Russian intrest in central asia after 9Document Transcript
RUSSIAN INTREST IN CENTRAL ASIA AFTER 9/11CONTENT ABSTRACT Background Russian Interests and Policy Russia and the West, Russia’s foreign policy, Central Asia Russia’s interests in Central Asia Russia and Central Asia’ Energy Resources Democratic Central Asia and Russia’s Interests US Presence in the Region and Russia’s Strategy Recent developments Conclusion ABSTRACT
From the time the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 to the mid-1990s, Russia waspreoccupied with revolutionary internal reforms and deeply focused on joiningEurope. Russia’s tired security, economic, and political policies toward Central Asiaduring this period exemplify its annoyance; a summary of the results of these policiesreveals that Russia reaped what it sowed.Russia’s security and military cooperation with Central Asia in the early 1990s wastypified by very limited expression and even less action. Russia became compelled toseveral Central Asian states via the Tashkent Collective Security Treaty of 1992, but inpractice drastically downsized its military cooperation. Russia’s regional bordertroops and Tajikistan-based 201st Motor Rifle Division were obvious exceptions; thatsaid, these remnants could neither prevent civil war in Tajikistan nor curb the flow ofdrugs traveling north from Afghanistan. Thus, despite Moscow’s announcement of anew regional “Monroe Doctrine,” Russia was neither welcome as a big brother norcapable of playing the role of the regional hegemony. Further representing policyincoherence, Russia assumed the USSR’s treaty obligations toward Afghanistan butturned its back on the “Afghan problem,” setting the stage for civil war.Yeltsin’s early economic policies toward Central Asia were even more destructivethan his dissolution of Russia’s southern defense buffer zone. Shock therapy architectYegor Gaidar forced the Central Asian impediment out of the ruble zone in 1993,leaving the fledgling countries without currency. While such Russian state practiceswreaked havoc, newly formed private Russian companies vigorously pursuedbusiness arrangements in Central Asia, especially in the area of natural resources.The proverb “no gardener, no garden!” rightly describes the results of Russia’s policyof indifference toward Central Asia in the early 1990s. Due to Russia’s virtuallymissing cultivation in the security, economic, and political realms, it effectively lostthe region. The states of Central Asia, lacking military and economic strength andrapidly losing faith in Russia, actively sought “external guarantors of regional securityand foreign assistance.”In 1994 the countries enrolled in the North Atlantic TreatyOrganization’s (NATO) Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. In 1995 the defense
ministers of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan formed a joint council to assistin coordinating their PFP efforts and constituted the Tsentrazbat (Central AsianBattalion) to conduct PFP training. Russia’s significantly reduced level of access toCentral Asian natural resources—something it had taken for granted in Soviet daysand heightened awareness that the nations were “throwing off the mantle of the ‘littlebrother’ ” soon convinced Russia that this “garden” needed a “gardener.”During the mid-1990s, Russia’s foreign policy took a new direction under new foreignminister Yevgeny Primakov, appointed in 1996. His aim of restoring Russia’s regionalinfluence took preference over integration with the West. Russia gradually took moreinterest in the region, perhaps in reaction to the Central Asian nations’ ongoing effortsto build new international relationships out of necessity. In fact, Primakov wrote thatthe West was actively working to prevent Russia from having a special role in theformer Russian republics and accused the West of blocking Russian attempts at arapprochement with the region.Developing its minor revival toward Central Asia in the latter half of the 1990s, Russiamade limited attempts to boost security and defense cooperation with Central Asia.During this time, Islamic radicals had taken control of the Chechen Republic and theTaliban had gained control in Afghanistan, so Russia had become more aware ofradical Islam’s threat to its national security. The link between Russia and Tajikistangrew slightly stronger when the Tajiks informally granted Russia a basing agreementfor the 201st Motor Rifle Division. By the end of 1999, however, border guards werevirtually phased out of Kyrgyzstan, and Russian advisers had left Turkmenistan.Adding insult to injury, Uzbekistan pulled out of the Collective Security Treaty, feelingthat Russia had not helped stem the Taliban tide. On the whole, Russia’s security roledeclined and mainly centered on the sale of military supplies, a peace-keepingcontingent and coordination with these states over anti-terrorist measures.Russian efforts to achieve the Primakov doctrine in the economic realm were aimedprimarily at hydrocarbon transport. Moscow asserted its right to transport CentralAsian hydrocarbons across Russian territory and opposed efforts to bypass Russia.
