Your SlideShare is downloading. ×
African Union Agenda 2063 Framework
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

×

Saving this for later?

Get the SlideShare app to save on your phone or tablet. Read anywhere, anytime - even offline.

Text the download link to your phone

Standard text messaging rates apply

African Union Agenda 2063 Framework

730
views

Published on

African Union Agenda 2063 Framework …

African Union Agenda 2063 Framework

The Africa We Want: Support of the United Nations system to the African Union’s Agenda 2063 as to 6th Region of the Diaspora
https://www.facebook.com/notes/friends-of-the-african-union-bermuda-americas-bureau/the-africa-we-want-support-of-the-united-nations-system-to-the-african-unions-ag/936771546339332


Congresswoman Karen Bass hosts H.E. Dr. Dlamini Zuma, Chairperson of the African Union Commission in Los Angeles
https://www.facebook.com/notes/andrew-williams-jr/congresswoman-karen-bass-hosts-he-dr-dlamini-zuma-chairperson-of-the-african-uni/10152452030389436

Andrew Williams Jr
Email: aj@trn.tv
Mobile: +1-424-222-1997
Skype: andrew.williams.jr
http://twitter.com/AWilliamsJr
http://slideshare.net/andrewwilliamsjr
http://xeeme.com/AmbassadorAWJ
https://www.facebook.com/FAUBermuda
http://www.yatedo.com/andrewwilliamsjr
http://www.slideshare.net/andrewwilliamsjr
http://www.linkedin.com/in/andrewwilliamsjr
http://www.facebook.com/ajactionteam
http://www.facebook.com/ambassadorawj
http://www.facebook.com/andrewwilliamsjr
http://www.facebook.com/AJGombeyBermuda

Published in: News & Politics, Business

0 Comments
1 Like
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
730
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
15
Comments
0
Likes
1
Embeds 0
No embeds

