Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought
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  • 1. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal Intentionality in Thought 40 Angela Mendelovici The University of Western Ontario and the Australian National University 60 Melbourne University, March 1, 2012 80 1 / 39
  • 2. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtOverview mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Phenomenal intentionality theory 40 2 The content of concepts 60 3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought 80 2 / 39
  • 3. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtOverview mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Phenomenal intentionality theory 40 2 The content of concepts 60 3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought 80 3 / 39
  • 4. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtIntentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively 40 Ostensive definition Mental states with intentionality can be said to represent A mental state’s content is what it represents 60 There might be other distinct semantic properties, such as reference, truth conditions, and truth 80 4 / 39
  • 5. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtIntentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively 40 Ostensive definition Mental states with intentionality can be said to represent A mental state’s content is what it represents 60 There might be other distinct semantic properties, such as reference, truth conditions, and truth 80 4 / 39
  • 6. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtIntentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 The ofness or aboutness of mental states that we at least sometimes notice introspectively 40 Ostensive definition Mental states with intentionality can be said to represent A mental state’s content is what it represents 60 There might be other distinct semantic properties, such as reference, truth conditions, and truth 80 4 / 39
  • 7. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtTheories of intentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Tracking theories Functional role theories Phenomenal intentionality theory 60 80 5 / 39
  • 8. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtTheories of intentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Tracking theories Functional role theories Phenomenal intentionality theory 60 80 5 / 39
  • 9. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtTheories of intentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Tracking theories Functional role theories Phenomenal intentionality theory 60 80 5 / 39
  • 10. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtTheories of intentionality mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Tracking theories Functional role theories Phenomenal intentionality theory 60 80 5 / 39
  • 11. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPhenomenal intentionality theory mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (or subject’s) intentional properties are identical with (some of) its phenomenal properties 40 Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mental state (e.g. redness, painfulness) We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwise related to them 60 Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is either instantiating a phenomenal character or being otherwise appropriately related to a phenomenal 80 character 6 / 39
  • 12. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPhenomenal intentionality theory mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (or subject’s) intentional properties are identical with (some of) its phenomenal properties 40 Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mental state (e.g. redness, painfulness) We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwise related to them 60 Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is either instantiating a phenomenal character or being otherwise appropriately related to a phenomenal 80 character 6 / 39
  • 13. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPhenomenal intentionality theory mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (or subject’s) intentional properties are identical with (some of) its phenomenal properties 40 Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mental state (e.g. redness, painfulness) We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwise related to them 60 Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is either instantiating a phenomenal character or being otherwise appropriately related to a phenomenal 80 character 6 / 39
  • 14. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPhenomenal intentionality theory mm 40 60 80 100 120 Phenomenal intentionality theory (PIT) A mental state’s (or subject’s) intentional properties are identical with (some of) its phenomenal properties 40 Phenomenal character The particular “what it’s like” of a mental state (e.g. redness, painfulness) We either instantiate phenomenal characters or are otherwise related to them 60 Phenomenal property Instantiating a phenomenal property is either instantiating a phenomenal character or being otherwise appropriately related to a phenomenal 80 character 6 / 39
  • 15. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPhenomenal intentionality theory mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Basic idea: What your mental states represent is a matter of what it’s like to be you 60 80 7 / 39
  • 16. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMotivations for PIT mm 40 60 80 100 120 In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties and intentional properties do not appear distinct1 40 To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenal 60 properties and intentional properties, the two go together 1 80 This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 8 / 39
  • 17. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMotivations for PIT mm 40 60 80 100 120 In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties and intentional properties do not appear distinct1 40 To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenal 60 properties and intentional properties, the two go together 1 80 This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 8 / 39
  • 18. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMotivations for PIT mm 40 60 80 100 120 In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties and intentional properties do not appear distinct1 40 To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenal 60 properties and intentional properties, the two go together 1 80 This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 8 / 39
