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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013
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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013

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The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security ...

The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenets and probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizations and operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also address U.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report, including through U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.

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ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013 Document Transcript

  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaANNUAL REPORTTO CONGRESSMilitary and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2013Office of the Secretary of DefensePreparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $95,000 in Fiscal Years 2012-2013.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaAnnual Report to Congress:Military and Security Developments Involvingthe People’s Republic of China 2013A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act forFiscal Year 2000Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic ofChina,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law 111-84, which amendsthe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section 1202, Public Law 106-65, provides thatthe Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in both classified and unclassified form, on military andsecurity developments involving the People’s Republic of China. The report shall address the current andprobable future course of military-technological development of the People’s Liberation Army and the tenetsand probable development of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizationsand operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shall also addressU.S.-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during the period covered by the report,including through U.S.-China military-to-military contacts, and the U.S. strategy for such engagement andcooperation in the future.”
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaExecutive Summary
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaiTHE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC)continues to pursue a long-term,comprehensive military modernizationprogram designed to improve the capacity ofits armed forces to fight and win short-duration, high-intensity regional militaryconflict. Preparing for potential conflict in theTaiwan Strait appears to remain the principalfocus and primary driver of China’s militaryinvestment. However, as China’s interestshave grown and as it has gained greaterinfluence in the international system, itsmilitary modernization has also becomeincreasingly focused on investments in militarycapabilities to conduct a wider range ofmissions beyond its immediate territorialconcerns, including counter-piracy,peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance/disasterrelief, and regional military operations. Someof these missions and capabilities can addressinternational security challenges, while otherscould serve more narrowly-defined PRCinterests and objectives, including advancingterritorial claims and building influence abroad.To support the Chinese People’s LiberationArmy’s (PLA) expanding set of roles andmissions, China’s leaders in 2012 sustainedinvestment in advanced short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles, land-attack and anti-ship cruise missiles, counter-space weapons, and military cyberspacecapabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) missions (whatPLA strategists refer to as “counter-intervention operations”). The PLA alsocontinued to improve capabilities in nucleardeterrence and long-range conventional strike;advanced fighter aircraft; limited regionalpower projection, with the commissioning ofChina’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning;integrated air defenses; undersea warfare;improved command and control; and moresophisticated training and exercises acrossChina’s air, naval, and land forces.During their January 2011 summit, U.S.President Barack Obama and then-PRCPresident Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that a“healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-militaryrelationship is an essential part of [their] sharedvision for a positive, cooperative, andcomprehensive U.S.-China relationship.”Within that framework, the U.S. Departmentof Defense seeks to build a military-to-militaryrelationship with China that is sustained andsubstantive, while encouraging China tocooperate with the United States, our allies andpartners, and the greater internationalcommunity in the delivery of public goods. Asthe United States builds a stronger foundationfor a military-to-military relationship withChina, it also will continue to monitor China’sevolving military strategy, doctrine, and forcedevelopment and encourage China to be moretransparent about its military modernizationprogram. In concert with its allies and partners,the United States will continue adapting itsforces, posture, and operational concepts tomaintain a stable and secure Asia-Pacificsecurity environment.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaContents
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of ChinaExecutive Summary iChapter 1: Annual Update 1Chapter 2: Understanding China’s Strategy 15Chapter 3: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 29Chapter 4: Resources for Force Modernization 45Chapter 5: Force Modernization for a Taiwan Contingency 55Chapter 6: U.S.-China Military-to-Military Contacts 61Special Topic: Space-Based Imaging and Remote Sensing 65Special Topic: China’s First Aircraft Carrier 65Special Topic: PLA Air Force Stealth Aircraft 66Special Topic: PLA Integrated Air Defenses 67Appendix I: Military-to-Military Exchanges 69Appendix II: China and Taiwan Forces Data 75Appendix III: Additional Maps and Chart 79
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China1ANNUAL UPDATE
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China1DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’SBILATERAL OR MULTILATERALRELATIONSHIPSChina’s military engagement with othercountries seeks to enhance China’sinternational presence and influence byimproving relationships with foreign militaries,bolstering China’s international and regionalimage, and assuaging other countries’concerns about China’s rise. The People’sLiberation Army’s (PLA) engagementactivities assist its modernization through theacquisition of advanced weapons systems andtechnologies, increased operational experienceboth throughout and beyond Asia, and accessto foreign military practices, operationaldoctrine, and training methods.In January 2013, China’s Ministry of NationalDefense released information about the PLA’s2012 military diplomacy, which it stated hadstood severe tests under a difficultinternational and regional situationthroughout the year. In 2012, senior militaryofficials from at least 25 countries visitedChina, including officials from Australia,Germany, Russia and Ukraine. Senior PLAofficials visited at least 33 countries, includingIndia, Poland, Tanzania, and Turkey. ThePLA participated in UN peacekeepingoperations (PKO), carried out humanitarianassistance and disaster relief work in Pakistanand conducted the second global goodwillvoyage of the PLA Navy ZHENG HEtraining vessel. PLA leaders participated invarious multilateral meetings, including theDefense Ministers’ Meeting of the ShanghaiCooperation Organization (SCO) and theAssociation of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) Regional Forum Security PolicyConference.Combined Exercises. PLA participation inbilateral and multilateral exercises isincreasing. The PLA derives political benefitthrough increased influence and enhanced tieswith partner states and organizations. Suchexercises provide the PLA opportunities toimprove capabilities and gain operationalinsights by observing tactics, commanddecision-making, and equipment used bymore advanced militaries.In 2011 and 2012 alone, the PLA held 21 jointexercise and training events with foreignmilitaries, compared to 32 during the entire11thFive-Year Plan period (2006-2010). Theseactivities included military exercises with SCOmembers, naval exercises, ground forcestraining, peacekeeping, and search and rescueoperations/missions. China also conductedjoint training for operations other than war,including the 2011 COOPERATION SPIRIThumanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR) exercise with Australia. Chinaobserved KHAN QUEST-11, a peacekeepingexercise in Mongolia – the first time it haddone so. The PLA Navy conducted maritimeexercises with Russia, Vietnam, and Thailand
  • and counter-piracy exercises with France andthe United States.The PLA Air Force (PLAAF) conductedunprecedented bilateral training during 2011,including its first bilateral air exercise withPakistan and training with air forces in Belarusand Venezuela. In contrast, the PLA AirForce participated in only one bilateralexercise in 2012 – an airborne trainingexercise with Belarus in November. PEACEMISSION 2012, conducted under theauspices of the SCO, did not include PLA AirForce participation as in the past, and insteadfocused on what SCO nations called“counterterrorism” training, which moreclosely resembles training to suppress armedopposition within a member country.Peacekeeping Operations (PKO). Overthe past ten years, China has increased itscommitment to UN PKO by approximatelyten fold, building to its current level ofapproximately 2,000 personnel in 11operations, mostly in sub-Saharan Africa andthe Middle East. This level of support hasbeen steadily maintained since 2008 and is thehighest among the permanent members of theUN Security Council. In total, China hasdeployed more than 21,000 troops to 30 UNmissions and bears 3.93 percent of the UN’scurrent peacekeeping budget of $7.23 billion.PKO participation can serve variousobjectives, including improving China’sinternational image, obtaining operationalexperience, providing opportunities to gatherintelligence, and advancing the PLA’s “NewHistoric Missions” by taking on roles andgenerating capabilities for operations farbeyond China’s borders. China is currentlytaking steps to meet these objectives bycommitting civilian police, military observers,engineers, logistics support, and medicaltroops to UN missions while abstaining frommissions that might result in regime change orlack host country consent.In 2012, China for the first time deployedinfantry to a UN PKO. This “guard unit,” asChinese media described it, is tasked withsecurity for the PLA engineering and medicalformed military units in its contingentdeployed to the United Nations Mission inthe Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS).These forces, likely no more than 50personnel from the 162ndMotorized InfantryDivision, are equipped with armored vehicles,enabling them to provide fixed-site securityand convoy escorts.Chinese Arms Sales. From 2007 to 2011,Chinese arms sales totaled approximately $11billion. As of this report’s publication, datafor 2012 arms sales was not yet available.China primarily conducts arms sales inconjunction with economic aid anddevelopment assistance to support broaderforeign-policy goals such as securing access tonatural resources and export markets,promoting its increasing political influenceamong host-country elites, and building
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China3support in international forums. Arms sales,however, also can reflect the profit-seekingactivities of individual arms trading companiesand efforts to offset defense-related researchand development costs. For example, Chinacontinues to develop and market unmannedaerial vehicles (UAVs) abroad, and in 2012,unveiled a new tactical UAV, the Yi Long,which will likely be marketed to developingcountries.From the perspective of China’s armscustomers (most of whom are developingcountries), Chinese arms are less expensivethan those offered by the top internationalarms suppliers, although they are alsogenerally of lower quality and reliability.Chinese arms also come with fewer politicalstrings attached, which is attractive to thosecustomers who may not have access to othersources of arms for political or economicreasons. China also offers relatively generousterms and flexible payment options to somecustomers.Counter-Piracy Efforts. China continues tosupport counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf ofAden, a commitment which began inDecember 2008. In July 2012, the PLA Navydeployed its 12th escort formation, whichincluded two guided missile frigates and oneoiler. Operational highlights for thisformation included the retrieval of 26 crewmembers of the fishing vessel Xufu-1 fromSomalia following their release by pirates inJuly 2012 (an operation that was recognizedby China’s Central Military Commission); andthe first combined counter-piracy exercisewith the U.S. Navy. After its departure fromthe Gulf of Aden, the 11thescort formationvisited Ukraine and Turkey, and for the firsttime for the PLA Navy, Romania, Bulgariaand Israel. Ships engaged in counter-piracyalso conducted port calls in Australia,Mozambique, and Thailand during 2012.Territorial Disputes. Senior Chinese officialshave identified protecting China’s sovereigntyand territorial integrity as a “core interest” andall officials repeatedly state China’s oppositionto and willingness to respond to actions itperceives as challenging this core interest. In2012, this was demonstrated by Chineseactions at Scarborough Reef in the SouthChina Sea and the Senkaku Islands in the EastChina Sea.The Chinese government maintains that itsmaritime rights extend to virtually the entireSouth China Sea and often illustrates thisclaim using a “nine-dash line” thatencompasses much of the South China Seaarea. At the same time, Beijing is ambiguousabout the precise meaning of the nine-dashline; to date, China has not clarified themeaning of the nine-dash line or its legal basis.In April 2012, Chinese maritime lawenforcement vessels and Philippine coastguard vessels engaged in a protracted standoffat Scarborough Reef, after the PhilippineNavy attempted to conduct a fishingenforcement action against Chinese fishermen.
  • Although overt tensions between China andthe Philippines subsided by year’s end, bothsides continue to claim jurisdiction over thereef. Chinese law enforcement vessels havemaintained an almost continuous presenceever since.In November 2012, China also added a mapwhich contained the nine-dash line to all of itsnew passports. This action elicited negativeresponses from other nations in the Asia-Pacific region. China’s increased reference inofficial government materials to the nine-dashline is a source of concern to its neighborsand other nations because, at a minimum, itcreates an impression that China is not merelyclaiming all the land features within the nine-dash line, but it may also be claiming a specialsovereign status of all the water and the sea-bed contained therein.China claims sovereignty over the SenkakuIslands (what the Chinese refer to as theDiaoyu Islands) in the East China Sea,territory also claimed by Taiwan and Japan.In April 2012, the Governor of Tokyoannounced plans to purchase three of the fiveislets from private Japanese owners. Inresponse, in September 2012, theGovernment of Japan purchased the threeislands. China protested the move and sincethat time has regularly sent maritime lawenforcement ships (and, less often, aircraft) topatrol near the Senkakus to protect its claims;this has included regular Chinese maritimeoperations within 12nm of the islands. OnSeptember 25, China published a white paperentitled, “Diaoyu Dao, an ’Inherent Territory’of China.” In addition, in September 2012,China began using improperly drawn straightbaseline claims around the Senkaku Islands,adding to its network of maritime claimsinconsistent with international law. InDecember 2012, China submitted informationto the U.N. Commission on the Limits of theContinental Shelf regarding China’s extendedcontinental shelf in the East China Sea thatincludes the disputed islands.THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THETAIWAN STRAITDealing with a potential contingency in theTaiwan Strait remains the PLA’s primarymission despite decreasing tensions there - atrend which continued following the re-election of Taiwan President Ma Ying-jeou inJanuary 2012. In this context, shoulddeterrence fail, the PLA could be called uponto compel Taiwan to abandon independenceor to re-unify with the mainland by force ofarms while defeating any third-partyintervention on Taiwan’s behalf.Cross-Strait Stability. China and Taiwanhave reached 18 agreements for cross-Straitcooperation on economic, cultural, andfunctional issues, but Taiwan authorities andthe broader Taiwan public do not supportnegotiation on issues directly related tosovereignty.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China5China and Taiwan have also undertaken somecombined security and police operations, andheld a combined maritime rescue exercise inAugust 2012 featuring two helicopters, 14vessels, and 300 personnel, with both sidesequally represented. Also in August, Chineseand Taiwan police apprehended 30 suspects ina human-trafficking and prostitution ring – afirst collaborative effort to combat humantrafficking.During a mid-October 2011 speech, PresidentMa stated that a cross-Strait peace agreementwith China might be attainable in 10 years, butbacked down immediately in the face ofwidespread negative public reaction and Maspecified the conditions under which hewould pursue such an agreement. Despiteoccasional signs of impatience, China appearscontent to respect Taiwan’s current approachto cross-Strait relations. In November 2012,Xi Jinping, China’s newly selected generalsecretary of the CCP Central Committee senta message to President Ma (in the latter’scapacity as chairman of the rulingKuomintang Party), emphasizing the need tocontinue promoting the peaceful developmentof cross-Strait relations. This early messagesuggests that China under Xi Jinping may bewilling to follow President Hu Jintao’s multi-pronged strategy for developing cross-Straitrelations rather than compelling unificationthrough the use of force. President Hu in hisreport to the 18thParty Congress inNovember 2012 used language that promotedpeaceful reunification and called for bothsides to explore political relations and makereasonable arrangements to discuss thecreation of a military confidence-buildingmechanism.CURRENT CAPABILITIES OF THEPEOPLE’S LIBERATION ARMYSecond Artillery. The Second Artillerycontrols China’s nuclear and conventionalballistic missiles. It is developing and testingseveral new classes and variants of offensivemissiles, forming additional missile units,upgrading older missile systems, anddeveloping methods to counter ballisticmissile defenses.By December 2012, the Second Artillery’sinventory of short-range ballistic missiles(SRBM) deployed to units opposite Taiwanstood at more than 1,100. This numberreflects the delivery of additional missiles andthe fielding of new systems. To improve thelethality of this force, the PLA is alsointroducing new SRBM variants withimproved ranges, accuracies, and payloads.China is fielding a limited but growingnumber of conventionally armed, medium-range ballistic missiles, including the DF-21Danti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM). The DF-21D is based on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5) medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM)and gives the PLA the capability to attacklarge ships, including aircraft carriers, in the