Report content
Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. Agenda 2063 Draft Framework Introduction As Africa commemorates the 50th Anniversary of the OAU/AU in 2013, it does so with pride in the core achievements of the past, pragmatic assessment of the challenges still faced, and renewed acknowledgement of the vital importance of Pan African solidarity towards the achievement of a brighter future for all the peoples of the continent. Today, at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, there is an invigorating mood of confidence in the future of the region, similar to that which marked the 1960s when the majority of African countries became independent. Once again, Africans are proudly asserting their independent voice within the international community and setting the agenda, direction and pace of change in the region. Internationally, Africa is also once again cogently spoken of as a region of great untapped potential that is poised to play a more significant role in the global arena. Several facts and trends certainly support the astuteness of these perspectives. Two decades ago, Africa celebrated success in its battle to free every corner of its landmass from colonial domination and racial oppression. With that long struggle over, a bold change was made to the regional institutional architecture that was epitomized by the transformation from the OAU to the African Union at the turn of the century. As part of this process new frameworks were established to improve the management of conflicts, and improve political governance and economic management. Building on this foundation, regional economic performance saw a marked and sustained improvement throughout the early 2000s, albeit from a very low base. The region’s economic growth has now averaged 5% per year for more than a decade, higher than at any other period since the early 1970s. Between 2000 and 2011, six of the world’s fastest growing economies were in Africa—Angola, Chad, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nigeria, and Rwanda. 1
  • 2. While this turn around in economic performance is laudable, it lags behind the pace and length of change that was experienced in regions of the world that have successfully transformed their socioeconomic conditions and livelihoods of their populations in the past 50 years e.g. in Asia. It thus can not be disputed that significantly more action is still required on a number of fronts in order to achieve the African Union’s vision of “An Integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and representing a dynamic force in the global arena”. Africans have not been short of ideas over the past 50 years. There has been substantial thinking and vigorous debate at various periods from the 1960s onwards regarding development planning approaches and the most viable frameworks to promote the effective mobilizing of Africa’s human, financial and natural resources that is critical to the achievement of the continent’s liberation from poverty, ignorance and disease. While various African countries may have been at differing times under the sway of different externally inspired approaches, a consensus vision and framework for the structural transformation and the socioeconomic development of the continent was first elaborated in the Lagos Plan of Action in 1980. This vision was then further developed in the following decades, as the regional and global context changed, and projected through the Abuja Treaty in 1990 and later the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) at the start of the new millennium. Aiming to encourage discussion among all stakeholders, this “Agenda 2063” framework document outlines an approach to how the continent should effectively learn from the lessons of the past, build on the progress now underway and strategically exploit all possible opportunities available in the immediate and medium term, so as to ensure positive socioeconomic transformation within the next 50 years. 2
  • 3. Changing dynamics within the region, and between Africa and the world (globalization), as well as the urgency of propelling the continent forward at much faster economic growth rates undeniably necessitate a stepping up of the pace. The first section of the document thus focuses on situating the current “moment” within the context of the experience of the past and analyzing how the lessons from that journey now inform the way forward. This includes a discussion of the measurements/yardsticks of success. Notably, while faster GDP growth is crucial, and is often held up by observers as proof that “Africa is rising”, this paper stresses that a focus on growth alone is insufficient. It argues instead that the impact of the positive growth rates must be more widely felt. Africa’s economic growth needs to promote greater equity, inclusiveness, the preservation of natural capital and creation of decent jobs, especially for the youth and women. The next section elaborates this line of reasoning further by placing a strong onus on investigating the core changes that are required in how things are done (and should be done) to enable Africa to strategically respond to the rapidly evolving contemporary global landscape. It provides comparative analysis of the effect of critical global mega-trends (e.g. climate, environmental, demographic, governance/political economy, technological innovation) on Africa and other global regions, with a view to highlighting possible long term impacts that must be envisaged now, the essential challenges to address, as well as the opportunities the region must seek to exploit if it is to make significant progress and not be left behind the rest of the world. In light of the complex task ahead, it makes the case that a “paradigm shift” of approach and a change in mindset is now absolutely essential towards realizing the continental vision. Thereafter, the main elements of “Agenda 2063” at the operational level are outlined. At its heart, this new roadmap, emphasizes the importance to success of rekindling the passion for Pan-Africanism, a sense of unity, selfreliance, integration and solidarity that was a highlight of the triumphs of the 20th 3
  • 4. century. It elucidates how a change in mindsets on how to get things done, based on the above, can best advance implementation on the ground. Africa is encouraged to take advantage of the failure of opposing externally inspired paradigms (socialist planning and the neo-liberal Washington consensus) to promote a new approach to development planning firmly embedded in its own experience, culture, capabilities and institutions. In that regard, concrete milestones to gauge success or failure along the way are specified. Finally, at the operational level the possible major risks/ threats and critical success factors are discussed in more detail. These include regional political, institutional renewal and financing/resource mobilization issues, as well as the changing nature of Africa’s relationships with the rest of the world. 1. Learning from the Past Africa in 2013 is faced with a myriad of fruitful opportunities to effectively take charge of its own destiny and propel itself forward into a prosperous and peaceful future. Success in this quest will nonetheless rest on the continent’s dynamic positioning of its engagement with the rest of the world within a rapidly changing global context. A recommitment, in both word and deed, to the values of Pan-Africanism, solidarity and self-reliance, which in the past guided and inspired the pioneers of the movement for the physical and mental emancipation of Africans worldwide, will also be critical. In several African cultures the importance of examining the experience of the past is stressed as highly important to guiding the way forward. In that regard, fifty years on from the foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and more latterly the African Union (AU), it is important to ground the presentation of the Agenda 2063 framework first on an assessment of past experiences in order to highlight issues which if addressed correctly within the current changed global context can guide the way forward. 4
  • 5. 1.1 The Evolution of the Pan-Africanist and Regional Integration Agenda The foundation of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on 25 May, 1963, in many ways marked the end of the beginning of the modern PanAfricanist journey, which from its start has had the freedom, unity and dignity of the peoples of Africa and of African descent as its core objectives. Through signing the founding act of the OAU, the thirty three 1 Heads of African States and Governments assembled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on that historic day, created a framework for cooperation and solidarity that sought to consolidate the hard-won independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all African countries, as well as provide a united front in the fight for the total liberation of the continent. At the same time, it was acknowledged that the struggle against foreign domination, and for dignity, did not end simply with the attainment of national independence, but was intimately connected with the significant improvement of the socio economic welfare and wellbeing of all Africans. The creation of the OAU thus also reflected the conviction that the unity of African States was necessary to ensure their long term economic independence and the socioeconomic advancement and transformation of the continent. A retrospective overview of the past half century shows that the establishment of the OAU/ AU, and related regional frameworks, has been fundamental to providing platforms for deepened and wider co-operation among African countries, yet progress has been slow due to numerous internal and external factors. Building on the significant successes in achieving liberation and political independence across the continent throughout the 1960s and 1970s, 1 Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (DRC), Dahomey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, The Sudan, Tanganyika, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Haute Volta (Burkina) and Zanzibar. 5
