Esdp and space document circulated at 15 ms and presented at eumc on 12 march 2003


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Esdp and space document circulated at 15 ms and presented at eumc on 12 march 2003

  1. 1. ESDP AND SPACE1I. INTRODUCTION 1. Hellenic Presidency’s initiative “ESDP and Space” which was presented in MilitaryCommittee (25/9/02), claimed that information from space minimizes uncertainty andincreases the chances for prudent political decisions and that space assets constitute anessential segment of the military capabilities needed. 2. The aim of the Greek initiative was to provide a background for the initialformulation of a Space Concept in the ESDP framework. The initiative attempted a survey ofthe whole range of ESDP space-related missions, such as Command, ControlCommunications and Information (C3I), Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition andReconnaissance (ISTAR), Early Warning, Signal Intelligence, Positioning, Navigation, andTiming, Weather, Oceanography and Mapping, Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) andSpace Surveillance. 3. As the way ahead, the Greek initiative commented that since the process ofreshaping the existing EU Space Policy in order to take into account all the strategicinterests involved in space activities has started, the formulation of a conceptual ESDPSpace Policy has been envisaged. The Greek food for thought paper informed the MilitaryCommittee that First pillar (Commission) together with ESA, following a Parliament’srequest, would start an inter-linked initiative concerning the development of an overallEuropean Space Policy, which should embrace all aspects of European Policies. The finaloutcome, to be submitted to the EU Council and Parliament, is expected by the end of 2003 4. For this initiative written comments were requested. Only 6 member statescontributed to the debate (see Appendix “A”) and the key points in their comments, were thefollowing: a. Some delegations stated that there was a need for a comprehensive inventoryof all assets and that a "first stocktaking" could prove very useful. Also the conclusions ofwork of ECAP panels related to the relevant Space elements/shortfalls will have to be takeninto account. b. Some delegations wondered about the selected "bottom up" approach to workout a space concept of the EU within the framework of the ESDP. They shared the view thata reflexion on the character undoubtedly " trans-pillars " must be undertaken very upstream;and that dual character must be taken into account. In this context, it would be very helpfulto find out in detail what is being developed in this field in another bodies of the EuropeanUnion, since space technology could be of as much importance to civil crisis managementas to military crisis management. c. The structures charged to express the various needs for the EU within thesecond pillar is advisable to be determined. Also the co-operation and interaction betweenEUMC and those fora or bodies in EU and European Space Agency, who deal with spacematters, must be examined.1 Paper circulated at 15 by the EU Hellenic Presidency and presented at the EU Military Committee (EUMC) on12 March 2003. Author, Dr. Alexander Kolovos (LtCol, HAF), Head of Hellenic National Centre for SpaceApplications. 1
  2. 2. 5. Recently (Jan. 21st, 2003), Commission adopted Green paper on European SpacePolicy, to stimulate debate over political sensitive issues including space-based security andthe needed institutional arrangements. For CFSP/ESDP aspects Green Paper raises thefollowing question: “How better to define and clarify, as part of a coherent whole (includingframework and time-scale): the nature and scale of the space capacities required to achievethe political objectives of the PESC? Within what context the possible new space capabilitymay be placed at the service of the security of citizens?”.II. Aim 6. The aim of the current document is twofold. Firstly, it should answer to thevarious comments by reviewing the European space effort in an overall context.Secondly, having in mind the request from First pillar, it is intended to raise theawareness of the need for a coherent approach to space and to map out a wayforward to develop such approach for Second Pillar.III. Presidency’s Fact Findings 7. The divergence of the above-mentioned views, the difference on theapproach (top down versus bottom up), the reminder that space is a cross-sectorialstrategic asset and policy instrument, the request to examine the current situation ina European level, plus the recent First pillar initiative, prompted the Presidency toconsider space as a whole, including the activities that has been undertaken atEuropean level (systems, policy and institutional issues). The Presidency would liketo present some of its findings in order to bring appropriate answers to the above-mentioned comments. To this end, the big picture of European space activities islisted below along with a certain number of explanations: a. EU Space Activities. 