Russian intrest in central asia after 9(1)
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Russian intrest in central asia after 9(1) Russian intrest in central asia after 9(1) Document Transcript

  • RUSSIAN INTREST IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11CONTENT  ABSTRACT  Background  Introduction  Russian Interests in central Asia  Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources  Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays  Russian Interest in Central Asian Water  Russia’s Involvement in the Central Asia’ Security and Economy  Recent developments  Conclusion  References ABSTRACT
  • This Research paper deals with the fluctuating relationship of Russia with itsneighboring central Asian states in the early 19th century the great Soviet Unioncollapsed, and its relationship with its former compartments (the central Asian states)was quite restrained. Earlier the soviet had complete control over the region’sresources, now it was a country rife with political instability and confusion. In theearly 19th century due to internal instability Russia did not play the big brother role incentral Asia, as was required of a country with such political, economic strength.In these years the need to form regional treaties in the field of defense and trade werenot given much important by the Russians. Central Asia was also opening to newmarkets ahead. But in the late nineties, the threat of Chechen and Afghanistan Islamitegrew and threatened Russia as well. That is why Russia decided to buckle up andwork to protect itself from the potential threat of radical Islam. Russia decided to takecontrol of the region once again, but this once it decided to use diplomatic techniques.This research paper explains how U.S.A and Russia share the same interest in thecentral Asia.The central Asian states are the second range of buffer zones for the two countriesafter Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Route is also essential for trade to them. Thispaper then talks of the techniques that Russia implied to gain it’s regional supremacyback. It uses oil, gas and minerals as strong economic tools, and signed treaties withneighboring states for expansion of trade along these lines, also security of the stateswas an essential component and Russia signed treaties with neighboring nations ondrugs trafficking, arms trafficking, curbing terrorism. Russia also aims at improvingand expanding its hydroelectric power through treaties by asking access to the waterresources of central Asian countries. Finally Russian plans to expand its banking and financingsystem to central Asian states, starting from Kazakhstan. In short this paper is basedupon the growing role of Russia in the region after 9/11 and how Russia is trying togain its past glory on the diplomatic front instead of fighting on the borders.
  • Background:From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia waspreoccupied with revolutionary internal reforms and deeply focused on joiningEurope. Russia’s tired security, economic, and political policies toward Central Asiaduring this period exemplify its annoyance; a summary of the results of these policiesreveals that Russia reaped what it sowed.Russia’s security and military cooperation with Central Asia in the early 1990s wastypified by very limited expression and even less action. Russia became compelled toseveral Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but inpractice drastically downsized its military cooperation. Russia’s regional bordertroops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle Division were obvious exceptions; thatsaid, these remnants could neither prevent civil war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow ofdrugs traveling north from Afghanistan. Thus, despite Moscow’s announcement of anew regional “Monroe Doctrine. Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Central Asiawere even more destructive than his dissolution of Russia’s southern defense bufferzone. The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rightly describes the results of Russia’spolicy of indifference toward Central Asia in the early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtuallymissing cultivation in the security, economic, and political realms, it effectively lostthe region. The states of Central Asia, lacking military and economic strength andrapidly losing faith in Russia, actively sought “external guarantors of regional securityand foreign assistance.”In 1994 the countries enrolled in the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the defenseministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to assistin coordinating their PFP efforts and constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central AsianBattalion) to conduct PFP training. Russia’s significantly reduced level of access toCentral Asian natural resources something it had taken for granted in Soviet days andheightened awareness that the nations were throwing off the mantle of the ‘littlebrother soon convinced Russia that this garden needed a gardener.