  • western Pacific Ocean. The DF-21D has arange exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with amaneuverable warhead.The Second Artillery continues to modernizeits nuclear forces by enhancing its silo-basedintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) andadding more survivable mobile deliverysystems. In recent years, the road-mobile,solid-propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) intercontinental-range ballistic missiles have entered service.The CSS-10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of11,200 km, can reach most locations withinthe continental United States. China may alsobe developing a new road-mobile ICBM,possibly capable of carrying a multipleindependently targetable re-entry vehicle(MIRV).PLA Navy (PLAN). The PLA Navy has thelargest force of major combatants,submarines, and amphibious warfare ships inAsia. China’s naval forces include some 79principal surface combatants, more than 55submarines, 55 medium and large amphibiousships, and roughly 85 missile-equipped smallcombatants.In the most publicized PLA Navymodernization event of 2012, after a year ofextensive sea trials, China commissioned itsfirst aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, in September2012. The PLA Navy successfully conductedits first launch and recovery of the carrier-capable J-15 fighter on November 26, 2012.The Liaoning will continue integration testingand training with the aircraft during the nextseveral years, but it is not expected to embarkan operational air wing until 2015 or later.China also continues to pursue an indigenousaircraft carrier program (the Liaoning is arefurbished vessel, purchased from Ukraine in1998), and will likely build multiple aircraftcarriers over the next decade. The firstChinese-built carrier will likely be operationalsometime in the second half of this decade.The PLA Navy places a high priority on themodernization of its submarine force. Chinacontinues the production of JIN-classnuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines(SSBN). Three JIN-class SSBNs (Type 094)are currently operational, and up to five mayenter service before China proceeds to its nextgeneration SSBN (Type 096) over the nextdecade. The JIN-class SSBN will carry thenew JL-2 submarine launched ballistic missilewith an estimated range of more than 4,000nm. The JIN-class and the JL-2 will give thePLA Navy its first credible sea-based nucleardeterrent.China also has expanded its force of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). TwoSHANG-class SSNs (Type 093) are already inservice, and China is building four improvedvariants of the SHANG-class SSN, which willreplace the aging HAN-class SSNs (Type091). In the next decade, China will likelyconstruct the Type 095 guided-missile attacksubmarine (SSGN), which may enable a
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China7submarine-based land-attack capability. Inaddition to likely incorporating better quietingtechnologies, the Type 095 will fulfilltraditional anti-ship roles with theincorporation of torpedoes and anti-shipcruise missiles (ASCMs).The current mainstay of the Chinesesubmarine force is modern diesel poweredattack submarines (SS). In addition to 12KILO-class submarines acquired from Russiain the 1990s and 2000s (eight of which areequipped with the SS-N-27 ASCM), the PLANavy possesses 13 SONG-class SS (Type 039)and eight YUAN-class SSP (Type 039A). TheYUAN-class SSP is armed similarly to theSONG-class SS, but also includes an air-independent power system. China may planto construct up to 20 YUAN-class SSPs.Since 2008, the PLA Navy has embarked on arobust surface combatant constructionprogram of various classes of ships, includingguided missile destroyers (DDG) and guidedmissile frigates (FFG). During 2012, Chinacontinued series production of several classes,including construction of a new generation ofDDG. Construction of the LUYANG II-class DDG (Type 052C) continued, with oneship entering service in 2012, and anadditional three ships under various stages ofconstruction and sea trials, bringing the totalnumber of ships of this class to six by the endof 2013. Additionally, China launched thelead ship in a follow-on class, the LUYANGIII- class DDG (Type 052D), which will likelyenter service in 2014. The LUYANG IIIincorporates the PLA Navy’s firstmultipurpose vertical launch system, likelycapable of launching ASCM, land attack cruisemissiles (LACM), surface-to-air missiles(SAM), and anti-submarine rockets. China isprojected to build more than a dozen of theseships to replace its aging LUDA-classdestroyers (DD). China has continued theconstruction of the workhorse JIANGKAI II-class FFG (Type 054A), with 12 shipscurrently in the fleet and six or more invarious stages of construction, and yet moreexpected. These new DDGs and FFGsprovide a significant upgrade to the PLANavy’s area air defense capability, which willbe critical as it expands operations into“distant seas” beyond the range of shore-based air defense.Augmenting the PLA Navy’s littoral warfarecapabilities, especially in the South China Seaand East China Sea, is a new class of smallcombatant. At least six of the JIANGDAO-class corvettes (FFL) (Type 056) werelaunched in 2012. The first of these shipsentered service on February 25, 2013; Chinamay build 20 to 30 of this class. These FFLsaugment the 60 HOUBEI-class wave-piercingcatamaran missile patrol boats (PTG) (Type022), each capable of carrying eight YJ-83ASCMs, for operations in littoral waters.The PLA Navy also increased its amphibiousforce in 2012. Two YUZHAO-classamphibious transport docks (LPD) (Type
  • 071) were accepted into service during theyear bringing the total of YUZHAO LPDs tothree.PLA Air Force (PLAAF). China basesapproximately 500 combat aircraft withinunrefueled operational range of Taiwan andhas the airfield capacity to expand thatnumber by hundreds. China continues tofield increasingly modern 4thgenerationaircraft, but the force still consists mostly ofolder 2ndand 3rdgeneration aircraft, orupgraded variants of those aircraft.Within two years of the J-20 stealth fighter’sfirst flight in January 2011, China tested asecond next generation fighter prototype.The prototype, referred to as the “J-31,” issimilar in size to a U.S. F-35 fighter andappears to incorporate design characteristicssimilar to the J-20. It conducted its first flighton October 31, 2012.China continues upgrading its H-6 bomberfleet (originally adapted from the late 1950sSoviet Tu-16 design) with a new variant thatpossesses greater range and will be armedwith a long-range cruise missile. China alsouses a modified version of the H-6 aircraft toconduct aerial refueling operations for manyof its indigenous aircraft, increasing theircombat range.The PLA Air Force possesses one of thelargest forces of advanced SAM systems in theworld, consisting of a combination ofRussian-sourced SA-20 battalions anddomestically produced HQ-9 battalions.China’s aviation industry is developing a largetransport aircraft (likely referred to as the Y-20) to supplement China’s small fleet ofstrategic airlift assets, which currently consistsof a limited number of Russian-made IL-76aircraft. These heavy lift transports areneeded to support airborne command andcontrol (C2), logistics, paradrop, aerialrefueling, and reconnaissance operations, aswell as humanitarian assistance and disasterrelief missions.Developments in China’s commercial andmilitary aviation industry indicate improvedaircraft manufacturing, associated technology,and systems development capabilities. Someof these advances have been made possible bybusiness partnerships with Western aviationand aerospace firms (including cleared U.S.defense contractors), which provide overallbenefit to China’s military aerospace industry.China will continue to seek advancement inaerospace technology, capability, andproficiency to rival Western capabilities.PLA Ground Force. The PLA is investingheavily in modernizing its ground force,emphasizing the ability to deploy campaign-level forces across long distances quickly. Thismodernization is playing out with wide-scalerestructuring of PLA ground forces thatincludes a more rapid, flexible specialoperations force equipped with advanced
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China9technology; improved army aviation unitsutilizing ultra-low altitude mobility helicoptersarmed with precision-guided munitions; andcommand and control (C2) capabilities withimproved networks providing real-time datatransmissions within and between units. Inaddition, the PLA has focused itsmodernization efforts on transforming from amotorized to a mechanized force, as well asimproving the ground force’s armored, airdefense, aviation, ground-air coordination,and electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. PLAground forces have benefited from increasedproduction of new equipment, including theZ-10 and Z-19 attack helicopters. New airdefense equipment includes the PLA groundforce’s first medium-range SAM, the CSA-16,as well as domestically-produced CSA-15s (acopy of the Russian SA-15) and a newadvanced self-propelled air defense artillerysystem, the PGZ-07. PLA ground forcerestructuring is highlighted by thedevelopment of brigades as a key operationalechelon for combat in diverse terrain andunder complex electromagnetic conditions.The ground force is a proponent of jointoperations since it requires transport fromother forces to operate beyond China’sborders. To assist with its power projectionneeds, PLA ground forces have practicedusing commercial transport assets such as roll-on/roll-off ships, to conduct maritimecrossing operations. However, broader jointoperations capability are still the primary goalfor the ground force, a goal that is now amandate for all the military services followingthe General Staff Department’s (GSD)December 2011 creation of the MilitaryTraining Department to oversee all PLAtraining, ensuring all military services realizethe “prominence of joint training.”Space Capabilities. In 2012, Chinaconducted 18 space launches. China alsoexpanded its space-based intelligence,surveillance, reconnaissance, navigation,meteorological, and communications satelliteconstellations. In parallel, China is developinga multi-dimensional program to improve itscapabilities to limit or prevent the use ofspace-based assets by adversaries during timesof crisis or conflict.During 2012, China launched six Beidounavigation satellites. These six satellitescompleted the regional network as well as thein-orbit validation phase for the globalnetwork, expected to be completed by 2020.China launched 11 new remote sensingsatellites in 2012, which can perform bothcivil and military applications. China alsolaunched three communications satellites, fiveexperimental small satellites, onemeteorological satellite, one relay satellite, anda manned space mission.China continues to develop the Long March 5(LM-5) rocket, which is intended to lift heavypayloads into space. LM-5 will more thandouble the size of the Low Earth Orbit
  • (LEO) and Geosynchronous Orbit (GEO)payloads China is capable of placing intoorbit. To support these rockets, China beganconstructing the Wenchang Satellite LaunchCenter in 2008. Located on Hainan Island,this launch facility is expected to be completearound 2013, with the initial LM-5 launchscheduled for 2014.Military Information Operations. Chinesewritings have outlined the five key features atan operational level of a maturing Chineseinformation operations (IO) strategy. First,Chinese authors emphasize defense as the toppriority and indicate that Computer NetworkDefense (CND) must be the highest priorityin peacetime; Chinese doctrine suggests that“tactical counteroffensives” would only beconsidered if an adversary’s operations couldnot be countered. Second, IO is viewed as anunconventional warfare weapon, which mustbe established in the opening phase of theconflict and continue during all phases ofwar. Third, IO is characterized as apreemption weapon to be used under therubric of achieving information dominanceand controlling the electromagneticspectrum. Fourth, IO is seen as a tool topermit China to fight and win an informationcampaign, precluding the need forconventional military action. Fifth, potentialChinese adversaries, in particular the UnitedStates, are seen as “information dependent.”An IO campaign includes actions taken toseize and maintain campaign informationsuperiority, unify command campaigninformation operational forces, carry outinformation warfare-related reconnaissance,and offensive and defensive informationwarfare methods. According to a PLAmilitary manual, there are many types ofsupporting IO to campaigns including anisland-landing campaign IO, blockadecampaign IO, fire power attack campaign IO,border counterattack campaign IO, counter-landing campaign IO, and counter-airstrikecampaign IO. These IO campaigns can besub-divided into joint campaign IO andcombined arms campaign IO. Depending onthe military services involved in the campaign,IO can be further divided into army campaign,navy, air force, and strategic missile forcecampaign IO. Their primary tasks are toprotect the PLA’s campaign informationsystems, collect intelligence from enemyinformation systems, destroy enemyinformation systems, and weaken the enemy’sability to acquire, transmit, process, and useinformation during war.The PLA continues to conduct frequentmilitary exercises demonstrating advances ininformation technology and informationintegration of its military forces. China hasperformed integrated joint combat operationsexercises showcasing intelligence acquisition,joint command, joint strike, and supportoperations, increasingly incorporatedinformation technology and informationintegration into its annual trainingrequirement. A number of annual exercise
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China11series, including the Vanguard, Lianhe, and JointEducation series have increased requiredintegration and full reliance on informationtechnology for command of complexoperations. In 2012, according to PLAnewspapers, many military exercises bannedpaper maps and orders altogether. Also in2012, there was an increasing emphasis onPLA command academies participating injoint exercises using command informationtechnologies, which indicates proficiency onsuch platforms is now a requirement forgraduation to higher command positions.DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINESEMILITARY DOCTRINE ANDTRAININGIn 2012, the PLA heavily emphasized trainingunder realistic, high-technology conditions.The Chinese aim to operate in “informatized”conditions by emphasizing system-of-systemsoperations, a concept similar to U.S. network-centric warfare. This requires linkinggeographically dispersed forces andcapabilities into an integrated system capableof unified action. These operational trainingreforms are a result of the Outline of MilitaryTraining and Evaluation (OMTE), which waslast published in mid-2008 and becamestandard across the PLA on January 1, 2009.Since that time, the PLA has pushed toachieve OMTE objectives by emphasizingrealistic training conditions, training incomplex electromagnetic and jointenvironments, and integrating new and hightechnologies into the force structure. A resultof these changes is a more flexible year-roundtraining cycle, which is a departure from theSoviet-style conscript-dependent trainingcycles that were prominent throughout thePLA over the previous decades.Additionally, the PLA is laying the foundationfor future changes in military doctrine. Todevelop a new cadre of officers, the PLA isreforming its academies to cultivate juniorofficers proficient with and capable ofleveraging technology in all warfightingfunctions for joint operations. The NationalUniversity of Defense Technology’s year-longjoint operations staff officer course is servingas a pilot for a future national-level program.The course allows junior officers to rotate tothe command elements of other PLA servicesto enhance their skills in joint operationsplanning and preparation.ADVANCED TECHNOLOGYACQUISITIONChina relies on foreign technology, acquisitionof key dual-use components, and focusedindigenous research and development (R&D)to advance military modernization. TheChinese utilize a large, well-organized networkto facilitate collection of sensitive informationand export-controlled technology from U.S.defense sources. Many of the organizationscomposing China’s military-industrialcomplex have both military and civilian
  • research and development functions. Thisnetwork of government-affiliated companiesand research institutes often enables the PLAto access sensitive and dual-use technologiesor knowledgeable experts under the guise ofcivilian research and development. Theenterprises and institutes accomplish thisthrough technology conferences and symposia,legitimate contracts and joint commercialventures, partnerships with foreign firms, andjoint development of specific technologies. Inthe case of key national security technologies,controlled equipment, and other materials notreadily obtainable through commercial meansor academia, China has utilized its intelligenceservices and employed other illicit approachesthat involve violations of U.S. laws and exportcontrols.A high-priority for China’s advancedtechnology acquisition strategy is its Civil-Military Integration policy to develop aninnovative dual-use technology and industrialbase that serve both military and civilianrequirements. China’s defense industry hasbenefited from integration with its expandingcivilian economy and science and technologysectors, particularly sectors with access toforeign technology. Examples of technologiesinclude: advanced aviation and aerospace (hotsection technologies, avionics and flightcontrols), source code, traveling wave tubes,night vision devices, monolithic microwaveintegrated circuits, and information and cybertechnologies.Differentiating between civil and military end-use is very challenging in China due to opaquecorporate structures, hidden asset ownership,and the connections of commercial personnelwith the central government. Somecommercial entities are affiliated with PLAresearch institutes, or have ties to and aresubject to the control of governmentorganizations such as the State-owned AssetsSupervision and Administration Commission.In March 2012, Hui Sheng Shen and HuanLing Chang, both from Taiwan, were chargedwith conspiracy to violate the U.S. ArmsExport Control Act after allegedly intendingto acquire and pass sensitive U.S. defensetechnology to China. The pair planned tophotograph the technology, delete the images,bring the memory cards back to China, andhave a Chinese contact recover the images.In June 2012, Pratt & Whitney Canada (PWC),a subsidiary of U.S. aerospace firm anddefense contractor United TechnologiesCorporation (UTC), pleaded guilty to illegallyproviding military software used in thedevelopment of Chinas Z-10 military attackhelicopter.UTC and two subsidiaries agreed to pay $75million and were debarred from licenseprivileges as part of a settlement with the U.S.Department of Justice and State Department.PWC "knowingly and willfully" caused sixversions of military electronic engine controlsoftware to be "illegally exported" from
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China13Hamilton Sundstrand in the United States toPWC in Canada and then to China for the Z-10, and made false and belated disclosuresabout these illegal exports.In September 2012, Sixing Liu, aka “SteveLiu,” was convicted of violating the U.S.Arms Export Control Act and theInternational Traffic in Arms Regulations(ITAR) and possessing stolen trade secrets.Liu, a Chinese citizen, returned to China withelectronic files containing details on theperformance and design of guidance systemsfor missiles, rockets, target locators, andunmanned aerial vehicles. Liu developedcritical military technology for a U.S. defensecontractor and stole the documents toposition himself for employment in China.