But other than limited oil-export partnership with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan,Russia did not concentrate on strengthening economic cooperation in fact, overalltrade volume decreased below the level of the early 1990s.Similarly, Russia made very little effort in the realm of multilateral cooperation withCentral Asia during this period. Relations became strictly bilateral since the CIS hadbecome ineffective after accomplishing its purpose of conducting the former republicscivilised divorce. Russia’s only multilateral success story was the resolution of theTajik civil war in cooperation with Iran and Uzbekistan.In sum, despite new leadership in the Foreign Ministry, Russia failed to strengthen itsposition in Central Asia in the late 1990s. Scholars attribute Russian shortfalls to lackof consensus among senior leadership, numerous policy inconsistencies andcontradictions due to the rapid turnover of prime ministers late in Yeltsin’s tenure,and economic and military weakness. Russia did not fully grasp the importance of theregion to its long-term security or economic interests. Regional experts VladimirParamonov and Aleksey Strokov assert that Russian leaders essentially had itbackwards by thinking that in order to strengthen its position in Central Asia, Russiafirst needed to recover its international status. Not surprisingly, the Central Asiannations continued to lose faith in Russia. They did not appreciate how Russia’s loftypronouncements regarding its intentions for Central Asia were rarely converted intosensible actions; furthermore, they recognized Russia’s economic and militaryweakness and continued to rely on their own limited internal resources and externalrelationships.IntroductIonFor Russia, relations with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan andUzbekistan are not a new Great Game, along the lines of the mid 19th century strugglebetween the British Empire and Imperial Russia. But nor are they business as usual.The Georgian war in August showed that Russia has a clear direct sphere of influencethat is marked by actual borders, those of the Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic States.
As a result of Russia’s tough stand in Georgia, it is likely that the European Union andthe United States will devote increased attention to Eastern Europe and the SouthernCaucasus, but also to Central Asia. After the break-up of the Soviet Union when Russiawas struggling to position itself internationally and aiming to integrate into westernstructures, interest in its southern neighbours was extremely low. Central Asia’snewly independent states were regarded as a annoyance that controlled Moscow,which, in turn, felt obliged to show some leadership in the region. In the second half ofthe 1990s, Yeltsin’s foreign policy slowly started to take a greater interest in CentralAsia, mainly in reaction to these countries’ efforts to look for new partners out ofnecessity. These new partners foremost the EU member states, the US and Chinareacted slowly or almost not at all in the case of Brussels, to the political andeconomic vacuum in Central Asia. Only Kazakhstan succeeded partially to develop anindependent multi-vector foreign policy and attract foreign interest. When Putin cameto power in 2000, Russia started taking a keener interest in its neighbours. Although aclear foreign policy strategy was never defined for Central Asia, all developmentspointed to Moscow making the five republics a priority and not wishing to risk losingthem. After all, Central Asia was part of Imperial Russia, later the Soviet Union, whilethe 1990s were considered as a brief interval of lack of influence. This transitionalperiod – it is not concluded yet – resulted in the need to acknowledge and allow otherplayers in the region. Nonetheless, Russia still has clear geographical, 71 economic,social and cultural advantages through its legacy in Central Asia. It will need theseassets to make sure that the interdependence between Moscow and its southernneighbours remains strong, especially now that other players will be more alert toRussia’s actions in its near abroad.Russia’s interests in Central Asia:
Russias interests in Central Asia are unusually similar to those of the United States.Central Asia has lost its former importance to Russia as a military buffer zone firstbetween the Russian and British Empires, and then between the USSR and U.S. clientstates in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and between the USSR and China. After the SovietUnions collapse, Russian troops were withdrawn from all the Central Asian statesapart from Tajikistan and some token forces on the Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstanborders with China. Today, Russias chief concern is also one of security. Russias ownterritory has been threatened by the overflow from Afghanistan through Central Asiaof Islamic militancy, terrorism, and drug trafficking. Indeed, from the beginning of hispresidency in January 2000, Russias President, Vladimir Putin, pushed the idea of aconcerted campaign against terrorism with American as well as European leaders. Hewas one of the first to raise the alarm about terrorist training camps in Afghanistan,and to warn of linkages between these camps and well-financed terrorist networksoperating in Europe and Eurasia. In addition, Russia actively supported the NorthernAlliance in its struggle with the Taliban in Afghanistan. In December 2000, Moscowjoined Washington in supporting United Nations sanctions against the Taliban, andlater appealed for additional sanctions against Pakistan for aiding the Taliban all aprecursor to cooperation with the United States in the war against terrorism afterSeptember 11.Russias other major interest in the region is in Central Asian energy development,with a new focus on gas as markets expand in Europe and Asia. Together, Russia, Iran,and the Central Asian states hold more than half of world gas reserves. Gas is not asmobile as oil and is destined for regional rather than world markets. Retaining amajor role in Central Asian gas production and export is a key issue for Russiasenergy industry. Energy analysts doubt that Russia can both meet its domesticdemand and growing ambitions for gas exports in the coming decades without havingaccess to and influence over the flow of Central Asian gas.In addition, Moscow seeks the restoration of Soviet-era communications and tradeinfrastructure between Russia and Central Asia, and some capacity for increasing
Russian private sector investment in the region beyond the energy sector. In line withthis interest, Russia has initiated a major project to revive and revitalize the formerNorth-South transportation corridor from Russian Baltic ports down the Volga River,across the Caspian to Central Asia and Iran, and from there to Pakistan and India. Inthe Soviet period, this served as a major freight route and an alternative to thetransportation of goods from Europe to Asia through the Mediterranean and SuezCanal. All of this makes for a primary focus on economic rather than military andstrategic issues for Russia in the region and, therefore, an increased interest in CentralAsias stability and development.russIa and central asIa’ energy resources:For its own stability and Central Asia to Russia for energy imports nrbad activeparticipation in East Asia is very important. Russias federal budget revenues andabout two-thirds of its exports of oil and gas accounts for 60% of exports. The fact thatRussia, despite the rich oil and gas resources, Oil and gas from Central Asia in bulk atlower prices on imports to supply the lucrative European markets. Exploit its positionas a transit Country for energy supplies to Europe, Central Asia with Russia in energysector have signed various agreements. For six years from 1994 to 2000, Russia tكrmyn did not buy gas, Gazprom, as the vast Russian energy (20% of world gas deal),it cost him to buy it from Turkmenistan labhهyn thought. In a dispute withTurkmenistan, the European market in 1997, Moscow cut off the flow pipe to the newstate.In an effort to achieve high energy prices, supply shortages. In September 2006,Gazprom tكrmyn 1000 cubic meters of gas per 100 dollars for maternity costs for a50% price increase agreed. Consensus already cost $ 65 / m thick was 1000.In exchange, Gazprom and Turkmenistans rich Yolotan access to natural gas sector.Export routes Gazprom and Turkmenistan also adsys 2009.11 in November 2007 untilthe actual control efficiency achieved .Turkmenistan with China also signedagreements on energy imports. Chinese officials every year for 30 years in 2009,Turkmenistan began exporting gas to 30 bysyym signed an agreement
