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Pure intentionalism

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  • 1. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References mm 40 60 80 100 120 Pure Intentionalism 40 Angela Mendelovici Princeton University 60 January 15, 2009 80 1 / 67
  • 2. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 2 / 67
  • 3. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 3 / 67
  • 4. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Two mental phenomena mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal consciousness It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974). 40 What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character. Mental representation Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality 60 (Brentano, 1874). Some mental states represent, or have content. 80 4 / 67
  • 5. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Two mental phenomena mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal consciousness It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974). 40 What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character. Mental representation Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality 60 (Brentano, 1874). Some mental states represent, or have content. 80 4 / 67
  • 6. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Two mental phenomena mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal consciousness It’s “like something” to be in certain states (Nagel, 1974). 40 What it’s like is a state’s phenomenal character. Mental representation Some mental states display aboutness, ofness, or intentionality 60 (Brentano, 1874). Some mental states represent, or have content. 80 4 / 67
  • 7. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Two mental phenomena mm 40 60 80 100 120 Are these two mental features related? 40 Intentionalism Phenomenal character is in some way determined by representational content. 60 80 5 / 67
  • 8. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Two mental phenomena mm 40 60 80 100 120 Are these two mental features related? 40 Intentionalism Phenomenal character is in some way determined by representational content. 60 80 5 / 67
  • 9. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 1: Transparency intuitions mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 When we pay attention to our experiences, all we notice is represented contents. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; Byrne, 2001; Jackson, 2004) 60 We only notice one mental feature. 80 6 / 67
  • 10. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 1: Transparency intuitions mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 When we pay attention to our experiences, all we notice is represented contents. (Harman, 1990; Tye, 1995; Byrne, 2001; Jackson, 2004) 60 We only notice one mental feature. 80 6 / 67
  • 11. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 12. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 13. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 14. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 15. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 16. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 17. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 2: An impressive correlation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Differences in phenomenal character are correlated with differences in representational content. 40 We get similar results with conceptual contents. We get similar results for other perceptual modalities. 60 We would not expect these results if representation was not related to consciousness. Intentionalism explains this correlation. 80 7 / 67
  • 18. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 3: A unified theory of mind mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 It would also be theoretically very nice if we could reduce two problems of mind to one. A unified theory would be simpler. This motivation gains some force together with the other two. 60 80 8 / 67
  • 19. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivation 3: A unified theory of mind mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 It would also be theoretically very nice if we could reduce two problems of mind to one. A unified theory would be simpler. This motivation gains some force together with the other two. 60 80 8 / 67
  • 20. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Motivating intentionalism mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 1 Transparency intuitions 2 An impressive correlation 3 A unified theory of mind 60 80 9 / 67
  • 21. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure versus impure intentionalism mm 40 60 80 100 120 Pure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content alone. 40 Impure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content and certain non-representational features (e.g. 60 functional role). On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it is possible to have two states alike in representational content but differing in phenomenal character. 80 10 / 67
  • 22. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure versus impure intentionalism mm 40 60 80 100 120 Pure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content alone. 40 Impure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content and certain non-representational features (e.g. 60 functional role). On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it is possible to have two states alike in representational content but differing in phenomenal character. 80 10 / 67
  • 23. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure versus impure intentionalism mm 40 60 80 100 120 Pure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content alone. 40 Impure intentionalism Phenomenal character is determined by representational content and certain non-representational features (e.g. 60 functional role). On impure intentionalism, but not on pure intentionalism, it is possible to have two states alike in representational content but differing in phenomenal character. 80 10 / 67
  • 24. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure intentionalism is preferable mm 40 60 80 100 120 The first two of the preceding considerations only properly 40 motivate the relevance of representational content to phenomenal character, not the relevance of other features. If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to be independently motivated. 60 80 11 / 67
  • 25. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure intentionalism is preferable mm 40 60 80 100 120 The first two of the preceding considerations only properly 40 motivate the relevance of representational content to phenomenal character, not the relevance of other features. If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to be independently motivated. 60 80 11 / 67
