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  1. 1. Team Palestinian-Israeli Conflict<br />1<br />
  2. 2. Requirement<br />What are the prospects for a Palestinian-Israeli comprehensive peace deal in the next three years?<br /><ul><li>Where are areas of compromise and areas of disagreement likely during these negotiations?
  3. 3. What are the likely conditions in order for Hamas and Fatah to reconcile?
  4. 4. How will select geopolitically relevant countries influence negotiations?
  5. 5. What are the likely areas of leverage in the negotiations? </li></ul>2<br />
  6. 6. Methodology<br />Three-Way Red Team<br />Three Teams: Hamas, Fatah and Israel<br />Two members per team, adopting the perspective<br />Preparation: In-depth research and analysis on topics for eight weeks<br />Recorded as Key Findings<br />A political emblem designates team slides <br />3<br />
  7. 7. Key Findings<br />Highly unlikely there will be a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli peace deal in the next three years due primarily to:<br />Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity<br />West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization<br />Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem<br />4<br />
  8. 8. Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity<br />Operation Cast Lead<br />Hamas failure to sign reconciliation treaty <br />Hamas oversees a black-market economy<br />Public support decreases; considered terrorist organization by the West<br />5<br />
  9. 9. West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization<br />Rockets Israel<br />Israel quote and pic of whoever<br />6<br />
  10. 10. Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem <br />Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to freeze settlements<br />Palestinian Authority President MahmoudAbbas refuses to negotiate without settlement freeze<br />7<br />
  11. 11. 8<br />
  12. 12. Negotiations and Compromises<br />Palestinian demands return of 1967 borders<br />Disagreement on settlements in Jerusalem and West Bank<br />East Jerusalem as the Palestinian capital<br />9<br />
  13. 13. 10<br />
  14. 14. Palestinian Reconciliation<br />Increase in Hamas’s political popularity by roughly 30% <br />Negotiated permanent party status or percentage of parliamentary seats guaranteed<br />11<br />
  15. 15. Geopolitically Relevant Countries/Entities Egypt and the United Nations<br />12<br />
  16. 16. Egypt: <br /><ul><li>Highly likely reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas will continue to fail
  17. 17. Continues to destroy Gaza tunnels
  18. 18. Hesitance to anger the Bedouins compromises security of Gaza border</li></ul>13<br />
  19. 19. 14<br />
  20. 20. United Nations<br /><ul><li>Unlikely to have direct role; will likely influence negotiations for Israelis and Palestinians
  21. 21. Highly likely to continue pressing for dialogue on the Goldstone Report</li></ul>15<br />
  22. 22. White Team: Israel<br /><ul><li>Israeli’s best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate
  23. 23. Settlement issue main component to negotiations with Fatah
  24. 24. Jerusalem key to peace with Fatah</li></ul>16<br />
  25. 25. Leverage Points for Hamas over Fatah<br />Hamas supporters in the West Bank have potential to instigate violence and destabilize Palestinian autonomy<br />Palestinian President MahmoudAbbas is the weak link for Fatah as he is declining in popularity <br />Hamas has legitimate ideological grounds to bash Abbas individually, but not Fatah as a political whole<br />17<br />
  26. 26. Leverage Points for Fatah over Hamas<br /><ul><li>In the case of reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas”
  27. 27. Fatah and Hamas must share governing power, undermining Hamas’s control of Gaza
  28. 28. Fatah’s economic leverage over Hamas
  29. 29. Hamas will likely return to terrorist tactics to maintain influence
  30. 30. In the unlikely event Fatah and Israel make a separate peace deal excluding Hamas, it is highly likely Hamas will become a less significant political entity</li></ul>18<br />
