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ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING

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Ertuğrul Akbaş eakbas@gmail.com
Enhancing SIEM Correlation Rules
T...
ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING
statistical analysis for audit records [10], and sequence
analysis for...
ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING
baselines and baseline parameters will be critical in a manner
of syst...
ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING

•

• Forward Channing.
Backward Chaining.

With this adaptation FAUNA...
ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING
event management, this paper proposed a security event
correlation alg...
ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING
event management, this paper proposed a security event
correlation alg...
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Enhancing SIEM Correlation Rules Through Baselining

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Enterprise grade software has been updated with a capability that identifies anomalous events based on baselines as well as rule based correlation engine, and alerts administrators when such events are identified. To reduce the number of false positive alerts we have investigated the use of different baseline training techniques and introduce the use of 3 different training approaches for baseline detection and updating lifecycle

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Transcript of "Enhancing SIEM Correlation Rules Through Baselining"

  1. 1. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING 1 Ertuğrul Akbaş eakbas@gmail.com Enhancing SIEM Correlation Rules Through Baselining Abstract— In this paper, we describe research into the use of baselining for enhancing SIEM Correlation rules. Enterprise grade software has been updated with a capability that identifies anomalous events based on baselines as well as rule based correlation engine, and alerts administrators when such events are identified. To reduce the number of false positive alerts we have investigated the use of different baseline training techniques and introduce the use of 3 different training approaches for baseline detection and updating lifecycle. Index Terms—Log, SIEM, Correlation, Rule Base, Baseline, Anomaly Detection, Baseline C I. INTRODUCTION omputer crime continues to be problematic for both public and private sectors not only in Turkey but at an international level. Over 50% of respondents to the 2006 Computer Security Institute/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey [1] reported unauthorized use of computer systems. The field of computer forensics has been rapidly expanding in the past twenty years in an effort to combat the continuing increase in the incidence of criminal activity involving computers. This area is normally defined by the identification, securing and analysis of evidence. Generally accepted definition of computer forensics can be made that simply attempts to detect, secure and analyze evidence from computer systems. Also some few cases will end at the court. This may be done by an organization, for instance, in response to a security incident, internal or external The surveys show that the most common types of criminal activity are the results of virus, worm or Trojan infections. Insider abuse of Internet access, email or computer system resources, however, is the third most common type of misuse in the United States of America [1] Insider misuse can be defined as the performance of activities where computers and networks in an organization are deliberately misused by those who are authorized to use them. Some activities which can be categorized as insider misuse include: unauthorized access to information which is an abuse of privileges unauthorized use of software or applications for purposes other than carrying out one’s duties theft or breach of proprietary or confidential information theft or unauthorized use of staff or customer’s access credentials computer facilitated financial fraud Logging – the act of recording events occurring in a system – is a mandatory security measure in any moderately complex digital environment. Logs can be used to detect and investigate incidents after they have occurred, but also to assist in the prevention of harmful incidents, by revealing use Manuscript received March 11, 2012. Ertuğrul Akbaş is with the ANET Software Turkey (corresponding author to provide phone: 90-216-3540580; fax: 90-216-3540580; e-mail: ertugrul.akbas@ anetyazilim.com.tr).  and abuse patterns and increasing situational awareness [2] The most efficient method for incident detection is using SIEM solution. All of the SIEM solutions are rule based systems but enhancing this rule based systems by comparing current performance to a historical metric is needed. And we need to define a methodology for updating this historical metric. A good security tool should make comparisons with historical data, clearly presenting deviations from the norm [3] This paper reports on work aimed at detecting anomalous events that may be indicators of misuse. First of all, we attempt to detect baselining parameters. Then we will prose an update mechanism for selected baselines. We suggest three possible approaches for updating the baselines. The first approach is to use a static or constant window baseline. With this approach detection of alerts is carried out on a weekly basis after the training period and the baseline remains the same for each week of testing. The drawback of this method is: decisions are always based on that initial