5. Difficulty or impossibility for
Greece
Ireland
Portugal
to re-finance their debts
5
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
6. Let’s Contextualise the € debt
Financing needs for the eurozone in 2010 came
to a total of €1.6 trillion, while the USA issued
US $1.7 trillion more Treasury securities, and
Japan had ¥213 trillion of government bonds to
roll over
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 6
9. Multi-factorial explanation
• globalization of finance
• easy credit conditions during the 2002-2008
period that encouraged high-risk lending and
borrowing practices
• international trade imbalances
• real estate bubbles slow economic growth
• national fiscal policies
• national bail outs, assuming private debt burden
or socialising losses
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 9
10. Inherent limits of EMU
• Since countries using the Euro as their
currency have fewer monetary policy choices
(e.g., they cannot print money in their own
currencies to pay debt holders), certain solutions
require multi-national cooperation.
• The ECB has an inflation mandate not an
employment mandate (unlike US Fed)
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 10
11. A crisis of confidence
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 11
13. January 2010
• Frightened investors demanded higher
interest rates from several governments with
higher debt levels or deficits
• This in turn made it difficult for governments
to finance further budget deficits and service
existing high debt levels
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 13
14. February 2010
• Greek PM Papandreou openly admitted that
Greece had failed to comply with the terms of
the Stability & Growth Pact:
– Excessive budget deficit ( > 3% of GDP)
– Excessive public debt ( > 60% of GDP)
(these rules bind Eurozone countries since 1992 when
creation of the EU Monetary & Economic Union)
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 14
15. To bail out or not to bail out?
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 15
16. No-bail out clause
• « A member state shall not be liable for or
assume the commitments of central
governments, regional, local or other public
authorities, other bodies governed by public
law, or public undertakings of another
member state, without prejudice to mutual
financial guarantees for the joint execution of
a specific project ». Article 125 TFEU
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 16
18. Yet
Progressive pooling of risks from particular EMU
states with unsound public finances and,
as a result, extra risks shifted to those countries
providing help and to their taxpayers
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 18
22. March 2010
• EU emergency mechanism:
– European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)
– European Financial Stabilisation Mechanim (EFSM)
– temporary
– worth €750 billion
– supported (also) by the IMF
22
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
23. • EFSF is a Luxembourg-registered company owned
by Euro Area Member States
• EFSF relies on the following instruments linked to
appropriate conditionality:
– Provide loans to countries in financial difficulties
– Intervene in the debt primary and secondary markets
– Finance recapitalisations of financial institutions
through loans to governments
• To fulfill its mission, EFSF issues bonds or other
debt instruments on the capital markets
• EFSF is backed by guarantee commitments from
the euro area Member States for a total of €780
billion and has a lending capacity of €440 billion. 23
24. 2 precedents
• November 2010: it financed €17.7 billion of
the total €67.5 billion rescue package for
Ireland (the rest was loaned from individual
European countries, the European
Commission (EFSM) and the IMF)
• May 2011: it contributed one third of the €78
billion package for Portugal
24
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
25. EFSM
• This mechanism provides financial assistance to EU Member
States in financial difficulties: loan or credit line granted to
Member States
• Memorandum of Understanding between the Member State
and the Commission. European Central Bank supervises it.
• The Commission is the borrower (up to € 60 billion) in
financial markets
• Collateral is EU budget guarantee (EU enjoys AAA)
• The Commission then on-lends the proceeds to Member State
• All interest and loan principal is repaid by MS VIA the
Commission.
• The EFSM has currently been activated for Ireland and
Portugal, for € 48.5 billion to be disbursed over 3 years.
25
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
26. • The EFSM and the EFSF can only be activated
after a request for financial assistance has
been made by the concerned Member State
and a macroeconomic adjustment
programme, incorporating strict
conditionality, has been agreed with the
Commission, in liaison with the European
Central Bank (ECB).
26
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
27. April 2010
Amid fears of default, Standard & Poor's slashed
Greece's sovereign debt rating :
BB+
or "junk" status
27
ALBERTO ALEMANNO HEC PARIS
28. May 2010
A series of austerity measures was proposed
Social unrest
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nxztGzUb66U&feat
!
