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Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
Anti corruption in afghanistan
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Anti corruption in afghanistan

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  • 1. 1 Universität Konstanz Politik- und Verwaltungswissenschaften Wintersemester 2011/2012 Comparative Policy Analysis Dr. Jale Tosun Efficiency of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan What has worked and what hasn’t Submitted by: Ahmad Rashid Jamal Born 28/01/1985 Martikelnr: 01/778825 Hindeburg Str. 7 78467 Konstanz Winter semester 2011/12, paper handed in 15/04/2012
  • 2. 2 Efficiency of Anti-Corruption Strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan Abstract Corruption is a severe problem in many Asian countries especially in Afghanistan and Pakistan, judging from their ranking and scores on Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). This paper assesses the effectiveness of anti- corruption strategies and the accountability of anti-corruption agencies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It starts with a general background regarding the practice and control of corruption. It then gives some information about Afghanistan and Pakistan’s administrative set-up. This is followed by an overview of the problem of corruption in Afghanistan and Pakistan and then, an analysis of the anti-corruption policies in terms of its mandate. Corruption in Afghanistan and Pakistan is horrible, and urgent actions are needed to improve the situation. To be effective, anticorruption strategies must include numerous exertions to reduce corruption as, broad-based, multi-faceted, and sustained medium-term efforts. This paper will answer the question that, Do Anti-corruption Agencies (ACAs) have the potential to turn into effective organizations by themselves, while the implementations of anticorruption policies require several agencies? 1. Introduction The nuisance of corruption has links to a mass of vices. Its roots are linked to injustice, mistrust, suspicion, extremism and terrorist activities. It creates a sense of insecurity, aggravates poverty and adds to the calamity of the vulnerable segments of the society. It also instills a sense of hopelessness and misery and threatens the potency of good values which have been established over centuries of civilized struggle. The term corruption has various definitions. The United Nations Manual on Anti- Corruption, the Transparency International, and the multilateral financial institutions like the World Bank and Asian Development Bank define corruption as, “abuse of public office for private gains” (USAID 2009; UNCAC 2006; World Bank 2009). The decisive victim of corruption and poverty is the human dignity itself. Hence it causes contravene in the social order and emerges as a latent threat to the prosperity and stability of human civilization. Corruption in government spending leads to severe decline in impact of improvements and results in continuous increase in cost of upholding of public assets. This paper analyses the features of anti-corruption strategies and agencies of Afghanistan and Pakistan. Therefore, this paper asses to address the questions: 1.Can
  • 3. 3 anti-corruption policies combat corruption with a particular agency or a jointly campaign is needed? What are the essential preconditions to anti-corruption agencies and strategies? While the implementation of anticorruption acts by several anti-corruption agencies can spread and intensify anti-corruption campaign, as of in India, the Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) is implemented by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), and the anti-corruption bureaus and vigilance commissions at the state level (Quah, 2003: 66). Similarly, the Philippines have relied on 18 anti-corruption agencies to enforce anti-corruption strategies since the Integrity Board was formed by President Quirino in May 1950 (Batalla, 2001, p. 47; Oyamada, 2005, pp.99-101). This paper compares the performance of the anti-corruption laws by assessing the extent to which these two ACAs have met the four conditions of ACAs. It is essential to illustrate the four crucial functions of the Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs). To combat corruption these countries should rely on the endorsement of anti-corruption policies without a specific agency (i.e. Anti-corruption office or High office of oversight). 2. Functions and Characterization of Anti-Corruption Agencies ACAs are recognized by governments for the explicit aim of minimizing corruption in their countries (i.e. High Office of Oversight in Afghanistan and National Accountability Bureau). According to John R. Heilbrunn (2006) important functions and features of ACAs are as follows: 1. The universal model, which is used in Hong Kong. It was characterized with its investigative, deterrent, and communicative functions. 2. The investigative model is exemplified by centralized investigative commission as operates in Singapore’s CPIB. 3. The parliamentary model distinguished by commissions that report to parliamentary committees and are independent from other branches of state (i.e. executive and judicial). For example, the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption.
