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only the wisest and stupidest of
                 men never change
                 Confucius




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                    Bridging Risk Modeling,
                    Threat Modeling, and
                    Operational Metrics With the
                    VERIS Framework
                          or: Data? WTH do we do now?!

                          Alex	
  Hu(on
                          @alexhu(on




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
State of the Industry
                 Ranum: Pseudoscience

                 Hutton: Kuhn’s Protoscience

                           •   somewhat random fact gathering (mainly of
                               readily accessible data)
                           •   a “morass” of interesting, trivial, irrelevant
                               observations
                           •   A variety of theories (that are spawned
                               from what he calls philosophical
                               speculation) that provide little guidance to
                               data gathering


Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                                       Impact Landscape




                                                                          Controls Landscape




                                                          risk

                           Asset Landscape




                                                             Threat Landscape




                                             including capabilities (skills, resources, decision quality...)



Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Managing risk means aligning
            the capabilities of the
            organization, and the exposure
            of the organization with the
            tolerance of the data owners
                                     - Jack Jones




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                                       Verizon RISK Team: Operating Model



                                             Framework



                                         =
                                      ∑
                                       ∩ ∫√
                                       Models            Data


                          -   VERIS is our framework that provides
                              context
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                           A Brief Overview of VERIS
                           (the Verizon Enterprise Risk &
                           Incident Sharing Framework)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Verizon has shared data




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
-   2010 ~ 900
                               cases
                               -   (900 million
                                   records)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Verizon is sharing our
                 framework




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Verizon Enterprise Risk & Incident Sharing
               (VERIS) Framework
                     it’s open*!



                                      * kinda



Tuesday, August 10, 2010
What is the Verizon Incident Sharing (VERIS)
               Framework?

                   - A means         to create metrics
                           from the incident narrative
                           -   how Verizon creates measurements for the DBIR

                           -   how *anyone* can create measurements from an incident

                           -   http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/wp-content/uploads/
                               2010/03/VerIS_Framework_Beta_1.pdf




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
What makes up the VERIS framework?


                   -   Demographics
                   -   Incident Classification
                           -   Event Modeling (a4)

                   -   Discovery & Mitigation
                   -   Impact Classification
                           -   Impact Modeling



Tuesday, August 10, 2010
What VERIS Contains
         The Incident Classification section employs Verizon’s A4 event model

                                               A security incident (or threat scenario) is
                                               modeled as a series of events. Every event is
                                               comprised of the following 4 A’s:

                                               Agent: Whose actions affected the asset
                                               Action: What actions affected the asset Asset:
                                               Which assets were affected Attribute: How the
                                               asset was affected




     Incident as a
   chain of events         >   1   >   2   >         3     >       4      >       5

                                                                                        14
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                           incident narrative                     incident metrics

                                                                      discovery
   demographics                    incident classification (a4)                      impact classification



                                                                               +
                                                                      & mitigation

                                      1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                                 $$$




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security
                             case studies                         data set

                                                                discovery
demographics                     incident classification (a4)                  impact classification



                                                                         +
                                                                & mitigation

  a                                1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                              $$$
  b                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  c                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  d                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  e                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
   f                                1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security       VERIS Data Comes From...



                          -   External Sources
                          -   Internal Sources


                              -   DBIR + Secret Service is the start of
                                  the VERIS data set.




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Good Lord Of The Dance,
      Models and data sharing!
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security        Using VERIS (DBIR) Data
                               (Verizon’s Internal Model)




                          -   Traditional GRC dictates “likelihood &
                              impact”
                          -   VERIS Data can be used to in
                              “traditional” risk management
                              -   weights
                              -   distribution development



Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security    Using VERIS (DBIR) Data
                           (Verizon’s Internal Model)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                           What VERIS Does




                             Data-driven decisions


Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Friederich Hayek
     invades my dreams to
     give me visions of a
     future approach

                           or, “How Jose Cardenal's
                            sweet afro could change
                                       the industry!”


Tuesday, August 10, 2010
the synthesis of
                                                                                               information creates a
                                                                                               “one true risk statement”
                                                                                               which overtime becomes
                                         Impact Landscape                                      a multitude of
                                                                                               probabilistic point
                                                                                               statements

                                                                          Controls Landscape




                                                      risk


                           Asset Landscape




                                                            Threat Landscape




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
from Mark Curphey’s SecurityBull$#!*




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
These “risk” statements
                     you’re making, I don’t
                     think you’re doing it right.

                     - (Chillin’ Friederich
                     Hayek)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                          VERIS Software (shhhhhhh)




                             -
                                 screenshots here
                             -




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security
                           Using VERIS (DBIR) Data
                           (data sharing)


                           -   VERIS data can provide comparative
                               analytics
                           -   This would be extremely useful in a
                               notional view of risk management
                           -   Incidents are evidence of (in)
                               effectiveness
                               -   hey Richard, time framing VERIS
                                   events might help answer the “why 2
                                   hours” question you get!