8. Since space technologies and space-based systems are quite generally ofmulti-use nature and thereby capable of supporting various policies simultaneously,European Union has been taking an increasing interest in space, which can beexplained by the many uses it can serve in EU policies (agriculture, urban planning,transport, the environment, etc). (1) First Pillar. Until now the responsibility of developing a European spacestrategy and relevant programmes lied in the competency of the first pillar (EuropeanCommission) and of European Space Agency,2 an entity that exists outside of the EUframework and is civilian in character.3 ESA has make a huge amount of productivework over many years and it seems that intends to share the EUs growing interest inESDP.4 (a) Institutional Aspects. Until recently, the DG/Research and theCommission’s Space Co-ordination Group with the Joint Research Centre (JRC) managedthe EC activity in space.5 Considering the central role of the ESA in Europes common effort2 Council resolution on a European space strategy, see item 1.2.75 in the Bulletin of the European Union, No.12-1999.3 ESA is an European intergovernmental organisation. It involves 13 of EU Member states as well as Switzerlandand Norway. Greece and Luxembourg do not participate in ESA. Created in 1975 by virtue of a convention whichdefines its purpose as "to provide for and to promote, for exclusively peaceful purposes, cooperation amongEuropean States in space research and technology and their space applications, with a view to their being used forscientific purposes and for operational space applications systems". It is therefore natural for ESA to be involvedin the definition of a European space strategy even though, it is not part of the European Union.4 "ESA increases communications budget", Space News, 22 January 2001.5 Joint Research Centre consists of eight institutes divided into a number of units. Part of its job is to provideEuropes policy-makers, scientists and citizens with information about space-based applications. Its mission is to 2
  3. 3. in the development of space activities, it has been decided that a synergy with ESA wasneeded. In this context, Commission and the ESA should seek to arrive at an efficientframework for cooperation (Framework Agreement to be signed in 2003) whereby the ESAacts as the implementing agency for the development and procurement of the spacesegment and ground segment involved in the European Communitys initiatives. Along theselines, a joint high-level Task Force (JTF) on Space Policy, has been set up between theCommission and the ESA-Executive (2001). Also a Joint Space Strategy Advisory Grouphas been set up (JSSAG). JTF developed further the European space strategy, taking alsointo account the developments regarding the ESDP,6 and produced proposals for itsimplementation. The JTF has recommended the joint development and implementation of acoherent overall European Space Policy, which takes into account the needs of the EU,incorporating the space policies of ESA and of the Member States of the EU and ESA whilealso prolonging the mandate for the JTF and JSSAG until the conclusion of the Frameworkagreement. The agreement could include the definition of a permanent structure as follow-on to the Joint Task Force, instrumental in the shaping of the European Space Policy. (b) Space Policy. In December 1999, the European Council decided tocall the European Commission and the Executive of the European Space Agency (ESA)to prepare a draft for a European Strategy for Space.7,8 As a result, a joint Commission –ESA document on a European strategy for space was produced9, which according to ECshould open a new chapter in Europe’s approach to space, becoming the reference forEuropean space activities.  In this strategy EC acknowledged for the first time that spacepresents a security dimension, which has thus far only been dealt with, at europeanlevel, in the context of the WEU and that the development of a common ESDP isprompting the EU to take space capabilities into account, for instance in decision-making for the planning and monitoring of the Petersberg Tasks. To meet the ESDPobjectives, the EU should be able to call on a range of military (initially established bythe WEU) and civil (established by the EU) means for intelligence gathering andcrisis management.  The Council in its resolution of 16 November 2000 expressed itsagreement in this document.10 The European Parliament, in its resolution of 18 May2000 requested for a debate to take place between the parties involved in the scientific,technical, industrial, commercial and political sectors, together with the nationalagencies. After two years of debate11, the European Parliament in its Resolution onspace12 invited the Commission to prepare a document on the future of Europe in Spaceand to further evolve and strengthen the European Space Policy (beyond actionsalready included in the Commission/ESA Joint Task Force mandate).provide, as and when required, specific information derived from space-based earth observation facilities incombination with data supplied by navigation and telecommunications satellites.6 Council Resolution of 16 November 2000 on a European space strategy. Official Journal C 371 , 23/12/2000 p.0002 – 0003.7 Resolution ESA Council at Ministerial level, Brussels, 11 and 12 May 1999.8 2112th EU Council meeting – Research (Brussels, 2 December 1999).9 COM(2000) 597 final Brussels, 27.9.2000.10 The EC-ESA document proposed that the European Space Strategy should be developed along the following threecomponents identified: First, strengthening the foundations of space activities; second enhancing scientific knowledgeand third, reaping the benefits for markets and society. CFSP is embedded in the third component of this SpaceStrategy under the full title "reaping the benefits for markets and society through a demand-driven exploitation of thetechnical capabilities of the space community", and is associated exclusively with the thematic area of globalobservation. The Communication states that thus far, space activities in Europe have been largely focused on the firsttwo objectives, although the capabilities exist to meet all three, which are, overall, inseparable.11 ‘Europe and Space: Turning to a new chapter’ (COM(2000) 597 – 2001/2072(COS)), 28 September 2000,12 Parliament Resolution, 17 January 2002, PR TAPROV(2002)0015 «Europe and Space». 3