  • 4. 4 4. The multi-agency model includes different agencies to combat corruption. Beside this, they are autonomous with preventive approach as, the United States Office of Government Ethics that complements the Justice Department and its investigative role (P. 136). 3. Components of Anti-Corruptions Strategies Corruption passes on to the use of public office for private gain in ways that breach declared rules. Bribery, extortion and fraud, for example, are classified as corruption when they entail the use of executive administrators or bureaucrats. Corruption potentially occurs in all branches of government—the bureaucracy, the armed forces (police and military army), the courts and legislative institutions—and can rage from small-scale transactions involving relatively low level officials to the comprehensive pillage of public resources by those at the very top of the opinionated and political structure. While corruption, involves those in official positions, it also frequently involves members of society, as victims or co-beneficiaries. Nonetheless, it is the involvement of office-holders that makes corruption vitally different from other types of misdeed and crime (USAID 2009: 7-12; World Bank 2009). Strategies to reduce corruption regularly conceptualize it as a principal agent problem: abuses occur because the public (the principal) is unable to manage and control the performance and behavior of political and bureaucratic agent. While the decisive set of principals consists of the general public, principal-agent problems can be simulated within government organizations and amongst different parts of government ( Solnick 1998; Rose Ackerman 1999). Some sorts of corruption are also sustained and continued by a momentous collective action problem: because the costs of corruption are often socialized, conniving in corruption may be individually rational for members of the public, even when they have collective interest in averting it. This collective and joint action problem facade the more anti-corruption strategies rely on the general public playing a vigorous function as a set of principals.
  • 5. 5 Anti-corruption policies/strategies entail the composition of a set of incentives (both positive and negative) for “rule-abiding” behavior by agents who are both self-absorbed and opportunistic. Through rule (policy, strategy) and institutional reforms, their aim is to shrink occasions for corruption, compose corrupt behavior more pricey to the agents, enhance the probability of its exposure and positively prize non-corrupt behavior. Doing this in extremely corrupt government systems is extraordinary intricate and difficult. Not only may institutions for identifying and penalizing corruption (Committees of parliament, audit and courts agencies, for example) themselves be corrupt, but the rational idea that corruption, once established, tends to endure accords with more formal replica of performance. Because an assessment of likelihood that corrupt action will be detected and punished is essential to an agent’s analysis of whether it is more rewarding to break the rules or abide by them, the professed level of corruption manipulates an agent’s decision to act corruptly, and is therefore a major determinant of the level of corruption (Bardhan 1997: 1,331-4). The more corruption becomes stabilized and normalized, the more a culture of corruption develops. Strategies to condense and reduce corruption are classified into three core categories: A. Policy change: It raises the cost and price of corruption through sanctions and external monitoring; with formulating systems of provoke self-restraint within government organizations. Corruption can only occur when government actors have prudence over the use of resources or the nuisance of costs on private actors. If the policies and programs that give rise to this prudence are themselves eliminated, the particular forms of corruption related with them inevitably vanish (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 39-42). While plans such as significance licensing, finance loans and government commercial activity are productive soil for corruption, a deregulatory key nevertheless has some limitations. First, corruption can undermine the implementation of certain types of deregulatory policy: import tariffs, for example, may be abolished but unofficial levies may still be imposed. Second, the prescription to deregulate may be politically naïve (McLeod 2000) - as in Afghanistan – powerful actors have an interest in economic controls and the opportunities for corruption that they generate. Third, getting rid of the
  • 6. 6 scope for discretion among government actors is frequently undesirable: many forms of guideline have sound economic and social. Privatization, for example, may simply open up new avenues for corruption if pursued in the absence of an autonomous judiciary and plausible enforcement institutions (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 43). B. The second kind in which anti-corruption strategies fall is that of resolving the principal-agent problem that underlies corruption by imposing peripheral and external restriction on government actors. If the reason for agency problems is that principals lack information, procedures, which provide information and authorize principals, should help resolve them. Hence observing and auditing institutions such as a free press and independent inspection and audit panels, the incorporation of community representatives in monitoring bodies, and laws that mandate transparency are all mechanisms that increase the stream of information and make corrupt behavior more likely to be detected. The complement to this sort of monitoring is efficient sanctioning power, without which potentially corrupt agents have no inducement to abide by the rules. Democracy and the rule of law are often advocated as sanctioning systems that can provide external constraints on government’s actors (Johnston 1998). Democracy