doubt premature for Europe to plan for neutralization weapons being39 According to R. Ramey following military activities in outer space are not comprehensively prohibited by theinternational law: the use of military personnel and space based remote sensors supporting combat or othermilitary activities; using of space based communication, navigation or meteorological systems for militarypurposes; the deployment and non-aggressive use of conventional space weapons; the transiting of WMD in non-orbital trajectories. Therefore there is a probability that space-faring states inventing new space technologies willinterpret the basic principle of “peaceful purpose” to fit their real ambitions in that regard. J. Nyamuya Maogoto,S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars ..., p. 29.40 J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars ..., p. 25.41 New advanced technologies should be perceived both as assets and challenges as far as space exploitation andexploration are concerned. Therefore states should avoid creating new space weapons, because it can only leadtowards greater chaos and insecurity in the same time changing the basic patterns of international order andbeginning the ne arms race. It is worth adding that states seem to be irresponsible as non-state actors in thatparticular issue. Moreover, new space technologies offer just new ways of killing assuring power states that theystill need to back up they hegemonic status by new military technologies unavailable to their rivals. J. NyamuyaMaogoto, S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars ..., pp. 18-19.42 N. Peter, Space and Security ..., p. 291.43 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security ..., p. 307.44 G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, Space for defence ..., p. 93. 12
    • placed in orbit, but it is now urgent that it reinforce its capacity to monitor space, whichmeans having at its disposal precise knowledge of all objects in space including debris, andthe ability to identify them.”45 That means at the same time that they do not make theweaponization of space impossible what in turn should influence European long-term visionregarding space exploitation.46European Space Policy – flagship projectsGalileo The Galileo navigation system (for which Directorate-General Transport and Energy isin charge of) and the Global Monitoring for Environment and Security renamed Kopernikusinitiative (for which Directorate-General Enterprise and Industry is responsible) are landmarkprojects aimed at establishing European space capabilities. The Galileo satellite navigation system is perceived as a key program because of manyreasons. Firstly, Galileo is the first EU space program. Secondly, when it reaches fulloperational capability, it will have worldwide coverage and availability. Thirdly, Galileo is aEuropean undertaking financed through a public-private partnership what means that as adual-use system will have both civilian and military applications47. Fourthly, there are manystates and organizations interested in Galileo project. For example, China has startedcooperation with the EU in the Galileo system since 200348. Galileo’s complete architecture will consist of 30 satellites including 3 that are spare.The ground segment - 2 control centers that will manage 20 sensor stations and 15 uplinkstations around the world. Galileo will send ten different signals. Six of them will be open andsafety-of-life signals provided for free. Another two signals will be reserved for commercialusers who must pay for the service in order to get more precise signal. There will be also twoPublic Regulated Service (PRS) signals which will be encrypted and intended for selected45 Space debris pose an additional challenge for actors involved in space activities. Some researches stress that“a war in space could create a battlefield that would last forever, with the capacity to encase the entire planet ina shell of whizzing debris, thus making space near the Earth highly hazardous for peaceful as well as militarypurposes.“ The worst case scenario is “cascade effect” – space debris will become self-generating andcompletely uncontrolled. J. Nyamuya Maogoto, S. Freeland, From Star Wars to Space Wars ..., p. 34.46 G. Brachet, B. Deloffre, Space for defence ..., p. 94.47 In 2007 Council of the EU “decided that the future development of the European navigation programmes,including governance and procurement aspects, are based on a full public, EU funding of the deployment phase.The public governance of the programmes will be based on the division of labor between the EC, the EuropeanGNSS Supervisory Authority (GSA) and ESA.” European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission WorkingDocument, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 3.48 C. Bildt, M. Dillon, Europe’s final frontier, in: Europe in Space, ed. By C. Bildt et al, London 2004, p. 10. 13