baseline. The second approach proposed for updating baseline is to use an extended window, where the newly added data from last baseline calculated time will be added to the baseline updating cycle. With this approach, the baseline becomes dynamic and captures changes in a baseline’s behavior or in the environment. A possible problem with this approach is that the baseline may retain too much related with history. A third approach is to use a fixed sliding time window for the baseline where the width of the time window remains fixed but data within windows always renewed. After training the baseline and making decisions based on the data from this week, the baseline is recalculated by removing the oldest week of baseline data and adding the new week of data. This approach is dynamic in nature and prune to historical data affects over baseline. II.RELATED WORK Baseline detection relies on models of the intended behavior of users, applications and networks and interprets deviations from this normal' behavior [4, 5, 6, 7]. This approach is complementary with respect to misuse detection, where a number of attack descriptions (usually in the form of signatures) are matched against the stream of audited events, looking for evidence that one of the modeled attacks is occurring [8]. A basic assumption underlying anomaly detection is that attack patterns differ from normal behavior. In addition, anomaly detection assumes that this `difference' can be expressed quantitatively. Under these assumptions, many techniques have been proposed to analyze different data streams, such as data mining for network traffic [9],
  2. 2. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING statistical analysis for audit records [10], and sequence analysis for operating system calls [11]. Of particular relevance to the work described here are techniques that learn the detection parameters from the analyzed data. For instance, the framework developed by Lee et al. [12] Provides guidelines to extract features that are useful for building intrusion classification models. The approach uses labeled data to derive which is the best set of features to be used in intrusion detection. The approach described in this paper is similar to Lee's because it relies on a set of selected features. The learning process is purely based on past data, as, for example, in [13] but we propose new learning schema. Also we borrowed techniques from intrusion detection and anomaly detection field. III. LOG CORRELATION As logs are sent to the correlation engine, they are normalized into a high level event type and a more specific unique event and processed by correlation algorithms. The quality of a correlation depends on accuracy and speed. The speed depicts how many correlations can be found in a certain amount of time. The accuracy depicts how many of the identified correlations represent real existing relations between these alerts. Due to more complex attacks and large scale networks, the amount of alerts increases significantly which yields the requirement for improved quality of the correlation. The correlation accuracy depends on the used correlation algorithm. IV. DETECTION AND LEARNING PHASE OF BASELINES Main approach for identifying those baselines is to interview a group of experienced network administrators and ask them how they identify and tackle problems. The authors have selected different kinds of administrators ranging from small, single OS (e.g. mostly Apple or Windows) networks to large heterogeneous, multi vendor networks. Below it is summarized the original results of the survey: 1. Concentrate on core services. DNS, routing services are critical in IP networks. If core services fail then everything fail 2. Statistical analysis that deals with extracting information from data is important for baseline detection. The statistical analysis of error status over the time is another good way for detecting baselines. 3. Monitor non-unicast traffic. Non-unicast traffic that is causing high utilization of the switch. or misconfigured windows hosts that have a misspelled workgroup name create a significant amount of broadcast traffic and can be easily detected. 4. Traffic analysis is very important for baseline detection. Unwanted traffic is key concept for network monitoring. There is some heuristics [16] that have an efficient way to detect unwanted network protocols. 5. Active monitoring: Rejected connection rate can be used for TCP services. ICMP port unreachable can be used for UDP services. 6. Monitor protocol distribution. 7. Client are most vulnerable than servers. Because they 2 Fig. 1. DOS attack affect on network traffic. are not maintained by the network administrators. Monitor clients’ behavior 8. Monitor protocols that have weakness or implementation flaws like FTP, IRC and DNS. Some other techniques are available in the literature [17,18,19] Since baselines are mostly statistically defined elements, they need to be updated. As your SIEM usage progresses, you need to add an interim values periodically. Although there is some previously done researches in the literature [20,21]. First of all we suggest detection methods of baselines then we list the baselines for enterprise network using case studies. As a last we suggest three possible new approaches for learning phase of the baseline detection. first approach is to use a static or constant window baseline. With this approach detection of alerts is carried out on a weekly basis after the training period and the baseline remains the same for each week of testing. The drawback of this method is: decisions are always based on that initial baseline. The second