Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaften
Comparative Policy Analysis
Dr. Jale Tosun
Efficiency of Anti-Corruption Strategies in
Afghanistan and Pakistan
What has worked and what hasn’t
Submitted by: Ahmad Rashid Jamal
Hindeburg Str. 7
Winter semester 2011/12, paper handed in 15/04/2012
Efficiency of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Corruption is a severe problem in many Asian countries especially in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, judging from their ranking and scores on Transparency International’s
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This paper assesses the effectiveness of anti-
corruption strategies and the accountability of anti-corruption agencies in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. It starts with a general background regarding the practice and control of
corruption. It then gives some information about Afghanistan and Pakistan’s
administrative set-up. This is followed by an overview of the problem of corruption in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and then, an analysis of the anti-corruption policies in terms of
its mandate. Corruption in Afghanistan and Pakistan is horrible, and urgent actions are
needed to improve the situation. To be effective, anticorruption strategies must include
numerous exertions to reduce corruption as, broad-based, multi-faceted, and sustained
medium-term efforts. This paper will answer the question that, Do Anti-corruption
Agencies (ACAs) have the potential to turn into effective organizations by themselves,
while the implementations of anticorruption policies require several agencies?
The nuisance of corruption has links to a mass of vices. Its roots are linked to
injustice, mistrust, suspicion, extremism and terrorist activities. It creates a sense of
insecurity, aggravates poverty and adds to the calamity of the vulnerable segments of the
society. It also instills a sense of hopelessness and misery and threatens the potency of
good values which have been established over centuries of civilized struggle.
The term corruption has various definitions. The United Nations Manual on Anti-
Corruption, the Transparency International, and the multilateral financial institutions like
the World Bank and Asian Development Bank define corruption as, “abuse of public
office for private gains” (USAID 2009; UNCAC 2006; World Bank 2009).
The decisive victim of corruption and poverty is the human dignity itself. Hence it causes
contravene in the social order and emerges as a latent threat to the prosperity and stability
of human civilization. Corruption in government spending leads to severe decline in
impact of improvements and results in continuous increase in cost of upholding of public
assets. This paper analyses the features of anti-corruption strategies and agencies of
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, this paper asses to address the questions: 1.Can
anti-corruption policies combat corruption with a particular agency or a jointly campaign
is needed? What are the essential preconditions to anti-corruption agencies and
While the implementation of anticorruption acts by several anti-corruption agencies can
spread and intensify anti-corruption campaign, as of in India, the Prevention of
Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the
Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), and the anti-corruption bureaus and vigilance
commissions at the state level (Quah, 2003: 66). Similarly, the Philippines have relied on
18 anti-corruption agencies to enforce anti-corruption strategies since the Integrity Board
was formed by President Quirino in May 1950 (Batalla, 2001, p. 47; Oyamada, 2005,
This paper compares the performance of the anti-corruption laws by assessing the extent
to which these two ACAs have met the four conditions of ACAs. It is essential to
illustrate the four crucial functions of the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs).
To combat corruption these countries should rely on the endorsement of anti-corruption
policies without a specific agency (i.e. Anti-corruption office or High office of
2. Functions and Characterization of Anti-Corruption Agencies
ACAs are recognized by governments for the explicit aim of minimizing corruption in
their countries (i.e. High Office of Oversight in Afghanistan and National Accountability
Bureau). According to John R. Heilbrunn (2006) important functions and features of
ACAs are as follows:
1. The universal model, which is used in Hong Kong. It was characterized with its
investigative, deterrent, and communicative functions.
2. The investigative model is exemplified by centralized investigative commission as
operates in Singapore’s CPIB.
3. The parliamentary model distinguished by commissions that report to parliamentary
committees and are independent from other branches of state (i.e. executive and judicial).
For example, the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption.
4. The multi-agency model includes different agencies to combat corruption. Beside this,
they are autonomous with preventive approach as, the United States Office of
Government Ethics that complements the Justice Department and its investigative role (P.