ALBERTO ALEMANNO -- HEC PARIS 28
29. December 2010
• Financial emergency support made
permanent:
– EFSF/ESFM will become European Stability
Mechanism (ESM)
– From 2013
– To complement the new framework for reinforced
economic surveillance in the EU:
• stronger focus on debt sustainability
• more effective enforcement measures
• focuses on prevention and will substantially reduce the
probability of a crisis emerging in the future. 29
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
30. Legal basis of ‘ESM Treaty’
• Treaty Revision (simplified) :
– addition of third para to Article 136 TFEU
– ratification by all EMU countries
– But intervention of the German Constitutional Court,
then entered into force in June 2011
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 30
HEC PARIS
31. in the meantime
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 31
HEC PARIS
32. ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 32
HEC PARIS
33. The ‘six-pack’
• EU Commission proposed in 2010:
- To strenghten economic/fiscal policy coordination
and surveillance
- EMU Member States agreed on:
- European Semester – preventive coordination of
budgetary and economic policies of € members
- EUROPLUS PACT – signed by EMU members but
open to non-members
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 33
37. June 2011
Standard and Poor's downgraded Greece's
sovereign debt rating to CCC
the lowest in the world
following the findings of a bilateral EU-IMF audit
which called for further austerity measures
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 37
38. ALBERTO ALEMANNO
July 2011
• Additional €109 billion to Greece
• Private sector agreed on debt restructuring of
21% (so called ‘hair-cut’)
38
40. September 2011
• Greek debt turned bigger than expected
• Growing concern for French bank system
(highly exposed to Greek debt)
• Italy on the radar of the bond markets, due to
its 120% debt and low economic growth
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 40
41. October 2011
• All EU members agreed on new Rescue Plan:
– 50% debt restructuring for Greece (no 21%) to
enable Greece to reach 120% GDP debt ration by
2020
– EFSF from €440 to €1000 billion
– Higher core-capital ration of 9% on EU banks
– Economic governace:
• Golden rules in national constitutions
• Euro Summit Meetings + Euro-group
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 41
43. A video on the Scr, ehm
Rescue Plan
http://www.xtranormal.com/watch/12611732/the-e
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 43
44. • Doubts about viability of Rescue Plan
– EU members did not chip in into the boosted EFSF
– No real banking deal yet in Greece (bank lobby
conditioned the 50% haircut to a 90% voluntarily
acceptance rate among its banks): why voluntary?
• Only way to avoid activation of CDS contracts, what
would trigger billion € claims against insurances
– In any event, only 120% debt GDP ratio by 2020:
the double the maximum allowed
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 44
48. No Treaty Change
Finding a workable solution w/o changes:
Article 136 TFEU offers special powers to (only)
eurozone countries to:
- Strenghten coordination/surveillance budgetary
discipline
- Set out economic policy guidelines
dismessed as SHORT TERM PERSPECTIVE
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS 48
50. Treaty Change
Fixing Euro’s birth defect:
Transferring economic policy to the EU
(not only monetary)
Unpopular and excuse to open a Pandora’s box (UK
claims for special treatment, etc)
Dismissed as LONG TERM PERSPECTIVE 50
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
52. December 5, 2011
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 52
HEC PARIS
53. December 8-9, 2011
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 53
HEC PARIS
54. Ideas on the table
• Transform the EFSF into a European Monetary
Fund (EMF):
– to provide governments with fixed interest rate
Eurobonds at preferential rate
• Eurobonds issued jointly by the 17 euro nations
• Fiscal union across the eurozone with strict and
enforceable fiscal rules and automatic penalties
embedded in the EU treaties; the European court
of justice ensuring that countries meet their
obligations
All seem to require a TREATY CHANGE
54
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - HEC PARIS
55. Fiscal compact
• An intergovernmental treaty which was
signed by all of the MS of the EU except Czech
Republic and UK on March 2, 2011
• The treaty will enter into force on Jan 2 2013
if by that time 12 Member States of the euro
area have ratified it
55
56. Fiscal compact
• national requirement to have national
budgets that are in balance or in surplus:
– Balance budget rule (deficit no > 0,5 % GDP)
• ECJ would fine a country up to 0.1 % of GDP if
this was not done a year after ratification
• Membership required to be eligible to ESM
56
57. ESM
• the European Stability Mechanism will be an
intergovernmental organisation under public
international law
• Located in Luxembourg
• Permanent bail-out mechanism
• Open to all Members in Fiscal Compact
57
60. A glimpse of hope
“I do absolutely believe in the European project.
I think it is the most noble political ideal in
human history in a thousand years”
Peter Sutherland, former WTO Director General
ALBERTO ALEMANNO - JEAN MONNET
CHAIR IN EU LAW & RISK REGULATION - 60
HEC PARIS