  • 19. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMotivations for PIT mm 40 60 80 100 120 In clear introspectible cases, phenomenal properties and intentional properties do not appear distinct1 40 To the extent to which we can separately focus on phenomenal 60 properties and intentional properties, the two go together 1 80 This is related to transparency intuitions. Gilbert Harman (1990). The Intrinsic Quality of Experience. Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52, and Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 8 / 39
  • 20. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 Perception is a good case for PIT 40 1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentional properties PIT wants to identify them with 2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to match 60 co-occurring perceptual intentional contents 80 9 / 39
  • 21. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 Perception is a good case for PIT 40 1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentional properties PIT wants to identify them with 2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to match 60 co-occurring perceptual intentional contents 80 9 / 39
  • 22. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 Perception is a good case for PIT 40 1 Phenomenal properties seem to co-occur with the intentional properties PIT wants to identify them with 2 Perceptual phenomenal characters seem to match 60 co-occurring perceptual intentional contents 80 9 / 39
  • 23. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Phenomenal characters match intentional contents iff they have a similar structure a similar “quality” 60 80 10 / 39
  • 24. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal character matches intentional content 40 E.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness 60 Plausibly similar simple structure Plausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit) 80 11 / 39
  • 25. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal character matches intentional content 40 E.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness 60 Plausibly similar simple structure Plausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit) 80 11 / 39
  • 26. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal character matches intentional content 40 E.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness 60 Plausibly similar simple structure Plausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit) 80 11 / 39
  • 27. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 It’s plausible that in perception, phenomenal character matches intentional content 40 E.g. represented blueness and phenomenal blueness 60 Plausibly similar simple structure Plausibly similar “quality” (the blueness bit) 80 11 / 39
  • 28. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMatching in perception mm 40 60 80 100 120 Complex perceptual states have intentional contents that match their phenomenal characters too 40 60 80 12 / 39
  • 29. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in thought mm PIT to be plausible in the case of 80 For 40 60 thought, 100 120 1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to the intentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identify them with 40 2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match the co-occurring intentional contents of thought I’ll grant (1)2 60 But (2) seems to fail 2 See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), 80 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1–36. 13 / 39
  • 30. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in thought mm PIT to be plausible in the case of 80 For 40 60 thought, 100 120 1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to the intentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identify them with 40 2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match the co-occurring intentional contents of thought I’ll grant (1)2 60 But (2) seems to fail 2 See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), 80 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1–36. 13 / 39
  • 31. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in thought mm PIT to be plausible in the case of 80 For 40 60 thought, 100 120 1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to the intentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identify them with 40 2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match the co-occurring intentional contents of thought I’ll grant (1)2 60 But (2) seems to fail 2 See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), 80 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1–36. 13 / 39
  • 32. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in thought mm PIT to be plausible in the case of 80 For 40 60 thought, 100 120 1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to the intentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identify them with 40 2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match the co-occurring intentional contents of thought I’ll grant (1)2 60 But (2) seems to fail 2 See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), 80 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1–36. 13 / 39
  • 33. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT in thought mm PIT to be plausible in the case of 80 For 40 60 thought, 100 120 1 The phenomenal properties of thought must correspond to the intentional properties of thought that PIT wants to identify them with 40 2 The phenomenal characters of thought must match the co-occurring intentional contents of thought I’ll grant (1)2 60 But (2) seems to fail 2 See Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (2002). The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), 80 Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press, and David Pitt (2004). The Phenomenology of Cognition, or, What is It Like to Think That P? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1–36. 13 / 39
  • 34. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe apparent failure of matching in thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Similar structure: It seems that thoughts have 40 fairly complex intentional contents but fairly simple phenomenal characters Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seem 60 similar to what thoughts represent 80 14 / 39
  • 35. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe apparent failure of matching in thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Similar structure: It seems that thoughts have 40 fairly complex intentional contents but fairly simple phenomenal characters Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seem 60 similar to what thoughts represent 80 14 / 39
  • 36. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe apparent failure of matching in thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Similar structure: It seems that thoughts have 40 fairly complex intentional contents but fairly simple phenomenal characters Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seem 60 similar to what thoughts represent 80 14 / 39