  • 6. African Heads of State and Government took several measures from the end of the 1970s onwards to focus more on promoting “national and collective selfreliance in social and economic development” 2. In a number of key summit declarations and decisions they stressed the need for their continental organization to focus more on economic issues and the need for African countries to individually and collectively restructure their development strategies and programmes so as to achieve rapid socio-economic change. With the Monrovia Declaration, African leaders expressed their resolution to address the economic challenges the continent was facing more effectively. Their adoption in April, 1980 of the “Lagos Plan of Action for the economic development of Africa” then paved the way for enhanced economic cooperation among African countries, setting common goals in thirteen areas, including: Food and agriculture; Industry; Natural resources; Human Resources Development and Utilization; Science and Technology; Transport and Communication; Trade and Finance; Energy; Women and Development; Development Planning, Statistics and Population. The bold plan was essentially still born, however, because shortly after it was adopted, African countries were pressured by the Bretton Woods Institutions to focus on implementing individually-negotiated Washington Consensus structural adjustment programmes (SAPs). With their attention focused mainly on internal economic dynamics and responding to an agenda set by outsiders, they failed to stick to the commitments they had made to integrate (through the LPA framework). The SAPs worsened the social and economic crises faced by the majority of African countries in the 1980s. With many countries enduring serious balance of payments and external debt problems, the collapse of their internal production systems and the weakening of the social fabric, the 1980s was termed “the Lost Decade” for Africa. During that 2 Monrovia Declaration of commitment of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity on guidelines and measures for national and collective self-reliance in social and economic development for the establishment of a new international economic order” July, 1979 6
  • 7. period, the advancement of the African integration agenda was given very little prominence in the national and regional discourse. Things began to change in the early 1990s, an era marked by fundamental changes in the global alignment of power and international relations following the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Abuja Treaty of 1991, establishing the African Economic Community carried forward some of the commitments made in the Lagos Plan of Action and the Final Act of Lagos (1980), and represented the first major step towards injecting new life into the African unification and integration project, since the foundation of the OAU. With the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) identified as the building blocks of the Economic Community, the Treaty was designed to serve four objectives, namely: promote economic, social and cultural development and the integration of African economies; mobilise the utilization of the human and material resources of Africa; raise the standard of living of African peoples; and coordinate and harmonize policies among existing and future economic communities in order to foster the gradual establishment of the Community. The global context, now increasingly dominated by the neo-liberal agenda, again, however, put several obstacles in the way of progress for Africa’s integration project. Internally, progress was also hampered by several factors including inadequate political will to implement integration decisions; apprehension on the part of States to cede some of their competencies; and, poor coordination and coherence among the RECs, as well as between them and other regional institutions, including the OAU. By the end of the 1990s, it was acknowledged that Africa needed to adopt a much more strategic approach to accelerating the regional socio-economic integration agenda than was possible within the framework of the OAU. This new approach and a revival of emphasis on the themes of unity, self-reliance and collective solidarity was given life through the 1999 Sirte Declaration that paved the way for the Constitutive Act of 2000 and the launching of the AU as the 7
  • 8. successor to the OAU in 2002 in Durban, South Africa. Concomitantly, New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), was adopted in 2001 as a programme for the socioeconomic transformation of the continent. 1.2 Macroeconomic and Economic Policy Trends The evolutions within the regional integration agenda outlined above were also linked to major macro economic and economic policy trends during the period under review, which impacted on Africa. In that regard, the continent has broadly passed through three major phases since the independence era. The first phase was the period 1960 to 1970. During this period, African countries experienced moderate growth. In this phase, the continent pursued Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) policies and there was the expectation that the replacement of imported goods with domestically produced ones would over time, enhance self-reliance and help prevent balance of payments problems 3. African countries grew by an average of 4% of GDP. However, over time, ISI proved inefficient although some industries did grow over this period. The second phase from 1970s to 1980s was characterized and dominated by the oil crisis and Africa’s growth slackened. Growth fell from around 4.5% to 2.4%. This resulted in African countries embarking on Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) to align macroeconomic fundamentals and enhance market forces and liberalisation. The third phase began in the 1990s and focused on Poverty Reduction Strategies, promoted by the Bretton Woods’ Institutions, which were implemented within the context of obtaining debt relief. Growth remained low. At the start of the new millennium, Africa entered a fourth phase at the time of the creation of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), which ushered in an era of innovative regional initiatives to enhance integration, maintain peace and security, and promote good governance and shared values. During this phase, over the past decade and more, Africa has experienced positive growth in various sectors. Between 2002 3 UNCTAD/UNIDO Economic Development In Africa Report 2011 8
  • 9. and 2008 African countries grew at an average of 5.6% of GDP. In 2008 this growth was interrupted by the global financial crisis and fell to 3.1%. African economies weathered the crisis and their economies rebounded in 2010 4. This growth was due to pro-growth macroeconomic policies which the continent pursued and continues to pursue. Africa’s growth during this period was also due to a boom in commodity exports as well as domestic demand arising from increased public investment on the continent. The reduction and end of conflicts on the continent also contributed to the growth. Africa was the second-fastest growing region in the World after Asia from 2000 to 2008. In 2010, ten of the 15 fastest growing economies in the world were from Africa. It is projected that seven out of the 10 fastest growing economies in the world in the next five years will be African. It is also projected that the continent’s combined GDP of US $ 1.5 trillion is set to double by 2020. According to the African Development Bank, African economies grew by 3.4% in 2011 5 and are expected to grow at an average of 5% over the coming years. African exports are increasing and African markets are diversifying. African trade has increased and trade with BRICS has increased from $10bn in 2000 to 160bn in 2012. However, essential challenges remain. First and foremost, growth to date has not created jobs and has not been inclusive. Large numbers of the populace have been left out of the new growth trend, and there is persistent inequality in terms of income, access to education and health services, limited job opportunities, especially for the youth and women. For example, data from 20062009 shows that only 28% of Africa’s population had access to electricity compared to 70% of other parts of the developing world; 69% of the population had access to improved water facilities compared to 88% of other developing world populations 6. The income gap between Africa and other regions has also been getting wider. This is essentially due to the fact that while Africa has been growing, others have been growing faster and hence widening the gap. Further, 4 ERA ERA 6 Briefing note 6: AfDB’s Long-Term Strategy for Inclusive Growth Agenda, 2012 5 9