  • 26. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pure intentionalism is preferable mm 40 60 80 100 120 The first two of the preceding considerations only properly 40 motivate the relevance of representational content to phenomenal character, not the relevance of other features. If we want to include extra ingredients, they will have to be independently motivated. 60 80 11 / 67
  • 27. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 28. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 29. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 30. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 31. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 32. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Preview mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism faces various challenges. These challenges motivate some theorists to move to impure 40 intentionalism. My claims: 1 The impure elements are unmotivated and oftentimes 60 unsuccessful. 2 A pure intentionalist strategy is possible. 3 The pure intentionalist strategies are not available on a tracking theory of mental representation. 80 12 / 67
  • 33. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 13 / 67
  • 34. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unavailable contents mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes it is easy find representational 40 contents that “match” a given phenomenal character. But other times, there’s no good candidate content. 60 . . . as in the case of pain. 80 14 / 67
  • 35. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unavailable contents mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes it is easy find representational 40 contents that “match” a given phenomenal character. But other times, there’s no good candidate content. 60 . . . as in the case of pain. 80 14 / 67
  • 36. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unavailable contents mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes it is easy find representational 40 contents that “match” a given phenomenal character. But other times, there’s no good candidate content. 60 . . . as in the case of pain. 80 14 / 67
  • 37. mm 40 60 80 100 120406080
  • 38. mm 40 60 80 100 120406080
  • 39. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 The challenge with pain is to find the 40 representational contents that account for the phenomenal character of pain-experience. Pain-experiences represent bodily damage at 60 certain bodily location and of a a certain type. (Tye, 1995) 80 16 / 67
  • 40. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 The challenge with pain is to find the 40 representational contents that account for the phenomenal character of pain-experience. Pain-experiences represent bodily damage at 60 certain bodily location and of a a certain type. (Tye, 1995) 80 16 / 67
  • 41. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 But this doesn’t seem to capture the phenomenology of pain-experiences. 40 It leaves the painfulness of pain out. And it lets in other contents that don’t do any work in determining the phenomenology. The problem is that there is no good candidate 60 for a property of our bodies that we’re representing and that plausibly “matches” our phenomenal experience. 80 17 / 67
  • 42. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 But this doesn’t seem to capture the phenomenology of pain-experiences. 40 It leaves the painfulness of pain out. And it lets in other contents that don’t do any work in determining the phenomenology. The problem is that there is no good candidate 60 for a property of our bodies that we’re representing and that plausibly “matches” our phenomenal experience. 80 17 / 67
  • 43. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 But this doesn’t seem to capture the phenomenology of pain-experiences. 40 It leaves the painfulness of pain out. And it lets in other contents that don’t do any work in determining the phenomenology. The problem is that there is no good candidate 60 for a property of our bodies that we’re representing and that plausibly “matches” our phenomenal experience. 80 17 / 67
  • 44. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain mm 40 60 80 100 120 But this doesn’t seem to capture the phenomenology of pain-experiences. 40 It leaves the painfulness of pain out. And it lets in other contents that don’t do any work in determining the phenomenology. The problem is that there is no good candidate 60 for a property of our bodies that we’re representing and that plausibly “matches” our phenomenal experience. 80 17 / 67
  • 45. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modes of presentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage under a “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003). 40 Problems 1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the part of phenomenology deriving from 60 representation of bodily location). 2 MoPs are themselves representational. But what do they represent that accounts for the felt painfulness of pain? We’re back where we 80 started. 18 / 67
  • 46. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modes of presentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage under a “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003). 40 Problems 1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the part of phenomenology deriving from 60 representation of bodily location). 2 MoPs are themselves representational. But what do they represent that accounts for the felt painfulness of pain? We’re back where we 80 started. 18 / 67
  • 47. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modes of presentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage under a “pain-y” MoP (Bain, 2003). 40 Problems 1 The MoP is doing almost all the work (save the part of phenomenology deriving from 60 representation of bodily location). 2 MoPs are themselves representational. But what do they represent that accounts for the felt painfulness of pain? We’re back where we 80 started. 18 / 67
  • 48. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modalities mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in a particular modality (Crane, 2008). 40 This is impure intentionalism. Problems 1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain 60 modality is doing almost all the work. This doesn’t look very much like intentionalism anymore. 2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to do 80 too much of the work. 19 / 67
  • 49. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modalities mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in a particular modality (Crane, 2008). 40 This is impure intentionalism. Problems 1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain 60 modality is doing almost all the work. This doesn’t look very much like intentionalism anymore. 2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to do 80 too much of the work. 19 / 67
  • 50. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modalities mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in a particular modality (Crane, 2008). 40 This is impure intentionalism. Problems 1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain 60 modality is doing almost all the work. This doesn’t look very much like intentionalism anymore. 2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to do 80 too much of the work. 19 / 67