  • 37. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe apparent failure of matching in thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Similar structure: It seems that thoughts have 40 fairly complex intentional contents but fairly simple phenomenal characters Similar “qualities”’: What it’s like to think doesn’t really seem 60 similar to what thoughts represent 80 14 / 39
  • 38. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtExample mm 40 60 80 100 120 Modal realism is true. 40 Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worlds exist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simple 60 phenomenal character Different “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about the phenomenal character 80 15 / 39
  • 39. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtExample mm 40 60 80 100 120 Modal realism is true. 40 Different structure: Fairly complex content possible worlds exist in the same way the actual world exists, but fairly simple 60 phenomenal character Different “qualities”: Nothing possible-worlds-y about the phenomenal character 80 15 / 39
  • 40. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPossible solutions mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what we currently think the intentional content of thought is like 40 (David Pitt?, H&T?) 2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currently think the phenomenal character of thought is like3 Thoughts represent fairly simple contents 60 And that this makes it plausible that their contents are similar in quality to thought phenomenal characters 80 3 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58 employs a similar strategy. 16 / 39
  • 41. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPossible solutions mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what we currently think the intentional content of thought is like 40 (David Pitt?, H&T?) 2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currently think the phenomenal character of thought is like3 Thoughts represent fairly simple contents 60 And that this makes it plausible that their contents are similar in quality to thought phenomenal characters 80 3 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58 employs a similar strategy. 16 / 39
  • 42. BackgroundThe problem of multimodal experiences Summary Extras The roles of content and modalities in the phenomenology of sensory experience David Bourget Institute of Philosophy University of London Monash University, March 2, 2012 1 / 29
  • 43. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPossible solutions mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what we currently think the intentional content of thought is like 40 (David Pitt?, H&T?) 2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currently think the phenomenal character of thought is like3 Thoughts represent fairly simple contents 60 And that this makes it plausible that their contents are similar in quality to thought phenomenal characters 80 3 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58 employs a similar strategy. 16 / 39
  • 44. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPossible solutions mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what we currently think the intentional content of thought is like 40 (David Pitt?, H&T?) 2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currently think the phenomenal character of thought is like3 Thoughts represent fairly simple contents 60 And that this makes it plausible that their contents are similar in quality to thought phenomenal characters 80 3 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58 employs a similar strategy. 16 / 39
  • 45. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPossible solutions mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 The phenomenal character of thought is like what we currently think the intentional content of thought is like 40 (David Pitt?, H&T?) 2 The intentional content of thought is like what we currently think the phenomenal character of thought is like3 Thoughts represent fairly simple contents 60 And that this makes it plausible that their contents are similar in quality to thought phenomenal characters 80 3 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58 employs a similar strategy. 16 / 39
  • 46. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtOverview mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Phenomenal intentionality theory 40 2 The content of concepts 60 3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought 80 17 / 39
  • 47. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe basic idea mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behave as if they represented complex contents So we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts 60 80 18 / 39
  • 48. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe basic idea mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behave as if they represented complex contents So we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts 60 80 18 / 39
  • 49. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtThe basic idea mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thoughts and the concepts that compose them don’t behave as if they represented complex contents So we shouldn’t attribute complex contents to them Concepts Vehicles of representation that constitute thoughts 60 80 18 / 39
  • 50. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtCandidate complex contents (CCCs) mm 40 60 80 100 120 What are candidate complex contents that concepts might be 40 said to represent? Definitions Characterizations Sets of features 60 Real definitions or essences Complex properties 80 19 / 39
  • 51. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtCandidate complex contents (CCCs) mm 40 60 80 100 120 What are candidate complex contents that concepts might be 40 said to represent? Definitions Characterizations Sets of features 60 Real definitions or essences Complex properties 80 19 / 39
  • 52. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtHow might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts? mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 They might contribute to the phenomenology They might contribute to further thought and behavior 60 80 20 / 39
  • 53. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtHow might contents behave like they’re represented byconcepts? mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 They might contribute to the phenomenology They might contribute to further thought and behavior 60 80 20 / 39
  • 54. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains between two types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alike wrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other 40 (Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts. 60 (Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respect to the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables. 80 In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents like possible worlds and likeness But not in thinking (Tables 1) 21 / 39
