Contents INTRODUCTION: Our Time and the Age of Marx vii1 . Into the Twenty-first Century: The New Parameters of Global Politics2. Twentieth-C entury Marxism and the Dialectics of Modernity 663 . After Dialectics: Radical Social Theory i n the North at the Dawn of the Twenty-first Century 1 11
INTRODUCTION Our Time and the Age of MarxKarl Marx, born in 1 8 1 8, is about the same age as LatinAmerican independence. The first calls for independencewere issued in 1 8 1 0, although the decisive anticolonialbattles of Mexico and Peru were fought in the 182 0 s . InLatin America, preparations for bicentenary celebrationsin 20 1 0 have already begun. Marx is of course youngerthan the protagonists of the Latin American liberationstruggles younger than, for instance, the Liberatorhimself, Simon Bolivar, recently revived as the spiritualguide of the revolution in Venezuela for he was born inthe dark years of European reaction, of the Holy Allianceof counter-revolution. But the seeds of modernity hadbeen deeply planted in the economic and the culturalsoil of Western Europe, and Karl witnessed their firstflowering. The Communist Manifesto appeared muchahead of its time, with its vision of globalized capitalismand working-class struggles during the Springtide ofpeoples, the February March revolutions of 1 84 8 . In terms of his literary counterparts, Marx i s much youngerthan, say, Rumi, Dante, Cervantes or Shakespeare, and asa social and political theorist younger than, for instance,Hobbes and Locke who in his day were the heroes of Cambridge academic politics not to speak of classical sagessuch as Plato, Aristotle, Confucius and Mencius.
viii INTRO D U CTION Nowadays, it is much harder to determine how long anintellectual will last than to predict the likely lifespan ofthe average human being. What can we say of Marxs abilityto endure? As we approach the bicentennial of the mansbirth, is the body of work that bears his name (long?) dead,dying, ageing, or maturing? Is its resurrection possible?Certainly, it would be impossible to argue that the founderof historical materialism is timeless or eternally young. Any appropriate response would have to take into accountthe fact that Marx was a great articulator and a multidimensional personality. He was an intellectual, a socialphilosopher of the radical Enlightenment, a social scientistcum-historian, and a political strategist and leader firstof the diasporic C ommunist League and then of the International Working Mens Association. Over the decades,these multiple personae have been assigned vastly differentmeanings and implications. Politics is inescapably a centralpiece of the legacy of Marxism, but nobody has ever claimedthat Marx was a major political leader. He has served as asource of political inspiration and as a social compass forpolitical navigation, but Marx the politician is long dead.Few, if any, social scientists and historians would deny thatsocial and historical methodology, understanding andknowledge have progressed in the 1 25-odd years sinceMarxs final illness put an end to his work on the manuscriptof Capital. But here matters are more complicated, becausesocial analysis, contemporary as well as historical, continuesto draw upon classics, not only for inspiration but alsofor topics of research, concepts, interesting apercyus andintriguing insights. Emile Durkheim, Alexis de Tocquevilleand Max Weber are coeval classics in this sense, as are IbnKhaldoun and Machiavelli, although several centuries older.And great philosophers never die they have their periodsof hibernation as well as of flowering, which usually last astretch of time somewhere between that of Kondratiev cycles and climatic epochs . This book is more concerned with Marx-ism than with
INT R O D UCTION ixMarx. But as far as Marx in our time is concerned, myimpression is that he is maturing, a bit like a good cheeseor a vintage wine not suitable for dionysiac parties orquick gulps at the battlefront. Rather, he is a stimulatingcompanion for profound thought about the meanings ofmodernity and of human emancipation. For his forthcoming bicentenary, I would p ropose threetoasts . First, to Karl Marx as a proponent of emancipatoryreason, of a rationalist scrutiny of the world, with acommitment to human fre edom from exploitation andoppression. Second, to his historical materialist approachto social analysis in other words, to his understandingof the present as history, with particular attention p aid tothe living and working conditions of ordinary people andto the economic and political materiality of power anapproach not to be followed as if laid out in a m anual,but rather as a broad directive accompanied by themotivation to pursue it further. Third, Karl should b ecelebrated for his dialectical openness his sensitivity to,and comprehension of, contradictions, antimonies andconflicts in social life. Marx-ism has, I think, an uncertain future, for reasonsexplained below. But Marx himself is bound for the longlife of alternating winters, springs, summers and autumnsundergone by so many of the great thinkers of humankind,from Confucius and Plato onward. The Nature of this StudyThis book is intended as a map and a compass. It is anattempt to understand the seismic social and intellectualshift between the twentieth century in an importantsense the century of Marxism and the twenty-firstcentury, which began in the years of 1 97 8 9 1 , when Chinaturned to the market and the Soviet system collapsed inboth Europe and the USSR itself. It lays no claim to beingan intellectual history or a history of ideas, and may be
x INTRO D UCTIONseen rather as a travellers notebook, unpretentious note sjotted down after a long, arduous j ourney through theclimbs, passes, descents and dead ends of twentieth- andearly twenty-first-century Marxism. The book has two aims. The first is to situate the leftwing political practice and thought of the early twenty-firstcentury in the terrain of the previous c entury. The secondis to provide a systematic p anorama of left-wing thoughtin the North at the beginning of this new century, an dto compare it with the Marxism of the preceding era.While abstaining from pleading for any particular pathor interpretation, I do not want to hid e the fact that thiswork is written by a scholar who has not surrendere dhis left-wing commitment. Indeed, it is that very commitm ent which has motivated the writing of this book. The two objectives are pursued in three differentchapters, of various origins . The first, on the spaces ofleft-wing thought and practice, was initially presented ata conference in Mexico organized by the senators ofthe PRD in April 2 0 0 1 , and was then published with apost-September update in New Left Review no. 1 0 . Hereit has been significantly restructured and rewritten . Thesecond, an attempt at identifying the legacy of twentiethcentury Marxism as critical theory, derives from acontribution to the first ( 1 9 9 6) edition of BlackwellsCompanion to Social Theory (edited by Bryan Turner, whoalso edited the second, twenty-first-century edition) . It ishere reprinted with minor changes, mainly with a view toavoiding too much overlap with the subsequent essay. Thethird chapter� on recent radical thought, derives from my contribution to The Handbook on European Social Theory (edited by Gerard D elanty for Routledge in 2006) , which was later expanded and Atlanticized for publication inNLR no . 43 . I have updated and somewhat extended ithere; some errors spotted by NLR readers and kindly conveyed to me have been corrected, and some contex tual arguments have been moved to other chapters .
INTRO D UCTION xi As a scholar whose interests are global, I try to situatethe Left in global space. But I admit from the outset thata systematic overview of contemporary Southern radicalthought has been beyond my linguistic competence as wellas my time constraints. I do, nevertheless, take note ofthe rich legacy of sophisticated left-wing thought in theSouth, for it is here that the future is likely to be decided. Cambridge October-November 2007
1 Into the Twenty-first Century: The New Parameters of Global PoliticsPolitics is thought and fought out, policies are forged andimplemented, political ideas wax and wane all within aglobal space. The space itself decides nothing: only actorsand their actions can do that. But it is this dimensionlong global, in many respects, but now far denser in itsworldwide connectivity that endows these actors withtheir strengths and weaknesses, constraints and opportunities. Space provides the coordinates of their politicalmoves. Skill and responsibility in the art of politics, luckand genius and their opposites remain constant, butit is the space that largely allocates the political actorstheir cards. This global space comprises three major planes. Oneis socio-economic, laying out the preconditions for thesocial and economic orientation of politics in otherwords, for Left and Right. Another is cultural, with itsprevailing patterns of beliefs and identities and the principal means of communication. The third is geopolitical,providing the p ower parameters f or confrontationsbetween and against states. This chapter aims to map thesocial space of Left Right politics, from the 1960s to the
2 F R O M MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM?first decade of the twenty-first century. It is neither a political history nor a strategic programme, although it bearss ome relevance to both. It is an attempt to assess thestrengths and weaknesses of the forces of Left and Right,in a broad, non-partisan sense both during the recentp ast, which still bears forcefully on the present, and withinemerging currents. The overall geopolitical space will b e invoked only whereit most directly affects Left Right p olitics. As regards theunderlying conceptions, however, a few p oints ofclarific ation may be needed. The analytical distinctionb etween the two elements does not, of course, imply thatthey are literally distinct . In the concrete world, socialand geopolitical spaces are conjoined . Nevertheless, it isimportant not to confound the two. The Cold War, forexample, had an important Left Right dimension thatof competing socialist and c apitalist modernities. But italso had a specifically geopolitical dynamic, which pittedthe two global superpowers against each other andentrained, on each side, allies, clients and friends . Whichof thes e two dimensions was the more important remainsa controversial question. The resources, opportunities and options of interterritorial actors within the geopolitical plane are generatedby a-variety of factors military might, demographic weight,economic power and geographical location, among others.For the understanding of Left Right p olitics that concernsus here, two further aspects are particularly significant:the distribution of geopolitical power in the world, andthe social character of interterritorial, or transterritorial, actors . On the first, we should note that the distribution ofpower has changed dramatically during the last forty years, and not just in one direction. The period began with thebuild-up to the United States first military defeat in its history, in Vietnam, and with the ascendancy of the USSR to approximate military parity. Then came the collapse of
INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 3the Soviet Union, and the US claim to a final victo ry inthe Cold War. Although in 1 9 56, the fiasco of the FrenchBritish-Israeli invasion of Suez signalled the end ofEuropean military might on a world scale, Europe hasas the EU returned as both an economic great power anda continental laboratory for complex, interstate relations. Atthe beginning of the p eriod, Japan was the worlds risingeconomic star; currently it is fading economically andrapidly ageing socially. By contrast, Chinas still unbrokendecades of spectacular growth have given economic muscleto its massive demographic weight. The social character of interterritorial a ctors c an b eread not only from the colour of state regimes but alsofrom the orientation and weight of non-state forces. Twonew kinds of international actors of divergent socialsignificance have become increasingly important duringthis perio d. I The first consists of transnational interstateorganizations such as the World Bank, the IMF and theWTO, which have jointly served as a maj or neoliberalspearhead for the Right (although the World Bank hashad some dissenting voices) . The second i s a loo ser setof transnational networks, movements and lobbies forglobal concerns that have emerged as fairly significant,progressive actors within the world are n a - initiallythrough their links with such UN mechanisms a s thehuman rights conventions and major internationalconferences on women and on population, and, morerecently, through their international mobilizations againsttrade liberalization. In brief, even though the US has become the onlysuperpower, the geopolitical space has not simply b ecomeunipolar; instead, it has begun to assume new forms ofcomplexity.1. Multinational corporations are, of course, an age old feature of capitalism.
4 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ? Socio-economic PlaneThe social space of modern p olitics has at least threecrucial p arameters: states, markets and social patternings .2 The first two are well-known and highly visibleinstitutional complexes. The third may require some explanation. It refers to the shaping of social actors a processinfluenced,. of course, by states and markets, but withadditional force of its OWO, derived from forms of livelihoodand residence, religions and family institution s . It involvesnot only a class structure but, more fundamentally, arendering of variable classness. It may be useful here toinvoke a more abstract, analytic al differentiation of socialpatterning than the conventional ones of class size orstrength, or of categorical identities such as class, genderand ethnicity. The p atternings I want to highlight aresociocultural ones, with an emphasis on broad, sociallydetermined cultural orientations rather than just structuralcategories . Here I suggest irreverence deference andcollectivism individualism as key dimensions (sketched inFigure 1.1). Irreverence and deference here refer to orientationstowards existing inequalities of power, wealth and status;collectivism and individualism to propensities high orlow towards collective identification and organization.The classical Left was driven by the irreverent collectivism of the socialist working-class and anti-imperialistmovements, while other contemporary radical currentsfor womens rights or human rights, for instance have2. Capitalism itself is a system of markets, social patternings and (one or more)states. Looking at the features and, above all, at the interrelationships of thesethree dimensions is one way in my experience, a fruitful one of dissectingpower relations and their dynamics within capitalism. These variables have theadvantage of opening up into empirical analytical overviews, while neitherpresupposing nor requiring assessments of the actual extent of the capitalistsystemness of states and social patterns. As current and foreseeable politicscan hardly be summed up in terms of socialism vs. capitalism, this conceptualapparatus broader, looser, less capitalllabour focused may have some merit.