3. Components of Anti-Corruptions Strategies
Corruption passes on to the use of public office for private gain in ways that breach
declared rules. Bribery, extortion and fraud, for example, are classified as corruption
when they entail the use of executive administrators or bureaucrats. Corruption
potentially occurs in all branches of government—the bureaucracy, the armed forces
(police and military army), the courts and legislative institutions—and can rage from
small-scale transactions involving relatively low level officials to the comprehensive
pillage of public resources by those at the very top of the opinionated and political
structure. While corruption, involves those in official positions, it also frequently
involves members of society, as victims or co-beneficiaries. Nonetheless, it is the
involvement of office-holders that makes corruption vitally different from other types of
misdeed and crime (USAID 2009: 7-12; World Bank 2009).
Strategies to reduce corruption regularly conceptualize it as a principal agent problem:
abuses occur because the public (the principal) is unable to manage and control the
performance and behavior of political and bureaucratic agent. While the decisive set of
principals consists of the general public, principal-agent problems can be simulated
within government organizations and amongst different parts of government ( Solnick
1998; Rose Ackerman 1999). Some sorts of corruption are also sustained and continued
by a momentous collective action problem: because the costs of corruption are often
socialized, conniving in corruption may be individually rational for members of the
public, even when they have collective interest in averting it. This collective and joint
action problem facade the more anti-corruption strategies rely on the general public
playing a vigorous function as a set of principals.
Anti-corruption policies/strategies entail the composition of a set of incentives (both
positive and negative) for “rule-abiding” behavior by agents who are both self-absorbed
and opportunistic. Through rule (policy, strategy) and institutional reforms, their aim is to
shrink occasions for corruption, compose corrupt behavior more pricey to the agents,
enhance the probability of its exposure and positively prize non-corrupt behavior. Doing
this in extremely corrupt government systems is extraordinary intricate and difficult. Not
only may institutions for identifying and penalizing corruption (Committees of
parliament, audit and courts agencies, for example) themselves be corrupt, but the
rational idea that corruption, once established, tends to endure accords with more formal
replica of performance. Because an assessment of likelihood that corrupt action will be
detected and punished is essential to an agent’s analysis of whether it is more rewarding
to break the rules or abide by them, the professed level of corruption manipulates an
agent’s decision to act corruptly, and is therefore a major determinant of the level of
corruption (Bardhan 1997: 1,331-4). The more corruption becomes stabilized and
normalized, the more a culture of corruption develops.
Strategies to condense and reduce corruption are classified into three core categories:
A. Policy change: It raises the cost and price of corruption through sanctions and
external monitoring; with formulating systems of provoke self-restraint within
government organizations. Corruption can only occur when government actors have
prudence over the use of resources or the nuisance of costs on private actors. If the
policies and programs that give rise to this prudence are themselves eliminated, the
particular forms of corruption related with them inevitably vanish (Rose-Ackerman 1999:
While plans such as significance licensing, finance loans and government commercial
activity are productive soil for corruption, a deregulatory key nevertheless has some
limitations. First, corruption can undermine the implementation of certain types of
deregulatory policy: import tariffs, for example, may be abolished but unofficial levies
may still be imposed. Second, the prescription to deregulate may be politically naïve
(McLeod 2000) - as in Afghanistan – powerful actors have an interest in economic
controls and the opportunities for corruption that they generate. Third, getting rid of the
scope for discretion among government actors is frequently undesirable: many forms of
guideline have sound economic and social. Privatization, for example, may simply open
up new avenues for corruption if pursued in the absence of an autonomous judiciary and
plausible enforcement institutions (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 43).
B. The second kind in which anti-corruption strategies fall is that of resolving the
principal-agent problem that underlies corruption by imposing peripheral and external
restriction on government actors. If the reason for agency problems is that principals lack
information, procedures, which provide information and authorize principals, should help
resolve them. Hence observing and auditing institutions such as a free press and
independent inspection and audit panels, the incorporation of community representatives
in monitoring bodies, and laws that mandate transparency are all mechanisms that
increase the stream of information and make corrupt behavior more likely to be detected.
The complement to this sort of monitoring is efficient sanctioning power, without which
potentially corrupt agents have no inducement to abide by the rules. Democracy and the
rule of law are often advocated as sanctioning systems that can provide external
constraints on government’s actors (Johnston 1998). Democracy as an external constraint
mechanism is, however, potentially hindered by collective action problems and political
corruption. And the “rule of law”- meaning , at a minimum, a political system in which
the government obeys its own laws and applies them consistently, without regard to the
identity or power of particular individuals-is a complex institution: “the exceptional, not
the usual, method of social ordering” (Goodpaster 1999: 27).
