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Drive the surprising science of motivation

  1. 1. Drive
  2. 2. ALSO BY DANIEL H. PINK FreeAgent Nation A Whole New Mind The Adventures ofJohnny Bunko
  3. 3. Drive THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US Daniel H. Pink RIVERHEAD BOOKSa member of Penguin Group (USA) Inc. New York 2009
  4. 4. : r RIVERH EAD BOOKS Publ ished by the Penguin Group Penguin Group (USA ) Inc., 575 Hud son Str eet. New York. N ew York J()()14 . USA Penguin Group (C anad a). 90 E~linton Avenu e East , Su ire 7()(). Tor ont o . Ontar io MAP 2Y5, Canada (a divi sion of Pear son Pen guin Ca nada Inc.) Pen g uin Boo b Ltd . 80 Strand . lond on WC 2R ORL, England Pen guin Ireland , 25 Sr Step he n s G ree n. Dublin 2. Ireland (a division of Pen guin Book s Ltd) Penguin G roup (Au str al ia). 250 Camberwell Road , Ca rnbe rwell, Victori a .1 124 , Australi a (a divi sion of Pearson Au stralia Group Pry ltd ) , Penguin Book s Indi a Pvr ltd , II Co m m u n ity Centre, Pan ch sheel Park, New Delhi-I 10 01 7, Indi a Penguin G ro up (N Z). 6 7 Ap oll o Drive, Rosedale , Norrh Shor e 0 6 .12, N ew Zeal and (a divi sion of Pear son New Zealand ltd) . Penguin Books (South Afri ca) (Pry) ltd , 24 Srurdee Avenue, Rosebank, Johanne sburg 21 96, South Afri ca Penguin Books ltd , Registered Offi ces: 80 Str and , Lond on W C 2R OR l. En glan d Copyright © 2009 by Daniel H. Pink All rights reserved . No parr of this book ma y be reproduced . sca nned, or di stributed in an y printed or electronic form without permission. Plea se d o not part icip ate in or encourage piracy of copy rig h ted materials in violati on of th e au t ho rs right s. Pur chase onl y authorized editi ons. Published simultaneously in Canada The author gratefully acknowledge s permission to reprint from the following : "Sexr. " copyright © 1955 by W . H . Aud en , from Collecte Poems by W. H. Auden. d Used by permission of Random H ouse, Inc. Unless otherwise indicated, all illustrations in thi s book are by Rob Ten Pas. library of Con gress Catalog ing- in-Publi cat ion Dat a Pink . Daniel H . Drive : the surprising truth about what motivates us / Daniel H . Pink . p. em . Includes bibl iographi cal referen ces and index. ISBN 9 78- 1-594 4 8- 88 4 -9 I . Motivation (Psychology) . I. Title, BF503 .P475 200 9 200 90 40 651 15 3.I 5.14----<1c22 Printed in the U n ited Sta tes of America 9 10 8While the a ut ho r has mad e ever y effort to provide acc urate telephone numbers and Inter-net addresses at the time of publication , neither the publi sher nor the author assumesany respon sibility for erro rs , or for changes that occ ur after publi cat ion. Further, the pub -lisher does not hav e any co nt ro l over and doe s nor assume an y respon sibil it y for author orthird-parr y web sire s or their content.
  5. 5. For Sophia, Eliza, and Saul-the surprising trio that motivates me
  6. 6. CONTENTSI~TRODUCTION: The Puzzling Puzzles of Harry Harlowand Edward Deci 1 U scientific terms, it wasakin to rollinga steelball down an inclined In planeto measure its velocity--onlyto watchthe ballfloat into theair instead. It suggested that ourunderstanding of thegravitationalPIl//s on ourbehavior was inadequate-that what wethoughtwerefixed laws had plentyof loopholes." Part One A New Operating SystemCHAPTER 1. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0 15 "But in thefirst tenyears of this century-a periodof tr1l1y staggering underachievement in business, technology, and social jwogms-weve
  7. 7. discovered that this sturdy, old operating system doesnt work nearly as well. It crashes-s-often and unpredictably. It forces people to devise workarounds to bypass its flaws. Most of a1/, it is provingincompatible with many aspects of contemporary business."CHAPTER 2. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks(Often) Dont Work. .. 34 IIIn otherwords, rewards canperform a weirdsort of behavioral alchemy: They can transform an interesting task into a drudge. They can turn play into work."CHAPTER 2A.... and the Special CircumstancesWhen They Do 60 "While an operating system centered around rewards and punishments has outlivedits usefulness and badly needs an upgrade, that doesnt meanwe shouldscrap its every piece. "CHAPTER 3. Type I and Type X 70 "A picturemay beworth a thousandwords-but sometimes neitheris as potentas just two fetters. "
  8. 8. Part Two The Three ElementsCHAPTER 4. Autonomy 85 "Perhaps its time to tossthe veryword management into the linguistic ash heapalongside icebox and horseless carriage. This eradoesnt callfor bettermanagement. It callsfor a renaissance of self-direction. "CHAPTER 5. Mastery 109 "In our offices and ourclassrooms we have way toomuchcompliance and way toolittle engagement. Theformermight getyou throughthe day, but only the latter will getyou throughthe night.".CHAPTER 6. Purpose 131 "Its in our natureto seek purpose. But that natureis now beingrevealed and expressed ona scale that is demographically unprecedented and, until recently, scarcely imaginable. The consequences couldrejuvenate our businesses and remake our world."
  9. 9. Pa rt Th ree The Type I ToolkitType I forIndividuals: Nine Strategies forAwakening Your Motivation 153Type I forOrganizations: Nine Ways toImprove Your Company,Office, orGroup 162The Zen ofCompensation: Paying People the Type I Way 170Type I forParents and Educators: Nine Ideas forHelping Our Kids 174The Type I Reading List: Fifteen Essential Books 185Listen tothe Gurus: Six Business Thinkers Who Get It 195The Type I Fitness Plan: Four Tips forGetting (and Staying)Motivated toExercise 201Drive: The Recap 203Drive: The Glossary 209The Drive Discussion Guide: Twenty Conversation Starters toKeep You Thinking and Talking 212Find Out More-About Yourself and This Topic 217Acknowledgments 219N otes 221Index 231
  10. 10. Drive
  11. 11. I NTRODUCT I ON The Puzzling Puzzles of Harry Harlow and Edward Deci I n the middle of the last century, two young scientists conducted experiments that should have changed the world-but did not. Harry F. Harlow was a professor of psychology at the University. of Wisconsin who, in the 1940s, established one of the worlds first laboratories for studying primate behavior. One day in 1949, Harlow and two colleagues gathered eight rhesus monkeys for a two-week experiment on learning. The researchers devised a simple mechani- cal puzzle like the one pictured on the next page . Solving it required three steps: pull out the vertical pin, undo the hook, and lift the hinged cover. Pretty easy for you and me, far more challenging for a thirteen-pound lab monkey.
  12. 12. DRIVEHarlows puzzle in the starting (left) and solved (right ) positions. The experimenters placed the puzzles in the monkeys cages toobserve how they reacted-and to prepare them for tests of theirproblem-solving prowess at the end of the two weeks. But almostimmediately, something strange happened. Unbidden by any outsideurging and unprompted by the experimenters, the monkeys beganplaying with the puzzles with focus, determination, and what lookedlike enjoyment. And in short order, they began figuring out how thecontraptions worked. By the time Harlow tested the monkeys ondays 13 and 14 of the experiment, the primates had become quiteadept. They solved the puzzles frequently and quickly; two-thirds ofthe time they cracked the code in less than sixty seconds. Now, this was a bit odd. Nobody had taught the monkeys howto remove the pin, slide the hook , and open the cover. Nobody hadreward ed them with food, affection, or even quiet applause whenthey succeed ed . And th at ran counter to the accepted notions of howprimates-including the bigger-brained, less hairy primates knownas human beings-behaved. Scientists then knew that two main drives powered behavior. The
  13. 13. The Puzzl ing Puzzle s of Harry Harl ow and Edward Decifirst was the biological drive. Humans and other animals ate to satetheir hunger, drank to quench their thirst, and copulated to sati sfytheir carnal urges. But that wasn t happening here . "Solu tio n di d notlead to food, water, or sex gratification," Harlow repo rt ed . I But the only other known drive also failed to explain the mo n-keys peculiar behavior. If biological motivat ions came from within,this second drive came from without-the rewards and punishmentsthe environment delivered for behaving in certain ways. This wascertainly true for humans , who responded exquisitely to such exter-nal forces. If you promised to raise our pay, wed work harder. If youheld out the prospect of getting an A on the test, wed study longer.If you threatened to dock us for showing up late or for incorrectlycompleting a form , wed arrive on time and tick every box. But thatdidnt account for the monkeys actions either. As Harlow wrote , andyou can almost hear him scratching his head , "T he behavior obtainedin this investigation poses some interesting questions for motivation theory, since significant learning was attained and efficient perfor-mance maintained without resort to special or extrinsic incentives." What else could it be? To answer the question, Harlow offered a novel theory-what. amounted to a third drive: "T he performance of the task ," he said ,"p rovided intrinsic reward. " The monkeys solved the puzzles simplybecause th ey found it g ratifying to solve puzzles . The y en joyed it .Th e joy of th e task was its own reward. If th is not ion was radical, what happened next only deepened th econfusio n and contr oversy. Perh aps this newly dis covered dri ve-H arlow eventually called it "intrinsic motivation"-was real. Butsure ly it was subordi nate to th e oth er two dri ves. If th e monkeyswere reward ed-with raisins!-for solvin g th e pu zzles, th eyd nodou bt perfor m even better. Yet when H arlow tested th at ap proach,the mon keys act ually made more errors and solved the pu zzles less
  14. 14. DRIVEfrequently. "Int rod uct ion of food in the present experiment, " Harlowwrote , "served to disrupt performance, a phenomenon not reportedin the literature." Now, this was really odd. In scientific terms, it was akin to roll-ing a steel ball down an inclined plane to measure its velocity-only to watch the ball float into the air instead. It suggested thatour understanding of the gravitational pulls on our behavior wasinadequate-that what we thought were fixed laws had plenty ofloopholes. Harlow emphasized the "strength and persistence" of themonkeys drive to complete the puzzles. Then he noted: It would appear that this drive ... may be as basic and strong as the [other} drives. Furthermore, there is some reason to believe that [it} can be as efficient in facilitating learning. "At the time, however, the prevailing two drives held a tight grip onscientific thinking. So Harlow sounded the alarm. He urged scien-tists to "close down large sections of our theoretical junkyard" andoffer fresher, more accurate accounts of human behavior. He warnedthat our explanation of why we did what we did was incomplete. Hesaid that to truly understand the human condition, we had to takeaccount of this third drive. Then he pretty much dropped the whole idea. Rather than battle the establishment and begin offering a morecomplete view of moti vation, Harlow abandoned this contentiousline of research and lat er became famous for studies on the scienceof affect ion." Hi s notion of this third drive bounced around the psy-chological literature, but it remained on the periphery-of behav-ioral science and of our understanding of ourselves. It would be twodecades before another scientist picked up the thread that Harlowhad so provocatively left on that Wisconsin laboratory table.