with.Turkmenistan also exports gas to Iran. Regional gas export agreements signedwith countries, like Turkmenistan with Russia and other energy-hungry statessudybajy whilst putting. The strategy worked, Turkmenistan increased its gas pricesin recent years has been able to export to Russia.U.S. Baku - tybls - syهan (BTC), Trans - Afghanistan - Pakistan (NULL) and pipeline(TCP), the Central Asian oil and gas export routes vowing to help. This aurqzaqstanWestern and Asian markets, Russia and Turkmenistan to separate will be able toexport their energy. But it is clear that considerable oil and gas pipelines aurqzaqstanand Turkmenistan to Russia as Central Asias energy resources are imported throughthese pipes do not have.In 2004, Russian oil production company lyuكul syyrg as $ 1billion for 35 years (pyysy) natural gas reserves of Uzbekistan signed with Uzbekistan.Under pyysy, lyuكul Kandym, Khauzak and southern regions of Uzbekistan haveagreed to partner in the shade. Uzbekneftegaz lyuكul Uzbeki state gas firm, with a90% stake acquired in the project.Uzbekistan in the early part of the development ofKarakal Ustyurt which borders Pakistans western autonomous region of Aral Sea.Under an agreement with Gazprom, Uzbekneftegaz for the same amount of gas tosouthern Kazakhstan and 3.5 million m thick Karachaganak gas supplies from Russia,Uzbekistans state-owned oil and gas company Vostok Limited Soyuzneftegaz theRussian gas company with an aide of Soyuzneftegaz pyysy announced. A five-yearjoint research project and a 36-year South Western Madhya Ustyurt is Guisar هadruكarbn agreed to submit a development program. There is agreement that was signedbetween the British ayujy 2001 Uabekneftegaz pyysy UzPEC.14 registered all itsnatural gas exports to Uzbekistan and Central Asia more than half of Russia is sendingto the rest. Russian President Vladimir Putin and 6 July 2005, President Nursultannjrbayyu Kurmangazy oil field offshore production of a joint agreement signed 55years. That same year, Russia and Kazakhstan also a Khvalynskoye agreed to developthe oil sector.According to press reports, for 2009, Russia cut off gas from Turkmenistan willannually from bysyym 60-70. That supply a large part (42-51 per year bysyym) is to
go ahead for Ukraine. Turkmen gas supplies to Ukraine in 2006 were not directly, butrather energy company RosUkrEnergo, the Russia - Ukraine gas deal is a mediator.RosUkrEnergo Turkmenistan, 8.5 / aurqzaqstan and Uzbekistan each year for 2007with 7 bysyym bysyym with 42 years of gas per year for imports of bysyym signed.Even Russias nuclear sector investment in East Asia is doing. Russia in February 2002for a nuclear power plant construction, approximately 400 kilometers north of Almatyoffered to revive the project.Total costs for these institutions is estimated atabout 10 $billion.17 with Uzbekistan, Russia (M o U) understand about 4500 tonnes of uraniumresources estimated Aktan uranium deposit with the development of Uzbekistan hassigned a Memorandum of Agreement.Central Asia through the development of nuclear energy, Russia is protecting itsinterests. If nuclear energy is increased in Central Asia, there is less loss of energy,nuclear energy as an energy shortage in the domestic market of Central Asia canserve. So, Russia and Central Asian oil and gas more easily be able to achieve. Russiannuclear industry investment in uranium enrichment, the uranium imports from EastAsia can benefit. If Russia does not invest in this area, China, India and other stateslike Iran against Russian interests in sensitive areas that could be invested. There arealso prohibited from providing nuclear materials to other neighboring countries inCentral Asia is a possibility. At the end of December 2007, a dangerous level of -137syzym rydyudrmy material from Kyrgyzstan to Iran aboard a freight train wassearched. In your search, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) If anapplication for managing details.19 Kyrgyz government for the development ofuranium resources, lack of money, such as Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are forced tosneak away to the poor garage sales Can any other country. Central Asia to Russia inthe nuclear sector participation is important not only for Central Asia, but also forregional countries. Russias nuclear sector, and U.S. shares common interests.Russia’s Oligarch Power Plays
