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Conflict

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  • 1. Team Palestinian-Israeli Conflict
    1
  • 2. Requirement
    What are the prospects for a Palestinian-Israeli comprehensive peace deal in the next three years?
    • Where are areas of compromise and areas of disagreement likely during these negotiations?
    • 3. What are the likely conditions in order for Hamas and Fatah to reconcile?
    • 4. How will select geopolitically relevant countries influence negotiations?
    • 5. What are the likely areas of leverage in the negotiations?
    2
  • 6. Methodology
    Three-Way Red Team
    Three Teams: Hamas, Fatah and Israel
    Two members per team, adopting the perspective
    Preparation: In-depth research and analysis on topics for eight weeks
    Recorded as Key Findings
    A political emblem designates team slides
    3
  • 7. Key Findings
    Highly unlikely there will be a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli peace deal in the next three years due primarily to:
    Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity
    West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization
    Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem
    4
  • 8. Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity
    Operation Cast Lead
    Hamas failure to sign reconciliation treaty
    Hamas oversees a black-market economy
    Public support decreases; considered terrorist organization by the West
    5
  • 9. West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization
    Rockets Israel
    Israel quote and pic of whoever
    6
  • 10. Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem
    Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to freeze settlements
    Palestinian Authority President MahmoudAbbas refuses to negotiate without settlement freeze
    7
  • 11. 8
  • 12. Negotiations and Compromises
    Palestinian demands return of 1967 borders
    Disagreement on settlements in Jerusalem and West Bank
    East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital
    9
  • 13. 10
  • 14. Palestinian Reconciliation
    Increase in Hamas’s political popularity by roughly 30%
    Negotiated permanent party status or percentage of parliamentary seats guaranteed
    11
  • 15. Geopolitically Relevant Countries/Entities Egypt and the United Nations
    12
  • 16. Egypt:
    • Highly likely reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas will continue to fail
    • 17. Continues to destroy Gaza tunnels
    • 18. Hesitance to anger the Bedouins compromises security of Gaza border
    13
  • 19. 14
  • 20. United Nations
    • Unlikely to have direct role; will likely influence negotiations for Israelis and Palestinians
    • 21. Highly likely to continue pressing for dialogue on the Goldstone Report
    15
  • 22. White Team: Israel
    • Israeli’s best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate
    • 23. Settlement issue main component to negotiations with Fatah
    • 24. Jerusalem key to peace with Fatah
    16
  • 25. Leverage Points for Hamas over Fatah
    Hamas supporters in the West Bank have potential to instigate violence and destabilize Palestinian autonomy
    Palestinian President MahmoudAbbas is the weak link for Fatah as he is declining in popularity
    Hamas has legitimate ideological grounds to bash Abbas individually, but not Fatah as a political whole
    17
  • 26. Leverage Points for Fatah over Hamas
    • In the case of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas”
    • 27. Fatah and Hamas must share governing power, undermining Hamas’s control of Gaza
    • 28. Fatah’s economic leverage over Hamas
    • 29. Hamas will likely return to terrorist tactics to maintain influence
    • 30. In the unlikely event Fatah and Israel make a separate peace deal excluding Hamas, it is highly likely Hamas will become a less significant political entity
    18
  • 31. Leverage Point for Israel over Fatah
    It is highly likely Israel's best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate and to have no legitimate reconciliatory elections
    The expansion of settlements and destruction of Palestinian homes are highly likely to be used by Israel in negotiations
    Roadblocks and checkpoints give Israel the physical ability to influence the West Bank economy and Palestinian movement at will
    19
  • 32. Leverage points for Fatah over Israel
    • If Fatah gains independent statehood, Israel will likely have to deal with them as equals in the international arena
    • 33. Abbas’s retirement as the President of the Palestinian Authority is likely to negatively impact Israel’s ability to negotiate with Fatah
    • 34. As the likelihood of an autonomous Palestinian State become less conceivable, the PASF becomes increasingly demoralized and militant
    • 35. If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem
    20
  • 36. Leverage points for Fatah over Israel continued
    If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem
    United States training of Palestinian soldiers
    Fatah can bring international pressure on Israel through :
    • The Goldstone report
    • 37. The Al-Aqsa Mosque incident
    • 38. Israeli settlement expansion into West Bank
    21
  • 39. Leverage Points for Israel over Hamas
    • Israel can improve relations with Fatah, making them appear more viable politically for Palestinians, decreasing Hamas’s appeal
    • 40. Elections scheduled for January 24 2010 will highly be likely manipulated by Israel in favor of Fatah
    • 41. Lack of political legitimacy for Hamas will likely result in Hamas’s loss of parliamentary seats
    • 42. With the political option closed, Hamas is likely to resume full terrorist activities
    22
  • 43. Leverage Points for Israel over Hamas continued
    • Israel’s economic blockade on the Gaza Strip restricts everything that can legally enter Gaza. While this is intended to weaken Hamas, it likely only affects their public support, not their power base
    • 44. Tunnel investment lost from Gazans exceeds USD 500 million and is rising due to Israeli airstrikes on tunnels; it is likely the loss of funds makes Hamas’s administration look incompetent
    • 45. It is likely Israel will manipulate Hamas's domestic environment. Israel is likely to publicize Hamas’s infighting with internal factions
    • 46. Israeli covert operations in Gaza could instigate violence between factions
    23
  • 47. Threats from Hamas to Hamas
    Highly unlikely Gaza will undergo reconstruction while Hamas is in control of the Gaza strip
    Gazans lost USD 500 million in investment in the Hamas-operated tunnels
    It is highly likely Hamas can influence factions within Gaza, but not fully control their militant activities and political power
    24
  • 48. Leverage Points of Hamas over Israel
    • It is highly unlikely that Hamas’s reconciliation with Fatah would put Israel in the precarious position of choosing to recognize Hamas as a legitimate political entity or cut off diplomatic relations with Palestinians
    • 49. It is highly likely Hamas’s monopolization of the flow of goods and income into Gaza will lead to Hamas’s further domination of Gaza
    • 50. It is highly likely the international community will label Israel as oppressors for the continuation of the Gaza blockade, which is creating an international incident
    • 51. Hamas capability to kidnap additional Israeli soldiers will likely hurt Israel’s internal domestic politics and damage internal moral
    • 52. Israel is vulnerable to rocket attacks and suicide attacks
    25
  • 53. Additional Opportunity
    It is likely in Israel, Hamas and Fatah's self interests to implement a three state solutionIt is likely Fatah would negotiate Gazan territory for joint ideological and physical control of Jerusalem
    It is highly unlikely Hamas will peacefully give up physical control of the Gaza strip
    It is an absolute certainty Israel will not recognize any unified Palestinian government that involves Hamas because Israel considers it a terrorist organization based on historical and current political developments
    Fatah, controlling the West Bank independently as a sovereign state, presents a workable situation for Israel
    26
  • 54. Thank You
    Questions?
    27

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