Grice revised

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GRICE'S MAXIMS AND CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES,COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE

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Grice revised

  1. 1. GRICE’S COOPERATIVE PRINCIPLE AND IMPLICATUREAHMED QADOURY ABEDINTRODUCTION In his William James Lectures at Harvard University in 1967, H. Paul Grice posited ageneral set of rules contributors to ordinary conversation were generally expected to follow.He named it the Cooperative Principle (CP), and formulated it as follows: Make yourconversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by theaccepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged (Grice, 1989:26).At first glance, the Cooperative Principle may appear an idealistic representation of actualhuman communication. After all, as Grice himself has learned from his detractors, manybelieve ‘‘. . . even in the talk-exchanges of civilized people browbeating disputation andconversational sharp practices are far too common to be offenses against the fundamentaldictates of conversational practice.’’ Further, even if one discounts the tone of an exchange,‘‘much of our talk exchange is too haphazard to be directed toward an end cooperative orotherwise’’ (Grice, 1989: 369). Grice has never intended his use of the word ‘cooperation’ toindicate an ideal view of communication. Rather, Grice was trying to describe how it happensthat – despite the haphazard or even agonistic nature of much ordinary humancommunication – most discourse participants are quite capable of making themselvesunderstood and capable of understanding most others in the course of their daily business.WHAT COUNTS AS COOPERATION? Grice considers the following, quite unextraordinary exchange:A: I am out of petrol.B: There is a garage round the corner (Grice, 1989: 32).Assuming A immediately proceeds to the garage, secures the petrol, and refills his car, wemay describe B’s contribution as having been successful. By what rational process of thoughtwas A so quickly able to come to the conclusion that the garage to which B refers would fulfillhis need for petrol? Why did B’s utterance work? Grice’s answer: because A and B adhere tothe Cooperative Principle of Discourse. It is not hard to imagine that two friends sharing aride would want to help each other through a minor crisis; thus, ‘cooperation’ in this scenarioseems quite apt. But imagine the exchange went this way instead: 1
  2. 2. A: I am out of petrol.B: (sarcastically) How nice that you pay such close attention to important details.In this second scenario, not only does B refuse to assist A in solving the problem, he uses theoccasion to add to A’s conundrum an assault upon his character. Assuming A feels the sting;again B’s contribution has been successful. So how and why in this case has B’s contributionworked? How can such a sour response as B’s callous retort be considered ‘cooperative’?Again, Grice’s Cooperative Principle proves a useful answer. The explanation requires closerinspection of the strictness with which Grice uses the term. Grice explicates his Cooperative Principle of Discourse in ‘Logic and Conversation,’ thepaper originally presented at Harvard University in 1967, later printed in Cole and Morgan(1975), and reprinted in a slightly revised version in Grice’s Studies in the Way of Words(1989). Citations are from his final version as it is assumed that this is the one he consideredmost complete. In the essay, Grice is careful to limit use of the CP for describing only talkexchanges that exhibit three specific characteristics:1. The participants have some common immediate aim.2. The contributions of the participants [are] dovetailed, mutually dependent.3. There is some sort of understanding (often tacit) that, other things being equal, thetransactions should continue in appropriate style unless both parties are agreeable that itshould terminate (Grice, 1989: 29).Though he is careful to limit the CP’s application to talk exchanges that exhibit theseparticular cooperative characteristics, this list should not be read as an admission of greatlimitation. Grice finds that most talk exchanges do follow the CP because most talk exchangesdo, in fact, exhibit the cooperative characteristics he outlines: Our talk exchanges . . are characteristically, to some degree at least, cooperative efforts; and each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction (Grice, 1989: 26).The following is Grice ‘s types of meanings: 2
  3. 3. What is meant What is What is said implicated Non- Conventionally conventionally Conversationally Non- conversationally Generally ParticularlyGRICE’S MAXIMSGrice identified the Cooperative Principle as a ‘super principle’ or a ‘supreme principle’ (1989:368f) that he generalized from four conversational ‘maxims’ he claimed discourseparticipants ordinarily follow. Grice(1989: 28) identifies the maxims as: 1. Quantity (give as much information as is required, and no more than is required) 2. Quality (do not say what is false or that for which you lack adequate evidence) 3. Relation (be relevant) 4. Manner (be clear, be orderly, and avoid ambiguity).Clear fulfillment of these maxims may be demonstrated in the following exchange:A: Do you know where I can buy some petrol?B: You can buy petrol at the garage right around the corner. 3
