HOW CO‐DECISION IS
AFFECTING THE
OUTCOME OF THE CAP
NEGOTIATIONS
Alan Matthews
Trinity College Dublin
alan.matthews@tcd.ie...
Introduction
 Political negotiations on the CAP reform
between Council, Parliament and Commission
continue at the time of...
Literature
 Both theoretical and descriptive literature on
how institutional rules influence EU
agricultural policy makin...
Co-decision (‘Ordinary legislative
procedure’)
 Parliament gained co-decision powers over many
policy domains (not CAP) i...
What are implications of EP involvement?
 How much influence? (potentially measured by
number of EP amendments incorporat...
What can we expect from co-decision?
 Political science literature
 Surveys experience across multiple dossiers
 Litera...
Preference for first reading agreement
highlights importance of trilogue process
Trilogue
Political
agreement
EP
mandate
C...
Further implications of trilogues
 Early trilogues avoid the ‘race against the clock’ which
starts ticking once first rea...
Implications of changes in formal
procedures
 Consultation procedure (EP opinion)
 Commission proposes policy. MS can pr...
Parallelism with MFF negotiations
 CAP reform and CAP budget are being decided
simultaneously
 Lisbon Treaty gave EP enh...
CAP issues in European Council agreement
(adopted into Ag Council general position)
 Overall level of commitment appropri...
The co-decision process to date
– lengthy, messy but working!
 EP Resolution on Lyon Report July 2010 to influence
Commis...
The Parliament’s position on CAP
reform
(dimensions of market orientation, targeting, subsidiarity,
simplification)
Exampl...
‘Constitutional’ issues
 Distribution of powers between Council and EP
post-Lisbon still to be clarified
 Article 43(3) ...
Co-decision and Commission’s role
 Commission’s power of initiative determined by:
 power to propose
 power to amend
 ...
Discussion
 Co-decision has given the EP greater influence
 Evidence of EP positions influencing the Council
legislative...
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How codecision between Council and European Parliament is affecting CAP reform June 2013

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  • Red items are those where the decision will be incorporated into the CAP regulations and which do not directly affect the distribution of resources between MS
  • Agriculture became a “shared competence” (Art. 4(2) TFEU)
  • How codecision between Council and European Parliament is affecting CAP reform June 2013