  • 10. while growth in the economies of other regions has been driven by structural changes to their productive bases marked by increases in value addition to products and the share of manufacturing in GDP, in Africa it has been driven predominately by a commodity exports boom, which is prone to external price shocks. Given the historic volatile nature of the commodity price swings, reliance on primary product exports clearly does not provide a basis for sustainable growth and socioeconomic transformation over the long term. In order to place the economies of the region on a sounder footing, greater efforts must now be made to diversify more into manufacturing (using the comparative advantages offered by Africa’s commodities sector) so that Africa can be transformed into the world’s newest industrial frontier over the next 50 years. The continent has embarked on promoting private sector development in recognition of the role that the private sector needs to play in economic development and transformation. This has already led to a degree of success in private sector development and the efforts must be continued and intensified. Africa’s private sector presently accounts for over 80% of total production, 67% of total investment, 75% of total credit to the economy, and 90% of the labour force 7. But there is a need to go further still in order for the private sector to play its role in creating jobs and economic opportunities for the majority, including the poor. The national and regional policy environment has to be more targeted and strategic in promoting the private sector to enable it to effectively drive the process of economic transformation on the continent. 1.3 The Importance of Effective Institutions The extent to which Africa can achieve its development aspirations and vision will very much depend on the capacity of its institutions. To date, Africa’s ability to deliver on its programmes has been seriously undermined by its institutions. While the continent’s plans and programmes have been of good intentions, the structures created to implement these programmes have not performed well. In most cases, these institutions have been bedevilled by political 7 MGI African Futures 2050 10
  • 11. considerations and interferences. This has led them to focus on activities not related to their mandates. On the whole, institutional related implementation challenges have slowed down progress and have at times derailed economies. A lot needs to be done in terms of professionalizing the civil service across Africa through inculcating the appropriate ethics and value systems and establishing independent and neutral bureaucracies. At national level inadequate funding of state institutions has also hurt programme implementation on the continent resulting in mediocre performance. In many cases governments have paid lip service to funding such institutions while at the same time expecting good results. Such institutions have in most cases operated on very limited budgets spreading their resources too thinly and hence have had limited impact. At the continental level, Africa has created many institutions including the AUC and RECs. Despite creating these Pan African institutions African governments have not adequately resourced them but have relied on international partners. For example, the AUC’s Programme budget is funded by international partners to the tune of 90 percent with African countries contributing a mere 10 percent 8. Furthermore, collaboration between these Pan African institutions has been poor resulting in duplication and hence inefficient use of resources. Human capacity in these institutions has also been an issue. Higher education in science and technology and vocational training and skills development are critical to development. Africa’s tertiary education systems must address the challenges of access, quality and relevance. Inadequate connectivity within the continent has also significantly contributed to the continent’s less than expected growth. Inter- state transport infrastructure is poor because of narrow national approaches and other problems. In many cases infrastructure projects have not gone beyond boundaries resulting in uncompetitive cost structures. In summary, Africa has to transform its institutions if it is to claim the 21st century. Africa needs strong institutions with the necessary capacity and 8 AUC 2013 Budget Framework Paper 11
  • 12. resources to effectively establish and maintain a sound macroeconomic framework, through good public financial management. Africa also needs a conducive environment with a legal and regulatory framework that facilitates contract enforcement, property rights encourages jobs and helps create a more stable and secure society. Political commitment in this regard is paramount. 1.4 “Implementation, Implementation, Implementation” Another key factor which has hindered Africa’s growth and transformation has been inadequate commitment to implement what has been agreed upon. Although the continent has made strides in governance and accountability over the past half century, there has been an inadequate emphasis on implementation of the continent’s agreed plans and programmes. This has also been coupled with inadequate Monitoring and Evaluation mechanisms including indicators to determine progress. At the continental level numerous decisions have been made which have not been implemented. For example, while countries have committed to advance the regional integration process in clearly defined steps, progress has not been as expected. This is not least due to nationalistic tendencies and the emotive issue of sovereignty, which countries are unwilling to reduce in preference for Africa’s greater good. Tariffs are still high and the envisaged Free Trade Area is non-existent. In contrast, the Asian continent succeeded in its integration agenda because countries were willing to make all efforts to downplay sovereignty issues in favour of promoting regional integration and intra-Asian trade. With regard to the free movement of people, very little has changed on the continent. With the exception of ECOWAS the rest of Africa still remains closed to intra-African movement. This trend runs contrary to the ideals of creating a union of the people and rather only creates a union of states. Africa’s poor implementation has also been due to lack of focus on its own development plans. The region’s limited policy space in the international arena and lack of voice globally has also in the recent past affected its ability to move 12
  • 13. forward fast. Furthermore, unfulfilled financial pledges from international partners have also had a negative effect on Africa’s capacity to deliver on development. Additionally, while it is recognised that governments have the mandate to propel development, the civil society, and the populace at large also share that responsibility. Nonetheless, governments have in most cases ignored this section of society thereby rendering their developmental efforts inadequate because people were not carried along in the developmental process. Overall, the numerous experiences and trends highlighted in this section which has sought to draw out the lessons of the past, have shown that Africa has failed to fulfil its full potential. It is well known that in the early 1960s, at the time of the establishment of the OAU, there was high optimism that the continent would perform very well given that several African countries were at par or had even higher GDP rates than their counterparts in Asian. For example, the GDP per capita of Ghana and South Korea were the same in 1960. Up until 1975 the fastest growing developing country was Gabon, and Botswana’s growth rate exceeded that of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Thailand. Despite this optimism, Africa failed to complete the transformation journey which Asian has to a large degree now traversed. So what lie’s behind this? An effective response to this question will entail Africa embracing a paradigm shift in the way it does things in order to promote sustained socioeconomic transformation over the next 50 years. Africa must do things very differently to take advantage of the current momentum towards 2063. 2. Towards a paradigm shift The challenges that face African countries are many but not insurmountable. Africa should draw inspiration from its rich history, from its successes and failures, to chart the way forward and address its challenges. As 13
  • 14. the success in the liberation struggles against colonialism showed, the ethos of Pan Africanism inspired countries to express solidarity and unity with those countries that were still under the yoke of oppression, often at the expense of their own national and regional development. This spirit was dominant for much of the last century, underlining Africa’s engagement with the world and influencing its positions in international forums such as the United Nations, the global peace movement and as a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement. Moreover, the global financial crisis has put to rest the confidence in neoliberalism as the sole answer to growth and development. Africans are therefore adding their voices to the view that the best solutions are not necessarily those of returning to rampant free market policies and externally driven and prescribed policy frameworks. 9 As already noted, Africa is on an upward growth trajectory, and future trends are also in its favour. Conditions are therefore ripe for a decisive break from the practices and approaches (internal and external) that have inhibited the continent from reaching its potential. Charting the way forward over the next fifty years Africans must address the following questions: • How can the current African growth trajectory be sustained for another 2-3 decades to ensure that it transforms the structure of economies and addresses unemployment? • How to ensure inclusive growth that leads to poverty eradication, shared development and social inclusion? • Does the growth trajectory meet the medium to long term development needs of Africa, or is it simply based on external demand for our raw materials? • Is Africa making optimal use of its comparative advantages – especially in natural resources, and how should it achieve this? 9 For example, see Desta (2012), Adedeji (2002) etc. 14
