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A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon
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A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon

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A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon

A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non-timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon

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  • We had earlier announced that if farmers don’t plant trees it is because they do not have security over their land. But what is tenure security. Some scientists argue that fear of eviction is a more important concept to use rathar than breadth of rights which takes into consideration breadth of rights.
  • Context and content of policy and policy instruments have been analyzed and they have been described to be flawed.
  • Context and content of policy and policy instruments have been analyzed and they have been described to be flawed.
  • Transcript

    • 1. A neo-institutional economic analysis of policies and policy instrument governing non timber forest products and agro forestry development in Cameroon Divine Foundjem Tita June 18, 2013 ICRAF Yaounde, Cameroon 1
    • 2. Outline 1. Introduction: problem & research question 2. Theoretical lens and study objectives 3. Method : choice of study sites & products 4. Results 5. Conclusions & policy implications 2
    • 3. 1.Introduction Household income Sustainable development Forest Agroforestry Food security Domestication Subsistence needs NTFP AFTP 3
    • 4. 1.Introduction 1. Longer time lags for trees to reach maturity 2. Appropriate technologies are poorly known 3.. Adverse or no national policies 4. Legal constraints from sister government sectors Globally, and for Cameroon potential of NTFP and AFTP to livelihoods and sustainable development are yet to be exploited 3.. Adverse or no national policies 4. Legal constraints from sister government sectors Globally, and for Cameroon potential of NTFP and AFTP to livelihoods and sustainable development are yet to be exploited What is the problem? 4 2. Appropriate technologies are poorly known 1. Longer time lags for trees to reach maturity Call on national governments to device appropriate policies and institutions
    • 5. Main research question 1.Introduction What formal policies/strategies and regulations currently exist to address NTFP in Cameroon and how do they influence agroforestry development ? 5
    • 6. Theoretical lens Neo-institutional economics: multi disciplinary economics, history, sociology, law, business org and political science 2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives Economic performance Formal: policies, strategies, regulati ons, legislation Institutions = rules of the game Informal: norms, culture, values, et hics 6
    • 7. Theoretical lens operationalised 2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives 7 1994 Forestry Law and 1995 Decree of application PolicyInstruments Customary laws, norms ,values , culture Access to Trees, Land , NTFP, AFTP Producers perception • secured property rights • incentives to invest in AFTP •increased revenue Traders access to permits •reduced TCs •reduced corruption,/rent seeking •profits/net margins •self compliance with permits 1974 Land Ordinance /land titles Government policy on poverty reduction and sustainable exploitation of natural resources including NTFP National and International Research NationalandInternationalNGOs Interaction of formal & informal institutions Chapter 6 Outcomes
    • 8. Research objectives Four main themes: (i) Appraise existing policies governing AFTP/NTFP sectors (ii) Assess the effect of existing policy on agroforestry development- farmer perspectives (iii) Analyse interaction between formal and informal rules regulating land and trees 2.Theoreticallens&studyobjectives 8
    • 9. Choice of products 3.Methodology 9 Gnetum spp: 3518 tons (10.5 m $) sold to Nigeria annually by sea Ricinodendron heudelotii: annual trade within Cameroon ~ 750,000 $ Irvingia spp: 8.5 m $ annually from one comm forest Cola spp: annual export estimated at 165,000 $
    • 10. Study sites 3.Methodology 10
    • 11. Choice of respondents 3.Methodology 11 Producers N= 394
    • 12. • Qualitative content analysis 12 4.Results Results objective 1: analysis of existing policies 2 3 3 6 6 7 0 5 10 NTFP Agriculture PRSP GESP RDSP PSFE Forest Number Policydocuments 6 5 4 4 4 3 1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Partial conclusion: Government of Cameroon is committed to include NTFP and AFTP in its economic and sustainable development policy • Number of policy documents addressing the issue
    • 13. Analysis of policy instruments - legislation 4.Results 13 • Clear definition of AFTP/NTFP • Ownership and access to resources • Economic and usufruct rights Analysis focused on • No distinction between NTFP and AFTP • Permits are required to sell NTFP & indirectly AFTP What did we find • Disincentive to agroforestry development • Conclusions are based on theory • Farmers’ opinion required Partial conclusion
    • 14. Results objective 2: effect of existing policies on agroforestry • Farmers perceptions 4.Results 14 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% Permits (AFTP = NTFP) WTA Certficates of origin for AFTP Intentions to plant trees if AFTP=NTFP 76% 39% 41% Yes No AFTP= NTFP (Yes ) Accept certificate of origin (Yes ) Will not plant trees if AFTP = NTFP Group (yes ) ns ns +ve (**) Education -ve(**) ns +ve(**) No of trees planted ns ns +ve (**) Experience ns ns -ve (**) Region of origin (savannah) -ve(**) -ve(**) ns
    • 15. Partial conclusions • Low level of awareness and enforcement of law at producers levels – what is its relevance? • Despite negative attitudes towards policy instruments, a majority will continue to plant trees • Number that may not plant trees is too large to be neglected 4.Results 15