as an external constraint mechanism is, however, potentially hindered by collective action problems and political corruption. And the “rule of law”- meaning , at a minimum, a political system in which the government obeys its own laws and applies them consistently, without regard to the identity or power of particular individuals-is a complex institution: “the exceptional, not the usual, method of social ordering” (Goodpaster 1999: 27). C. The third form of anti-corruption strategy intends to renovate government institutions in ways that supply for internal order along Weberian rantional-legal lines (Weber 1978: 217-26, 956-68). Specific reforms include international monitoring, sanctioning and inspection mechanisms (internal audit committees, reporting requirements and disciplinary codes, for example), but enlarge to a greater set of positive and negative incentives for truthful behavior. These rang from increased official salaries to selective employment, merit-based promotion and the development of organizational routines that reproduce habits of formalized, rule-based behavior (for example, Powell and DiMaggio
  • 7. 7 1991). While such characteristics are sometimes considered inefficient, there is verification of a positive relationship between Weberian bureaucracy and economic growth, even when initial per capita GDP and human capital are controlled for (Evans and Rausch 1999). Strategies and policies to shrink corruption by generating interconnected organizations with strong inner incentive do not always combine easily with strategies to impose external constraints and accountability on government. Historically, however, most countries that successfully made the transition to systems of government with relatively low levels of corruption eventually combined both types of strategy (Silbermann 1993). Indication about the optimal sequencing of these different types of reform is mixed. Some European states developed elements of the rule of law well before significant bureaucratic rationalization occurred. The early introduction of electoral democracy, however, has presented problems for subsequent bureaucratic rationalization in the countries such as the Philippines (Sidel 1999). Some dispersion of political power is essential if political leaders are to have any motivation to create the kinds of de- personalized government institutions that decrease opportunities for corruption—but political leaders whose positions are very unconfident and insecure also have petite motivation to develop capable, incorrupt bureaucracies (Geddes 1994). 4. Afghanistan’s anti-corruption efforts and High Office of Oversight Almost one decade after the collapse of the Taliban government, corruption has become more than the standard issue bribery, nepotism, and extortion in government. Corruption has become a system, through networks of corrupt practices and people that reach across the whole of government to sabotage governance and administration system. Particularly, these networks ensure that the guilty are not brought to justice; often the officials and agencies that are supposed to be part of the solution to corruption are instead a critical part of the corruption disease. Corruption is a momentous and growing problem across Afghanistan which destabilizes security, development and state-building objectives. Pervasive and systematic corruption
  • 8. 8 is now at an unprecedented scope in the country’s history. The government has or is developing most of institutions needed to combat corruption. But these institutions, like the rest of the government, are limited by lack of capacity and unwillingness to prosecute high level corruption Thus corruption, a symptom of worse and poor governance, caused a serious threat to Afghanistan’s entire development agenda. It has become widespread, entrenched and pervasive in Afghanistan. The country’s ranking in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index dropped from 117th out of 159 countries covered in 2005 to 172nd of 180 countries in 2007 and subsequently to 176th out of 180 countries in 2008 (i.e. fifth-worst in the world). Finally, Afghanistan has positioned 180th out of 182 countries in 2011 (Transparency International 2005; 2011). Year (2005- 2011) Number of Countries Afghanistan’s Rank Afghanistan’s Score ( Out of 10) 2005 158 117 2.5 2006 163 NA NA 2007 179 172 1.8 2008 180 176 1.5 2009 180 179 1.3 2010 178 176 1.4 2011 182 180 1.5 Source: International Transparency
  • 9. 9 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Number of Countries 158 163 Afghanistan’s Rank 117 NA Afghanistan’s Score ( Out of 10) 2.5 NA High rate of corruption significantly impacts in judicial, financial management and service delivery of government most Afghans have little confidence in the formal justice system. Some have claimed that the justice sector is the most corrupt in the country. Investigators, prosecutors and judges are too often part of the problem, not the solution. People saw justice as a commodity, they bought and sold. Many, especially those outside the cities, turn not to courts for justice and dispute resolution but rather to community structures (USAID 2009: 7). Corruption affects natural resource extraction which is an essential development potential. Afghanistan has substantial undeveloped sub-soil resources of many types. Developing these resources, especially in ways that support the foundation and extension of upstream and downstream linkages through inputs as well as processing, may afford for considerable economic growth, employ expansion, tax revenues, and business growth (USAID 2009: 6). Pervasive corruption can also make donors more unwilling to offer funds through Afghan government budget channels, despite the findings of earlier and recent assessments of public financial management performance that financial controls and fiduciary standards are adequate and diminish the risk of fraud and other misuse of budgetary funds (World Bank 2009: 2).