  15. 15. The Pu zzl ing Puzzle s of Harry Ha r l o w and Edward Dec i In the summer of 1969, Edward Deci was a Carnegie Mellon Uni-versity psycholog y g rad uate student in search of a dissertation topi c.Deci , who had alread y earned an MBA from Whart on, was intr ig uedby motivation but suspected that scholars and busines speople hadmisunderstood it . So, tearing a page from th e H arlow pla ybook, heset out to study the topic with the help of a puzzle. Deci chose the Soma puzzle cub e, a th en popular Parker Broth-ers offerin g that , thanks to YouTube , retains something of a cultfollowing today. The puzzle, shown below , consists of seven plasticpieces-six comprising four one-inch cubes, one comprising threeone-inch cubes. Players can assemble the seven pieces into a few mil-lion possible combinations-from abstract shapes to recognizableob jects .The seven p ieces of th e Soma pu zzle unassembled (lef t) arid th en fa shion ed into one ofseveral million possibl e configuration s. For th e st udy, Deci divided participants, male and female uni-versi ty st ude nts, int o an expe rimenta l g roup (what Ill call GroupA) and a contr ol g roup (wha t Ill call Group B). Each parti cip ated int hree one- ho ur sessions held on consec ut ive days . H eres how the sessions work ed : Each parti cip ant entered a roomand sat at a tab le on top of whi ch were th e seven Soma pu zzle pie ces,
  16. 16. DRIVEdraw ings of three puzzle configurati ons, and cop ies of Time, TheNewYorker, and Playboy. (Hey, it was 1969.) Deci sat on th e oppo sit e endof the table to explain the instructions and to time performance wit ha stopwatch. In the first session , members of both groups had to assem ble th eSoma pieces to replicate the configurations before them . In th e sec-ond session, they did the same thing with different draw ing s--onlythis time Deci told Group A that they d be paid $1 (the equ ivalentof nearly $6 today) for every configuration they successfull y repro-duced . Group B, meanwhile, got new drawings but no pay. Finall y,in the third session, both groups received new drawings and had toreproduce them for no compensation, just as in session one. (See th etable below.)HOW THE TWO GROUPS WERE TREATED Day 1 Day 2 Day 3 Group A No reward Reward No reward Group B No reward No reward No reward The twist came midway through each session. After a participanthad assembled the Soma puzzle pieces to match two of the threedrawings , Deci halted the proceedings. He said that he was go ing togive them a fourth draw ing-but to choose the right one , he neededto feed their com pletion tim es into a computer. And-this bein g thelate 1960s, when room-stradd ling mainframes were the norm anddesktop pes were sti ll a decade away-that meant he had to leavefor a little while. On the way out, he said , "I shall be gone only a few minutes, you
  17. 17. The Puzzling Puzzles of Harry Harlow and Edward Decimay do whatever you like while Im gone." But Deci wasnt reallyplugging numbers into an ancient teletype. Instead, he walked toan adjoining room connected to the experiment room by a one-waywindow. Then, for exactly eight minutes, he watched what peopledid when left alone. Did they continue fiddlin g with the puzzle,perhaps attempting to reproduce the third draw ing ? Or did th ey dosomething else-page through the magazines, check out the center-fold, stare into space, catch a quick nap? In the first session, not surprisingly, there wasnt much differencebetween what the Group A and Group B participants did duringthat secretly watched eight-minute free-choice period. Both contin-ued playing with the puzzle, on average, for between three and ahalf and four minutes, suggesting they found it at least somewhatinteresting. On the second day, during which Group A participants were paidfor each successful configuration and Group B participants were not, theunpaid group behaved mostly as they had during the first free-choiceperiod . But the paid group suddenly got really interested in Soma puz-zles. On average, the people in Group A spent more than five minutesmessing with the puzzle, perhaps getting a head start on that thirdchallenge or gearing up for the chance to earn some beer money whenDeci returned. This makes intuitive sense, right? Its consistent withwhat we believe about motivation: Reward me and Ill work harder. Yet what happened on the third day confirmed Decis own suspi-cions about the peculiar workings of motivation-and gently calledinto question a guiding premise of modern life. This time, Deci toldthe participants in Group A that there was only enough money topay them for one day and that this third session would therefore beunpaid . Then things unfolded just as before-two puzzles, followedby Deci s interruption .
  18. 18. DRIVE During the ensuing eight-mi nute free-choice period , t he sub-jects in the never-be en -paid Group B actually played with th e puzzlefor a little longer than they had in pr eviou s sessions. Maybe theywere becoming ever more engaged ; mayb e it was just a statisticalquirk. But the subjects in Group A, who pr eviou sly had been paid ,responded differently. They now spent significantly less time play-ing with the puzzle-not only about two minutes less than du r-ing their paid session, but about a full minute less than in th e firstsession when they initially encountered, and obviously en joyed , th epuzzles. In an echo of what Harlow discovered two decades earlier, Decirevealed that human motivation seemed to operate by laws that rancounter to what most scientists and citizens believed. From the officeto the playing field, we knew what got people going . Rewards-especially cold, hard cash-intensified interest and enhanced per-formance. What Deci found , and then confirmed in two additionalstudies he conducted shortly thereafter, was almost the oppos ite ."W hen money is used as an external reward for some activ it y, thesubjects lose intrinsic interest for the activity," he wrote.? Rewardscan deliver a short-term boost-just as a jolt of caffeine can keepyou cranking for a few more hours. But the effect wears off-and ,worse, can reduce a persons longer-term motivation to continue theproject. Human beings, Deci said , have an "inherent tendency to seekout novelty and challen ges, to extend and exercise their capac ities,to explore, and to learn. " But this third drive was more fragile th anthe ot her two ; it needed the right environment to survi ve. "O newho is interested in developing and enhancing intrinsic rnoti va-tion in children, employees, students, et c., should not concentrate onexte rnal-control systems such as monetary rewards ," he wrote in a
  19. 19. The Puzzling Puzzles of Harry Harlow and Edward Decifollow-up paper. " Thus began what for Deci became a lifelong questto rethink why we do what we do--a pursuit that sometimes puthim at odds with fellow psychologists, got him fired from a businessschool , and challenged the operating assumptions of organ izationseverywhere. "It was controversial," Deci told me one spring morning fortyyears after the Soma experiments. "Nobody was expecting rewardswould have a negative effect."THIS IS A BOOK about motivation. I will show that much of whatwe believe about the subject just isnt so--and that the insights thatHarlow and Deci began uncovering a few decades ago come muchcloser to the truth. The problem is that most businesses haventcaught up to this new understanding of what motivates us. Too manyorganizations-not just companies, but governments and nonprofitsas well-still operate from assumptions about human potential andindividual performance that are outdated, unexamined, and rootedmore in folklore than in science. They continue to pursue practicessuch as short-term incentive plans and pay-for-performance schemesin the face of mounting evidence that such measures usually dontwork and often do harm. Worse, these practices have infiltrated ourschools , where we ply our future workforce with iPods, cash, andpizza coupons to "incenrivize" them to learn. Something has gonewrong . The good news is that the solution stands before us-in thework of a band of behavioral scientists who have carried on the pio-neering effort s of Harlow and Deci and whose quiet work over thelast half-century offers us a more dynamic view of human motiva-tion. For too long, theres been a mismatch between what science
  20. 20. DRIVEknows and what business does. The goal of this book is to repair thatbreach. Drive has three parts. Part One will look at the flaws in ourreward-and-punishment system and propose a new way to thinkabout motivation. Chapter 1 will examine how the prevailing viewof motivation is becoming incompatible with many aspects of con-temporary business and life. Chapter 2 will reveal the seven rea-sons why carrot-and-stick extrinsic motivators often produce theopposite of what they set out to achieve. (Following that is a shorraddendum, Chapter 2a, that shows the special circumstances whencarrots and sticks actually can be effective.) Chapter 3 will introducewhat I call "Type I" behavior, a way of thinking and an approach tobusiness grounded in the real science of human motivation and pow-ered by our third drive--our innate need to direct our own lives, tolearn and create new things, and to do better by ourselves and ourworld. Part Two will examine the three elements of Type I behavior andshow how individuals and organizations are using them to improveperformance and deepen satisfaction. Chapter 4 will explore auton-omy, our desire to be self-directed. Chapter 5 will look at mastery,our urge to get better and better at what we do. Chapter 6 willexplore purpose, our yearning to be part of something larger thanourselves. Part Three, the Type I Toolkit, is a comprehensive set of resourcesto help you create settings in which Type I behavior can flourish.Here you ll find everything from dozens of exercises to awakenmotivation in yourself and others, to discussion questions for yourbook club, to a supershort summary of Drive that will help youfake your way through a cocktail party. And while this book ismostly about business, in this section Ill offer some thoughts about 10
  21. 21. The Puzzling Puzzles of Harry Harlow and Edward Decihow to apply these concepts to education and to our lives outside ofwork. But before we get down to all that, lets begin with a thoughtexperiment, one that requires going back in time-to the days whenJohn Major was Britains prime minister, Barack Obama was a skinnyyoung law professor, Internet connections were dial-up, and a black-berry was still just a fruit. 11
  22. 22. Part One A Ne.wOperating System