    1. 1. HOW CO‐DECISION IS AFFECTING THE OUTCOME OF THE CAP NEGOTIATIONS Alan Matthews Trinity College Dublin alan.matthews@tcd.ie Presentation to the AIEAA, 2nd Annual Conference June 6‐7 2013, Parma
    2. 2. Introduction  Political negotiations on the CAP reform between Council, Parliament and Commission continue at the time of this presentation  Thus, how co-decision has affected CAP outcome cannot yet be answered  Instead, this presentation highlights a number of relevant issues for future research
    3. 3. Literature  Both theoretical and descriptive literature on how institutional rules influence EU agricultural policy making  Runge and von Witzke (1987), Pokrivcak, de Gorter and Swinnen (2001), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2006), Pokrivcak, Crombez and Swinnen (2008), Crombez and Swinnen (2011)  Blumann (2008), Geuguen and Marissen (2012)  Arovuori and Niemi (2009), Greer and Hind (2012), Swinnen and Knops (2012)
    4. 4. Co-decision (‘Ordinary legislative procedure’)  Parliament gained co-decision powers over many policy domains (not CAP) in Maastricht Treaty 1993  Co-decision introduced into the CAP by the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009  Except Art 43(3) – fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations  Formal process includes first reading, second reading, conciliation  Then delegated and implementing acts, implementation by member states  Strong preference for first reading agreement (possibility introduced by Amsterdam Treaty in 1999) highlights the importance of the trilogue process  What are implications for CAP reform of EP
    5. 5. What are implications of EP involvement?  How much influence? (potentially measured by number of EP amendments incorporated into final legislation)  What kind of influence? (has EP supported or constrained CAP reform?)  Who determines EP influence? (within the EP, what is role of parties, committees, Presidency, national interests of individual MEPs?)  The struggle for influence (potential for contested ‘constitutional’ issues with the Council to influence the CAP reform outcome, both substance and timing)  Implications for Commission’s influence (has co- decision weakened role of Commission as ‘agenda setter’? (Greer and Hind, 2012; Crombez and
    6. 6. What can we expect from co-decision?  Political science literature  Surveys experience across multiple dossiers  Literature finds that co-decision increased Parliament’s powers vis a vis the Council  No previous studies have examined EP’s role in the CAP (Greer and Hind, 2012)  Spatial models of decision-making (Crombez and Swinnen, 2011)  explain policy outcomes as a function of legislative procedures, the preferences of the political actors and the location of the status quo  Are not predictive models without knowing EP preferences
    7. 7. Preference for first reading agreement highlights importance of trilogue process Trilogue Political agreement EP mandate Council general position Resort to conciliation committees has decreased from 39% in 1993- 1999 to only 4% in 2009- 2011 while first readings have increased from 28% in 1999-2004 to 78% inCo-decision process First reading procedure
    8. 8. Further implications of trilogues  Early trilogues avoid the ‘race against the clock’ which starts ticking once first reading is completed  Greater flexibility in appointing members to trilogues  Refers especially to EP where sometimes political group leaders become involved in addition to committee rapporteurs and chairs  Unlike conciliation where the committee can only discuss amendments previously made by either the EP or the Council, trilogues allow committee members to introduce completely new amendments to proposals and then to offer the compromise text for a single vote in each chamber  Members of trilogue negotiations have considerable flexibility in determining the outcome of legislation which is then voted on up- down basis by the two bodies
    9. 9. Implications of changes in formal procedures  Consultation procedure (EP opinion)  Commission proposes policy. MS can propose amendments. Amendments need unanimity for adoption. Council votes on (amended) proposal by QVM.  Co-decision procedure  Commission proposes policy. EP can propose amendments (1st reading). Commission can decide to include in its proposal. Council decides on (amended) proposal with QMV, unanimity required for amendments (1st reading)  2nd reading – similar to 1st  Conciliation committee – Council and EP can jointly amend Commission’s proposal in a ‘joint text’  Commission loses much of its formal influence, especially in CC  Trilogue process introduces conciliation prior to 1st reading
    10. 10. Parallelism with MFF negotiations  CAP reform and CAP budget are being decided simultaneously  Lisbon Treaty gave EP enhanced powers in MFF negotiations, but not co-decision  Two issues  EP has linked timing of CAP agreement to MFF agreement  this issue defused by the very limited cuts to CAP budget in the European Council conclusions but could still delay final ratification of CAP agreement  MFF agreement extended to key parameters in the CAP debate  European Council MFF positions incorporated into Agricultural Council general position – what role for co- decision for these paragraphs?  Next slide shows the overlap between MFF and CAP negotiations
    11. 11. CAP issues in European Council agreement (adopted into Ag Council general position)  Overall level of commitment appropriations for Heading 2, including specific ceilings for direct payments  Level and model for redistribution of direct support – details of convergence across Member States  The model for capping support to large farms - voluntary  Method for financial discipline  Allocation of 30% of Pillar 1 payments to greening  Recommendation that EFAs will be implemented in ways that do not take land out of production and that avoid unjustified income losses to farmers  Flexibility between pillars  Principles for allocation of rural development support, including ‘sweets’  Co-financing rates for rural development support  Operation of the crisis reserve  Introduces macro-economic conditionality in deciding on the release of EAFRD rural development funds (as well as for the structural and cohesion funds) as part of Common Strategic Framework regulation
    12. 12. The co-decision process to date – lengthy, messy but working!  EP Resolution on Lyon Report July 2010 to influence Commission’s consultation paper in November 2010  EP Resolution on Dess Report June 2011 responded to Commission’s consultation paper  Dess draft report heavily amended in COMAGRI  COMAGRI report strongly backed by Parliament plenary  COMAGRI rapporteurs’ reports responded to Commission’s legislative proposals October 2011  Over 7,000 amendments to Commission proposals reduced to smaller number of consolidated amendments  The Parliament’s mandate March 2013  Largely backed COMAGRI amendments  Confusion over greening amendments  The Agricultural Council’s general position March 2013  Evidence that Presidency incorporated EP’s text where there was no substantive disagreement
    13. 13. The Parliament’s position on CAP reform (dimensions of market orientation, targeting, subsidiarity, simplification) Example Direct Payments regulation Art Issue Pro Con 9 Active farmer – negative list approach x 18 Payment entitlements – allow SAPS to continue x 22 Flexibility in internal convergence x 28(a) Complementary payment for first hectares x 29 Flexibility wrt greening measures C 30 Crop diversification x? x? 31 Maintenance of permanent pasture x? x? 32 Ecological focus areas x 33 Mandatory payment to young farmers x 38-9 Voluntary coupled support x C implies EP position agrees with Commission proposal, which in turn is placed in Pro or
    14. 14. ‘Constitutional’ issues  Distribution of powers between Council and EP post-Lisbon still to be clarified  Article 43(3) exceptions on fixing prices, levies, aid and quantitative limitations  Choice between delegated and implementing acts  Council and Parliament failed to reach agreement on Commission 2010 proposals on alignment of CAP regulations with Lisbon Treaty provisions  EP favours greater use of delegated acts, Council favours more use of implementing acts where MS exercise influence through comitology  Contested ‘constitutional’ issues may yet complicate completion of CAP2020 negotiations
    15. 15. Co-decision and Commission’s role  Commission’s power of initiative determined by:  power to propose  power to amend  power to withdraw a proposal  The CAP2020 experience  Initial proposal based on most extensive consultation process yet  Cautious initial proposal – result of Commissioner preferences or realistic assessment of what might be possible to achieve?  Commission has lost ability to control legislation  EP proposal to introduce milk supply control measures  Council proposal on approximation for internal convergence  From ‘co-participant’ to ‘honest broker’  Mandate must be renewed as negotiations proceed
    16. 16. Discussion  Co-decision has given the EP greater influence  Evidence of EP positions influencing the Council legislative track  Outcome of trilogue process will shift Council/Commission positions on at least some issues  EP influence has largely pulled CAP2020 reform in a backward direction  The critical role played by COMAGRI  Question mark over administrative and technical resources  Disagreements on constitutional issues could provide unexpected last-minute sticking point for EP agreement  What happens if no political agreement in June?

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