Russia has also successfully managed to use the commercial sphere to consolidate itsinfluence and power in Central Asia. This has been especially evident in Kazakhstanpossibly Russia’s only direct link to the other republics. Russia has made its initialinroads in the Kazakh banking system through state-owned banks both through thedirect and indirect gaining of shares. In theory, this policy will allow Moscow to putinfluence on the Kazakh economy by controlling access to loans, and decisions oncommercial debt. Vnesheconombank, for example, gave Astana a U.S. $3.5 billion loanto be used solely to purchase Russian products. It is also likely that Kazakh BTA Bankwill follow a restructuring path that involves a possible sale to Russia’s Sberbank.Despite a focus on cornering the financial market, Russia is also gaining influence inthe energy and mining sectors. Companies including Polyus Gold and Polymetal havegained considerable leverage over gold and copper deposits; and LUKoil continues toexpand its presence. For example, Moscow offered capital at a time of crisis to ensurethat LUKoil could purchase BP’s stake in the Caspian Pipeline Consortium project. It isalso worth noting that LUKoil was invited to sit on Kazakhstan’s Foreign InvestmentsCouncil in 2003 by President Nursultan Nazarbayev.Both China and Russia, in following commercial strategies to gain influence in theregion, have inadvertently contributed to securing the current political status quo.Investigating various business deals that have included Chinese or Russian interestshas confirmed that in many instances the rule of law, corporate governance, andtransparency of beneficial ownership are considered to be luxuries and thusdispensable. State involvement in commercial transactions thus has little to do withcontributing to the creation of sustainable economic growth. In fact, severalcommercial transactions have merely worked to sustain the ‘shadow state’, ensuringthat income generation is not tied to economic development but to securing regimesurvival.russIan Interest In central asIan Water:
Russia’s increasing interest in Central Asia’s water resources. former Soviet republicsKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan an added elementin the environment is water, used by Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan largely to generatehydroelectric power, while the downstream states of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan andTurkmenistan view it as a resource for supporting agriculture rather than an energysource.In the 17 years since the Soviet Union collapsed, the Central Asian nations emergingfrom the debris have yet to resolve the issue of an equitable distribution of the aridregion’s most precious resource. The most significant amounts of oil and gas arefound in the westerly “Stans” of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan; the region’s aquaticreserves are largely under the control of the most easterly (and poor) mountainousstates, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which between them account for more than 85percent of the region’s groundwater reserves, primarily in the form of alpine glacialrunoff that feeds the region’s two largest rivers, the Syr Darya and Amu Darya.Earlier this week Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, during a state visit toUzbekistan, weighed in on the issue, telling journalists: “The construction ofhydropower stations in Central Asia should meet the interests of all neighboringcountries and should correspond to international rights norms of transboundaryrivers usage. It is impossible to act in isolation. It can cause tensions which can only besolved not by economic but by political means.“Hydroelectric power stations in the Central Asian region must be built withconsideration of the interests of all neighboring states,” he said, adding, “If there is nocommon accord of all parties, Russia will refrain from participation in such projects.”Medvedev’s comments delighted his hosts, who have argued that if Tajikistanproceeds with constructing its planned Rogun hydroelectric cascade, which would beCentral Asia’s largest, it would severely impact the water needs of downstream states.Uzbek President Islam Karimov stated: “I would like to especially speak on one issue.