C. The third form of anti-corruption strategy intends to renovate government institutions
in ways that supply for internal order along Weberian rantional-legal lines (Weber 1978:
217-26, 956-68). Specific reforms include international monitoring, sanctioning and
inspection mechanisms (internal audit committees, reporting requirements and
disciplinary codes, for example), but enlarge to a greater set of positive and negative
incentives for truthful behavior. These rang from increased official salaries to selective
employment, merit-based promotion and the development of organizational routines that
reproduce habits of formalized, rule-based behavior (for example, Powell and DiMaggio
1991). While such characteristics are sometimes considered inefficient, there is
verification of a positive relationship between Weberian bureaucracy and economic
growth, even when initial per capita GDP and human capital are controlled for (Evans
and Rausch 1999).
Strategies and policies to shrink corruption by generating interconnected organizations
with strong inner incentive do not always combine easily with strategies to impose
external constraints and accountability on government. Historically, however, most
countries that successfully made the transition to systems of government with relatively
low levels of corruption eventually combined both types of strategy (Silbermann 1993).
Indication about the optimal sequencing of these different types of reform is mixed. Some
European states developed elements of the rule of law well before significant
bureaucratic rationalization occurred. The early introduction of electoral democracy,
however, has presented problems for subsequent bureaucratic rationalization in the
countries such as the Philippines (Sidel 1999). Some dispersion of political power is
essential if political leaders are to have any motivation to create the kinds of de-
personalized government institutions that decrease opportunities for corruption—but
political leaders whose positions are very unconfident and insecure also have petite
motivation to develop capable, incorrupt bureaucracies (Geddes 1994).
4. Afghanistan’s anti-corruption efforts and High Office of Oversight
Almost one decade after the collapse of the Taliban government, corruption has
become more than the standard issue bribery, nepotism, and extortion in government.
Corruption has become a system, through networks of corrupt practices and people that
reach across the whole of government to sabotage governance and administration system.
Particularly, these networks ensure that the guilty are not brought to justice; often the
officials and agencies that are supposed to be part of the solution to corruption are instead
a critical part of the corruption disease.
Corruption is a momentous and growing problem across Afghanistan which destabilizes
security, development and state-building objectives. Pervasive and systematic corruption
is now at an unprecedented scope in the country’s history. The government has or is
developing most of institutions needed to combat corruption. But these institutions, like
the rest of the government, are limited by lack of capacity and unwillingness to prosecute
high level corruption Thus corruption, a symptom of worse and poor governance, caused
a serious threat to Afghanistan’s entire development agenda. It has become widespread,
entrenched and pervasive in Afghanistan. The country’s ranking in Transparency
International’s Corruption Perception Index dropped from 117th
out of 159 countries
covered in 2005 to 172nd of 180 countries in 2007 and subsequently to 176th
out of 180
countries in 2008 (i.e. fifth-worst in the world). Finally, Afghanistan has positioned 180th
out of 182 countries in 2011 (Transparency International 2005; 2011).
Year (2005- 2011) Number of Countries Afghanistan’s Rank Afghanistan’s Score
( Out of 10)
2005 158 117 2.5
2006 163 NA NA
2007 179 172 1.8
2008 180 176 1.5
2009 180 179 1.3
2010 178 176 1.4
2011 182 180 1.5
Source: International Transparency
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of Countries 158
Afghanistan’s Rank 117
Afghanistan’s Score ( Out
of 10) 2.5 NA
High rate of corruption significantly impacts in judicial, financial management and
service delivery of government most Afghans have little confidence in the formal justice
system. Some have claimed that the justice sector is the most corrupt in the country.
Investigators, prosecutors and judges are too often part of the problem, not the solution.
People saw justice as a commodity, they bought and sold. Many, especially those outside
the cities, turn not to courts for justice and dispute resolution but rather to community
structures (USAID 2009: 7).
Corruption affects natural resource extraction which is an essential development
potential. Afghanistan has substantial undeveloped sub-soil resources of many types.