INTO T H E TWENTY FIRST C E N T U RY 5Figure 1.1: Crucial dimensions of the social patterning of actors Collectivism Irreverence Deference Individualisma more individualist character. The traditional Right wasinstitutionally, or c1ientistically, collectivist; liberalism, bothold and new, tends rather towards deferential individualism deferring to those of supposedly superior status,entrepreneurial bosses, the rich, managers, experts (inparticular, liberal economists) - and, at least until recently,male chefs de famille, imperial rulers and representatives ofHerrenvolk empires. It is within this triangle of states, markets and socialpatternings that political ideas gain their ascendancy, andpolitical action occurs. The dynamics of this space derive,firstly, from the outcomes of previous political contests;secondly, from the input of new knowledge and technology; and thirdly, from the processes of the economic system capitalism and, formerly, actually existing socialism. Aschematization of the full model is given in Figure 1 . 2 . C O O RDINATES O F POLITICAL SPACEMost contemporary discussions of the state, whether fromLeft or Right, focus on the question of the nation-stateas it confronts globalization, or on privatization as a
6 F R O M MARXIS M TO P O ST MARXISM? Figure 1.2: Social space of politics and its dynamics Social coordinates of politics States Markets Social patternings il Dynamics of the social space Political outcomes Knowledge and technology Systemic economic dynamicschallenge to its institutions. These approaches tend toignore both the reality of contemporary state policy-makingand, even more importantly, the varying structural formsof state development. On the first point, the key questionis: has the states capacity to pursue policy targets actuallydiminished over the p ast four decades? The clear answerfor developed democracies is that, generally speaking, ithas not. On the contrary, one c ould say that recent yearshave seen some stunning successes for state policies:the worldwide reduction indeed, the virtual abolitionof inflation is one major example; the development ofstrong regional interstate organizations the EU, ASEAN,Mercosur and NAFTA - is another. True, the persistenceof mass unemployment in the EU is a clear policy failure,but the European unemployed have, on the whole, not
INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 7been pushed into American-style poverty, which mustcount as at least a modest success. Policy orientations and priorities have changed; newskills and greater flexibility may be required; as always, aconsiderable number of policies fail to reach their goals.But this is nothing new. Nation-states, regions and citieswill differ, as always, in their effectiveness, but I see notrend towards a generally diminished policy-making capacity. That certain left-wing policies have b e c ome moredifficult to implement is probably true, but that derivesnot so much from state-level failures as from the rightwing tilt of the political coordinates. Successful State FormsThe most serious flaw of conventional globalizationdiscourse, however, is its blindness to the development ofstrongly differentiated state forms over the past forty years.Two models arose in the sixties: the welfare state, based ongenerous, publicly financed social entitlements, and theEast Asian outward development model. Both have beensuccessfully deployed and consolidated ever since. The coreregion of welfare statism has been Western Europe, whereit has had an impact on all the original OECD countries.Although its European roots go back a long way, it was inthe years after 1960 that welfare statism began to soar inabout a decade, the expenditure and revenue of the statesuddenly expan ded, more than during its entire previoushistory. Unnoticed by conventional globalization theory, thelast four decades of the twentieth century saw the developedstates grow at a far greater rate than international trade . Forthe old OE CD as a whole, public expenditure as a proportionof GDP increased by 13 percentage points between 1 960and 1999, while exports grew 1 1 per cent.3 For the fifteen3 . That is, for the O E CD before the recent inclusion of Mexico, South Koreaand post Communist East Central Europe.
8 FROM MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXISM?members of the European Union, the corresponding figureswere 18 19 percentage points and 14 per cent.4 Despite the many claims to the contrary echoed onboth Left and Right the welfare state still stands tallwherever it was constructed. Whether measured by publicexpenditure or by revenue, the public sector in the richestcountries of the world stands at, or has plateaued at, peakhistorical levels . For the OECD countries of WesternEurope, North America, Japan and O ceania, the nationalaverage of total government outlays (unweighted bypopulation, but exclusive of Iceland and Luxembourg) in1960 was 24 .7 per cent of GDP. By 200 5 it sto od at 44per cent. For the G7, public outlays increased from 28 percent of their total combined GDP in 1960 to 44 per centin 2005. True, the expenditure share in both cases was acouple of percentage points higher during the recessionyears of the early nineties than at the booming end of thedecade, but that should be interpreted as a largely conjunctural oscillation. In terms of taxes, in 2006 the OECDb eat its own historical record of tax revenue, from 2000,and registered its highest revenue ever, about 37 per centof GDP flowing into public coffers . This is not to arguethat there is not a growing need and demand for education,health and social services, and retirement income, whichwill require the further growth of the welfare state, a growthcurrently stultified by right-wing forces. The second new state form its breakthrough againcoming in the sixties (following a pre-war take-off in Japan) has been that of the East Asian outward-developmentmodel: oriented towards exports to the world market, biasedtowards heavy manufacturing, characterized by state planning and control of banks and credit, and indeed, sometimes,as in Korea, by full state ownership. Pioneered by Japan,4. 1 960 data from OEeD Historical Statistics 1960-1997, Paris: OECD, 1 99 9 ,tables 6.5, 6 . 1 2; 1 9 99 data from OEeD Economic Outlook, Paris: OECD, 2000,annex tables 28, 29.
INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 9the development state soon became with varying combinations of state intervention and capitalist enterprise aregional model, with S outh Korea (perhaps now thearchetype), Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong blazing thetrail for Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and, less successfully,the Philippines (the latter, culturally and socially, is something of a Latin America in Southeast Asia, with its powerfullandowning oligarchy still in place, for instance). These werethe examples that China would draw upon from the lateseventies onward; as, a decade later, would Vietnam . Thereis considerable variation between these stat e s and theirdiffering forms of capitalism but all arose within a commonregional context a Cold War frontier receiving a great dealof US economic (and military) assistance . All shared severalfeatures: Japan as the regional development model, a broken,or absent, landed oligarchy; a high rate of literacy; a strongentrepreneurial stratum, usually diaspora Chinese. For themost part, they have also had similar political regimes:authoritarian yet strongly committed to national economicdevelopment through international competitiveness, withthe will to implement decisive state initiatives. This sixties legacy remains a major feature of the worldtoday. China, the largest country on the planet, has becomehistory s most successful development state, with a twentyyear growth rate per capita of almost 10 per cent peryear. The crisis of 1997 98 hit Korea and S outheast Asiapretty hard but, with the possible exception of strife-tornIndonesia, it did not result in a lost decade. On thecontrary, most countries Korea above all have alreadyvigorously bounced back. The Western European welfarist and East Asian development states were rooted in very differently patternedsocieties, and their political priorities have been quitedistinct . But qua states, and economies, they have hadtwo important f eatures in c ommon. Firstly, they are bothoutward looking, dependent on exports to the worldmarket. Contrary to conventional opinion, there has been
10 FROM MARXI S M T O P O S T MARXI S M ?a significant, and consistent, positive correlation betweenworld-market dependence and social-rights munificenceamong the rich OECD countries: the more dependent acountry is on exports, the greater its social generosity. 5Secondly, for all their competitive edge and receptivity tothe new, neither the welfarist nor the development statesare wide open to the winds of the world market. Both modelshave established, and continue to maintain, systems ofdomestic protection . Among the welfare states, this takesthe form of social security and income redistribution. WhenFinland, for instance, was hit by recession in the earlynineties, with a 10 per cent decline of GDP and unemployment climbing to nearly 20 per cent, the state stepped into prevent any increase in poverty, thereby maintaining oneof the most egalitarian income distributions in the world.While I am writing this, the Finnish economy is riding highagain, and Finnish Nokia currently reigns as the world leaderin mobile phones. By European standards, the Canadianwelfare state is not particularly developed; nevertheless,despite Canadas close ties with its massive neighbourreinforced through NAFrA it has been able to maintainits more egalitarian income distribution over the past twentyyears, whereas US inequality has risen sharply. The Asian development states have been moreconcerned with political and cultural protection againstunwanted foreign influences, often adopting an authoritarian nationalist stance . Japan and S outh Korea havewaged low-key but tenacious and effective battles againstincoming foreign investment. The IMF and, behind it,the US attempt to use the East Asian crisis of 1 9 97-985. In the mid nineties the Pearson correlation measure of exports and socialexpenditure as a percentage of GDP in the original OECD countries was 0.26.There is probably no direct cause and effect here. Rather, the link should beinterpreted as meaning that international competitiveness has contributed,through growth, to the weight of progressive forces, and has not been incompatible with the latters p olicies of extending social entitlements.
INTO T H E TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 11to force open the regions economies has met with onlymodest success; Malaysia even managed to get away withimposing a set of controls on transborder capital flows. State FailuresOn the other hand, there has been a lethal crisis amongeconomically inward-looking, low-trade states. The shieldedC o mmunist models have imploded, with the exceptio nof North Korea, which b arely remains afloat. China,Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos have all staked out a newcourse: China now has a proportionately larger block offoreign investment than Latin America. Cuba has managedto survive despite the US blockade even after the disappearance of the Soviet Union - largely through mutatinginto a tourist destination, with the help of capital from Italy,C anada and Spain (although that capital is curently beingovertaken by Venezuelan money iri return for Cuban educational and medical aid) . In Africa, the postcolonial stateswith national socialist ambitions have failed miserably,through a lack of both administrative and economic competence and a suitable national political culture. S outh Asiahad better initial conditions, with a qualified administrativeelite, a significant domestic b ourgeoisie and a democraticculture . But the outcome has been disappointing, with anexclusionary education system and low economic growthleading to an increase in the numbers of people living inpoverty. Even after Indias recent moves onto a path ofeconomic growth, it remains the largest poorhouse on earth.About 40 per cent of the worlds p oor (living on less than$2 a day) are in South Asia, 7 5 80 per cent of the regionalpopulation. The tum towards import-substituting industrialization in Latin America in the fifties was not withoutsuccess, especially in Brazil. But it was clear by the seventiesand eighties that the model had reached a dead end. Bythen, the entire region had run into a deep crisis, economicas well as political. Traditionalist, inward-oriented states
12 FRO M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXI S M?such as Francos Spain were also forced to change: beginingin about 1 960, Spain took a new tack, concentrating onmass tourism and attracting foreign investment. The widespread crises faced by this type of inward-lookingstate, in all its many incarnations in sharp contrast tothe successes of the diferent versions of the two outwardlooking state forms must have some general explanation.It should probably be sought along the following lines. Theperiod after the Second World War saw a new upturn ininternational trade although by the early seventies, it hadonly reached the same proportion of world trade as that of 1 9 1 3 . More important than its scale, however, was its changing character. As became clear by the end of the twentiethcentury, international trade has been decreasingly anexchange of raw materials against industrial commoditiespredominant in the Latin American age of export orientation and increasingly a competition among industrial enterprise s . One effect of this growth of intra-industrial trade hasbeen a great boost to technology; thus, countries standing aside from the world market have tended to miss out onthis wave of development. By the early eighties, when theUSSR finally managed to surpass the US in steel production,steel had become an expression of economic obsolescencerather than a signifier of industrial might. Somewherebetween the enthusiasm over Sputnik ( 1 9 57) and the precrisis stagnation of the 1 980s, the Soviet Union - whichhad always borrowed its industrial goal-models· from theWest, from the US above all slacked off in its technological dynamic . The Western post-industrial turn and the newpossibilities of electronics were discovered too late by the Soviet and Eastern European planners. A state, then, can still assert itself and implement its own policies under current conditions of globalization provided that its economy can compete on the world market. To the classical Left, this is a new challenge, but it was something the Scandinavian labour movement grew up with, in small, little-developed societies that turned
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY l3their attention to the production of compe titive exp ortsby relatively skilled labour. Corporations and StatesThe relative economic importance of the large st corporations has grown over the long historical haul creating aconcentration of capital, j ust as Marx predicted. In 1 905,the fifty largest US corporations, by nominal capitalization,had assets equal to 1 6 per cent of GNP. By 1999, the assetsof the fifty largest US industrial companies amounted to37 p er cent of GNP. For the UKs ten large st industrialcompanies, the rise was from 5 per cent of GNP in 1 905to 4 1 per cent in 1 999 of which Vodafone, the worldslargest mobile phone operator, had 1 8 per cent.6 Comparedwith the growth of the state, however, corporate growth isnot always so outstandingly impre ssive . Perhap s surpri singly, although the figures are not quite comparable, itseems that the US state has actually grown faster thanindustrial corporations during the course of the twentiethcentury (although in the UK, the reverse is true). Pu blicexpenditure in the US more than quadrupled between 19 1 3and 1 9 98, rising from 7 . 5 to 33 p er cent of GDP; in theUK it trebled, from 1 3 to 40 per cent.7 In Sweden, too,the state has outgrown the corporations. The capital assetsof the countrys three largest industrial c orporationsamounted to 1 1- 1 2 per cent of GNP i n 1 913 and 1 929,went down to 5 per cent i n 1 948, and reache d 28-29 per6. The capital balance in principle, a balance of assets versus shares and debt -of the historical record may not be quite the same as the curent accounting ofcorporate assets, but that change in turn corresponds to actual corporate development.Calculations from P.L. Payne, The Emergence of the Large Scale Company inGre at Britain, Economic History Review 20, 1 9 67, 540- 1 , and British and US historicalnational accounts; compared with contemporary data from Fom, 31 July 2000,and from the World B anks World Development Repurt 2000/200 l.7. N. Crafts, Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century, in IMF,World Economic Outlook, Supporting Studies, Washin gt o n, DC: IMF, 2001, 3 5 .
14 FROM MARXISM T O POST MARXI SM?cent in 1 99 9. Public taxes, on the other hand, rose from8 per cent of GNP in 1 9 1 3 to 52 per cent in 1 9 97. Over the more recent period, growth relations b etweentransnational corporations and national economies havebeen surprisingly nuanced. The revenue a measure notusually available for long-te rm comparisons of the worldsten largest corporations has decrease d, relative to theworlds largest national economy. In 1 9 80, their salesre venue amounted to 2 1 p er cent of US GDP; in 2006,to only 1 7 per cent; in 1 9 80, corporate revenue was threetimes the GDP of Mexico; in 2006, twice that of Mexico,whose p opulation was then around 1 0 5 million. We are,nevertheless, facing big private forces. In 1 999, the totalrevenue of the worlds 500 largest corporations amountedto 43 per cent of the world product. Their annual profitsalone were 29 per cent larger than the GNP of Mexico,whose 1 99 9 population was around 97 million people.8It is the wealth rather than the revenue of corporationsthat has increased in relation to states and nationaleconomies. Contrary to current assumptions, corporatere venue has no t quite kept up with the growth of coreeconomies in the past two decades.9 Market DynamicsEven more than corporations, it is markets transnationalmarkets that have grown. The financing of the US warin Vietnam was probably one of the turning-points in theeconomic history of the twentieth century: it helped to spawnthe new transnational currency market with its giganticcapital flows, and American war purchases played a crucial8. C orporations data from Fortune, 24 July 2000. GDP data from WorldDevelopment Report 2000/200 I.9. Corporate account assets are more stable than market capitalization i.e.,the stock market value of the corporations shares on a given day. On 24 April2000, at the very start of the downturn on the worlds stock exchanges, themarket value of Microsoft was almost 7 per cent of US GDP in 1 99 9 , and thatof General Electric almost 6 per cent; see the Financial Times, 4 May 2000.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 15role in the take-off of East Asian development. On a worldscale, stock-market turnover increased from 2 8 per cent ofthe world product in 1 990 to 81 1 998 . US stock per cent inmarket capitalization rose from about 40 per cent of GDPin 1 980, to 53 per cent in 1 990, to 1 50 per cent by early2 00 1 , after peaking at around 1 80 per cent.10 Transnationalcapital flows have speeded up to an enormous extent� notonly probably not even mainly thanks to innovations incommunications technology, but because of institutionalchange. Two examples come to mind, the first of which isthe transnational currency market. The postwar transnational anchorage of the currency system, set up at BrettonWoods, collapsed in the early seventies. Transnationalcurrency trading soon became an enormous global casino,amounting to 12 times world exports in 1979 and 61 timesworld exports in 1 9 89, and then levelling off on this altiplano .In April 1 998 the daily turnover of foreign-currency tradingin the world was 3.4 times larger than the Mexican GNIfor the whole year. Since the autumn of 1 998, however,with the introduction of the euro and the fallout from theAsian crisis, among other factors, currency trading hasdeclined significantly. In April 2007 the daily turnover offoreign exchange markets was $3.2 trillion, more than theannual GDP of the worlds third largest economy, Gennany,with a GDP in 2006 of $2.9 trillion. The second change has been the development of significant new objects of trade. One such invention contrivedin the seventies, but exploding in the eighties was that ofderivatives: betting on the future. Between 1 986 and 1996,derivatives trading multiplied fifty-six-fold, reaching avolume of around $34,000 billion. In 1 995, the notionalamount of bets outstanding in global derivatives tradingalmost equalled the whole world product; since 1 9 96, theyhave surpassed it. Cross-border flows of bonds and equitiesrose in the eighties and soared to a peak in 199 8. Transnational transactions on bonds and equities that involved1 0 . The World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, DC: The WorldBank, 2005, table 5.4.
