1. Headquarters U.S. Air Force Alternative Futures Panel USSTRATCOM Space and Cyber Symposium Omaha, Nebraska Dr. Mark T. Maybury Chief Scientist United States Air Force 15 November 2011 Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. SAF/PA Case 2011-0647 I n t e g r i t A. Approved for publicv i c distribution is unlimited. l l e n c e Distribution y - S e r release; e - E x c e 1
2. Panelists Mr. William Scott, Author, Counterspace: The Next Hours of World War III Dr. Herb Lin, Chief Scientist, Computers Science and Telecommunications Board, The National Academies Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, President, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, Author, 7 Deadly Scenarios Dr. David White, Senior Manager, Computer Systems and technologies Group, Sandia National Laboratories Mr. James M. Brase, Deputy Program Director for Intelligence, Office of Strategic Outcomes, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 2 Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
3. Predicting the Future “Aircraft flight is impossible.” Lord Kelvin “The [flying] machines will eventually be fast; they will be used in sport but they should not be thought of as commercial carriers.” Octave Chanute, 1910 “There has been a great deal said about a 3,000 mile rocket. In my opinion such a thing is impossible for many years. I think we can leave that out of our thinking.” Vannevar Bush, 1945 “…the Gas Turbine can hardly be considered a feasible application to airplanes…” Committee with Von Karman, Millikan, Kettering, 1941 (Reported by N. Augustine) Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
4. Questions What is the likely future of Space and Cyber? What are the key risks in the future, in particular, what are the primary trends in terms of threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences? What are the possible rewards? Where should our focus be to drive advantageous futures? 4 Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
5. Air Force Technology Horizons Priority Technology Areas Autonomous systems Spectral mutability Autonomous reasoning and learning Dynamic spectrum access Resilient autonomy Quantum key distribution Complex adaptive systems V&V for complex adaptive control Multi-scale simulation technologies Collaborative/cooperative control Coupled multi-physics simulations Autonomous mission planning Embedded diagnostics Cold-atom INS Decision support tools Chip-scale atomic clocks Ad hoc networks Automated software generation Polymorphic networks Sensor-based processing Agile networks Behavior prediction and anticipation Laser communications Cognitive modeling Frequency-agile RF systems Cognitive performance augmentation Human-machine interfaces Most Future Space and Cyber Technologies www.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-100727-053.pdf Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 5
6. Energy Horizons: Air Force Energy S&T Vision Energy Horizons VisionAssured energy advantage across air, space, cyberspace and infrastructure Findings Recommendations Energy S&T advances can Mission-focused S&T roles (lead, revolutionize cost, readiness, follow, watch) in near-, mid-, far-term and resiliency Air: Efficient engines and structures, Air fuels and facilities/data distributed virtual training, flight centers primary cost drivers formation Benefits from systems, Space: Efficient photovoltaics, operations, supply, and culture efficient ground stations, fractionated Partnership and S&T leverage constellations essential Cyber: Efficient cloud and HPC Infrastructure: Secure microgrids, Expeditionary energy, small modular nuclear reactors, solar to petrol Enabling: nanomaterials, biomimicry, Air Cyber autonomy Space Infrastructure HPC: High Performance Computing 6 Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. AF/PA Case # 11-589
7. Space Trends www.aero.org/capabilities/cords/ Bigger: Distributed communications architectures Smaller: Rad-hard electronics, catching up to terrestrial node sizes Diverse: Fractionated, composable satellites such as Software Defined Radio (SDR) or even Cognitive Radio More dangerous: Space is congested (debris, users) and contested – the US operates critical national security capabilities within this dangerous environment, so the capabilities are vulnerable More competitive: Commercialization and internationalization (e.g., SpaceX), however, US losing edge in space technology; ITAR restrictions reduce global competitiveness of US companies Less US talent: STEM Challenge as with cyber Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
8. Cyber Trends (top500.org) Bigger: HPC: Petascale to exascale • Programmable, performance (peta to exa), green Smaller: Nanoelectronics (e.g., nanowires, memristers) Diverse: Clusters, clouds, GPUs, FPGAs More dangerous: Advanced threat, insider threat, supply chain More competitive: global hardware, software, talent Embedded: 4.5M LOC in F-35, 90% of functionality More complex: Interconnected Greener: infrastructure and algorithms Less US talent: STEM Challenge Source: www.dodlive.mil Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
9. A Perfect Storm Technology Change Complexity Threat ~1M viruses in Connectivity Foreign 2008 Supply Years Vulnerabilities 14k in nvd.nist.gov 2004 Cost Overruns 20-50% Overruns (GAO) US Computing Graduates -5% program managers <10% -12% production engineers Expert StaffOverruns in 1950s 1.7 k in -20% financial managers Response 2001 50K viruses in 2000 Seconds Timelines1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
10. DoD and AFRL Cyberspace Strategy Aligned DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY FOR OPERATING IN CYBERSPACE Align with others and grow AF expertiseStrategic Initiative 1: Treat cyberspace as anoperational domain to organize, train, and equip sothat DoD can take full advantage of cyberspace’s AFRL Strategic Cyber Thrustspotential Assure and Empower the MissionStrategic Initiative 2: Employ new defense operatingconcepts to protect DoD networks and systems Optimize Human-Machine SystemsStrategic Initiative 3: Partner with other U.S.government departments and agencies and theprivate sector to enable a whole-of-governmentcybersecurity strategy Enhance Agility and ResilienceStrategic Initiative 4: Build robust relationshipswith U.S. allies and international partners tostrengthen collective cybersecurity Invent Foundations of Trust and Assurance Strategic Initiative 5: Leverage the nation’s ingenuity through an exceptional cyber workforce Partner with acquisition and rapid technological innovation and operational communities Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
11. Observations Increasing risk = f(threats, vulnerabilities, dependence, and consequences) Increasing capabilities and opportunities Increasingly contested, congested, competitive Global technology proliferation and acceleration driving need for rapid acquisition model Fiction can help shape futures Distribution A. Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.