  23. 23. CHAPTER 1 The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0Imagine its 1995. You sit down with an economist-an accom- plished business school professor with a Ph.D. in economics. Yousay to her: "Ive got a crystal ball here that can peer fifteen years intothe future. Id like to test your forecasting powers." Shes skeptical, but she decides to humor you. "Im going to describe two new encyclopedias---one just out, theother to be launched in a few years. You have to predict which willbe more successful in 2010." "Bring it," she says. "The first encyclopedia comes from Microsoft. As you know,Microsoft is already a large and profitable company. And with thisyears introduction of Windows 95, its about to become an era-defining colossus. Microsoft will fund this encyclopedia. It willpay professional writers and editors to craft articles on thousands
  24. 24. DRIVEof topics. Well-compensated managers will oversee the proje ct toensure it s completed on budget and on time. Then Micro soft willsell the encyclopedia on CD-ROMs and later online. "The second encyclopedia won t come from a company. It will becreated by tens of thousands of people who write and edit articles forfun. These hobbyists won t need any special qualifications to partici-pate. And nobody will be paid a dollar or a euro or a yen to writeor edit articles. Participants will have to contribute their labor-sometimes twenty and thirty hours per week-for free. The encyclo-pedia itself, which will exist online, will also be free-no charge foranyone who wants to use it. "Now," you say to the economist, "think forward fifteen years.According to my crystal ball, in 2010, one of these encyclopediaswill be the largest and most popular in the world and the other willbe defunct. Which is which?" In 1995, I doubt you could have a found a single sober econ-omist anywhere on planet Earth who would not have picked thatfirst model as the success. Any other conclusion would have beenlaughable--contrary to nearly every business principle she taughther students. It would have been like asking a zoologist who wouldwin a 200-meter footrace between a cheetah and your brother-in-law.Not even close. Sure, that ragtag band of volunteers might produce something.But there was no way its product could compete with an offeringfrom a powerful profit-driven company. The incentives were allwrong. Microsoft stood to gain from the success of itsproduct; every-one involved in the other project knew from the outset that successwould earn them nothing. Most important, Microsofts writers, edi-tors, and managers were paid . The other projects contributors werenot. In fact, it probably cost them money each time they performedfree work instead of remunerative labor. The question was such a 16
  25. 25. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0no-brainer that our economist wouldnt even h~ve considered put-ting it on an exam for her MBA class. It was too easy. But you know how things turned out . On October 31, 2009, Microsoft pulled the plug on MSN Encarta,its disc and online encyclopedia, which had been on the market forsixteen years. Meanwhile, Wikipedia-that second model-endedup becoming the largest and most popular encyclopedia in the world.Just eight years after its inception, Wikipedia had more than 13 mil-lion articles in some 260 languages, including 3 million in Englishalone. What happened? The conventional view of human motivationhas a very hard time explaining this result.THE TRIUMPH OF CARROTS AND STICKSC omputers- whether the giant mainframes in Decis experiments, the iMac on which Im writing this sentence, or the mobile phonechirping in your pocket-all have operating systems. Beneath thesurface of the hardware you touch and the programs you manipulateis a complex layer of software that contains the instructions, proto-cols, and suppositions that enable everything to function smoothly.Most of us don t think much about operating systems. We noticethem only when they start failing-when the hardware and softwarethey re supposed to manage grow too large and complicated for thecurrent operating system to handle. Then our computer starts crash-ing. We complain. And smart software developers, whove alwaysbeen tinkering with pieces of the program, sit down to write a fun-damentally better one-an upgrade. Societie s also have operating systems. The laws, social customs, 17
  26. 26. DRIVEand economic arrange me nts th at we encounte r each day sit atopa layer of instructions , protocols, and suppositions about how th eworld work s. And mu ch of our societa l operating syste m consis ts ofa set of assumptions about human behavior . In our very early days-I mean very early days, say, fifty th ou-sand years ago-the underlying assumption about human behav-ior was simple and true. We were trying to survive. From roam ingthe savannah to gather food to scrambling for th e bu shes when asaber-toothed tiger approached, that drive guided most of ourbehavior. Call this early operating system Mot ivation 1.0. It wasntespecially elegant, nor was it much different from those of rhesusmonkeys, giant apes, or many other animals . But it served us nicely.It worked well. Until it didn t. As humans formed more complex societies, bumping up aga inststrangers and needing to cooperate in order to get things done , anoperating system based purely on the biological drive was inadequate.In fact , sometimes we needed ways to restrain this drive-to pre ventme from swiping your dinner and you from stealing m y spouse. Andso in a feat of remarkable cultural engineering , we slowl y repl acedwhat we had with a version more compatible with how wed begunworking and living. At the core of this new and improved operating system was arevised and more accurate assumption: Humans are more than thesum of our biolo gical urges. That first drive still mattered-nodoubt about th at-but it didn t fully account for who we are . W ealso had a second drive-to seek reward and avoid punishment morebroa d ly. And it was from this insight th at a new oper ating system-call it Motivation 2.0- arose. (Of course , other anima ls also respondto reward s and punishments , but only humans have proved ableto channel thi s drive to develop everything from contract law toconvenie nce stores.) 18
  27. 27. The Ris and Fa l l of Mot ivation 2.0 H arn ssin thi s second drive has been essential to economic progressaround the world , especially during the last two centuries. Consider theIndu str ial Revolution. Technological developments -steam engines,railroads, widespread electricity-played a crucial role in fostering thegrowth of industry. But so did less tangible innovation s- in part icular,the work of an American eng ineer named Frederick Win slow Taylor.In the early 1900s , Taylor, who believed businesses were being run inan inefficient , haphazard way, invented what he called "scientific man-agement." His invention was a form of "software" expertly crafted torun atop the Motivation 2.0 platform. And it was widely and quicklyadopted. Workers , this approach held, were like parts in a complicatedmachine. If they did the right work in the right way at the righttime, th e machine would function smoothly. And to ensure that hap-pened, you simply rewarded the behavior you sought and punishedth e behavior you discouraged. People would respond rationally toth ese external forces-these extrinsic motivators-and both theyand the system itsel f would flourish. We tend to think that coal andoil have powered economic development. But in some sense, theengine of commerce has been fueled equally by carrots and sticks. T he Mot ivat ion 2.0 operating system has endured for a very longtime. Indeed , it is so deeply embedded in our lives that most of usscarcely recogn ize th at it exists. For as long as any of us can remem-ber, weve configured our organizations and constructed our livesaround its bedro ck assumpt ion: The way to improve performance,increase product ivity, and encourage excellence is to reward the goodand punis h th e bad . Despite its g reate r sophistication and high er aspirations, Motiva-tion 2.0 still wasnt exactly ennobling. It suggested that, in the end,human beings arent mu ch di fferent from horses-that the way toge t us movin g in the righ t di rection is by dangling a crunchier carrot 19
  28. 28. DRIVEor wielding a sharper stick. But what this operating system lackedin enlightenment, it made up for in effectiveness. It worked well-extremely well. Until it didnt. As the twentieth century progressed, as economies grew stillmore complex, and as the people in them had to deploy new, moresophisticated skills, the Motivation 2.0 approach encountered someresistance. In the 1950s, Abraham Maslow, a former student ofHarry Harlows at the University of Wisconsin, developed the fieldof humanistic psychology, which questioned the idea that humanbehavior was purely the ratlike seeking of positive stimuli andavoidance of negative stimuli. In 1960, MIT management professorDouglas McGregor imported some of Maslows ideas to the businessworld. McGregor challenged the presumption that humans are fun-damentally inert-that absent external rewards and punishments,we wouldnt do much. People have other, higher drives, he said. Andthese drives could benefit businesses if managers and business leadersrespected them. Thanks in part to McGregors writing, companiesevolved a bit. Dress codes relaxed, schedules became more flexible.Many organizations looked for ways to grant employees greaterautonomy and to help them grow. These refinements repaired someweaknesses, but they amounted to a modest improvement ratherthan a thorough upgrade-Motivation 2.1. And so this general approach remained intact-because it was,after all, easy to understand, simple to monitor, and straightforwardto enforce. But in the first ten years of this century-a period oftruly staggering underachievement in business, technology, andsocial progress-weve discovered that this sturdy, old operating sys-tem doesn t work nearly as well. It crashes--often and unpredictably.It forces peopl e to devise workarounds to bypass its flaws. Most ofall, it is proving incompatible with many aspects of contemporary 20
  29. 29. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0business. And if we examine those incompatibility problems closely,well realize that modest updates-a patch here or there -will notsolve the problem. What we need is a full-scale upgrade.THREE INCOMPATIBILITY PROBLEMS otivation 2.0 still serves some purposes well. Its just deeply unreliable. Sometimes it works; many times it doesnt. Andunderstanding its defects will help determine which parts to keepand which to discard as we fashion an upgrade. The glitches fall intothree broad categories. Our current o~erating system has become farless compatible with, and at times downright antagonistic to: howwe organize what we do; how we think about what we do; and how wedo what we do.How We Organize What We DoGo back to that encyclopedic showdown between Microsoft andWikipedia. The assumptions at the heart of Motivation 2.0 suggestthat such a result shouldnt even be possible. Wikipedias triumphseems to defy the laws of behavioral physics . Now, if this all-volunteer, all-amateur encyclopedia were the onlyinstance of its kind, we might dismiss it as an aberration, an excep-tion that proves the rule. But its not. Instead, Wikipedia representsthe most powerful new business model of the twenty-first century:open source. 21