  • 15. • Are we addressing the underlying causes of conflict (resources and identity issues)? • Is the state of democracy and inclusion on the continent conducive to development? • Do we have an endogenous African development agenda that will lead to prosperity and peace? The answers to these questions are not all positive. At the same time, we have a window of opportunity – which is not infinite – to make sure that we address all these questions. This, we argue requires a paradigm shift, a shift in thinking and doing, that will enable us to respond to the above and move with resolution. The areas in which we need new ways of doing and thinking, building on the foundations and learning from the past, include our approaches to leadership, resource mobilization, implementation and execution of plans, integration, role of national states and pooled sovereignity, shared values, attitudes and behaviour, solidarity and people-centred approaches, the importance of identity issues and inclusion, and, Africa’s relationship with the world. Without a doubt the transition from the OAU to the AU is an important milestone that we hope will be acknowledged by future generations, having positioned Africa to be in a better place to address its various challenges.There is now a need to build on the AU and its NEPAD programme by emphasising strong political leadership and effective institutional frameworks, adopting growth promoting macroeconomic policies, diversifying the structure of economies, deepening intra-African trade and investment, increasing investments in highquality education, health and infrastructure, and providing social protection for vulnerable groups. 10 There is now a renewed sense of optimism about the fortunes of the African continent based on a number of developments on the economic and political front. There is also a clear sense of continuity between 10 See also UNECA (2012), UNCTAD (2007) 15
  • 16. previous initiatives by generations of African leaders, aimed at crafting frameworks for Africa’s development, and what is entailed in various AU continental policy frameworks and strategies. Most important among these are the emphasis on self-reliance, regional integration and greater intra-African trade, and enhanced partnerships with the South and with the developed world. Over the next 50 years the ability to fully utilize these platforms will determine how successful Africa is in realizing its vision for a united, prosperous continent at peace with itself. 3. Agenda 2063 3.1. The Foundations There is a remarkable continuity between the current vision and those depicted by African leaders in all major, past and present, political and economic development frameworks of the continent. While the fundamental beliefs that have constituted the foundation of Africa’s vision over the years, and now form the core of Agenda 2063, have virtually remained unchanged, the ambition of the continent in terms of the political and/or economic heights to be attained has been reshaped by prevailing circumstances. Generally, there has been an upward trend in the targets of successive vision statements, although they are all anchored on the same principles of self-reliance, solidarity and regional integration. Thus while the Lagos Plan of Action aimed to pull Africa out of the economic crisis of the 1980s, the Abuja Treaty, crafted in 1991, was bolder and targeted the economic integration of the continent. The AU Constitutive Act and NEPAD, meanwhile, were adopted at a time (the early 2000s) when African countries had started experiencing renewed economic growth following two decades of structural adjustment. This explains why both frameworks aim at eradicating poverty and achieving sustained growth. Agenda 2063 is more ambitious. It aims at the establishment of Africa as a global growth pole and achievement of, at least, middle income status for the economies of all the 16
  • 17. countries of the continent. This is objective is realistic given the current trend of sustained two-digit economic growth rates in many African countries 3.2 Unpacking the Vision for 2063 In the context of Agenda 2063, an integrated Africa alludes to a continent that has completed all the stages for establishing the African Economic Community, as stipulated by the Abuja Treaty signed in 1991. Hence, by 2063, the African common market will be fully functional, with the free movement of people, goods, capital and services, as well as the rights of residence and establishment. Africa will also have an established single domestic market, PanAfrican Economic and Monetary Union, single African Central Bank, Single African Currency, and a Pan-African Parliament. A prosperous Africa by 2063 means that countries on the continent will have graduated from being predominantly in the group of low income countries, that is, having a Gross National Income (GNI) per capita of $1,025 or less to becoming middle income countries with per capita GNI ranging between $1,026 and $12,195. By 2063, Africa will also be a transformed continent where economic growth is translated in wealth and employment creation, guided by sustainable environmental policies. Through their dynamism and size, African economies, by 2063, will even be in the position to drive growth elsewhere on the planet. Global experience indicates that there are multiple pathways to structural transformation. However, once set in motion the process proceeds along the following well-established path. First, there is an increase in the share of manufacturing coupled with a sustained decline in that of agriculture. Second, the share of agriculture employment falls while that of the total labor force in other sectors of the economy increases. Third, economic activity shifts from rural areas to the cities leading to an increase in the degree of urbanization. Successful transformation of African economies will entail the unlocking of the continent’s potential in a range of areas, including matching the skills mix of the large and 17
  • 18. youthful population to the needs of transforming economies and societies, better health and nutrition and improved access to basic services. Such a transformation must create conditions that remove gender barriers and allow for the full participation of African women in politics and economics, and eliminate all constraints to ownership of property, including land. Additionally, it requires strategies for a process of industrialization that is dynamic and selfreinforcing. Africa’s development agenda will need to harness the continent’s human and natural resources in a sustainable manner. Its strategies and policies must be crafted and driven by its own citizens. In order to become a global growth pole, the continent will have to sustain its recent impressive growth momentum for at least two more decades. Africa will also have to vigorously address the challenges of structural transformation of its output and trade, broaden and strengthen its weak infrastructural and human resource base, as well as significantly strengthen and modernize its science and technology capability. There is also a need to strategically manage the opportunities and risks presented by the newly forming multi-polar world that is being shaped by a significant redistribution of political and economic power between the advanced economies and the major emerging economies (e.g. China, Brazil, Russia and India). 3.3 Key Drivers of Change The factors listed below are critical to achieving the change needed to make the Agenda 2063 vision a reality. Promoting science, technology and innovation: Africa’s sustained growth, competitiveness and economic transformation will require investments in new technologies and innovations including in the areas of education, health and biosciences, agriculture, and clean energy. To bring African science and technology to the frontier, attention should be given to initiatives such as the Pan African 18
  • 19. University, the African Science and Technology Observatory and the African Space Programme, as well as the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa. African countries should also put in place incentives to retain high calibre individuals who excel in science, research and technology to contribute to Africa’s development. Investing in human development: The continent’s population of one billion people, most of whom are youth, continues to grow. It will necessarily become an economic and social burden if they are not empowered to take part in the development process. In 1980, only 28 percent of Africans lived in cities. Presently, it is estimated that 40 percent do – which is a share close to China’s and larger than India’s – and the share is projected to increase. Africa has more than 500 million people of working age (15 to 64 years). By 2040, Africa’s labour force is projected to reach 1.1 billion, overtaking China’s or India’s. Converting this population bulge into a “demographic dividend” will require aggressive job creation, with corresponding innovative investments in health and education (particularly education in science, technology and skills development). In the same way, advancing and protecting the rights of women, children, and vulnerable groups must assume a more elevated policy role in Africa. Managing the natural resource endowment: Africa is endowed with approximately 12 percent of the world’s oil reserves, 40 percent of its gold and vast arable land, water and forest resources. The natural resource sector is expected to generate, in net present terms, more than US$ 600 billion (US$30 billion per annum) in government revenue over the next 20 years. Proper management, including value addition and beneficiation of these resources will translate into substantially improved fiscal positions for governments, the private sector and households that can be used to create other forms of wealth and accelerate poverty reduction. Pursuing climate-conscious development: Growing climate change concerns imply that Africa may need to take a different development path from that 19