approach proposed for updating baseline is to use an extended window, where the newly added data from last baseline calculated time will be added to the baseline updating cycle. With this approach, the baseline becomes dynamic and captures changes in a baseline’s behavior or in the environment. A possible problem with this approach is that the baseline may retain too much related with history. A third approach is to use a fixed sliding time window for the baseline where the width of the time window remains fixed but data within windows always renewed. After training the baseline and making decisions based on the data from this week, the baseline is recalculated by removing the oldest week of baseline data and adding the new week of data. This approach is dynamic in nature and prune to historical data affects over baseline. V. BASELINES FOR CORRELATION RULES The concept of a baseline is not new or complex. In general, a baseline is a well-defined, well-documented reference that serves as the foundation for other activities. We will call this baseline from now on. Understanding the network devices, applications, services etc. deployed in your network and their normal status is key to establishing a baseline. A. Identifying Baselines The method is marked by comparing current performance to a historical metric. Detecting baselines for correlation engine is important. One can increase the number of baselines detected as many as needed. But detecting sufficient
  3. 3. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING baselines and baseline parameters will be critical in a manner of system response. For an enterprise grade SIEM solution in memory correlation is critical. You will need to understand 'good traffic' for your network during the 'initial tuning' phase, use white lists and blacklists of signatures, and then build heuristic analysis if you want to alert on deviation from the normal. In our approach we offer methods for baseline detection in section IV. Also we analyzed some real world case studies from FAUNA installations [14]. Results of those methods are: • Port Usage Baseline o Hits on port 80 over the last week o Count of new ports hit on a firewall • User Baseline o Software Usage Baseline o Internet Usage Baseline o Intranet Usage Baseline • EPS Baseline o Normal Events per second (NE) :The NE metric will represent the normal number of events usage time for a device, or for your Log or Event Management scope. o Peak Events per second (PE) :The PE metric will represent the peak number of events usage time for a device, or for your Log or Event Management scope. The PE represent abnormal activities on devices you create temporary peaks of EPS, for example DoS, ports scanning, mass SQL injections attempts, etc. PE metric is the more important cause it will determine your real EPS requirements. • Traffic Baseline o Number of hosts touching each server per hour • Network Baseline o Protocols o System Access o Event Types • System Baseline o Login/Logout Success/Failure o CPU per day o Memory per day o Disk availability per day o User Logins to Server X per day o Process Starts o Use of “su” command per hour of day o Configuration Changes o User Rights o Event Log settings o Restricted Groups o System Services o File Permissions o Registry Permissions • Application Baseline o Data Access Types 3 o User Data Changes o Client • Database Baseline o Data Access Types o User Data Changes o Client As it is mentioned before that detecting baselines and baseline parameters are very critical, we did a search on use cases of an available enterprise software FAUNA [14] within real world cases then detect above baselines and baseline parameters VI. SECURITY INCIDENT DETECTION LEVERAGING PROFILING The challenge with correlation rules is that in a sense they are “signature based” in that you largely have to know the situation you are trying to detect. For example, “monitor my five external firewalls and tell me if you see port scans from the same public net block on more than 3 of my firewalls in the same 30 minute period.” An approach we find far more promising is Baselining. This approach will be used addition to rule based system in our case [15]. Its advantage is that it doesn’t watch for anything specific, rather it attempts to identify any patterns of security events which are unusual based on previously base lined performance. Interestingly, baselining is based on the meta-data from events — not the events themselves – although the events themselves can be retrieved based on the meta data. An example that will best illustrates the value of Anomaly Detection: A quick FTP connection attempt confirmed that FTP was indeed responding on the server and a few more minutes of sleuthing determined that a Windows reboot had restarted the FTP service a few hours prior. Within an hour a hacker had initiated a brute force admin password attack on the server. Anomaly Detection noted the unusual FTP pattern (as compared to the previous months baseline) and thwarted the security incident before any impact. Automatically detecting anomalous behavior by looking for unexpected statistical deviations from an ever evolving “baseline” VII. IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS Since FAUNA [3] has a JAVA based API for customization, we used JAVA for implementation. FAUNA has RULE based correlation engine currently with the features of: • Support Mvel and java • JSR94 compatible • In-memory correlation • Single point of correlation rules source • Multi point of correlation rules source • Negative condition rules • Context based correlation • Rule Base. • Complex Event Processing(CEP).