    • 16. Results objective 3: land and tree tenure security 4.Results 16 • Village resident : this is my land sir what are you doing here? • City man: I am developing the land. Who are you and who says it is your land? • Village resident: I am the owner of this land, i have been farming the land • for the past 30 years • City man: how did you get the land? • Village resident: My father gave it to me • City man: And how did your father get the land? • Village resident: I don’t know, what I know is that he planted that tree and he owns this land unfortunately Mr. Tom who could testify died last year • City man: Sorry my friend, this land was given to me by father who got it from his father who fought the Meta people and seized the land from them during the German colonial period • City man continues: I am now on retirement and have come to the village to develop my land. And then the conflict begins, who owns the land based on formal law and by custom? (adopted from Bromely 1989. P 220)
    • 17. Farmers perception of land and tenure security as factors of agroforestry development 4.Results 17 Formal rules • Ownership of land is sanctioned by a title deed • Land with no deed = National land • Trees on land with no title deed belongs to the state Informal rules • First occupant owns the land • Tree planting symbolises ownership Which of the two • Guarantee security over land and trees ? • Favours agroforestry? • Role of cultural differences?
    • 18. 4.Results 18 16% 84% Farmers’ attitudes towards land titles No ( Negative ) Yes ( Positive) 29% 27% 6% 17% 21% % 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50% North West West Centre South East Preferences for formal or customary systems Formal system Customary system 41% 59% Belief of ownership (Individual) Positive attitude towards land titles Preference for customary systems Land conflict (yes ) +ve(*) +ve(***) -ve(*) Form of leadership (forest) +ve(**) ns -ve(**) Population density +ve(**) ns ns 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120% NorthWest West Centre South East Total Region of orgin of village Government Community/chiefs Individuals Farmer’s perception of ownership
    • 19. Tenure security & tree planting 4.Results 19 45 4 55 96 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 Tenure security based on fear of eviction No yes Disincentive to agroforestry ? Fear of eviction: yes = 3% Land availability: yes = 23%
    • 20. Partial conclusions • Farmers have positive attitude towards land titles however, • Where customs are intact = customary tenure is more preferred • Where there have been cases of land conflict = title deed is preferred • Fear of eviction not a threat to tree planting, land availability may be the problem • Current customary systems guarantees security and favours tree planting • Study supports evolutionary land rights theory • The state needs to protect existing customary ownership and rights with simplified procedures to obtain land titles 4.Results 20
    • 21. General conclusions and policy implications • Specific strategy/ program are needed to develop, guide and implement agroforestry strategies • Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation should make the distinction between AFTP and NTFP e.g certificates of origin • Customary rights to land needs to be protected e.g by simplifying access to land titles 5.Conclusions&policyimplications 21
    • 22. Further research: getting the institutions right How do we design optimal and efficient formal institutions and institutional arrangements to: - manage land and trees, - that will also protect, consolidate - and correct existing customary systems? 5.Conclusions&policyimplications 22
    • 23. Thank you for listening 23
    • 24. Results objective 4: market access • Traders’ possession of permits & informal taxes – 70 traders operate illegally 4.Results 24 Prefer to rent permit (illegal) and pay informal taxes If Perceived TCs Bribe = No permit+Rents>
    • 25. Estimated costs borne by farmer groups 4.Results 25 Process assessed Case study group Number of steps to compile files 10 Time to process file (days ) About 98 Amount of money to process file About 1.3 million FCFA (1$= 500FCFA) Duration to monitor files in the capital city 4 years Cost to monitor files 12, 130,000 FCFA
    • 26. 4.Results 26 1.7% annual turn over 9% 37% 54% 0% 20% 40% 60% Government Economic operators Police and Forestry Partial conclusions • Permit system :  characterised by high TCs  encourage rent seeking  and unofficial taxes (bribes) • Decision not to comply is a rational choice by traders to overcome TCs
    • 27. Options to motivate compliance based on choice experiment Attributes Option 1 Option 2 Option 3 Option 4 None Decentralised /centralised simplified/ complicated Joint or individual Transferability of permit Duration of permit 1 year 3 years 1 year 3 years Regeneration tax 20 FCFA 5 FCFA 10 FCFA 20 FCFA Choose one □ □ □ □ □X 4.Results 27
    • 28. Results from choice experiment 4.Results 28 Attribute Change Implicit willingness to pay Complicated to simplified 22.00 Single to joint 9.80 No transfer to traders based transfer 8.80 No transfer to government based transfer 6.80 Increase in duration of permit by one year 5.60
    • 29. General conclusions and policy implications • Specific strategy/ program are needed to develop, guide and implement agroforestry strategies • Subsequent policies, regulations/legislation should make the distinction between AFTP and NTFP e.g certificates of origin • Customary rights to land needs to be protected e.g by simplifying access to land titles • Reduce TCs e.g simplify access to NTFP permits • Reduce rent seeking and unofficial taxes in the governance of permits 5.Conclusions&policyimplications 29
    • 30. Further research: getting the institutions right • Producers level: – How do we design optimal and efficient formal institutions and institutional arrangements to manage land and trees, that will also consolidate and correct existing customary systems? • Traders level: – What are the most appropriate reforms to improve the regulatory mechanisms governing permits and to reduce corruption and rent seeking 5.Conclusions&policyimplications 30
    • 31. Thank you for listening 31
    • 32. 32

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