  4. 4.  To this end, EC initialized the Green Paper on European SpacePolicy process, which should embrace all aspects of European policies, including thoseof the CFSP-ESDP aspects.13 The Green Paper puts forward a number of politicallysensitive questions, which Europe will have to face in the medium and long term (suchas the Security and Defense Dimension of a Space Policy, space needs for the CFSP,dual use of space systems, institutional matters as the role of ESA, the shrinking ofcommercial space activities in the last 2 years etc). The official consultation period willextend until 30 May 2003 and. The contribution of space assets to the CFSP and ESDP,is mentioned in chapter 2.3, under the title “Improving the Security of Citizens”14.Subsequently, an action plan ("White Paper") will be drawn up by the Commission,detailing the action to be undertaken and the role of each partner in ensuring that theyare successfully implemented. This plan will be presented before the end of 2003. ( c ) Space Programme. An EU space programme is already taking place and isdeveloped jointly by Commission & ESA. GALILEO and GMES initiatives, respectively in thefield of navigation by satellite and Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, aremainly focused on the competency of transport, environment and research. Until now, thisEU Programme has not taken officially into account the developments regarding the ESDP:  The security component of the GMES initiative does not include militarymatters, since the “S” in GMES covers the security and protection of citizens related toenvironmental threats. According to EC, the security and dual use dimensions of GMES hasnot been adequately investigated so far and the issue of crisis management and its bearingon an EU capacity for GMES will need to be considered at the appropriate time in theappropriate setting. 15 The GMES concept and implementation plan will be further elaborated(it may address the question of the built-up of a European dual-use structure with regard tothe analysis, distribution and services based on the GMES satellite data) and proposed toEU Council and European Parliament by the end of 2003.16 JTF recommended theestablishment of an appropriate dialogue on security and dual use issues between theDirectorates-General of the Commission, the Secretary General of the Council of theEU/High Representative for CFSP, ESA and relevant authorities in Member States and thedetermination on the future role of ESA with respect to these issues.17  The GALILEO radionavigation system is a civil programme under civilcontrol;18 although one of the initial arguments for the development of it was that there areserious problems of both sovereignty and security if Europe’s safety critical navigationsystems are out of Europe’s control.19 On the other hand it should be noted that on thepolitical dimension JTF recommends to address security aspects in a timely manner andestablish the appropriate security mechanism across all phases of the programme. Also JTFcalls for the establishment of an appropriate dialogue on security and dual use issuesbetween the Directorates-General of the Commission, the Secretary General of the Councilof the EU/High Representative for CFSP, ESA and relevant authorities in Member States,13 GREEN PAPER, European Space Policy, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels,COM(2003) 17/5, 20 January 2003.14 The question that is raised is how better to define and clarify, as part of a coherent whole (including frameworkand time-scale): the nature and scale of the space capacities required to achieve the political objectives of thePESC?.15 Communication from the Commission to the Council and The European Parliament. Global Monitoring forEnvironment and Security (GMES) Outline. GMES EC Action Plan (Initial Period: 2001 – 2003) COM(2001) 609final Brussels, 23.10.2001.p.3.16 “The European Space Policy and its Security Aspects”, Draft keynote address of Mr. Achilleas Mitsos, Director-General of DG Research, European Satellites for Security, Bruxelles 18-19 June, 2002.17 ‘Towards a European Space Policy’, The European Commission and the European Space AgencyJoint Task Force Report, COM(2001) 718 final, 07.12.2001, p. 16.18 Transport Council Resolution on GALILEO, 5 April 2001.19 COM(1999) 54 Final/European Commission/ 10 February 1999. 4
  5. 5. the determination on the future role of ESA with respect to these issues and finallyrecommends to build GALILEO in coherence with the European Strategy for Space and withthe political evolution of the European Union.20 (2) Second Pillar. (a) Institutional Aspects. EU is institutionally weak when itcomes to security space since there is no space unit within second pillar, nor any otherinstrument to deal with the development of space capabilities. EU became aware of thestrategic value of space for the implementation of its policies in the context of its CFSP, as itis evident by the EU Council decision to incorporate from WEU the Satellite Center (EUSC)in order to support the decision-making of the Union both in the context of its CFSP and itsESDP. The EUSC, as directed by the SG/HR in accordance with the Joint Action,contributes to early warning21. Satellite Center continues to exploit commercial imagery asits prime data source and thus it remains focused on earth observation only. EUSC alsoperforms civilian activities, coordinates with JRC, while the Commission is a member of itsmanagement board. Recently the SG/HR asked from the Helios countries to examine againthe possibility of supplying Helios-1 images to the EUSC. (b) Space Policy. There is no such policy, although WEU’s spacepolicy was inherited.22 During EC’s Green paper initiative, officials from the Council andEUMS were invited and attended a special Workshop on Security Aspects of Europeanspace policy.23 © Space Programme. EU does not yet have a military spaceprogramme. The Western European Union (WEU), which has being partiallyabsorbed by the EU, attempted to define an earth observation system in the mid‘90s, but did not develop into a procurement programme. The work inside secondpillar is at a very early stage since:  In the identified shortfalls, three domains of Spaceassets have been included so far:24 Strategic Satellite Imagery (Serial Number 49),Signal intelligence (SIGINT Satellite, SN 58) and Early warning (Warning Satellites,SN 50).  