  • 2UNDERSTANDING CHINA’SSTRATEGY
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China15NATIONAL-LEVEL PRIORITIESAND GOALSChina’s leaders characterize the first twodecades of the 21stcentury as a “strategicwindow of opportunity.” They assess thatduring this period, both domestic andinternational conditions will be conducive toexpanding China’s “comprehensive nationalpower,” a term that encapsulates all elementsof state power, including economic capacity,military might, and diplomacy. China’s leadersanticipate that a successful expansion ofcomprehensive national power will serveChina’s strategic objectives, which include:perpetuating Chinese Communist Party (CCP)rule, sustaining economic growth anddevelopment, maintaining domestic politicalstability, defending national sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and securing China’s statusas a great power.China’s leaders routinely emphasize the goalof reaching critical economic and militarybenchmarks by 2020. These benchmarksinclude successfully restructuring theeconomy to maintain growth and increase thequality of living of China’s citizens to promotestability; making major progress in militarymodernization; and attaining the capability tofight and win potential regional conflicts,including those related to Taiwan, protectionof sea lines of communication (SLOCs),defense of territorial claims in the SouthChina Sea and East China Sea, and thedefense of western borders. Statements byChinese leaders indicate that, in their view, thedevelopment of a modern military is necessaryfor China to achieve greater power status.These statements also indicate that theChinese leadership views a modern military asa critical deterrent to prevent actions byoutside powers that could damage Chineseinterests, or to allow China to defend itselfagainst such actions should deterrence fail.Since China launched its “reform andopening” in late 1978, the essential elementsof China’s strategy to accomplish these goalshave remained relatively constant. Ratherthan challenge the existing global order, Chinahas adopted a pragmatic approach tointernational relations and economicdevelopment that seeks to strengthen theeconomy, modernize the military, and solidifythe CCP’s hold on power. China balances theimperative to reassure countries that its rise is“peaceful” with the imperative to strengthenits control over existing sovereignty andterritorial claims.China regards stable relations with itsneighbors and the United States as essential toits stability and development. Chinacontinues to see the United States as thedominant regional and global actor with thegreatest potential to both support and,potentially, disrupt China’s rise. In addition,China remains concerned that should regionalstates come to view China as a threat, theymight balance against China through unilateralmilitary modernization or through coalitions,
  • possibly with the United States. ManyChinese officials and the public see the U.S.rebalance to Asia as a reflection of “Cold Warthinking” and as a way to contain China’s rise.Despite its desire to project an image of adeveloping country engaged in a peacefuldevelopment strategy, China’s efforts todefend national sovereignty and territorialintegrity (underpinned by growing economicand military capabilities) have occasionallymanifested in assertive rhetoric and behaviorthat generate regional concerns about itsintentions. Prominent examples of thisinclude China’s response to Japan’s arrest of aPRC fishing trawler captain following acollision with Japanese coast guard vessels in2010, its use of punitive trade policies as aninstrument of coercion, its actions to shieldNorth Korea from the international responseto its sinking of the South Korean naval vessel,Cheonan, and its action to pressure Vietnamand the Philippines in the South China Seaand Japan in the East China Sea. Officialstatements and media during these situationsindicate that China sees itself as responding toperceived threats to its national interests orprovocations by outside actors. China’s lackof transparency surrounding its growingmilitary capabilities and strategic decision-making has also increased concerns in theregion about China’s intentions. Absent amove towards greater transparency, theseconcerns will likely intensify as the PLAmodernization progresses.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China17Origin of the “New Historic Missions”In 2004, former President Hu Jintao articulated a mission statement for the armed forces titled,the “Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the New Period of the New Century.” These “newhistoric missions” focus primarily on adjustments in the leadership’s assessment of theinternational security environment and the expanding definition of national security. Thesemissions were further codified in a 2007 amendment to the CCP Constitution. The missions, ascurrently defined, include:• Provide an important guarantee of strength for the party to consolidate its rulingposition.• Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategicopportunity for national development.• Provide a powerful strategic support for safeguarding national interests.• Play an important role in safeguarding world peace and promoting commondevelopment.According to official writings, the driving factors behind the articulation of these missions were:changes in China’s security situation, challenges and priorities regarding China’s nationaldevelopment, and a desire to realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’s objectives. Politburomember and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted “the historic missions embody thenew requirements imposed on the military by the Party’s historic tasks, accommodate newchanges in our national development strategy, and conform to the new trends in global militarydevelopment.” While these missions are not expected to replace the defense of China’ssovereignty in importance, implications for PLA modernization may be increased preparation forand participation in international peacekeeping and disaster relief operations, interaction withthe international community that allows the PLA more opportunities to learn from other militaries,and greater efforts to improve PLA logistics and transport capabilities.FACTORS SHAPING CHINA’SLEADERSHIP PERCEPTIONSChinese leaders continue to view themselvesas operating in a “window of opportunity” toadvance their priorities of economicdevelopment, territorial integrity, anddomestic stability. Although domesticstability is believed to be China’s top priority,official documents indicate that China sees itssecurity environment becoming more“complex” as a result of several factors:Economics. Continued economicdevelopment remains the bedrock of socialstability. A wide range of economic factorscould disrupt this trajectory, including afailure to shift away from its overreliance oninvestment and exports to drive growth.China’s leaders scaled back GDP targets for2011-2015 (from 8 percent to 7.5 percent) tomitigate risk of overheating and to manageexpectations. Other potential economic risksfor China include shifting global tradepatterns, domestic resource constraints, rising
  • wages driven by labor shortages, or attemptsto challenge China’s access to global resources,including energy.Nationalism. Communist Party leaders andmilitary officials continue to be affected by,and in some cases exploit, nationalism tobolster the legitimacy of the Party, deflectdomestic criticism, and justify their owninflexibility in dialogues with foreigninterlocutors. However, nationalist forcescould ultimately restrict the leadership’sdecision-making on key policy issues orpressure the CCP if these forces perceiveparty leaders as insufficiently satisfyingnationalist goals.Regional Challenges to China’s Interests.Tensions with Japan in the East China Seaand with South China Sea claimants challengeto China’s desire to maintain a stableperiphery. Combined with a greater U.S.presence in the region, these factors raiseChinese concerns that regional countries willstrengthen their military capabilities orincrease security cooperation with the UnitedStates to balance China.Domestic Unrest. The CCP continues toface long-term popular demands for limitingcorruption and improving governmentresponsiveness, transparency, andaccountability. If unmet, these factors likelyweaken the legitimacy of the CCP in the eyesof the Chinese people. The Arab Spring andfears of a Jasmine Revolution amplifyhistorical concerns about internal stability.Environment. China’s economicdevelopment has come at a highenvironmental cost. China’s leaders areincreasingly concerned that environmentaldegradation could undermine regimelegitimacy by threatening economicdevelopment, public health, social stability,and China’s international image.Demographics. China faces the dual threatof a rapidly aging population and a decliningbirth rate, one that now falls belowreplacement level. Longer life expectanciesmay force China to allocate more resources tosocial and health services, while the decliningbirth rate will continue to reduce China’ssupply of young and inexpensive labor, a keydriver of the country’s three decades ofeconomic growth. This dual phenomenoncould lead to economic stagnation that couldthreaten CCP legitimacy.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China19China’s Energy StrategyChina’s engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue to grow.China has constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries, spanning nearlyevery continent. This ambitious investment in energy assets is driven primarily by two factors. First,China is increasingly dependent upon imported energy to sustain its economy. A net oilexporter until 1993, China remains suspicious of international energy markets. Second, energyprojects present a viable option for investing China’s vast foreign currency holdings.In addition to ensuring reliable energy sources, Beijing hopes to diversify producers and transportoptions. Although energy independence is no longer realistic for China, given populationgrowth and increasing per capita energy consumption, Beijing still seeks to maintain a supplychain that is less susceptible to external disruption.In 2011, China imported approximately 58 percent of its oil; conservative estimates project thatChina will import almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and three-quarters by 2030. Beijing looksprimarily to the Persian Gulf, Africa, and Russia/Central Asia to satisfy its growing demand, withimported oil accounting for approximately 11 percent of China’s total energy consumption.A second goal of Beijing’s foreign energy strategy is to alleviate China’s heavy dependence onSLOCs, particularly the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca. In 2011, approximately 85percent of China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca.Separate crude oil pipelines from Russia and Kazakhstan to China illustrate efforts to increaseoverland supply. A pipeline that would bypass the Strait of Malacca by transporting crude oilfrom Kyuakpya, Burma to Kunming, China is currently under construction with an estimatedcompletion time of late 2013 or early 2014. The crude oil for this pipeline will be supplied bySaudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern and African countries.Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will only slightly alleviate China’s maritimedependency on either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. Despite China’s efforts, thesheer volume of oil and liquefied natural gas that is imported to China from the Middle East andAfrica will make strategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing.In 2011, China imported 14.3 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas, or 46 percent of all of itsnatural gas imports, from Turkmenistan to China by pipeline via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Thispipeline is designed to carry 40 bcm per year with plans to expand it to 60 bcm. Another naturalgas pipeline designed to deliver 12 bcm per year of Burmese-produced gas is underconstruction and estimated for completion in late 2013 or early 2014. This pipeline parallels thecrude oil pipeline across Burma. Beijing is negotiating with Moscow for two pipelines that couldsupply China with up to 69 bcm of gas per year; discussions have stalled over pricingdifferences.
  • Chinas Top Crude Suppliers 2011Country Volume (1,000 barrels per day) Percentage of Imported Crude OilSaudi Arabia 1010 20Angola 626 12Iran 557 11Russia 396 8Oman 365 7Iraq 277 5Sudan 261 5Venezuela 231 5Kazakhstan 225 4Kuwait 192 4Others 956 19Total 5096 100INTERNAL DEBATE OVERCHINA’S REGIONAL ANDGLOBAL ROLEChina’s leadership has supported formerparamount leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictumfrom the early 1990s that China should,“observe calmly; secure our position; copewith affairs calmly; hide our capabilities andbide our time; be good at maintaining a lowprofile; and never claim leadership.” Thisguidance reflected Deng’s belief that Chineseinterests are best served by focusing oninternal development and stability whilesteering clear of challenging or confrontingmajor powers. In December 2010, StateCouncilor Dai Bingguo specifically citedDeng’s guidance, insisting China adhered to a“path of peaceful development” and wouldnot seek expansion or hegemony. He assertedthat the “hide and bide” rhetoric was not a“smokescreen” employed while China buildsits strength, but rather an admonition to bepatient and not stand out.However, some Chinese scholars questionwhether Deng’s policy approach will continueto win support as China’s interests increaseabroad and its power expands. China’sperceived security interests have changedconsiderably since Deng’s era to include aheavy reliance on maritime commerce.China’s improving naval capabilities enableroles and missions that would have beenimpossible for the PLA to pursue just adecade ago. Proponents of a more active andassertive Chinese role on the world stage havesuggested that China would be better servedby a firm stance in the face of U.S. or otherregional pressure. These voices could increase
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China21as a result of renewed tensions with thePhilippines and Vietnam over the SouthChina Sea and with Japan over the Senkakus,further complicating this debate.“New Type of Relationship.” Top Chineseleaders have repeatedly advocated for a “newtype of relationship between great powers” inmeetings with U.S. officials. The “new typeof relationship” concept urges a cooperativeU.S.-China partnership based on equality,mutual respect, and mutual benefit. Theconcept also reflects China’s aspirations to beregarded as a great power, emphasizingconflict avoidance to maintain its “peacefulrise.”China’s Periphery. The Chinese leadershipfaces a policy dilemma in seeking to maintaina stable periphery in order to assure its“window of opportunity” for developmentremains open. China also perceives otherregional countries asserting their nationalinterests in China’s periphery and feelscompelled to respond to ensure continuedstability; however, too strong of a responsemay motivate regional actors tocounterbalance China’s rise through greatercooperation with each other and the UnitedStates. Therefore, China’s leaders are tryingto maintain a delicate balance betweendefending territorial integrity in the face ofperceived provocations by its neighbors whileconcurrently tamping down threat perceptionsacross the globe. China publicly states that itsrise is “peaceful” and that it harbors no“hegemonic” designs or aspirations forterritorial expansion. However, China’s lackof transparency surrounding these growingcapabilities has increased concerns in theregion about China’s intentions.China’s Territorial DisputesChina’s use of force in territorial disputes has varied throughout its history. Some disputes led towar, such as China’s border conflicts with India in 1962 and Vietnam in 1979. A contestedborder with the former Soviet Union during the 1960s raised the possibility of nuclear war. In morerecent cases, China has been willing to compromise with and even offer concessions to itsneighbors. Since 1998, China has settled eleven land-based territorial disputes with six of itsneighbors. Several disputes continue over exclusive economic zones (EEZ) and ownership ofpotentially rich, off-shore oil and gas deposits.The East China Sea contains approximately seven trillion cubic feet of natural gas and up to 100billion barrels of oil. Japan maintains that an equidistant line from each country involved shouldseparate the EEZs, while China claims an extended continental shelf beyond the equidistant lineto the Okinawa Trench (which almost reaches Japan’s shore). In early 2009, Japan accusedChina of violating a June 2008 agreement providing for joint exploration of oil and natural gas
  • fields, and claimed that China unilaterally drilled beneath the demarcation line, extractingreserves from the Japanese side. China, Japan, and Taiwan continue to dispute possession ofthe nearby Senkaku Islands.The South China Sea plays an important role in Northeast and Southeast Asian securityconsiderations. Northeast Asia relies heavily on the flow of oil and commerce through SouthChina Sea shipping lanes, including over 80 percent of the crude oil to Japan, South Korea, andTaiwan. China claims sovereignty over the Spratly and Paracel island groups and other landformations within its “nine-dash line” claim - claims disputed in whole or part by Brunei, thePhilippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Taiwan, which occupies Itu Aba in the SpratlyIslands, makes the same claims as the PRC. In 2009, China protested extended continental shelfclaims in the South China Sea made by Malaysia and Vietnam; in its protest to the U.N.Commission, China included the ambiguous nine-dash line and reiterated that it has“indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters andenjoys sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the relevant waters as well as the seabed and subsoilthereof.”Despite increased political and economic relations over the years between China and India,tensions remain along their shared 4,057 km border, most notably over Arunachal Pradesh(which China asserts is part of Tibet, and therefore of China), and over the Aksai Chin region atthe western end of the Tibetan Plateau. Both countries in 2009 stepped up efforts to assert theirclaims. China tried to block a $2.9 billion loan to India from the Asian Development Bank,claiming part of the loan would have been used for water projects in Arunachal Pradesh. Thisrepresented the first time China sought to influence this dispute through a multilateral institution.The then-governor of Arunachal Pradesh announced that India would deploy more troops andfighter jets to the area. An Indian newspaper reported that the number of Chinese borderviolations had risen from 180 in 2011 to more than 400 by September 2012.Power Projection Capability. There hasalso been an active debate among military andcivilian theorists in China concerning futurecapabilities the PLA should develop toadvance China’s interests beyond traditionalrequirements. Some senior officers andcivilian theorists advocate an expansion of thePLA’s power projection capabilities tofacilitate missions well beyond Taiwan andregional disputes. Publicly, Chinese officialscontend that increasing the scope of China’smaritime capabilities is intended to buildcapacity for international peacekeeping,humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, andprotection of sea lanes. The commissioningof the PLA Navy’s first aircraft carrier in2012, in addition to serving as a symbol ofnational prestige, exemplifies theseaspirations.Indicators of Decision and Intent. Thereare several possible indicators of change in
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China23Chinese decision-making, depending on theissue. This intent could be reflected throughspeeches in regional and multi-nationalorganizations, commentary in official,domestic newspapers or prominent Chinesethink tanks, adjustments to China’s DefenseWhite Paper, changes in talking points withcivilian and military interlocutors, dispositionof forces, and changes in military diplomacy.PLA MILITARY ENGAGEMENTThe PLA’s level of engagement with foreignmilitaries continues to grow significantly. Atthe operational level, this engagementprovides the PLA with opportunities to sharedoctrines, strategies, tactics, techniques, andprocedures with other militaries - bothmodern and developing. At the strategic level,China uses military engagement as a platformfor demonstrating the PLA’s growingcapabilities, its status as a modern military,and its potential role as a responsible securitypartner.Senior-level visits and exchanges provideChina with opportunities to increase militaryofficers’ international exposure, communicateChina’s positions to foreign audiences, betterunderstand alternative world views, andadvance foreign relations throughinterpersonal contacts and military assistanceprograms. Expanded PLA travel abroadenables China’s military officers to observeand study foreign military commandstructures, unit formations, and operationaltraining.The PLA is participating in a growing numberof bilateral and multilateral military exercises.The PLA derives political benefit from theseexercises in terms of increased influence andenhanced ties with partner states andorganizations. These exercises also contributeto PLA modernization by providingopportunities to improve capabilities in areassuch as counterterrorism, mobility operations,and logistics. The PLA gains operationalinsight by observing tactics, commanddecision making, and equipment used by moreadvanced militaries.PLA participation or observer status inmilitary training exercises of nations inpossession of U.S. military equipment,systems, and weapons may, in certaincircumstances, have unintended consequencesthat could result in the unauthorizeddisclosure of defense articles, technical data,or defense services to China. Public Law 101-246 – the Tiananmen Sanctions – prohibitsthe transfer or disclosure of U.S.-origindefense articles, defense services, technicaldata, and/or technology to China.Additionally, Public Law 94-329 – the ArmsExport Control Act - and the InternationalTraffic in Arms Regulations list China as anation for which U.S. policy denies thetransfer or export of defense articles(including technical data) and defense services.Beijing primarily conducts arms sales toenhance foreign relationships and to generaterevenue to support its domestic defenseindustry. China’s arms sales range from small
  • arms and ammunition to joint development ortransfer of advanced weapons systems.Chinese companies sell mostly to developingcountries where China’s low-cost weaponssales serve a strategic purpose. For example,China maintains strong and longstandingmilitary–technical cooperation with Pakistan,which includes arms sales and defenseindustrial cooperation. With other countriesof strategic importance to China, such asSudan, arms sales and other security assistancedeepen developing ties and balance China’senergy imports.As China’s regional and international interestsgrow more complex, the PLA’s internationalengagement will expand, especially in theareas of peacekeeping operations, counter-piracy, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief(HA/DR), and joint exercises. In addition tofurthering PLA modernization, the focus ofthese engagements will likely remain onbuilding China’s political ties, assuaging fearsabout China’s rise, and building China’sexternal influence, particularly in Asia.China’s Military LeadershipThe PLA is the armed instrument of the CCP and, organizationally, is subordinate to the Partyapparatus. Career military officers are CCP members, and units at the company level andabove have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, andcounterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, also led by thepolitical officers and commanders.The PLA’s highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is technically adepartment of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers. The CMCChairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the CCP and President. Other membersinclude several vice chairmen, the commanders of the military services, and the directors of thefour general headquarters departments.China’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) is not equivalent to the “defense ministry” in mostother nations, but rather is a small office coordinating military-related tasks where responsibilityoverlaps between the civilian government and the armed forces, including foreign militaryrelations, mobilization, recruitment, “national defense education,” and civil support to militaryoperations. The Minister of Defense is a uniformed military officer, a member of the State Council(the country’s chief administrative authority), and also a CMC member.Following the increasing professionalization of the PLA, the military now holds fewer formalpositions in key political bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the passing ofChina’s revolutionary generation, few national leaders have served in the military: the PolitburoStanding Committee has not had a uniformed member since 1997 and only 4 of the 25 currentPolitburo members have military experience. However, the PLA remains an influential player in
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China25China’s defense and foreign policy due to the CMC’s special bureaucratic status and the PLA’snear monopoly on military expertise. Even as the PLA remains subordinate to top Partyleadership direction as the armed wing of the Chinese Communist Party, longstandingbureaucratic coordination issues and China’s increasingly active media landscape havesometimes led to PLA-associated actions or statements that appear to diverge from the positionsof China’s other key bureaucratic actors, especially on national sovereignty or territorial issues.Members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Central Military Commission (CMC)Chairman Xi Jinping’s appointment as Party General Secretary and CMC chairman, and hisexpected selection as state president in the spring, represent the first clean transfer of power inrecent decades. Prior to becoming China’s new commander-in-chief, Xi served as the CMC’sonly civilian vice chairman. Xi’s father was an important military figure during the Chinesecommunist revolution and a Politburo member in the 1980s. The younger Xi served as secretaryto a defense minister early in his career and would have had ample opportunities to interact withthe PLA as a provincial Party official. In meetings with U.S. officials Xi has emphasized increasingmutual trust between Beijing and Washington.Vice Chairman Fan Changlong is Beijing’s top uniformed officer. He formerly commanded theJinan Military Region (MR), a test bed for new operational concepts and technology that hasbeen at the forefront of the PLA’s joint training efforts in recent years. Fan was the longest servingof China’s seven MR commanders at the time of his promotion to the CMC. He also spent 35years in the Shenyang MR where he reportedly served in the same unit as outgoing CMC ViceChairman Xu Caihou, the PLA’s top political officer.Vice Chairman Xu Qiliang—the first career air force officer promoted to CMC vice chairman—previously served on the CMC as PLA Air Force commander where he oversaw rapid forcemodernization and expanded the air force’s foreign engagement. He vocally advocated forincreasing the PLA Air Force’s role within the larger PLA including arguing in 2009 that the airforce should lead the development of offensive space capabilities. Xu may have crossed pathswith Xi Jinping earlier in their careers when both men served in Fujian Province. Xu was the firstPLA Air Force officer to serve as deputy chief of the General Staff Department (GSD) since theCultural Revolution period, and—at 54—the youngest in PLA history.Chang Wanquan was appointed Minister of National Defense at the National People’s Congressin March 2013. The Minister of National Defense is the PLA’s third most senior officer andmanages its relationship with state bureaucracies and foreign militaries. Chang previouslyoversaw the PLA’s weapons development and space portfolio as head of the GeneralArmament Department. He is a veteran of China’s border skirmishes with Vietnam and held topposts across military regions.