  • 55. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains between two types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alike wrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other 40 (Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts. 60 (Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respect to the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables. 80 In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents like possible worlds and likeness But not in thinking (Tables 1) 21 / 39
  • 56. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains between two types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alike wrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other 40 (Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts. 60 (Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respect to the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables. 80 In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents like possible worlds and likeness But not in thinking (Tables 1) 21 / 39
  • 57. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t make a difference forphenomenology mm 40 60 80 100 120 Supervenience’s CCC: the relation that obtains between two types of facts when, necessarily, two worlds that are alike wrt on set of facts are alike wrt the other 40 (Tables 1) The facts about tables supervene on the physical facts. 60 (Tables 2) Necessarily, two possible worlds that are alike with respect to the physical facts are alike with respect to facts about tables. 80 In thinking (Tables 2), you seem to “grasp” contents like possible worlds and likeness But not in thinking (Tables 1) 21 / 39
  • 58. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 59. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 60. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 61. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 62. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 63. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 64. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts’ CCCs don’t play a role in further thought andbehavior mm 40 60 80 100 120 Sometimes we need a concept’s CCC to answer certain questions 40 What is supervenience? Does a necessary god supervene on everything? Answering such questions requires the retrieval of a definition or characterization of supervenience 60 Unpacking The process by which definitions/characterizations are retrieved This suggests that (Tables 1) doesn’t represent supervenience’s CCC 80 Failure to unpack can cause us to fail in such tasks 22 / 39
  • 65. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMight CCCs play a role in unpacking? mm 40 60 80 100 120 One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it is unpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented by 40 concepts and is not inert Response: There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from a story of concept acquisition 60 If this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play other roles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, but they don’t 80 23 / 39
  • 66. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMight CCCs play a role in unpacking? mm 40 60 80 100 120 One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it is unpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented by 40 concepts and is not inert Response: There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from a story of concept acquisition 60 If this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play other roles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, but they don’t 80 23 / 39
  • 67. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMight CCCs play a role in unpacking? mm 40 60 80 100 120 One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it is unpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented by 40 concepts and is not inert Response: There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from a story of concept acquisition 60 If this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play other roles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, but they don’t 80 23 / 39
  • 68. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtMight CCCs play a role in unpacking? mm 40 60 80 100 120 One might suggest that a concept’s CCC determines how it is unpacked, so this is evidence that it is represented by 40 concepts and is not inert Response: There are other explanations of unpacking - perhaps from a story of concept acquisition 60 If this suggestion is correct, we’d expect CCCs to play other roles as well in the generation of thought and behavior, but they don’t 80 23 / 39
  • 69. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts don’t represent CCCs mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCs So we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contents would be inert Similar points apply to other concepts 60 80 24 / 39
  • 70. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts don’t represent CCCs mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCs So we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contents would be inert Similar points apply to other concepts 60 80 24 / 39
  • 71. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtConcepts don’t represent CCCs mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Concepts don’t behave as if they represent their CCCs So we shouldn’t attribute their CCCs to them - such contents would be inert Similar points apply to other concepts 60 80 24 / 39
  • 72. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtTwo questions mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 1 What do concepts represent? 2 What is the status of CCCs? 60 80 25 / 39
  • 73. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought2. The status of CCCs mm 40 60 80 100 120 Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs (possibly definitions or characterizations)4 40 Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions to unpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackings of concepts 60 4 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely 80 Conflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 26 / 39
  • 74. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought2. The status of CCCs mm 40 60 80 100 120 Concepts derivatively represent at least some of their CCCs (possibly definitions or characterizations)4 40 Derived mental representation is a matter of dispositions to unpack and have experiences of accepting certain unpackings of concepts 60 4 David Bourget (2010). Consciousness is Underived Intentionality. Noûs 44 (1):32–58, Angela Mendelovici (2010). Mental Representation and Closely 80 Conflated Topics, PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, and Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program. In U. Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality: New Essays. Oxford University Press. 26 / 39
