IPV6 Under the Hood

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IPV6: Under the Hood - Mark Dowd

IPV6: Under the Hood - Mark Dowd

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  • 1. IPv6: Under The Hood Mark Dowd Principal Security Architect [email_address]
  • 2. Overview
    • IP version 4 (IPv4) is a core component of the Internet’s TCP/IP suite
    • Time-tested, well-understood and extensively studied protocol
    • Has some shortcomings when addressing the changing needs of the Internet (limited address space, security issues, functionality limitations, and inefficiencies)
    • IP version 6 (IPv6) is IPv4’s successor, and attempts to address these shortcomings
  • 3. Why IPv6?
    • IPv6 is the next-generation Internet workhorse-protocol
    • Many OS’s have IPv6 support (Linux, Windows XP2+/2k3/Vista, *BSD..)
    • IPv4 protocol stacks are time-tested and proven to work in untrusted and uncertain environments, IPv6 stacks are not
    • Many OS’s have fresh stacks that are ripe for the hacking
    • Same with firewall-based technologies targeted for IPv6
    • IPv6 connectivity over the Internet is increasingly being made available
  • 4. Covered in this Speech
    • We will look at some of the basic building blocks of IPv6
    • We will consider some of the inherent weaknesses in some of the IPv6 protocol design
    • Problem areas in host OS stack implementations
    • Firewall/IDS/IPS bypassing techniques
  • 5. IPv6 Addressing
    • IPv6 Addresses are 128-bit
    • Represented as 16-bit words separated by colons (‘:’)
    • Example: 0102:0304:0506:0708:090a:0b0c:0d0e:0f00
    • Sequences of zeros compressed using “::”
    • Example: 0102:0000:0000:0000:090a:0b0c:0d0e:0f00 -> 0102::090a:0b0c:0d0e:0f00
  • 6. IPv6 Addressing
    • Link-local addresses (fe80::/64) are only visible on a local physical link
    • Every IPv6-enabled network interface must have a link local address
    • Usually an interface will auto-configure its link-local address when it is enabled (more on this later)
    • Site-local addresses (fec0::/10) are for internal networks
    • Much like 192.168 and similar ranges for IPv4
  • 7. IPv6 Addressing
    • Unique local addresses (FC00::/7) are unique network ranges within an organization
    • Global Unicast addresses (2000::/3) are public routable IP addresses
    • IPv6 has multicast addresses for sending packets to groups of nodes simultaneously. Multicasting is also used for broadcasts
    • There are also anycast addresses, which is like multicast except that a packet will be delivered to any one node in the group (the closest node)
  • 8. IPv6 Packet Structure
    • An IPv6 packet is composed of an IP header, followed by any number of optional extension headers, followed by an Upper-Layer (UL) protocol header + data
    • Each optional header can be from 8 bytes in length up to 2048 (1 byte length header is incremented and multiplied by 8)
    • There are a few fixed-length ones that don’t follow these rules (primarily the fragmentation header)
  • 9. IPv6 Packet Structure
  • 10. IPv6 Packet Structure
  • 11. IPv6 Extension Headers
    • Hop-by-Hop Header if present, is always first
    • Comprises a series of options that are processed by each routing hop
    • Has TLV-based options including router alerts (RSVP) and jumbo payload size for large packets
  • 12. IPv6 Extension Headers
    • Destination Options Header
    • Also has a series of TLV options, but they’re just processed by the destination, not intermediate routers
    • Fragmentation Header for fragmented packets (discussed later)
    • Routing Header – basically the IPv6 equivalent of source routing (we will look at this again later too)
    • AH/ESP Headers – for encrypted communications
    • IPv6 Headers – encapsulation
  • 13. IPv6 Fragmentation
    • IPv4 stacks and firewalls experienced a myriad of problems related to fragmentation
    • Since fragmentation is the basis of some of the attacks we will look at with IPv6 as well, the process is explained here
    • IP packets can have a series of option headers (the “non-fragmentable” part) followed by a fragment header, followed by fragmented data (“fragmentable part”)
  • 14. IPv6 Fragmentation (expected traffic)
  • 15. IPv6 Fragmentation (allowable traffic)
  • 16. Address Discovery
    • Local nodes can auto-configure themselves on a network to some extent
    • This is achieved with ICMPv6 Neighbour Advert/Solicitation requests
    • Replaces ARP
    • There are also related “Router Advertisement” / “Router Solicitation” exchanges to establish MTU’s, TTL’s, and more
  • 17. Address Discovery
    • This stuff isn’t performed with any level of authentication
    • Possible to do similar attacks to “ARP Spoofing” that was popular with IPv4
    • Originally demonstrated by “Van Hauser” from THC (http://thc.segfault.net/releases.php)
  • 18. OS Stacks
    • Many OS’s now have IPv6 stacks
    • There are a number of problem areas that can be easy to get wrong
    • Focusing on these areas is a good place to start when conducting an audit of an IPv6 stack
  • 19. OS Stacks - Basic Header Parsing
    • In general, length manipulations are safer than in IPv4
    • Length values for the IPv6 header and options headers never include the length of the header itself, so no math needs to be done on an untrusted length value
    • Less likely to have integer underflows
    • Special case: When length is 0 in the IPv6 header, a Hop-by-Hop header must follow with a Jumbogram options
    • What happens when a length exists in the IP header and a jumbogram option is supplied?