  4. 4. Let us assume that B is sincere and knowledgeable, and A finds the garage right away basedupon B’s advice. It is the case then that B’s response to A’s question follows the maximscompletely, giving exactly the right amount of information (quantity), information for whichB has the required evidence (quality), information that is directly connected to A’s question(relevance), and information given in a fashion effectively and efficiently understood(manner). But Grice knew that people do not always follows these maxims as theycommunicate ;”What dull business conversation analysis would be if they did!” Rather,interlocutors can fail to fulfill the maxims in a variety of ways, some mundane, someinadvertent, but others lead to what most consider the most powerful aspect of Grice’s CP:conversational ‘implicature.’ Another Example A. “How do I get to Sainsbury’s, mate?” B-“Go straight ahead, turn right at the school, then left at the bus stop on the hill.”Speaker A assumes that: B believes his directions to be genuine – the maxim of quality; B believes the information to be sufficient – the maxim of quantity; B believes the information to be clear – the maxim of manner; B believes his directions are to Sainsbury’s – the maxim of relation.FAILURE OF MAXIMS AND IMPLICATURESGrice describes four ways in which maxims may go unfulfilled in ordinary conversation. Thefirst three ways are fairly straight forward. One might violate or infringe a maxim. Thisinfringement is often done with the intention of misleading; for example, one might say,‘Patricia was with a man last night’ as a way of making Patricia’s routine dinner out with herhusband seem clandestine. One might opt out, making it clear that one refuses to cooperatein a conversation for some reason:One may be legally bound not to provide information one has. Or,One might encounter a clash of maxims, facing the choice of violating one maxim oranother.For example, one may not be able to give all of the information required (quantity) becauseone does not have adequate evidence for the information (quality). Most interesting is thefinal possibility for the nonfulfillment of a maxim: flouting or exploiting a maxim for the 4
  5. 5. purpose of implicating information (implicature). This case is the one in which even anapparently uncooperative response illustrates discursive or linguistic cooperation. Let’s recallthe above example:A: I am out of petrol.B: There is a garage round the corner.In this instance, we may claim, that B – at first blush – appears to break the maxim ofrelation. For what does a garage have to do with petrol? Since drivers are aware that garagessell petrol, it is not long before A realizes that B has not broken the maxim of relation at all; itis, in fact, instantaneous. B’s point is directly relevant. B is being cooperative in both thecolloquial sense and the specialized sense Grice applies to the term. Grice’s CooperativePrinciple makes sense of the speed with which A is able to process the usefulness of B’scontribution. A assumes B is following the maxims and would thus not mention the garageunless it had petrol. In the next scenario, however, the exchange, and thus the rationalprocess by which A makes sense of B’s contribution, is markedly different:A: I am out of petrol.B: (sarcastically) How nice that you pay such close attention to important details.In this instance, B flouts the maxim of quality by stating as true something for which he hasspecific and immediate evidence is untrue. One likely implication of B’s remark is that A is anidiot for not paying attention to such an important detail as having enough petrol in the car.If A feels the sting of B’s remark, A and B have exhibited discursive cooperation that resultedin an implicature directed to A from B . Maxim infringement occurs when a Speaker fails toobserve the maxim, although s/he has no intention of generating an implicature and nointention of deceiving. Generally infringing stems from imperfect linguistic performance (inthe case of a young child or a foreigner) or from impaired linguistic performance broughtabout by nervousness, drunkenness, excitement, disability.–Rachel: Yeah, and also we need more umm, drinks. Hold on a second. (Gets up but stumblesa little bit.) Whup, okay. (She makes it to the phone and picks it up, without dialing.) Hello!Vegas? Yeah, we would like some more cola, and y’know what else? We would like somemore pizza. Hello? Ohh, I forgot to dial!–(They both start laughing. There’s a knock on the door.)–Ross: That must be our cola and piza! (Gets up to answer it.)–Joey: Hey!–Ross: Ohh, it’s Joey! I love Joey! (Hugs him.)–Rachel: Ohh, I love Joey! Joey lives with a duck! (Goes and hugs Joey.)–Joey: Hi! 5