  30. 30. DRIVE Fire up your hom e computer, for exam ple. When you visit theWeb to check th e weath er forecast or ord er some sneakers, you mightbe usin g Firefox, a free open -sour ce W eb browser created almostexclusiv ely by volunteers around th e world . U npaid labo rers wh og ive away their product ? Th at could n t be susta inable. Th e incentivesare all wrong. Yet Firefox now has mor e than 150 milli on users. Or walk into the IT department of a large company an ywherein the world and ask for a tour. That companys corpo rate com puterservers could well run on Linux , software devised by an arm y ofunpaid programmers and available for free. Linu x now powers onein four corporate servers. Then ask an employee to exp lain how thecompanys website works. Humming beneath the site is pr obab lyApache, free open-source Web server software created and ma in-tained by a far-flung global group of volunteers . Apaches share of th ecorporate Web server marker: 52 percent. In other words , com paniesthat typically rely on external rewards to manage their employeesrun some of their most important systems with products created bynonemployees who dont seem to need such rewards. And its not just the tens of thousands of software pro jects acrossthe globe. Today you can find: open-source cookbooks ; open-sour cetextbooks; open-source car design; open-source medical research ;open-source legal briefs; open-source stock photogr aph y; open-s ourceprosthetics; open-source credit unions; open-source cola; and forthose for whom soft drinks won t suffice, open-source beer. This new way of org anizing what we do doesn t banish extrins icreward s. Peopl e in the ope n-source movement haven t taken vowsof povert y. For many, pa rt icipa tion in these projects can burnishtheir repu tat ions and sharpen th eir sk ills, wh ich can enha nce the irearning pow er. Entrepr eneurs have laun ched new, and som et im eslucrative, com panies to help organ izations implement and maintainop en -sourc e software app licat ions. 22
  31. 31. The Rise and Fall of Motiv ation 2.0 But ultimately, open source depends on intrinsic motivationwith the sam e ferocity that older business models rely on extrin-sic motivation, as several scholars have shown. MIT managementprofessor Kar im Lakh ani and Boston Consulting Group consultantBob Wol f surve yed 684 open-source developers, mostl y in No rthAmerica and Europe, about why they part icipated in these proje cts.Lakhan i and Wolf uncovered a range of mot ives, but th ey found"t hat enjo yment-based intrinsic motivation , namely how creative aperson feels when working on the project, is the strongest and mostpervasiv e dr iver.? A large majority of programmers, the research-ers di scovered, reported that they frequently reached the state ofopti ma l challenge called "flow." Likewise , three German economistswho studied open-source projects around the world found that whatdr ives participants is -"a set of predominantly intrinsic motives"-in part icular, "t he fun .. . of mastering the challenge of a givensoftwa re problem" and the "desire to give a gift to the program-mer cornrnuniry" Motivation 2.0 has little room for these sorts ofimpulses. Whats more , open source is only one way people are restructur-ing what the y do along new organ izational lines and atop differentmo tiv atio nal ground. Let s move from software code to the legal code.T he laws in most developed countries permit essentially two typesof business organ izations-profit and nonprofit. One makes money,the ot her does good. And the most prominent member of that firstcategory is the publicly held corporation--owned by shareholdersand run by managers who are overseen by a board of directors . Themanagers and di rectors bear one overr idin g responsibility: to maxi-mi ze share holde r gai n. Other typ es of business organizations steer bythe same rules of the road . In th e United Stat es, for instance, partner-ships, S corpo ratio ns, C corporations, limited liability corporations,and other business configuratio ns all aim toward a com mon end . Th e 23
  32. 32. DRIVEobje ctive of those who run th em-practi call y, legall y, in some waysmorally-is to maximize profit . Let me g ive a rousing , heartfelt, and grateful cheer for th ese busi -ness forms and the farsighted count ries that enable th eir citi zens tocreate them. Without them , our lives would be in finit ely less p ros-perous, less healthy, and less happy. But in th e last few years, severalpeople around the world have been changing the recipe and cookingup new varieties of business organizations. For example, in April 2008, Vermont became the first U .S. stateto allow a new type of business called the "low-p rofit lim ite d lia-bility corporation. " Dubbed an L3C, this entity is a corporation-but not as we typically think of it. As one report expla ined , an L3C"operatejs] like a for-profit business generating at least modest pro f-its, but its primary aim [is} to offer significant social benefits. " Threeother U.S. states have followed Vermonts lead ." An L3C in N orthCarolina, for instance, is buying abandoned furniture factor ies in thestate, updating them with green technology, and leasin g them backto beleaguered furniture manufacturers at a low rate. The venturehopes to make money, but its real purpose is to help revit alize astruggling region. Meanwhile, Nobel Peace Prize winner Muhammad Yunus hasbegun creating what he calls "social businesses. " These are compa-nies that raise capital, develop products , and sell them in an openmarket but do so in th e service of a larger social mission-s-or as heputs it , "with the pro fit-max im izat ion principle repl aced by thesocial-b enefit princip le." The Fourth Sector N etwork in the U nitedStates and Denmark is promoting "the for-b enefit organi zation"-ahybrid th at it says represents a new category of organi zation th at isboth economically self-sustaining and ani ma ted by a public purpose.One exam ple: Mozilla, the entity that gave us Firefox, is organi zed 24
  33. 33. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0as a "for-benefit" organization. And three U.S. entrepreneurs haveinvented the CCB Corporation," a designation that requires companiesto amend their bylaws so that the incentives favor long-term valueand social impact instead of short-term economic gain. Neither open-source production nor previously unimagined "notonly for profit" businesses are yet the norm, of course. And theywont consign the public corporation to the trash heap. But theiremergence tells us something important about where were head-ing. "Theres a big movement out there that is not yet recognized asa movement," a lawyer who specializes in for-benefit organizationstold The New York Times. 6 One reason could be that traditional busi-nesses are profit maximizers, which square perfectly with Motivation2.0. These new entities are purpose maximizers-which are unsuited tothis older operating system because they Bout its very principles.How We Think About What We DoWhen I took my first economics course back in the early 1980s, ourprofessor-a brilliant lecturer with a Patton-like stage presence-offered an important clarification before shed chalked her first indif-ference curve on the blackboard. Economics, she explained, wasntthe study of money. It was the study of behavior. In the course ofa day, each of us was constantly figuring the cost and benefits ofour actions and then deciding how to act. Economists studied whatpeople did, rather than what we said, because we did what was bestfor us. We were rational calculators of our economic self-interest. When I studied law a few years later, a similar idea reappeared.The newly ascendant field of "law and economics" held that precisely 25
  34. 34. DRIVEbecause we were such awesome self-interest calculators, laws andregulations often impeded, rather than permitted, sensible and justoutcomes. I survived law school in no small part because I discoveredthe talismanic phrase and offered it on exams: "In a world of perfectinformation and low transaction costs, the parties will bargain to awealth-maximizing result." Then, about a decade later, came a curious turn of events thatmade me question much of what Id worked hard, and taken on enor-mous debt, to learn. In 2002, the Nobel Foundation awarded itsprize in economics to a guy who wasnt even an economist. Andthey gave him the fields highest honor largely for revealing that wewerent always rational calculators of our economic self-interest andthat the parties often didnt bargain to a wealth-maximizing result.Daniel Kahneman, an American psychologist who won the NobelPrize in economics that year for work hed done with Israeli AmosTversky, helped force a change in how we think about what we do .And one of the implications of this new way of thinking is that itcalls into question many of the assumptions of Motivation 2.0. Kahneman and others in the field of behavioral economics agreedwith my professor that economics was the study of human economicbehavior. They just believed that wed placed too much emphasison the economic and not enough on the human. That hyperrationalcalculator-brained person wasn t real. He was a convenient fiction. Playa game with me and Ill try to illustrate the point. Supposesomebody gives me ten dollars and tells me to share it-some, all ,or none-with you. If you accept my offer, we both get to keep themoney. If you reject it, neither of us gets anything. If I offered yousix dollars (keeping four for myself), would you take it? Almost cer-tainly. If I offered you five, youd probably take that, too. But what ifI offered you two dollars? Would you take it ? In an experiment rep- 26
  35. 35. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0Iicated around the world, most people rejected offers of two dollarsand below." That makes no sense in terms of wealth maximization.If you take my offer of two dollars, youre two dollars richer. If youreject it, you get nothing. Your cognitive calculator knows two isgreater than zero-but because youre a human being, your notionsof fair play or your desire for revenge or your simple irritation over-rides it. In real life our behavior is far more complex than the textbookallows and often confounds the idea that were purely rational.We dont save enough for retirement even though its to our cleareconomic advantage to do so. We hang on to bad investments lon-ger than we should, because we feel far sharper pain from losingmoney than we do from gaining the exact same amount. Give usa choice of two television sets, well pick one; toss in an irrelevantthird choice, and well pick the other. In short, we are irrational-and predictably so, says economist Dan Ariely, author of PredictablyIrrational, a book that offers an entertaining and engaging overviewof behavioral economics. The trouble for our purposes is that Motivation 2.0 assumes werethe same robotic wealth-maximizers I was taught we were a couple ofdecades ago. Indeed , the very premise of extrinsic incentives is thatwell always respond rationally to them. But even most economistsdon t believe that anymore. Sometimes these motivators work. Oftenthey don t. And many times, they inflict collateral damage. In short,the new way economists think about what we do is hard to reconcilewith Motivation 2.0. Whats more , if people do things for lunk-headed, backward-looking reasons, why wouldnt we also do things for significance-seeking , self-actualizing reasons? If were predictably irrational-andwe clearly are-why couldn t we also be predictably transcendent? 27