  • 51. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Modalities mm 40 60 80 100 120 Possible solution Pain-experiences represent bodily damage in a particular modality (Crane, 2008). 40 This is impure intentionalism. Problems 1 A dedicated pain modality? Then the pain 60 modality is doing almost all the work. This doesn’t look very much like intentionalism anymore. 2 A tactile modality? The modality still has to do 80 too much of the work. 19 / 67
  • 52. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain properties mm 40 60 80 100 120 A better solution Pain-experiences represent bodily locations as having pain properties. 40 There are different kinds of pain properties: stingy-painful, throbbing-painful, etc. 60 These properties are probably never instantiated. We reliably misrepresent our body parts as 80 being painful. 20 / 67
  • 53. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain properties mm 40 60 80 100 120 A better solution Pain-experiences represent bodily locations as having pain properties. 40 There are different kinds of pain properties: stingy-painful, throbbing-painful, etc. 60 These properties are probably never instantiated. We reliably misrepresent our body parts as 80 being painful. 20 / 67
  • 54. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain properties mm 40 60 80 100 120 A better solution Pain-experiences represent bodily locations as having pain properties. 40 There are different kinds of pain properties: stingy-painful, throbbing-painful, etc. 60 These properties are probably never instantiated. We reliably misrepresent our body parts as 80 being painful. 20 / 67
  • 55. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain properties mm 40 60 80 100 120 A better solution Pain-experiences represent bodily locations as having pain properties. 40 There are different kinds of pain properties: stingy-painful, throbbing-painful, etc. 60 These properties are probably never instantiated. We reliably misrepresent our body parts as 80 being painful. 20 / 67
  • 56. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Pain properties mm 40 60 80 100 120 A better solution Pain-experiences represent bodily locations as having pain properties. 40 There are different kinds of pain properties: stingy-painful, throbbing-painful, etc. 60 These properties are probably never instantiated. We reliably misrepresent our body parts as 80 being painful. 20 / 67
  • 57. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 58. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 59. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 60. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 61. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 62. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reliable misrepresentation mm 40 60 80 100 120 A state reliably misrepresents when all or most of its activations (or tokens) are nonveridical and occur in similar 40 circumstances. Reliable misrepresentation arises when a representation represents one thing but tracks something else. 60 Reliable misrepresentation can be just as useful as veridical perception. Reliable misrepresentation allows us to respond differently to different situations. 80 21 / 67
  • 63. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 This view is not open to the tracking theorist. Mental representation is a species of causal or 40 causally-mediated co-variation relation, a tracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995). We are just sophisticated thermometers. 60 This is related to a general problem of tracking views in allowing for adaptive and reliable misrepresentation. 80 22 / 67
  • 64. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 This view is not open to the tracking theorist. Mental representation is a species of causal or 40 causally-mediated co-variation relation, a tracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995). We are just sophisticated thermometers. 60 This is related to a general problem of tracking views in allowing for adaptive and reliable misrepresentation. 80 22 / 67
  • 65. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 This view is not open to the tracking theorist. Mental representation is a species of causal or 40 causally-mediated co-variation relation, a tracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995). We are just sophisticated thermometers. 60 This is related to a general problem of tracking views in allowing for adaptive and reliable misrepresentation. 80 22 / 67
  • 66. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 This view is not open to the tracking theorist. Mental representation is a species of causal or 40 causally-mediated co-variation relation, a tracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995). We are just sophisticated thermometers. 60 This is related to a general problem of tracking views in allowing for adaptive and reliable misrepresentation. 80 22 / 67
  • 67. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 This view is not open to the tracking theorist. Mental representation is a species of causal or 40 causally-mediated co-variation relation, a tracking relation (Tye, 2000; Dretske, 1995). We are just sophisticated thermometers. 60 This is related to a general problem of tracking views in allowing for adaptive and reliable misrepresentation. 80 22 / 67
  • 68. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary mm 40 60 80 100 120 Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism. Other examples: 40 Itches and other bodily sensations Sweetness Color Hotness and coldness This tempts some intentionalists to impurity. 60 The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms of reliable misrepresentation. This route is not open to the tracking theorist. 80 23 / 67
  • 69. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary mm 40 60 80 100 120 Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism. Other examples: 40 Itches and other bodily sensations Sweetness Color Hotness and coldness This tempts some intentionalists to impurity. 60 The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms of reliable misrepresentation. This route is not open to the tracking theorist. 80 23 / 67
  • 70. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary mm 40 60 80 100 120 Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism. Other examples: 40 Itches and other bodily sensations Sweetness Color Hotness and coldness This tempts some intentionalists to impurity. 60 The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms of reliable misrepresentation. This route is not open to the tracking theorist. 80 23 / 67
  • 71. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary mm 40 60 80 100 120 Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism. Other examples: 40 Itches and other bodily sensations Sweetness Color Hotness and coldness This tempts some intentionalists to impurity. 60 The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms of reliable misrepresentation. This route is not open to the tracking theorist. 80 23 / 67