Developing these resources, especially in ways that support the foundation and extension
of upstream and downstream linkages through inputs as well as processing, may afford
for considerable economic growth, employ expansion, tax revenues, and business growth
(USAID 2009: 6). Pervasive corruption can also make donors more unwilling to offer
funds through Afghan government budget channels, despite the findings of earlier and
recent assessments of public financial management performance that financial controls
and fiduciary standards are adequate and diminish the risk of fraud and other misuse of
budgetary funds (World Bank 2009: 2).
Further effect of corruption is uncommunicativeness in the media and civil society to slot
in with government – either to work with officials and elected leaders or on the other
hand to serve as watchdogs on their operations. In general, non-government organizations
have been created to deliver services and support particular groups, such as women. In
general, their interest in advocacy is low, let alone pushing on general issues of
governance like corruption. NGOs and the media can be intimidated by powerful local
interests. The “mafia” does threaten organizations, sometimes directly with violence, and
other times indirectly by pressuring business to reduce support and advertising. However,
more proactive task by civil society organizations and the media is necessary to shine the
light on government practices and combat corruption (USAID 2009: 7).
One of the considerable and fundamental issues of democracy and state building is
education, corruption weakens education system significantly. In adequate salaries
driving teachers to concentrate on personal tutoring, bribes for grades, teacher
performance/competency evaluation and salaries are beginning to be addressed by the
Ministry of Education (MoED). Corruption has affected the higher levels of public
bureaucrats in Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), where university degrees can be
bought, often after students buy their way in and through their courses. New measures
and legislation should be undertaken to oversight responsibilities of MoHE of emerging
private universities in Afghanistan (USAID 2009: 5).
Furthermore, corruptions represent a solemn warning to Afghanistan’s state-building and
development programs. The serious threats include, in addition to depletion and loss of
funds and public sector’s assets; distortion of government decisions and strategies;
ineffectiveness of service delivery; unequal damage to the poor who can least afford to
pay bribes; adverse effects on private sector; loss of government assets and revenue; and
entrenchment of a criminal culture within the government (including buying and selling
of governmental positions).
In spite of strong statements against corruption by governmental bureaucrats, little
tangible evolution has been achieved in combat against corruption. The argument used to
be that the institutional environment for combating corruption in Afghanistan is
characterized by “a lack of clear policy support, explicit legal frameworks,
leadership, capability and/or clarity of functions in the different integrity institutions”
UNDP 2008), Central to these efforts is the High Office of Oversight (HOO), which was
created by Presidential Decree in July 2008. The dedicated AC agency has limited but
critical technical responsibilities and authority, but will provide oversight and technical
assistance to other key government agencies.
A high-level inter-institutional committee set up by President and has completed its
report which is now available, but this report is widely considered not to constitute a full-
blown anti-corruption strategy. More generally, “A number of separate, overlapping, and
to some extent competing government anti-corruption documents are in circulation
(including the Afghanistan National Development Strategy’s anticorruption document,
the anti-corruption roadmap paper, and others), which leads to risk of confusion and lack
of broad ownership of a clear anti-corruption agenda” (World Bank 2009: 2).
The legal framework to fight against corruption in Afghanistan is not clear enough and
the institutional arrangements are so weak like other governmental organs, moreover,
many organizations are working in isolation without coordination with Anti-corruption
agencies. There are lacks of political supports and interference by president, which is an
evident, that undermines the fight against corruption. Above all, lack of limited capacity
presents a grave constraint hindering anti-corruption efforts. Recently some progress has
been made on the legal and institutional front. Some new anti-corruption laws have been
adopted, under which a new anti-corruption agency (i.e. The High Office for Monitoring
Implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy) has been established and it is directly
reporting to the president. Under new law, GIAAC is abolished. However, there are some
enduring technical issues with the new law, and more commonly the extent to which the
new legal and institutional arrangements may achieve better consequences than past
efforts, is not yet clear. Moreover, United Nations Convention Against Corruption
(UNCAC) has been ratified by Parliament, and the government is working with UN
organization on Drug and Crime (UNODC) to make Afghanistan’s laws consistent with
UNCAC. The current problem is that the HOO is not an independent agency, but has
been established within the Office of the President (USAID 2009; World Bank 2009,
The operations of all anti-corruption agencies are limited by a lack of capacity, rivalries
and poor integration, and an unwillingness to pursue and prosecute high-level corruption.