  4. 4. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING • • Forward Channing. Backward Chaining. With this adaptation FAUNA will have a correlation engine with the below features: • Pre-defined pattern matching • Statistical analysis (anomaly detection) • Basic conditional Boolean logic statements • Contextually relevant and/or enhanced data set with Boolean logic Complex Event Processing, or CEP, is primarily an event processing concept that deals with the task of processing multiple events with the goal of identifying the meaningful events within the event cloud. CEP employs techniques such as detection of complex patterns of many events, event correlation and abstraction, event hierarchies, and relationships between events such as causality, membership, and timing, and event-driven processes." The vision on FAUNA of a Behavioral Modeling Platform can only be achieved by moving away from any of the narrow modeling perspectives that see only Rules, or Processes, or Events as their main modeling concept. To effectively achieve the flexibility and power of behavioral modeling, a platform must understand all of these concepts as primary concepts and allow them to leverage on each other strengths. FAUNA, in this scenario, is an independent module, but still completely integrated with the rest of the platform, that adds a set of features to enable it: • understand and handle events as first class citizens of the platform • select a set of interesting events in a cloud or stream of events • detect the relevant relationships (patterns) among these events • take appropriate actions based on the patterns detected Events as first class citizens: events are a special entity that is a record of a significant change of state in the application domain. They have several unique and distinguishing characteristics, like being usually immutable, having strong temporal constraints and relationships. FAUNA understand events by what they are and allow users to model business rules, queries and processes depending on the occurrence or absence of them Support asynchronous multi-thread streams: events may arrive at any time and from multiple sources (or streams). They can also be stored in cloud-like structures. FAUNA supports both work with streams and clouds of events. In case of streams it supports asynchronous, multi-thread feeding of events. Support for temporal reasoning: events usually have strong temporal relationships and constraints. FAUNA adds a complete set of temporal operators to allow modeling and reasoning over temporal relationships between events. Support events garbage collection: events grow old, 4 quickly or slow, but they do grow old. FAUNA is able to identify the events that are no longer needed and dispose them as a way of freeing resources and scaling well on growing volumes. Support reasoning over absence of events: the same way in that it is necessary to model rules and processes that react to the presence of events, it is necessary to model rules and processes that react to the absence of events. Example: "If the temperature goes over the threshold and no contention measure is taken within 10 seconds, then sound the alarm". FAUNA leverages on the capabilities of the Drools Expert engine, allowing it complete and flexible reasoning over the absence of events, including the transparent delaying of rules in case of events that require a waiting period before firing the absence. Support to Sliding Windows: a especially common scenario on Event Processing applications is the requirement of doing calculations on moving windows of interest, be it temporal or length-based windows. FAUNA has complete support for Sliding Windows, providing out of the box aggregation functions as well as leveraging the pluggable function framework to allow for the use of users defined custom functions. FAUNA correlation engine will automatically retract the event if it's not needed anymore, for example if you are calculating the average using sliding windows, as soon as the event falls out of the sliding windows and don't match any other rule it will be automatically retracted if FAUNA is operating in Stream Mode. About persisting the internal state, we have implemented our own mechanisms storing the average and re initialize the state when it is needed Baseline updating achieved by Rule/Model chaining. In a typical scenario, a control rule triggers a model and generates an output. This output can either be validated directly using rules or by starting other more complex inference chains. Eventually,one or more of the inferred facts is consumed by an avaluator which in turn triggers another control rule and the processis restarted, as shown below. rule " Trigger " when $input : Data ( <pr e c ondi t i ons> ) $model : ?Model ( . . . ) then insert (new Re sul t ( $model . invoke ( $input ) ) ) ; end rule " Eval " when Re sul t ( value pm eval t a r g e t ) then insert (new Data ( . . . ) ) ; end VIII.CONCLUSION On the existing problem of the current network security