Tuesday, August 10, 2010
multitude of
                                                                                               probabilistic point
                                         Impact Landscape                                      statements...



                                                                          Controls Landscape




                                                      risk


                           Asset Landscape




                                                            Threat Landscape




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
impact Landscape

                                                                                 the deconstruction of risk
                                                                                 information to create
                                                                                 a balanced scorecard?




                                                                    Controls Landscape

                           Asset Landscape


                                                   risk




                                                 Threat Landscape




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
a VERIS-data based scorecard with
                                                          synthesis not based on probabilistic point
                                                          statements, but on correlation to
                                      Impact Landscape    successes and failures (can/should be
                                                          supplemented with other operational and
                                                          business metrics).
                                                                              Threats
                                                                              Frequencies
                                                                              Capabilities
                                                                                 Variety
                  Asset Landscape                        Controls Landscape      (Patterns of tactics)

                                         risk                                 Assets
                                                                              Frequencies in incidents
                                                                              vulnerability management
                                                                              capability & management
                                                                              metrics
                                    Threat Landscape
                                                                              Controls
                                                                              capability & management
                                                                              metrics
                                                                              incidents back to decision
                                                                              management

                                                                              Impact
                                                                              histories (internal, external)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
a VERIS-data based scorecard with
                                                          synthesis not based on probabilistic point
                                                          statements, but on correlation to
                                      Impact Landscape
                                                          successes and failures.
                                                                              Informative:
                                                                              (We know these traits are
                                                                              more indicative of
                                                                              “failures” or “successes”
                  Asset Landscape                        Controls Landscape
                                                                              - esp. if we could ever
                                                                              build on Visible Ops for
                                         risk                                 Security research)

                                                                              Comparative:
                                                                              (“We rank well” or “We
                                    Threat Landscape                          suck eggs”)

                                                                              Business Relevant:
                                                                              (“Sucking eggs at these
                                                                              things leads to these
                                                                              sorts of compromise
                                                                              which leads to losses
                                                                              somewhere in this
                                                                              distribution.”)

Tuesday, August 10, 2010
evidence based medicine, meet information security



                           What is evidence-based risk
                                 management?

                             a deconstructed, notional view of risk




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Risk	
  Modeling	
  becomes	
  Opera;onally	
  Important




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Patterns are cool.

                     - (Chillin’ Friederich
                     Hayek)




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security
                             case studies                         data set

                                                                discovery
demographics                     incident classification (a4)                  impact classification



                                                                         +
                                                                & mitigation

  a                                1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                              $$$
  b                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  c                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  d                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
  e                                 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
   f                                1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                         +     $$$
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
data set                       knowledge & wisdom

                                                            discovery
demographics               incident classification (a4)                    impact classification



                                                                     +
                                                            & mitigation

 a                           1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                                $$$
 b                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                     +     $$$
 c                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                     +     $$$
 d                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                     +     $$$
 e                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                     +     $$$
 f                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                     +     $$$
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
threat information

                                                          discovery
demographics               incident classification (a4)                  impact classification



                                                                   +
                                                          & mitigation

 a                           1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                              $$$
 b                            1> 2> 3 > 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 c                            1> 2> 3> 3 > 5
                                       4
                                                                   +     $$$
 d                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 e                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 f                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
threat information - shared data

                                                          discovery
demographics               incident classification (a4)                  impact classification



                                                                   +
                                                          & mitigation

 a                           1> 2> 3> 4 > 5                              $$$
 b                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 c                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 d                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 e                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
 f                            1> 2> 3> 4 > 5
                                                                   +     $$$
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Tuesday, August 10, 2010
evidence-based risk management:

                           data driven treatment.