  • 75. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtExample of derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 60 80 27 / 39
  • 76. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtExample of derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 60 80 27 / 39
  • 77. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtExample of derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 60 80 27 / 39
  • 78. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtCircumstances mm 40 60 80 100 120 In different circumstances, we might accept different contents as the contents of our concepts 40 E.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor as unmarried man, in others as man available for long-term relationship 60 We might consider certain circumstances authoritative, e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc. 80 28 / 39
  • 79. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtCircumstances mm 40 60 80 100 120 In different circumstances, we might accept different contents as the contents of our concepts 40 E.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor as unmarried man, in others as man available for long-term relationship 60 We might consider certain circumstances authoritative, e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc. 80 28 / 39
  • 80. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtCircumstances mm 40 60 80 100 120 In different circumstances, we might accept different contents as the contents of our concepts 40 E.g. In some circumstances, you might unpack bachelor as unmarried man, in others as man available for long-term relationship 60 We might consider certain circumstances authoritative, e.g. circumstances in which you aren’t drunk, etc. 80 28 / 39
  • 81. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPluralism about derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 Focusing on different circumstances might yield different notions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes 40 Circumstances in which you do not discover new information yield a kind of narrow content Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield a kind of broad content 60 E.g. Burge’s Bert Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out your concepts relative to circumstances. 80 29 / 39
  • 82. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPluralism about derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 Focusing on different circumstances might yield different notions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes 40 Circumstances in which you do not discover new information yield a kind of narrow content Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield a kind of broad content 60 E.g. Burge’s Bert Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out your concepts relative to circumstances. 80 29 / 39
  • 83. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPluralism about derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 Focusing on different circumstances might yield different notions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes 40 Circumstances in which you do not discover new information yield a kind of narrow content Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield a kind of broad content 60 E.g. Burge’s Bert Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out your concepts relative to circumstances. 80 29 / 39
  • 84. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPluralism about derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 Focusing on different circumstances might yield different notions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes 40 Circumstances in which you do not discover new information yield a kind of narrow content Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield a kind of broad content 60 E.g. Burge’s Bert Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out your concepts relative to circumstances. 80 29 / 39
  • 85. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPluralism about derived content mm 40 60 80 100 120 Focusing on different circumstances might yield different notions of content, which might be useful for ifferent purposes 40 Circumstances in which you do not discover new information yield a kind of narrow content Circumstances that allow for worldly interaction might yield a kind of broad content 60 E.g. Burge’s Bert Summary: There are only right or wrong ways to cash out your concepts relative to circumstances. 80 29 / 39
  • 86. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought1. What concepts really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 There is reason to think that concepts have some content, even if it’s not their CCCs 40 There is some content that plays some role: In phenomenology In further thought and behavior Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairly 60 simple (the alternative would be that they represent other concepts’ CCCs) 80 30 / 39
  • 87. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought1. What concepts really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 There is reason to think that concepts have some content, even if it’s not their CCCs 40 There is some content that plays some role: In phenomenology In further thought and behavior Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairly 60 simple (the alternative would be that they represent other concepts’ CCCs) 80 30 / 39
  • 88. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought1. What concepts really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 There is reason to think that concepts have some content, even if it’s not their CCCs 40 There is some content that plays some role: In phenomenology In further thought and behavior Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairly 60 simple (the alternative would be that they represent other concepts’ CCCs) 80 30 / 39
  • 89. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought1. What concepts really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 There is reason to think that concepts have some content, even if it’s not their CCCs 40 There is some content that plays some role: In phenomenology In further thought and behavior Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairly 60 simple (the alternative would be that they represent other concepts’ CCCs) 80 30 / 39
  • 90. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought1. What concepts really represent mm 40 60 80 100 120 There is reason to think that concepts have some content, even if it’s not their CCCs 40 There is some content that plays some role: In phenomenology In further thought and behavior Since concepts don’t represent CCCs, their contents are fairly 60 simple (the alternative would be that they represent other concepts’ CCCs) 80 30 / 39