16 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXI SM?US residents rose from 6.9 per cent of US GDP in 1975-9to 22 1.8 per cent in 1 99 8 more than twice US GDPbefore declining to 189 per cent in 1 999 .1 1 A hundred and fifty years ago, Marx foresaw ahistorical tendency of development that the productiveforces would acquire a more social character and wouldthus come into increasing contradiction with the privateownership of the means of production. From that perioduntil about 1 980, there was indeed a long-term trend towardsthe socialization and/or public regulation of the means ofproduction, transport (railways, airlines, rapid transit) andcommunications (telephones and, later, broadcasting). Thiswas a major dynamic in the capitalist heartlands from theFirst World War to the beginning of the Cold War. It wasbuttressed by the might of Soviet industrialization and, afterthe S econd World War, by the entire Communist bloc. Stillanother socializing wave came with postcolonial socialism,the Cuban revolution, the Chilean Unidad Popular and thesocialization proposals of the French and Swedish governments between the mid-seventies and the early eighties . Then the trend reversed, with failures and defeatsfrom Sweden to Chile, from France to Tanzania to India,accompanied by a mounting crisis in the Communist countries. In Britain the wave of privatization was initiated byThatcher in this respect, more radical than her Chileancounterpart, Pinochet. Since then, privatization programmeshave been adopted not only in post-Communist EasternEurope but also in the largest remaining C ommunistcountries, China and Vietnam, and by virtually all socialdemocracies not to speak of the Right. Such programmeshave become a major, sometimes a decisive, condition1 1 . The World Bank, World Development Indicators, Washington, D C: The WorldBank, 2000, table 5.2; Dagens Nyheter, 1 2 April 200 1 , C3; David Held et ai.,Global Transformations, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1 9 99, 208 9;Bank for International Settlements, 70th Annual Report, Basle: Bank for International Settlements, 2000.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 17for IMF loans. How can this historical tum from socializa tion to privatization be explained? What happenedwas a confluence of three systemic processes� under theconditions - favourable or unfavourable� depending on onespoint of view of contingent events.1. The development programme of the Communist states,dependent on mobilizing natural and human resourceswith the help of existing technology, domestic or borrowed,was beginning to exhaust itself.. This first became visiblein East Central Europ e by the mid-sixties and in the S ovietUnion about a decade later. Outside the domain of thearms race with the US, the question of how to generatenew technology and more productivity was neveranswered. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1 9 68froze new Communist initiatives and inaugurat ed a periodof stagnation, which perestroika could not disrupt.2. The competence and integrity of the postco lonial statesturned out to be fatally inadequate to the requirements ofsocial planning and state-sponsored economic development.3. In the core capitalist countries, new source s of capitalgeneration and management technologies challenged thecapacity of the state. Heavy social commitments also madeit increasingly difficult for even wealthy states to meet newdemands for investment in infrastructure, while the explosionof financial markets generated much more private capital. These three systemic tendencies coalesced in theeighties. Privatization then gained its own politicalthrust through the emergence of two particularly ruthlessand strong-willed tendencies, both arising out of theLefts failed crisis management: Pinochetismo in Chileand Thatcherism in Britain . In neither case was privatizationinitially an issue - beyond undoing Allendes s o cializations- but rather something which emerged, early on, from within
18 FROM MARXI SM TO POST MARXISM?the leaders entourage. Once put on track, though, it wasvigorously pushed by interested investment bankers andbusiness consultants, turned into a condition of IMF WorldBank loans, and taken up as an ideological centrepiece bythe right-wing media. As was noted, there have been sometechnological aspects to this shift, mainly in telecommunications, and some managerial aspe cts. Private-sectoroutsourcing has been a parallel development. But overall,the privatization drive has been powered by new privatecapital, strongly supported by ideological fashion. Less Class� More IrreverenceIndustrial employment peaked in the capitalist heartlandsin the second half of the sixties; the industrial working-classmovement reached the historical height of its size and influence in the seventies; and a fairly dramatic process ofdeindustrialization took place in the eighties . 12 While industrialization and industrial working-class formation continuedin East and Southeast Asia, most powerfully in South Korea where manufacturing employment soared from 1 . 5 percent in 1 960 to 22 per cent in 1 980, peaking in 1 990 at 27per cent of total employment deindustriali zation alsohit old Third World industrial centres, such as Bombay.Manufacturing employment also declined, relatively, beginning in 1 980 in all the more developed Latin Americancountries (save Mexico, with its US-operated maquiladoras)Y Between 1 96 5 and 1 990, industrial employment asa proportion of world employment declined from 19 to 17per cent, and among the industrial countries from 37 to26 per cent.14 A later ILO time series, 1 99 6-2006, indicatesa certain stabilization at a slightly higher level, with industrial1 2 . See my European Modernity and Beyond, London: Sage Publications,1 99 5 , 69ff.13. CEPAL, Panorama social de America Latina, 1997, Santiago de Chile: UN,1 997, table 111.3.14 . ILO, World Employment 1995, Geneva: ILO, 1 9 95, 2 9 .
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 19employment making up 21 per cent of world employmentat both end years, in as much as post-industrial decline wasoffset by S outh Asian industrialization. Clearly, however, the great epoch of the industrialworking-class movem ent has come to an end. In fa ct,industrial labour came to dominate post-agrarian employment only in Europe, never in the US, Japan or S outhKorea, and it is most unlikely to happen ever a gain. Onc emore according t o the ILO, service employment is o n theverge of overtaking industrial employment in China . Theenormous growth of Third World megacities � from Cairoto Jakarta, from Dhaka to Mexico via Kinshasa and Lagosis generating an urb an proletariat only in i the Rom an, �pre-Marxist sense of informal labour and dea �rs. In India,only about a tenth of the economically activ� p opulationis in the fonnal urban sector; in China, 23 per kent. Whilean international slum-dwellers organization i exists, aneventual revolt of the slums (as suggested in Mike DavissPlanet of Slums), if it occurs, is unlikely to fit into the classicalrepertoire of working-class protest and revolution. Classicalirreverent c ollectivism, of which the industrial workingclass movement was the main historical carrier, has passedits high point and is now progressively weakening . But thisis only part of the story. The other crucial development over this period hasbeen the strong erosion of traditional deference, religiousas well a s s o c iopolitical . De-agrarianization has been onefactor here agricultural lab our declining fro m 5 7 to48 per cent of world employment between 1 9 6 5 and1 990 although peasants have been far from always andeverywhere deferential. According to the 2000 census,town-dwellers in China now make up a good third of thepopulation; ten years ago, they constituted a quarter. TheNetherlands provides a stark example of secul arizatio n :the explicitly religious parties received over half of all votescast in every election from the introduction o f universalsuffrage in 1918 up until 1 9 63; their share then dropped
20 F R O M MARXI S M T O POST MARX I S M?to one-third in the twenty years that followed. The gripof patriarchy, too, has been significantly loosened : womensrights and questions of gender equality have appeared onthe agenda virtually everywhere in the world. 1 5 What we might call social modernization resulting fromeconomic change, education, mass communication, formaldemocratic rights, transnational migrations has had theeffect of eroding many different kinds of deference, affectingnot only women and young people but also the salariedmiddle strata in most countries, the lower castes anduntouchables in South Asia, indigenous peoples on allcontinents, the urban poor in the new big-city slums of theThird World, Catholics and European Protestants. Thisdevelopmental outcome was first visible in the sixties, withthe undermining of traditional clientelism in Latin Europeand America. It was highlighted in the protests of 1 968 andthen by the womens movement that followed in their wake. One element of this erosion of deference has been thecre ation of new forms of rebellious collectivism. Indigenous p e oples have organized in defence of their rights andh ave become a significant political force throughout theAmericas, from Arctic Canada to sub-Antarctic C hile, anda major force in Bolivia and Ecuador. In India, indigenousmovements allied with environmentalist organizations haveexerted veto power. Lower castes have reshaped theircollective identity as D alits, the downtrodden oroppressed, rather than polluted untouchables; women haveworke d to build transnational feminist networks . But therehave been other trends as well . One is towards what wecould call deferential individualism the worship ofmammon and success in any form. The decline of erstwhile authority has also given rise to new, self-chosen brandsof authoritarianism or to fundamentalism p articularlysignificant within American Protestantism, West Asian and1 5 . See Part 1 of my Between Sex and Power, Family in the World 1 900-2000,London: Routledge, 2004.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 21North African Islam and Israeli Judaism. While Islamicfundamentalism and Latin American evangelicalism havethrived on the social failures of both the secularized Leftand traditional religious institutions, fundamentali stcurrents within Judaism and US Protestantism seem ratherto be driven by specific concerns of identity. It is impossible, at this stage, to draw up a balance she etof the combined effects of all these social processes, withtheir many contradictions, their exceptions, their unevenness. But my impression would be that the overall directionin which they have been and will be heading is notonly away from traditional collectivism but also, and moreinsistently, towards a greater irreverence in the face ofinequalities and privileges, particularly those of power andstatus . From a left-wing perspective, these processes offernot only the potential reinforcement of further allies in thestand against deference but also the challenge of an individualist or a new-collectivist questioning of the traditionalcollectivism of the Left and the anti-imperialist and labourmovements . Most importantly, however, these developments do not simply provide additional resources for theLeft. They raise new issues and generate new questions ofpriorities, alliances and compromises. At the very least, forinstance, environmentalism and identity politics can clashhead-on with the developmentalism and egalitarianism ofthe classical Left. Irreverence may also express itself inrepulsive forms, such as xenophobic violence or crime . DYNAMICS OF THE POLITICAL SPHEREWithin these coordinates, further dynamics are at work. Themost immediate are those created by the historical outcomeof previous political contests. Here we shall simply list whatseem to have been the most significant defeats and victories,successes and failures, of the past forty years for both Rightand Left, as well as noting what parameters have changedacross the political field.
22 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM? Left Successes1. The discrediting of explicit racism and the fall ofcolonialism. Until the sixties, European colonial rule overother p eoples was still widely held to be perfectly legitimate. Blacks in the US were still denied human and civilrights . The decolonization of Mrica, the defeat of institutional racism in the US, the overthrow of ap artheid inSouth Africa and the defeat of US imperialism in Cubaand Vietnam were resounding left-wing victories, whichaltered the political space of the world in imp ortant ways .2. The postwar argument over the welfare state within theadvanced capitalist countries did the new prosperitymean that less so cial expenditure would be needed, orthat s ocial security and proper social services had nowbecome affordable? was resoundingly won by the(refonnist) Left, especially in West Germany, Scandinaviaand the Netherlands, and ratified by a series of importantelection results around 1 9 60.3. The worldwide student movement o f 1 968 was a majoradvance for the forces of ireverence across the world, forit attacked not only tradition and reaction but also thecomplacency of social liberalism, social democracy, Communism and national revolutions . It rejected the fonnula ofeconomic growth and expanded mass education as anadequate fulfilment of the classical Left Enlightenmentdemands for emancipation and equality, and set newagendas for human liberation and self-realization.4. The new feminist movement questioned male radicalsleadership of movements for liberation and equality in whichtraditional gender roles remained unchanged. Overall,feminism has been a movement of the Left in the broadestsense, although more so in Western Europe and in theThird World questioning the masculinist rule of capital
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 23as well as of patriarchy than in the US. In the past,womens voting patterns tended to be more right-wing thanmens, in spite of the tendency of the early feminist movement to align with the Left. But in the course of theeighties and nineties this pattern changed, in the capitalistdemocracies, into a female voting preference for leftof-centre parties and candidates (very clearly marked inrecent US presidential elections). Left Failures and Defeats1 . An important turning-point was the failure of the Leftto cope with the distributive conflicts that broke out duringthe economic crises of the seventies and eighties. WesternEuropean social democracy above all, the British LabourParty US liberalism, Latin American populism and theChilean Left were confronted with such confli cts, whi chled to ever deeper crises of inflation, unemployment,economic ungovernability and decline. Their failures pavedthe way for a powerful right-wing backlash violent inLatin America but within the bounds of formal democracyin North America and Western Europe . Thus ensued themoment of neoliberalism, which is with us still .2. The rendez-vous m anque between the protesters of1 968 and the existing labour movements. After its first waveof individualist iconoclasm, the former turned to mimeticearly Bolshevik romanticism and party-building. Disillusionment there in turn generated a good deal of right-wing liberalrenegadism, nouveaux philosophes and the ideological stonntroopers of the Gulf and Kosovo wars, as well as the selfindulgent individualism of the Clinton kids. A good part ofthe irreverent individualism of 1 968 has persisted, toosometimes politically expressed, as in feminist andenvironmentalist movements and in human-rights activism.But because of that missed appointment, the potential for ahistorical renewal or refounding of the Left was lost.