Tuesday, August 10, 2010
Cybertrust Security




                    https://verisframework.wiki.zoho.com
                     @alexhu(on




Tuesday, August 10, 2010

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Alex hutton metricon

  • 1. only the wisest and stupidest of men never change Confucius Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 2. Cybertrust Security Bridging Risk Modeling, Threat Modeling, and Operational Metrics With the VERIS Framework or: Data? WTH do we do now?! Alex  Hu(on @alexhu(on Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 3. State of the Industry Ranum: Pseudoscience Hutton: Kuhn’s Protoscience • somewhat random fact gathering (mainly of readily accessible data) • a “morass” of interesting, trivial, irrelevant observations • A variety of theories (that are spawned from what he calls philosophical speculation) that provide little guidance to data gathering Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 4. Cybertrust Security Impact Landscape Controls Landscape risk Asset Landscape Threat Landscape including capabilities (skills, resources, decision quality...) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 5. Managing risk means aligning the capabilities of the organization, and the exposure of the organization with the tolerance of the data owners - Jack Jones Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 6. Cybertrust Security Verizon RISK Team: Operating Model Framework = ∑ ∩ ∫√ Models Data - VERIS is our framework that provides context Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 7. Cybertrust Security A Brief Overview of VERIS (the Verizon Enterprise Risk & Incident Sharing Framework) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 8. Verizon has shared data Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 9. - 2010 ~ 900 cases - (900 million records) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 10. Verizon is sharing our framework Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 11. Verizon Enterprise Risk & Incident Sharing (VERIS) Framework it’s open*! * kinda Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 12. What is the Verizon Incident Sharing (VERIS) Framework? - A means to create metrics from the incident narrative - how Verizon creates measurements for the DBIR - how *anyone* can create measurements from an incident - http://securityblog.verizonbusiness.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2010/03/VerIS_Framework_Beta_1.pdf Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 13. What makes up the VERIS framework? - Demographics - Incident Classification - Event Modeling (a4) - Discovery & Mitigation - Impact Classification - Impact Modeling Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 14. What VERIS Contains The Incident Classification section employs Verizon’s A4 event model A security incident (or threat scenario) is modeled as a series of events. Every event is comprised of the following 4 A’s: Agent: Whose actions affected the asset Action: What actions affected the asset Asset: Which assets were affected Attribute: How the asset was affected Incident as a chain of events > 1 > 2 > 3 > 4 > 5 14 Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 15. Cybertrust Security incident narrative incident metrics discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 16. Cybertrust Security case studies data set discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation a 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ b 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ c 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ d 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ e 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ f 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 17. Cybertrust Security VERIS Data Comes From... - External Sources - Internal Sources - DBIR + Secret Service is the start of the VERIS data set. Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 18. Good Lord Of The Dance, Models and data sharing! Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 19. Cybertrust Security Using VERIS (DBIR) Data (Verizon’s Internal Model) - Traditional GRC dictates “likelihood & impact” - VERIS Data can be used to in “traditional” risk management - weights - distribution development Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 20. Cybertrust Security Using VERIS (DBIR) Data (Verizon’s Internal Model) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 21. Cybertrust Security What VERIS Does Data-driven decisions Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 22. Friederich Hayek invades my dreams to give me visions of a future approach or, “How Jose Cardenal's sweet afro could change the industry!” Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 23. the synthesis of information creates a “one true risk statement” which overtime becomes Impact Landscape a multitude of probabilistic point statements Controls Landscape risk Asset Landscape Threat Landscape Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 24. from Mark Curphey’s SecurityBull$#!* Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 28. These “risk” statements you’re making, I don’t think you’re doing it right. - (Chillin’ Friederich Hayek) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 34. Cybertrust Security VERIS Software (shhhhhhh) - screenshots here - Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 35. Cybertrust Security Using VERIS (DBIR) Data (data sharing) - VERIS data can provide comparative analytics - This would be extremely useful in a notional view of risk management - Incidents are evidence of (in) effectiveness - hey Richard, time framing VERIS events might help answer the “why 2 hours” question you get! Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 36. multitude of probabilistic point Impact Landscape statements... Controls Landscape risk Asset Landscape Threat Landscape Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 37. impact Landscape the deconstruction of risk information to create a balanced scorecard? Controls Landscape Asset Landscape risk Threat Landscape Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 38. a VERIS-data based scorecard with synthesis not based on probabilistic point statements, but on correlation to Impact Landscape successes and failures (can/should be supplemented with other operational and business metrics). Threats Frequencies Capabilities Variety Asset Landscape Controls Landscape (Patterns of tactics) risk Assets Frequencies in incidents vulnerability management capability & management metrics Threat Landscape Controls capability & management metrics incidents back to decision management Impact histories (internal, external) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 39. a VERIS-data based scorecard with synthesis not based on probabilistic point statements, but on correlation to Impact Landscape successes and failures. Informative: (We know these traits are more indicative of “failures” or “successes” Asset Landscape Controls Landscape - esp. if we could ever build on Visible Ops for risk Security research) Comparative: (“We rank well” or “We Threat Landscape suck eggs”) Business Relevant: (“Sucking eggs at these things leads to these sorts of compromise which leads to losses somewhere in this distribution.”) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 40. evidence based medicine, meet information security What is evidence-based risk management? a deconstructed, notional view of risk Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 41. Risk  Modeling  becomes  Opera;onally  Important Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 42. Patterns are cool. - (Chillin’ Friederich Hayek) Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 43. Cybertrust Security case studies data set discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation a 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ b 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ c 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ d 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ e 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ f 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 44. data set knowledge & wisdom discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation a 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ b 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ c 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ d 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ e 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ f 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 45. threat information discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation a 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ b 1> 2> 3 > 4 > 5 + $$$ c 1> 2> 3> 3 > 5 4 + $$$ d 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ e 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ f 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 46. threat information - shared data discovery demographics incident classification (a4) impact classification + & mitigation a 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 $$$ b 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ c 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ d 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ e 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ f 1> 2> 3> 4 > 5 + $$$ Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 48. evidence-based risk management: data driven treatment. Tuesday, August 10, 2010
  • 49. Cybertrust Security https://verisframework.wiki.zoho.com @alexhu(on Tuesday, August 10, 2010