    • What about if there is no jumbogram option and the IP header length is 0?
  • 20. OS Stacks - Basic Header Parsing
    • Optional headers of course need their length verified to ensure that they don’t specify a length larger than the packet
    • Failure to do so would result in potential kernel panics or memory corruption
    • TLV parsing within Destination options and Hop-by-Hop options can also skip out of bounds if careful checks aren’t in place
    • This is possible on BSD, although it doesn’t seem to buy you anything (maybe an interesting evasion technique)
  • 21. OS Stacks – Error Generation
    • A number of checks are needed to ensure generated errors can’t create smurf-like scenarios
    • Destination should not be multicast
    • Source should not be multicast
    • IPv4 mapped addresses are also dangerous, exposing potential IPv4 multicast/broadcast addresses
  • 22. OS Stacks - Routing
    • Usually a host has to be configured to forward packets to perform the routing specified in the packet
    • Many special cases they need to be careful of
    • Multicast Destinations
    • Multicast Next Hops
    • IPv4-mapped Destinations
    • IPv4-mapped Next Hops
    • Link-local or site-local hops
    • Globally-unique local hops
  • 23. OS Stacks - Fragmentation
    • Fragmentation is interesting for a few reasons – errors in implementation, fingerprinting, and firewall/IDS de-synchronization
    • IPv4 stacks had a few major vulnerabilities due to incorrect reassembly
    • Errors in fragmentation either result in memory corruption, out of bounds kernel reads, mistakenly thinking fragments are complete and passing it to a higher layer, or accidentally including auxilary data
  • 24. OS Stacks – Fragmentation Quirks
    • Fragmentation also exposes unique behaviour of the OS
    • Windows will discard fragment queues if overlaps are found in most cases
    • BSD will discard an overlapped fragment, but keep the queue
    • Linux allows overlaps using the same algorithm as its IPv4 stack (favors earlier fragments)
    • Timeouts and thresholds will also differ
  • 25. Firewalling
    • IPv6 is a good target to undermine firewall rulesets
    • Simple packet filtering through to more complex state mechanisms
    • For packet filtering: want to block certain upper-layer protocols, extension headers, or more specific information (certain ports, or properties within extension headers)
  • 26. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • Extension Headers are desirable to filter
    • Things like routing extensions can be particularly useful in violating policy
    • Filtering packets containing them should be fairly easy, but there are some tricks to it
    • Based around handling fragmented packets
  • 27. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • One method we can employ is the “NUL fragment” technique
    • Set the offset to 0 and the MF bit also clear
    • OS stacks will all ignore this header and continue regular processing
    • Some packet filters will try to record it for reassembly and so forth
    • Linux IP’s conntrack netfilter module does this
  • 28. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • Otherwise, we can just fragment a datagram with a series of optional headers following
    • Put the optional header being filtered in a non 0-offset fragment
  • 29. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • Most packet filters only check the first (0-offset fragment)
    • For good reason – processing other datagrams is wrong because the data in the fragment might not even be options
    • The only way to detect extensions in these fragments is to reassemble the datagram first
    • Filters attempting to detect payloads in non-0 offset fragments are trivially bypassed
  • 30. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • What about upper layer protocols (TCP/UDP/ICMP/others) ?
    • We can do the same thing in some cases
    • Filling the first fragment with just extension headers make it hard for the packet filter to figure out what kind of data is in the packet
    • Dealing with non 0-offset packets is easy to get wrong – really can’t rely on anything after fragment header
  • 31. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • Why? Again, it might be halfway through another option or some data
    • Result: Parsing data as extension headers when they’re not
    • “Next Header” value in non 0-offset fragment is ultimately ignored
    • IPTables/IP6Fw actually pays attention to this next header to figure out upper-layer protocols, so you can match on pretty much arbitrary rules
  • 32. Firewalling – Packet Filtering
    • Fragmentation is a good way of desynchronizing a firewall or IDS
    • Using this technique, we make the firewall/packet filter see a different kind of packet than the end host
    • Result: incorrect match which could allow packets through that are meant to be blocked
    • Exploit variances in how the firewall reassembles packets and how the end host does
  • 33. Firewalling – Duplicate Fragment Sets
    • Duplicate Fragment Sets is sending two sets of fragments, both of which assemble and can pass a firewall inspection
    • Both fragment sets have the same ID field
    • We then want to have select fragments dropped from each assembled fragment set to create a new assembled packet that shouldn’t have been allowed
  • 34. Firewalling – Duplicate Fragment Sets
  • 35. Firewalling – Duplicate Fragment Sets
    • How do we drop select fragments?