    • government receivers like for example law enforcement and security services, intelligenceservices, border control agencies, the European anti-fraud office and the European policeEUROPOL. Greater accuracy and reliability than current GPS signals should be the basicadvantage of the Galileo’s signals49. It is worth to add, that in June 2004 an agreementbetween the EU and U.S. was signed. Its aim was to harmonize Galileo and GPS with lowersignal robustness than originally planned for Galileo (in order not to jam American M-signal)50. Following the adoption of the Space Council Resolution issued in May 2007,“important technical progress has been achieved in the development and in-orbit validationphase of the GALILEO programme”51. According to the Commission’s Report “GIOVE-B,the second GALILEO experimental satellite, has been successfully launched on 27 April2008. It will work in conjunction with the first GALILEO experimental satellite, GIOVE-A,carrying critical new technologies to be tested in space and needed for the performances of theGALILEO systems, notably the most accurate atomic clock ever put into orbit”52. It is alsostated in the document that “the first four operational GALILEO satellites will be launched in2010, by which time the related ground control infrastructure will also be established”53. Thefull operational capability of Galileo is targeted for 2013 (although at the beginning of theproject it has been planned for 2008). At the same time, the European GeostationaryNavigation Overlay Service (EGNOS) infrastructure is progressively being phased intooperation. EGNOS is monitoring and correcting signals emitted from existing global satellitenavigation systems to make them suitable for safety critical navigation applications54. Researchers and strategists agree that Galileo’s navigation system can be particularlyuseful for security and defence goals. For example for guide of munitions, to improvelogistics within the theatre of operation, to track enemy assets and positions, to enhance thecapability to synchronize the movement of different units, to enhance awareness within thebattlefield, to improved strike effectiveness or to reduce the possibility of “friendly fire”55.49 There are many advantages of the Galileo navigation system, yet some question the need to establish newEuropean system since both American GPS and Russian GLONASS will be improved in a near future and theywill be available to European states. G. Lindström, G. Gasparini, The Galileo satellite system and its securityimplications, Paris 2003, p. 16.50 Ibid., p. 19. See also: B. Giegerich, Satellite States – Transatlantic Conflict and the Galileo System, paperpresented during ISA Annual Convention, 1-5 March 2005, Honolulu.51 Commission Working Document. European Space Policy Progress Report, Brussels 11.9.2008, p. 3.52 Ibid., p. 3-4.53 Ibidem.54 Ibidem.55 G. Lindström, G. Gasparini, The Galileo satellite system and its security implications, Paris 2003, p. 7. 14
    • Yet its crucial applications are: border control, transport management and logistics, and thesurveillance of critical energy and communications infrastructures.56GMES/Kopernikus Although initially Global Monitoring for Environment and Space was targeted atmonitoring environmental changes, the concept was expanded to include security issues inorder to realize the goals within the CFSP and particularly the CSDP57. R. E. Johnsonunderlines that “it is intended to bring together all the relevant European Earth observationactivities, making the use of European assets more effective by forming a “system ofsystems”, which would enable a better flow of information. In addition to its original purposeof monitoring climate change and providing early warning of environmental dangers, GMEShas been rethought as a tool to be used to monitor borders and population centres andmovements, support conflict prevention and crisis management, and help verify internationalarms control and environmental treaties”58. The space component of GMES relies on five concepts of space missions or‘Sentinels” feeding into the US-initiated ‘Global Earth Observation System of Systems’(GEOSS) and contribute to data sharing for land monitoring, climate research, marineresearch and disaster (emergency) planning. Some elements have been operational since 2008,some are scheduled to follow in 2009-13. In order to avoid duplication and enhance cost-effectiveness, “GMES will start by incorporating planned national and EU satellite and in-situsystems”59. According to the Commission Working Document “GMES requires the integration ofdata from space-based and in-situ (ground) Earth observation capacities into operationalEuropean application services. Three user-based GMES services in the areas of EmergencyResponse, Land and Marine Monitoring will be pre-operational by the end of 2008. Work wasalso launched on identifying user requirements for security services, on the development of anadditional Atmosphere Pilot Service, as well as on the potential contribution of GMES toaddressing climate change”60. It is worth adding that GMES “is based on several interlinked56 European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 3.57 See: N. Rohnera, K.-U. Schrogl, S. Chelic, Making GMES better known: Challenges and opportunities,“Space Policy” 2007, no. 23, pp. 195-198.58 R. E. Johnson, Europe’s Space Policies ..., p. 50.59 Ibid. p. 50-5160 Commission Working Document. European Space Policy Progress Report, Brussels 11.9.2008, p. 5. 15