  36. 36. DRIVE If that seems far-fetched, consider some of our other bizarre behav-iors. We leave lucrative jobs to take low-paying ones that provide aclearer sense of purpose. We work to master the clarinet on week-ends although we have little hope of making a dime (Motivation 2.0)or acquiring a mate (Motivation 1.0) from doing so. We play withpuzzles even when we dont get a few raisins or dollars for solvingthem. Some scholars are already widening the reach of behavioral eco-nomics to encompass these ideas. The most prominent is BrunoFrey, an economist at the University of Zurich. Like the behavioraleconomists, he has argued that we need to move beyond the idea ofHomo Oeconomicus (Economic Man, that fictional wealth-maximizingrobot). But his extension goes in a slightly different direction-towhat he calls Homo Oeconomicus Maturus (or Mature Economic Man ).This figure, he says, "is more mature in the sense that he is endowedwith a more refined motivational structure. " In other words, to fullyunderstand human economic behavior, we have to come to termswith an idea at odds with Motivation 2.0. As Frey writes, "Intr in-sic motivation is of great importance for all economic activities. It isinconceivable that people are motivated solely or even mainly byexternal incentives. :"How We Do What We DoIf you manage other people, take a quick glance over your shoul-der. Theres a ghost hovering there. His name is Frederick WinslowTaylor-remember him from earlier in the chapter?-and hes whis-pering in your ear. "W ork ," Taylor is murmuring, "consists mainly 28
  37. 37. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0of simple not particularly interesting, tasks. The only way to getpeople to do them is to incentivize them properly and monitor themcar fully." In the early 1900s, Taylor had a point. Today, in much of the world, thats less true. Yes, for some people work remains routine, unchallenging, and directed by others. But for a surprisingly large number of people, jobs have become more complex, more interest- ing, and more self-directed. And that type of work presents a direct challenge to the assumptions of Motivation 2.0. Begin with complexity. Behavioral scientists often divide what we do on the job or learn in school into two categories: "algorith- mic" and "heuristic." An algorithmic task is one in which you fol- low a set of established instructions down a single pathway to one conclusion. That is, theres an algorithm for solving it. A heuristic task is the opposite. Precisely because no algorithm exists for it, you have to experiment with possibilities and devise a novel solution. Working as a grocery checkout clerk is mostly algorithmic. You do pretty much the same thing over and over in a certain way. Creat- ing an ad campaign is mostly heuristic. You have to come up with something new. During the twentieth century, most work was algorithmic-and. not just jobs where you turned the same screw the same way all day long. Even when we traded blue collars for white, the tasks we car- ried out were often routine. That is, we could reduce much of what we did-in accounting, law, computer programming, and other fields-to a script, a spec sheet, a formula, or a series of steps that produced a right answer. But today, in much of North America, West- ern Europe, Japan, South Korea, and Australia, routine white-collar work is disappearing. It s racing offshore to wherever it can be done the cheapest. In India, Bulgaria, the Philippines, and other coun- tries , lower-paid workers essentially run the algorithm, figure out 29
  38. 38. DRIVEthe correct answer , and deliver it instantaneously from th eir com -puter to someone six thousand miles away. But offshoring is just one pressure on rule-based , left-brain work .Just as oxen and then forklifts replaced simple physical labor , com -puters are replacing simple intellectual labor. So while outsourcingis just beginning to pick up speed, software can already performmany rule-based, professional functions better, more quickly, andmore cheaply than we can. That means that your cousin the CPA ,if he s doing mostly routine work, faces competition not just fromfive-hundred-dollar-a-month accountants in Manila, but from taxpreparation programs anyone can download for thirty dollars. Theconsulting firm McKinsey & Co. estimates that in the United States ,only 30 percent of job growth now comes from algorithmic work ,while 70 percent comes from heuristic work. ? A key reason: Routinework can be outsourced or automated; artistic, empathic , nonroutinework generally cannot. 10 The implications for motivation are vast. Researchers such asHarvard Business Schools Teresa Amabile have found that externalrewards and punishments-both carrots and sticks-can work nicel yfor algorithmic tasks. But they can be devastating for heuristic ones .Those sorts of challenges-solving novel problems or creating some-thing the world didnt know it was missing-depend heavil y onHarlows third drive. Amabile calls it the intrinsic motivation prin-ciple of creativity, which holds, in part: "Int rinsic motivation is con-ducive to creativity; cont rolling extrinsic motivation is detrimentalto creat ivity. "! In other words, the central tenets of Motivation 2.0may actually impair performance of the heuristic, right-brain workon which modern economies depend. Partly because work has become more creative and less routine,it has also become more enjoyable. That, too, scrambles Motivation2.0 s assumptions. This operating system rests on the belief that 30
  39. 39. - - - - - - - 1 lie rrt e IIl1 reill UI IVIUl:IVCJl:IUII L.U ork is not inherently enjoyable-which is precisely why we must coax people with external rewards and threaten them with outside punishment. One unexpected finding of the psychologist Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, whom well encounter in Chapter 5, is that peo- ple are much more likely to report having "optimal experiences" on the job than during leisure. But if work is inherently enjoyable for more and more people, then the external inducements at the heart of Motivation 2.0 become less necessary. Worse, as Deci began dis- covering forty years ago, adding certain kinds of extrinsic rewards on top of inherently interesting tasks can often dampen motivation and diminish performance. Once again, certain bedrock notions suddenly seem less sturdy. Take the curious example of Vocation Vacations. This is a business in which people pay their hard-earned money ... to work at another job. They use their vacation time to test-drive being a chef, running a bike shop, or operating an animal shelter. The emergence of this and similar ventures suggests that work, which economists have always considered a "disutility" (something wed avoid unless we received a payment in return), is becoming a "utility" (something wed pursue even in the absence of a tangible return). Finally, because work is supposed to be dreary, Motivation 2.0 holds that people need to be carefully monitored so they dont shirk. This idea, too, is becoming less relevant and, in many ways, less pos- sible. Consider, for instance, that America alone now has more than 18 million of what the U.S. Census Bureau calls "non-employer businesses"-businesses without any paid employees. Since people in these businesses dont have any underlings, they dont have anybody to manage or motivate. But since they dont have bosses themselves, theres nobody to manage or motivate them. They have to be self- directed. So do people who arent technically working for themselves. In 31
  40. 40. DRIVEthe United States , 33 .7 million people telecornmute at least one daya month, and 14.7 million do so every day-placing a sub stantialportion of the workforce beyond the gaze of a manager, forcing themto direct their own work. ? And even if many organizations haven topted for measures like these, they re generally becoming leanerand less hierarchical. In an effort to reduce costs, they trim the fatt ymiddle. That means managers oversee larger numbers of people andtherefore scrutinize each one less closely. As organizations flatten, companies need people who are self-motivated. That forces many organizations to become more like , er,Wikipedia. Nobody "manages" the Wikipedians. Nobody sits aroundtrying to figure out how to "motivate" them. Thats why W ikipediaworks. Routine, not-so-interesting jobs require direction; non-routine, more interesting work depends on self-direction. One busi-ness leader, who didnt want to be identified, said it plainly. When heconducts job interviews, he tells prospective employees: "If you needme to motivate you, I probably dont want to hire you. "To RECAP, Motivation 2.0 suffers from three compatibility prob-lems. It doesnt mesh with the way many new business models areorganizing what we do--because were intrinsically motivated pur-pose maximizers, not only extrinsically motivated profit maximizers.It doesnt comport with the way that twenty-first-century economicsthinks about wh at we do--because economists are finally realizingthat were full- fledge d human beings, not single-minded economicrobo ts. And perhaps most important, its hard to reconcile withmuch of what we actually do at work-because for growing num-bers of people, work is often creative, interesting, and self-directedrather than unrelentingly routine, boring, and other-direct d. Taken
  41. 41. The Rise and Fall of Motivation 2.0together, these compatibility problems warn us that somethingsgone awry in our motivational operating system. But in order to figure out exactly what, and as an essentialstep in fashioning a new one, we need to take a look at the bugsthemselves. 33
  42. 42. CHAPTER 2 Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work ...A n object in motion will stay in motion, and an object at restwill stay at rest unless actedon by an outside force. , Thats Newtons first law of motion. Like Newtons other laws,this one is elegant and simple-which is part of its power. Even peo-ple like me, who bumbled through high school physics, can under-stand it and can use it to interpret the world. Motivation 2.0 is similar. At its heart are two elegant and simpleideas: Rewardingan activity will getyou more of it. Punishingan activity will getyou less of it.And just as Newtons principles can help us explain our physicalenvironment or chart the path of a thrown ball, Motivation 2.0 s