  • 10. 10 Further effect of corruption is uncommunicativeness in the media and civil society to slot in with government – either to work with officials and elected leaders or on the other hand to serve as watchdogs on their operations. In general, non-government organizations have been created to deliver services and support particular groups, such as women. In general, their interest in advocacy is low, let alone pushing on general issues of governance like corruption. NGOs and the media can be intimidated by powerful local interests. The “mafia” does threaten organizations, sometimes directly with violence, and other times indirectly by pressuring business to reduce support and advertising. However, more proactive task by civil society organizations and the media is necessary to shine the light on government practices and combat corruption (USAID 2009: 7). One of the considerable and fundamental issues of democracy and state building is education, corruption weakens education system significantly. In adequate salaries driving teachers to concentrate on personal tutoring, bribes for grades, teacher performance/competency evaluation and salaries are beginning to be addressed by the Ministry of Education (MoED). Corruption has affected the higher levels of public bureaucrats in Ministry of Higher Education (MoHE), where university degrees can be bought, often after students buy their way in and through their courses. New measures and legislation should be undertaken to oversight responsibilities of MoHE of emerging private universities in Afghanistan (USAID 2009: 5). Furthermore, corruptions represent a solemn warning to Afghanistan’s state-building and development programs. The serious threats include, in addition to depletion and loss of funds and public sector’s assets; distortion of government decisions and strategies; ineffectiveness of service delivery; unequal damage to the poor who can least afford to pay bribes; adverse effects on private sector; loss of government assets and revenue; and entrenchment of a criminal culture within the government (including buying and selling of governmental positions). In spite of strong statements against corruption by governmental bureaucrats, little tangible evolution has been achieved in combat against corruption. The argument used to
  • 11. 11 be that the institutional environment for combating corruption in Afghanistan is characterized by “a lack of clear policy support, explicit legal frameworks, leadership, capability and/or clarity of functions in the different integrity institutions” UNDP 2008), Central to these efforts is the High Office of Oversight (HOO), which was created by Presidential Decree in July 2008. The dedicated AC agency has limited but critical technical responsibilities and authority, but will provide oversight and technical assistance to other key government agencies. A high-level inter-institutional committee set up by President and has completed its report which is now available, but this report is widely considered not to constitute a full- blown anti-corruption strategy. More generally, “A number of separate, overlapping, and to some extent competing government anti-corruption documents are in circulation (including the Afghanistan National Development Strategy’s anticorruption document, the anti-corruption roadmap paper, and others), which leads to risk of confusion and lack of broad ownership of a clear anti-corruption agenda” (World Bank 2009: 2). The legal framework to fight against corruption in Afghanistan is not clear enough and the institutional arrangements are so weak like other governmental organs, moreover, many organizations are working in isolation without coordination with Anti-corruption agencies. There are lacks of political supports and interference by president, which is an evident, that undermines the fight against corruption. Above all, lack of limited capacity presents a grave constraint hindering anti-corruption efforts. Recently some progress has been made on the legal and institutional front. Some new anti-corruption laws have been adopted, under which a new anti-corruption agency (i.e. The High Office for Monitoring Implementation of the Anti-corruption Strategy) has been established and it is directly reporting to the president. Under new law, GIAAC is abolished. However, there are some enduring technical issues with the new law, and more commonly the extent to which the new legal and institutional arrangements may achieve better consequences than past efforts, is not yet clear. Moreover, United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) has been ratified by Parliament, and the government is working with UN organization on Drug and Crime (UNODC) to make Afghanistan’s laws consistent with UNCAC. The current problem is that the HOO is not an independent agency, but has