    • components (service, space and ground components), which produce data and information forusers and for the further processing by the downstream service sector”61. In particular, GMES services could provide support in areas such as conflict earlywarning, counter-proliferation monitoring of sensitive or denied locations, and ESDPoperations. With respect to ESDP operations, imagery of key infrastructures in the theatre ofoperations is particularly useful: marking of road networks, embassy locations, identificationof potential landing sites for aircraft and helicopters, and other facilities which could eitherfacilitate or complicate the operation62.Conclusions Firstly, I would like to emphasize that the utmost aim of the European Space Policy isto enhance European and regional security in almost every aspect, although it is not aboutestablishing of military superiority. Because European strategic culture is not offensive one,all European space assets and capabilities will primarily focus on anticipation and protection,not on defence as such. As it was written in the EC’s European Space Policy communication,“the development of a truly European Space Policy is a strategic choice for Europe, if it doesnot want to become irrelevant. (...) Europe needs an effective space policy to enable it to exertglobal leadership in selected policy areas in accordance with European interests and values.To fulfil such roles the EU increasingly relies on autonomous decision-making, based onspace-based information and communication systems. Independent access to spacecapabilities is therefore a strategic asset for Europe.”63 Secondly, although both GMES and Galileo projects are expensive we should noticetheir political and strategic importance. Strengthening Europe’s commercial and strategicspace independence is viewed more as a public service than as a solely commercial enterpriseand is seen as a tool to deepen the CFSP/CSDP. Moreover, without appropriate spacecapabilities and clear common space policy, the EU will not change the political, military andcommercial American monopoly within space activities. “European space capacities have61 Ibidem. See also: The Graz Declaration, “Space Policy” 2007, no. 23, pp. 57-59.62 G. Lindström, GMES: the Security Dimension, 16 March 2007, EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris. “Interms of its dual-use applications, GMES will have to meet the increasingly stringent requirements of thedefence ministries of the EU member states. Sensors for strictly military use are currently the property of nationsor governed by bilateral or multilateral agreements among states. The main challenge for GMES will be todevelop a model for interconnections and interoperability among the different national components. Among suchcomplementary national elements are COSMOSKYMED, PLEIADE, TERRASAT, SAR-LUPE and the futureHELIOS-3.” Space systems for Europe’s security: GMES and Galileo – reply to the annual report of the Council,European Security and Defence Assembly, Assembly of Western European Union, 4 June 2008, p. 19.63 European Space Policy, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament,Brussels, 26.4.2007, p. 4. 16
    • become critical information tools in addressing a diversity of environmental, economic andsecurity challenges of a global or regional scale. Autonomous access to information derivedfrom space is thus a strategic EU asset. The EU will need to further strengthen its ability torespond to these challenges, including in the security and defence domains, both throughimproved coordination and through the development of own capacities.”64 Thirdly, analyzing the European space assets we should be fully aware that there is acrucial distinction between “militarization” and “weaponisation” of space. Space has been“militarized” since the earliest communications satellites were launched into orbit. Incontemporary strategic environment, mostly advanced technically armed forces rely heavilyon satellites for command and control, communications, reconnaissance and monitoring, earlywarning, treaty verification, and navigation with the GPS. It means that space is militarized,but it is not yet weaponised. Space “weaponisation” is understood as the placement in orbit ofspace-based devices that have a destructive capacity. Space weapon is defined as “any systemwhose use destroys or damages objects in or from space.”65 Therefore, while satellites may beused for military purposes, such as GPS navigation of fighter jets or precision guided missiledelivery, satellites themselves have no destructive capacity and their military supporting roleis not