  • Developing its minor revival toward Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, Russiamade limited attempts to boost security and defense cooperation with Central Asia.During this time, Islamic radicals had taken control of the Chechen Republic and theTaliban had gained control in Afghanistan, so Russia had become more aware ofradical Islam’s threat to its national security.Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov doctrine in the economic realm were aimedprimarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow asserted its right to transport CentralAsian hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.But other than limited oil-export partnership with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,Russia did not concentrate on strengthening economic cooperation in fact, overalltrade volume decreased below the level of the early 1990s.Relations became strictly bilateral since the CIS had become ineffective afteraccomplishing its purpose of conducting the former republics civilized divorce.Russia’s only multilateral success story was the resolution of the Tajik civil war incooperation with Iran and Uzbekistan.In sum, despite new leadership in the Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen itsposition in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lackof consensus among senior leadership, numerous policy inconsistencies andcontradictions due to the rapid turnover of prime ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure,and economic and military weakness. Russia did not fully grasp the importance of theregion to its long-term security or economic interests. They did not appreciate how Russia’s superior pronouncements regarding itsintentions for Central Asia were rarely converted into sensible actions; furthermore,they recognized Russia’s economic and military weakness and continued to rely ontheir own limited internal resources and external relationships.IntroductIon:
  • For Russia, relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan are not a new Great Game, along the lines of the mid 19th century strugglebetween the British Empire and Imperial Russia. But nor are they business as usual.The Georgian war in August showed that Russia has a clear direct sphere of influencethat is marked by actual borders, those of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States.As a result of Russia’s tough stand in Georgia, it is likely that the European Union andthe United States will devote increased attention to Eastern Europe and the SouthernCaucasus, but also to Central Asia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union when Russiawas struggling to position itself internationally and aiming to integrate into westernstructures, interest in its southern neighbors was extremely low. Central Asia’s newlyindependent states were regarded as a annoyance that controlled Moscow, which, inturn, felt obliged to show some leadership in the region. In the second half of the1990s, Yeltsin’s foreign policy slowly started to take a greater interest in Central Asia,mainly in reaction to these countries’ efforts to look for new partners out of necessity.Only Kazakhstan succeeded partially to develop an independent multi-vector foreignpolicy and attract foreign interest. When Putin came to power in 2000, Russia startedtaking a keener interest in its neighbors. Although a clear foreign policy strategy wasnever defined for Central Asia, all developments pointed to Moscow making the fiverepublics a priority and not wishing to risk losing them. After all, Central Asia waspart of Imperial Russia, later the Soviet Union, while the 1990s were considered as abrief interval of lack of influence.russIa’s Interests In central asIa:Russias interests in Central Asia are unusually similar to those of the United States.Central Asia has lost its former importance to Russia as a military buffer zone firstbetween the Russian and British Empires, and then between the USSR and U.S. clientstates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the SovietUnions collapse, Russian troops were withdrawn from all the Central Asian statesapart from Tajikistan and some token forces on the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan
  • borders with China. Today, Russias chief concern is also one of security. Russias ownterritory has been threatened by the overflow from Afghanistan through Central Asiaof Islamic militancy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Indeed, from the beginning of hispresidency in January 2000, Russias President, Vladimir Putin, pushed the idea of aconcerted campaign against terrorism with American as well as European leaders. Hewas one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,and to warn of linkages between these camps and well-financed terrorist networksoperating in Europe and Eurasia. In December 2000, Moscow joined Washington insupporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, and later appealed foradditional sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban all a precursor tocooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism after September 11.In addition, Moscow seeks the restoration of Soviet-era communications and tradeinfrastructure between Russia and Central Asia, and some capacity for increasingRussian private sector investment in the region beyond the energy sector. In line withthis interest, Russia has initiated a major project to revive and revitalize the formerNorth-South transportation corridor from Russian Baltic ports down the Volga River,across the Caspian to Central Asia and Iran, and from there to Pakistan and India. Inthe Soviet period, this served as a major freight route and an alternative to thetransportation of goods from Europe to Asia through the Mediterranean and SuezCanal. All of this makes for a primary focus on economic rather than military andstrategic issues for Russia in the region and, therefore, an increased interest in CentralAsias stability and development.russIa and central asIa’s energy resources:For its own stability and Central Asia to Russia for energy imports active participationin East Asia is very important. Russias federal budget revenues and about two-thirdsof its exports of oil and gas accounts for 60% of exports. The fact that Russia, despitethe rich oil and gas resources, Oil and gas from Central Asia in bulk at lower prices on