  43. 43. Seven Reasons Carrot s and Stick s (Often) Dont Work . . .principles can help us comprehend our social surroundings and pre-di ct th e traje ctory of human behavior. But Newtonian physics runs into problems at the subatomiclevel. Down th ere-in the land of hadrons , quarks, and Schro d ing -ers cat-things get freaky. The cool rationality of Isaac Newtong ives way to the bizarre unpredictabil it y of Lewis Carro ll. Moti-vation 2.0 is similar in this regard, too . When rewards and pun-ishments encounter our third drive, something akin to behavioralqu antum mechanics seems to take over and strange things begin tohappen. O f course, the starting point for any discussion of motivation inthe workplace is a simple fact of life: People have to earn a living.Salary, contr act payments , some benefits, a few perks are what I call"baseline rewards. " If sorneone s baseline rewards arent adequate oreq ui table, her focus will be on the unfairness of her situation and theanxiety of her circumstance. Youll get neither the predictability ofextrinsic motivation nor the weirdness of intrinsic motivation. Youllget very little motivation at all. But once were past that threshold , carrots and sticks can achieveprecisely the opposite of their intended aims. Mechanisms designedto inc rease motivation can dampen it. Tactics aimed at boosting cre-ativity can redu ce it. Programs to promote good deeds can makethem disappear. Meanwhile, instead of restr aining negative beha vior ,rewards and punishments can often set it loose-and g ive rise tocheating, add ict ion, and dangerou sly myopic thinking . This is wei rd. An d it doesn t hold in all circumsta nces (aboutwhi ch mo re afte r t his chap te r). But as Edw ard Decis Soma pu zzleexperiment de mo nstrates, many pract ices whose effectiveness wetake for gra nted prod uce counte rint uit ive results: Th ey can g ive usless of what we want-and more of what we don t want. Th ese arethe bugs in Motivati on 2.0 . And th ey rise to th e surface whether 35
  44. 44. DRIVEwere promising rupees in India, charging shekels in Israel , drawingblood in Sweden, or painting portraits in Chicago.LESS OF WHAT WE WANTO ne of the most enduring scenes in American literature offers an important lesson in human motivation. In Chapter 2 of MarkTwain s The Adventures of Tom Sawyer, Tom faces the dreary task ofwhitewashing Aunt Polly s 810-square-foot fence. He s not exactlythrilled with the assignment. "Life to him seemed hollow, and exis-tence but a burden," Twain writes . But just when Tom has nearly lost hope, "not hing less than agreat, magnificent inspiration" bursts upon him. When his friendBen ambles by and mocks Tom for his sorry lot, Tom acts confused.Slapping paint on a fence isnt a grim chore, he says. It s a fantasticprivilege-a source of, ahem, intrinsic motivation. The job is so cap-tivating that when Ben asks to try a few brushstrokes himself, Tomrefuses. He doesnt relent until Ben gives up his apple in exchangefor the opportunity. Soon more boys arrive, all of whom tumble into Tom s trap andend up whitewashing the fence-several times over---on his behalf.From this episode, Twain extracts a key motivational principle,namely "that Work consists of whatever a body is OBLIGED to do ,and that Play consists of whatever a body is not obliged to do. " Hegoes on to write: There are wealthy gentlemen in England who drive four-horse passenger-coaches twenty or thirty miles on a daily line , in the summer, because the privilege costs them considerable money; 36
  45. 45. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work ... but if they were offered wages for the service, that would turn it into work and then they would resign. 1In other words, rewards can perform a weird sort of behavioralalchemy: They can transform an interesting task into a drudge. Theycan turn play into work. And by diminishing intrinsic motivation,they can send performance, creativity, and even upstanding behaviortoppling like dominoes. Lets call this the Sawyer Effect. * A sam-pling of intriguing experiments around the world reveals the fourrealms where this effect kicks in-and shows yet again the mismatchbetween what science knows and what business does.Intrinsic MotivationBehavioral scientists like Deci began discovering the Sawyer Effectnearly forty years ago, although they didnt use that term. Instead,they referred to the counterintuitive consequences of extrinsic incen-tives as "the hidden costs of rewards." That, in fact, was the titleof the first book on the subject-a 1978 research volume that wasedited by psychologists Mark Lepper and David Greene. One of Lepper and Greenes early studies (which they carried outwith a third colleague, Robert Nisbett) has become a classic in thefield and among the most cited articles in the motivation literature.The three researchers watched a classroom of preschoolers for severaldays and identified the children who chose to spend their "free play"time draw ing. Then they fashioned an experiment to test the effectof rewarding an activity these children clearly enjoyed.*Here the two-sided definition of the Sawyer Effect: practices that can either turn play into work or tu rn work into play. 37
  46. 46. DRIVE The researchers divided the children into three groups. The firstwas the "expected-award" group. They showed each of the se child rena "G ood Player " certificate-adorned with a blue ribbon and featur-ing the childs name-and asked if the child wanted to draw in orderto receive the award. The second group was the "unexpected-award "group. Researchers asked these children simply if they wanted todraw. If they decided to, when the session ended , the researchershanded each child one of the "Good Player " certificates. The thirdgroup was the "no-award" group. Researchers asked these children ifthey wanted to draw, but neither promised them a certificate at thebeginning nor gave them one at the end. Two weeks later, back in the classroom, teachers set out paperand markers during the preschools free play period while theresearchers secretly observed the students. Children previously in the"unexpected-award" and "no-award" groups drew just as much, andwith the same relish, as they had before the experiment. But childrenin the first group-the ones who d expected and then received anaward-showed much less interest and spent much less time draw-ing.? The Sawyer Effect had taken"hold. Even two weeks later, thosealluring prizes-so common in classrooms and cubicles-had turnedplay into work. To be clear, it wasnt necessarily the rewards themselves thatdampened the childrens interest. Remember: When children didn texpect a reward, receiving one had little impact on their intrinsicmotivation. Only contingent rewards-if you do this, then youll getthat-had th e negat ive effect. Why? "If-t hen" rewards require peo-ple to forfeit some of their autonomy. Like the gentlemen drivingcarriages for money instead of fun, they re no longer fully controllingtheir lives. And that can spring a hole in the bottom of their motiva-tional bucket, draining an activity of its enjoyment. Lepper and Greene replicated these results in several subsequent 38
  47. 47. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work .. . experiments with children. As time went on, other researchers found similar results with adults. Over and over again, they discovered that extrinsic rewards-in particular, contingent, expected, "if-then" rewards-snuffed out the third drive. These insights proved so controversial-after all , they called into question a standard practice of most companies and schools-that in 1999 Deci and two colleagues reanalyzed nearly three decades of studies on the subject to confirm the findings. "Careful consideration of reward effects reported in 128 experiments lead to the conclu- sion that tangible rewards tend to have a substantially negative effect on intrinsic motivation," they determined. "When institutions- families, schools, businesses, and athletic teams, for example-focus on the short-term and opt for controlling peoples behavior," they do considerable long-term damage. " Try to encourage a kid to learn math by paying her for each work- book page she completes-and shell almost certainly become more diligent in the short term and lose interest in math in the long term. Take an industrial designer who loves his work and try to get him to do better by making his pay contingent on a hit product-and hell almost certainly work like a maniac in the short term, but become. less interested in his job in the long term. As one leading behavioral science textbook puts it, "People use rewards expecting to gain the benefit of increasing another persons motivation and behavior, but in so doing, they often incur the unintentional and hidden cost of under- mining that persons intrinsic motivation toward the activity.": This is one of the most robust findings in social science-andalso one of the most ignored. Despite the work of a few skilled andpassionate popularizers-in particular, Alfie Kohn, whose prescient 199 3 book, Punished by Rewards, lays out a devastating indictmentof extrinsic incentives-we persist in trying to motivate people thisway. Perhaps were scared to let go of Motivation 2.0, despite its 39
  48. 48. DRIVEobvious downsides. Perh aps we cant ge t our minds around th e pecu-liar quantum mechanics of intrinsic motivati on. Or perhaps th eres a better reason . Even if th ose contr olling"if-then" rewards activate th e Sawyer Effect and suffocate the thi rddrive, maybe they actually get peopl e to perform better. If th at s th ecase, perhaps they re not so bad. So let s ask: Do extr insic rewardsboost performance ? Four economists went to Indi a to find out.High PerformanceOne of the difficulties of laboratory experiments th at test th e im pactof extrinsic motivators like cash is the cost. If you re going to paypeople to perform, you have to pay them a meaningful amount. Andin the United States or Europe, where standards of livin g are high ,an individually meaningful amount multiplied by dozens of parti ci-pants can rack up unsustainably large bills for behavioral scient ists. In part to circumvent this problem, a quartet of economists-including Dan Ariely, whom I mentioned in the last chap ter- set upshop in Madurai, India, to gauge the effects of extrinsic incenti ves onperformance. Because the cost of livin g in rur al India is mu ch lowerthan in North America, the researchers could offer large reward swithout breaking their own banks. They recruited eighty-seven participants and asked th em topla y several games-for example, tossing tennis balls at a target ,unscrambling anag rams, recalling a string of digits-that requiredmotor skills, creativity, or concentration. To test th e power of incen-tives, the experimenters offered three typ es of reward s for reachincertain performance levels. One-third of the participants could earn a small reward-4 fUP(at the time worth around 50 U .S. cents and eq ual to about a d y s 40
