Oligopolio de Alejandro

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    Oligopolio de Alejandro - Presentation Transcript

    1. OLIGOPOLY
    2. Learning Objectives  Definition  Types of oligopoly  Models of oligopoly  Assumptions of the models  Equilibrium condition  Short run oligopoly  Long run oligopoly
    3. Definition  Anoligopoly is a market structure in which there are 3-11 sellers and many buyers  Typesof commodities are both homogenous and heterogeneous
    4. ASSUMPTIONS  Few sellers  Barriers to entry  Economies of scale  Legal restrictions  Brand names  Control over an essential resource  High cost of entry  Start-up costs; advertising  Crowding out the competition
    5. TYPES OF OLIGOPOLY (w.r.t goods)
    6. TYPES OF OLIGOPOLY (w.r.t goods)  PURE OLIGOPOLY: the products are all homogenous i.ethe companies are making same product.  Example is of sugar and edible oil manufacturers.  Example OPEC: Oil producing countries  DIFFERENTIATED OLIGOPOLY: if the products of the companies are heterogeneous
    7.  Heterogeneous production refers to a firm having various product lines.  Example Service shoes have other product lines besides being a shoe manufacturer.  Leather jacket companies also have various spin of products such as leather bags, belts etc.
    8. Types of oligopoly( w.r.t category)
    9. COLLUSIVE OLIGOPOLY  oligopoly in which two or more than two firms are making an agreement or determination of price and output.  Supply is curtailed so that the price does not go low.
    10. Types of collusive oligopoly
    11. cartel  In which two or more than two firms are making an agreement on determination of price and output  Shortest way of controlling/earning profit by controlling the supply.
    12. Cartel as a monopolist MC p Dollars per unit c D MR Quantity per period 0 Q
    13. Cartel as a monopolist A cartel acts as a monopolist. Here, D is the market demand curve, MR the associated marginal revenue curve, and MC the horizontal sum of the marginal cost curves of cartel members (assuming all firms in the market join the cartel). Cartel profits are maximized when the industry produces quantity Q and charges price p.
    14. Examples of Cartels  Example of Walls and Olpers products. Olpers has come up with a new product of Omore ice cream which is giving tough competition to Walls ice cream Result is a 30%-40% decrease in the profits of Walls within a period of 6 months.
    15. Profit sharing cartel  Collusivepricing model reveals that firms in the market agree on production limits and set a common price to maximize the joint profit.  When firms collude and agree on common price so mostly they earn Economic profit.  Itis assumed here that firms have identical cost data and same demand and thus Marginal revenue data.
    16. Difficulties in collusion  Collusion among Corporations is difficult because of;  Demand and Cost Differences among Seller  The Complexity of Output Coordination among Producers  The Potential for Cheating  The Potential Entry of New Firms
    17. MARKET SHARING CARTEL  Giveseach member the right to operate in a particular geographic area.  Most notorious example of this cartel:  Du pont and Imperial chemicals agreeing to divide market.
    18. Price leadership  The firms in the Oligopolistic industry without any formal agreement accept the price set by the leading firm in the industry and move their prices in line with the prices of the leader firm.  Price Leadership can be in any of the forms;  PriceLeadership by a Dominant firm  Barometric Price Leadership  Aggressive or Exploitative Price Leadership
    19. Equilibrium under Price Leadership MC b Revenue/ Cost/ B MC a Prices A MR 0 Y X Output
    20. Non collusive oligopoly  That oligopoly in which two or more firms are making an independent decision about their price and output determination, keeping in view the reaction of other firms operating in the market.  One firm’s action effects other firm’s profit  The response is to be kept under considered during the competition analysis because say if the supply by all the firms exceeds demand the price would go down and adversely affect all the firms in the market.
    21. Models in non-collusive oligopoly  Cournot Model  Bertrand model  Chamberlin model  Kinked Sweezy model  Stackleberg model
    22. Cournot Model  Cournot model: if one firm is predicting about the other firm’s price, then the first firm can make erudite decisions about the price of its own product.
    23. HOW TO DETERMINE THE PRICE? Price Determination Depends:  Nature of Goods  Technology  Elasticity of Demand  Marketing Strategy  Price of Inputs(Factors of Production)
    24.  buy 1 get 1 free offers  Lucky draw  Discount sales  Customer incentives
    25. Bertrand model one firm can predict the output of other firms and taking this information into account the level of output to be produced can be determined.  Prediction made through analyzing the technology used, scale of production, raw material and market share.
    26. Chamberlin model
    27. Kinked sweezy model  It is practiced application of Chamberlin model.  It was introduced by Paul Sweezy in 1939.  Kinked seewzy model: is basically the practical implementation of the preceding 3 models  It is assumed that:  the firms are independent and are not engaged in any collusive pricing.  The price and output in the market is given.  The kink or bending position of demand curve is formed at prevailing market price.
    28. KINKED SWEEZY MODEL  Corporations may follow price changes or may ignore it.  Ifrivals match price changes so demand curve will be Less Elastic for the firm while if rivals ignore price changes so Demand curve will be more Elastic.  Ithas taken the information about the price and output of two firms and used an empirical research to prove that the demand curve for both the firms would be kinked.
    29. Normal Trend The rivals Match price changes Price D1 Quantity MR1
    30. KINKED SWEEZY MODEL The rivals Ignore price changes Price D2 MR2 D1 Quantity MR1
    31. Kinked sweezy model Price D2 M R2 Quantity
    32. Kinked sweezy model Effectively creating a kinked demand curve Pric e D Quantity
    33. Equilibrium under “Kinked- Demand Curve” MR cuts MC from below MC1 Price MC2 D Quantity
    34. Personal Opinions On Oligopoly  Zuhaib Gull  Farwah Iqbal
    35. The End
    36. Thank You

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