  • 20. followed by other regions of the world. This being a global public good, African leaders must engage other global partners to ensure that the continent has resources and sufficient capacity to pursue a green path to industrial development, based on low-energy intensity, low-carbon, and clean technologies. Creating capable developmental states: In all cases where structural transformation has succeeded, the state has played a crucial role in the process. African countries must thus build developmental states that are able to mobilize the population and build national consensus around a common development agenda, and ensure that adequate resources are committed to achieve it. Above all, the African developmental state must be accountable and responsive to the needs of its population. The continent is already making progress in this regard. Today, Africa’s governments have improved the continent’s macroeconomic stability significantly. The continent reduced its collective inflation rate from 22 per cent in the 1990s to 2.6 in the 2000s. Governments cut their combined foreign debt from 82 percent of GDP to 59 per cent. And they shrunk their budget deficit from 4.6 percent of GDP to 1.8 percent. Harnessing Regional Integration: Regional integration is critical in promoting peace and security. Furthermore, regional cooperation in the development of infrastructure will lower transaction costs, enhance the development of regional markets, and make manufacturing production and exports more competitive. Regional integration can also contribute to reducing the regulatory burden facing African firms and boost intra-African trade. 3.4 Long-term trends, external and internal For it to be meaningful, the vision for Africa 2063 must take into account several incipient long-term trends that will continue to shape tomorrow’s socioeconomic situation, and which will not only open new opportunities, but also confront policy-makers with new challenges. 20
  • 21. At a global level, the future decades will be characterized by the already apparent emergence as systemically relevant “growth poles” of several developing and transition countries – most notably the BRICS. The ensuing recalibration of the world economic and political power opens the way for Africa to also become a more prominent player in the global arena. Yet, in order to seize this opportunity the continent needs to forge a proactive engagement strategy with these emerging partners, harnessing the growing economic relations with them to advance its long-term development objectives. 11 Secondly, strong global demand for primary resources can be expected to prevail over the medium- long-term. 12 For most African countries (though not net importers) this will improve the terms of trade, boost export and government revenues, and result in buoyant economic growth. The sustainability of these trends, however, will hinge on the capacity of African countries to articulate a more transparent and development-oriented policy framework for the minerals sector, to retain a higher portion of natural resource rents, and to utilize the proceeds towards achieving economic diversification and structural transformation. Thirdly, the continuation of unsustainable consumption patterns in rich countries, the unrelenting expansion of world demand for natural resources, and effects of climate change are set to pose considerable environmental challenges, whose socio-economic effects could be far-reaching. In Africa and elsewhere, countries may soon be confronted with resource scarcities, and huge costs for adaptation and mitigation, and will have no choice but to factor in environmental concerns in their long-term development strategies. Fourthly, the growing sophistication of markets and value chains will plausibly continue in the coming decades. Hence, successfully diversifying its production structure and undertaking high value-added activities will require 11 AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA; (2011); “African Economic Outlook 2011: Africa and its Emerging Partners”. 12 Kaplinsky and Farooki; (2010); “What are the implications for global value chains when the market shifts from the North to the South?” Policy Research Working Paper no. 5205, World Bank. 21
  • 22. Africa to invest massively in science, technologies and innovations, thereby fostering human capital accumulation and technological upgrading. Fifthly, against the background of the increasing importance of finance in the world economy, it is crucial for African countries to strengthen both domestic and regional financial markets, boosting resource mobilization and broadening access to financial services. In this regard, the continent is already moving in the right direction. For instance, the largest share of Africa’s infrastructure funding (65 per cent) comes from the continent’s governments, followed by private investors (25 per cent). Funding from non-OECD countries, of which China is the largest, provides an additional 6 percent. Official development assistance from multilateral agencies funds the remaining 4 per-cent. On top of the above global (and to a large extent exogenous) trends, the vision has to factor in regional long-term phenomena, which will unavoidably shape its development challenges. In that respect, four key elements are worth stressing. 1. First, as a result of demographic dynamics, Africa will face a significant growth of its population, particularly in the young cohorts. This will be accompanied by rapid urbanization and possibly increasing migration flows, including climate-induced population movements.. 2. Second, it is expected that the private sector will have to play a more prominent role in mobilizing resources for structural transformation. This will likely be the result of the already apparent “aid fatigue” plaguing Africa’s traditional development partners, as well as of the emerging new approaches to development cooperation. 13 3. Third, regional integration will go hand in hand with a growing interdependence of African economies, both in the real and financial sphere, and with a transfer of monetary and fiscal autonomy from single countries 13 UNECA; (2012); “Partnerships and Financing for Development in the post-2015 Development Agenda”; Issues Paper prepared for the Third Meeting of the High Level Panel of Eminent Persons on post-2015 Development Agenda. 22
  • 23. to continental institutions. Successfully managing these processes will require devising effective ways to (i) deal with idiosyncratic shocks affecting only one or few countries in the region; and (ii) address in a sustainable way the likely presence of structurally-surplus and structurallydeficit countries within the future African Monetary Union. 14 4. Fourth, the compound effect of population growth, climate change, and rising appetite for primary commodities, will likely translate into mounting pressure on Africa’s natural resources, including land and water. National and regional institutions will thus have to find ways to achieve sustainable and inclusive development, while diffusing the potential scope for conflicts over natural resources, and ensuring greater social and political participation. 3.5 Milestones on the way The vision for Africa 2063 builds on pre-existing strategic frameworks towards an “integrated, prosperous, and peaceful continent”, including most notably the Abuja Treaty, the New Partnership for Africa's Development – NEPAD, the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme – CAADP, the plan of action for Accelerated Industrial Development in Africa – AIDA, the Minimum Integration Programme, the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa – PIDA, and Africa’s Agro-industry and Agribusiness Development Initiative 3ADI. These strategic frameworks define critical milestones that will guide the process ahead, supported by others that will provide additional guidance. Milestones related to integration  Complete removal of barriers to the movement of Africans within the continent by 2015 and possibly introduction of an African Union passport by 2018 14 A similar situation could pose considerable problems for a monetary union, as evidenced by the current difficulties of the Euro area. 23
  • 24.  Establishment of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA) by 2017, as per January 2012 AU Summit Agreement  Establishment of the Continental Customs Union by 2019, as per Abuja Treaty  Establishment of the Continental Common Market by 2023, as per Abuja Treaty  Establishment of the Pan-African Economic and Monetary Union by 2028, as per Abuja Treaty  Attainment of an African share of world trade of 10-15 % and an intraAfrican trade of all African trade of 60-70 % (from current baselines of respectively 2% and 11-12%) by 2040. Milestones related to prosperity  Agricultural sector in African LDCs to be constituted by highly-productive and profitable agricultural value chains by 2020, as per 3ADI  Half of Africa’s 34 LDCs to meet the graduation criteria by 2020, as per the Istanbul Programme of Action  African agriculture modernized and transformed into a highly diversified and productive sector by 2023  Modernization of Africa’s infrastructure to attain world-class standard by 2028, using revenue from the extractive industries and funds raised through innovative financing mechanisms (Presently, only 30% of Africans have access to electricity compared to 70-90 percent for Asians; telecommunication penetration rate is about 6 per cent in Africa compared to an average of 40 per cent for other regions; internet penetration is the lowest in the world at 3 per cent; the road access rate is 34 per cent compared to 55 per cent for other regions; and access to water and 24
  • 25. sanitation is 65 per cent for urban and 38 per cent rural areas compared to 80-90 per cent for other regions in the world.)  Achievement by each African country of an income status at least one step higher than its level in 2013 by 2033  Achievement of an economic growth rate of at least 6% a year for African countries from 2010 to 2040, resulting in a GDP per capita of at least USD 10’000 for all African countries by 2040, as per PIDA 15  Achievement of electricity access of 70% by 2040, providing power access to an additional 800 million people, as per PIDA Milestone related to African ownership of its development programmes  Ending Africa’s dependence on foreign aid by 2028 Milestones related to structural transformation  The following imperatives of Africa’s structural transformation realised by 2033: o The share of manufacturing reaching 28 per cent of GDP in highand upper-middle income countries and 24 per cent in lower middle-income and low-income countries o The industry share of GDP reaching 10 percent and 14 per cent, respectively in the two categories of countries, and the service sector share reaching 59 percent and 47 percent, respectively, o The share of agriculture of GDP falling to 3.3 per cent In highincome and upper middle-income African countries and 15.5 per cent in lower middle-income and low-income countries.. o Achievement of a per capita energy use of 4,365 kilowatt-hours.  Africa’s contribution to world GDP reaching 5.1 per cent by 2034 15 The assumed economic growth rate is comparable to India’s one over the past three decades. 25