  49. 49. Seven Reasons Carrot s and Sti ck s (Often) Dont Wor k . in Madurai) for reaching their performance tar gets. One-thirdcould earn a medium reward-40 rupees (about $5, or two weeks pa y). And one-third could earn a very large reward-400 rupees(about 50 , or nearly five months pay) . What happened ? Did the size of the reward predict the q uality ofthe performance ? Yes. But not in the way you might expect . As it turned out , thepeople offered the medium-sized bonus didn t perform any betterth an those offered the small one. And those in the 4 00-rupee super-incentivized group ? They fared worst of all. By nearly every measure,the y lagged behind both the low-reward and medium-reward partic-ipants. Reporting the results for the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston,the researchers wrote, "In eight of the nine tasks we examined acrossthe three experiments, higher incentives led to worse performance. "? Let s circle back to this conclusion for a moment. Foureconomists-two from MIT, one from Carnegie Mellon, and one fromthe U niversity ofChicago--undertake research for the Federal ReserveSystem, one of the most powerful economic actors in the world . Butinstead of affirming a simple business principle-higher rewards leadto hig her performance-they seem to refute it. And it s not just Amer-ican researchers reaching these counterintuitive conclusions. In 2009,scholars at th e London School of Economics-alma mater of elevenNobel laureates in econom ics- analyzed fifty-one studies of corporatepay-fo r-pe rformance plans. Thes e economists conclusion: "We findthat financial ince ntives . . . can result in a negative impact on overallperfo rrnance. :" On both sides of th e Atlantic, the gap betwe en whatscience is learning and wha t bu sin ess is doing is wid e. "Many exis ti ng inst it ut ions provide very large in centives forexactly th e type of tas ks we used here," Ari ely and his colleag ueswrote. "O ur resul ts challe nge [that] assum p t ion. Our expe rime ntsuggests .. . that one cannot assume th at introducin g or rais ing 41
  50. 50. DRIVEincentives always improves perform ance." Ind eed , in many instan ces,contingent incentives-that cornerstone of how bu sin esses attemptto motivate employees-may be "a losin g proposition ." Of course, procrastinating writers notwithstand ing , few of usspend our working hours flinging tenni s balls or doing anagrams.How about the more creative tasks that are mor e ak in to what weactually do on the job ?CreativityFor a quick test of problem-solving prowess, few exercises are moreuseful than the "candle problem." Devised by psychologist KarlDuncker in the 1930s, the candle problem is used in a wide variety ofexperiments in behavioral science. Follow along and see how you do. You sit at a table next to a wooden wall and the experimentergives you the materials shown below: a candle, some tacks , and abook of matches . T he candl e problem presented. 42
  51. 51. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work . . . Your job is to attach the candle to the wall so that the wax doesn tdrip on the table. Think for a moment about how youd solve theproblem . Many people begin by trying to tack the candle to thewall. But that doesnt work. Some light a match, melt the side ofthe candle, and try to adhere it to the wall . That doesn t work either.But after five or ten minutes, most people stumble onto the solution,which you can see below . The candle problem soloed. The key is to overcome whats called "fu nct ional fixedness. " Youlook at the box and see only one function-as a container for thetacks. But by thinking afresh, you eventually see that the box canhave another function-as a platform for the candle. To reprise lan-guage from the previous chapter, the solution isnt algorithmic (fol-lowing a set path) but heuristic (breaking from the path to discovera novel strategy). What happens when you give people a conceptual challenge likethis and offer them rewards for speedy solutions? Sam Glucksberg, a 43
  52. 52. DRIV Epsychologist now at Princeton Universit y, tes ted th is a few decadesago by timing how qui ckl y two g roups of pa rt icipants solved thecandle problem. H e told th e first g roup th at he was t im ing theirwork merely to esta blish norms for how long it typically took some-one to complete this sort of puzzle. To th e second g roup he offeredincentives. If a participant s t ime was am ong th e fastest 25 pe rcentof all the people bein g test ed , th at parti cip ant would receive $5.If the participant s time was the fastest of all, the reward would be$2 0. Adjusted for inflation , those are decent sums of m oney for a fewminutes of effort-a nice motivator. How much faster did the incentivized group com e up wi t h a solu -tion ? On average, it took them nearly three and a half minutes longer.Yes, three and a half minutes longer. (W henever I ve relayed theseresults to a group of businesspeople, the reaction is almost always aloud , pained , involuntary gasp.) In direct contravention to the coretenets of Motivation 2.0, an incentive designed to clarify think-ing and sharpen creativity ended up clouding thinking and dullingcreativity. Why? Rewards, by their very nature, narrow our focus.Thats helpful when there s a clear path to a solution . They help usstare ahead and race faster . But "if-then" motivators are terrible forchallenges like the candle problem. As this experiment shows , therewards narrowed peoples focus and blinkered the wide view th atmight have allowed them to see new uses for old ob jects . Something similar seems to occur for challenges that aren t somuch about cracking an exist ing problem but about iterat ingsomething new. Teresa Am abile , the Harvard Business School pro -fessor and one of th e worlds leading researchers on creativity, hasfrequentl y tested the effects of cont inge nt rewards on th e creat iveprocess. In one study, she and two colle agues recruited twenty-threeprofe ssional art ists from th e United Stat es who had produced both 44
  53. 53. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work . . .commissioned and noncommissioned artwork. They asked the artiststo randomly select ten commissioned works and ten noncommis-sioned works. Then Amabile and her team gave the works to a panelof accomplished artists and curators, who knew nothing about thestudy, and asked the experts to rate the pieces on creativity and tech-nical skill. "Our results were quite startling," the researchers wrote. "Thecommissioned works were rated as significantly less creative thanthe non-commissioned works, yet they were not rated as differentin technical quality. Moreover, the artists reported feeling signifi-cantly more constrained when doing commissioned works than whendoing non-commissioned works ." One artist whom they intervieweddescribes the Sawyer Effect in action: Not always, but a lot of the time, when you are doing a piece for someone else it becomes more "work" than joy. When I work for myself there is the pure joy of creating and I can work through the night and not even know it. On a commis- sioned piece you have to check yourself-be careful to do what the client wants." Another study of artists over a longer period shows that a con-cern for outside rewards might actually hinder eventual success. Inthe early 1960s, researchers surveyed sophomores and juniors at theSchool of the Art Institute of Chicago about their attitudes towardwork and whether they were more intrinsically or extrinsically moti-vated. Using these data as a benchmark, another researcher followedup with these students in the early 1980s to see how their careerswere progressing. Among the starkest findings, especially for men:"T he less evidence of extrinsic motivation during art school, the more 45
  54. 54. DRIVEsuccess in professional art both several years after gra d uatio n andnearly twenty years later ." Painters and sculptors who were in trin si-cally motivated , those for whom th e joy of di scovery and th e chal-lenge of creation were their own reward s, were able to weath er thetough times-and the lack of remuneration and recognition-thatinevitably accompany artistic careers . And that led to yet anoth erparadox in the Alice in Wonderland world of the third dr ive. "T hoseartists who pursued their painting and sculpture more for th e plea-sure of the activity itself than for extrinsic rewards have produced artthat has been socially recognized as superior," the study said. "It isthose who are least motivated to pursue extrinsic reward s who even- .tually receive them. " 9 This result is not true across all tasks, of course. Amabile and oth-ers have found that extrinsic rewards can be effective for algorithmictasks-those that depend on following an existing formula to itslogical conclusion. But for more right-brain undertakings-thosethat demand flexible problem-solving, inventiveness, or conceptualunderstanding-eontingent rewards can be dangerous. Rewardedsubjects often have a harder time seeing the periphery and craftingoriginal solutions. This, too, is one of the sturdiest findings in socialscience--especially as Amabile and others have refined it over theyears. !" For artists, scientists, inventors, schoolchildren, and the restof us, intrinsic motivation-the drive do something because it isinteresting, challenging, and absorbing-is essential for high lev-els of creativity. But the "if-then" motivators that are the staple ofmost bus inesses often stifle, rather than stir, creative thinking . Asthe economy moves toward more right-brain, conceptual work-asmor e of us deal with our own versions of the candle problem-thismight be the most alarming gap between what science knows andwhat business does. 46
  55. 55. S v n Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work . . .Good BehaviorPhilosophers and medical professionals have long debated whetherblood donors should be paid. Some claim th at blood, like humantissu e or organs , is special-that we shouldn t be able to buy and sellit like a barrel of crude oil or a crate of ball bearings. Others argueth at we should shelve our squeamishness, because paying for thissubsta nce will ensure an ample supply. But in 1970 , British sociologist Richard Titmuss, who had stud-ied blood donation in the United Kingdom, offered a bolder specu-lat ion . Paying for blood wasn t just immoral, he said. It was alsoinefficient . If Britain decided to pay citizens to donate, that would crual ly reduce the countrys blood supply. It was an oddball notion,to be sure . Economists snickered. And Titrnuss never tested the idea;it was merel y a philosophical hunch. 11 But a qu arter-century later , two Swedish economists decided tosee if Tirrnuss was right. In an intriguing field experiment, they vis-ited a reg ional blood center in Gothenburg and found 153 women ho ere in te rested in g iving blood . Then-as seems to be the cus-tom among mot ivat ion researchers-they divided the women intothree roups. 12 Experimenters told those in the first group that blooddon tion as voluntary. Th ese participants could g ive blood , butthe ouldn r receive a payment. The experimenters offered the sec-ond roup differen t arrange me nt. If these participants gave blood ,th eyd each recei e 50 wedis h kronor (about ). The th ird g roupre ei ed v ri rion on th t second offer: a 50-kronor payment ithn immed i re op t ion to dona te t he amount to a chil dren s cancerh rir . f th e first roup , 5_ percent of the omen decided to go ahead