  • 72. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary mm 40 60 80 100 120 Cases like pain pose a challenge for intentionalism. Other examples: 40 Itches and other bodily sensations Sweetness Color Hotness and coldness This tempts some intentionalists to impurity. 60 The pure intentionalist can account for them in terms of reliable misrepresentation. This route is not open to the tracking theorist. 80 23 / 67
  • 73. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 24 / 67
  • 74. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 75. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 76. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 77. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 78. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 79. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Non-perceptual states mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism looks good for perceptual states. What about non-perceptual states? 40 Thoughts Non-conscious non-conceptual states These states are a source of counterexamples. Example 60 Case 1: A perceptual state representing redness Case 2: A thought about redness Case 3: A non-conscious state representing redness 80 25 / 67
  • 80. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The impure intentionalist strategy mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 60 Non-conscious states 80 26 / 67
  • 81. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The impure intentionalist strategy mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 60 Non-conscious states 80 26 / 67
  • 82. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References A pure intentionalist strategy mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal 60 Non-conscious states 80 27 / 67
  • 83. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References A pure intentionalist strategy mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal 60 Non-conscious states 80 27 / 67
  • 84. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 28 / 67
  • 85. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Red wall mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 4:40 visual experience of a uniformly painted, A uniformly textured unique red (pure red) wall Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is a uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 60 Tye: Only nonconceptual states have phenomenal character. 80 29 / 67
  • 86. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Red wall mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 4:40 visual experience of a uniformly painted, A uniformly textured unique red (pure red) wall Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is a uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 60 Tye: Only nonconceptual states have phenomenal character. 80 29 / 67
  • 87. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s view mm Having a concept of P is a 60 40 80 matter of being 100 120 able to recognize instances of P on separate occasions (perhaps among other things). A state has nonconceptual content just in 40 case a subject need not have the corresponding concepts in order to be in that state. E.g. the visual representation BLUE421 ) On this way of cashing out the 60 conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is a distinction between types of states rather than types of contents (what Heck (2000) calls the “state view”). 80 And so Tye’s view is a form of impure intentionalism. 30 / 67
  • 88. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s view mm Having a concept of P is a 60 40 80 matter of being 100 120 able to recognize instances of P on separate occasions (perhaps among other things). A state has nonconceptual content just in 40 case a subject need not have the corresponding concepts in order to be in that state. E.g. the visual representation BLUE421 ) On this way of cashing out the 60 conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is a distinction between types of states rather than types of contents (what Heck (2000) calls the “state view”). 80 And so Tye’s view is a form of impure intentionalism. 30 / 67
  • 89. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s view mm Having a concept of P is a 60 40 80 matter of being 100 120 able to recognize instances of P on separate occasions (perhaps among other things). A state has nonconceptual content just in 40 case a subject need not have the corresponding concepts in order to be in that state. E.g. the visual representation BLUE421 ) On this way of cashing out the 60 conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is a distinction between types of states rather than types of contents (what Heck (2000) calls the “state view”). 80 And so Tye’s view is a form of impure intentionalism. 30 / 67
  • 90. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s view mm Having a concept of P is a 60 40 80 matter of being 100 120 able to recognize instances of P on separate occasions (perhaps among other things). A state has nonconceptual content just in 40 case a subject need not have the corresponding concepts in order to be in that state. E.g. the visual representation BLUE421 ) On this way of cashing out the 60 conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is a distinction between types of states rather than types of contents (what Heck (2000) calls the “state view”). 80 And so Tye’s view is a form of impure intentionalism. 30 / 67
  • 91. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s view mm Having a concept of P is a 60 40 80 matter of being 100 120 able to recognize instances of P on separate occasions (perhaps among other things). A state has nonconceptual content just in 40 case a subject need not have the corresponding concepts in order to be in that state. E.g. the visual representation BLUE421 ) On this way of cashing out the 60 conceptual/nonconceptual distinction, it is a distinction between types of states rather than types of contents (what Heck (2000) calls the “state view”). 80 And so Tye’s view is a form of impure intentionalism. 30 / 67
  • 92. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 It denies that it’s like anything to use 40 concepts in thought. Supporters of conceptual phenomenology: G. Strawson (1994) Siewert (1998) Horgan and Tienson (2002) 60 Pitt (2004) Husserl (1900a,b) 80 31 / 67
  • 93. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 It denies that it’s like anything to use 40 concepts in thought. Supporters of conceptual phenomenology: G. Strawson (1994) Siewert (1998) Horgan and Tienson (2002) 60 Pitt (2004) Husserl (1900a,b) 80 31 / 67
  • 94. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 It denies that it’s like anything to use 40 concepts in thought. Supporters of conceptual phenomenology: G. Strawson (1994) Siewert (1998) Horgan and Tienson (2002) 60 Pitt (2004) Husserl (1900a,b) 80 31 / 67