  • Chief of the General Staff Department Fang Fenghui oversees PLA operations, training, andintelligence. He served as “commander-in-chief” of China’s 60th anniversary military parade in2009 and oversaw security for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Fan is the first Beijing MilitaryRegion commander to move directly to Chief of the General Staff Department. He was theyoungest military region commander when he was promoted to lead the Beijing Military Regionin 2007.General Political Department Director Zhang Yang oversees the PLA’s political work to includepropaganda, discipline, and education. He previously served as Political Commissar of theGuangzhou Military Region, which borders Vietnam and the South China Sea. Zhang assumedthat position at a relatively young age and is unusual among the other newly appointed CMCmembers for spending his entire career in one military region. Zhang also participated in China’sborder conflict with Vietnam and supported disaster relief efforts following a January 2008snowstorm in southern China.General Logistics Department Director Zhao Keshi is responsible for overseeing PLA supportfunctions including finances, land, mining, and construction. Zhao spent his entire career in theNanjing MR responsible for a Taiwan contingency and most recently served as its Commander.He was also reportedly an exercise commander in the large military drills that induced the 1996Taiwan Strait Crisis. Zhao has written on defense mobilization and reserve construction.General Armament Department Director Zhang Youxia is responsible for overseeing the military’sweapons development and space program. Nicknamed “General Patton,” he has rareexperience as a combat commander during China’s brief conflict with Vietnam in 1979. Zhangformerly commanded the Shenyang Military Region, which shares a border with North Korea andRussia. Zhang is one of China’s military “princelings.” His father, a well-known military figure inChina, served with Xi Jinping’s father in the 1940s.PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli has served as head of the navy since 2006 and on the CMCsince 2007—only the second PLA Navy Commander to do so in recent decades. Under Wu, thenavy has increased its out-of-area exercises, multinational patrols, and foreign naval exchanges,and initiated its first deployment to the Gulf of Aden. The first career navy officer to serve as aDeputy Chief of the General Staff, Wu held leadership positions in two of the PLA Navy’s threefleets, spending most of his career in the East Sea Fleet.PLA Air Force Commander Ma Xiaotian previously oversaw the PLA’s military engagementactivities as a Deputy Chief of the General Staff. Ma led the PLA side in key military-to-militaryexchanges with the United States, including the Defense Consultative Talks and the StrategicSecurity Dialogue component of the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Ma hassignificant operational experience both as a pilot and staff officer in multiple military regions.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China27Second Artillery Commander Wei Fenghe oversees China’s strategic missile forces and bases.Wei served in multiple missile bases across different military regions and held top posts in theSecond Artillery headquarters before being promoted in late 2010 to Deputy Chief of theGeneral Staff - the first officer from the Second Artillery to do so. In that role, Wei met frequentlywith foreign delegations, including senior U.S. officials, affording him greater internationalexposure than previous Second Artillery commanders.
  • 3FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALSAND TRENDS
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China29OVERVIEWAlthough Taiwan continues to dominate thePLA’s force modernization agenda (seeChapter Five: Force Modernization for aTaiwan Contingency), Beijing is investing inmilitary programs and weapons designed toimprove extended-range power projection andoperations in emerging domains such as cyber,space, and electronic warfare. Current trendsin China’s weapons production will enable thePLA to conduct a range of military operationsin Asia well beyond Taiwan, in the SouthChina Sea, western Pacific, and Indian Ocean.Key systems that have been either deployedor are in development include ballistic missiles(including anti-ship variants), anti-ship andland attack cruise missiles, nuclear submarines,modern surface ships, and an aircraft carrier.The need to ensure trade, particularly oilsupplies from the Middle East, has promptedChina’s navy to conduct counter-piracyoperations in the Gulf of Aden. Disputeswith Japan over maritime claims in the EastChina Sea and with several Southeast Asianclaimants to all or parts of the Spratly andParacel Islands in the South China Sea haveled to renewed tensions in these areas.Instability on the Korean Peninsula could alsoproduce a regional crisis involving China’smilitary. The desire to protect energyinvestments in Central Asia, along withpotential security implications from cross-border support to ethnic separatists, couldalso provide an incentive for militaryinvestment or intervention in this region ifinstability surfaces.China’s political leaders have also charged thePLA with developing capabilities for missionssuch as peacekeeping, disaster relief, andcounterterrorism operations. Thesecapabilities will increase Beijing’s options formilitary influence to press its diplomaticagenda, advance regional and internationalinterests, and resolve disputes in its favor.China has become more involved in HA/DRoperations in response to the “New HistoricMissions.” China’s ANWEI-class militaryhospital ship (the Peace Ark) has deployedthroughout East Asia and to the Caribbean.China has conducted more than ten jointmilitary exercises with the SCO members, themost prominent being the PEACE MISSIONseries, with China and Russia as the mainparticipants.China continues its Gulf of Aden counter-piracy deployment that began in December2008. Outside of occasional goodwill cruises,this represents the PLA Navy’s only series ofoperational deployments beyond theimmediate western Pacific region.PLA FUTURE CAPABILITIESNuclear Weapons. China’s official policyon nuclear weapons continues to focus onmaintaining a nuclear force structure able to
  • survive an attack and respond with sufficientstrength to inflict unacceptable damage on anenemy. The new generation of mobilemissiles, with warheads consisting of MIRVsand penetration aids, are intended to ensurethe viability of China’s strategic deterrent inthe face of continued advances in U.S. and, toa lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence,surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR),precision strike, and missile defensecapabilities. The PLA has deployed newcommand, control, and communicationscapabilities to its nuclear forces. Thesecapabilities improve the Second Artillery’sability to command and control multiple unitsin the field. Through the use of improvedcommunications links, the ICBM units nowhave better access to battlefield information,uninterrupted communications connecting allcommand echelons, and the unit commandersare able to issue orders to multiplesubordinates at once, instead of serially viavoice commands.China has consistently asserted that it adheresto a “no first use” (NFU) policy, stating itwould use nuclear forces only in response to anuclear strike against China. China’s NFUpledge consists of two stated commitments:China will never use nuclear weapons firstagainst any nuclear-weapon state, and Chinawill never use or threaten to use nuclearweapons against any non-nuclear-weaponstate or nuclear-weapon-free zone. However,there is some ambiguity over the conditionsunder which China’s NFU policy would apply,including whether strikes on what Chinaconsiders its own territory, demonstrationstrikes, or high-altitude bursts wouldconstitute a first use. Moreover, some PLAofficers have written publicly of the need tospell out conditions under which China mightneed to use nuclear weapons first; for example,if an enemy’s conventional attack threatenedthe survival of China’s nuclear force or of theregime itself. However, there has been noindication that national leaders are willing toattach such nuances and caveats to China’sNFU doctrine.China will likely continue to investconsiderable resources to maintain a limited,but survivable, nuclear force (sometimesdescribed as “sufficient and effective”), toensure the PLA can deliver a damagingretaliatory nuclear strike.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China31PLA Underground FacilitiesChina maintains a technologically advanced underground facility (UGF) program protecting allaspects of its military forces, including C2, logistics, missile, and naval forces. Given China’s NFUnuclear policy, China has assumed it may need to absorb an initial nuclear blow while ensuringleadership and strategic assets survive.China determined it needed to update and expand its military UGF program in the mid to late1980s. This modernization effort took on a renewed urgency following China’s observation of U.S.and NATO air operations in Operation Allied Force and of U.S. military capabilities during the1991 Gulf War. A new emphasis on “winning hi-tech battles” in the future precipitated researchinto advanced tunneling and construction methods. These military campaigns convincedChina it needed to build more survivable, deeply-buried facilities, resulting in the widespreadUGF construction effort detected throughout China for the last decade.Land-Based Platforms. China’s nucleararsenal currently consists of approximately 50-75 ICBMs, including the silo-based CSS-4(DF-5); the solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10Mods 1 and 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and themore limited range CSS-3 (DF-4). This forceis complemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road-mobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21) MRBMsfor regional deterrence missions. By 2015,China’s nuclear forces will include additionalCSS-10 Mod 2 and enhanced CSS-4 ICBMs.Sea-Based Platforms. China continues toproduce the JIN-class SSBN, with threealready delivered and as many as two more invarious stages of construction. The JIN-classSSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2submarine-launched ballistic missile with anestimated range of 7,400 km. The JIN-classand the JL-2 will give the PLA Navy its firstlong-range, sea-based nuclear capability. Aftera round of successful testing in 2012, the JL-2appears ready to reach initial operationalcapability in 2013. JIN-class SSBNs based atHainan Island in the South China Sea wouldthen be able to conduct nuclear deterrencepatrols.Future Efforts. China is working on a rangeof technologies to attempt to counter U.S.and other countries’ ballistic missile defensesystems, including maneuverable reentryvehicles (MaRVs), MIRVs, decoys, chaff,jamming, thermal shielding, and anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons. China’s official media alsocite numerous Second Artillery trainingexercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, andlaunch operations under simulated combatconditions, which are intended to increasesurvivability. Together with the increasedmobility and survivability of the new
  • generation of missiles, these technologies andtraining enhancements strengthen China’snuclear force and enhance its strategic strikecapabilities. Further increases in the numberof mobile ICBMs and the beginning of SSBNdeterrence patrols will force the PLA toimplement more sophisticated command andcontrol systems and processes that safeguardthe integrity of nuclear release authority for alarger, more dispersed force.Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD). Aspart of its planning for military contingencies,China continues to develop measures to deteror counter third-party intervention,particularly by the United States. China’sapproach to dealing with this challenge ismanifested in a sustained effort to develop thecapability to attack, at long ranges, militaryforces that might deploy or operate within thewestern Pacific, which the DoD characterizesas “anti-access” and “area denial” (A2/AD)capabilities. China is pursuing a variety of air,sea, undersea, space and counter-space, andinformation warfare systems and operationalconcepts to achieve this capability, movingtoward an array of overlapping, multilayeredoffensive capabilities extending from China’scoast into the western Pacific. China’s 2008Defense White Paper asserts, for example,that one of the priorities for the developmentof China’s armed forces is to “increase thecountry’s capabilities to maintain maritime,space, and electromagnetic space security.”An essential element, if not a fundamentalprerequisite, of China’s emerging A2/ADregime is the ability to control and dominatethe information spectrum in all dimensions ofthe modern battlespace. PLA authors oftencite the need in modern warfare to controlinformation, sometimes termed “informationblockade” or “information dominance,” andto seize the initiative and gain an informationadvantage in the early phases of a campaign toachieve air and sea superiority. China isimproving information and operationalsecurity to protect its own informationstructures, and is also developing electronicand information warfare capabilities, includingdenial and deception, to defeat those of itsadversaries. China’s “information blockade”likely envisions employment of military andnon-military instruments of state poweracross the battlespace, including in cyberspaceand outer space. China’s investments inadvanced electronic warfare systems, counter-space weapons, and computer networkoperations (CNO) — combined with moretraditional forms of control historicallyassociated with the PLA and CCP systems,such as propaganda and denial throughopacity, reflect the emphasis and priorityChina’s leaders place on building capability forinformation advantage.In more traditional domains, China’s A2/ADfocus appears oriented toward restricting orcontrolling access to China’s periphery,including the western Pacific. China’s currentand projected force structure improvements,for example, will provide the PLA withsystems that can engage adversary surfaceships up to 1,000 nm from China’s coast.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China33China is also developing weapons for itsentire military to project force further from itscoast.Current and projected missile systems willallow the PLA to strike regional air bases,logistical facilities, and other ground-basedinfrastructure. Chinese military analysts haveconcluded that logistics and power projectionare potential vulnerabilities in modern warfare,given the requirements for precision incoordinating transportation, communications,and logistics networks. China is fielding anarray of conventionally armed ballistic missiles,ground- and air-launched land-attack cruisemissiles, special operations forces, and cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at riskthroughout the region.Counter-Space. PLA strategists regard theability to utilize space and deny adversariesaccess to space as central to enabling modern,informatized warfare. Although PLA doctrinedoes not appear to address space operationsas a unique operational “campaign,” spaceoperations form an integral component ofother PLA campaigns and would serve a keyrole in enabling A2/AD operations. Publicly,China attempts to dispel any skepticism overits military intentions for space. In 2009, PLAAir Force Commander General Xu Qiliangpublically retracted his earlier assertion thatthe militarization of space was a “historicinevitability” after President Hu Jintao swiftlycontradicted him. General Xu Qiliang is nowa Vice Chairman of the Central MilitaryCommission and the second highest-rankingofficer in the PLA.The PLA is acquiring a range of technologiesto improve China’s space and counter-spacecapabilities. China demonstrated a direct-ascent kinetic kill anti-satellite capability tolow Earth orbit when it destroyed the defunctChinese FY-1C weather satellite during a testin January 2007. Although Chinese defenseacademics often publish on counterspacethreat technologies, no additional anti-satelliteprograms have been publicly acknowledged.A PLA analysis of U.S. and coalition militaryoperations reinforced the importance ofoperations in space to enable “informatized”warfare, claiming that “space is thecommanding point for the informationbattlefield.” PLA writings emphasize thenecessity of “destroying, damaging, andinterfering with the enemy’sreconnaissance...and communicationssatellites,” suggesting that such systems, aswell as navigation and early warning satellites,could be among the targets of attacksdesigned to “blind and deafen the enemy.”The same PLA analysis of U.S. and coalitionmilitary operations also states that “destroyingor capturing satellites and other sensors…willdeprive an opponent of initiative on thebattlefield and [make it difficult] for them tobring their precision guided weapons into fullplay.”Information Operations. New technologiesallow the PLA to share intelligence, battlefieldinformation, logistics information, weather
  • reports, etc., instantaneously (over robust andredundant communications networks),resulting in improved situational awarenessfor commanders. In particular, by enablingthe sharing of near-real-time ISR data withcommanders in the field, decision-makingprocesses are facilitated, shortening commandtimelines and making operations moreefficient.These improvements have greatly enhancedthe PLA’s flexibility and responsiveness.“Informatized” operations no longer requiremeetings for command decision-making orlabor-intensive processes for execution.Commanders can now issue orders tomultiple units at the same time while on themove, and units can rapidly adjust theiractions through the use of digital databasesand command automation tools. This iscritical for joint operations needed to executeA2/AD. However, to fully implement“informatized” command and control, thePLA will need to overcome a shortage oftrained personnel and its culture of centralized,micro-managed command.The PLA GSD Fourth Department(Electronic Countermeasures and Radar)would likely use information operations (IO)tools, to include jamming/EW, CNO, anddeception to augment counter-space andother kinetic operations during a wartimescenario. “Simultaneous and parallel”operations would involve strikes against U.S.warships, aircraft, and associated supply craftand the use of IO to affect tactical andoperational communications and computernetworks. The PLA would likely rely on IOto disrupt the U.S. capability to usenavigational and targeting radar.Maritime. The PLA Navy is in the forefrontof China’s A2/AD developments, having thegreatest range and staying power within thePLA to interdict third-party forces. In a near-term conflict, PLA Navy operations wouldlikely begin in the offshore and coastal areaswith attacks by coastal defense cruise missiles,maritime strike aircraft, and smallercombatants, and extend as far as the secondisland chain and Strait of Malacca using largesurface ships and submarines. As the PLANavy gains experience and acquires largernumbers of more capable platforms, includingthose with long-range air defense, it willexpand the depth of these operations furtherinto the Western Pacific. It will also develop anew capability for ship-based land-attackusing cruise missiles. China views long-rangeanti-ship cruise missiles as a key weapon inthis type of operation and is developingmultiple advanced types and the platforms toemploy them for this purpose. Theseplatforms include conventional and nuclear-powered attack submarines (KILO SS, SONGSS, YUAN SSP, SHANG SSN), surfacecombatants (LUYANG III DDG [Type052D], LUZHOU DDG [Type 051C],LUYANG I/II DDG [Type 052B/C],SOVREMENNY II-class DDG, JIANGKAIII FFG [Type 054A], JIANGDAO FFL [Type056]), and maritime strike aircraft (JH-7 andJH-7A, H-6G, and the SU-30 MK2).