  • 26. Milestones on human development  Tertiary enrolment rates increased from 6% presently to 20-30% by 2040  Adults and youth literacy rates increased to100% by 2063  Life expectancy improved from 49 presently to 75 in 2063  Infant mortality rate reduced from 100 per 100,000 births presently to less than 10 by 2063 Milestones on good governance  Illicit financial outflows from Africa reduced by half by 2023  Achievement of the status of “the least corrupt continent” by 2063 Milestones on innovation and technology transfer  Building a better infrastructure, engineering and manufacturing base: Increased capacity for infrastructure design and development (% of local content in infrastructure projects; growth rate in the construction industry)  Enhancing technical competences:(i) Increased Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) output at national and regional levels (e.g. number of patents emerging from research activities in Africa); (ii) Increased human capacity for STI (e.g. proportion of science and engineering students in the total enrolment).  Stimulating entrepreneurship: Increased number of added value products and services 4. Threats and Risks As Africa looks towards the next 50 years of development, new and unforeseen threats are likely to emerge, while the ones we know today could assume new and more threatening dimensions. The risks and threats to Africa 26
  • 27. will arise from four interrelated sources: state fragility and its regional impact, failure to harness the demographic dividend, escalation of the disease burden, and climate change. 4.1 State Fragility and Its Regional Impact In the past 50 years, countries in all regions of Africa have experienced varying degrees of fragility caused by poor economic management, ethnic conflict and civil war, and natural and man-made disasters. Although many African countries are much stronger today, the threat of state fragility lingers on through important neighbourhood effects. Four closely interrelated examples of the regional impacts of state fragility can be given here: transit of narcotic drugs, maritime piracy, human trafficking, and small arms proliferation. The choice of these is somewhat arbitrary. However, they all have in common the fact that they cannot be sustained in the presence of strong state institutions and countervailing and credible measures to address them. In the past decade, international drug cartels have used West Africa as a major transit route to Europe. The United Nations Office for Drugs and Crime has estimated that at least 50 tonnes of cocaine worth some US$2billion from Latin America transits through West Africa every year. The trade has corrupted government officials and the military in some countries. Examples from Latin America and Asia indicate that economies affected by the narcotics trade have taken much longer to catch up and have remained threats to the political stability and growth of their neighbours. Indeed, what the affected states in West Africa are going through today is a potent reminder of the power of the narcotics trade to unravel weak and vulnerable states, destabilize neighbours and ultimately cause military conflict 16. • 16 Mark Shaw, Leadership Required: Drug trafficking and the Crisis of Statehood in West Africa, ISS Policy Brief, No, 37 October 2012 27
  • 28. The proliferation of maritime piracy in Africa has also been closely related to state fragility. Today it is staged mainly from two regions of Africa, the Horn and the Gulf of Guinea. The incidence of piracy in the Horn totaled 445 between 2005 and 2010. During this period, ransom demands increased thirty-six fold to US$238 million. Similar to drug trafficking, piracy also distorts regional economies. Kenya’s tourist industry was seriously affected by the activities of the pirates and the government was forced to take extraordinary measures 17. Maritime piracy is also a serious threat to Nigeria’s oil industry, as well as that of Cameroun, the Republic of Benin and Guinea. It has not only a negative impact on maritime security, trade and confidence in the region, but also on the activities of the oil companies who play important roles in the region as investors, prospectors and transporters. State fragility also manifests itself regionally through the proliferation of small arms and human trafficking, which are having a debilitating impact on many communities. The examples above well illustrate that there remain significant pockets of fragility in many parts of the continent. Left to fester, they will acquire dimensions that have the potential to reverse Africa’s progress. They will erode state institutions in the affected countries with a strong possibility of regional contagion. They raise the cost of doing business and impact negatively on domestic investment. They also erode the capacity of Africa’s youth to enter productive employment. • 17 The East African, Ransom, Naval Operations push Piracy costs to $12 billion, www.theeastafrican.co.ke 28
  • 29. 4.2 Failure to Harness the Demographic Dividend In the next 50 years, Africa’s biggest single asset but also its Achilles heel is going to be its large and youthful population. It is estimated that its population will be about 2.6 billion by 2063 that is more than double its current level. Its population would then be much larger than that of India or China. It is also estimated that the “middle of the pyramid”, that is Africans living above the subsistence level will grow from 355 million in 2010 to 1.1 billion in 2060, an increase from 34 to 42 per cent. Consumer spending which reached an annual expenditure of $680 billion in 2008 is projected to reach $2.2 billion in 2030. Data indicate that Africa’s population will continue to be the youngest in the world for the foreseeable future. Furthermore in the next decade Africa’s share of the global population aged between 15 and 29 could rise to 28 percent. In many of Africa’s so-called fragile states, almost three-quarters of the population are aged below 30 years 18. As the mass of today’s young people in Africa move into their productive years, the ratio of the working age population to the rest is expected to improve markedly. If the young are well trained and enter key sectors of the economy, as happened in Asia and Latin America, this is bound to engender a “demographic dividend” that can propel the economy forward fast. However, it is important to underline that this does not just happen. Strategies and policies that raise the capacity of the population to embark on productive employment must be formulated and implemented. There is no easy formula to do this and governments must be willing to experiment. This can range from facilitating improved nutrition and combating the disease burden to enhance productivity, to raising standards of technical training at vocational and tertiary levels. So far few African countries have approached the issue of raising technical training in the schools and universities anywhere near as consistently as the Asian countries. A leaf or two could be borrowed from their experience. 18 Justin Yifu Lin, 2012, “Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in developing countries, 20/01/12”, http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographic-dividend 29
  • 30. 4.3 Escalation of Africa’s Disease Burden Africa has had a disproportionately large disease burden compared to all developing areas. This has been due to a combination of many factors including its largely tropical location, poverty and poor nutrition. Malaria has been a particularly difficult disease to combat given its resistance to therapies. It has a particularly debilitating impact on child health and on subsequent school performance. It has also reduced rural productivity and industrial productivity. Since the onset of the HIV/AIDs pandemic, more than 15 million people have died in Africa from AIDS related illnesses. The impact on countries, though varied, has been devastating, raising the demand for healthcare to unprecedented levels, reducing the pool of experience in government, and squeezing other important social expenditures. How Africa tackles its disease burden in the future will depend squarely on its ability to develop its institutional capabilities. So far the approach to malaria and HIV/AIDS has been largely donor driven, and therefore not sustainable. To continue along this path will imply that when other diseases emerge in the future, for example those related to increasing affluence and rapidly changing way of life such as stress and heart disease, the capacity to address them might be very constrained. 4.4 Climate Change Climate change will have important impacts on Africa’s future. In 2007, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared Africa as one of the most vulnerable continents to climate change and climate variability, a situation aggravated by the interaction of multiple stresses at various levels and its low adaptive capacity 19. Already, climate change is recognized as a key driver of human conflict over land and water resources, and as the main cause of the 19 Brown, Oli, Ann Hammill and Robert Mclean, “Climate Change as New Security threat: Implications for Africa”, International Affairs, 83:6, 2007, pp1141 – 1154 30