  • imports to supply the lucrative European markets. Exploit its position as a transitCountry for energy supplies to Europe, Central Asia with Russia in energy sector havesigned various agreements. For six years from 1994 to 2000, Russia did not buy gas,Gazprom, as the vast Russian energy (20% of world gas deal), it cost him to buy itfrom Turkmenistan thought. In a dispute with Turkmenistan, the European market in1997, Moscow cut off the flow pipe to the new state in an effort to achieve high energyprices, supply shortages. In September 2006, Gazprom 1000 cubic meters of gas per100 dollars for maternity costs for a 50% price increase agreed. Consensus alreadycost $ 65 / m thick was 1000. In exchange, Gazprom and Turkmenistans rich Yolo tanaccess to natural gas sector. Export routes Gazprom and Turkmenistan in 2009.11 inNovember 2007 until the actual control efficiency achieved .Turkmenistan with Chinaalso signed agreements on energy imports. Chinese officials every year for 30 years in2009, Turkmenistan began exporting gas to 30 signed an agreement withTurkmenistan also exports gas to Iran. Regional gas export agreements signed withcountries, like Turkmenistan with Russia and other energy-hungry states. Thestrategy worked, Turkmenistan increased its gas prices in recent years have been ableto export to Russia. Afghanistan - Pakistan (NULL) and pipeline (TCP), the Central Asian oil and gasexport routes vowing to help. Under an agreement with Gazprom, Uzbekneftegaz forthe same amount of gas to southern Kazakhstan and 3.5 million m thick Karachaganakgas supplies from Russia, Uzbekistans state-owned oil and gas company VostokLimited Soyuzneftegaz the Russian gas company. Central Asia through thedevelopment of nuclear energy, Russia is protecting its interests. If nuclear energy isincreased in Central Asia, there is less loss of energy, nuclear energy as an energyshortage in the domestic market of Central Asia can serve, If Russia does not invest inthis area, China, India and other states like Iran against Russian interests in sensitiveareas that could be invested. At the end of December 2007, a dangerous level of -137material from Kyrgyzstan to Iran aboard a freight train was searched Central Asia toRussia in the nuclear sector participation is important not only for Central Asia, butalso for regional countries. Russias nuclear sector and U.S. shares common interests.
  • russIa’s olIgarch Power Plays:Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate itsinfluence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstanpossibly Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initialinroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks both through thedirect and indirect gaining of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to putinfluence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions oncommercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loanto be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bankwill follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank.Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in theregion, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo.Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interestshas confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, andtransparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thusdispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do withcontributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, severalcommercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuringthat income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regimesurvival.russIan Interest In central asIan water:Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia’s water resources. former Soviet republicsKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan an added elementin the environment is water, used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely to generatehydroelectric power, while the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan view it as a resource for supporting agriculture rather than an energysource.
  • In the 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian nations emergingfrom the debris have yet to resolve the issue of an equitable distribution of the aridregion’s most precious resource. The most significant amounts of oil and gas arefound in the westerly “Stans” of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the region’s aquaticreserves are largely under the control of the most easterly (and poor) mountainousstates, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which between them account for more than 85percent of the region’s groundwater reserves, primarily in the form of alpine glacialrunoff that feeds the region’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.Earlier this week Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a state visit toUzbekistan, weighed in on the issue, telling journalists: “The construction ofhydropower stations in Central Asia should meet the interests of all neighboringcountries and should correspond to international rights norms of transboundaryrivers usage. It is impossible to act in isolation. It can cause tensions which can only besolved not by economic but by political means.“Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built withconsideration of the interests of all neighboring states,” he said, adding, “If there is nocommon accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such projects.”Medvedev’s comments delighted his hosts, who have argued that if Tajikistanproceeds with constructing its planned Rogun hydroelectric cascade, which would beCentral Asia’s largest, it would severely impact the water needs of downstream states.Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated: “I would like to especially speak on one issue.Uzbekistan counts on Russia’s well thought-out and considered position on issuesrelating to the implementation of hydropower projects in the Central Asian region.”Medvedev’s statements caused Tajikistan to deliver a diplomatic protest, fearing thatMoscow was favoring Tashkent’s position over its own. There are, however,alternatives to gigantic Soviet-legacy projects like Rogun, first begun in 1976, such assmaller, more numerous hydroelectric facilities that would alleviate many of thedownstream nations’ concerns and have been advocated by Western specialists with