  5. 5. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING event management, this paper proposed a security event correlation algorithm based on baselining and an algorithm for updating lifecycle of baselines. Additionally we listed predefined baselines and baseline parameters from real world cases. So, when you think SIEM, don’t just think “how many rules?” – think “what other methods for real-time and historical event analysis do they use?”. Sample of the rules than can be developed with the help of enhancement to rule based systems: 1. Monitor and compare with baseline “count unique port per source per hour/day” 2. Monitor and compare with baseline “protocol per hour per sensor” 3. Monitor and compare with baseline “Hits on port 80 per the week” 4. Monitor my five external firewalls and tell me if you see port scans from the same public net block on more than 3 of my firewalls in the same 30 minute period. For example, “monitor my five external firewalls and tell me if you see port scans from the same public net block on more than 3 of my firewalls in the same 30 minute period. 5. Monitor five attempts to login to a system within one minute using the same user account 6. Monitor/Associate system navigation with non-standard working hours. 7. Monitor traffic source: o (IF username=root AND ToD>10:00PM AND ToD<7:00AM AND Source_Country=China, THEN ALERT “Root Login During Non-Biz Hours from Foreign IP”) As a result, the developed system has features below: • Pre-defined pattern matching • Statistical analysis (anomaly detection) • Basic conditional Boolean logic statements • Contextually relevant and/or enhanced data set with Boolean logic . REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W. and Richardson, R. 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey: http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2006.pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2007. Stefan Axelsson, Ulf Lindqvist, Ulf Gustafson, and Erland Jonsson. An Approach to UNIX Security Logging. In Proc. 21st NIST-NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 62–75, 1998. Raffael Marty. Applied Security Visualization. Pearson Education, Inc,501 Boylston Street, Suite 900, Boston, MA, 2008. D.E. Denning. An Intrusion Detection Model. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 13(2):222{232,February 1987. A.K. Ghosh, J. Wanken, and F. Charron. Detecting Anomalous and Unknown Intrusions Against Programs. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'98), pages 259{267, Scottsdale, AZ, December 1998. C. Ko, M. Ruschitzka, and K. Levitt. Execution Monitoring of SecurityCritical Programs in Distributed Systems: A Specification-based Approach. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 175{187, May 1997. T. Lane and C.E. Brodley. Temporal sequence learning and data reduction for anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on [8] [9] [1] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 5 Computer and communications security, pages 150{158. ACM Press, 1998. K. Ilgun, R.A. Kemmerer, and P.A. Porras. State Transition Analysis: A Rule-Based Intrusion Detection System. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 21(3):181{199, March 1995. W. Lee, S. Stolfo, and K. Mok. Mining in a DataFlow Environment: Experience in Network Intrusion Detection. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD '99), San Diego, CA, August 1999. H. S. Javitz and A. Valdes. The SRI IDES Statistical Anomaly Detector. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 1991. S. Forrest. A Sense of Self for UNIX Processes. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 120{128, Oakland, CA, May 1996. W. Lee and S. Stolfo. A Framework for Constructing Features and Models for Intrusion Detection Systems. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 3(4), November 2000. C. Kruegel, T. Toth, and E. Kirda. Service Specific Anomaly Detection for Network Intrusion Detection. In Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC). ACM Scientific Press, March 2002. FAUNA, www.anetyazilim.com.tr FAUNA, http://www.anetyazilim.com.tr/fauna/4/286/1/1/ D. Plonka, FlowScan: A Network Traffic Flow Reporting and Visualization Tool, Proc. of XIV th Lisa Conference, December 2000. Daniela Brauckhoff, Network Traffic Anomaly Detection and Evaluation , ETH ZURICH ,2010 Augustin Soule, Kav´e Salamatian, and Nina Taft.Combining filtering and statistical methods for anomaly detection. In IMC’05: Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Internet Measurement 2005, Berkeley, California, USA, October 19-21, 2005,pages 331–344. USENIX Association, 2005. Animesh Patcha and Jung-Min Park. An overview of anomaly detection techniques: Existing solutions and latest technological trends. Comput. Netw., 51(12):3448–3470, 2007. Northcutt, S., Novak, J.: Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst’s Handbook. New Riders Publishing, Thousand Oaks (2002) Kruegel, C., Valuer, F., Vigna, G.: Intrusion Detection and Correlation: Challenges and Solutions. AIS, vol. 14. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) Ertuğrul Akbaş ertugrul.akbas@anetyazilim.com.tr is currently working with ANET. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science with a thesis on Intelligent Systems from Gebze Institute of Technology in 2005. He previously worked as research scientist TÜBİTAK-Marmara Research Center and as project manager at National Research Institute of Electronics and Cryptology. His professional interests include network security, information security, network management and monitoring, software components and object-oriented technology.
