Censorship Regimes On The Chinese Internet

Censorship enforcement regimes on the Chinese Internet Anders Pedersen Thesis Abstract 16. April 2009 [email_address]

What they used to think

“ In the new century, liberty will spread by cell phone and cable modem … Now, there’s no question China has been trying to crack down on the internet --- good luck. That’s sort of like trying to nail Jello to the wall.”1 (former President of the United States Bill Clinton, 8 March 2000)

Premises

Hangovers following the wave of Internet optimism  The Chinese state has succeeded in imposing censorship on the Internet (The Great Firewall, blocking of Youtube and filtering Google.cn)

Tradeoff of China as an authoritarian regime: Economic growth or political control

Challenges from current research

Overwhelming empirical documentation on freedom of expression violations

Still little transparency from what the Chinese state does and doesn’t

Growing mapping of Chinas governance structures on the Internet

Where it leaves this study

An institutional framework around “enforcement regimes” allows a focus on “how by who” rather than “how much” censorship

In other words: “Which institutional regimes assisted the Chinese state in reaching comprehensive and efficient censorship”

Problem formulering

What tools have the Chinese role Chinese state manage to censor the Internet and

In what way does the censorship-tools applied on the Chinese Internet constitute different enforcement regimes and ?

The Great Firewall: the inside-outside dimension

The public private regime:

The private networks: QQ

Key theoretical perceptions

The Internet is a constructed space

Internet users can be regulated by the architecture itself or by intimidations…

Institutions act within structures, but can leverage agency

Private agencies and the state are separate, are driven by separate incentives and act accordingly

Limitations

Self-censorship and panoptical reflections about the Chinese police state

Circumvention: political dissidents on Youtube and the use of proxy-servers

No extensive disucssion of institutional analysis’ place in authoritarian states

The Chinese Internet as an unbalanced public sphere and the idea of authoritarian deliberation

The role of the media is not included

Normative approach

China doesn’t recognize freedom of expression as defined by the ICCPR, but this this study use it as point of departure

Freedom of expression within the Internet:

Freedom to hold opinions (free to produce content)

Freedom to impart information and ideas (access to producing and sharing content)

Freedom to receive information which includes the right to gather information (ie. access to unedited search engines)

Transparency of censorship regulation (ie. the need for explicit information for users, when material is filtered)

Internet as theoretical field

Constructed (Lessig)

Generative – it inherently generates wealth, innovation and information (Zittrain and Benkler)

The end-to-end principle (Zittrain)

Can be regulated at the points-of-control

Constitutes a legal territory for regulation

Structures

The socio-economic dynamics of the generative net (incentive for the state)

The architecture of the Internet (complex regulatory field)

The law (some presence of rule of law)

Agency and agents

Gatekeepers at the points of control

State institutions (enforcement agencies and regulatory boards)

Private agencies (Google, Yahoo, Baidu)

Users (will seek information and has the right to do so)

Mechanisms (operationalizing censorship on the Internet)

Logging (surveillance of users): privacy

Filtering and blocking websites: access to information and free speech

Intimidations such as arrests: free speech

The campaign

Enforcement regimes

An ideal type to understand institutional dynamics and public-private relations

Three levels of enforcement:

Law and regulation

Oversight

Execution

Three enforcement regimes

The Great Firewall:

Measure: Filtering inside outside going content

Command and control, pure public regime from regulation to execution

Shaping policy on Internet freedom (regulation)

Managing a complete list of blocked websites (oversight)

Implementing the Great Firewall (execution)

Private-public co-regulation regime within China

The state:

Drafting voluntary “public pledge” (regulation)

Monitoring the field (oversight)

Arresting users (execution)

Private agencies:

Managing list of key-words to filter content (oversight)

Implementing the actual filtering (execution)

Sharing information about users with the state (execution)

Private regime with state influence

Filtering of content within private networks such as QQ and Sina

Managing list of filtered key words (oversight)

Formulating terms-of-use agreements with users under private legal frameworks

Executing filtering and sharing information with the state (execution)

Conclusions

The Chinese state applies a varied strategy to reach efficient censorship

The Chinese state initiates enforcement at all points of control

The private agencies plays an individual role a should therefore be held accountable

The more points of control on the Internet, the more censorship (Search engines)

Consequences for human rights strategies

CSR offers a framework for challenging the actions of private agencies

CSR attempts to moderate behavior of private agencies

CSR frameworks like the Global Network Initiative is currently including enteties like Yahoo!, Google, but no Chinese. Another West><East. CSR thereby continues the dichotomy of current HR discussions of cultural differences and universality.

A role model for other states?