  • 31. serious droughts, floods and land degradation that we have witnessed in recent decades. As has been noted by many commentators, while Africa is the continent that makes the least contribution to the effects of climate change, owing to its low level of industrialization, it is likely to suffer most from the consequences of climate change. The question is, therefore, not so much whether Africa needs to adapt to climate change, but how. The risk and threat lie in whether African countries will be able to garner the human and financial resources required to respond to this epic challenge. 5. Critical Success Factors Since the early 2000s, many African economies have posted some of the highest growth rates in the world. The question for African countries and pundits alike is whether this is a temporary phenomenon soon to be forgotten or a serious pointer to a brighter future for the continent built on solid fundamentals? To answer that question and achieve the development goals voiced eloquently by its independence leaders, Africa needs to examine a number of critical success factors. 5.1 Changing the Mind Set It is well known that Africa has not been short of well laid out strategies, nor good intentions in the last 50 years, but failed to transform. Why? Why have so few of these plans been implemented in spite of the bright prospects and promise they envision? The lack of resources has been used to explain Africa’s relatively poor performance. But the factors at the core of the “lost opportunity” are paucity of political commitment and a dependence syndrome. African countries spectacularly failed to mobilize their populations for development in the past and hoped to finance their way to development through donor support. The latter as is well known came with many strings attached. It is therefore a political imperative for Africa to evolve a developmental mind set in the next decades. 31
  • 32. This is at the core of the paradigm shift whose necessity was emphasized earlier in this document. It is not to say that Africa should shy away from bold plans and visions, but it must also expend the political, human and financial resources needed for their achievement. There are obvious advantages to rapid economic integration for example, but Africa will need to undertake the steps required, sometimes in minute detail to achieve them. 5.2 Institutional Capabilities A paucity of strong institutions at the national and regional levels explains to some extent the slow pace of Africa’s development. The planning and monitoring functions at the national, sub-national and sector levels have been especially problematic. This has had implications for estimating the human and financial resources required and how to sequence public sector efforts and strategies. In contrast to experiences in other parts of the world, development has been more episodic than planned, with periods of optimism and others of despondence, neither feeding into the planning capacities of the country. There are similar challenges at the regional and continental levels. To implement many of the broad reforms and plans agreed at the level of Regional Economic Communities and the African Union, including those for greater integration, will require the enhancement of legal technical and regulatory capacities that today are far from adequate. As Africa evolves toward greater levels of integration, its institutional capabilities must also grow accordingly. The call for Africa’s integration started over 50 years ago, as part of the continent’s independence movement. Today there is little or no political discussion of Africa’s integration project at the national levels, beyond the intelligentsia and the bureaucracies. It is important to re-introduce the integration agenda into the national political discourse. It should not be allowed to proceed merely as a legacy issue. 32
  • 33. To assess whether Africa is making progress in all the efforts proposed in this report, it will be important to measure progress in a tangible form. This raises the importance of strengthening institutions for the collection and analysis of statistics at all levels of the economy. Without this kind of data, it is not possible to execute policies in timely fashion, nor to monitor or evaluate their outputs and outcomes. 5.3 Resource mobilisation It is now clear that ODA, which has been an important source of development assistance for Africa, cannot be sustainable. The continent’s expanding needs have propelled it beyond what donor resources can offer. Moreover, the international community has not been able to meet many recent commitments. A notable example being the financing commitments made in 2005 at Gleneagles. The rapidly changing global financial markets, economic emergence of “the South” and the recent commodity boom have also created opportunities for alternative approaches. Africa needs to find the money to strengthen the public sectors, notably the civil services, and their capacity to provide social services. The expansion of infrastructure and telecommunications will, for example, require a huge amount of resources. In many countries, the dependence on ODA, the breadth of the informal sector, and poor tax structures reduced the government’s capacity to generate revenue. During recent years, governments have also given tax holidays to many external firms—with loss of revenue as a result. Poor administration and corruption have also played their part. New vehicles for mobilizing resources will include public–private partnerships (PPP), sovereign wealth funds (occasioned by the current natural resources boom), infrastructure bonds, the creation of national venture capital funds, sovereign bonds, diaspora bonds, corporate bonds, and private equity funds. In each of these cases careful technical capacities need to be put in place. 33
  • 34. Moreover, a corollary to these is also the need to strengthen transparency and accountability in tax system management and curb illicit financial flows. 5.4 Knowledge and innovation The global economy is today driven by the explosion in information and communications technology. African has shown that in spite of starting from a low base, it has the potential to harness sophisticated technologies. To consolidate Africa’s recent growth will require investments in new technologies and innovations including in the areas of health and bio-sciences, agriculture, and clean energy. The rapid growth of Africa’s telecommunications industry illustrates the impact that new technologies can have. The ICT broadband penetration rate is set to cover 99% of the African population by 2060, up from 7% in 2010, reaching almost every corner of the continent and touching on all areas of commerce. The mobile phone industry has transformed Africa’s technology landscape. In 2011, Africa became the second largest mobile market in the world after Asia, with about 620 million mobile connections. Currently, the mobile phone industry represents 3.5% of Africa’s GDP and employs over 5 million people. Using mobile phone technology, Kenya’s M-Pesa provides banking services to more than 70% of the country’s adult population. It has become a global benchmark in mobile banking. Similar technologies have revolutionized access to agricultural market information in Ghana, electronic filing of taxes in South Africa, and sensor based irrigation in Egypt. In the coming decades, Africa’s mobile industry is projected to lead the transformation of Africa’s consumer market. References • AfdB, AU, UNECA, Assessing Regional Integration in Africa • Brown, Oli, Ann Hammill and Robert Mclean, “Climate Change as New Security threat: Implications for Africa”, International Affairs, 83:6, 2007, pp1141 – 1154. 34
  • 35. • Ban Ki-Moon, West Africa, Sahel Face “Toxic Brew” of Crime, Drug trafficking , Piracy, Terror: We must do more to keep the situation from escalating, Report to the UN Security Council,Ref: SG/SM/14118 ; SC/10547;AFR/2340, 21 Feb.2012 • The Economist Magazine, Africa’s hopeful Economies: the Sun Shines Bright, 12/2/2013, www.economist.com • Calestous Juma and Hezekiah Agwara, Africa in the global knowledge economy: Strategic Options, International Journal of Technology and globalisation, Vol.2 Nos. 3 and 4, 2006, pp 220 – 233. • Edward Alpers, “Piracy in the Indian Ocean Africa”, Journal of African Development, Spring 2011/vol. 13, No.1 pp17 – 38). • The East African, Ransom, Naval Operations push Piracy costs to $12 billion, www.theeastafrican.co.ke • KAD (knowledge for Africa Development) “Utilising Knowledge for Development: Ten priorities for Africa”, distilled report of a Knowledge for Africa’s Development Conference, Johannesburg, November 2007 • MthuliNcube, AfDB Chief Economist and vice President, Presentation to theAfDB Board of Directors 2013 • Mark Shaw, Leadership Required: Drug trafficking and the Crisis of Statehood in West Africa, ISS Policy Brief, No, 37 October 2012 • Justin Yifu Lin, 2012, “Youth Bulge: A Demographic Dividend or a Demographic Bomb in developing countries, 20/01/12”, Let’s talk development blog hosted by World Bank Chief Economist, http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/youth-bulge-a-demographicdividend... • Shanta Devarajan, “Africa’s Statistical Tragedy”, In the World Bank Chief Economist Blog Africa Can End Poverty 2011, http://blogs.worldbank.org/africacan/africa-s-statistical-tragedy 35
  • 36. • See also ref. Morten Jerven, Poor Numbers: How we are Misled by African Development statistics • The United States White House, On the occasion of the hosting of the 11 AGOA Forum in Washington, the White House, the seat of the US Presidency released the new “US Strategy Towards Sub-Saharan Africa”, acknowledging Africa as the next frontier for global investments, 14 June 2012, • UNECA, Economic Report on Africa 2011, Chapter 5 – Africa’s Need for A Developmental State: Opportunities and Challenges • World Bank, Renewing the World Bank Strategy for Africa: Consultations Note, May 2010. 36