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China35China would face several short-comings in anear-term A2/AD operation. First, it has notdeveloped a robust, deep water anti-submarine warfare capability, in contrast to itsstrong capabilities in the air and surfacedomains. Second, it is not clear whetherChina has the capability to collect accuratetargeting information and pass it to launchplatforms in time for successful strikes in seaareas beyond the first island chain. However,China is working to overcome theseshortcomings.Air and Air Defense. China’s future airforce A2/AD capabilities will be bolstered bythe development of a 5thgeneration fighterforce, which is not likely to be fielded before2018. Key characteristics of fifth generationfighters include high maneuverability, lack ofvisibility on radar due to very low observablestealth shaping, and an internal weapons bay.Other key features of these aircraft aremodern avionics and sensors that offer moretimely situational awareness for operations innetwork-centric combat environments, radarswith advanced targeting capabilities andprotection against enemy electroniccountermeasures, and integrated electronicwarfare systems with advancedcommunication and GPS navigation functions.These next generation aircraft will improveChina’s existing fleet of fourth generationaircraft (Russian built Su-27/Su-30 andindigenous J-10 and J-11B fighters) byutilizing low-observable platforms to supportregional air superiority and strike operations.Additionally, China’s continuing upgrades toits bomber fleet may provide the capability tocarry new, longer-range cruise missiles.Similarly, the acquisition and development oflonger-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV),including the BZK-005, and unmannedcombat aerial vehicles (UCAV), will increaseChina’s ability to conduct long-rangereconnaissance and strike operations.China’s ground-based air defense A2/ADcapabilities will likely be focused oncountering long-range airborne strikeplatforms with increasing numbers ofadvanced, long-range SAMs. China’s currentair and air defense A2/AD componentsinclude a combination of advanced long-rangeSAMs – its indigenous HQ-9 and Russian SA-10 and SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, which have theadvertised capability to protect against bothaircraft and low-flying cruise missiles. Chinacontinues to pursue the acquisition of theRussian extremely long-range S-400 SAMsystem (400 km), and is also expected tocontinue research and development to extendthe range of the domestic HQ-9 SAM tobeyond 200km.Ballistic Missile Defense. China has madeefforts to go beyond defense from aircraft andcruise missiles to gain a ballistic missiledefense capability in order to provide furtherprotection of China’s mainland and strategicassets. China’s existing long-range SAMinventory offers limited capability againstballistic missiles. The SA-20 PMU2, the mostadvanced SAM Russia offers for export, hasthe advertised capability to engage ballistic
  • missiles with ranges of 1,000km and speeds of2,800m/s. China’s domestic CSA-9 long-range SAM system is expected to have alimited capability to provide point defenseagainst tactical ballistic missiles with ranges upto 500km. China is proceeding with theresearch and development of a missile defenseumbrella consisting of kinetic energy interceptat exo-atmospheric altitudes (>80km), as wellas intercepts of ballistic missiles and otheraerospace vehicles within the upperatmosphere. In January 2010, and again inJanuary 2013, China successfully intercepted aballistic missile at mid-course, using a ground-based missile.Cyber Activities Directed Against theDepartment of Defense. In 2012,numerous computer systems around theworld, including those owned by the U.S.government, continued to be targeted forintrusions, some of which appear to beattributable directly to the Chinesegovernment and military. These intrusionswere focused on exfiltratinginformation. China is using its computernetwork exploitation (CNE) capability tosupport intelligence collection against the U.S.diplomatic, economic, and defense industrialbase sectors that support U.S. nationaldefense programs. The information targetedcould potentially be used to benefit China’sdefense industry, high technology industries,policymaker interest in US leadership thinkingon key China issues, and military plannersbuilding a picture of U.S. network defensenetworks, logistics, and related militarycapabilities that could be exploited during acrisis. Although this alone is a seriousconcern, the accesses and skills required forthese intrusions are similar to those necessaryto conduct computer networkattacks. China’s 2010 Defense White Papernotes China’s own concern over foreigncyberwarfare efforts and highlighted theimportance of cyber-security in China’snational defense.Cyberwarfare in China’s Military.Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve Chinesemilitary operations in three key areas. Firstand foremost, they allow data collection forintelligence and computer network attackpurposes. Second, they can be employed toconstrain an adversary’s actions or slowresponse time by targeting network-basedlogistics, communications, and commercialactivities. Third, they can serve as a forcemultiplier when coupled with kinetic attacksduring times of crisis or conflict.Developing cyber capabilities for warfare isconsistent with authoritative PLA militarywritings. Two military doctrinal writings,Science of Strategy, and Science of Campaignsidentify information warfare (IW) as integralto achieving information superiority and aneffective means for countering a strongerfoe. Although neither document identifies thespecific criteria for employing computernetwork attack against an adversary, bothadvocate developing capabilities to competein this medium.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China37The Science of Strategy and Science of Campaignsdetail the effectiveness of IW and CNO inconflicts and advocate targeting adversary C2and logistics networks to affect their ability tooperate during the early stages of conflict. AsScience of Strategy explains, “In the informationwar, the command and control system is theheart of information collection, control, andapplication on the battlefield. It is also thenerve center of the entire battlefield.”In parallel with its military preparations, Chinahas increased diplomatic engagement andadvocacy in multilateral and internationalforums where cyber issues are discussed anddebated. Beijing’s agenda is frequently in linewith Russia’s efforts to promote moreinternational control over cyberactivities. China and Russia continue topromote an Information Security Code ofConduct that would have governmentsexercise sovereign authority over the flow ofinformation and control of content incyberspace. Both governments also continueto play a disruptive role in multilateral effortsto establish transparency and confidence-building measures in international fora such asthe Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE), ASEANRegional Forum, and the UN Group ofGovernmental Experts. Although China hasnot yet agreed with the U.S. position thatexisting mechanisms, such as internationalhumanitarian law, apply in cyberspace,Beijing’s thinking continues to evolve.Role of Electronic Warfare (EW) in Future ConflictAn integral component of warfare, the PLA identifies EW as a way to reduce or eliminate U.S.technological advantages. Chinese EW doctrine emphasizes using electromagnetic spectrumweapons to suppress or deceive enemy electronic equipment. PLA EW strategy focuses onradio, radar, optical, infrared, and microwave frequencies, in addition to adversarial computerand information systems.Chinese EW strategy stresses that it is a vital fourth dimension to combat and should beconsidered equally with traditional ground, sea, and air forces. Effective EW is seen as adecisive aid during military operations and consequently the key to determining the outcome ofwar. The Chinese see EW as an important force multiplier and would likely employ it in support ofall combat arms and services during a conflict.PLA EW units have conducted jamming and anti-jamming operations testing the military’sunderstanding of EW weapons, equipment, and performance, which helped improve theirconfidence in conducting force-on-force, real-equipment confrontation operations in simulatedelectronic warfare environments. The advances in research and deployment of electronicwarfare weapons are being tested in these exercises and have proven effective. These EWweapons include jamming equipment against multiple communication and radar systems andGPS satellite systems. EW systems are also being deployed with other sea and air-basedplatforms intended for both offensive and defensive operations.
  • Systems and Capabilities EnablingPower Projection. China has prioritizedland-based ballistic and cruise missileprograms to extend its strike warfarecapabilities further from its borders. It isdeveloping and testing several new classes andvariants of offensive missiles, formingadditional missile units, upgrading oldermissile systems, and developing methods tocounter ballistic missile defenses. The SecondArtillery has deployed more than 1,100SRBMs to garrisons across from Taiwan andis fielding cruise missiles, including theground-launched CJ-10 land-attack cruisemissile. China continues to field an ASBMbased on a variant of the DF-21 (CSS-5)medium-range ballistic missile that it begandeploying in 2010. Known as the DF-21D,this missile provides the PLA the capability toattack large ships, including aircraft carriers, inthe western Pacific. The DF-21D has a rangeexceeding 1,500 km and is armed with amaneuverable warhead.The PLA Navy continues the developmentand deployment of ship, submarine, andaircraft-deployed ASCMs, Russian- andChinese-built. New long-range air-launchedcruise missiles for the H-6 bomber fleetextend the PLA’s strike range.The PLA Air Force is continuing amodernization effort to improve its capabilityto conduct offensive and defensive off-shoreoperations such as strike, air and missiledefense, strategic mobility, and early warningand reconnaissance missions. Chinacontinues its development of stealth aircrafttechnology, with the appearance of a secondstealth fighter following on the heels of themaiden flight of the J-20 in January 2011. Inan effort to address its strategic airliftdeficiency, as mentioned earlier in this report,China is also developing a heavy lift transportaircraft, possibly identified as the Y-20.Capabilities to Realize a “Blue Water”Navy. The PLA Navy remains at theforefront of the military’s efforts to extend itsoperational reach beyond East Asia and intowhat China calls the “far seas.” Missions inthese areas include protecting important sealanes from terrorism, maritime piracy, andforeign interdiction; providing humanitarianassistance and disaster relief; conducting navaldiplomacy and regional deterrence; andtraining to prevent a third party, such as theUnited States, from interfering withoperations off China’s coast in a Taiwan orSouth China Sea conflict. The PLA Navy’sability to perform these missions is modestbut growing as it gains more experienceoperating in distant waters and acquires largerand more advanced platforms. The PLANavy’s goal over the coming decades is tobecome a stronger regional force that is ableto project power across the globe for high-intensity operations over a period of severalmonths, similar to the United Kingdom’sdeployment to the South Atlantic to retakethe Falkland Islands in the early 1980s.However, logistics and intelligence supportremain key obstacles, particularly in the IndianOcean.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China39In the last several years, the PLA Navy’sdistant seas experience has primarily derivedfrom its ongoing counter-piracy mission inthe Gulf of Aden and long-distance taskgroup deployments beyond the first islandchain in the western Pacific. China continuesto sustain a three-ship presence in the Gulf ofAden to protect Chinese merchant shippingfrom maritime piracy. This operation isChina’s first enduring naval operation beyondthe Asia region.Additionally, the PLA Navy has begun toconduct military activities within theExclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) of othernations, without the permission of thosecoastal states. Of note, the United States hasobserved over the past year several instancesof Chinese naval activities in the EEZ aroundGuam and Hawaii. One of those instanceswas during the execution of the annual Rim ofthe Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July/August2012. While the United States considers thePLA Navy activities in its EEZ to be lawful,the activity undercuts China’s decades-oldposition that similar foreign military activitiesin China’s EEZ are unlawful.The PLA Navy has made long-distancedeployments a routine part of the annualtraining cycle. In 2012, it deployed taskgroups beyond the first island chain seventimes with formations as large as seven ships.These deployments are designed to completea number of training requirements, includinglong-distance navigation, C2, and multi-discipline warfare in deep sea environmentsbeyond the range of land-based air defense.The PLA Navy’s force structure continues toevolve, incorporating more platforms with theversatility for both offshore and long-distanceoperations. In addition to the recently-commissioned KUZNETSOV-class aircraftcarrier (CV) Liaoning, China is engaged inseries production of the LUYANG-class IIIDDG, the JIANGKAI-class II FFG, and theJIANGDAO-class FFL. China will also beginconstruction on a new Type 081-class landinghelicopter assault ship within the next fiveyears. China will probably build severalaircraft carriers over the next 15 years.Limited logistical support remains a keyobstacle preventing the PLA Navy fromoperating more extensively beyond East Asia,particularly in the Indian Ocean. Chinadesires to expand its access to logistics in theIndian Ocean and will likely establish severalaccess points in this area in the next 10 years(potential sites include the Strait of Malacca,Lomboc Strait, and Sunda Strait). Thesearrangements will likely take the form ofagreements for refueling, replenishment, crewrest, and low-level maintenance. The servicesprovided will likely fall short of U.S.-styleagreements permitting the full spectrum ofsupport from repair to re-armament.
  • China’s Maritime Security ApproachDuring the 2012 Scarborough Reef and Senkaku Island tensions, the China Maritime Surveillance(CMS) and Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC) ships were responsible for directlymanaging the disputes on a daily basis, while the PLA Navy maintained a more distant presenceaway from the immediate vicinity of the contested waters. China prefers to use its civilianmaritime agencies in these disputes, and use the PLA Navy further ashore from disputed areas oras an escalatory measure. The five civilian agency entities, commonly referred to as the “FiveDragons” are:Anti-Smuggling Bureau (ASB): Subordinate to the General Administration of Customs and Ministryof Public Security. Armed entity responsible for criminal investigations and smuggling cases alongChina’s inland border posts and rivers.China Coast Guard (CCG): Subordinate to the Ministry of Public Security. Active duty maritimepolice force responsible for combating maritime crime.China Maritime Surveillance (CMS): Subordinate to the State Oceanic Administration andMinistry of Land and Resources. Responsible for asserting China’s marine rights and sovereigntyclaims in disputed maritime regions.Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC): Subordinate to the Ministry of Agriculture. EnforcesPRC fisheries laws and handles fishery disputes with foreign entities across China’s exclusiveeconomic zone (EEZ).Maritime Safety Administration (MSA): Subordinate to the Ministry of Transport. Responsible forsafety of life at sea (SOLAS), maritime pollution control, and cleanup, port inspection, andmaritime investigation.In the next decade, an expanded and modernized force of civilian maritime ships will affordChina the capability to more robustly patrol its territorial claims in the ECS and SCS. China iscontinuing with the second half of a modernization and construction program for its maritimelaw enforcement agencies. The first half of this program, from 2004-2008, resulted in the additionof almost 20 ocean-going patrol ships for the CMS (9), Bureau of Fisheries (BOF) (3), MaritimeSafety Administration (MSA) (3), and China Coast Guard (2). The second half of this program,from 2011-2015, includes at least 30 new ships for the CMS (23), BOF (6), and MSA (1). Severalagencies have also acquired ships that were decommissioned from the PLA Navy. Some oldpatrol ships will be decommissioned during this period. In addition, MLE agencies will likely buildmore than 100 new patrol craft and smaller units, both to increase capability and to replace oldunits. Overall, CMS total force level is expected to increase 50 percent by 2020 and BOF by 25percent. MSA, China Coast Guard, and Maritime Customs force levels will probably remainconstant, but with larger and more capable units replacing older, smaller units. Some of theseships will have the capability to embark helicopters, a capability that only a few MLE shipscurrently have. The enlargement and modernization of China’s MLE forces will improve China’sability to enforce its maritime sovereignty.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China41Military Operations Other Than War.China’s military continues to emphasizeMilitary Operations Other Than War(MOOTW) including emergency response,counter-terrorism, international rescue,disaster relief, peacekeeping, and various othersecurity tasks. China’s 2010 Defense WhitePaper cited the use of its military for thesepurposes as a means of maintaining socialharmony and stability. These missionssupport the “New Historic Missions” whileenabling the PLA opportunities to acquireoperational and mobilization proficiency inaddition to strengthening civil-militaryrelations.According to Chinese media, between 2008and 2011, the PLA employed more than 2.4million active-duty forces, roughly 7.82million militia and reservists, and more than6,700 aircraft sorties for MOOTW, includinghigh-profile events such as the 2008 BeijingOlympics and the 2011 evacuation of Chinesecitizens from Libya. Within the past year,China’s MOOTW experience has includeddispatching soldiers to work with civilianentities to provide disaster relief in YunnanProvince following a 5.6 magnitudeearthquake in September, and counter-piracypatrols in the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, thePLA has increasingly committed itself to UNpeacekeeping operations and continuesmilitary engagements as a member of the SCO.In December 2011, the Military OperationsOther Than War Research Center wasfounded at the Academy of Military Sciencesin Beijing, indicating MOOTW’s growing rolein the PLA following the establishment ofguidelines and regulations for such operationsduring the preceding two years. Thisincreased emphasis of MOOTW provides thePLA experience with joint operations andvarious command and control scenarios.Depending on the nature of the operation,PLA resources for MOOTW can be under thecommand of local jurisdiction or up to thehighest levels of civilian and militaryleadership, allowing the PLA to rapidlyrespond to unexpected events.
  • Precision StrikeShort-Range Ballistic Missiles (< 1,000 km): The Second Artillery had more than 1,100 SRBMs at theend of 2012, a modest increase over the past year. The Second Artillery continues to fieldadvanced variants with improved ranges and more sophisticated payloads, while graduallyreplacing earlier generations that do not possess true precision strike capability.Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km): The PLA is fielding conventional MRBMs toincrease the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships(including aircraft carriers) operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain.Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missiles (3,000-5,000 km): The PLA is developing conventionalintermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM), increasing its capability for near-precision strike out tothe second island chain. The PLA Navy is also improving its over-the-horizon (OTH) targetingcapability with sky wave and surface wave OTH radars, which can be used in conjunction withreconnaissance satellites to locate targets at great distances from China (thereby supportinglong-range precision strikes, including employment of ASBMs).Land-Attack Cruise Missiles: The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launched LACMs forstand-off, precision strikes. Air-launched cruise missiles include the YJ-63, KD-88, and the CJ-20.Ground Attack Munitions: The PLA Air Force has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missilesas well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs.Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles: The PLA Navy is deploying the domestically-produced, ship-launchedYJ-62 ASCM; the Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonic ASCM, which is fitted on China’sSOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquired from Russia; and the Russian SS-N-27B/SIZZLER supersonicASCM on China’s Russian-built KILO SS. It has, or is acquiring, nearly a dozen ASCM variants,ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 and SS-N-27B. China isworking to develop a domestically-built supersonic cruise missile capability. The pace of ASCMresearch, development, and production has accelerated over the past decade.Anti-Radiation Weapons: China is starting to integrate an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known as the YJ-91 into its fighter-bomber force. The PLA imported Israeli-madeHARPY UAVs and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles during the 1990s.Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions: The PLA is developing or deploying artillery systemswith the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait, including the PHL-03 300mm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and the longer-range AR-3 dual-caliberMRL (out to 220 km).Second Artillery: As detailed elsewhere in this report, the Second Artillery is expanding itsconventional MRBM force and developing IRBMs to extend the distance from which it canthreaten other countries with conventional precision or near-precision strikes.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China43China’s Internal Security ForcesChina’s internal security forces primarily consist of the People’s Armed Police (PAP), the Ministryof Public Security (MPS), and the PLA. The PAP is a paramilitary organization whose primarymission is domestic security. It falls under the dual command of the CMC and the State Council.Although there are different types of PAP units, such as border security and firefighting, thelargest is internal security. PAP units are organized into “contingents” in each province,autonomous region, and centrally administered city. In addition, 14 PLA divisions weretransferred to the PAP in the mid- to late-1990s to form “mobile divisions” that can deploy outsidetheir home province. The official budget for China’s internal security forces exceeds that of thePLA.The key mission of the MPS is domestic law enforcement and the “maintenance of social securityand order,” with duties including anti-riot and anti-terrorism. There are approximately 1.9 millionMPS police officers spread throughout local public security bureaus across the country.The PLA’s main mission is external security, but assumes internal stability missions when needed.For example, the PLA may provide transportation, logistics, and intelligence. China may also taskthe militia to assist local public security forces with internal security roles, including protection ofinfrastructure and maintaining public order.Chinese leaders perceive threats to the country’s internal security coming from popular protestsregarding social, economic, environmental, and political problems. Beijing also perceives asecurity challenge from external non-state actors, such as the separatist East TurkestanIndependence Movement and its reported connection with ethnic Uighur nationalistmovements in the Xinjiang region.China activated security forces, but not the PLA, in 2012 to quell incidents ranging from anti-foreign sentiment to socio-economic protests. China deployed paramilitary police in Septemberto control anti-Japanese protesters across multiple cities during the Senkaku Islands dispute. Alsoin September, paramilitary police mobilized to a Foxconn Manufacturing factory in Shanxiprovince to put down a riot involving poor pay and working conditions. MPS forces andparamilitary police have deployed multiple times in 2012 to Sichuan and Qinghai provinces tocontrol unrest over self-immolations of monks protesting Chinese rule over Tibet.