No ECAP panel was dedicated to space.  Only ECAP panel "Strategic IMINT collection" haspresented its final report, recommending that basic element of capability required tofill the gap is access to commercial as well as military and dual-use satellite imagingsystems.  According to Early Warning & Distant Detection ECAPpanel (Progress Report version 1), projects or initiatives related to early warningsatellites are still to be addressed.  The following two ECAP panels have make additionalreference to space systems in their findings: According to ECAP Panel UAVHALE/MALE, the use of long endurance UAVs generates new communicationsrequirements, including satellite access for communications relay. According to20 ‘Towards a European Space Policy’, The European Commission and the European Space AgencyJoint Task Force Report, COM(2001) 718 final, 07.12.2001, p. 14.21 COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION Brussels, 16 May 2002, 8945/02.22 Space Policy , WEU Council Of Ministers, Rome, CM (98) 43, 16 November 1998.23 ‘Green Paper’ on the future of Europe in Space, Workshop on Security Aspects Brussels 15 th November 2002,EUROPEAN COMMISSION, RESEARCH DIRECTORATE-GENERAL, Space Policy and Coordination ofResearch, Brussels, 26/11/2002, D(2002) CB - Final version.24 Helsinki Headline Catalogue, v.2001, Part II. 5
  6. 6. ECAP Panel CM-PGM, european efforts could in order of priority look for aircraftcapability of tactical situation updating via satellite links.  Apart from the strategic IMINT requirements andcapabilities which are presented as annex “b” to the final report of the relevant ECAPPanel, no other specific operational requirements have been defined.b. National, Bilateral and Multinational Space Efforts: (1) Institutional and Space Policy aspects. Most Europeancountries have formulated national space policies and set up Space Agencies. (2) Space Programmes. The European space endeavour is based ona series of different choices and national-multinational programmes rather than onany European policy as such: (a) Various programmes have been developed on a nationalbasis since ‘60s, for both civilian and security purposes, mainly in the fields of earthobservation and communications. The last two years has seen commitment byMember States to a series of defence and security programmes (sometimes withbilateral or multilateral cooperation).25 A detailed reference to them is attached asAppendix B. In summary these programmes are26:  France: Helios second generation observation, € 2Bn plus;Syracuse 3 communications, €2Bn plus; Pleiades observation (shared with Italy), €500million; ESSAIM ELINT, €500 million.  United Kingdom: Skynet 5 communications satellite system,€2Bn plus;  Italy: COSMO/Skymed (civil/military observation, shared withFrance), €800 million, Sicral 1B, €150 million.  Spain: SPAINSAT, €300 million for communications; jointprogramme with a US company.  Germany: SAR Lupe radar observation; €500 million (b) Some Member states, in order to push forward the development ofan European global system of earth observation, decided that it was essential to define andevaluate the common needs. This is the main objective of the document called BOC, fromthe French Besoins Opérationnels Communs (BOC),27 since this document focuses uponthe common operational requirements for a global observation system. This document isattached as annex “c” in the final Report of the strategic IMINT collection ECAP panel, withthe title “Common Operational Requirements for a European global satellite observationsystem (for security and defense purposes)”. At the beginning, it is envisaged that thebuilding of this European system is based upon exchanges amongst national systemsthrough users ground segments. EU could get an access to the information provided by thissystem. Concerning the generation after 2010/2012, it should be based upon a commonglobal European procurement policy. Five European Chiefs of Staff (of France, Germany,25 On the other hand it should be noted that European countries have so far been unable to reach agreement on ajoint military satellite communications system. (see Eumilsatcom, then Trimilsatcom and last Bimilsatcominitiatives).26 The Future of Europe in Space, High Level Space Policy Workshop, Elements for Discussion, Brussels3rd October 2002.27 Common Operational Requirements for a European Global Satellite Observation System (for security anddefence purposes) signed by France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Belgium. 6
  7. 7. Italy Spain and Belgium) have signed the BOC document while his signature could beextended to other partners. To some extent, the BOC could be considered as the militarycounterpart of the GMES, the global monitoring system to protect and manage theenvironment. According to the Green paper, this first step could be complemented by theGMES initiative in order to produce a European observation system in space, subsequentlyextended to information and reconnaissance.IV. Description of Different Options for an Overall Second Pillar Response 9. Integrating space policy into Union competence poses a number of complexand sensitive questions.28 After all, one of the most important recommendations ofJoint Task Force concerned the establishment of a regular dialogue on securityissues between the SG/HR of the CFSP, the European Commission, ESA andMember States. It is therefore against this background that the present Green paperprocess and the Greek initiative should be seen as a step towards the establishmentof such a dialogue, because, according to DG/Research, the defense and securityaspects of space until now has not received the attention it merits. 