  • 95. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why think there is conceptual phenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by the phenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery. 40 Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’t account for phenomenology associated with thought: 1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl, 60 1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004)) 2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about a myriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes) 80 32 / 67
  • 96. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why think there is conceptual phenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by the phenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery. 40 Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’t account for phenomenology associated with thought: 1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl, 60 1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004)) 2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about a myriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes) 80 32 / 67
  • 97. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why think there is conceptual phenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by the phenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery. 40 Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’t account for phenomenology associated with thought: 1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl, 60 1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004)) 2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about a myriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes) 80 32 / 67
  • 98. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why think there is conceptual phenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by the phenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery. 40 Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’t account for phenomenology associated with thought: 1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl, 60 1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004)) 2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about a myriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes) 80 32 / 67
  • 99. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why think there is conceptual phenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Question: Is the phenomenology of thought exhausted by the phenomenology of concurrent verbal or other imagery. 40 Standard arguments that verbal and other imagery can’t account for phenomenology associated with thought: 1 Cases where the verbal imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. ambiguous sentences (Husserl, 60 1900a; Siewert, 1998; Pitt, 2004)) 2 Cases where other imagery is the same but phenomenology differs (e.g. thinking about a chiliagon versus thinking about a myriagon (Husserl (1900b), example due to Descartes) 80 32 / 67
  • 100. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References A quick way to illustrate the point mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 60 80 33 / 67
  • 101. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References A quick way to illustrate the point mm 40 60 80 100 120 If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts only consisted in visual and verbal phenomenology, then thinking about a megagon would be something like this: 40 60 80 33 / 67
  • 102. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References A quick way to illustrate the point mm 40 60 80 100 120 If the phenomenology corresponding to thoughts only consisted in visual and verbal phenomenology, then thinking about a megagon would be something like this: 40 60 80 “This is a megagon.” 33 / 67
  • 103. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 1 It denies that it’s like anything to use concepts in thought. 2 It constrains what we can say about other cases involving conceptual contents. 60 80 34 / 67
  • 104. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Problems with Tye’s “nonconceptual” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 1 It denies that it’s like anything to use concepts in thought. 2 It constrains what we can say about other cases involving conceptual contents. 60 80 34 / 67
  • 105. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The duck-rabbit mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck 40 Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit It’s plausible that representing the duck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbit 60 accounts for much of the phenomenal difference. But the contents duck and rabbit are conceptual contents. 80 35 / 67
  • 106. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The duck-rabbit mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck 40 Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit It’s plausible that representing the duck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbit 60 accounts for much of the phenomenal difference. But the contents duck and rabbit are conceptual contents. 80 35 / 67
  • 107. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The duck-rabbit mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 6: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a duck 40 Case 7: Seeing the duck-rabbit as a rabbit It’s plausible that representing the duck-rabbit as a duck versus as a rabbit 60 accounts for much of the phenomenal difference. But the contents duck and rabbit are conceptual contents. 80 35 / 67
  • 108. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 40 Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is a uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 60 The two cases are not representationally alike after all. The concept of unique red and the visual representation of unique red have different 80 contents. 36 / 67
  • 109. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 40 Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is a uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 60 The two cases are not representationally alike after all. The concept of unique red and the visual representation of unique red have different 80 contents. 36 / 67
  • 110. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example Case 4: A visual experience of uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 40 Case 5: An occurrent thought that there is a uniformly painted, uniformly textured unique red wall 60 The two cases are not representationally alike after all. The concept of unique red and the visual representation of unique red have different 80 contents. 36 / 67
