Deforestation in Tanzania's East Usambaras: sticks, carrots, and the crowding out effect

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Seminar presentation at the World Agroforestry Centre (ICRAF)Conference Hall, Thursday 9th November, 2010

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Deforestation in Tanzania's East Usambaras: sticks, carrots, and the crowding out effect

  1. 1. Deforestation in Tanzania’s East Usambaras:Sticks, Carrots and the ‘Crowding Out’ effect David Kaczan M.Sc Student Brent Swallow Professor and supervisor Vic Adamowicz Professor and co-supervisor Delia Catacutan ICRAF co-supervisor
  2. 2. What is the ‘Crowding Out’ effect, andwhy does it matter? Endogenous preferences Self determination Information conveyance Framing
  3. 3. (Reyes, et al. 2006) The Context •3300 km2 of sub montane and montane forest •A Biodiversity hotspot: “...the highest ratio of endemic flora and fauna per 100 km2 of all biodiversity hotspots in the world” •35 % of species endemic •Other important ecosystem functions: water provision, local climate (Reyes et al. 2006; Burgess et al. 2007)
  4. 4. Human Impact Reyes et al. (2007)
  5. 5. •60 percent of forest cover lost in East Usambaras•26 percent of remaining forest has cardamom
  6. 6. Hall, 2006
  7. 7. Conservation efforts•Forest reserves, Amani nature reserve, Deremacorridor•What about incentive schemes (PES)?•If so, how would you design such a scheme formaximum effectiveness?
  8. 8. Intervention Points No compensation?> 100 percent compensation (Knowledge transfer, (- altruism / pro social) Credit) > 50 percent compensation (- altruism / pro social)
  9. 9. A research questionBut: if PES is used, is there a danger that economicincentives could ‘crowd out’ pre existing altruistic/prosocial incentives?
  10. 10. Approach 1: Experiments Precedents, mechanisms?
  11. 11. Experimental design: dictator game Donated to passive group30 Tsh 20 Tsh 50 Tsh50 Tsh 40 Tsh 20 Tsh
  12. 12. Dictator game: stylized PES0.65 Not Significant Significant 0.60.55 0.50.45 0.40.35 0.30.25 0.2 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 Period Control PES treatment Control (average) PES (average)
  13. 13. Dictator game: stylized enforcement (high)0.65 Significant Not significant 0.60.55 0.50.45 0.40.35 0.30.25 0.2 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 Period Control Enforcement - high Control (average) Enforcement - high (average)
  14. 14. Dictator game: stylized enforcement (low)0.65 Not Significant Not significant 0.60.55 0.50.45 0.40.35 0.30.25 0.2 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 Period Control Enforcement - low (average) Control (average) Enforcement - low
  15. 15. Dictator game: stylized PES (collective)0.65 Significant Significant 0.60.55 0.50.45 0.40.35 0.30.25 0.2 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 Period Control PES - collective Control (average) PES collective (average)
  16. 16. Experiment II: Which of the payment options will you prefer? (n=194)70% 62%60%50%40%30% 23%20% 11%10% 2.5%0% No payment but Individual Payment of Disagree/Need provision for payment of Tsh2000 additional village Tsh2000 transferred to options infrastructure village committee Vardhan, 2010 (unpublished)
  17. 17. Experiment I: Will your neigbor participate under these payment options? (n=194)120% 97%100% 82% 76%80% 74% 64%60%40%20% 0% High No mention High social Payment Low individual of payment payment (Tsh mentioned individual payment 1000) offered but not payment (Tsh (Tsh1000) offered 200 offered) offered Vardhan, 2010 (unpublished)
  18. 18. In summary...•Preliminary evidence suggests crowding out forrewards, less so for enforcements• Fact of enforcement may be more importantthan its magnitude•Contrary to other studies, but some similaritieswith Vardhan?•Collective payment unsuccessful
  19. 19. “First do no harm....”
  20. 20. With thanks…to supervisors B. Swallow, V. Adamowicz and D. Catacutan;field assistants F. Njilima, V. Mkongewa, Y. Mwaikio and A. Kajiru;administrators at ICRAF Tanzania and Kenya;and valuable, regular advice from H. Vihemaki, S. Rantala and R. Bullock

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