24 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARX I S M ?3. The Rights capacity for violence - fatally underestimatedby the Left led to a number of bloody defeats : Indonesiain 1 9 65 , the S outhern Cone of Latin America in the earlyseventies, a more protracted but proportionately even moremurderous struggle in Central America.4. The implosion of Communism in the 1 990s was a negativetum on an epochal scale, for the non-Communist as wellas the Communist Left: the possibility of achieving a viablenoncapitalist society lost much of its credibility. The demiseof Communism was neither a heroic defeat nor merely theresult of an accelerating process of decay. It had, in fact,an ironic twist. In both the Soviet Union and China, thebeginning of the end was a wave of radical and unexpectedinternal reforms; in both countries, the denouement cameas the unintended result of the success of these reforms . Inthe Soviet Union, the reforms were largely political anddemocratizing; they threw the planned economy into chaosand, finally, benefited nationalist politicians. In China, theywere largely economic, taking longer to tear socialist politicsto pieces while profoundly corrupting the party-state . EasternEurope overtook the USSR, breaking loose before the latterdisintegrated, and C ommunist Southeast Asia followedChina rather cautiously. Two smaller Communist regimes, however, have so farmaintained themselves, through very different survivalstrategies. Nationalist isolation has mutated North KoreanCommunism into a dynastic power, complete with ballisticmissiles and mass poverty. Cuba has survived with the revolutionary integrity of its regime intact, although this is hardlyless personality-driven and authoritarian than what precededit. Its ingenious strategy has been to become, once again,a major international holiday resort . While tourism iscertainly an industry of the future, it is less clear that thebeach hotel can be a medium-term social model. 161 6 . Many if not most of the best Cuban hotels are public property, butthey are usually managed by foreign based capitalist enterprises.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 255. A further difficulty for the Left : neoliberal economicpolicies did bring some material rewards and could notcredibly be denounced as a complete failure for the Right .Neoliberal governments succeeded in curbing inflation, amajor political asset in the nineties in Argentina, Bolivia,Brazil, Peru and elsewhere . The opening of world marketsmeant new opportunities for quite a number of people .Some privatization initiatives succeeded n o t only inproviding more privileges for a few but also in encouraginginvestment and providing services: telecommunications isthe outstanding example here.6. Geopolitical events at the state level have weighed heavilyon the Left Right balance of world forces. A brief list mustsuffice as a reminder. The Sino-Soviet split, later reproducedin the Pol Pot Vietnam conflict, divided and demoralizedthe Left and enormously strengthened the hand of the Right.State breakdowns in independent Africa, begining in theCongo in the autumn of 1960, left little space for Leftpolitics and policy on that continent a restriction camouflaged for a while by the geopolitical alignment of someleaders with the USSR. The catastrophic defeat by Israelin the 1 9 67 war discredited and demoralized the secularizedArab Left throughout the region and bred aggressive religiousfundamentalisms among both Arabs and Jews.In addition to these successes and failures, we must registerthe ways in which the parameters of the political field ingeneral have shifted during this period. Again, there is spacehere only to note the effects of some of these dynamics onthe balance of Right and Left. Firstly, there has been therise of environmental politics, which surged in the wake ofthe mid-seventies oil crisis. While generally more critical ofcapital than of labour, these currents have also questionedthe fundamentally developmentalist perspective of theindustrial Left, and may prove more tolerant of unemployment and economic inequality than the traditional Left has
26 F R O M MARXI S M T O P O ST M ARXI S M ?been. S econdly, the politics of ethnic and sexual identityhave become considerably more important in some parts ofthe world. Their relation to socio-economic issues is oftenambiguous critical of inequalities that affect their groupingor community, for instance, but not of those that affectothers or of inequality in general. Impact of TechnologiesNew developments in scientific knowledge and technologyover the past forty years have also had an impact on politicalspace. First, we should note the effects of technology in theacceleration of industrial productivity, resulting inrelative deindustrialization and, with it, the disappearanceof traditional working-class milieux. Television has furtheredthe creation of new, home-centred social relations and ofa more image-focused politics. Further developments intelecommunications satellite broadcasting, mobile phones,email and the Internet have been double-edged, erodingboth public-service communication and also public-ordercontrols . 1 7 Finally, more than a century after Darwin, biologyis once more emerging as a site for the expansion of knowledge and technology, and thereby also for cultural ideology.The political field of the future will surely contain a largerelement of life politics around issues such as health, theenvironment, coping with ageing, genetic engineering, ethicalquestions and quality of life . C ULTURE S O F C RITIQUECritical thought depends on cultural soil to grow. Inorder to make sense, a critique must depart from certain1 7 . This loosening of public order controls may be reversed in the near future:an interesting test will be how the police authorities deal with forthcoming EU,WTO or World Bank summits. The technology for global surveillance andespionage already exists in the US Echelon system.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 27assumptions or principles embodied in its subject. TheEnlightenment and its subsequent traditions provided anideal starting point for left-wing critical thought. Criticalenquiry, unhampered by existing authorities and beliefs,was enshrined at the core of the Enlightenment itself -Sapere aude! (Dare to know!) Its universalistic principle ofreason provided a tribunal for critical accusation, againstancestral wisdom and the self-proclaimed heirs of theEnlightenment. European modernity developed, culturally and philosophically, out of the Enlightenment and, politically, outof the French Revolution. Its political culture fo cuse d onthe confrontation of the people/nation against the prince,the monarchical entourage of aristocracy, and upperranks of the clergy. Although the forces of the status quohad strong institutional and intellectual resources to drawupon, the culture of European modernity was a fertilebreeding-ground for radical critical thought; post- 1 7 89Europe became the worlds primary arena for ideologicalconfrontation . S o what was actually happening to therights of the people, to lib erty, equality and fraternityunder industrial capitalism and landowner p olitics ? Theconcept of class was forged before Marx in the first breakthrough of European modernity, in reflections on theIndustrial Revolution in Britain and on the FrenchRevolution . The value assigned to progress tended toundermine the b asic assumptions of conservatism. As I have argued more extensively in other contexts,the modem rupture with the past took different roads indifferent parts of the world a European road, a roadsuited to the New World of settlers, a colonial roa d andthe road of reactive modernization from above . In the new settler worlds of the Americas after independence, modern thought be came the conventionalmainstream, fundamentally challenged only by C atholicclericalism in Colombia and some other p arts of LatinAmerica. The main question in the Americas was not,
28 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ?What are the rights of the people? but rather, Who arethe people? Does the people include indigenous inhabitants? Black people? Uncouth recent immigrants? In arough summary of New World political culture, two thingsstand out . Liberalism in the broad sense of the defenceof liberty (private pursuits, private property, private beliefs)and a commitment to science and progress (to reason)has had a much firmer intellectual hold than in Europe,usually, if not always, overshadowing socialist critiques .Secondly, because of the much less pronounced ideologicaldivides in America, Marxist thought and p olitics have onoccasion more easily melded with mainstream politicalcurrents, such as New Deal liberalism; Creole p opulismin Cuba, Guatemala and Argentina in the 1 9 4 0 s ; orChilean radicalism in the 1 9 6 0 s 7 0 s . The anticolonial modernism of the colonized a perspective also adopted in Latin America by those who rejectedsettler Creolity was highly conducive to radicalism. Thecolonized modems the generation of Nehru, Sukarno,Ho Chi Minh and Nkrumah were probably the p eopleexperiencing the contradictions of liberal European modernity most acutely. On one hand, they had identified withthe modem aggressor, the colonial power learning itslanguage, its culture, its political principles ofnation/people, rights and self-determination. On the other,they experienced the denial of rights and self-determinationto their own people, the haughty face and the iron fist ofliberal imperialism . Socialist radicalism, both Communistand non-Communist, was a pervasive characteristic of postSecond World War anticolonial nationalism. Reactive modernization from above, by contrast, leftlittle space for radical thought. By definition, it meant aninstrumentalization of nation, politics, science and progress,with a view to preserving a regime real or imaginedunder external imperialist threat. Since liberty, equalityand fraternity were predefined in the mainstream as ameans of strengthening the regime, their intrinsic social
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 29contradictions were kept out of sight or sidelined from thebeginning. This did not, of c ourse, prevent radical currentsfrom making their way, alongside modem ideas in general,into Japan, Siam, Turkey and the uncolonized Arab world.There, however, they encountered a more b arren soil, aswell as repressive vigilance. Modernism - with its commitment to reason, science,change, progress and the future - was not inherently leftwing. (Chapter 3 examines the different master narratives of modernity and their relationship to Marxism . ) In thelatter p art of the ninete enth century, traditionalistconservatism was increasingly supplemented, and in theAmericas it was overtaken, by a right-wing modernism thatextolled the overriding rights of the strongest and the fittest.This was social Darwinism and the new language of liberalimperialism, both important ingredients of twentieth-centuryFascism. However, after Stalingrad and Auschwitz, thisracist, imperialist and militaristic modernism was bothdefeated and utterly discredited. Non-militaristic laissez-fairesocial Darwinism, promulgated by Herbert Spencer amongothers and very influential in the US, had its thesis of theantagonism between industrialism and militarism disprovedby the First World War, and its e conomic credentialsdestroyed by the Depression of the 1 930s . After the Second World War, modernism was overwhelmingly left-of-centre in all parts of the world, except, by andlarge, the countries involved in reactive modernization .Then, in about 1 9 80, came the avalanche of postmodernism. The same period that saw the eclipse of politicalMarxism also witnessed the denial of modernity in the nameof p ostmodernity, and the rise of postmodernism . The latterhas at least two very different originS. 1 8 One is aesthetic:a mutation of the modernist succession of avant-gardes,most clearly developed in the field of architecture as a1 8 . See the unrivalled critical archaeology of Perry Anderson, The Origins ofPostmodernity, London: Verso, 1 99 8 .
30 FROM MARXISM T O POST MARXISM?reaction against the austere high modernism of Mies vander Rohe and the International Style. The other source liesin social philosophy, a manifestation of ex-leftist exhaustionand disenchantment . The key figure here is the late Frenchphilosopher Jean-Fran90is Lyotard, a disillusioned formermilitant of the far-left grouplet Socialisme au Barbarie. 1 9 Why did postmodernism become such a formidablechallenge? Why was postmodernity badly needed, intuitivelylonged for, and desperately sought, as an early devoteerecently put it, with the benefit of a more sceptical hindsight?20 The aesthetic attraction is easily understood as,above all, another manifestation of the relentless modernistdrive for innovation; what influences its specific forms wouldbe in opposition to its immediate predecessor/enemy, aswell as the sociocultural context. But the question of thetheoretical and p olitical significance of p ostmodernism stillremains . Here, Jeffrey Alexander captures one salient pointwhen he c oncludes that postmodern theory . . . may beseen . . . as an attempt to redress the problem of meaningcreated by the experienced failure of "the sixties" . 2 1 All this involved a remarkable conflation of brillianceand myopia . In the cultural sphere, important changeshad clearly taken place b etween the work of, say, Miesvan der Rohe and Robert Venturi, o r Jackson Pollockand Andy Warhol changes emerging in the 1 9 6 0 s, andsetting a new aesthetic tone for the coming decade s .Thos e d evelopments warranted analyses of a new modeof cultural production, such as Fredric Jamesons Pos tmodernism. 22 But even the very best attempts at relating1 9 . J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, tran s .G . Bennington and B . Massumi, Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press,1 984 ( 1 979).20. Z. B auman and K. Tester, Conversations with Zygmunt Bauman, Cambridge:Polity, 200 1 , 7 1 .2 1 . J. Alexander, Modem, Anti, Post, Neo, NLR 1 : 2 1 0, March April 1 995, 82.22. Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism,London: Verso, 1 99 1 .
INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 31cultural analysis to socio-economic change never fullysucceeded in articulating the connections between thetwo . Jameson bases his account on Ernest Mandel s LateCapitalism, a picture of the postwar world economy originating in the 1 9 60s, which largely focused on the stateregulation of capital and its insuperable limits, so Jamesondoes not discuss the later post- 1 9 7 5 capitalism or thesurge of right-wing neolibe ral modernism. 2 3 Despite hisseminal contributions, postmodernism mutated into a setof cultural political attacks on modernity and the modern- a malaise within scholarly analytics. 24 Outside the specificaudiences of architecture and art, it largely addressed theLeft and the ex-Left, including feminism, and paid scantattention to the simultaneous rise of right-wing modernismin the form of neoliberalism or assertive capitalism .25 Instead, postmodernism fed on the demoralization anduncertainty of the Left in the aftermath of late 1 960s andearly 1 970s euphoria. Its critique of reason and rationalitythrived on the machinery of images of the television society,providing sustenance to academic cultural studies . 2 6 Therewere, in addition, two further pillars of the new edifice ofpostmodernity. One was the social restru cturing thatfollowed from deindustrialization an epochal s o ci alchange. Another was the critique of modernist progressthat arose from ecological concerns, which were intensifiedby the oil crises of the 1 970s and early 1 9 8 0 s . Environ-2 3 . Ernest Mandels Late Capitalism was published in English in 1 9 75; its Gennanedition appeared in 1 972 from Suhrkamp. According to the authors preface,the main elements of the theory of late capitalism were conceived in 1 9 63 6 7 .24. S e e also Linda Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, London: Routledge,2002 ( 1 989); and Pauline Marie Rosenau, Post-Modernism and the Social Sciences,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 9 9 1 .2 5 . 1ameson himself scoffingly dismisses the doctrines intellectual attractions:no one is going to persuade me that there is anything glamorous about thethought of a Milton Friedman, a Hayek or a Popper in the present day andage; see Jameson, A Singular Modernity, London: Verso, 2002, 2-3 .2 6 . Anderson, The Origins of Postmodernity, 8 8 .