  6. 6. ENHANCING SIEM CORRELATION RULES THROUGH BASELINING event management, this paper proposed a security event correlation algorithm based on baselining and an algorithm for updating lifecycle of baselines. Additionally we listed predefined baselines and baseline parameters from real world cases. So, when you think SIEM, don’t just think “how many rules?” – think “what other methods for real-time and historical event analysis do they use?”. Sample of the rules than can be developed with the help of enhancement to rule based systems: 1. Monitor and compare with baseline “count unique port per source per hour/day” 2. Monitor and compare with baseline “protocol per hour per sensor” 3. Monitor and compare with baseline “Hits on port 80 per the week” 4. Monitor my five external firewalls and tell me if you see port scans from the same public net block on more than 3 of my firewalls in the same 30 minute period. For example, “monitor my five external firewalls and tell me if you see port scans from the same public net block on more than 3 of my firewalls in the same 30 minute period. 5. Monitor five attempts to login to a system within one minute using the same user account 6. Monitor/Associate system navigation with non-standard working hours. 7. Monitor traffic source: o (IF username=root AND ToD>10:00PM AND ToD<7:00AM AND Source_Country=China, THEN ALERT “Root Login During Non-Biz Hours from Foreign IP”) As a result, the developed system has features below: • Pre-defined pattern matching • Statistical analysis (anomaly detection) • Basic conditional Boolean logic statements • Contextually relevant and/or enhanced data set with Boolean logic . REFERENCES [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W. and Richardson, R. 2006 CSI/FBI computer crime and security survey: http://i.cmpnet.com/gocsi/db_area/pdfs/fbi/FBI2006.pdf. Accessed 12 Oct 2007. Stefan Axelsson, Ulf Lindqvist, Ulf Gustafson, and Erland Jonsson. An Approach to UNIX Security Logging. In Proc. 21st NIST-NCSC National Information Systems Security Conference, pages 62–75, 1998. Raffael Marty. Applied Security Visualization. Pearson Education, Inc,501 Boylston Street, Suite 900, Boston, MA, 2008. D.E. Denning. An Intrusion Detection Model. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 13(2):222{232,February 1987. A.K. Ghosh, J. Wanken, and F. Charron. Detecting Anomalous and Unknown Intrusions Against Programs. In Proceedings of the Annual Computer Security Applications Conference (ACSAC'98), pages 259{267, Scottsdale, AZ, December 1998. C. Ko, M. Ruschitzka, and K. Levitt. Execution Monitoring of SecurityCritical Programs in Distributed Systems: A Specification-based Approach. In Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 175{187, May 1997. T. Lane and C.E. Brodley. Temporal sequence learning and data reduction for anomaly detection. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on [8] [9] [1] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] 5 Computer and communications security, pages 150{158. ACM Press, 1998. K. Ilgun, R.A. Kemmerer, and P.A. Porras. State Transition Analysis: A Rule-Based Intrusion Detection System. IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 21(3):181{199, March 1995. W. Lee, S. Stolfo, and K. Mok. Mining in a DataFlow Environment: Experience in Network Intrusion Detection. In Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery & Data Mining (KDD '99), San Diego, CA, August 1999. H. S. Javitz and A. Valdes. The SRI IDES Statistical Anomaly Detector. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 1991. S. Forrest. A Sense of Self for UNIX Processes. In Proceedings of the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 120{128, Oakland, CA, May 1996. W. Lee and S. Stolfo. A Framework for Constructing Features and Models for Intrusion Detection Systems. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security, 3(4), November 2000. C. Kruegel, T. Toth, and E. Kirda. Service Specific Anomaly Detection for Network Intrusion Detection. In Symposium on Applied Computing (SAC). ACM Scientific Press, March 2002. FAUNA, www.anetyazilim.com.tr FAUNA, http://www.anetyazilim.com.tr/fauna/4/286/1/1/ D. Plonka, FlowScan: A Network Traffic Flow Reporting and Visualization Tool, Proc. of XIV th Lisa Conference, December 2000. Daniela Brauckhoff, Network Traffic Anomaly Detection and Evaluation , ETH ZURICH ,2010 Augustin Soule, Kav´e Salamatian, and Nina Taft.Combining filtering and statistical methods for anomaly detection. In IMC’05: Proceedings of the 5th Conference on Internet Measurement 2005, Berkeley, California, USA, October 19-21, 2005,pages 331–344. USENIX Association, 2005. Animesh Patcha and Jung-Min Park. An overview of anomaly detection techniques: Existing solutions and latest technological trends. Comput. Netw., 51(12):3448–3470, 2007. Northcutt, S., Novak, J.: Network Intrusion Detection: An Analyst’s Handbook. New Riders Publishing, Thousand Oaks (2002) Kruegel, C., Valuer, F., Vigna, G.: Intrusion Detection and Correlation: Challenges and Solutions. AIS, vol. 14. Springer, Heidelberg (2005) Ertuğrul Akbaş ertugrul.akbas@anetyazilim.com.tr is currently working with ANET. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Science with a thesis on Intelligent Systems from Gebze Institute of Technology in 2005. He previously worked as research scientist TÜBİTAK-Marmara Research Center and as project manager at National Research Institute of Electronics and Cryptology. His professional interests include network security, information security, network management and monitoring, software components and object-oriented technology.

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