29 It is obviousfrom the facts presented above that an active debate about the security aspects ofspace systems, the policy and the institutional issues has started. 10. The answer to the question raised by Green paper (see. para. 5), requires aformulation of a Space Policy for second pillar. Second pillar has a choice. Eithercontribute to it or maintain the current situation. a. In the first case, second pillar has already been involved in the ongoingdiscussions as it is proved by the involvement of the EU High Representative in theEuropean Advisory Group on Aerospace which was set up in 2001 to analyze theadequacy of the existing political and regulatory framework for aerospace in Europe,to highlight deficiencies and to make proposals for further improvement. Theirfindings are presented in a report entitled Strategic Aerospace Review for the 21stCentury (STAR 21), which the Group presented to the President of the EuropeanCommission, on 16 July 2002. In this report, this Group made specificrecommendations regarding safeguarding Europe’s role in space. b. In the second case, Commission and ESA will proceed alone andSecond Pillar will not have the opportunity to present its position, about aspects thatclearly lie in his competence. Greek Presidency believes that it is logical to contributeto the dialogue and presents below some of the options second pillar has in theareas of space policy and space programme in the CFSP-ESDP framework, and inthe institutional aspects. a. Policy (1). The EU is a multi-pillar organisation in which the military tool is only oneinstrument available for crisis management. As first pillar admitted that theCFSP/ESDP space dimension was only partially addressed so far, due to currentexisting institutional limitations,30 there is a place for this space policy for28 Commission Launches Debate On A Space Policy For The Eu, Ip/03/, Brussels, 21 January 2003.29 ‘Green Paper’ on the future of Europe in Space, Workshop on Security Aspects Brussels 15 th November 2002,EUROPEAN COMMISSION, D(2002) CB30 ‘Towards a European Space Policy’, The European Commission and the European Space AgencyJoint Task Force Report, COM(2001) 718 final, 07.12.2001, p. 23. 7
  8. 8. CFSP/ESDP within an overall EU Space Policy. Thus Presidency proposes thedrafting of a Space policy in the CFSP-ESDP framework. This policy can be draftedfurther with the help of EUMS until the end of May 2003, date for which EC sets asthe end of the debate for the Green paper. (2). So far, both representatives of the HR and of EUMS have attended workshops(EC, Luven) and panels related with space policy, technology and applications. TheIntelligence Directorate of the EUMS and the Staff of the EU Council attended as observersof the Strategic IMINT Panel. Also in the preparation of the Green paper process bothattended a working meeting to consider issue relates to the security aspect (November 15,2002). (3) Since most of European countries have already a national Military SpacePolicy, this process can also be augmented by the method used with success initiallyin the elaboration of the headline goal, in particular the involvement of Member Stateexperts through expert groups, with the EUMS assisting. Also, according to thecomments made by the Spanish Director General For Defence Policy, during ameeting in Athens (12 November 2002), for this endeavour the assistance of the EUSC’sexperience could be well appreciated. (4) First pillar believes that this European Space Policy, including security and defenceaspects, has to be presented at the highest level for political endorsement. It is only Headsof State and Governments, meeting at their European Councils, who can consider theEuropean Space Policy in full.31 To this end, this space policy in the CFSP-ESDP frameworkcan be presented to PSC. b. Institutional issues. (1) The development of such a coherent space policy involves institutional questions,which initially relate to the different competencies of the Unions main institutions with regardto the first and second pillar of the current EU Treaty. More specifically Green Papermentions that such a policy should cover all civilian, security and defence aspects and callsfor a review of the decisional architecture in relative matters. For the Second Pillar movinginto this new area of activity requires a formal structure. (2) Several institutions in Europe are developing ideas for new systems andservices. However, there is no overall planning within which the various potential servicescan find their specific role at a European level. At the same time, those organizations withsome responsibility to supply information services to the policy maker need to be fullyengaged in the process of defining what will be necessary. (3) Looking at the US paradigm, US have one coherent space policy, leading to aclear share of responsibilities among two major public actors, which manage the most of for science, advanced and risky technologies, and mannedprogrammes; and DoD for end-to-end navigation, telecommunications, and Earthobservation systems, and for operational expendable launchers.32 (4) The big challenge will therefore be to identify and to elaborate an overall EU Spacesecurity architecture. This architecture would be based either on existing or on newlycreated structures, assets and procedures. A Commission document33 states that the31 Ibid, p. 23.32 ‘The European Space Sector In The World’, from ‘Europe and Space: Turning to a new chapter’ (COM(2000) 597 – 2001/2072(COS)), 28 September 2000. 8