  • 111. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 112. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 113. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 114. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 115. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 116. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The efficient concept view mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concepts used in thought are structurally simpler and have simpler contents than we might have previously thought. E.g. the concept MODAL REALIST doesn’t represent believer 40 of the view that possible worlds exist in the same way that the actual world exists. Rather it represents something simpler, like someone who holds some view about possible worlds. Concepts can be unpacked to yield more contents. 60 The results of unpacking are experienced as further cashings out of what you were previously thinking. We can define notions of derived content that capture these results of unpacking that are experienced in this way. 80 37 / 67
  • 117. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concept of redness and the visual 40 representation of redness have different contents, but the same derived contents. Thoughts involving the concept of redness have impoverished representational content to 60 match their impoverished phenomenal character. 80 38 / 67
  • 118. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 The concept of redness and the visual 40 representation of redness have different contents, but the same derived contents. Thoughts involving the concept of redness have impoverished representational content to 60 match their impoverished phenomenal character. 80 38 / 67
  • 119. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 Conceptually representing red versus non-conceptually representing red involves a 40 difference in content, not necessarily in type of state (although there might be such a difference as well). Note: This makes it possible to understand 60 the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction as a distinction between types of contents, rather than types of states. 80 39 / 67
  • 120. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Alternative solution mm 40 60 80 100 120 Conceptually representing red versus non-conceptually representing red involves a 40 difference in content, not necessarily in type of state (although there might be such a difference as well). Note: This makes it possible to understand 60 the conceptual/nonconceptual distinction as a distinction between types of contents, rather than types of states. 80 39 / 67
  • 121. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 So this kind of view is not easily available to the tracking theorist. Difficult to say the two cases represent 40 differently: The concept RED and the visual representation of redness might track the same or relevantly similar things. Difficult to account for the impoverished 60 phenomenology of thought: Our concepts presumably track contents more complex than what those that can account for their impoverished phenomenology. 80 40 / 67
  • 122. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 So this kind of view is not easily available to the tracking theorist. Difficult to say the two cases represent 40 differently: The concept RED and the visual representation of redness might track the same or relevantly similar things. Difficult to account for the impoverished 60 phenomenology of thought: Our concepts presumably track contents more complex than what those that can account for their impoverished phenomenology. 80 40 / 67
  • 123. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 So this kind of view is not easily available to the tracking theorist. Difficult to say the two cases represent 40 differently: The concept RED and the visual representation of redness might track the same or relevantly similar things. Difficult to account for the impoverished 60 phenomenology of thought: Our concepts presumably track contents more complex than what those that can account for their impoverished phenomenology. 80 40 / 67
  • 124. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The mm 40 60 impure intentionalist strategy 80 100 120 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 40 Non-conscious states The pure intentionalist strategy 60 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states 80 41 / 67
  • 125. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The mm 40 60 impure intentionalist strategy 80 100 120 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 40 Non-conscious states The pure intentionalist strategy 60 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states 80 41 / 67
  • 126. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The mm 40 60 impure intentionalist strategy 80 100 120 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 40 Non-conscious states The pure intentionalist strategy 60 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states 80 42 / 67
  • 127. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 43 / 67
  • 128. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Vertical line mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Example Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing a vertical60 line 80 44 / 67
  • 129. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s “poised” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must be 40 poised to affect conceptual states in order for it to qualify as having phenomenal character. Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and so are ruled out from having phenomenal character. 60 This is impure intentionalism. 80 45 / 67
  • 130. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s “poised” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must be 40 poised to affect conceptual states in order for it to qualify as having phenomenal character. Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and so are ruled out from having phenomenal character. 60 This is impure intentionalism. 80 45 / 67
  • 131. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tye’s “poised” requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 Tye invokes an extra constraint: A state must be 40 poised to affect conceptual states in order for it to qualify as having phenomenal character. Non-conscious occurrent states are not poised, and so are ruled out from having phenomenal character. 60 This is impure intentionalism. 80 45 / 67
  • 132. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Vertical line mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example 40 Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing a vertical line 60 The state in Case 9 is not poised, so it does not have phenomenal character. 80 46 / 67
  • 133. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Vertical line mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example 40 Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing a vertical line 60 The state in Case 9 is not poised, so it does not have phenomenal character. 80 46 / 67
  • 134. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrent conceptual states? 60 80 47 / 67
  • 135. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrent conceptual states? 60 80 47 / 67
  • 136. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Is the idea that non-conscious states don’t affect occurrent conceptual states? 60 80 47 / 67