With development, the HOO may be able to both boost capacity and address integration.
But the HOO is not a substitute for high-level anti-corruption efforts in other institutions.
The HOO can nudge these other bodies and assist them – but cannot drive the needed
processes themselves. Monthly meetings of the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission
(AC), chaired by the President, with the HOO participating and serving as the secretariat,
are the lever to push ministries and departments into building anti corruption capacity,
integrate actions across the government, and prosecute corrupt actions (USAID 2009:
Summing up, the problem of corruption faced by Afghanistan is horrible, and urgent
actions are needed to improve the situation. There should be different anti-corruption
efforts as, a broad-based, multi-faceted, sustained medium-term effort. By itself, just
trying to catch and punish corrupt officials will not work or be sustainable. It needs a
holistic approach which co-ordinates all pillars and elements of anti-corruption strategy
(prevention through systems and capacity improvements, law enforcement,
administrative measures, consciousness rising, and external accountability). It is
important to have an anti-corruption lens because corruption is a cross-cutting issue. We
should not expect sudden, major infiltrate in the short run, but significant development,
sustained over time, is crucial.
5. Pakistan’s National Anti-corruption Strategy
Pakistan is making headlines in the globe on corruption these days and contemporary
discourse within the country has been focused on this issue in the recent past. In fact,
corruption and corrupt practices continue in one form or the other, only to raise their
head. The administration and bureaucratic System of Pakistan is rooted in the
administration system of British India. Pakistan had adapted the structure from the Indian
Civil Service (ICS). The arrangement was designed, mainly, to preserve order and collect
taxes (Chowdhury 1972: 12). District officers were the key stone of the administration.
They collected revenue, ran the police and were the head magistrates of their districts.
Later it changes to a centralized system.” It was important to the British that the
executive and judiciary should not be separated: unrepresentative rulers need to block
challenges to their authority” (Duncan 1989).
It is useful to note that corruption was mentioned as one of the ailments afflicting
territories constituting Pakistan by the founder of the country, (i.e. Pakistan inherited
corruption since its foundation), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in his first address to the
Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947. He said: “One of the biggest curses from
which India is suffering—I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think our
condition is much worse—is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put
that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it
is possible for this Assembly to do so” (Jinnah 1947).
State employees across different institutions of the state engage in various forms of
corrupt practices. These range from basic bribery and extortion of individuals and
businesses to various forms of domestic and international payment on procurement of
materials and services. In general, one can observe and distinguish state-led corruption by
civil bureaucrats, the armed forces and politicians.
Pakistan has shaped notably on the list of corrupt countries. In 1998, the World Bank
estimated corruption in Pakistan close to 10% of GDP (Khan et al., 2004). The country is
being fast dumped by its manpower because of being victims of corruption and left with
no prospects of progression
Pakistan’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI)
has constantly been among the lowest:
Year (2005-2011) Number of Countries Pakistan’s Rank Pakistan’s Score
(Out of 10)
2005 158 144 2.1
2006 163 142 2.2
2007 179 138 2.4
2008 180 134 2.5
2009 180 139 2.4
2010 178 143 2.3
2011 182 134 2.5
Source: Transparency International
2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
Number of Countries
Pakistan’s Score (Out of
A large amount of the bribery carried out by the state, is executed through the civil
bureaucracy. Ranging from petty bribes to the policeman or building authority clerk to
major payment on procurement, civil bureaucrats are the ‘deal executors? They are in the
circle for the simple reason that they carry out the certification and are most familiar with
rules and regulations, as well as the gap and lacunae that exist. However, apart from the
petty bribes and extortion, for the most part the civil administration is not the sole
applicant of big-ticket corruption. Over the years, the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has
lost its thump and political power to the executive and legislature, whether military or
civilian (Samad 2008).
Compare to anti-corruption policies in Afghanistan, the National Accountability Bureau
Ordinance 1999 (NAB) is the most comprehensive piece of legislation to date in Pakistan
to combat corruption. It gives NAB unique and unprecedented powers. The preamble sets
the tone for what NAB was proclaimed to achieve by aiming for “effective measures for
the detection, investigation, speedy disposal of cases of corruption, corrupt practices,
misuse or abuse of power” (NAB 1999: 1).
