Requirement What are the prospects for a Palestinian-Israeli comprehensive peace deal in the next three years?
Where are areas of compromise and areas of disagreement likely during these negotiations?
What are the likely conditions in order for Hamas and Fatah to reconcile?
How will select geopolitically relevant countries influence negotiations?
What are the likely areas of leverage in the negotiations?
Methodology Three-Way Red Team Three Teams: Hamas, Fatah and Israel Two members per team, adopting the perspective Preparation: In-depth research and analysis on topics for eight weeks Recorded as Key Findings A political emblem designates team slides 3
Key Findings Highly unlikely there will be a comprehensive Palestinian-Israeli peace deal in the next three years due primarily to: Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem 4
Hamas’s inability to be an accountable political entity Operation Cast Lead Hamas failure to sign reconciliation treaty Hamas oversees a black-market economy Public support decreases; considered terrorist organization by the West 5
West’s view of Hamas as a terrorist organization Rockets Israel Israel quote and pic of whoever 6
Israel’s reluctance to negotiate on Jerusalem Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu refuses to freeze settlements Palestinian Authority President MahmoudAbbas refuses to negotiate without settlement freeze 7
Leverage Points for Hamas over Fatah Hamas supporters in the West Bank have potential to instigate violence and destabilize Palestinian autonomy Palestinian President MahmoudAbbas is the weak link for Fatah as he is declining in popularity Hamas has legitimate ideological grounds to bash Abbas individually, but not Fatah as a political whole 17
Hamas will likely return to terrorist tactics to maintain influence
In the unlikely event Fatah and Israel make a separate peace deal excluding Hamas, it is highly likely Hamas will become a less significant political entity
Leverage Point for Israel over Fatah It is highly likely Israel's best interest to keep Fatah and Hamas separate and to have no legitimate reconciliatory elections The expansion of settlements and destruction of Palestinian homes are highly likely to be used by Israel in negotiations Roadblocks and checkpoints give Israel the physical ability to influence the West Bank economy and Palestinian movement at will 19
If Fatah gains independent statehood, Israel will likely have to deal with them as equals in the international arena
Abbas’s retirement as the President of the Palestinian Authority is likely to negatively impact Israel’s ability to negotiate with Fatah
As the likelihood of an autonomous Palestinian State become less conceivable, the PASF becomes increasingly demoralized and militant
If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem
Leverage points for Fatah over Israel continued If the West Bank becomes a sovereign entity, it is highly likely Israel will have to negotiate an agreement on shared control of Jerusalem United States training of Palestinian soldiers Fatah can bring international pressure on Israel through :
Israel can improve relations with Fatah, making them appear more viable politically for Palestinians, decreasing Hamas’s appeal
Elections scheduled for January 24 2010 will highly be likely manipulated by Israel in favor of Fatah
Lack of political legitimacy for Hamas will likely result in Hamas’s loss of parliamentary seats
With the political option closed, Hamas is likely to resume full terrorist activities
Leverage Points for Israel over Hamas continued
Israel’s economic blockade on the Gaza Strip restricts everything that can legally enter Gaza. While this is intended to weaken Hamas, it likely only affects their public support, not their power base
Tunnel investment lost from Gazans exceeds USD 500 million and is rising due to Israeli airstrikes on tunnels; it is likely the loss of funds makes Hamas’s administration look incompetent
It is likely Israel will manipulate Hamas's domestic environment. Israel is likely to publicize Hamas’s infighting with internal factions
Israeli covert operations in Gaza could instigate violence between factions
Threats from Hamas to Hamas Highly unlikely Gaza will undergo reconstruction while Hamas is in control of the Gaza strip Gazans lost USD 500 million in investment in the Hamas-operated tunnels It is highly likely Hamas can influence factions within Gaza, but not fully control their militant activities and political power 24
It is highly unlikely that Hamas’s reconciliation with Fatah would put Israel in the precarious position of choosing to recognize Hamas as a legitimate political entity or cut off diplomatic relations with Palestinians
It is highly likely Hamas’s monopolization of the flow of goods and income into Gaza will lead to Hamas’s further domination of Gaza
It is highly likely the international community will label Israel as oppressors for the continuation of the Gaza blockade, which is creating an international incident
Hamas capability to kidnap additional Israeli soldiers will likely hurt Israel’s internal domestic politics and damage internal moral
Israel is vulnerable to rocket attacks and suicide attacks
Additional Opportunity It is likely in Israel, Hamas and Fatah's self interests to implement a three state solutionIt is likely Fatah would negotiate Gazan territory for joint ideological and physical control of Jerusalem It is highly unlikely Hamas will peacefully give up physical control of the Gaza strip It is an absolute certainty Israel will not recognize any unified Palestinian government that involves Hamas because Israel considers it a terrorist organization based on historical and current political developments Fatah, controlling the West Bank independently as a sovereign state, presents a workable situation for Israel 26