  • 12. 12 been established within the Office of the President (USAID 2009; World Bank 2009, ADB 2010). The operations of all anti-corruption agencies are limited by a lack of capacity, rivalries and poor integration, and an unwillingness to pursue and prosecute high-level corruption. With development, the HOO may be able to both boost capacity and address integration. But the HOO is not a substitute for high-level anti-corruption efforts in other institutions. The HOO can nudge these other bodies and assist them – but cannot drive the needed processes themselves. Monthly meetings of the High-Level Anti-Corruption Commission (AC), chaired by the President, with the HOO participating and serving as the secretariat, are the lever to push ministries and departments into building anti corruption capacity, integrate actions across the government, and prosecute corrupt actions (USAID 2009: 12). Summing up, the problem of corruption faced by Afghanistan is horrible, and urgent actions are needed to improve the situation. There should be different anti-corruption efforts as, a broad-based, multi-faceted, sustained medium-term effort. By itself, just trying to catch and punish corrupt officials will not work or be sustainable. It needs a holistic approach which co-ordinates all pillars and elements of anti-corruption strategy (prevention through systems and capacity improvements, law enforcement, administrative measures, consciousness rising, and external accountability). It is important to have an anti-corruption lens because corruption is a cross-cutting issue. We should not expect sudden, major infiltrate in the short run, but significant development, sustained over time, is crucial. 5. Pakistan’s National Anti-corruption Strategy Pakistan is making headlines in the globe on corruption these days and contemporary discourse within the country has been focused on this issue in the recent past. In fact, corruption and corrupt practices continue in one form or the other, only to raise their head. The administration and bureaucratic System of Pakistan is rooted in the administration system of British India. Pakistan had adapted the structure from the Indian Civil Service (ICS). The arrangement was designed, mainly, to preserve order and collect
  • 13. 13 taxes (Chowdhury 1972: 12). District officers were the key stone of the administration. They collected revenue, ran the police and were the head magistrates of their districts. Later it changes to a centralized system.” It was important to the British that the executive and judiciary should not be separated: unrepresentative rulers need to block challenges to their authority” (Duncan 1989). It is useful to note that corruption was mentioned as one of the ailments afflicting territories constituting Pakistan by the founder of the country, (i.e. Pakistan inherited corruption since its foundation), Mohammad Ali Jinnah, in his first address to the Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947. He said: “One of the biggest curses from which India is suffering—I do not say that other countries are free from it, but, I think our condition is much worse—is bribery and corruption. That really is a poison. We must put that down with an iron hand and I hope that you will take adequate measures as soon as it is possible for this Assembly to do so” (Jinnah 1947). State employees across different institutions of the state engage in various forms of corrupt practices. These range from basic bribery and extortion of individuals and businesses to various forms of domestic and international payment on procurement of materials and services. In general, one can observe and distinguish state-led corruption by civil bureaucrats, the armed forces and politicians. Pakistan has shaped notably on the list of corrupt countries. In 1998, the World Bank estimated corruption in Pakistan close to 10% of GDP (Khan et al., 2004). The country is being fast dumped by its manpower because of being victims of corruption and left with no prospects of progression Pakistan’s ranking on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) has constantly been among the lowest:
  • 14. 14 Year (2005-2011) Number of Countries Pakistan’s Rank Pakistan’s Score (Out of 10) 2005 158 144 2.1 2006 163 142 2.2 2007 179 138 2.4 2008 180 134 2.5 2009 180 139 2.4 2010 178 143 2.3 2011 182 134 2.5 Source: Transparency International 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 Number of Countries Pakistan’s Rank Pakistan’s Score (Out of 10) A large amount of the bribery carried out by the state, is executed through the civil bureaucracy. Ranging from petty bribes to the policeman or building authority clerk to major payment on procurement, civil bureaucrats are the ‘deal executors? They are in the circle for the simple reason that they carry out the certification and are most familiar with rules and regulations, as well as the gap and lacunae that exist. However, apart from the petty bribes and extortion, for the most part the civil administration is not the sole applicant of big-ticket corruption. Over the years, the civil bureaucracy in Pakistan has lost its thump and political power to the executive and legislature, whether military or civilian (Samad 2008).