32 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M ?mentalism m a y have found i t hard t o flourish i n th e esotericambience of postmodernist philosophizing, but its adherentshave proved receptive to postmodernism. Indeed, massmarket imagery, de-industrialization and ecologicalblowbacks provided a social echo chamber for the postmodernist discourse of (ex-) Left disorientation. Against thisbackground, the modem the target of postmodernismsattacks has been defined in a number of ways . JamesonsA Singular Modernity, for example, while grimly notingrecent regressions from an earlier consensu s around full p ostmodernity, cites the asceticism of modernism, itsphallocentrism and authoritarianism, the teleology of itsaesthetic, its minimalism, its cult of genius and the nonpleasurable demands it made on the audience or public . 27 Although the intellectual wave of postmodernism hasnow subsided, the right-wing revival of modernity p ersists.The contamination of social Darwinism by Fascism is beingpushed under the rug, while globalization is staged as thesurvival of the fittest alone, free from Spencerian p acifismand accompanied instead by a loud neo-imperial drumbeat.The modem is becoming the property of liberal reaction.Modernizing the labour market usually means more rightsfor capital and employers . Modernizing social servicesusually means the privatization of and cuts to public services.Modernizing the pension system generally means fewerrights for old people. Rarely does the term signal morerights for employees, the unemployed and pensioners, fewerrights for capital, or more public services. Were socialistmodernism a species, it would be almost extinct. Progressive academic culture has declined the worldover, as p o stmo dernism has turned into socioculturalstudies, a tendency that is more closely connected to darkening p o litical pro spe cts extra muros than the kind of27. Jameson, A Singular Modernity, 1 . But were asceticism, phallocentrism andauthoritarianism really more characteristic of, and more universal in, modernthan pre modern cultures and societies?
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 33virulent internal anti-leftism found within French academiaand certain post-C ommunist milieux. Japans once stronguniversity-based Marxist economics, which survived thegreat postwar boom, has faded; radical historiography inIndia seems to have lost its once impressive vibrancy; andthe left-wing intellectual political essay has gone out offashion in Latin America . The public universities havelost many of their brightest students to right-wing p rivateinstitutions. The continental European and Latin Americanmass Marxism of students and teaching a ssistants is gone .University students have not only been depoliticized, theirmovements have als o diversified and now include streetb attalions supporting liberal-democratic, pro-Americanregime change in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, as wellas the anti-Chavista opposition in Venezuela . Academia, think tanks and public research institutes,however, still support a wide range of Marxist and otherleft-wing thought. The politically more insulated AngloSaxon universities fare better in this regard than do theLatin American ones, which are always more susc eptibleto political developments and ambitions. Non-conformismremains well represented at Oxbridge and in the IvyLeague, as well as at, for instance, top universities in S aoPaulo and S eoul . Part of their strength comes from amatured generation, with intellectually oriented studentradicals of the late sixtie s and early seventies havingattained s enior professorships. But in the last five to tenyears a new, though smaller, left-of-centre intelle ctualgeneration has been blossoming. Institutional innovation has also taken place . One example is the revitalization of CLACSO (the Latin AmericanCouncil of S o cial S ciences) under the leadership of AtilioBoron and, more recently, Emir Sader, aided by Swedishand other external public funding. CLACSO has b ecomean important inspiration to and financier of progressiveempirical research; its work includes the monitoring ofprotest movements in Latin America, which have been
34 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM?staging an increasing number of actions in the 2000s, andthe promotion of South-South contacts . 28 Its weakerAfrican equivalent, C ODESRIA, based in Dakar, hasrecently been reinvigorated. In the current research armsof the UN, one also finds several products of an e arlierprogressive era, particularly from the Third World, doingexcellent work while exercising diplomatic caution. LatinAmerica has also been a major centre of thought andanalysis of the cultures of globalization, as can be seen inthe work of Octavio Ianni and Renato Ortiz in Brazil andof Nestor Garcia C anclini in Mexico, for example . 2 9 There has always existed a strong subaltern antimodernism, to which the working-class history of E. P.Thomp son in England and the multi-volume SubalternStudies of Ranajit Guha and his associates in India gaveeloquent expression, and of which James C. Scott hasbeen a sympathetic theorist.30 The Marxist labour movement could usually accommodate it through its socialistcritique of industrial capitalism. But now that theMarxian dialectic has lost most of its force, it is necessaryto take a systematic look, however brief, at the currentpolitical implications of antimodernism. Here we are interested in movements critical ofmodernism that are not, however, right-wing defences oftraditional privilege and power. There are several suchmovements, and they tend to cluster in two groups , onechallenging the call for progress, development andgrowth, and the other questioning mundane rationalismand secularism.28. See A. B oron and G. l.echini, eds, Politicas y movimientos sociales en unmundo hegemOnico, Buenos Aires: ClACSO, 2007.2 9 . N. Garcia Canclini, Culturas Hibridas, Mexico: Editorial Paidos, 2002;O. Ianni, A sociedade global, Rio de Janeiro: Civilizac;ilo Brasilera, 1 992; R. Ortiz,Mundializacao e cultura, Silo Paulo: Brasiliense, 1 994.30. Scotts classic work was Weapons of the Weak, New Haven and London:Yale University Press, 1 98 5 ; but his oeuvre also includes Domination and theArts of Resistance and Seeing like a State.
INT O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 35 Among the critiques of progress and development, thereis one that has followed the Industrial Revolution into thepostindustrial world: the defence of traditional livelihoodsby artisans, peasants, small farmers, fishermen and tribalcommunities. That defence is easily supported by an anticapitalist Left in opposition� and has been adopted by thecurrent Social Forum movement: We do not want development. We just want to live, declared a front-stage bannerat the World S ocial Forum in Mumbai in 2004. But wheriframed in strong� unqualified terms� it makes no sense tothe masses of the world, who are struggling to get out ofpoverty. As a movement, antidevelopment frequently fragments into isolated minority battles with ineffectual andlimited support. The World S o cial Forums of the 2000s have given riseto similar antimodernist protest movements from differentcountries and continents, and have also given them platfonus and a sympathetic hearing. But that has been possiblebecause WSF is a forum, a meeting-place by far themost exciting one in the last two decades and not amovement or even a force of common action. The criticalculture created at the forums has been that o f resistanceto neoliberal modernism. The global amplitude of thelatters offensive engendered a wide range of losers andcritics, who were brought together with Latin flair in 2 00 1by a diverse c oalition of Brazilian social movements andFrench academics and journalists grouped around Le MondeDiplomatiqueY Significant organizational infrastructure hasbeen provided by the Workers Party CPT) governm e ntsin Porto Alegre and Rio Grande do SuI, by French andother Trotskyists in the alter-globalist movement ATTAC,and by the CPI CM) in Mumbai. But in their ideologicalecumenism, lack of a single control centre and truly globalcharacter, the WSF does represent a novel phenomenonin the world history of the Left. On the other hand, a3 1 . B. Cassen, On the Attack, New Left Review 2: 19, Januray February 2003 .
36 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXIS M ?stimulating cultural space is not in itself transformativeaction, which has led to tense debates within the broadInternational C ouncil of the WSF.32 Another current, as old as modernism itself, is driven bya commitment to a natural or aesthetic lifestyle, originallyconceived as a protest against massive ugly and unhealthyurbanization. In the 1 960s, this became a significant urbanmovement, above all in Western Europ e and NorthAmerica, against the demolition of historic city centres tomake room for motorways and commercial development.It scored several important victories in big cities such asAmsterdam, Paris and Washington DC, as well as in smallerplaces such as Lund, my oid university town in Sweden.Since then it has spread to other parts of the world. Theradical Left and to a much lesser extent social democracyand its centre-left equivalents usually played an active rolein these urban movements, and broad, winning coalitionshave often proved feasible . The political irony is that suchcoalitions have generally also included a strong right-wingcomponent of cultural conservatives, so that the credit forsuccess is legitimately claimable by both Right and Left.Nevertheless, the pollution and traffic congestion of Asiancities, and Third World cities in general, testify to the weakness of and the urgent need for critical urban movements. In some parts of the rich world, most notably perhapsin California, a kind of postmodern middle-class culturehas also developed, its origins traceable to the youth cultureof 1 9 6 8 individualistic, irreverent, hedonistic but notnecessarily consumerist, unattracted by capitalism s relentless drive to accumulate . Open to idealistic arguments aswell as to ecological and aesthetic concerns, this is a milieuto which left-wing discourse can connect. The youngstersof the North who attend the World Social Forums often3Z. Cf. B . de Sousa Santos (2007) , The World Social Forum and the GlobalLeft, http://focusweb. orgithe world social forum and the globalleft.html?Itemid=1 5 0; C. Whitaker, Crossroads do not always close roads , http ://wsficstrategies.blogspot.comlZ007/08/chico whitaker crossroads do not always.html
INTO THE TWENTY FI RST CENTURY 37hail from here . Although its new spirit of c apitalism ishardly on the verge of transforming the ruthlessness ofactual world capitalism, as some enthusiastic theorizingseems to imply (with some caveats) , it does provide newpossibilities for dialogue and debate with the Left as didthe old Enlightenment liberalism . 33 The ecological critique of developmentalism connectsrather easily with both livelihood defence and urbancommunity aestheticism, but as a major movement it ismore recent, traceable to the early 1 970s and the impactof the (recently updated) Limits to Growth. Its original neoMalthusian thrust focused on the depletion of planetaryresources, which has been replaced by an emphasis onenvironmental destruction, currently centreing on the effectof man-made climate change . But the engineers modernism,which built the Soviet Union and is now building post-MaoChina, is as deaf and blind to environmental externalitiesas was the capitalist modernism hailed in the CommunistManifesto. In this regard, it is noteworthy that the firstoppositional movements in late Communist Eastern Euro pewere very often ecological movements . Environmentalism and developmentalism have reacheda modernist compromise, at least in principle, in theconcept of sustainable development. To the extent that it istaken seriously, that concept provides an imp ortant b asisfor critiques of and interventions against unfetteredcapitalism. Indeed, socialism would have made much moresense in the twenty-first century if conceptions of sustainable development had been developed out of socialisttheory, rather than growing into a belated ecologicalqualification of capitalism. In the second cluster of challenges to modernism, thesecular universalism of the European Enlightenment, alongwith its offshoots of settler liberalism, anticolo nial nationalism and reactive developmentalism from above , has3 3 . Cf. L. Boltanski a n d E . Chiapello, Th e New Spirit of Capitalism, London:Verso, 2006; N . Thrift, Knowing Capitalism, London: Sage, 2005 .