  6. 6. –Rachel: Hey!–Joey: Look-look-look you guys, I need some help! Okay? Someone is going to have toconvince my hand twin to cooperate!–Ross: I’ll do it. Hey, whatever you need me to do, I’m your man. (He starts to sit down on thebed. There’s one problem though, he’s about two feet to the left of it. Needless to say, hemisses and falls on his butt.) (Looking up at Joey.) Whoa-oh-whoa! Are you, are you okay?A Speaker opts out of observing a maxim whenever s/he indicates unwillingness to cooperatein the way the maxim requires. This happens when a suspect exerts their right to remainsilent or when a witness chooses not to impart information that may prove detrimental tothe defendant.Detective: Has the defendant ever told you she hated her father and wanted him dead?Shrink: Such information is confidential and it would be unethical to share it with you.Under certain circumstances,as part of certain events ,there is no expectation on the part ofany participant that one or several maxims should be observed (and non-fulfillment does notgenerate any implicatures). Such cases include:1) Suspending the Quality Maxim in case of funeral orations and obituaries, when thedescription of the deceased needs to be praiseworthy and exclude any potentiallyunfavourable aspects of their life or personality.2) Poetry suspends the Manner Maxim since it does not aim for conciseness, clarity and lackof ambiguity.3) In the case of speedy communication via telegrams, e-mails, notes, the Quantity Maxim issuspended because such means are functional owing to their very brevity.4) Jokes are not only conventionally untrue, ambiguously and seemingly incoherent, but areexpected to exploit ambiguity, polysemy and vagueness of meaning, which entails, amongother things, suspension of the Maxims of Quality, Quantity and Manner.Without cooperation, human interaction would be far more difficult and counterproductive.Therefore, the Cooperative Principle and the Gricean Maxims are not specific to conversationbut to interaction as a whole. For example, it would not make sense to reply to a questionabout the weather with an answer about groceries because it would violate the Maxim ofRelation. Likewise, responding to a request for some milk with an entire gallon instead of aglass would violate the Maxim of Quantity.A: I hear you went to the theatre last night; what play did you see? 6
  7. 7. B: Well, I watched a number of people stand on the stage in Elizabethan costumesuttering series of sentences which corresponded closely with the script of Twelfth Night.Here, B’s verbose answer, although it doesn’t say anything more than “I saw a performanceof Twelfth Night,” invites A to infer that the performers were doing a miserably bad job ofacting. However, it is possible to flout a maxim intentionally or unconsciously and therebyconvey a different meaning than what is literally spoken. Many times in conversation, thisflouting is manipulated by a speaker to produce a negative pragmatic effect, as with sarcasmor irony. One can flout the Maxim of Quality to tell a clumsy friend who has just taken a badfall that her nimble gracefulness is impressive and obviously intend to mean the completeopposite. The Gricean Maxims are therefore often purposefully flouted by comedians andwriters, who may hide the complete truth and manipulate their words for the effect of thestory and the sake of the reader’s experience:A: What are you baking?B: Be i are tee aitch dee ay wye see ay kay ee.By answering obscurely, B conveys to A the implicature that the information is to be keptsecret from the young child who is in the room with them. Speakers who deliberately floutthe maxims usually intend for their listener to understand their underlying implication. Thus,the Gricean Maxims serve a purpose both when they are followed and when they are flouted.GRICE’S POSSIBLE IMPLICATURESWhile one example hardly illustrates so many cases, Grice works out a number of possibleforms of implicature: irony, metaphor, meiosis (understatement), hyperbole, social censure,deliberate ambiguity, and deliberate obscurity (for example, if one is trying to keep a secretfrom the children). In all of these cases, maxims are broken and the breaks result in specificinformation implied to and understood by the receiver of the utterance. The power of theconversational maxims to describe rational processes by which speakers and hearers makesense of each other’s utterances have energized many scholars of language and conversationacross many fields. But the Cooperative Principle has not been free from serious critique.CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES 7
  8. 8. According to Grice, utterance interpretation is not a matter of decoding messages, but ratherinvolves:(1) taking the meaning of the sentences together with contextual information,(2) using inference rules(3) working out what the speaker means on the basis of the assumption that the utteranceconforms to the maxims.The main advantage of this approach from Grice’s point of view is that it provides a pragmaticexplanation for a wide range of phenomena, especially for conversational implicautres--- akind of extra meaning that is not literally contained in the utterance.Conversationalimplicatures have the following characteristics: 1- They are cancelable: … a putative conversational implicature that p is explicitly cancelable if, to the form of words the utterance of which putatively implicates that p, it is admissible to add but not p, or I do not mean to imply that p, and it is contextually cancelable if one can find situations in which the utterance of the form of words would simply not carry the implicature. (Grice,1989: 44.) 2- They are non-detachable: … it will not be possible to find another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question, except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of Manner). (Grice,1989: 39.) 3- They are calculable: The presence of a conversational implicature must be capable of being worked out; for even if it can in fact be intuitively grasped, unless the intuition is replaceable by an argument, the implicature (if present at all) will not count as a conversational implicature. (Grice,1989: 31).This last property is what Grice considers crucial for distinguishing between conversationaland conventional implicatures. Conventional implicatures are generated by the meaning ofcertain particles like ‘but’ ,’yet’, ‘even’, or ‘therefore.’ Consider the difference between (1)and (2): 8