  • 91. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 92. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 93. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 94. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 95. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 96. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich fairly simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 Proper parts of CCCs (e.g. some possible worlds view) 40 Jesse Prinz’s proxytype theory (perceptual imagery) Verbal representations (e.g. “supervenience” or “some modal relation”) Chris Viger, others who think we think in words 60 New simple contents (e.g. supervenience) Tim Williamson with knowledge, G. E. Moore with good 80 31 / 39
  • 97. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Different options might be true of different concepts All these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try to adjudicate between them 60 80 32 / 39
  • 98. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtWhich simple contents? Some options mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Different options might be true of different concepts All these options are compatible with PIT, so I will not try to adjudicate between them 60 80 32 / 39
  • 99. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtBack to thoughts mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents are determined by the content of their constituent concepts So it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs and that they represent simpler contents instead 60 80 33 / 39
  • 100. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtBack to thoughts mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thoughts are composed of concepts, and their contents are determined by the content of their constituent concepts So it’s plausible that thoughts don’t represent their CCCs and that they represent simpler contents instead 60 80 33 / 39
  • 101. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtOverview mm 40 60 80 100 120 1 Phenomenal intentionality theory 40 2 The content of concepts 60 3 Phenomenal intentionality and thought 80 34 / 39
  • 102. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtChallenge mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to match their intentional contents Different structure Different “qualities” 60 80 35 / 39
  • 103. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtChallenge mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to match their intentional contents Different structure Different “qualities” 60 80 35 / 39
  • 104. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtChallenge mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 The phenomenal characters of thoughts don’t seem to match their intentional contents Different structure Different “qualities” 60 80 35 / 39
  • 105. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtResponse mm 40 60 80 100 120 Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents and have fairly simple phenomenal characters 40 Similar features: Some options: Intentional content Phenomenal character 60 words verbal phenomenology perceptual perceptual new simple content new simple phenomenology parts of intuitive content depends 80 36 / 39
  • 106. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtResponse mm 40 60 80 100 120 Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents and have fairly simple phenomenal characters 40 Similar features: Some options: Intentional content Phenomenal character 60 words verbal phenomenology perceptual perceptual new simple content new simple phenomenology parts of intuitive content depends 80 36 / 39
  • 107. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtResponse mm 40 60 80 100 120 Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents and have fairly simple phenomenal characters 40 Similar features: Some options: Intentional content Phenomenal character 60 words verbal phenomenology perceptual perceptual new simple content new simple phenomenology parts of intuitive content depends 80 36 / 39
  • 108. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtResponse mm 40 60 80 100 120 Same structure: Concepts represent fairly simple contents and have fairly simple phenomenal characters 40 Similar features: Some options: Intentional content Phenomenal character 60 words verbal phenomenology perceptual perceptual new simple content new simple phenomenology parts of intuitive content depends 80 36 / 39
  • 109. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT meets the challenge mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thought intentional contents This removes an important obstacle from applying PIT to thought 60 80 37 / 39
  • 110. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT meets the challenge mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 Thought phenomenal characters arguably match thought intentional contents This removes an important obstacle from applying PIT to thought 60 80 37 / 39
  • 111. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT about thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentional properties are phenomenal properties 40 But the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not the complex content we intuitively associate with thoughts Some of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughts are derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mental 60 representation is a matter of dispositions to unpack concepts and dispositions to accept certain unpackings 80 38 / 39
  • 112. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT about thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentional properties are phenomenal properties 40 But the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not the complex content we intuitively associate with thoughts Some of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughts are derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mental 60 representation is a matter of dispositions to unpack concepts and dispositions to accept certain unpackings 80 38 / 39
  • 113. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thoughtPIT about thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 Intentional properties are phenomenal properties 40 But the content of thoughts is fairly simple - it is not the complex content we intuitively associate with thoughts Some of the contents we intuitively associate with thoughts are derivatively represented by thoughts, where derived mental 60 representation is a matter of dispositions to unpack concepts and dispositions to accept certain unpackings 80 38 / 39
  • 114. Phenomenal intentionality theory The content of concepts Phenomenal intentionality and thought mm 40 60 80 100 120 40 The End 60 80 39 / 39