  • 444RESOURCES FOR FORCEMODERNIZATION
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China45OVERVIEWThe PLA continues to decrease its reliance onforeign weapons acquisitions in morecapability areas as China’s defense-industrialand research bases mature. However, thePLA still looks to foreign assistance to fillsome critical near-term capability gaps. Chinacontinues to leverage foreign investments,commercial joint ventures, academicexchanges, the experience of repatriatedChinese students and researchers, and state-sponsored industrial and technical espionageto increase the level of technologies andexpertise available to support military research,development, and acquisition. Beijing’s long-term goal is to create a wholly-indigenousdefense industrial sector, augmented by astrong commercial sector, to meet the needsof PLA modernization and to compete as atop-tier producer in the global arms market.China draws from diverse sources to supportPLA modernization, including: domesticdefense investments, indigenous defenseindustrial development, a growing researchand development/science and technologybase, dual-use technologies, and foreigntechnology acquisition.MILITARY EXPENDITURES TRENDSOn March 5, 2013, Beijing announced a 10.7percent increase in its annual military budgetto $114 billion, continuing more than twodecades of sustained annual defense spendingincreases. Analysis of data from 2003 through2012 indicates China’s officially disclosedmilitary budget grew at an average of 9.7percent per year in inflation-adjusted termsover the period. China has the fiscal strengthand political will to support defense spendinggrowth at comparable levels, despite loweringits economic growth forecast in 2012 to 7.5percent from 8 percent in 2011. Continuedincreases will support PLA modernizationefforts and facilitate China’s move toward amore professional force.Estimating China’s Actual MilitaryExpenditures. Using 2012 prices andexchange rates, the DoD estimates thatChina’s total actual military-relatedexpenditure for 2012 falls between $135billion and $215 billion.However, it is difficult to estimate actual PLAmilitary expenses due to China’s pooraccounting transparency and incompletetransition from a command economy.China’s published military budget omitsseveral major categories of expenditure, suchas procurement of foreign weapons andequipment.
  • 2012 Defense Budget Comparison (Adjusted for Inflation)Billion (USD)China (Official Budget) $106.7Russia (National Defense Budget) $61.3Japan $58.0India $45.5Republic of Korea $29.2Taiwan $10.8Comparison of China’s official defense budgets with those of other regional powers.DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS INCHINA’S DEFENSE INDUSTRYDefense Sector Reform. China’s defenseindustry has undergone a dramatictransformation since the late 1990s and itscompanies and research institutes continue tore-organize in an effort to improve weaponsystem research, development, andproduction capabilities. China also continuesto improve business practices, streamlinebureaucracy, shorten developmental timelines,and improve quality control.In 1998, China adopted a comprehensivestrategy for improving defense industrialcapabilities. This strategy called for selectivemodernization in key capabilities areas,increased civil-military industrial integration toleverage available dual use technologies, andthe acquisition of advanced foreign weapons,materiel and technologies. An overarchinggoal of these reforms was to introduce the“Four Mechanisms” of competition,evaluation, supervision, and encouragementinto the entire defense industrial system. In1999, the State Council implementedstructural reforms within defense industries toincrease competition and efficiency and tomake China’s defense industry moreresponsive to the PLA’s operationalrequirements. Each of China’s five state-owned defense conglomerates was split intotwo enterprises, creating a parallel structure inwhich each would produce both defense andcivilian products, encouraging the potentialfor competition. The production of civilian-use commercial products allows legitimate
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China47access to the latest industry and dual-usetechnologies, which can then be used tosupport military production. Commercialoperations also provide revenue streams tosupport defense-related activities.In 2003, the Sixteenth Party Congressintroduced the concept of locating militarypotential in civilian capabilities. It calls forbuilding a civilian industrial sector capable ofmeeting the needs of military forcemodernization. In a further move tostrengthen the defense sector and improveoversight, China created a new super ministryin 2008. The Ministry of Industry andInformatization (MIIT) was charged withfacilitating civil-military integration and thecoordinated development of advancedtechnology and industry. Other structuralreforms were adopted to strengthen defenseresearch, development, and production and tobring them more in line with marketprinciples.China is also emphasizing integration ofdefense and civilian sectors to leverage outputfrom China’s expanding science andtechnology base. Select defense firms operateresearch institutes with academic departments,some of which are capable of grantingadvanced degrees. These institutes serve tofocus scientific research on cutting-edgemilitary technologies and to groom the nextgeneration of scientists and engineers who willsupport defense research, development, andproduction. These institutes also provide anaccess point to international resources andscientific research networks. Chinesepractitioners and students at these defenseinstitutes regularly attend conferences, presentresearch findings, and publish scholarlyarticles.The China Academy of Sciences (CAS) alsoplays a key role in facilitating research thatsupports advancements in militarymodernization. The CAS Institute ofMechanics is one example, with a missionfocus on scientific innovation and high techintegration in aerospace technology,environmental engineering, and energyresources. Specific areas of emphasis includenano-scale and micro-scale mechanics, hightemperature gas and supersonic flighttechnologies, and advanced manufacturing.In May 2012, the Institute announcedsuccessful acceptance testing of its new super-large JF12 hypersonic wind tunnel (reportedlythe largest in the world), capable of replicatingflying conditions at mach 5 to 9. This projectwas one of eight detailed in China’s NationalMid-and-Long-Term Scientific andTechnological Development Outline Plan(2006-2020). This facility and others like itsponsored by CAS will support research anddevelopment efforts in China’s civilian andmilitary aerospace sector.Military Equipment Modernization Trends.China’s defense industry resource andinvestment prioritization and allocation favorsmissile and space systems, followed bymaritime assets and aircraft, and, lastly,ground force materiel. China is developing
  • and producing increasingly advanced systems,augmented through selected investments intoforeign designs and reverse engineering.However, China’s defense industries areincreasing the quality of output in all of theseareas as well as increasing overall productioncapacities. Over the past decade, China hasmade dramatic improvements in all defenseindustrial production sectors and iscomparable to other major weapon systemproducers like Russia and the EuropeanUnion in some areas.Missile and Space Industry. China’sproduction of a range of ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles for the PLAand for export has likely been enhanced byupgrades to primary final assembly and rocketmotor production facilities over the past fewyears. China’s space launch vehicle industry isexpanding to support satellite launch servicesand the manned space program. The majorityof China’s missile programs, including itsballistic and cruise missile systems, arecomparable to other international top-tierproducers, while its surface-to-air missilesystems lag behind global leaders. China’smissile industry modernization efforts havepositioned it well for the foreseeable future.Naval/Shipbuilding Industry. Shipyardexpansion and modernization have increasedChina’s shipbuilding capacity and capability,generating benefits for all types of militaryprojects, including submarines, surfacecombatants, naval aviation, and sealift assets.China continues to invest in foreign suppliersfor some propulsion units, but is becomingincreasingly self-reliant. China commissionedits first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, arenovated Russian KUZNETSOV-class hull,in September 2012. China is among the topship-producing nations in the world and iscurrently pursuing an indigenous aircraftcarrier program. To date, China has notproduced a non-carrier surface combatantlarger than a destroyer, but is outfitting thesesships with increasingly sophisticated anti-surface, -air and –subsurface defensive andoffensive capabilities. China is using moresophisticated ship design and constructionprogram management techniques andsoftware, and it is improving in most areas ofthe maritime sector.Armament Industry. There have beenproduction capacity advances in almost everyarea of PLA ground forces systems, includingproduction of new tanks, armored personnelcarriers, air defense artillery systems, andartillery pieces. However, China still relies onforeign acquisition to fill gaps in select criticaltechnical capabilities, such as turbine aircraftengines. China is capable of producingground weapons systems at or near worldstandards however, quality concerns persistwith some export equipment.Aviation Industry. China’s commercial andmilitary aviation industries have advanced toindigenously produce improved versions ofolder aircraft and modern fourth-to-fifthgeneration fighters and attack helicopters.China’s commercial aircraft industry has
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China49invested in high-precision and technologicallyadvanced machine tools, avionics, and othercomponents that can also be used in theproduction of military aircraft. However,production in the aircraft industry will belimited by its reliance on foreign sourcing fordependable, proven aircraft engines, as well asa continued lack of skilled personnel andfacilities. Infrastructure and experience forthe production of large-body commercial andmilitary aircraft are believed to be limited, butgrowing with new investments. China isdeveloping fourth and fifth generation aircraftthat incorporate stealth and low-observabletechnologies (including carbon fiber and otherspecialty materials), and it is pursuing anindigenous heavy-lift military transport.Although China is modernizing its aviationindustry, it lags behind in the production ofreliable high performance aircraft engines.Foreign Technology Acquisition. Keyareas where China continues to supplementindigenous military modernization effortsthrough targeted foreign technologies includeengines for aircraft and tanks, solid stateelectronics and micro processors, guidanceand control systems, and enablingtechnologies such as cutting-edge precisionmachine tools, advanced diagnostic andforensic equipment, and computer-assisteddesign, manufacturing and engineering. Chinaoften pursues these foreign technologies forthe purpose of reverse engineering or tosupplement indigenous militarymodernization efforts.Russia has been China’s primary weapons andmateriel provider, selling China advancedfighter aircraft, helicopters, missile systems,submarines, and destroyers. Relying onRussian components for several of itsproduction programs, China purchasedproduction rights to Russian weapon designs.Though still committed to filling capabilitygaps with Russian equipment, this trend ischanging as China becomes more self-sufficient in research, development, andproduction.Science and Technology DevelopmentGoals Through 2020. China’s NationalMedium- and Long-Term Program for Science andTechnology Development (2006-2020), issued bythe State Council in February 2006, seeks totransform China into an “innovation-orientedsociety by 2020.” The plan defines China’sscience and technology focus in terms of“basic research,” “leading-edge technologies,”“key fields and priority subjects,” and “majorspecial items,” all of which have militaryapplications.Basic Research. As part of a broad effortto expand basic research capabilities, Chinaidentified five areas that have militaryapplications as major strategic needs orscience research plans requiring activegovernment involvement and funding:> Material design and preparation;> Manufacturing in extreme environmentalconditions;
  • > Aeronautic and astronautic mechanics;> Information technology development; and> Nanotechnology research.In nanotechnology, China has progressedfrom virtually no research or funding in 2002to being a close second to the United States intotal government investment.Leading-edge Technologies. China isfocusing on the following technologies forrapid development:> Information Technology: Prioritiesinclude intelligent perception technologies,ad hoc networks, and virtual realitytechnologies;> New Materials: Priorities include smartmaterials and structures, high-temperaturesuperconducting technologies, and highlyefficient energy materials technologies;> Advanced Manufacturing: Prioritiesinclude extreme manufacturingtechnologies and intelligent serviceadvanced machine tools;> Advanced Energy Technologies:Priorities include hydrogen energy andfuel cell technologies, alternative fuels,and advanced vehicle technologies;> Marine Technologies: Priorities includethree-dimensional maritimeenvironmental monitoring technologies,fast, multi-parameter ocean floor surveytechnologies, and deep-sea operationstechnologies; and> Laser and Aerospace Technologies:Priorities include development ofchemical and solid laser state technologiesto ultimately field a weapons-grade systemfrom ground-based and airborneplatforms.Key Fields and Priority Subjects. Chinahas identified certain industries andtechnology groups with potential to providetechnological breakthroughs, removetechnical obstacles across industries, andimprove international competitiveness.Specifically, China’s defense industries arepursuing advanced manufacturing,information technology, and defensetechnologies. Examples include radar,counter-space capabilities, secure C4ISR,smart materials, and low-observabletechnologies.Major Special Items. China has alsoidentified 16 “major special items” for whichit plans to develop or expand indigenouscapabilities. These include core electroniccomponents, high-end universal chips andoperating system software, very large-scaleintegrated circuit manufacturing, next-generation broadband wireless mobilecommunications, high-grade numericallycontrolled machine tools, large aircraft, high-resolution satellites, and lunar exploration.Foreign Arms Acquisition. China seekssome high-tech components and certain
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China51major end items that it has difficultyproducing domestically, particularly fromRussia. China is pursuing advanced Russiandefense equipment such as the SA-21 (S-400)surface-to-air missile system and Su-35 fighteraircraft. Between 2011 and 2012, Russiaagreed to sell China IL-76 transport aircraftand Mi-171 helicopters. Russia’s concernsabout intellectual property protections willaffect the types and quantities of advancedarms or associated production technologies itis willing to transfer to China. China also hassigned significant purchase contracts withUkraine in recent years, including contractsfor assault hovercraft and aircraft engines.Espionage Supporting MilitaryModernization. China utilizes a large, well-organized network of enterprises, defensefactories, affiliated research institutes, andcomputer network operations to facilitate thecollection of sensitive information andexport-controlled technology, as well as basicresearch and science that supports U.S.defense system modernization. Many of theorganizations comprising China’s military-industrial complex have both military andcivilian research and development functions.This network of government-affiliatedcompanies and research institutes oftenenables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies or knowledgeable expertsunder the guise of civilian research anddevelopment. The enterprises and institutesaccomplish this through technologyconferences and symposia, legitimatecontracts and joint commercial ventures,partnerships with foreign firms, and jointdevelopment of specific technologies.As in previous years, China utilized itsintelligence services and employed other illicitapproaches that involve violations of U.S.laws and export controls to obtain keynational security technologies, controlledequipment, and other materials not readilyobtainable through commercial means oracademia. Based on investigations conductedby the law enforcement agencies of theDepartment of Defense, Department ofJustice, Department of Homeland Security,and Department of Commerce, Chinacontinues to engage in activities designed tosupport military procurement andmodernization. These include economicespionage, theft of trade secrets, exportcontrol violations, and technology transfer.> In August 2010, Noshir Gowadia wasconvicted of providing China withclassified U.S. defense technology. Thisassisted China in developing a low-signature cruise missile exhaust systemcapable of rendering a cruise missileresistant to detection by infrared missiles.> In September 2010, Chi Tong Kuok wasconvicted for conspiracy to illegally exportU.S. military encryption technology andsmuggle it to Macau and Hong Kong.The relevant technology includedencryption, communications equipment,and Global Positioning System (GPS)
  • equipment used by U.S. and NATOforces.> In September 2010, Xian Hongwei and LiLi were arrested in Hungary and laterextradited to the United States forconspiring to procure thousands ofradiation-hardened Programmable Read-Only Microchips, classified as defenseitems and used in satellite systems, for theChina Aerospace and TechnologyCorporation. Both defendants pleadedguilty and were sentenced in September2011 to two years in prison.> In January 2012, Yang Bin was arrested inBulgaria and later extradited to the UnitedStates based on a December 2011 criminalindictment related to the attempted exportof military-grade accelerometers used in“smart” munitions, aircraft, and missiles.> In July 2012, Zhang Zhaowei, anaturalized Canadian citizen, was arrestedwhile entering the United States, based ona sealed January 2011 indictment allegingZhang attempted to illegally acquire andexport military gyroscopes used inunmanned aerial systems and for tacticalmissile guidance.> In September 2012, Zhang Mingsuan wasarrested in the United States and indictedafter attempting to acquire up to two tonsof aerospace-grade carbon fiber. In arecorded conversation, Zhang claimed heurgently needed the fiber in connectionwith a scheduled Chinese fighter planetest flight.In addition, multiple cases identified since2009 involved individuals procuring andexporting export controlled items to China.These efforts included attempts to procureand export radiation-hardened programmablesemiconductors and computer circuits used insatellites, restricted microwave amplifiers usedin communications and radar equipment,export-restricted technical data, and thermalimaging cameras. There were also at least twocases in 2011 in which U.S. companiesworking on Department of Defense contractssubcontracted manufacturing work on smallarms and replacement parts to Chinesecompanies in violation of the Arms ExportControl Act.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China53China’s Arms ExportsFrom 2007 to 2011, China signed approximately $11 billion in agreements for conventionalweapons systems worldwide, ranging from general purpose materiel to major weapons systems.In 2012 and the coming years, China’s arms exports will likely increase modestly as China’sdomestic defense industry improves. Chinese defense firms are marketing and selling armsthroughout the world with the bulk of their sales to Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. In 2012,China unveiled the Yi Long tactical unmanned aerial vehicle, which will probably be marketedto developing countries.> Pakistan remains China’s primary customer for conventional weapons. China engages inboth arms sales and defense industrial cooperation with Islamabad, including co-productionof the JF-17 fighter aircraft, F-22P frigates with helicopters, K-8 jet trainers, F-7 fighter aircraft,early warning and control aircraft, tanks, air-to-air missiles, anti-ship cruise missiles, andcooperation on main battle tank production.> Sub-Saharan African countries view China as a provider of low-cost weapons with fewerpolitical strings attached compared to other international arms suppliers. China uses armssales as part of a multifaceted approach to promote trade, secure access to naturalresources, and extend its influence in the region.