  9. 9. -He is an Englishman, therefore he is brave.-He is an Englishman, and he is brave.-His being brave follows from his being English.According to Grice, a speaker has said the same with (1) as with (2). The difference is thatwith (1) he implicates (3). This is a conventional implicature. It is the conventional meaning of‘therefore,’ and not maxims of cooperation, that carry us beyond what is said. Grices conceptof conventional implicatures (which has antecedents in Frege; see Bach 1999) is the mostcontroversial part of his theory of conversation for many followers, for several reasons.According to some, its application to particular examples runs against common intuitions. Byusing the word ‘therefore’ is the speaker not saying that there is some causal connectionbetween being brave and being English?TYPES OF CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES Among conversational implicatures, Grice distinguished between ‘particularized’ and‘generalized.’ The former are the implicatures that are generated by saying something invirtue of some particular features of the context, “cases in which there is no room for theidea that an implicature of this sort is normally carried by saying that p.” (Grice ,1989: 37).Theabove example of conversational implicature is, then, a case of particularized conversationalimplicature. A generalized conversational implicature occurs where “the use of a certainforms of words in an utterance would normally (in the absence of special circumstances)carry such-and-such an implicature or type of implicature” (Ibid.). Grices first example is asentence of the form “X is meeting a woman this evening.” Anyone who utters this sentence,in absence of special circumstances, would be taken to implicate that the woman in questionwas someone other than Xs “wife, mother, sister, or perhaps even close platonic friend”(Ibid.) Being an implicature, it could be cancelled, either implicitly, in appropriatecircumstances, or explicitly, adding some clause that implies its denial. Also , conversationalimplicatures can be scalar and non-scalar. They are scalar as in using ‘some ,,compared with<all, most, many , some , few >: - I’m studying linguistics and I‘ve completed some of the required courses. Tannen (1986:34-45) claims that Grice’s maxims of cooperative discourse can’t applyto ‘‘real conversations’’ because in conversation ‘‘we wouldn’t want to simply blurt out whatwe mean, because we’re judging the needs for involvement and independence’’. Tannenassumes that Grice’s maxims are prescriptions that conversations must follow strictly in orderto be considered cooperative. Cameron demonstrates a reductive view of Grice’s use of the 9
  10. 10. term ‘cooperation’ when she describes Grice’s CP as an ‘inflexible’ and ‘unproductive’apparatus that provides yet another way for both ‘chauvinists and feminists’ to believe that‘whereas men compete in competition, women use co-operative strategies’ (1985: 40f).Cooper (1982), interested in applying Grice to theories of written composition, claims thatGrice advocates cooperation because what enables conversation to proceed is an underlyingassumption that we as conversants have purposes for conversing and that we recognize thatthese purposes are more likely to be fulfilled if we cooperate (1982: 112). Grice himself acknowledged the difficulty some have had interpreting his use of‘cooperation.’ As a final chapter to his 1989 book, Grice wrote a ‘Retrospective Epilogue’ inwhich he considered criticism of his theories had engendered. It has already been related thathere Grice acknowledged that his theory suffers from a perceived naı¨vete´. To combat thecriticism, Grice adds useful information about what counts as cooperative in discourse. First,he reminds readers of the sort of utterances he seeks to elucidate: voluntary talk exchangesthat require some form of ‘‘collaboration in achieving exchange of information or theinstitution of decisions.’’ And, he points out that within exchanges intended to produceinformation or determine decisions, cooperation ‘‘may coexist with a high degree of reserve,hostility, and chicanery and with a high degree of diversity in the motivations underlyingquite meager common objectives’’ (Grice, 1989: 369). In the maxims, Grice believes he hasfound universal conventions that all people may regularly follow in their meaning-making talkexchanges. In order for such a set of conventions to function, a certain degree of at least tacitassent to those conventions is necessary. Thus, the term ‘cooperation’ is quite apt. Thecrucial subtlety of Grice’s theory is this: interlocutors do not necessarily cooperate with eachother; they cooperate with a set of conventions that allows each interlocutor to produceapproximate enough meanings for communication to work. The aim for Gricean conversationanalysis – and thus the CP and the maxims – is not to advocate benevolent cooperation, butto prove the rationality of conversation. ‘‘. . . observance *of the maxims+ promotes and theirviolation *except in the case of implicature+ dispromotes conversational rationality’’ (Grice,1989: 370).COPERATIVE:INTERLOCUTORS OR THEIR CONTRIBUTION! Although many have claimed Grice’s writing on the CP is ambiguous and is on occasioninconsistent with terminology, this should not be said of Grice’s measured use of the term‘cooperation.’ Precise readings of Grice’s writing on cooperation demonstrate that he rarely,if ever, describes interlocutors as being cooperative. Rather, he claims that interlocutors’contributions to conversation are cooperative. The contributions are uttered in cooperationwith a set of conventions for producing meaning. In this sense, we might think of a pair of 10
  11. 11. interlocutors as each operating according to the dictates of a set of conventions (the maxims)and thus they are ‘cooperators’: two operators of discourse operating at once. The second major critique of the Cooperative Principle has been a topic of spiriteddiscussion among linguistic philosophers since Grice first proposed it. Grice himself identifiesthe problem as resulting from the thought that communication is simply too ‘‘haphazard’’ tobe described accurately as having a cooperative end. Some forms of communication are notappropriately described by the CP. Grice suggests the problem is two-fold: First, he agreeswith critics that the maxims appear less ‘‘coordinate’’ than he would prefer. The maxim ofquality appears in some ways more definitive of information than the other maxims. And, themaxims are not independent enough: relevance has been often regarded as containing theessence of the other maxims. Second, Grice’s selection of cooperation as the ‘‘supremeConversational Principle’’ underpinning the rationalizing operations of implicature remains,to say the least, not generally accepted (1989: 371). Though in his final work he admittedsome misgivings and offered minor refinements of his maxims of cooperative discourse,Grice, up until his death in 1988, defended his selection of the Cooperative Principle as the‘supreme principle.’ Grice’s influence is most apparent in a branch of linguistic study that hasbecome known among some as Neo-Gricean pragmatics. Scholars in this field have greatlyrevised Grice’s maxims of cooperative discourse in a variety of interesting ways, but theyhave maintained the basic direction of Grice’s work, especially in regard to the concept ofconversational implicature.Sperber & Wilson (1986) produced one of the most influential alternatives to Grice’s theory.They developed a theory of relevance based on a number of assumptions aboutcommunication:1- Every utterance has a variety of linguistically possible interpretations, all compatible withthe decoded sentence meaning. 2. Not all these interpretations are equally accessible to the hearer (i.e. equally likely tocome to the hearer’s mind) on a given occasion. 3. Hearers are equipped with a single, very general criterion for evaluating interpretations asthey occur to them, and accepting or rejecting them as hypotheses about the speaker’smeaning. 4. This criterion is powerful enough to exclude all but at most a single interpretation (or afew closely similar interpretations), so that the hearer is entitled to assume that the firsthypothesis that satisfies it (if any) is the only plausible one .Sperber and Wilson argued that all of Grice’s maxims could be replaced by a single principleof relevance that the speaker tries to be as relevant as possible in the circumstances (1986).Davis (2005) argues that Sperber and Wilson’s theory suffers from some of the sameproblems as Grice’s, including: 11
  12. 12. - overgeneralization of implicatures - a clash with the principle of style - a clash with the principle of politenessANALYSIS OF A TEXTThe selected text is The Creak, a short play by Yousif Al-An, translated into English by Dr.Mahammed Darweesh( Mamoon House,2010) pp.23-41. The procedure adopted in analyzingthe text is the following: 1- Numerating the starting of each line. The total number of lines is 539. This short play is of two presentations. The first presentation is either description of the context, or a long monologue .The second one is a conversation between the only two characters, namely , He and She. This is the part we will focus on in our analysis. 2- The text will be examined from a conversationally-organized orientation , in the sense that a full conversation implicature will be regarded as the functional context. 3- Identifying the existent implicatures. 4- Classifying implicatures into conventional or conversational (scalar or non-scalar). 5- The selected approach is Grice‘s classification into conversational vs conventional implicatures. 6- Reference will be shedded on their maxims.Examples1-He: Good morning life, good morning world…(Turns to the door) may you last long ,creak,for as long as you are there, I am here! Go on with your music,for you are the sign of my lifeand existence.+> He expresses his loneliness to the extent he regards the door creaky sound a lovely pieceof music. A conversational implicature where Flouting the maxim of quality is so clear byusing hedges like ‘as far as ‘, and the manner maxim in using the modal ‘may’.2- He: this is enough, it suffices to remind the muscles of life and work+> He regards the creak of the door as the ultimate sign of action and movement in thesense that his life is such a quiet one. A conversational implicature of the maxim of manneris maintained by using ‘enough’ and ‘suffice’. 12