  56. 56. DRIVEand donate blood . Th ey were altruistic citizens app arently, will ingto do a good deed for th eir fellow Swedes even in the absence ofcompensation. And the second group ? Motivation 2.0 would sugges t that thi sgroup might be a bit more motivated to donate. They d shown up ,which indi cated intrinsic motivation. Getting a few kronor on topmight give that impulse a boost . But-as you might have g uessedby now-thats not what happened . In this group, only 30 percentof the women decided to give blood. Instead of increasing th e num-ber of blood donors, offering to pay people decreased the number bynearly half. Meanwhile, the third group-which had the option of donatingthe fee ·directly to charity-responded much the same as the firstgroup. Fifty-three percent became blood donors .* Titrnusss hunch might have been right, after all. Adding a mon-etary incentive didn t lead to more of the desired behavior. It led toless. The reason: It tainted an altruistic act and "crowded out " theintrinsic desire to do something good ." Doing good is what blooddonation is all about. It provides ·w hat the Amer ican Red Cross bro-chures say is "a feeling that money cant buy." Thats why volun-tary blood donations invariably increase during natural disasters andother calamities. " But if governments were to pay people to helpthe ir neighbors during these crises, donations might decline. Th at said, in th e Swedish example, the reward itself wasn t inher-ently destructi ve. Th e immediate option to donate the 50-kronorpay ment rat her than pocke t it seemed to negate the effect . This , too ,is extremely im port ant. It s not that all rewards at all times are bad.For instan ce, when the Italian government gave blood donors paid*The results for the 119 men in the experiment were somewhat different . The payment had no statistically significant effect, positive or negative, on the decision co give blood . 48
  57. 57. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work . . .time off work, donations increased." The law removed an obstacleto altruism. So while a few advocates would have you believe in thebasic evil of extrinsic incentives, thats just not empirically true.What is true is that mixing rewards with inherently interesting, cre-ative, or noble tasks----deploying them without understanding thepeculiar science of motivation-is a very dangerous game. Whenused in these situations, "if-then" rewards usually do more harmthan good. By neglecting the ingredients of genuine motivation-autonomy, mastery, and purpose-they limit what each of us canachieve.MORE OF WHAT WE DONT WANTIn the upside-down universe of the third drive, rewards can often produce less of the very things theyre trying to encourage. Butthats not the end of the story. When used improperly, extrinsic moti-vators can have another unintended collateral consequence: They cangive us more of what we dont want. Here, again, what businessdoes hasn t caught up with what science knows. And what science isreveali ng is that carrots and sticks can promote bad behavior, createaddiction, and encourage short-term thinking at the expense of thelong view.Unethical BehaviorWhat could be more valuable than having a goal? From our earliestdays, teachers , coaches, and parents advise us to set goals and to work 49
  58. 58. DRIVEmi ghtily to achieve th em - and with good reason . G oals wor k. Theacadem ic lit erature shows that by helping us tune out di stract ion s,goals can ge t us to try harder, work lon ger, and achi eve more. But recently a g roup of scholars from th e Harvard BusinessSchool, Northwestern Universitys K ello gg School of Manag em en t ,the University of Arizonas Eller Coll ege of Manag em ent, and th eUniversity of Pennsylvanias Wharton School questioned th e effi-cacy of this broad prescription. "Rather than bein g offered as anover-the-counter salve for boosting performance, goal setting shouldbe prescribed selectively, presented with a warning label , and closelymonitored, " they wrote.! " Goals that people set for themselves and that are devoted to attaining mastery are usually healthy. But goalsimposed by others-sales targets, quarterly returns , standardizedtest scores , and so on-can sometimes have dangerous side effects . Like all extrinsic motivators, goals narrow our focus. Thats onereason they can be effective; they concentrate the mind. But as we veseen, a narrowed focus exacts a cost. For complex or conceptual tasks ,offering a reward can blinker the wide-ranging thinking necessa ryto come up with an innovative solution. Likewise , when an extrins icgoal is paramount-particularly a short-term , measurable one whoseachievement delivers a big payoff-its presence can restrict our viewof the broader dimensions of our behavior. As the cadre of bus inessschool professors write, "Substantial evidence demonstrates that inaddition to motivating constructive effort , goal setting can induceunethical behavior ." The examples are legion, the researchers note . Sears im poses asales quota on it s auto repair staff-and workers respond by over-charg in g customers and completing unnecessary rep airs . Enron setslofty revenue goals-and the race to m eet them by any means pos-sible catalyzes th e com panys collapse. Ford is so intent on producin g 50
  59. 59. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work . ..a certain car at a certain weight at a certain price by a certain datethat it omits safety checks and unleashes the dangerous Ford Pinto. The problem with making an extrinsic reward the only destina-tion that matters is that some people will choose the quickest routethere , even if it means taking the low road . Indeed , most of the scandals and misbehavior that have seemedendemic to modern life involve shortcuts. Executives game theirqu arterly earnings so they can snag a performance bonus. Secondaryschool counselors doctor student transcripts so their seniors can get into college. 17 Athletes inject themselves with steroids to post better numbers and trigger lucrative performance bonuses. Contrast that approach with behavior sparked by intrinsic moti-vat ion. When the reward is the activity itself-deepening learning,del ighting customers, doing one s best-there are no shortcuts. Theonly route to the destination is the high road. In some sense, its impossible to act unethically because the person who s disadvantaged isnt a competitor but yourself. Of course , all goals are not created equal. And-let me emphasizeth is point-goals and extrinsic rewards aren t inherently corrupting., But goals are more toxic th an Motivation 2.0 recognizes. In fact, thebusiness school professors suggest they should come with their ownwarning label: Goals may causesystematic problems for organizations dueto narrowed focus, unethical behav increased risk taking, decreased coop- ior,eration, and decreased intrinsic motivation. Use carewhen applying goalsinyour organization. If carrots-as-g oals somet imes encourage unworthy behavior, thensticks-as-punishme nt should be able to halt it , right ? Not so fast.T he third d rive is less mechani sti c and mor e surprising than that, astwo Israeli econom ists discovered at some day care centers. In 2000, economists U ri G neezy and Aldo Rustichini studied a 51
  60. 60. DRIVEg roup of child care facilities in H aifa, Israel, for twe nty weeks. IS T hecenters opened at 7:3 0 A.M. and closed at 4:00 P.M . Parent s had toretrieve th eir child ren by th e closin g tim e or a teacher woul d haveto sta y late . During the first four weeks of th e experime nt, th e economistsrecorded how many parents arrived lat e each week. Th en , before thefifth week , with the permission of the day care centers, th ey postedthe following sign: ANNOUNCEMENT: FINE FOR COMI NG LAT E As Y Oft all know, the official dosing time of the day care center is 1600 every day. Sincesome parentshave been coming late, we (with theapproval of the A uthority f orPrivate Day-CareCenters in Israel) have decidedto impose a fine on parents who come late topick up their children. As of next Sunday a fine of NS 10* will becharged every time a child is collected after 1610. This fine will becalculated monthly, it is to bepaid together with the regular monthly payment. Sincer ely, The manager of the day-care ce nterThe theory underlying the fine, said Gneezy and Rustichini , wasstraightforward : "W hen negative consequences are imposed on abehav ior, th ey will pro d uce a reduction of that particular response. "In other words, thwack the parents with a fine, and they ll stop show-ing up lat e.*The fine was per child, so a parent with two child ren would have to pay twe nty Israeli shekels (N S 20) for each instance of tard iness. Wh en th e experiment was cond ucted, ten Israeli shekels was equ ivalent to about three U .S. do llars. 52
  61. 61. Seven Reasons Carrots and Sticks (Often) Dont Work ... But thats not what happened. "After the introduction of the finewe observed a steady increase in the number of parents coming late,"the economists wrote. "The rate finally settled, at a level that washigher, and almosttwiceas large as the initial one."!" And in languagereminiscent of Harry Harlows head scratching, they write thatthe existing literature didnt account for such a result. Indeed, the"possibility of an increase in the behavior being punished was noteven considered." Up pops another bug in Motivation 2.0. One reason most par-ents showed up on time is that they had a relationship with theteachers-who, after all, were caring for their precious sons anddaughters-and wanted to treat them fairly. Parents had an intrinsicdesire to be scrupulous about punctuality. But the threat of a fine-like the promise of the kronor in the blood experiment-edged asidethat third drive. The fine shifted the parents decision from a partlymoral obligation (be fair to my kids teachers) to a pure transaction(I can buy extra time). There wasn t room for both. The punishmentdidn t promote good behavior; it crowded it out.AddictionIf some scientists believe that "if-then" motivators and other extrin-sic rewards resemble prescription drugs that carry potentially dan-gerous side effects, others believe theyre more like illegal drugs thatfoster a deeper and more pernicious dependency. According to thesescholars, cash rewards and shiny trophies can provide a delicious joltof pleasure at first, but the feeling soon dissipates-and to keep italive, the recipient requires ever larger and more frequent doses. The Russian economist Anton Suvorov has constructed an 53