  • 545FORCE MODERNIZATIONFOR A TAIWAN CONTINGENCY
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China55OVERVIEWSecurity in the Taiwan Strait is largely afunction of dynamic interactions between andamong mainland China, Taiwan, and theUnited States. China’s strategy towardTaiwan continues to be influenced by what itsees as positive developments in Taiwan’spolitical situation and approach toengagement with Beijing. However, China’soverall strategy continues to incorporateelements of persuasion and coercion to deteror repress the development of politicalattitudes in Taiwan favoring independence.The two sides made progress in expandingcross-Strait trade/economic links and people-to-people contacts; China addressed in limitedterms Taiwan’s expressed desire for greaterinternational space through its decision not tooppose Taiwan’s meaningful participation inthe World Health Assembly.Alongside positive public statements aboutthe Taiwan Strait situation from top leaders inChina following the re-election of TaiwanPresident Ma Ying-jeou in 2012, however,there have been no signs that China’s militarydisposition opposite Taiwan has changedsignificantly. The PLA has developed anddeployed military capabilities to coerceTaiwan or to attempt an invasion, if necessary.These improvements pose major challenges toTaiwan’s security, which has been basedhistorically upon the PLA’s inability to projectpower across the 100 nm Taiwan Strait,natural geographic advantages of islanddefense, Taiwan’s armed forces’ technologicalsuperiority, and the possibility of U.S.intervention.CHINA’S STRATEGY IN THETAIWAN STRAITChina appears prepared to defer the use offorce, as long as it believes that unificationover the long-term remains possible and thecosts of conflict outweigh the benefits. Chinaargues that the credible threat to use force isessential to maintain the conditions forpolitical progress, and to prevent Taiwan frommaking moves toward de jure independence.China has refused for decades to renounce theuse of force to resolve the Taiwan issue,despite simultaneously professing its desirefor peaceful unification under the principle of“one country, two systems.”The circumstances under which the mainlandhas historically warned it would use forcehave evolved over time in response to theisland’s declarations of political status,changes in PLA capabilities, and China’s viewof Taiwan’s relations with other countries.These circumstances, or “red lines,” haveincluded:> Formal declaration of Taiwanindependence;> Undefined moves toward Taiwanindependence;> Internal unrest on Taiwan;> Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons;
  • > Indefinite delays in the resumption ofcross-Strait dialogue on unification;> Foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internalaffairs; and> Foreign troops stationed on Taiwan.Article 8 of the March 2005 “Anti-SecessionLaw” states that China may use “non-peacefulmeans” if “secessionist forces … cause thefact of Taiwan’s secession from China;” if“major incidents entailing Taiwan’s secession”occur; or, if “possibilities for peacefulreunification” are exhausted. The ambiguityof these “redlines” preserves China’sflexibility.CHINA’S COURSES OF ACTIONAGAINST TAIWANThe PLA is capable of increasinglysophisticated military action against Taiwan.It is possible China would first pursue ameasured approach characterized by signalingits readiness to use force, followed by adeliberate buildup of force to optimize thespeed of engagement over strategic deception.Another option is that China would sacrificeovert, large-scale preparations in favor ofsurprise to force rapid military and/orpolitical resolution before other countriescould respond. If a quick resolution is notpossible, China would seek to:> Deter potential U.S. intervention;> Failing that, delay intervention and seekvictory in an asymmetric, limited, quickwar; and,> Fight to a standstill and pursue a politicalsettlement after a protracted conflict.Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. Inaddition to direct military engagement, PLAwritings describe potential alternativesolutions—air blockades, missile attacks, andmining to force capitulation. China coulddeclare that ships en route to Taiwan muststop in mainland ports for inspection and/ortransshipment prior to transiting to Taiwanports. China could also attempt the equivalentof a blockade by declaring exercise or missileclosure areas in approaches to ports, in effectclosing port access and diverting merchanttraffic. The PLA employed this methodduring the 1995-96 missile firings and live-fireexercises. There is a risk, however, that Chinawould underestimate the degree to which anyattempt to limit maritime traffic to and fromTaiwan would trigger countervailinginternational pressure and military escalation.China today probably could not enforce a fullmilitary blockade, particularly if a major navalpower intervened. However, its ability to doso will improve significantly over the next fiveto ten years.Limited Force or Coercive Options.China might use a variety of disruptive,punitive, or lethal military actions in a limitedcampaign against Taiwan, likely inconjunction with overt and clandestineeconomic and political activities. Such acampaign could include computer network orlimited kinetic attacks against Taiwan’spolitical, military, and economic infrastructureto induce fear in Taiwan and degrade the
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China57populace’s confidence in the Taiwanleadership. Similarly, PLA special operationsforces could infiltrate Taiwan and conductattacks against infrastructure or leadershiptargets.Air and Missile Campaign. Limited SRBMattacks and precision strikes against airdefense systems, including air bases, radarsites, missiles, space assets, andcommunications facilities, could be conductedin an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses,neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break theTaiwan people’s will to fight.Amphibious Invasion. Publicly availableChinese writings describe differentoperational concepts for amphibious invasion.The most prominent of these, the Joint IslandLanding Campaign, envisions a complexoperation relying on coordinated, interlockingcampaigns for logistics, air and naval support,and EW. The objective would be to breakthrough or circumvent shore defenses,establish and build a beachhead, transportpersonnel and materiel to designated landingsites in the north or south of Taiwan’swestern coastline, and launch attacks to seizeand occupy key targets and/or the entireisland.The PLA is capable of accomplishing variousamphibious operations short of a full-scaleinvasion of Taiwan. With few overt militarypreparations beyond routine training, Chinacould launch an invasion of small Taiwan-heldislands in the South China Sea such as Pratasor Itu Aba. A PLA invasion of a medium-sized, better defended offshore island such asMatsu or Jinmen is within China’s capabilities.Such an invasion would demonstrate militarycapability and political resolve while achievingtangible territorial gain and simultaneouslyshowing some measure of restraint. However,this kind of operation includes significant, ifnot prohibitive, political risk because it couldgalvanize pro-independence sentiment onTaiwan and generate international opposition.Large-scale amphibious invasion is one of themost complicated and difficult militaryoperations. Success depends upon air and seasuperiority, rapid buildup and sustainment ofsupplies on shore, and uninterrupted support.An attempt to invade Taiwan would strainChina’s armed forces and invite internationalintervention. These stresses, combined withChina’s combat force attrition and thecomplexity of urban warfare andcounterinsurgency (assuming a successfullanding and breakout), make amphibiousinvasion of Taiwan a significant political andmilitary risk. Taiwan’s investments to hardeninfrastructure and strengthen defensivecapabilities could also decrease China’s abilityto achieve its objectives. Moreover, Chinadoes not appear to be building theconventional amphibious lift required tosupport such a campaign.THE PLA’S CURRENT POSTUREFOR A TAIWAN CONFLICTPreparation for a Taiwan conflict with thepossibility of U.S. intervention has largely
  • dominated China’s military modernizationprogram. Despite decreased cross-straittensions since 2008, Taiwan remains a primarymilitary focus.Missile Forces. The Second Artillery isprepared to conduct SRBM attacks andprecision strikes against Taiwan’s air defensesystems, air bases, radar sites, missiles, spaceassets, C2 and communications facilities, in anattempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses,neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break thepublic’s will to fight.Air Forces. The PLA Air Force hasmaintained a force posture that provides itwith a variety of capabilities to leverageagainst Taiwan in a contingency. First, it hasstationed a large number of advanced aircraftwithin an unrefueled range of Taiwan,providing them with a significant capability toconduct air superiority and ground attackoperations against Taiwan. Second, a numberof long-range air defense systems provide astrong layer of defense of China’s mainlandagainst a counterattack. Third, China’sdevelopment of support aircraft provide itimproved ISR to support PLA Air Forceoperations in a contingency.Navy Forces. The PLA Navy is improvinganti-air and anti-surface warfare capabilities,developing a credible at-sea nuclear deterrent,and introducing new platforms that arepositioned to strike Taiwan in a cross-Straitconflict. The additional attack submarines,multi-mission surface combatants, and fourth-generation naval aircraft entering the force aredesigned to achieve sea superiority within thefirst island chain and counter any potentialthird party intervention in a Taiwan conflict.The PLA Navy currently lacks the massiveamphibious lift capacity that a large-scaleinvasion of Taiwan would require.Ground Forces. Increasingly armed withmore modern systems such as armed attackhelicopters, the PLA ground forces areconducting joint training exercises that willprepare them for a Taiwan invasion scenario.Training, including amphibious landingtraining, is often conducted under realisticconditions, including all-weather and at night.Improved networks provide real-time datatransmissions within and between units,enabling better command and control duringoperations. Additionally, the PLA Armysongoing fielding of advanced air defenseequipment is significantly enhancing the selfdefense of key command and controlelements and other critical assets assessed aslikely tasked for potential use against Taiwan.As the number of these new systems grows inthe PLA ground forces, the ability of anamphibious invasion force to successfullydefend cross-Strait amphibious lodgmentsagainst counterattacks by both legacy andadvanced weaponry will inevitably increase.TAIWAN’S DEFENSIVECAPABILITIESTaiwan has historically relied upon multiplemilitary variables to deter PLA aggression: thePLA’s inability to project sufficient poweracross the 100 mile Taiwan Strait, the Taiwan
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China59military’s technological superiority, and theinherent geographic advantages of islanddefense. China’s increasingly modernweapons and platforms (more than 1,100ballistic missiles, an anti-ship ballistic missileprogram, ships and submarines, combataircraft, and improved C4ISR capabilities)have largely negated many of these factors.Taiwan has taken important steps to build itswar reserve stocks, grow its defense industrialbase, improve joint operations and crisisresponse capabilities, and increase its officerand noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.These improvements partially addressTaiwan’s eroding defensive advantages.Taiwan is following through with its transitionto a volunteer military and reducing its activemilitary end-strength from 275,000 to 215,000personnel to create a “small but smart andstrong force.” Under this plan, which is slatedfor completion by December 2014, the costsavings from a smaller force will free upresources to increase volunteer salaries andbenefits, although these savings are notsufficient to cover the costs of volunteers.However, the transition has led to additionalpersonnel costs needed to attract and retainpersonnel under the volunteer system,diverting funds from foreign and indigenousacquisition programs, as well as near-termtraining and readiness. The actual number ofactive-duty service members is approximately235,000 – well below the 275,000 currentlyauthorized. In addition, Taiwan militaryspending has dropped to approximately 2percent of GDP – well below President Ma’spledge of 3 percent. China’s official defensebudget is about 10 times that of Taiwan.Realizing that Taiwan cannot match China’smilitary spending, Taiwan is working tointegrate innovative and asymmetric measuresinto its defense planning in order to counter-balance China’s growing capabilities.U.S. policy toward Taiwan derives from itsOne-China Policy, based on the three JointCommuniqués and the Taiwan Relations Act(TRA). U.S. policy opposes any unilateralchanges to the status quo in the Taiwan Straitby either side. The United States continues tosupport peaceful resolution of cross-Straitdifferences in a manner acceptable to thepeople on both sides.Consistent with the TRA, the United Stateshas helped to maintain peace, security, andstability in the Taiwan Strait by providingdefense articles and services to enable Taiwanto maintain a sufficient self defense capability.To this end, the United States has announcedmore than $12 billion in arms sales to Taiwansince 2010. This includes, most recently, inSeptember 2011, the U.S. announcement ofits intent to sell to Taiwan $5.85 billion worthof defensive arms and equipment, includingan advanced retrofit program for Taiwan’s F-16 A/B fighter jets, training, and spare partsfor Taiwan’s air force.
  • 6U.S.-CHINAMILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China61STRATEGY FOR ENGAGEMENTOver the past two decades, the PRC hassteadily transformed a poorly equipped,ground forces-centric military into a morecapable force that is assuming diversemissions well beyond China’s shores. Giventhis trajectory, the need for a robust U.S.-China military-to-military relationship thatbuilds trust and helps manage frictioncontinues to grow. During their January 2011summit, U.S. President Barack Obama andPRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed thata “healthy, stable, and reliable military-to-military relationship is an essential part of[their] shared vision for a positive, cooperative,and comprehensive U.S. China relationship.”Both sides have repeatedly endorsed thisobjective.The fundamental purpose for two countriesto conduct military-to-military relations is togain a better understanding of how each sidethinks about the role and use of militarypower in achieving political and strategicobjectives. It is precisely during periods oftension when a working relationship is mostimportant. Over the long term, a fullyfunctioning relationship should help bothparties develop a more acute awareness of thepotential for cooperation and competition.Sustained and substantive military-to-militarycontacts at all levels can help reducemiscommunication, misunderstanding, andthe risks of miscalculation.The United States bases its contacts andexchanges with China’s military on theprinciples of mutual respect, mutual trust,reciprocity, mutual interest, continuousdialogue, and mutual risk reduction. TheDepartment of Defense conducts them in amanner consistent with the provisions ofSection 1201 of the National DefenseAuthorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year2000, which provide the Secretary of Defensesufficient latitude to develop a program ofexchanges with China that supports U.S.national interests.The complexity of the security environmentboth in the Asia-Pacific region and globally,calls for a continuous dialogue between thearmed forces of the United States and China.The U.S. position is that our engagement withChina should expand cooperation in areas ofmutual interest, provide a forum to candidlyaddress areas of disagreement and improvemutual understanding. The United States seesvalue in sustained and reliable military ties andregards the military relationship as an integralcomponent of a comprehensive U.S.-Chinarelationship.Sustained military engagement underpins U.S.policy objectives of promoting China’sdevelopment in a manner consistent withinternational rules and norms and thatcontributes to regional and global problem-solving. The U.S. National Defense Strategyemphasizes that U.S. defense interaction withChina will be long-term and multi-dimensional.
  • U.S. military-to-military engagement withChina serves three general purposes insupport of the broader relationship. First, itallows the U.S. and PRC militaries to buildcooperative capacity. This is achievedthrough activities that enhance or facilitateour ability to interact at a tactical oroperational level. Second, engagement fostersunderstanding of each others’ militaryinstitutions in ways that dispel misconceptionsand encourage common ground for dialogue.Third, military engagement allows seniorleaders to address the global securityenvironment and relevant challenges. Theseinteractions can facilitate common approachesto challenges and serves as a bridge to buildmore productive working relationships.MILITARY-TO-MILITARYENGAGEMENT IN 2012 -HIGHLIGHTS2012 was a year of positive momentum in themilitary relationship between the UnitedStates and China. Although the 2012 military-to-military engagement plan was not finalizeduntil April 2012, PRC Vice President XiJinping’s successful visit to the Pentagon andmeeting with U.S. Secretary of DefensePanetta in February set the tone for a positiveatmosphere that continued through the year.Although both nations underwent politicaltransitions in November, the robust scheduleof engagements proceeded withoutinterruption – selected visits are highlightedbelow (see complete list of 2012 engagementsat Appendix II).High Level Visits. Along with PRC VicePresident Xi Jinping’s February visit to theUnited States, PRC Minister of NationalDefense General Liang Guanglie traveled tothe United States in May, visiting SanFrancisco; Naval Air Station, San Diego;Washington, DC; SOUTHCOMHeadquarters in Miami; Camp Lejeune, NorthCarolina; Ft. Benning, Georgia; and the U.S.Military Academy at West Point.PACOM Commander Admiral SamuelLocklear visited China in June, where he hadmeetings in Beijing and visited theGuangzhou Military Region Headquarters,observed tank live fire demonstrations inGuilin, and received briefings at the South SeaFleet Command Headquarters in Zhanjiangand toured a PLA Navy destroyer.In August, PRC Deputy Chief of the GeneralStaff, General Cai Yingting, visited the UnitedStates, making stops in New York;Washington, DC; Fort Hood, TX; andPACOM Headquarters in Honolulu.Secretary Panetta visited China in September,where he met with senior military and civilianleaders in Beijing and gave an address tocadets at the PLA’s Armed ForcesEngineering Academy (several of whom heshared lunch with afterward). Secretary ofDefense Panetta then traveled south toQingdao, where he visited China’s North SeaFleet headquarters and toured a SONG-class
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China63diesel electric submarine and a JIANGKAI II-class guided missile frigate. Secretary ofDefense Panetta invited China to participatein RIM OF THE PACIFIC (RIMPAC),PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP, and PACIFICANGEL exercises.Finally, at the end of November 2012,Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus conducted avisit to China that included meetings inBeijing and visits to the PLA Navy’s bases inZhoushan and Daxie Dao, where he touredthe Peace Ark hospital ship, a JIANGKAI II-class guided missile frigate, and a YUAN-classSSP submarine.Recurrent Exchanges. A full slate ofrecurrent exchanges was also conducted in2012. These events form the backbone ofdefense policy-level discussions for the twonations and serve as a more regularized,routine mechanism for dialogue than high-level visits, with their less-predictableschedules.In May, on the margins of the Strategic andEconomic Dialogue (S&ED) in Beijing,Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Dr.James Miller participated in the Departmentof State-led second annual Strategic SecurityDialogue (SSD). Under Secretary Miller alsoled the Department of Defense delegation tothe S&ED, where he spoke at the finalsecurity track plenary session (hosted by U.S.Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and PRCState Councilor Dai Bingguo) on the state ofU.S.-China military-to-military relations.Under Secretary Miller’s PRC counterpart,then-Deputy Chief of the General StaffGeneral Ma Xiaotian, also participated in boththe SSD and the S&ED.The PACOM-led Military MaritimeConsultative Agreement (MMCA) plenarysession (focused on maritime safety) tookplace in Qingdao in September, withpreparatory working group meeting in June(future meetings may also focus on safe airintercept practices).In October 2012, the two sides conducted theannual Defensive Policy Coordination Talks(DPCTs) at the Pentagon, with maritimesafety/security and regional/global securityissues the focus of the agenda. In addition tobeginning negotiations for the 2013 military-to-military engagement plant, the DPCTs setthe stage for Under Secretary Miller toconduct the annual Defense ConsultativeTalks (DCTs) in December at the Pentagon.The DCTs are the highest-level annualdefense dialogue between the United Statesand China.Academic, Functional Exchanges. InJune 2012, 29 PLA generals, primarily fromthe ground forces, visited the United States aspart of a delegation of students in the strategic“Dragons” course at the PLA NationalDefense University (NDU). The U.S. NDU“Capstone” course conducted a reciprocalvisit to China the following month.