  9. 9. European Space Agency, building on its achievements and its technical expertise, willremain the principal programming and funding agency through which Member States realizejoint research and development projects in the area of space. But, apart from this reference,there is a vacuum concerning which body will be the focal point dealing with securityaspects related with space and more specifically who shall be the body of executive powerresponsible for carrying out space activity, that is elaborating programmes to create and usemilitary space technology in accordance with the space security policy of the second pillar?Below are a few different ideas, which can be explored further in the future. (a). ESA. Some proposals deal with the idea of ESA’s involvement in space forsecurity and defence, although some difficulties arise from its specific mission. Suchissues were examined during the preliminary phase of the Green paper process.According to DG/Research, “indeed, ESA’s charter limits its activities to «peacefulpurposes,» and thus necessitates the examination of the question if ESA’s mission iscompatible with the so-called Petersberg tasks. Also its status as an internationalorganization outside the EU Treaty involves the necessity of building a bridge betweenthe Union and ESA, in a first step via a framework agreement between the EU andESA. Furthermore, they necessitate the examination of the question if ESA’s missionis compatible with the so-called Petersberg tasks, which define the general scope ofthe European Union approach with regard to conflict prevention and crisismanagement”.34 But, according to the Wise Men report:35 “We thus see it as logical touse the capabilities of ESA also for the development of the more security-orientedaspects of the European Space Policy. As the efforts of the European Union in thesefields are geared to the so-called Petersberg tasks of peace strengthening in the formof conflict prevention and crisis management, including civil and environmentalemergencies, we do not see any problem with the Convention of ESA”. JTF alsorecommended the determination on the future role of ESA with respect to the dialogueon security and dual use issues. These institutional issues have also to be seen in thelight of the general on-going debate on the Future of Europe and the future structure ofthe EU-Treaty, which is presently taking place in the context of the Convention. (b). EUSC. Some other ideas are concentrated to the EU Satellite Center.STAR 21 Report recommends the establishment of appropriate institutional mechanismstaking full account of user needs and broadening the experience of the Satellite Centre.According to Strategic IMINT Panel’s report, existing arrangements and infrastructurelimit the ability of the SATCEN to address the whole range of emerging requirementsunder second Pillar. A recent report for the WEU Technological and AerospaceCommittee has stated “the EU Satellite Centre’s role should be expanded to include theuse of remote-sensing, communication, meteorological, electronic surveillance systemsand later on early-warning systems. It should have access to all commercial and militarysatellites on a case-by-case basis, and create an intelligence capacity in conjunctionwith a future European intelligence agency.»36 ©. Space Group. According to another recommendation, the creation of aspace group should be envisaged, similar to the group which used to exist in WEU; it34 34 The Future of Europe in Space, High Level Space Policy Workshop, Elements for Discussion, Brussels3rd October 2002.35 ESA Director General has set up a committee of three "wise men" chaired by Carl Bildt, former Swedish PrimeMinister and UN envoy to the Balkans, the other two members being Jean Peyrelevade, President of CrιditLyonnais, and Lothar Späth, CEO of Jenoptik, Former Prime Minister of the State Baden-Württemberg. The threerepresent a combination of high-level political, economic and industrial expertise. See ‘Towards a Space Agencyfor the European Union’, Report to the ESA Director General, November 2000.36 Technological and Aerospace Committee report ‘Developing a European space observation capability to meetEurope’s security requirements’ prepared by Edward O’Hara (UK, Lab.) and Sam Cherribi (Netherlands, Lib,WEU Assembly, 5 June 2002. 9
  10. 10. would be answerable to the Political and Security Committee and responsible forcoordinating those aspects of European security and defence that concern the use ofspace.37 (d). EU Space Agency. Last, there is a proposal for the creation of a EUspace agency in charge of space systems for security and defence purposes. Thisagency could collect the necessary funds, ensure technical analysis and programmanagement, in the same way as ESA works for scientific programs.38 c. Space Programme in the ESDP framework. (1) The Gulf crisis provided a graphic illustration of the use of satellites, both civiland military, in crisis-management and the conduct of military operations. Intensiveuse of this medium contributed greatly to the success of the coalition. Satellitesystems covered a wide spread of tasks: observation, monitoring, communications,navigation and meteorology. (2) On the other hand, there are no EU military programmes, at all. Public Europeanspace expenditure is divided into civil and military activities and of the ESA memberstates, only few fund military space activities. France and the United Kingdom possesssubstantial military space budgets, while Italy, Spain and Germany follow. Thesecountries are engaged in national or multinational related programmes outside theframework of either ESA or the EU. Since there are not enough resources to fulfill all EUrequirements with expensive dedicated military systems in an environment of increasingglobal responsibilities, some of them might be of special interest to EU. But in whatspace-related areas should this EU military programme emerge? (a) Areas of Applications. STAR 21 Report recommends the development of afully European-based space defence and security capability for domains such assurveillance, reconnaissance, and command/control including telecommunications andpositioning.39 According to the identified shortfalls other areas of operational interestinvolves SIGINT capability and Early warning satellites. This paper will examine furtherthe prospects in each one of these space domains.  