  • 15. 15 Compare to anti-corruption policies in Afghanistan, the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance 1999 (NAB) is the most comprehensive piece of legislation to date in Pakistan to combat corruption. It gives NAB unique and unprecedented powers. The preamble sets the tone for what NAB was proclaimed to achieve by aiming for “effective measures for the detection, investigation, speedy disposal of cases of corruption, corrupt practices, misuse or abuse of power” (NAB 1999: 1). The director of NAB is appointed by the President of Pakistan, making it a political appointment. After an amendment in 2001 in the NAB Ordinance, further security of term was granted to the chairperson by equating his/her terms of appointment with that of a Supreme Court judge, who can only be removed by the Supreme Judicial Council, a constitutional body. But in Afghanistan the director of HOO is appointed by the president. After an amendment in the NAB Ordinance in 2002, NAB has multiple tasks and also responsible for enhancing awareness about corruption and for its prevention. It has prepared a National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS). The awareness campaign has found allies in the educational sector and the media such as poster competitions for students and public television debate on corruption (Hafiez, 2005). Contrary to Afghanistan, the government of Pakistan has launched the most significant institutional reforms which are the decentralization and separation of powers through the local government ordinance, 2001. This ordinance encourages and gives special role to the civil society, community representatives to participate in development programs. Other initiatives include civil service reforms, judicial reforms and separation of accounting functions from the auditor-general’s office etc. During a mission to Pakistan in April 2002, Transparency International praised the government for these measures but also pointed to a range of areas where further reforms were needed such as freedom of information legislation, overhauling the public procurement system and bringing the military and judiciary under NAB (Ham et al.2007). A conspicuous gap is insufficient implementation of the existing reforms in this area though the police force is one of the most corrupt institutions of the country (Samad 2008: 97).
  • 16. 16 Conclusion A distinct and single anticorruption institution cannot function as an omnipotent and supreme institution. In order to combat and eradicate corruption it is necessary to reform all governmental institutions and make them capable of effectively implementing their mandate and developing coordination and inter linkages among entities. Among underlying theoretical models, monitoring and incentives programmes are typically based on the principal–agent model. In this model the „principal‟, who are population at large, wants to achieve some goals and the “agent”, typically a civil servant to implement this goal. It is often difficult for the principal to know if the agent is achieving the principal’s goal or following his or her own agenda, given that the end goal can be difficult to observe. Monitoring and incentives model increases the probability of agent’s punishment, who is engaging in corrupt activities. Therefore, monitoring is not effective without incentives agendas. The anti-corruption strategies in Afghanistan and Pakistan should include Monitoring and incentives programs to increase the efficiency of policies. Structurally, NAB follows the Hong Kong model i.e. it is allocated functions of investigation, prosecution, prevention and awareness. The success of this model depends upon a number of conditions including: support from government; independence of anticorruption entities from government; components of a national anti-corruption strategy; levels of corruption that allow the agency to manage them; governance activities with different incentives to reduce corruption; and appropriate legal frameworks to follow cases through the courts. Internally, the agency should be financially independent and have sufficient resources and appropriate staffing; clear strategic and operational objectives; operational independence and freedom from political interference; high levels of integrity in its leaders and competency among staff; public understanding and confidence in the agency (Doig et al., 2006). However, as can be seen from the above discussion, many of these conditions do not yet exist in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s institutions.
  • 17. 17 Effectiveness of HOO and NAB would require high political commitment, accountability of these entities to an elected body such as the parliament and overall governance reforms to create an enabling environment. Challenges and Recommendations • Firstly, given these countries’ (Afghanistan and Pakistan) economic problems and political fragility, it is unlikely to expect reforms to eradicate corruption in a few months. Reforms should concentrate on role of information and foreign constraints- a free press, broad auditing, democratic controls, the courts and external strain from international institutions. • Secondly, there should be adequate legal support for the ACA to investigate corruption. To investigate corruption and carry out effective enforcement a government needs strong power and political will by passing effective legislations. • Thirdly, the ACA should be independent in implementing of its enforcement work without political obstructions and interference. • Afghanistan and Pakistan need to adopt a zero tolerance policy on corruption. If there is a mutual standard in the society, where small corruption is tolerated in private sector, then it is unfeasible for the society to eradicate corruption and become clean. • Fighting corruption is a challenging task; therefore, you do need very professional, intelligent and knowledgeable staffs. Thus anti-corruption agents must be very professional.
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