    • In IPv4 it was possible setting the TTL on some packets to a low value so they would expire after the firewall but before the end host
    • Thomas Lopatic used an inventive technique involving abuse of the timestamp IP option
    • In IPv6, it’s much easier because there are a lot of ways to invalidate a packet, especially if they’re not examined particularly closely by a firewall
  • 36. Firewalling – Packet Invalidation
    • Low TTL – easy technique but probably will be detected
    • Destination Option TLV’s can be used to force the host to drop fragments (as can HBH ones, but each hop will pick those up…)
    • Invalid routing options – not a 0-type route or has a multicast destination
    • Valid routing options that have multiple entries to deliver to the same host or router just before the end host, thus eating up TTL’s
    • Timing attacks
  • 37. Firewalling – Packet Invalidation
    • Sometimes packet filters/firewalls will let you have unknown headers too, whereas the end host will drop them
    • Firewalls/filters also often will allow you to put hop by hop option headers anywhere, whereas end hosts don’t
    • Insert a HBH option somewhere in the middle of the packet and it will never make it through processing
  • 38. Firewalling – Fragment Stacking
    • Fragment stacking is a technique where you put multiple fragment headers inside a single datagram
    • Alternatively, you have a fragment header somewhere inside a fragmented packet
    • When the packet is reassembled, the newly formed packet is still a fragment of another chain!
    • You can nest fragment headers arbitrarily deep
  • 39. Firewalling – Fragment Stacking
  • 40. Firewalling – Fragment Stacking
    • Useful for messing with firewalls trying to reconstruct the packet stream
    • Firewalls packet filters record information about either the first fragment header they see, or the last one
    • This can lead to them making inaccurate decisions about what the packet really contains
    • Also useful for firewalls attempting to cache ID’s to prevent duplicate fragment set attacks
  • 41. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • Stateful inspection firewalls are generally harder than packet filters
    • Fragment duplication and stacking can help to bypass them
    • Another thing they need to be careful of is TCP/UDP header processing
    • Some firewalls will inspect flags of a TCP packet to decide whether a connection is open or not
  • 42. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • A trick here was to send an overlapping fragment at offset 1 in a TCP packet, overwriting the flags portion of the header
    • Lot’s of implementations check for this, even in IPv6
    • That particular check is not useful in IPv6 though, because the TCP header doesn’t need to start at offset 0
    • We can pad with extension headers, thus causing it to check potentially invalid flags
    • Pretty hard to pull off still though, due to the way most hosts to fragmentation
  • 43. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • We can also supply TCP or UDP packets that are not going to ever get to the host
    • This might be useful if we want the firewall to maintain or teardown a connection entry
    • We can use the techniques for invalidating packets described earlier
    • TTL’s, routing headers, invalid destinations, and so on
  • 44. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • Routing Headers might also provide some interesting possibilities
    • What if we route the packet around to a less protected interface on a target host?
    • Maybe we can use this to elicit some sort of response due to misplaced trust
    • Windows XP firewall seems to exhibit some behavior like this
    • What if we could entice a host/router to send a packet that was originated by us back to us?
    • Using the routing header with the attacking host as one of the hops can be used to accomplish this
  • 45. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
  • 46. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
  • 47. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • Let’s say we wanted to contact a target machine on port 22, but the firewall only lets in port 80
    • It has TCP connection awareness
    • We send a packet (src port: 22, dest port: 80) with their IP as a source address and destination
    • They get it, inspect the routing header and send it back
    • Should redirect in this case really, but at least Windows and BSD seem to route wherever you want (Linux will send a redirect)
  • 48. Firewalling – Stateful Inspection
    • Firewall sees packet (source port: 22, dest port: 80) and makes a new connection entry
    • We now have the possibility of contacting the target on port 22
    • Potential problems: careful flags checks might detect something is up
    • Anti-spoofing will see source and destination address the same, or at least source address not valid for receiving interface
    • Tunneling can come in handy here
  • 49. Tunneling Data
    • Tunneling is a big issue in IPv6, especially for nodes that do both IPv4 and IPv6
    • IPv6 over IPv4
    • IPv4 over IPv6
    • IPv6 over IPv6 (supported by default on Windows)
    • Arbitrary levels of nesting
    • Combined with fragmentation tricks, firewalls have their work cut out for them
  • 50. Tunneling Data
    • Tunneling to hosts has several uses
    • Bypassing firewall rules
    • Contacting hosts behind a firewall using routing combined with tunneling
    • Contacting non-routable (link-local/site-local) addresses using routing headers
    • Additional bonus that your tunneled IP data is not going to be subject to anti-spoofing and other validation in many cases
    • Special Address Classes are also useful – we could route over to their IPv4 accessible network for example
  • 51. Questions?
    • Any Questions?