Imagery Satellites. Until now, the domain of IMINT collection fromsatellites has gained more attention than the other space areas. The field of a Europeanspace-based observation system has been examined both in the studies carried out bythe WEU Space Group on the development of such a system and the possibility ofWEU’s participation at a multilateral European level; and recently by the relevant ECAPpanel. This is well understood since in the context of the ESDP a proven space ISTARcapability is of crucial importance. ISTAR assets, with the exception of EUMS Int Div andthe EUSC, are all assets belonging to Member States. Member States are thereforeresponsible for making available ISTAR product for EU crisis management and ISTARassets and systems in a deployment phase and during EU-led crisis managementoperations. A failure to do so would leave EU decision makers, both political and military,lacking in the essential elements required to formulate options and to make sound37 A joint European space strategy: security and defence aspects, WEU Assembly, DOCUMENT A/1738, 20 June2001.38 ‘Building a common space defence in Europe’, BG Gavoty, ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES - BUREAUESPACE, European Satellites for Security, Bruxelles 18-19 June, 2002.39 The EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, along with five EuropeanCommissioners, were involved in this report. 10
  11. 11. decisions for EU crisis management and for EU led-crisis management operations. Therelevant ECAP panel that dealt with strategic IMINT recommended the following phasedapproach to closing the shortfall. In the short term (by 2005): a combination of improvednational intelligence support, improved access to commercial satellite imagery sourcesand negotiated access to existing military systems. In the medium term (2005-2007): inaddition to the above, negotiated access to emerging military and dual use systems. Inthe longer term (2010-2015): continued access to the next generation of capability,potentially through the development of a common EU satellite imaging system.40 Alsothis panel identified requirements and capabilities that can be examined against existingor planned systems and then ascertain whether existing systems are able to meet thatrequirements or whether new systems are necessary.  Communications. But earth observation covers only one area of a spaceprogramme. Space communications is another area of vital interest. In the past severaldiscussions were hold about the possibility of collaboration on a military satcom system,because costs were very high and cost sharing was important, as was interoperability.These efforts were Eumilsatcom, a European option involving at least seven Europeanstates (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK),Bimilsatcom, a Franco-British project utilising British experience with the Skynet series;and Inmilsat/Trimilsatcom, a Franco-British-US system. All of these efforts failedbecause of the lack of equality in the capability, requirement levels and funds available.It is obvious that there is a need to assess the EU satellite communication requirementsand then ascertain whether existing or new systems are necessary.  Navigation and Positioning. In this area EU already has taken thedecision to develop Galileo system. As it has been mentioned before there is a call forthe establishment of a dialogue on security and dual use issues between theCommission, EU/High Representative for CFSP, ESA and relevant authorities inMember States. Greek Presidency believes that the military need to know if they will beusing it or not GALILEO - in order to make the current/future equipment compatible withthis system.  SIGINT and Early Warning. Proposals in this area remain in theirinfancy. In the latter area there are ongoing deliberations between US with Europe aboutnational missile defense in which European industry is interest to cooperate. Also sinceUS with Russia are jointly developing a common program called RAMOS (Russian-American Observation Satellite), this may be an area of potential cooperation for EU,proposal which has been addressed in Europe in the past.41 After all there is already anexample of developing a common space infrastructure, the programme NPOESS, thenew polar orbiting environment satellite system. It will be built around two US satellitesand one European METOP from the European meteorology organization EUMETSAT.This system will serve both military and civilian European and American needs. (b) Estimated Cost. One last question deals with the cost for the development of afully European space-based defence and security capability. In the field of militaryspace, according to the Green paper, there are 5 programmes in Europe forcommunications satellites and 3 for observation satellites, each based on its own40 On the short run, that is by 2005: to improve the qualitative and quantitative levels of the commercial spatialimagery products purchase (SPOT, IKONOS, QUICKBIRD, EROS-Al, ...) for the benefit of the 2nd pillar; Tonegotiate with the partners οf HELIOS Ι which is the only military observation system in service in Europe, asupplying contract of images for the benefit of the 2nd pillar; To invite the European Union States to supply moreimages received from satellites, to the intelligence division of the European Union military staff. On the horizon2005-2007: To negotiate an access to the observation military systems, HELIOS Π and SAR-LUPE and to dualsystems COSMO-SKYMED and PLEIADES, which are expected to be in service between 2004 and 2007. On thehorizon 2010-2015: Tο insure the continuity of service by purchasing its own access to the capacities, which willbe offered by the next generation of observation satellites. This requirement could be satisfy by developing ofcommon space programs led under the aegis of the European Union.41 G. Klinger, acting US Deputy Under Secretary of Defence, in ‘A European space-based observation system’,Assembly of Western European Union, March 1995, p. 23. 11