  • such institutions as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and theAsian Development Bank.russIa’s Involvement In the central asIa’securIty and economy:A Quest for Retaining Power in Central Asia, Russia economic security, and politicalinterests in East Asias. Russian drug trafficking, arms trafficking, international crimeand terrorism in Central Asia that caters to the international threat is received. Totheir area of influence in Central Asia, Russia, Central Asia is to maintain its presence.For this purpose, the deployment of Russian military bases and lease them to thevarious agreements signed with Central Asia. Russian troops on +14000 Armenia,Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, mulduua, Russia and Tajikistan in the 201Motorized Rifle Divisions in the garage Ukraine.20 deployed outside their borders isthe largest Russian deployment. More than 5,000 Russian soldiers dsaby, Kurgan-Tubeand Kulab areas are posted. Maintain its strong presence in Central Asia to Russia,Central Asia and Russias strategy for providing economic assistance to Central Asiadyndaryu used as a bone.to recover, it was decided in April 1996 Russia Russia fromKyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz outstanding debt as a share in the industry will get. Deferredpayment of Kyrgyz debt to Russia in 2002.Bill Agreement with Tajikistan in 1993, Russia signed the situation, and amended inApril 1999. But many problems Russia.25 Tajikistan Tajikistan Soviet Russian troopsin Tajikistan also spend 50% of funding was $ 300 million loan for up to writing fulltime and then woke up. Under the agreement, Russian troops in Tajikistan for 199350:50 Russia and Tajikistan through money should be shared. However, Tajikistanmaximum 5% of costs not yet paid. In 2004, under the influence of Russia, Tajikistan,Russia ownership of a space control center confirmed. In June 2004, Russia, Tajikistanreach an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis was able to change the militarydeployment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President Imomali
  • Rakhmanov, 4 June 2004 meeting and decided that Russia without pay and will useTajik bases. In return, Russia and Uzbekistan advanced navigation system will provideair defense weapons.Era.27 Soviet Russian influence in Kyrgyzstan that was equal tothat system will be relived.In a September 2003 agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia launched 23October 2003 Spin for 15 years, took control of the air base, the foundation allotted $35 million for expansion. In various public statements by Russian President VladimirPutin as Russias foreign policy that was to be subordinated to domestic economicinterests. 26 January 2001 in a speech, Putin stressed that Russias strategic goal ofworking within a community are interlinked. In an era of globalization, promoting theinterests of economic policy.29 Russian Minister of Foreign Investment in countrieslike Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan key column, and its effects should be expanded; Russiahas tried to influence other Central Asia, and presented himself as the chief option forEast Asia and its resources for infrastructure development.recent develoPments:Putin protege Medvedev took up his mentor’s layer in May 2008. Putin has played anactive role in foreign policy from his current position as prime minister, so Russia’songoing activist stance toward Central Asia can be seen simply as a continuation ofthe policies of his presidency. Since the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in itsinfancy, it is too early to fully analyze the results of Russian policy toward Central Asiaunder his leadership. Nonetheless, a brief examination of his “Foreign Policy Concept”(FPC) and an assessment of Russia’s recent unsure posture toward operations inAfghanistan will prove useful to US policy makers.The July 2008 FPC, a document similar in nature to the US national security strategy,resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence in both global aspirations andresponsibilities near abroad.
  • Another primary objective, according to the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed atstability the essence of Putin’s multilateral efforts, discussed above. The CSTO,Eurasec, and SCO are specifically mentioned as instruments for ensuring mutualsecurity and combating widespread threats such as “terrorism, extremism, drugtrafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration” in the CIS.Recent developments indeed confirm Russia’s reassertion of a zone of influence inthis portion of the former Soviet Union. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian thinktank focused on Afghanistan, confirms that Russia wants to be the only master of theCentral Asian domain and to the maximum extent possible make things difficult forthe U.S. in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan be dependent onthe will of the Kremlin. Exhibiting its penchant for having the last word in the region,in the wake of the eventual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled Uzbekistan byannouncing plans to open a CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.conclusIon:Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian policy toward Central Asia hasprogressed from passive and annoyed to active and engaged. Early in the Yeltsinyears, Russia concentrated on conducting domestic reforms and integrating with theWest; the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost confidence in Russia and pursuednew partnerships. Russia paid slightly more attention to Central Asia during the late1990s, but economic weakness and policy inconsistencies prevented meaningfulprogress. Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia’shegemonic aspirations and its intense focus on security and energy interests. Mindfulof the evolution of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed with an appreciation forRussia’s historic sense that the region is in its zone of influence, and attentive toRussia’s zero-sum thinking regarding areas near abroad, US leaders and airpowerpractitioners will be better prepared to craft and implement mutually agreeable,
  • contextually sound strategic policy for Central Asia. Russias interests, economy,energy sector and the governments of Central Asia for a rapid reaction betweenseparate deal between Russia and Central Asia need to be implemented. Bureaucraticrulers of Central Asia states that are growing in Russia for help in protecting theinterests are therefore, democracy is not in the interest of Russia in Central Asia.Militarily weak Russia in Central Asia will provide an opportunity to present a securityrisk to our troops deployed in Central Asia and Russia for influence will endureforever. East Asian economies with weak internal always happen according to Russianinterests. Russia with the European Union-style integration in East Asia does not wantIts always for their safety, economic development and supply of energy to try to relyon Central Asia.