  13. 13. 3-He: impossible …you…impossible!! She: Let me at least say hello before you shout. It reminds me of your voice when you used torage and scream.+> He saw her after a long period of time. Both are friends or relatives that she still had somememories about his reaction.A conversational implicatures of the maxim of relation. This implicatures is of two sides; inthe first line ,it is flouted by using ‘impossible’ as scalar implicature .In the second line ,thisconversational implicatures is followed without any form of violation simply by using ‘atleast’, which in turn stopped the possibility of another scalar implicatures.4-She: My house is in a densely populated area. He: I do not …+> She lives in such a popular area or in a city, or many people always visit her, incomparison of his. A conversational implicature where flouting of the maxim of quantity isclear ,since more than one alternative is possible. He opts out this maxim since he does notcomplete his statement.5-She :I wanted to depend on myself. I am still able to be of value to people and the world,and be delighted by their happiness. I do not want to be a small part of a whole.He: You still philosophize as usual.+>She has the ability to help other people and she is willingly eager to do that Aconversational implicatures that she is still productive and useful despite being in the sixties.She still has many ambitions to be done , which are regarded as somehow difficult thereforehe described the situation as a sort of philosophy. Flouting of the maxim of quantity is clear inthe scalar implicature by ‘able to’ and ‘small’.6-He: Do not you feel lonely sometimes? She: Sometimes? Yes, I do and … He: And what?She: Aha! Am I on a social visit or to give you an account of my private life? 13
  14. 14. +> He is behind something that at that age, does she feel lonely like him, or something else?The difference is that she has friends visiting her all the time ,whereas he has nothing. Aconversational implicatures where flouting of the maxim of quantity is evident. Anotherimplicatures is in the last line where the maxim of relation is clear.7-He: Let me bring you coffee first …I will be back soon.She: still moving about like a small child.+> She is commenting on his way of moving may be because of his age or other factors. Also ,the verb ‘moving’ can be interpreted as behaving ,since she has spent more than one hourwithout anything to be offered. A conversational implicatures with the maxim of quality.Using ‘first’ stops the possibility of violating this maxim.8-She: I gave up smoking three years ago…Have you forgotten? He: I did too only a year ago.+> Both are not smokers now. A conversational implicatures suspended the quality maxim. Itis quite easy to a speaker to suspend the implicatures (only) using the expression ‘at least’ : ‘Idid too at least a year ago’. Also ,it can be cancelled by adding further information ,oftenfollowing the expression ‘in fact’: I did too only a year ago, in fact , ten months from now.9-She: I’ll finish some paper work and be back.+>She intends to do part of the work. This is realized as a scalar implicature <all ,most,many, some, few>. A conversational implicatures where flouting the quantity maxim isclear.10-She: whenever she writes a letter to her uncle she includes lines of verse.+> Her granddaughter is either studying literary subjects and writing verse ,or quoting versewithout studying literary subjects , or reading poetry without writing. A conversationalimplicature with flouting of the quality maxim.11-She: To the bus. Perhaps it is repaired now and they are waiting for me….Thank you for thecoffee. He: Thanks for the visit. Do it often…. 14
  15. 15. +> She has finished her visit. The reason that led he to this visit is repairing the bus. So shelives away from him. A conversational implicature of the quality maxim where flouting isclear in using ‘perhaps’.12-She: They repaired the bus quickly and took whoever was nearby, leaving the othersbehind? He: What will you do? She: I will wait for the next one. He: When will it arrive? She: Within an hour as well.+> They repaired the bus and left many behind and she is one of them. Her decision is towait the next one. More than one conversational implicature here: the first one is related tothe flouting of the maxim of manner by using ‘whoever’ and ‘others’. The second one isflouting the maxim of quality by using ‘within’ , and this maxim ,on the other hand is kept byusing ‘the next’. 15

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