Uzbekistan counts on Russia’s well thought-out and considered position on issuesrelating to the implementation of hydropower projects in the Central Asian region.”Medvedev’s statements caused Tajikistan to deliver a diplomatic protest, fearing thatMoscow was favoring Tashkent’s position over its own. There are, however,alternatives to gigantic Soviet-legacy projects like Rogun, first begun in 1976, such assmaller, more numerous hydroelectric facilities that would alleviate many of thedownstream nations’ concerns and have been advocated by Western specialists withsuch institutions as the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund and theAsian Development Bank.russIa’s Involvement In the central asIa’ securItyand economy:A Quest for Retaining Power in Central Asia, Russia economic security, and politicalinterests in East Asias. Russian drug trafficking, arms trafficking, international crimeand terrorism in Central Asia that caters to the international threat is received. Totheir area of influence in Central Asia, Russia, Central Asia is to maintain its presence.For this purpose, the deployment of Russian military bases and lease them to thevarious agreements signed with Central Asia. Russian troops on +14000 Armenia,Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Georgia, mulduua, Russia and Tajikistan in the 201Motorized Rifle Divisions in the garage Ukraine.20 deployed outside their borders isthe largest Russian deployment. More than 5,000 Russian soldiers dsaby, Kurgan-Tubeand Kulab areas are posted. Maintain its strong presence in Central Asia to Russia,Central Asia and Russias strategy for providing economic assistance to Central Asiadyndaryu used as a bone.to recover, it was decided in April 1996 Russia Russia fromKyrgyzstan to the Kyrgyz outstanding debt as a share in the industry will get. Deferredpayment of Kyrgyz debt to Russia in 2002. Kyrgyzstan and Russia $ 170 million after a20-year extension was provided financial assistance for Kyrgyz debt service.Russiaagreed to import wheat for the 1996 loan.
Bill Agreement with Tajikistan in 1993, Russia signed the situation, and amended inApril 1999. But many problems Russia.25 Tajikistan Tajikistan Soviet Russian troopsin Tajikistan also spend 50% of funding was $ 300 million loan for up to writing fulltime and then woke up. Under the agreement, Russian troops in Tajikistan for 199350:50 Russia and Tajikistan through money should be shared. However, Tajikistanmaximum 5% of costs not yet paid. In 2004, under the influence of Russia, Tajikistan,Russia ownership of a space control center confirmed. In June 2004, Russia, Tajikistanreach an agreement with Russia on a permanent basis was able to change the militarydeployment. Russian President Vladimir Putin and Tajik President ImomaliRakhmanov, 4 June 2004 meeting and decided that Russia without pay and will useTajik bases. In foreign currency, it was concluded that Tajikistan emaining $ 250million debt will be written off.26 16 June 2004, Putin visited Uzbekistan and astrategic partnership agreement was signed between Uzbekistan and Russia. Bothcountries pledged to cooperate against terrorism. Was agreed that Russia andUzbekistan sthapnau bases can be used if necessary. Russia has the responsibility toprotect Uzbek air space. Russia also used Navai Uzbek airspace. Russia in case ofemergency always has the right to use. In return, Russia and Uzbekistan advancednavigation system will provide air defense weapons.Era.27 Soviet Russian influence inKyrgyzstan that was equal to that system will be relived.In a September 2003 agreement between Russia and Kyrgyzstan, Russia launched 23October 2003 Spin for 15 years, took control of the air base, the foundation allotted $35 million for expansion. Central Asia in October 2005, Russian Foreign MinisterSergey lauruu your visit, including Russia Iran, which includes troops from all coastalstates to establish a connection to the imposition of a military group NATO has tried toreduce foreign influences. In various public statements by Russian President VladimirPutin as Russias foreign policy that was to be subordinated to domestic economicinterests. 26 January 2001 in a speech, Putin stressed that Russias strategic goal ofworking within a community are interlinked. In an era of globalization, promoting theinterests of economic policy.29 Russian Minister of Foreign Investment in countrieslike Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan key column, and its effects should be expanded; Russia