  • In August, a PLA Civilian Personnel Systemdelegation visited the United States (andCanada) to learn more about integration ofcivilian and military personnel in theDepartment of Defense. The visit increasedmutual institutional understanding andcovered issues including promotion systems,ranking equivalency, casualty compensation,and incorporating retired military personnelinto civilian roles.In September, just days before Secretary ofDefense Panetta’s visit to China, the UnitedStates and China conducted their first bilateralcounter-piracy exercise in the Gulf of Aden.In November 2012, the PRC hosted expertsfrom the U.S. Army Pacific for an annualDisaster Management Exchange (DME),which included a table-top exercise whereboth sides discussed possible responses to anearthquake in a third country.In December 2012, the PACOM CommandSurgeon led a military medical delegation toChina, the first delegation of its kind, in aneffort to chart out more robust cooperation.PLANNING FOR MILITARY-TO-MILITARY ENGAGEMENTS IN2013Planning for 2013 military-to-militaryengagements began mid-year 2012 andcontinued during the DPCTs in October. Asthis report went to print, the 2013 plan hadbeen agreed to in principle.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China65SPECIAL TOPIC: SPACE-BASED IMAGING AND REMOTE SENSINGChina has developed a large constellation of imaging and remote sensing satellites under avariety of mission families. These satellites can support military objectives by providing situationalawareness of foreign military force deployments, critical infrastructure, and targets of politicalsignificance. Since 2006, China has conducted 16 Yaogan remote sensing satellite launches.The Yaogan satellites conduct scientific experiments, carry out surveys on land resources,estimate crop yield, and support natural disaster reduction and prevention. Additionally, Chinahas launched two Tianhui satellites designed to conduct scientific experiments and support landresource surveys and territory mapping with a stereoscopic imaging payload. China has threeHuanjing disaster monitoring satellites currently on orbit (the third of which was launched inNovember 2012). The Ziyuan series of satellites are used for earth resources, cartography,surveying, and monitoring. China also operates the Haiyang ocean monitoring constellationand Fengyun weather satellites in low Earth and geosynchronous orbits. China will continue toincrease its on-orbit constellation with the planned launch of 100 satellites through 2015. Theselaunches include imaging, remote sensing, navigation, communication, and scientific satellites,as well as manned spacecraft.SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA’S FIRST AIRCRAFT CARRIERThe most significant development in the PLA Navy over the past year has been the sea trials andcommissioning of China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning. The Liaoning was commissioned andentered service with the PLA Navy on September 25, 2012. The carrier most likely will conductextensive local operations focusing on shipboard training, carrier aircraft integration, and carrierformation training before reaching an operational effectiveness in three to four years. Thecarrier could operate in the East and South China Seas in the nearer term and may be used forother mission sets as needed.The carrier will most likely be based at Yuchi in the Qingdao area in the near term, althoughSanya Naval Base on Hainan Island is also a possibility, particularly after an operational air wing isformed. The base under construction at Yuchi features a deep draft harbor with replenishment,repair, and maintenance facilities. The Qingdao area also supports nearby airfields for aircraftmaintenance and repair.The J-15 aircraft conducted its first takeoffs and landings from the Liaoning on November 26,2012. Subsequently, at least two aircraft conducted multiple landings and takeoffs from the ship.The J-15 carrier-based fighter is the Chinese version of the Russian Su-33. The J-15 is designed forski-jump takeoffs and arrested landings, as required by the configuration of the Liaoning.Although the J-15 has a land-based combat radius of 1200 km, the aircraft will be limited in
  • range and armament when operating from the carrier, due to limits imposed by the ski-jumptakeoff and arrested carrier landings.The formation of carrier battle groups will enable the PLA Navy to conduct comprehensiveoperations and enhance its long-range operational capabilities. Although reports havesurfaced regarding the construction of a second Chinese aircraft carrier in Shanghai, theChinese Ministry of National Defense has dismissed these claims.SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA AIR FORCE STEALTH AIRCRAFTThe PLA seeks to develop aircraft with low observable features, advanced avionics, super-cruiseengines, and stealth applications, as demonstrated by the January 2011 flight test of the J-20prototype and recent observations of a second indigenously-produced aircraft with stealthfeatures. China seeks to develop these advanced aircraft to improve its regional airpowerprojection capabilities and strengthen its ability to strike regional airbases and facilities. China’sfirst fifth generation fighter is not expected to enter service prior to 2018, and China facesnumerous challenges to achieving full operational capability, including developing high-performance jet engines.The PLA Air Force has observed foreign military employment of stealth aircraft and views thistechnology as a core capability in its transformation from a predominantly territorial air force toone capable of conducting offensive and defensive operations. The PLA Air Force alsoperceives there is an imbalance between offensive and defensive operations due to advancesin stealth aircraft and related technologies with stealth aircraft providing an offensiveoperational advantage that denies an adversary the time to mobilize and conduct defensiveoperations. The PLA Air Force also sees the offensive advantage to combining an aircraft’sstealthy features with information systems that enhance situational awareness and improvecoordination of forces during combat.The development of stealth aircraft incorporated with advanced fifth generation capabilities,including super-cruise engines and advanced avionics, would make the aircraft capable ofsupporting a variety of tactical and regional missions. Furthermore, stealth aircraft the size ofChina’s J-20 could be used as a multi-role fighter to strike ground targets within the region inaddition to supporting air superiority missions beyond China’s borders. Although China’s seconddevelopmental fifth generation fighter is smaller in size than the J-20, this aircraft (tentativelyidentified as the J-31) may be designed for multi-role missions, providing China with a secondstealth platform for regional operations. In addition to manned fighter aircraft, the PLA Air Forcealso views stealth technology as integral to unmanned aircraft, specifically those with an air-to-ground role, as this technology will improve the system’s ability to penetrate heavily protectedtargets.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China67The PLA recognizes the technological challenges posed by the next generation of advancedfighters, and has concerns about its ability to counter U.S. 5th generation aircraft, such as the F-22and F-35. In response, the PLA Air Force has emphasized the need to develop systems andtraining to defend against the employment of foreign stealth technology in combat. In addition,the PLA Air Force believes that it should not focus solely on defense against stealth technology,but must also emphasize offensive capabilities to counter an adversary’s use of stealthtechnology, to include the use of long-range attack capabilities to destroy enemy aircraft onthe ground.SPECIAL TOPIC: PLA INTEGRATED AIR DEFENSESChina has developed a national integrated air defense system (IADS) to defend key strategiccities and borders, territorial claims, and forces against threats from the air. Overall, China’s IADSrepresents a multilayered defense consisting of weapons systems, radars and C4ISR platformsworking together to counter multiple types of air threats at various ranges and altitudes. One ofChina’s primary goals is to defend against precision strike munitions such as cruise and ballisticmissiles, especially those launched from long distances. In order to counter precision strikemunitions, China has developed advanced long-range SAM systems, airborne early warningplatforms, and C2 networks. Defense against stealth aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles isalso a growing priority. Another aspect of China’s IADS development is the deployment of land-based air defense brigades beyond the eastern coast of China and improving the air defense ofChina’s naval fleets in the ECS and SCS. This is part of China’s longstanding effort to expand itscapabilities from focusing on territorial defense to supporting both defensive and offensiveoperations.Air Defense Weapons. China’s air force and navy employ land- and sea-based SAMs andantiaircraft artillery (AAA) and its ground forces employ short- and medium-range SAMs andAAA in extensive numbers. The PLA Air Force employs one of the largest forces of advancedlong-range SAM systems in the world, including SA-20 battalions acquired from Russia anddomestically-produced HQ-9 battalions. China has shown interest in acquiring Russia’s newestlong-range SAM, the S-400 TRIUMF, but a contract has not been signed yet and Russian officialshave stated China would not receive the S-400 until at least 2017. This SAM can target aircraft,cruise missiles, and tactical and medium-range ballistic missiles.Early Warning Network. Another element of China’s multilayered IADS is its extensive ground-based radar network. In the past, this ground-based early warning network and China’s Russian-acquired SAMs primarily protected Beijing and other key strategic locations in the eastern part ofthe country. China has since developed the KONGJING-2000 (KJ-2000) airborne early warningaircraft to provide coverage at long ranges and low altitudes for faster response and command
  • targeting to weapons systems. In the future China may expand its national early warningnetwork to protect China’s territorial air space and waters farther from the mainland, as well asto provide space defense. This effort would include China’s growing constellations ofreconnaissance, data relay, navigation, and communications satellites. China is also improvingreconnaissance technologies to include infrared, multiple-spectrum, pulsed doppler, phasedarray, and passive detection. Over-the-horizon skywave radar is also an important componentof China’s improvement in its strategic early warning capabilities.C4ISR Network. China’s IADS also includes a C4ISR network to connect early warning platforms,SAM and AAA, and command posts in order to improve communication and response timeduring operations. The network is intended to include battle damage assessment capability.China continues to make progress on command, communication, and control systems. China’sair defense brigades are training to use this information network and mobile C2 platforms toconnect different types of weapons systems’ operations together by sending automatedtargeting information to them simultaneously. Weapon systems that are geographicallyseparate, in different units, and a mix of older and newer battalions could achieve compatibilitythrough the use of networked C2. China is also using simulation systems to attempt to train forcommand of air defense operations in realistic operational conditions, including networkwarfare. China has deployed air defense brigades employing its newest SAM system to thewestern part of China to train for long-distance mobility and operations in high-altitudeconditions, including operations in the conditions of network warfare.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China69APPENDIX I: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGESU.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS FOR 2012HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINA Month (2012)USPACOM Commander to China JuneSecretary of Defense to China SeptemberSecretary of the Navy to China NovemberHIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATESPRC Minister of Defense to United States MayPRC Deputy Chief of the General Staff for Strategic Planning to United States JulyRECURRENT EXCHANGESDefense POW/Missing Personnel Office meeting with PLA Archivists MayMilitary Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) Working Group in United States JuneMMCA Plenary Session in China SeptemberDefense Policy Coordination Talks in United States OctoberDefense Consultative Talks in United States DecemberACADEMIC EXCHANGES TO UNITED STATESPLA University of Science and Technology delegation to United States AprilPRC National Defense University student delegation to United States JuneACADEMIC EXCHANGES TO CHINANational War College student delegation to China MayNational Defense University CAPSTONE Course to China JulyFUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES TO UNITED STATESPLA Civilian System Delegation to United States AugustPRC Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Visit to United States DecemberFUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES TO CHINAU.S. Army Band to China NovemberDisaster Management Exchange and Tabletop Exercise in China NovemberUSPACOM Command Surgeon General Visit to China DecemberJOINT EXERCISESGulf of Aden (GOA) Counter-piracy Exercise September
  • U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGES PLANNED FOR 2013HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO CHINAChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to ChinaChief of Staff of the Air Force to ChinaChief of Staff of the Army to ChinaHIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO UNITED STATESPRC Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission or Minister of Defense visit to United StatesPRC Chief of Naval Operations to United StatesPRC Senior Military Delegation (TBD)Military Delegation (TBD)RECURRENT EXCHANGESMMCA Working Group in China (2x)MMCA Special SessionMMCA Plenary SessionDisaster Management ExchangeDefense POW/Missing Personnel Office meeting with PLA ArchivistsDefense Policy Coordination TalksDefense Consultative TalksACADEMIC EXCHANGES TO UNITED STATESU.S. National Defense University- PRC National Defense University Strategic DialoguePRC National Defense University student delegation to United States (2x)Academy of Military Science / Army War College ExchangePLA Navy Command College Student Delegation to United StatesPRC Army cadet participation in West Point’s International Week/Sandhurst competitionACADEMIC EXCHANGES TO CHINANational Defense University PresidentNational Defense University student delegationNational War College Student delegationU.S. Air War CollegeU.S. Naval War College student delegationWest Point cadet visit to PLA University of Science and TechnologyFUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES TO UNITED STATESPLA Senior Leader Familiarization CourseNon-Traditional Security Missions Logistics Working GroupMilitary Lawyer Study GroupPLA Daily Media DelegationHuman Resources Management Study Group
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China71PLA Navy Ship VisitPLA Medical Department Chief Visit to USPACOMPLA Observers to LIGHTNING RESCUE 13PRC Peacekeeping Delegation to Carlisle Barracks, PSFUNCTIONAL EXCHANGES TO CHINAUSPACOM Mid-level Officer DelegationU.S. Army Corps of Engineers DelegationOSD Media and Public Affairs DelegationU.S. Navy Ship VisitU.S. Navy Senior Leader Familiarization CourseJOINT EXERCISESGulf of Aden Counter-piracy ExerciseDisaster Management Exchange and Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief ExerciseSearch and Rescue Exercise in conjunction with ship visitCHINA’S FOREIGN MILITARY EXCHANGESCountries Visited by Senior Chinese Military Leaders in 2012ArgentinaBelarusBosnia andHerzogovinaBurmaCambodiaGabonIndiaLatviaLaosLithuaniaMalaysiaMongoliaPakistanPolandSenegalSeychellesSingaporeSri LankaSouth AfricaTajikistanTanzaniaThailandTurkeyTurkmenistanUnited StatesUzbekistanSenior Foreign Military Officials Visiting China in 2012AustraliaBruneiBurmaCentral AfricanRepublicChileCroatiaCubaGermanyIsraelKazakhstanKyrgyzstanLatviaLithuaniaMaldivesMoldovaNew ZealandPakistanPolandRussiaSingaporeSlovakiaSouth AfricaSri LankaSwedenThailandTogoTrinidad andTobagoUkraineUnited StatesUzbekistanVietnamZambia
  • BILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL MILITARY EXERCISES INVOLVING THE PLA 2007-2012Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises Since 2007Year Exercise Name Type of Exercise Participants2007Aman (Peace) 2007 Search and Rescue PakistanChina-France Friendship 2007 Maritime FranceChina-Spain Friendship 2007 Maritime SpainCooperation 2007 Counterterrorism RussiaHand-in-Hand 2007 Counterterrorism IndiaPeace Mission 2007 CounterterrorismRussia, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,UzbekistanStrike 2007 Counterterrorism ThailandWestern Pacific Naval Symposium Search and RescueUnited States, France,Japan, Australia, NewZealand, India, Pakistan,ROK, SingaporeUnnamed Maritime IndiaUnnamed Search and Rescue Australia, New Zealand2008Hand-in-Hand 2008 Counterterrorism IndiaStrike 2008 Counterterrorism Thailand2009Aman (Peace) 2009 MaritimeHosted by Pakistan(38 countries participated)Cooperation 2009 Counterterrorism SingaporeCountry-Gate Sharp Sword 2009 Counterterrorism RussiaPeace Angel 2009 Medical GabonPeace Keeping Mission 2009 Peacekeeping Operations MongoliaPeace Mission 2009 Counterterrorism RussiaPeace Shield 2009 Counter-piracy RussiaUnnamed Maritime Singapore2010Blue Strike/Blue Assault 2010 Counterterrorism ThailandCooperation 2010 Counterterrorism SingaporeFriendship 2010 Counterterrorism PakistanFriendship Action 2010Ground(Mountain Warfare)RomaniaPeace Angel 2010 Medical PeruPeace Mission 2010 CounterterrorismRussia, Kazakhstan,Kyrgyzstan, TajikistanStrike 2010 Counterterrorism ThailandUnnamed Search and Rescue AustraliaUnnamed Maritime New ZealandUnnamed Counter-piracy South KoreaUnnamed Search and Rescue TaiwanUnnamed Air TurkeyUnnamed Ground TurkeyUnnamed Search and Rescue Vietnam
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China732011Unnamed Joint Border Patrol KazakhstanShaheen 1 Air Exercise PakistanTian Shan-2 2011 CounterterrorismKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Russia, Tajikistan,UzbekistanAman (Peace) 2011 MaritimeHosted by Pakistan(39 countries participated)Unnamed Maritime (Counter-piracy) TanzaniaUnnamed Maritime (Counter-piracy) PakistanSharp Blade-2011SpecialOperations/CounterterrorismIndonesiaUnnamed Maritime VietnamUnnamed Airborne BelarusKhan Quest-11Peacekeeping Operations(observer status)MongoliaCooperation-2011Special Operations (UrbanWarfare)VenezuelaFriendship-IVGround (Low IntensityConflict)PakistanCooperation Spirit 2011Humanitarian Aid/DisasterReliefAustralia2012Naval Cooperation 2012 Maritime RussiaUnnamed Counter-piracy FranceBlue Assault 2012Maritime (AmphibiousAssault)ThailandPeace Mission 2012 CounterterrorismKazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Russia, Tajikistan,UzbekistanSharp Knife 2012 Counterterrorism IndonesiaUnnamedMaritime (Search andRescue)VietnamUnnamed Counter-piracy United StatesCooperation Spirit 2012 HA/DR Australia, New ZealandUnnamed Counterterrorism Jordan
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China75APPENDIX II: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATATaiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground ForcesChina TaiwanTotalTaiwan StraitAreaTotalPersonnel (Active) 1.25 million 400,000 130,000Group Armies 18 8 3Infantry Divisions 15 5 0Infantry Brigades 16 6 8Mechanized InfantryDivisions6 2 0Mechanized InfantryBrigades17 7 3Armor Divisions 1 0 0Armor Brigades 16 7 4Artillery Divisions 2 2 0Artillery Brigades 17 6 5Airborne Divisions 3 3 0Amphibious Divisions 2 2 0Amphibious Brigades 3 3 3Tanks 7,000 3,000 1,100Artillery Pieces 8,000 3,000 1,600Note: PLA active ground forces are organized into group armies. Infantry, armor, and artilleryunits are organized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA’sseven military regions (MRs). A significant portion of these assets are deployed in the TaiwanStrait area, specifically the Nanjing, Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. Taiwan has seven defensecommands, three of which have field armies. Each army contains an artillery command roughlyequivalent to a brigade plus.
  • Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval ForcesChina TaiwanTotalEast and SouthSea FleetsTotalAircraft Carriers 1 0 0Destroyers 23 16 4Frigates 52 44 22Tank Landing Ships/Amphibious Transport Dock29 27 12Medium Landing Ships 26 24 4Diesel Attack Submarines 49 33 4Nuclear Attack Submarines 5 2 0Coastal Patrol (Missile) 85 67 45Note: The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibiouswarfare ships in Asia. In the event of a major Taiwan conflict, the East and South Sea Fleetswould be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy. The North Sea Fleetwould be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could providemission-critical assets to support other fleets.Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air ForcesChina TaiwanAircraft TotalWithin range ofTaiwanTotalFighters 1,700 330 388Bombers/Attack 600 160 22Transport 475 40 21Note: The PLA Air Force and the PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combataircraft. These consist of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers. An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employedfor training, research, and development. The two air arms also possess approximately 475transports and more than 100 surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surfacesearch, and airborne early warning capabilities. The majority of PLA Air Force and PLA Navyaircraft are based in the eastern half of the country. Currently, 490 aircraft could conductcombat operations against Taiwan without refueling, but this number could be significantlyincreased through any combination of aircraft forward deployment, decreased ordnanceloads, or altered mission profiles.
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China77
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China79APPENDIX III: ADDITIONAL MAPS AND CHARTSFigure 1: China’s Sovereignty Claims
  • Figure 2: China’s Import Transit Routes
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China81Figure 3: Conventional Strike Capabilities
  • Figure 4: Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles
  • OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSEAnnual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China83Figure 5: Taiwan Strait SAM and SRBM Coverage.