  12. 12. technology, and developed without co-ordination, thus making delicate a possibleinteroperability. These programmes correspond to a cash flow to industry of the order of€500 million per year.  According to a conference of European governments interested in thedevelopment of a European space capability, held in Helsinki in 2001, the annualinvestment to procure a military space capability in Europe to answer to the minimalneeds of the ESDP, was estimated in 716 M€ per year.42 Other studies from the FrenchBureau Espace raised this investment to the annual amount of 785 M€ to be sharedamong the European Union members. This cost covers communications, earthobservation, SIGINT, early warning and space surveillance.43 Green paper informs thataccording to some estimates, acquiring a minimum common space capability wouldrequire annual investments of €800 million for 10 years or so. It is clear that no singleMember State has the ability to support an independent national space policy.  It should be noted that the total yearly investment in ESA programs byits members is about 2.3 G€. From the above-mentioned estimations, the Europeanmilitary space need is about the 30% of the yearly investment for ESA. Perhaps thetransformation of ESA to a EU Space Agency who shares EU’s interests in ESDP, wouldsolve the problem of funding. In other words, the major problem for the development of aEuropean common military space capability and architecture is not linked to technical orfinancial issues; instead, it is a question of political will.VI. Conclusions 11. Since space technologies and space-based systems are of multi-use natureand thereby capable of supporting various policies simultaneously, EU has been takingan increasing interest in space. Until now the responsibility of developing a Europeanspace strategy and relevant programmes lied in the competency of the first pillar(European Commission) and of European Space Agency. EU space programme has nottaken officially into account the developments regarding the ESDP. 12. EC initialized the Green Paper on European Space Policy process, whichshould embrace all aspects of European policies, including those of the CFSP-ESDPaspects.44 Consultation period will extend until 30 May 2003. 13. Second pillar is institutionally weak to security space, and additionally it hasneither relevant policy nor programme. On the other hand it is logical to contribute in adialogue for security policy issues that lie in its competence. 14. The European space endeavour is based on a series of different choices andnational programmes rather than on any European policy as such; no single MemberState has the ability to support an independent national space policy, 15. Integrating space policy into Union competence poses a number of complexand sensitive questions. There is a need for a better institutionalizing cooperationbetween the various organizations. 16. Second pillar space programme can be covered with a series of differentchoices, which need priorities and further elaboration.42 European Space Directory, 2002, Seig Press, p. 48.43 ‘Building a common space defence in Europe’, BG Gavoty, ETAT-MAJOR DES ARMEES - BUREAUESPACE, European Satellites for Security, Bruxelles 18-19 June, 200244 GREEN PAPER, European Space Policy, COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES Brussels,COM(2003) 17/5, 20 January 2003. 12
  13. 13. VII. Way ahead: Different Steps required on a Space Security Policy 17. It is recommended that further work on EU Space Security Policy should beundertaken on the basis of the contents of the question raised by Commission’s GreenPaper and of this Food for Thought paper. In this context the Hellenic Presidency,recommends following the same approach as the one adopted for the EU informationoperations.45 To this end, recommends that the EUMC.  To convene a Task Force of experts which will be in charge ofelaborating the EU Space Policy, which will cover all CFSP-ESDP considerations. Thisdocument has to be proposed by the end of May 2003.  EUMS will take part in the Task Force of experts, which will be also incharge of elaborating the EU security space architecture. This Task Force is foreseen toinclude the main services of the Secretariat General, which are or might be concernedwith the elaboration of the EU Space Security Policy and of related concepts. The TaskForce could identify the decision-makers and key players in the field of security spaceand propose the co-ordinating mechanisms required to implement this policy.  As a way ahead, additional steps in the future could be the formulationof a concept paper, which will elaborate all the needed space capabilities, which couldbe employed to the execution of the types of scenarios for the implementation ofPetersberg taskst, the definition of the common operational requirements, theidentification of shortfalls, the proposal of remedial steps contributing thus to thedevelopment of a balanced EU Space Security Programme, avoiding any duplication.45 Food For Thought Paper For EU Information Operations, Eumc Doc / Ccd02-08/07-Ops 11/2001 13