has tried to influence other Central Asia, and presented himself as the chief option forEast Asia and its resources for infrastructure development.recent developmentsPutin protege Medvedev took up his mentor’s layer in May 2008. Putin has played anactive role in foreign policy from his current position as prime minister, so Russia’songoing activist stance toward Central Asia can be seen simply as a continuation ofthe policies of his presidency. Since the Medvedev presidency is still arguably in itsinfancy, it is too early to fully analyze the results of Russian policy toward Central Asiaunder his leadership. Nonetheless, a brief examination of his “Foreign Policy Concept”(FPC) and an assessment of Russia’s recent unsure posture toward operations inAfghanistan will prove useful to US policy makers.The July 2008 FPC, a document similar in nature to the US national security strategy,resounds with Russia’s perceived resurgence in both global aspirations andresponsibilities near abroad. The FPC asserts a “real capacity to play a well-deservedrole globally” as one of the “influential centers in the modern world.” One of Russia’schief foreign policy objectives, per the FPC, is “to promote good neighborly relationswith bordering States, to assist in eliminating the existing hotbeds of tension andconflicts in the regions adjacent to the Russian Federation and to prevent emergenceof the new ones.”Another primary objective, according to the FPC, is to pursue partnerships aimed atstability the essence of Putin’s multilateral efforts, discussed above. The CSTO,Eurasec, and SCO are specifically mentioned as instruments for ensuring mutualsecurity and combating widespread threats such as “terrorism, extremism, drugtrafficking, transnational crime, and illegal migration” in the CIS. In its section on“International Economic and Environmental Cooperation,” the FPC describes Russia’sinterest in energy security and its goal of strengthening “strategic partnership with
leading producers” in order to ensure secure transit. Such verbiage is consistent withRussia’s demonstrated willingness to play hardball in the energy domain.Recent developments indeed confirm Russia’s reassertion of a zone of influence inthis portion of the former Soviet Union. Andrei Serenko, cofounder of a Russian thinktank focused on Afghanistan, confirms that Russia wants to be the only master of theCentral Asian domain and to the maximum extent possible make things difficult forthe U.S. in making the transfer of American forces into Afghanistan be dependent onthe will of the Kremlin. Exhibiting its penchant for having the last word in the region,in the wake of the eventual Manas-eviction rollback, Russia rattled Uzbekistan byannouncing plans to open a CSTO base at Osh in southern Kyrgyzstan.conclusIon:Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russian policy toward Central Asia hasprogressed from passive and annoyed to active and engaged. Early in the Yeltsinyears, Russia concentrated on conducting domestic reforms and integrating with theWest; the new Central Asian nations, in turn, lost confidence in Russia and pursuednew partnerships. Russia paid slightly more attention to Central Asia during the late1990s, but economic weakness and policy inconsistencies prevented meaningfulprogress. Under Putin, Russia demonstrated its “ultimate intention” for the CentralAsian nations namely, to limit their sovereignty and expand control over their foreignpolicies.” Medvedev’s FPC and recent actions in Central Asia confirm both Russia’shegemonic aspirations and its intense focus on security and energy interests. Mindfulof the evolution of Russia’s Central Asia policies, armed with an appreciation forRussia’s historic sense that the region is in its zone of influence, and attentive toRussia’s zero-sum thinking regarding areas near abroad, US leaders and airpowerpractitioners will be better prepared to craft and implement mutually agreeable,contextually sound strategic policy for Central Asia. Russias interests, economy,energy sector and the governments of Central Asia for a rapid reaction between
separate deal between Russia and Central Asia need to be implemented. Bureaucraticrulers of Central Asia states that are growing in Russia for help in protecting theinterests are Therefore, democracy is not in the interest of Russia in Central Asia.Militarily weak Russia in Central Asia will provide an opportunity to present a securityrisk to our troops deployed in Central Asia and Russia for influence will endureforever. East Asian economies with weak internal always happen according to Russianinterests. Russia with the European Union-style integration in East Asia does not wantIts always for their safety, economic development and supply of energy to try to relyon Central Asia.