  • 137. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 Maybe there’s a particular way W in which non-conscious 40 states affect conceptual states. Replace the poised requirement with a poised-in-way-W requirement. 60 80 48 / 67
  • 138. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 Maybe there’s a particular way W in which non-conscious 40 states affect conceptual states. Replace the poised requirement with a poised-in-way-W requirement. 60 80 48 / 67
  • 139. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 This is a winning strategy. And that’s what’s wrong with it. 60 80 49 / 67
  • 140. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 This is a winning strategy. And that’s what’s wrong with it. 60 80 49 / 67
  • 141. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 We don’t want any difference between phenomenal states and 40 non-conscious occurrent states. We want the difference that accounts for the fact that conscious perceptual states but not non-conscious states have phenomenal character. 60 80 50 / 67
  • 142. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The poised requirement mm 40 60 80 100 120 We don’t want any difference between phenomenal states and 40 non-conscious occurrent states. We want the difference that accounts for the fact that conscious perceptual states but not non-conscious states have phenomenal character. 60 80 50 / 67
  • 143. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 144. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 145. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 146. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 147. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 148. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 149. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 150. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentionalism promises to avoid explanatory gap style concerns. Why should this brain state result in that phenomenal experience? 40 Why should representing red result in that phenomenal experience? Well, what would you expect it to be like to represent red? Just like it is. But as soon as we start adding extra ingredients to the 60 reduction base, explanatory gap style concerns threaten to arise. Poised/poised-in-way-W requirements Nonconceptual content 80 Systemic representations with the potential for calibration (Dretske, 1995) 51 / 67
  • 151. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 The problem is that while mental representation seems 40 relevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear that being poised in way W is relevant. The real issue here is one of explanation or plausible identification. 60 Mere extensional correctness is not enough. 80 52 / 67
  • 152. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 The problem is that while mental representation seems 40 relevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear that being poised in way W is relevant. The real issue here is one of explanation or plausible identification. 60 Mere extensional correctness is not enough. 80 52 / 67
  • 153. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Unmotivated impurity mm 40 60 80 100 120 The problem is that while mental representation seems 40 relevant to phenomenal consciousness, it is not clear that being poised in way W is relevant. The real issue here is one of explanation or plausible identification. 60 Mere extensional correctness is not enough. 80 52 / 67
  • 154. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The vertical line case mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 We can say something different about the vertical line case. Suggestion: Deny that non-conscious states have representational content in the same sense of “content” in 60 which conscious states have content. 80 53 / 67
  • 155. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The vertical line case mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 We can say something different about the vertical line case. Suggestion: Deny that non-conscious states have representational content in the same sense of “content” in 60 which conscious states have content. 80 53 / 67
  • 156. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 157. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 158. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 159. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 160. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 161. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Why do we think non-conscious states represent? mm 40 60 80 100 120 They track certain features in the environment, e.g. bodily damage. 40 They eventually give rise to certain contentful conscious states, e.g. pain-experiences. But bodily damage = pain. These considerations motivate conflicting content attributions. 60 This can happen whenever we have reliable misrepresentation. 80 54 / 67
  • 162. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 163. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 164. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 165. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 166. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 167. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References R doesn’t really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 R tracks bodily damage and gives rise to pain-experiences, and R probably interacts with other states. It plays a certain causal/functional role in virtue of all that. 40 We can define a notion of computational content in terms of these roles. Computational content is not the same thing as representational content. 601 Computational content is cheap. 2 There are different constraints on attributions of computational content versus representational content. 80 55 / 67
  • 168. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Vertical line mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example 40 Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing a vertical line 60 Case 9 is neither a case of representation nor a case of consciousness. So this isnt a counterexample. 80 56 / 67
  • 169. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Vertical line mm 40 60 80 100 120 Example 40 Case 8: A conscious visual state representing a vertical line Case 9: A non-conscious occurrent state representing a vertical line 60 Case 9 is neither a case of representation nor a case of consciousness. So this isnt a counterexample. 80 56 / 67
  • 170. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 This solution is not open to tracking theories of mental representation. Non-conscious states reliably track things. 60 80 57 / 67
  • 171. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 This solution is not open to tracking theories of mental representation. Non-conscious states reliably track things. 60 80 57 / 67
  • 172. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Tracking theories of mental representation mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 This solution is not open to tracking theories of mental representation. Non-conscious states reliably track things. 60 80 57 / 67