38 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXI SM?increasingly been challenged and undermined by ethnonationalism, ethnoreligious movements and by a resurgentreligious universalism. In different ways, these new culturaltendencies which make a mockery of modernitys selfconfident secular evolutionism severely restrict radicalcritical thought. Their unexpected emergence also callsfor a reconsideration of some of the assumptions ofEuropean modernity. Marx, Engels and later great Marxists have always beenmuch more shrewd and circumspect than textbooksummaries of historical materialism would suggest. Whileethnicity, nations and national conflict have no place inthe latter, the former always paid attention to their strategicimportance, from Marxs hypothesis on a linkage of futurerevolutions in Ireland and Britain to Lenins and theCominterns focus on national liberation. On the otherhand, ethnicity as such does not promote critical and radical thought. On the contrary, ethnic/national mobilizationstend to foster ethnic cultural closure . The leadership,which usually has had a trans ethnic enculturation, maylink the national struggle to global anti-imperialism andto universalistic proj ects of social change, to socialism orto communism, but their national standing is not basedon this. Positions of anti-imperialism and/or socialism maytherefore, under changed geopolitical circumstances,become easily discarded postures. Ethiopia and MugabesZimbabwe are gaudy illustrations; another is contemporaryIraqi Kurdistan, who se regional leading family, the Barzanis, once flew the banner of Marxism-Leninism . Until certain Second World War rapprochements in the USSR and certain post-Second Vatican Council shifts inWestern Europe and Latin America, Marxism had been firmly planted in the secularist, anticlerical and often atheistic strand of modernism . Where the subaltern populationshave a strong religious commitment, as is the case in most of the Islamic world, this has been a major barrier between Marxism and the people. But even in Indonesia, where
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C E N TURY 39a more open Islamic culture did n o t prevent the emergenceof a Marxist-le d mass movement, the massacre o f 1 9 6 5fed o n whipped-up religious fervour. The failures of secular anticolonial nationalisms spawneda strong religious comeback, thoroughly politicized in theArab Islamic world and in maj ority Hindu India; mainlyap olitical in Christian Africa, except in the ap artheidS outh; politically active but internally divided in LatinAmerica into currents of Christian demo cracy, liberationtheology and US-exported Protestantism (either rightwing or politically acquiescent) . This religious resurgence,which also includes a p owerful fundamentalist ChristianRight in the US and an international revival of militantJudaism, has significantly altered the cultural parametersof the Left. Between middle- and upper-class fundamentalismwhether Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu o r Buddhist- and the Left there is no common language that couldfacilitate dialogue, as there is, deriving from the EuropeanEnlightenment, with middle- and even upper-class liberalism . With the religiosity of the popular classes, however,there might b e . Historically, achieving any common understanding or anyform of cooperation between strongly religious subalterncommunities on the one hand and the Marxist Left and thelabour movem:ent on the other has been extremely difficultand rare . The Christian s ocial movements of late nineteenthand early twentieth-century continental Europe were usuallyset up by local clergy worried about industrial secularization,of which the socialist labour movement was the most important representative . The cultural antagonism almost alwaysovershadowed their common social issues, poverty andmisery, with which the Christian social movements wereincreasingly confronted. In spite of mounting friction andoccasional conflict, these religious movements loyallypreserved their subordination to the church hierarchy andto the political leaders blessed by it. Until the religious trade
40 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?unions secularized, as happened in Austria after the SecondWorld War, and in the Netherlands and in France in the1 9 60s, when the chips were down, the Christian social movements sided with reactionary and anti-Left authoritarianism,in Austria in 1 927 34, in the Netherlands in 1 9 1 8 and 1 9 54,in Germany in 1 9 3 3 . I n the last third o f the twentieth century, however, thereoccurred a seismic shift in a part of Christianity.Mainstream C atholicism and Protestantism generallybecame socially progressive, and often also culturally andpolitically progressive . Advocates of Third World s olidarityand aid, environmental activists, poverty-alleviation projects, harassed immigrants and even religious minoritiesand persecuted political radicals could count on substantialsupport from mainstream Protestantism as well as fromthe C atholic Church . The Jesuits, long demonized bysecular liberals and left-wingers, provided courageoussupport to popular struggles and to human rights, aboveall in Central America. Many were martyred by the localrepresentatives of Yankee America for it. ProgressiveC atholics constituted a major component in the formationof the most successful labour party in Latin Americanhistory, the PT, which lifted the metallurgical trade unionist Lula to the presidency of Brazil . C an something similar happen in the non-Christianworld? Sinhala Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Hindutva inIndia seem to be purely ethnoreligious political movements . The Buddhist monks of Burma/Myanmar maysustain a democratic movement, but almost nothing isknown of their social agenda, if any although the autumn2007 p rotests started as a protest against price increasesfor fuel . In the Muslim world, by contrast, there aredefinitely strong social currents . Hamas in P alestine andHizbollah in Lebanon already function as Islamic socialmovements, even while cornered by Israeli might that isbacked by the entire North Atlantic Right. There were similar tendencies in Turkey, and still are, but the AKP
INTO THE TWENTY F I RST C ENTURY 41Gustice Development Party) i n its mutation into a governingparty seems to take European Christian democracy as asocial model, that is, seeing and presenting itself as a centreright party with social concerns. In Indonesia too, there isan Islamist political movement with a social perspective . Social Islamism is likely to develop further, having analmost unlimited supply of social problems in Muslimcountries to nourish it. But it occupies an unstable positionon a wide spectrum from theocratic fundamentalism to apolitically secularized Left, and thanks to heavy S audi,US and Israeli investments in the form of money andmilitary terror, the former is stronger and more attractivethan the latter. In sum, the cultural space of the Left has altered substantially in the past quarter century. On the whole that spacehas narrowed, but the new challenges to Enlightenmentmodernism indicate new tasks and possibilities for leftwing thought and practice, as well as a call for a self-criticalappraisal of the inherent limitations and lacunae of leftwing modernism. G E O P O L I T I C S AFTER THE S OVIET UNI O NPolitical inspiration and demoralization are much influencedby state power and by the outcome of state conflicts . TheJapanese victory over Russia in 1 9 05, for instance, was asource of inspiration to anticolonial nationalists not only allover Asia but also in Egypt and Morocco. After the outcomeof the Stalingrad battle, European opinion from occupiedFrance to neutral Sweden tilted left. The Vietnam War,unlike the Korean War, unleashed tremendous politicalrepercussions on social movements throughout the world. The twenty-first century starts out with a quite newgeopolitical configuration, radically different from that ofthe previous century. As it now stands, there are three majornovelties. One is the absence of any state counterpart tothe big capitalist power(s) . The Soviet Union whatever
42 FROM MARXISM TO PO ST MARXI SM?it was "really" was always perceived, except for the fouryears of its anti-Fascist alliance, 1 94 1 4 5, as the state powerof anticapitalism, as a scandal and a provocation to allcurrents of the Right. As such, the US SR provided inspiration to many socialists and anti-imperialists, and to othersat least a certain confidence that another kind of societythan prevailing capitalism was possible. The Soviet Unionalso lent substantial material assistance to radical states,Communist organizations and left-wing refugees. With theimplosion of the USSR and its European dependencies, noone is likely to take them up . And except for intraregionalLatin American actors, all those roles and functions havebeen left vacant. S econdly, there is a general feeling in the world Northand South, Right, Left and centre - that the end of NorthAtlantic world domination is approaching. Compared withthe explosive economic growth of China and the new vigourof India, the European Union and the extension and Asiandeployment of NATO are off-Broadway shows. A Southled by China, India, Brazil and South Africa is replacingthe Third World. What this tilt of the globe will mean isstill uncertain. Left-of-centre political forces are betterlocated in the South than in the US or in the NATO worldgenerally. All four countries of the Big South even have Communist parties with governmental influence, ruling in China and playing minor parts in the governing coalitions of the other three countries . But the meaning of left-of centre forces is very unclear in China, ambiguous in Brazil and South Africa, and clearly minoritarian in India. A weak ening of US domination will, ceteris paribus, increase the prospects of peace and strengthen national sovereignty. The rest is still open to speculation, whether of hope or fear. Third is the de-territorialized world war launched by George W. Bush, with great help from Osama bin Laden and cheered on by Zionist politicians and ideologues both inside and outside Israel. Proclaimed to b e a war of annihilation with a time frame of at least a generation,
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 43it has created a global b attlefield in which the Left, andindeed any movement p o ssessing any human decency� hasno stake whatsoever except that no side should win� andthat the sooner both sides are exhausted the b etter. It has been an extraordinary war, fought by relativelysmall numbers, but with theatres, as the military jargongoes, stretched across several continents. On the one side,there are well-paid, high-tech mercenary annies whosecommanders, p rivate or public, are all funded by thetaxpayers; on the other� there are unpaid� low-tech� religiously motivated fighters . Sustained by volunteers� paidor unpaid, neither side depends much on wide p ublicsupport, although the political bosses of the mercenariesmust ensure their own (re-) election. Both sides have takenwarfare to new depths of cruelty. The weaker side hasconcentrated on the weakest element of their enemycivilian populations albeit on a much smaller scalecompared to the British and American bombings of Germanand Japanese civilians during the Second World War. Yetthe bombs, missiles and occupations of the stronger sidehave killed more civilians than the other side, showing howthin the civilized varnish of liberal democracies can be. Thecruel attack of September 1 1 by a score of fanatics unleasheda fury of cosmic proportions . As a result, two countries onanother continent have been devastated� and the destructionof a third country, Iran, has been overtly threatened . Moreremarkable, however� are the worldwide abductions; theofficial use of torture, both in-house and outsourced; theestablishment of secret torture chambers and concentrationcamps; and the official rejection of the Geneva Conventionrelative to the treatment of prisoners of war and due processof law. This extraordinary violence has been defendedand even condoned by majorities of the US C ongre ss,by European s ocial-demo cratic leaders of the UK andGermany, and by Scandinavian liberals spearheaded bythe Danish government, which has participated in the warsin Mghanistan and Iraq.
44 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM? That revolutions and civil wars involve abhorrent violencehas become impossible for late-born sympathizers withrevolutions or with, for instance, Republican Spain toignore, and rightly so. But a critical scrutiny of modernitymust also reveal the mechanisms that drive liberal democratsto the horrors of Dresden, Hiroshima, Bagram andGuannmamo. The scale of terror remains different, butStalins road from violent poverty in the Caucasus, Tsaristoppression and the life-or-death Russian Civil War (abettedfrom outside) to the Gulag is no more incomprehensiblethan the career of George W. Bush from inherited p oliticalwealth, Yale fraternities and Texas sweetheart business deals,through the small-scale though highly symbolic September 1 1 attack, and onward to Bagram, Abu Ghraib, Guantanamoand the devastation of whole countries just by the stroke ofhis pen. Killing from a desk is, of course, always easier. Communists worldwide were blind to Soviet terror andfamines, but why is the same blindness repeated in thecurrent media-saturated liberal world concerning the fourmillion dead in Russia in the 1 9 90s resulting from therestoration of capitalism? The answer in both cases is thesame : total commitment to a cause, whether Communismor capitalism, blinds one to the cost. A very large p art ofthe Left has now learned that lesson, but hardly anybo dy of significance on the Right has . So far, we have seen avengeful repetition of historical violence by the liberal right (in the European sense of liberal) , cheered on or at least defended by most left-of-centre liberals. Any historical lessons regarding the costs of blank cheques of p olitical support have been postponed for an uncertain future . But the record is there . The starry-eyed defenders of the Yezhovschina of the 1 9 30s have been succeeded by their equally starry-eyed fellow-travellers of the Yeltsinschina of the 1 990s. Globally, the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the Bush war against the world mean a geopolitical situation much more unfavourable to the Left, which will have to
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 45wait for the Southern tilt to become more pronounced.Regional developments, however, are more variable. InLatin America, the situation of the Left has been drasticallyameliorated in the new century. The cautious weight ofleft-of-centre Brazil provides a certain balance to the US,which is mostly preoccupied elsewhere. The alliance ofChavista oil money and Cuban professionals (doctors,nurses, teachers, political cadres) is sustaining not only therevolutions of Cuba and Venezuela, but is also providingmuch-needed help to Evo Morales in Bolivia, to RafaelCorreia in Ecuador and to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,and is encouraging Left forces all over the hemisphereand occasionally, as in Mexico, it is frightening the middleclasses even more . Chavezs idea of a Bank of the South,endorsed in October 2007 by Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureateand former chief economist of the World B ank, mightbecome as significant as the Persian Gulf capital which isalready making the US Congress nervous. Many Latin American Creole settler-states, many of whichactively promoted their Whitening by nineteenth-centuryimmigration, are now facing new indigenista movementschallenging the very foundations of the Creole state . Thischallenge has gone furthest in Bolivia, now living througha process of reconstitution that is driven by the p residencyof Evo Morales. Ecuador is now entering a reconstitutionphase, and indigenous claims are getting louder all overthe Americas, although thus far they have been containedand divided in Mexico and Guatemala. North A mericaAs the worlds only superpower, the US is the lender oflast resort to all reactionary regimes of the current worldorder. Outside the corridors of power, there has alwaysbeen a courageous current of US opposition to imperialism,and it broadened in the face of the Bush wars, although itremained much weaker than in Europe. Opposition to
46 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI S M ?war made moderate, rather than overwhelming, headwayin the Democratic primaries of 2 008, although pushed byBarack Obama and John Edwards, and especially byDennis Kucinich (the latter two of whom dropped out ofthe race early) . As could be expected, the 1 999 Seattlecoalition of protectionist trade unions, anti-imperialistsand alter-globalists has not been sustained. The US isalso the homebase of a vicious Zionist lobby with animportant Christian fundamentalist wing which occasional free speech defence may defy, but which has noserious political counterpart. A telling example of its virulent militancy was staged in O ctober 2007, when DavidHorowitz launched Islamo-Fascism Awareness Week,including a campaign against Jimmy Carters war againstthe Jews , presumably referring to C arters traveloguethrough apartheid Palestine. In spite of intrepid and undaunted j ournalists, maverickidealist congressmen, a vibrant academia which stillincludes a quite impressive amount of intellectual dissentand critique, and an admirable though powerless opposition, the US remains the solid citadel of ruthless worldpower, explicitly defiant of international law or concernfor non-AIDerican lives. During the autumn of 2007,prospects for the 2008 presidential election indicated thatthe American voting population learned little from the IraqWar, with the Republican contenders competing in belligerence and the leading Democrat signaling her preparednessto follow the warpath into Iran. That the more belligerentDemocrat lost to the one more willing to employ diplomacymay offer a modicum of encouragement, augmented bythe Bush administrations decision to send a diplomat tosit in on talks in July 2008 between the ED and Iran, andto send several diplomats to Tehran later in the year. American world influence is clearly weakening, but toextrapolate from this a terminal decline of US power is,so far, mere speculation. For the foreseeable future, theUS will remain not only the worlds overwhelming military