  31. 31. Leverage Point for Israel over Fatah<br />It is highly likely Israel&apos;s best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate and to have no legitimate reconciliatory elections<br />The expansion of settlements and destruction of Palestinian homes are highly likely to be used by Israel in negotiations<br />Roadblocks and checkpoints give Israel the physical ability to influence the West Bank economy and Palestinian movement at will<br />19<br />
  32. 32. Leverage points for Fatah over Israel<br /><ul><li>If Fatah gains independent statehood, Israel will likely have to deal with them as equals in the international arena
  33. 33. Abbas’s retirement as the President of the Palestinian Authority is likely to negatively impact Israel’s ability to negotiate with Fatah
  34. 34. As the likelihood of an autonomous Palestinian State become less conceivable, the PASF becomes increasingly demoralized and militant
  35. 35. If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem</li></ul>20<br />
  36. 36. Leverage points for Fatah over Israel continued <br />If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem<br />United States training of Palestinian soldiers<br />Fatah can bring international pressure on Israel through :<br /><ul><li>The Goldstone report
  37. 37. The Al-Aqsa Mosque incident
  38. 38. Israeli settlement expansion into West Bank</li></ul>21<br />
  39. 39. Leverage Points for Israel over Hamas<br /><ul><li>Israel can improve relations with Fatah, making them appear more viable politically for Palestinians, decreasing Hamas’s appeal
  40. 40. Elections scheduled for January 24 2010 will highly be likely manipulated by Israel in favor of Fatah
  41. 41. Lack of political legitimacy for Hamas will likely result in Hamas’s loss of parliamentary seats
  42. 42. With the political option closed, Hamas is likely to resume full terrorist activities </li></ul>22<br />
  43. 43. Leverage Points for Israel over Hamas continued <br /><ul><li>Israel’s economic blockade on the Gaza Strip restricts everything that can legally enter Gaza. While this is intended to weaken Hamas, it likely only affects their public support, not their power base
  44. 44. Tunnel investment lost from Gazans exceeds USD 500 million and is rising due to Israeli airstrikes on tunnels; it is likely the loss of funds makes Hamas’s administration look incompetent
  45. 45. It is likely Israel will manipulate Hamas's domestic environment. Israel is likely to publicize Hamas’s infighting with internal factions
  46. 46. Israeli covert operations in Gaza could instigate violence between factions</li></ul>23<br />
  47. 47. Threats from Hamas to Hamas<br />Highly unlikely Gaza will undergo reconstruction while Hamas is in control of the Gaza strip<br />Gazans lost USD 500 million in investment in the Hamas-operated tunnels<br />It is highly likely Hamas can influence factions within Gaza, but not fully control their militant activities and political power<br />24<br />
  48. 48. Leverage Points of Hamas over Israel<br /><ul><li>It is highly unlikely that Hamas’s reconciliation with Fatah would put Israel in the precarious position of choosing to recognize Hamas as a legitimate political entity or cut off diplomatic relations with Palestinians
  49. 49. It is highly likely Hamas’s monopolization of the flow of goods and income into Gaza will lead to Hamas’s further domination of Gaza
  50. 50. It is highly likely the international community will label Israel as oppressors for the continuation of the Gaza blockade, which is creating an international incident
  51. 51. Hamas capability to kidnap additional Israeli soldiers will likely hurt Israel’s internal domestic politics and damage internal moral
  52. 52. Israel is vulnerable to rocket attacks and suicide attacks</li></ul>25<br />
  53. 53. Additional Opportunity<br />It is likely in Israel, Hamas and Fatah&apos;s self interests to implement a three state solutionIt is likely Fatah would negotiate Gazan territory for joint ideological and physical control of Jerusalem<br />It is highly unlikely Hamas will peacefully give up physical control of the Gaza strip<br />It is an absolute certainty Israel will not recognize any unified Palestinian government that involves Hamas because Israel considers it a terrorist organization based on historical and current political developments<br />Fatah, controlling the West Bank independently as a sovereign state, presents a workable situation for Israel<br />26<br />
  54. 54. Thank You<br />Questions?<br />27<br />