The director of NAB is appointed by the President of Pakistan, making it a political
appointment. After an amendment in 2001 in the NAB Ordinance, further security of
term was granted to the chairperson by equating his/her terms of appointment with that of
a Supreme Court judge, who can only be removed by the Supreme Judicial Council, a
constitutional body. But in Afghanistan the director of HOO is appointed by the
president. After an amendment in the NAB Ordinance in 2002, NAB has multiple tasks
and also responsible for enhancing awareness about corruption and for its prevention. It
has prepared a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS). The awareness campaign has
found allies in the educational sector and the media such as poster competitions for
students and public television debate on corruption (Hafiez, 2005).
Contrary to Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has launched the most significant
institutional reforms which are the decentralization and separation of powers through the
local government ordinance, 2001. This ordinance encourages and gives special role to
the civil society, community representatives to participate in development programs.
Other initiatives include civil service reforms, judicial reforms and separation of
accounting functions from the auditor-general’s office etc. During a mission to Pakistan
in April 2002, Transparency International praised the government for these measures but
also pointed to a range of areas where further reforms were needed such as freedom of
information legislation, overhauling the public procurement system and bringing the
military and judiciary under NAB (Ham et al.2007). A conspicuous gap is insufficient
implementation of the existing reforms in this area though the police force is one of the
most corrupt institutions of the country (Samad 2008: 97).
A distinct and single anticorruption institution cannot function as an omnipotent and
supreme institution. In order to combat and eradicate corruption it is necessary to reform
all governmental institutions and make them capable of effectively implementing their
mandate and developing coordination and inter linkages among entities. Among
underlying theoretical models, monitoring and incentives programmes are typically based
on the principal–agent model. In this model the „principal‟, who are population at large,
wants to achieve some goals and the “agent”, typically a civil servant to implement this
goal. It is often difficult for the principal to know if the agent is achieving the principal’s
goal or following his or her own agenda, given that the end goal can be difficult to
observe. Monitoring and incentives model increases the probability of agent’s
punishment, who is engaging in corrupt activities. Therefore, monitoring is not effective
without incentives agendas. The anti-corruption strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan
should include Monitoring and incentives programs to increase the efficiency of policies.
Structurally, NAB follows the Hong Kong model i.e. it is allocated functions of
investigation, prosecution, prevention and awareness. The success of this model depends
upon a number of conditions including: support from government; independence of
anticorruption entities from government; components of a national anti-corruption
strategy; levels of corruption that allow the agency to manage them; governance activities
with different incentives to reduce corruption; and appropriate legal frameworks to
follow cases through the courts.
Internally, the agency should be financially independent and have sufficient resources
and appropriate staffing; clear strategic and operational objectives; operational
independence and freedom from political interference; high levels of integrity in its
leaders and competency among staff; public understanding and confidence in the agency
(Doig et al., 2006). However, as can be seen from the above discussion, many of these
conditions do not yet exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s institutions.
Effectiveness of HOO and NAB would require high political commitment, accountability
of these entities to an elected body such as the parliament and overall governance reforms
to create an enabling environment.
Challenges and Recommendations
• Firstly, given these countries’ (Afghanistan and Pakistan) economic problems and
political fragility, it is unlikely to expect reforms to eradicate corruption in a few
months. Reforms should concentrate on role of information and foreign
constraints- a free press, broad auditing, democratic controls, the courts and
external strain from international institutions.
• Secondly, there should be adequate legal support for the ACA to investigate
corruption. To investigate corruption and carry out effective enforcement a
government needs strong power and political will by passing effective
• Thirdly, the ACA should be independent in implementing of its enforcement work
without political obstructions and interference.
• Afghanistan and Pakistan need to adopt a zero tolerance policy on corruption. If
there is a mutual standard in the society, where small corruption is tolerated in
private sector, then it is unfeasible for the society to eradicate corruption and
• Fighting corruption is a challenging task; therefore, you do need very
professional, intelligent and knowledgeable staffs. Thus anti-corruption agents
must be very professional.
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