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 47power, but also the worlds richest large economy, withdynamic high-tech industries in electronics, telecommunications, aerospace and biotechnology, and with a p opularculture of film, television and music of unrivalled worldwide attraction serious competitors operating mainly innational or regional arenas . Canada, a member of the G7, has been able to preservea more egalitarian social model, in spite ofNAFTA, b elyingthe untimeliness of the crows cries about the erosion ofthe nation-state . In the run-up to the Iraq War, C anadawas more resilient than most European states, althoughnow it is taking an active part in the war in Mghanistan. North America is the main destination of worldwidemigration, and the main backdrop of the unfulfilleddreams of migrants from the South. C anada in general,and C anadian cities such as Toronto and Vancouver inparticular, have become centres of multiculturalism. Thisalso means that the politic al ambiguity of cosmopolitanism is visible most clearly in Canada, currently undera conservative, pro-US government. EuropeEurope is going in the opposite direction from that ofLatin America. Neither the social-democratic electoraltide of the late 1 990s when social-democratic p artiesgoverned or were in the government of fourteen out ofthe then fifteen EU member states nor the Left socialdynamic of the French and Dutch referenda of 200 5 hasbeen sustained. The French political system prevented aconsolidation of Frances finest hour, when the countrystood up against the attack on Iraq; on the c ontrary, thecurrent French government seems to have taken over TonyBlairs previous role in supporting American wars. One might say that post- Communist Eastern Europewas bound to become pro-American and right-wing, butin fact, the political process there after 1 989 turned out to
48 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?be much more complex. One reason was that the restorationof capitalism was far from a general success. On the contrary,it resulted in a deep depression, massive impoverishmentand unemployment, while simultaneously presenting newopportunities, particularly for the young and well educated.Another was the understandable incompetence of the newanti-Communist politicians, who had few chances to learnabout government during Communist times . As a result,ex-Communist political leaders from Estonia to Albaniastaged successful comebacks, including, for instance,Alexander Kwasniewski beating the North Atlantic heroLech Walesa in a presidential election . But the exCommunists were all awestruck by Western power andWestern money, and many were personally corrupt besides.None of them created a robust party of social justice, andthe Western European leaders offered them no choice of aEuropean security system independent from the US . In theend, they were sucked into the maelstrom of NATOincluding contributing to the wars in Mghanistan and Iraq together with some variety of neoliberalism. Post-Communist Russian politics has been very manipulative . It has never allowed any proper democratization,as it has continuously been run by a tiny clique in theKremlin that lived on Western advice and aid in the yearso f Yeitsin, drew on the old security apparatus, and thrivedon high oil, gas and metals prices during the Putin years .Under Putin, Russia recovered as a nation-state andb ecame able to pursue its own national interests, whichare neither antagonistic to nor identical with those ofAmerica . Their relation to left-wing interests is alsocompletely contingent, but Russia after Yeltsin has actedas a kind of brake, slow and ultimately inefficient, toAmerican belligerence. Nationalism has trumped anysocial agenda. Russian nationalism was the card thatYeltsin and his managers used against Gorba chev, withwhom a reformed Soviet Union would have been possible,shed of the now irretrievably nationalist incorporations
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 49of the Tsarist empire the Baltics, the Transcaucasus,western Ukraine. When Yeltsin b ecame a representativeof the West, the Communist opposition became mainlynationalist, remaining so ever since and never spawningany serious so cial-democratic attempt even remotelycorresponding to the utterly modest East-Central Europe anones. Anti-Chechen, anti-terrorist nationalist machinationsoutmanoeuvred Putins more socially anchored andpolitically much more meritorious rivals . With the helpof the oil and gas revenue, Putin turned out to be moreskilful and became more popular than most p eople hadexpected. B ecause of him, Russia is back a s an independent geopolitical player, a dding a certain amount ofpluralism to the Big Games . AfricaAfrica was dragged into the Cold War with the murderof Patrice Lumumba, the first elected prime minister of theCongo, who was perceived to be anti-Western. O ccasionallythe war became hot, as when apartheid South Africainvaded Angola t o prevent a Marxist government fromcoming into power and were driven out by airlifted Cubantroops. The Americans kept control of the C ongo, butthe Soviet Union drew much attention, leading to phonybut indigenous Marxist-Leninist regimes in s everalcountries, from Ethiopia to B enin to Mozambique, all ofwhich were toppled or had evaporated by the early nineties .The Chinese, who ran their own race in the last decadesof the Cold War, are now back with a huge appetite forAfrican raw materials. Whether their generous offers ofaid rebuilding the destroyed transport infrastructure ofthe C ongo, for instance will leave more enduringdevelopment traces than have previous projects, East andWest, remains to be seen. With the democratization of South Africa, Nigeria andseveral smaller c ountries, and the onset of c ooperation
50 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?among them, a certain political stability and dignity areemerging in Africa, currently supported by a return ofoverall economic growth. Prosperous, democratic and relatively well-managed S outh Africa is providing somecontinental and progressive leadership, noticeable evenin p arts of francophone Mrica. But everything positive isstill very fragile and patchy. In the centre, Congo-Kinshasa is still a black hole,infested with violence, plunder and misery, and in thesouth there is the unresolved crisis of Zimbabwe . In thewest, there are the simmering Muslim-Christian and ethnicconflicts in Nigeria, and the immense corruption and scameconomy that persist under a thin gauze of chaotic elections .I n the north, the conflicts and internal wars o f Sudan havedrawn American and Western European attention b ecausethey pit Arab Muslims against Black Christians . Moreominously, both the north of Mrica south as well asnorth of the S ahara and northeast S omalia are beingdrawn into the new American world war. AFRIC OM, anew US military command structure, is being set up inMrica, and in a spiral of mutual encouragement, MricanMuslims are becoming attracted to violent Islamism. Outside S outh Africa, S enegal and Morocco, there are currently hardly any explicitly left-wing political forces ofany importance in Africa . The most important contingent,the Communist Party of S outh Africa the only true CPever constituted south of the S ahara is a party of tradeunion and other cadres and intellectuals, very dependent on its capacity to ride the rough waves of ANC populistnationalism . The intellectual centres of sub-SaharanAfrica the universities of Ghana in Legon, Ibadan inNigeria, Makerere in Uganda; the famous Marxist centres of development studies in Dar es Salaam and (for a brieftime after Liberation) Maputo were virtually destroyed by the crises of the late seventies and the eighties . Legon and Makerere are now returning to intellectual life, and Dakar always remained an important outpost of research
INTO THE TWENTY FIR S T CENTURY 51and reflection, to a large extent through the persistentefforts and commitment of S amir Amin. Apartheid S outhAfrica, because of its resources and because of the complexcrevices within its racist rule, provided a few verysignificant intellectual milieux of progressivism. TheUniversity of Fort Hare educated Blacks, including Blackradicals; some anglophone universities, the Witwatersrand(Wits) in Johannesburg perhaps above all, harboured acourageous and vivid White radicalism. D emocracy,however, has now sucked most of the bright intellectuals,Black and Coloured in particular, into politics . West AsiaWest Asia is a small part of the world. But it has a globalsignificance out of all proportion to its territory and population, because of three things : oil, Israel and Mecca .American dependence on West Asian oil makes control ofthe region a vital American interest. Oil revenue has madepossible the survival into the twenty-first century of archaicdynastic regimes more similar to Tudor England than tothe Georgian England that young Americans rebelledagainst. If Saddam Hussein and the sheikh of Kuwait hadgotten rich from rice exports rather than from p etrol, it isunlikely that the sovereignty of the latter and the weaponsof the fonner would have mattered much to the Bushes. Israel is the last of the European settler-states, whichstarted in modem times with the conquest and re-peoplingof the Americas but which may also be seen as d escendingfrom the crusader states of the twelfth and thirteenthcenturies. Its origins lie to a large extent in a socialistZionism characterized by a strong universalistic idealism.But that idealism could not survive the g eopoliticalreality that Palestine was not a land without people,for a people without land . Palestine was populated, andthe Zionist project could not but b ecome occupation andethnic cleansing, surviving in a hostile context only through
52 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM?anne d force and through resources drawn from abroad:immigrants, money and weapons. In itself the Palestine conflict is rather small and local,but it has been projected onto the world stage for tworeasons : its proximity to the dominant Western oil supp lyand the resourceful Jewish diaspora. The latter has madethe situation of the Zionist settlers a world issue, drawingstrongly on Euro-American shame and guilt concerningthe Holocaust. And for Germans and Americans, forinstance, it is of course much more comfonable to let thePalestinians pay the Euro-American debt of guilt than tolet the Zionists create their ethnic state in, say, Bavariaor New York. The Jewish diaspora is always able to call on Americanmight to protect Israel, but because of its oil interests, theUS must also pay some p ositive attention to Israels Arabneighbors . That imperative makes killing off or deponingall Palestinians from Palestine a genocidal Endlosungof the Palestine question advocated by at least one minorparty in the governing Israeli coalition politically impossible. The result is that in spite of a gradual increase ofIsraeli land, wealth and armed power, the conflict persists .The area is a perennial war zone. Founded in war, Israelthen attacked its neighbors in 1 95 6, 1 9 67, 1 982 (Lebanon) ,in 2 0 0 0 (the helpless Gaza Strip), and 2006 (Hizbollahin Lebanon) . Israel was attacked by Egypt in 1 97 3 . Nowthe Israelis are preparing, together with the Americans,for a new war against Iran. The conflict is further exacerbated and amplified by the proximity of Palestine andoil to the holiest shrines and the spiritual centre of worldIslam. The Zionist presence and the American guardingof the oil fields are seen as an affront to Islam. The secular Arab Left was discredited by the crushing Israeli war against it in 1 96 7 . The Iranian Left was repressedby the Shah and then smashed during the second phase of the Islamic revolution. The Baathists killed off mostof Iraqs Communists, and their Syrian comrades were
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 53able t o survive only b y supporting the Assad regime. TheTurkish Left, always squeezed between the ever-vigilantmilitary, urban nationalism and rural conservatism, hasbeen eclipsed by the social wing of the Islamic movement;and Palestinian Marxism the Popular Front (PFLP) andth e D emocratic Front for the Liberation of Pale stine(DFLP), two main factions of the PLO, as well as theCommunist party in Israel - has been similarly wiped outor marginalized. The outcome is that what there are ofdemocratic and social forces in West Asia are mainly, ifnot exclusively, Islamic . But so too are monarchist reactionand theocratic repression. The academic milieux of the region home to someexcellent Turkish and Israeli universities, relatively resourceful American universities in Beirut and Cairo, and a numberof much less well-endowed outfits do include a few ongoing currents of radical thought. But on the whole, most ofthe region is a tragic zone of darkness, against which thehedonism of upper-class life in Beirut, Cairo and Tel Avivappears obscene . Several small sheikhdoms in the ArabianPeninsula, on the other hand, have been giving the regiona dose of p ositive significance . The TV station al-Jazeerais becoming a major world news medium, and the Englishlanguage Gulf press, run largely by Indian j ournalists, offersexcellent Web-based financial news . Because of the imbrication of aggressive Zionist settlers,big oil and the holy centres of Islam, West Asia emergedduring the second half of the twentieth century as the majormanufacturer of world trouble, for the Right as well as forthe Left. Today, it is more bloody and messy than ever. South AsiaThrough its involvement in Mghanistan and its role inthe 1 9 80s and early 1 990s as a conduit of S audi moneyfor Islamist anti-Communism in Mghanistan and C entralAsia, Pakistan has been drawn into the turmoil of West
54 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXI S M?Asian Islamist militancy. Mter S eptember 1 1 , it waspressured into joining the anti-Islamist crusade of the Bushregime, thus ripping the officially Islamic but dividedcountry further apart. Aside from that, the geopolitics ofSouth Asia is still largely shadowed by the Indo-Pakistaniconflict over Kashmir, a conflict of only local interest.Indian as well as Pakistani nuclear weapons, too, are oflocal c oncern and significance only. Traditionally, in the post-Second World War era, Indianneutrality has been a force of Third World reason, as faras it has reached. To what extent it may stand up to recentAmerican courtship, in the face of stiff Chinese economiccompetition, is still unresolved. But it is worth notingIndias important role in the attempts to shape a collectivegeopolitical leadership of the South, first by bringingtogether Brazil and S outh Mrica with India itself to createa democratic Southern tricontinental, and later byincluding China and launching the G-20/G-22 groupwithin the WTO . India is now also being courted byASEAN with the aim of forging a wider, horizontal Asianframework. Nevertheless, India has no world leader ofNehrus stature in sight. In contrast to Bangladesh and Pakistan, India hostsimportant radical movements of universal significance, asdemonstrated at the successful World Social Forum inMumbai in 2 0 0 4 . The Communist Party of India (Marxist) the CPI (M) serves as part of the federalgovernmental coalition, within which it has at least someveto powers; in addition, it has for decades governed thelarge state of West Bengal . Indian academia, once a majorworld centre for Marxism, still seems to harbour a significant amount of radical ·thought, whereas much less of it survives in the locally p oliticized universities of B angladesh and Pakistan. The Mumbai Economic and Political Weekly remains an enormously important fount of information and analysis, with no international equivalent in its progressive academic austerity.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 55 Southeast AsiaThi s is the part of the world where most of the postwarbattles for and against Communism were fought. AntiCommunism inflicted its most bloody and crushing victoriesin Malaya, Bunna, the Philippines and Thailand, and in thema ssacre of unanned civilian Communists in Indonesia in 1 96 5 . Communists won their most resounding victories inthe region those of the Vietnamese against the Frenchin 1 954 and against the Americans in 1 97 5 . At present, thereis a renewal of Communist insurgency in the Philippines. No wonder that the states organization of the region,ASEAN, has a conservative tenor, although not reactionaryinterventionist like the Europ ean Holy Alliance . OriginallyASEAN had an implicitly anti- (C ommunist) -Chineseorientation, which has now become untenable, given thesurge of Chinese markets. As a consequence, ASEAN isnow trying to recycle itself as an Asian pivot, seekingcooperation both with India and with the Northeast Three :China, Japan a n d South Korea. While the region contains active and even militant forcesof liberal democracy, primarily in the Philippines butalso in Indonesia and Thailand, it is a region of victoriousconservatism, with nominally C ommunist p owers inVietnam, Cambodia and Laos that are nonetheless fullyabsorbed by market developments . Singapore, under vigilant if not totalitarian cons ervative surveillance, is theintellectual centre of the region and is investing heavilyin enhancing its position. For reasons not completelyclear to me, the largest country in the area, Indonesia, isremarkably weak academically. Northeast AsiaThe geopolitical weight of this region is rapidly increasing.Internally, the balance of p ower is clearly turning fromJapan to China. Regional interstices may allow minor
56 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXI S M?players to develop, such as the Korean Wave in p opularculture, but the centre of gravity is China, which is overtaking the US as the main export market of Japan andKorea. This is a region still divided by historical resentmentand distrust between China and Japan, between Koreaand Japan, and including the controversial status ofTaiwan, de facto an independent state but de jure aprovince of China . Japan and South Korea have both generated militanttrade unions and student movements, important thoughminoritarian. Taiwan has been a fortress of reactio n, nowundermined and eroded by localist and demo craticTaiwanese-nationalist forces. China remains a Communistp ower, which means that a more socially concerned optionis still possible, although the c ountry has become one ofthe most income-unequal in Asia, much more so thanIndia. Northeast Asia is the crucial world arena of the comingdecades. The path of Chinese development will bedecisive whether a continuously controlled, capitalisttakeover or towards the institutionalization of s ocialistmarkets. There remains a critical Marxist legacy in Chineseresearch centres, intellectual circles in civil society and pockets of the vast party apparatus; in addition, there is a lot oflocal labour and rural civic protest. So far, however, theseelements do not add up to a significant national politicalforce. The opaque inner workings of the Communist Partyremain the invisible key to the future of China. Seen from a global perspective, the Chinese world-viewis much more circumspect, delimited and peaceful thanthe American missionary universalism, with its constanturge to hammer home the c orrect American view. Chineseworld domination would allow more breathing space thanAmeric an domination, but it would not necessarily beprogressive.