considered weaponisation per se. Fourthly, we should bear in mind that the EU entering space will enhance itscapability as a global player, but in the same time it will be exposed to new threats. Anydisruption in the availability and functioning of space-based systems could have significantconsequences on security, safety and economic activities. That is why, it is crucial to developthe Space Situational Awareness (SSA). Up to now Europe does not have its own independentcapacity and is partly dependent on US data to monitor the population of space objects. TheEDA has created a project team tasked to define CSDP-related SSA requirements. Fifthly, the European Space Agency, the European Organisation for the Exploitationof Meteorological Satellites, the Space Council, based on the EU-ESA Framework Agreementor High-Level Space Policy Group as well as member and non-member EU states are engagedin the European space projects. It means that it is a cooperative undertaking aimed at64 European Space Policy Progress Report, Commission Working Document, Brussels, 11.9.2008, p. 6.65 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security ..., p. 43. That definition of space weapon excludes: non-devoted,dual-use systems, which can disable or capture satellites; missiles passing through space without harming spaceassets; systems which interrupt the operation of satellites (like electronic jamming) – reversible effects;unintentional weapons – debris fragments, old spacecraft. It includes: ground-, sea-, space-based anti-ballisticmissile; ASAT systems – laser, kinetic-kill vehicles, explosive systems used to destroy objects in space; anymilitary systems used in space that have damaged spacecraft in the past – for example nuclear weapons tests inspace. 17
    • enhancement security in distant places within different dimensions. Cooperation concerningspace activities is beneficial because it gives involving partners additional capabilities whichcannot be reached individually. This is not only the matter of the financial input, but also thescientific, technological and political ones. Therefore partners can improve their capability,share their costs and build common interests as far as space exploitation and exploration areconcerned.66 N. Peter points out, that “recent geopolitical developments, combined with thefunding constraints of the various space-faring countries, have made it clear that greaterinternational cooperation will be important for future major space activities, as cooperationcan occur at different stages of a space project.” Formerly dominated by the intra-bloccooperation, space activities attract nowadays lot of different public and private entities. It ispossible due to the development of small satellite technology and use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology. Therefore, states who traditionally have not been engaged in spaceactivities now have an opportunity to enter that realm.67 Sixthly, European projects have a huge public support within the EU states. Accordingto General public survey on the European Galileo Programme, 63% of the EU citizens saidthey were willing to allocate public funds, with a higher level of support for this course ofaction coming from the newer Member States, although respondents were informed that itcould necessitate public funding of 2.4 billion EURO to complete the Galileo project.Moreover, 80% of respondents are in favor of independent European navigation system68. According to J. C. Moltz, there are four basic alternatives/scenarios for spaceexploration/exploitation: 1. international hostility; 2. selective military restraint; 3.commercial cooperation; 4. international management.69 My preliminary analysis of theEuropean Space policy entitled me to state that the EU realizes the third alternative –commercial cooperation, although a slightly shift towards selective military restraint is visiblethrough the influence of military-industrial bases on space policy directions.70 Yet the EU’sdecision-makers underline that all space activities undertaken by the EU are for peacefulpurposes and they are fully in line with international law provisions regarding spaceexploration/exploitation. M. P. Gleason even thinks, that the EU can acquire space assetscomparable to the U.S. if it accepts certain rules: highly capable, inexpensive small satellitesshould be a basis; dual-use space operational and organizational architectures of space66 N. Peter, The changing geopolitics of space activities, “Space Policy” 2006, no. 22, p. 100.67 Ibid., p. 101.68 General public survey on the European Galileo Programme. Analytical Report, Flash Eurobarometer 211, June2007.69 J. C. Moltz, The Politics of Space Security ..., p. 327.70 The biggest and most influential actors are EADS Space and Alcatel-Alenia. 18
    • activities; “imaginative” additional sources of funding; avoiding human spaceflight andprestige programs; and partnering with other space-faring nations.7171 M. P. Gleason, European Union Space Initiatives ..., p. 35. 19