  • 173. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The mm 40 60 impure intentionalist strategy 80 100 120 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 40 Non-conscious states The pure intentionalist strategy 60 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states 80 58 / 67
  • 174. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The mm 40 60 impure intentionalist strategy 80 100 120 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Non-Phenomenal Thoughts 40 Non-conscious states The pure intentionalist strategy 60 Representational Non-Representational Phenomenal Perceptual states Thoughts Non-Phenomenal Non-conscious states 80 58 / 67
  • 175. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary so far mm 40 60 80 100 120 Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptual 40 cases are unsatisfactory. Pure intentionalism is possible. To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should move 60 away from tracking views. 80 59 / 67
  • 176. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary so far mm 40 60 80 100 120 Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptual 40 cases are unsatisfactory. Pure intentionalism is possible. To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should move 60 away from tracking views. 80 59 / 67
  • 177. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary so far mm 40 60 80 100 120 Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptual 40 cases are unsatisfactory. Pure intentionalism is possible. To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should move 60 away from tracking views. 80 59 / 67
  • 178. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Summary so far mm 40 60 80 100 120 Impure intentionalist strategies to dealing with non-perceptual 40 cases are unsatisfactory. Pure intentionalism is possible. To the extent to which we like intentionalism, we should move 60 away from tracking views. 80 59 / 67
  • 179. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Outline mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Motivating intentionalism 2 40 Unavailable contents 3 Non-perceptual states Thoughts and other occurrent conceptual states 60 Non-conscious occurrent states 4 Reductionism 80 60 / 67
  • 180. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The reductive intentionalist program mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Reductive intentionalists will complain that pure intentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning this project. 60 80 61 / 67
  • 181. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References The reductive intentionalist program mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Reductive intentionalists will complain that pure intentionalism, as I have described it, requires abandoning this project. 60 80 61 / 67
  • 182. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But their project fails anyway: If representation is just 40 tracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases. A failed reduction is not a reduction. There may be reason to think we can’t account for representation in terms of tracking either. 60 80 62 / 67
  • 183. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But their project fails anyway: If representation is just 40 tracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases. A failed reduction is not a reduction. There may be reason to think we can’t account for representation in terms of tracking either. 60 80 62 / 67
  • 184. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But their project fails anyway: If representation is just 40 tracking, we can’t adequately deal with all the problem cases. A failed reduction is not a reduction. There may be reason to think we can’t account for representation in terms of tracking either. 60 80 62 / 67
  • 185. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 No one has a reductive theory. You don’t get points just for trying. 60 80 63 / 67
  • 186. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 No one has a reductive theory. You don’t get points just for trying. 60 80 63 / 67
  • 187. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But intentionalism is still well-motivated. 40 1 Transparency intuitions 2 An impressive correlation 3 A unified theory of mind It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism. 60 80 64 / 67
  • 188. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But intentionalism is still well-motivated. 40 1 Transparency intuitions 2 An impressive correlation 3 A unified theory of mind It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism. 60 80 64 / 67
  • 189. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References Reductionism mm 40 60 80 100 120 But intentionalism is still well-motivated. 40 1 Transparency intuitions 2 An impressive correlation 3 A unified theory of mind It’s time to re-explore other versions of intentionalism. 60 80 64 / 67
  • 190. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 The End 60 80 65 / 67
  • 191. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References References I mm 40 60 80 100 120 Bain, D. (2003). Intentionalism and pain. Philosophical Quarterly, 53:50252. Brentano, F. (1973/1874). Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. Byrne, A. (2001). Intentionalism defended. Philosophical Review, 110(2):199–240. 40 Crane, T. (2008). Intentionalism. Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind, pages 474–493. Dretske, F. (1995). Naturalizing the Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge. Harman, G. (1990). The intrinsic quality of experience. Philosophical Perspectives, 4:31–52. 60 Heck, R. (2000). Nonconceptual content and the “space of reasons”. The Philosophical Review, 109:483–523. Horgan, T. and Tienson, J. (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality, pages 520–533. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 80 Husserl, E. (2001/1900a). Logical Investigations I. Routledge Press, Trans. J. N. Findley. London. 66 / 67
  • 192. Motivating intentionalism Unavailable contents Non-perceptual states Reductionism References References II mm 40 60 80 100 120 Husserl, E. (2001/1900b). Logical Investigations II. Routledge Press, Trans. J. N. Findley. London. Jackson, F. (2004). Representation and experience. Representation in Mind: New Approaches to Mental Representation, pages 107–124. 40 Nagel, T. (1974). What is it like to be a bat? The Philosophical Review, 83(4):435–450. Pitt, D. (2004). The phenomenology of cognition or what is it like to think that P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 69(1):1–36. Siewert, C. (1998). The Significance of Consciousness. Princeton University 60 Press, Princeton. Strawson, G. (1994). Mental Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge. Tye, M. (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press, Cambridge. Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge. 80 67 / 67

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