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 57 P OLITICAL SPAC E S O F T H E EARLY TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY AND A PERSPE CTIVE O F TRANS-SO C IALISMThe Left is on the defensive . But it has p owerful lines ofdefence . Irreverence is dismantling traditions of deference,oases of critical culture persist across the globe, and thesurge of belligerent Americanism is being balanced by thesociopolitically ambiguous economic tilt of the world toEast Asia. The socio-economic, the cultural, and the geopoliticalspaces of the twenty-first century are radically different fromthose of the twentieth. While economic inequality is againincreasing after its historical trough in the 1 970s, class structure of social forces is eroding. Class is most unlikely everto regain anywhere the importance it had in nineteenthand twentieth-century Europe. On the other hand, astraditional kinds of deference have faltered and shrunk, anew field of irreverence, both individualist and collective,has been opening up, creating a new structural volatility ofpolitical commitments and alignments . Markets haveregained the dynamics that operated in the rich nationsbefore the First World War and now hold sway throughoutmost of the world, testifying to capitalisms reinforced vigour. The changes in the socio-economic space hold profoundimplications for the Marxist social dialectic . The newmarket dynamics reverse the tendency towards an increasingly social character of the productive forces, cominginto ever sharper conflict with the private capitalist relations of production and p ointing to a socialist solution.This tendency predicted for capital did in fact occur duringthe first two-thirds of the twentieth century, underlyingthe collectivization under many different political regimes of urban mass transport, railways, water supplies,electricity grids, credit institutions, strategic branches ofproduction and investments in science and technology.Market dynamics and new means of private c apital accumulation have made the once-marginalized ultraliberal
58 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM?calls for unlimited private capitalism into a reality ofmassive privatization, North and South, East and West,by the centre-Left as well as by the Right. The postindustrial turn reverses the second basicpillar of the Marxist dialectic : that the development ofcapitalism generate,s an ever larger, more concentratedand more unified working class . Dispersed service workers,informal sweatshop toilers and hawkers of the ThirdWorld may be more rather than less exploited than industrialworkers, but that is beside the point. The Marxist view ofsocial transformation was not predicated on compassionfor the wretched of the earth but on the capacity of theexploited and the oppressed to emancipate themselvesthrough class struggle . Current social tendencies makesuch struggle more difficult. Contrary to many recent comments, the nation-state isthe social dimension which has changed the least. More ofthem exist than ever, and the demand for new ones continues. Nation-states are also larger and more resourceful thanever, in terms of revenue and expenditure. Boundary surveillance and boundary penetration have both expanded, theformer to unprecedented levels and the latter in international migration returning to the same scale as ahundred years ago. As was the case then, a small fractionof migrants turn militant and subversive, provoking largescale xenophobic reactions in the countries of immigration.A hundred years ago, the terrorists were Southern andEastern European (and very often Jewish) anarchists,syndicalists and other labour militants. S ecularized Enlightenment modernism, of which theMarxist labour movement has been a major part and whichhas provided a congenial milieu for radical, iconoclastic artand critical social thought, has been seriously weakened. Itsleft and left-of-centre was particularly hard hit, by distributiveconflicts in the Anglo-Saxon countries (epitomized in theBritish winter of discontent of 1 9 78 9) , by the failuresand defeats of nationalist developmentalism in the South,
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST C ENTURY 59by the stagnation and implosion of ruling C ommunism,and by the fundamental questioning of modernism byn on-right-wing constituencies, subaltern p opular movem ent s, environmentalists, and forays into postmodernismby important currents of the intellectual avant-garde. Inthe Left defensive, global neoliberal modernism has in thenew millennium provided a target large enough to assemble wide networks of resistance, physically broughttogether by the World Social Forums. This is a new criticalculture with an implicitly hegemonic antimodernist thrust,which, however, is unlikely to be sustainable, either againstmore robust religious and ethnic antimodernism or againstpersistent left-wing efforts to create another modern world.A perspective of sustainable development by a differentleft-wing modernity is yet to be elaborated . The geopolitical situation has changed fundamentallysince the twentieth century, most importantly with the disappearance of the Soviet Union. For all the left-wing critiquesof it, the USSR was a major pole of orientation of the leftof-centre world, not only to Communists, dissident or not,but also to Latin European socialists, Austro-Marxists, leftwing labour, militant trade unionists, and anti-imperialistnationalists across the three continents of the ThirdWorld . The twentieth century was the last Eurocentric century.Even the glob alized Cold War between the US and theUSSR, neither of them fully European, had its centrein Europe, in the division of Berlin, and its end-gamewas played out in Eastern Europe . Twenty-first-centurygeopolitics is becoming more open and de-centred withAmeric an military superpower diverging increasinglyfrom new economic developments, in Asia and elsewhere,and by new networks of states. The ascendancy of nonstate violence, enacted by mercenary corp orations andmilitant volunteers, adds to the de-centreing of currentgeopolitics although most of this violence is inscribedwithin the American imperial configuration, as either a
60 FRO M MARX I S M T O POS T MARXI S M ?defense of or an attack on it. However, the predomina ntactors in geop olitics are still nation-states, not glob almovements . While alter-glob alists are protesting, theWTO, the World Bank and the IMF continue on theirpath. The peace movement may have mobilized the peopleand persuaded majorities in many countries, but warscame, still continue, and are still being planned. Nevertheless, popular protests are neither meaninglessnor powerless, even in geopolitical contexts. They clarifythe ethical issues, and can shift balances of power andforce choices among policy options . As a global ideology,neoliberalism has been both largely discredited and effectively pushed back, if not decisively beaten. In the opinionof a majority of the British public, Tony Blair, for all hisrhetorical and other gifts, has been irremediably soiled bythe dirty war on Iraq. The Vietnam War was decided onthe battlefield, but the option to bomb the Vietnameseback to the Stone Age be came politically impossiblebecause of the antiwar movement. All these changes have profound consequences andimplications for left-wing politics . For the time being, theirgeneral trend is to intensify the struggles for peace, emancipation and social justice. But that may very well change .Much more certain is that the new parameters requiremuch fundamental rethinking on the Left. The new capitalist vigour, and the situation of less class and moreirreverence, calls for something that goes beyond attentionto new social movements . Novel conceptions of societaltransformation are needed. Enlightenment modernismremains an honourable tradition from a perspective ofhuman emancipation, quite worth developing as well asdefending. But its antimonies were too easily covered bythe anticapitalist class dialectic, and its relations to nonmodernist subaltern resistance and to ecology must bereconsidered. Via Lenin and Leninism, Marxism becamea global ideological current. But Marxism-Leninismturned out to be an unsustainable modernism. In a post-
INTO T H E TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 61Eurocentric world, admirers o f Marx have t o admit thisand adjust their positions, taking into account that withits secularized class focus, Marxism was a profoundlyEuropean movement. This is the time to begin thinking, from a trans-socialistperspective, of a world beyond capitalism and its globaljoint ventures of luxuriant wealth and mis ery. Transsocialism is a persp ective of social transformation goingbeyond the strategies and historical institutions of socialism,the c entrality of the working-class and the agency of thelabour movement, of public ownership and large-scalecollective planning of production. It is not postsocialist,because it does not imply an acceptance of capitalism asthe only possible game and because it implies a rejectionneither of the goals of historical socialism nor of theattempts to build it. On the contrary, it starts from anacceptance of the historical legitimacy of the vast socialistmovement and its heroic epic of creativity and enthusiasm,of endurance and struggle, of beautiful dreams and hopesas well as of blunders, failures and disillusions in short,of defeats as well as victories . It retains the fundamental .Marxian idea that human emancipation from exploitation,oppression, discrimination and the inevitable linkagebetween privilege and misery can c ome only from struggleby the exploited and disadvantaged themselves. It thencontinues by recognizing that the twenty-first century isbeginning to look very different from the twentieth notmore equal and just, but with new constellatio n s of p owerand new possibilities of resistance . What might be the basis of such a trans-socialist politicalperspective? There are four dimensions that seem worthkeeping in mind. First, there is the social dialectic of capitalism, whichcontinues to exist. How the congruity or incongruity ofcapitalist relations of production and the force s of production will turn out by the end of this century is impossibleto tell. But the dialectic of class conflict still operates,
62 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXIS M ?although not necessarily with system-transcendent implications. The spread and growth of capitalism continuesto strengthen the working class, other things being equal.Workers strikes and other protests are increasing todayin China and Eastern Europe, as they did yesterday inSouth Africa and Korea and as they are likely to do inVietnam tomorrow. The very success of capitalism stillgenerates protest against its manifestations . Strikes andrebellions do produce better wages and conditions, evenfor the tightly controlled immigrant workers of the ArabGulf. A similar feminist dialectic is spawned by the expansion of womens education, which is likely to seriouslyundermine the obdurate patriarchy of West Asia and NorthAfrica. For the foreseeable future, however, it is unlikelythat this class and gender dialectic in Mrica, Asia, EasternEurope and Latin America will carry the working class orwomen even to the levels they reached in Western Europein the 1 9 70s and the 1 9 80s, respectively. Second, there is also a dialectic of ethnic collectiveidentity among oppressed or discriminated ethnic groups.The breakdown of well-arranged hierarchies in capitalistcrises, as well as the availability of new means of communication to the disadvantaged such as the scheduled castesbecoming a factor in urbanized electoral politics in India;the experience of Bolivian mine workers being a model forthe struggles of Bolivian cocaleros; the spread of the Internet;indigenous peoples of the Americas and of South Asia gaining considerable access to NGO financial resources havepromoted the rise of vigorous ethnic movements. Third, of increasing importance is a dimension classically denied significance by Marxism, moral discourse. De facto, it was always there in the working- class movement, concerned not only with a fair wage for a fair days work, but also with human dignity . For all its hypocritical abuseby Anglo-American politicians, the global spread of human rights discourse beginning in the mid- 1 9 70s opens up an area of broad concern and possible argumentation .
I N T O THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 63 Two aspects of this moral discourse currently standout as urgent. One is a social anchoring or embedding ofhuman rights in a conception of social rights, of life-coursechoice and life-course development. This necessitatesthe freeing of human rights from its overpoliticized AngloAmerican c onstruction which, for instance, treats thecontinued assassinations of trade unionists, human-rightslawyers, journalists and activists in Mexico, Colombia,Brazil and elsewhere as p eccadilloes, but regards theimprisonment of political dissidents in Cuba as a heinouscrime while not simply turning the Washington Londonconsensus upside down. A consistent human-rights discoursemeans, more than anything, that all human beings have aright to grow, to develop, to choose how to lead their .lives.This version of human rights has a venerable pedigree inlabour movements and the Left: solidarity with all strugglesagainst the denial of human social rights. The second aspect of a moral discourse is antiviolence,which may be seen as derivative of human rights . Violenceis a denial of human rights. The Bush Cheney regime,applauded by Blairism, has shown how thin the veneerof bourgeois civility is, how easily it turns into terrorbombing, abductions, torture and killing. But Bush,Cheney and Blair are only gloating over a seismic shift ofbourgeois and middle-of-the-road opinion. The leadersof the German Greens supported the humanitarianbombing of S erbia; German and Dutch as well asAnglo-American generals produced in the autumn of 2007a new NATO strategy for nuclear war pre-emptivenuclear attacks which may be translated into a newNATO slogan, Let us create two, three, a hundredHiroshimas ! The peaceful Danes of modern history arenow making war against uppity natives in both Iraq andMghanistan while humiliating their tiny Muslim minorityat home, actions electorally endorsed in the name ofliberalism. The US Republican presidential nominee in2008 sang Bomb, bomb, bomb Iran at electoral rallies,
64 F R O M MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXI SM?while Hillary Clinton, one of the Democratic favouritesin the primaries, threatened Iran with total obliteration .Alongside the ruthless, albeit small-scale, terrorism of AlQaeda and other footloose militants, these manifestationsindicate that violence has unexp e ctedly b e come thesignature of the post Cold War period of the early twentyfirst century. A crucial line of moral demarcation hasemerged between the bombers on one side the richterror- and missile-bombers; the poor suicide bombers; thehumanitarian, democratic bombers; the Islamist bombersand the anti-bombing, anti-occupation, antiviolence peopleon the other. As recent developments show, there is no moralevolution indeed, currently there is a large-scale liberalregression going on and there has never been a !TIoraldialectic . It could be argued, however, that there is nowa wider field of moral argument, one that may hold agre ater p otential for transcending class and nationalboundaries. What will happen in this area is of mountingsignificance . Finally, and fourthly, on top of a (most likely) truncatedsocial dialectic and an enlarged but highly contested arenaof moral discourse, the twenty-first-century Left has to tapinto a third root: a commitment to universal pleasure. Themeaning of Marxian Communism was human enjoyment,phrased in terms of a nineteenth-century bucolic ideal .The austerity of the revolutionary struggle substituted arevolutionary heroism for Marxian hedonism, and the latter did not appeal to the respectable workers of social democracy. But after May 1 9 68, the hedonistic, the ludic, theplayful orientation of the Marxian original must reaffirmits importance . On the one hand, it is a question of the right to pleasure universal rather than segregated and, on the other, it is a condition of adequate institutionsmaking opportunities accessible. Left-wing commitmentto labour, to s ocially meaningful human rights, to antiviolence, should also envisage a universal society of fun
INTO THE TWENTY FIRST CENTURY 65and enjoyment. Only right-wing perverts have fun at theexpense of others. Sensual festivity has been one of thecrucial Brazilian contributions to the World Social Forumsand to the possibility of another world.
2Twentieth-Century Marxism and the Dialectics of ModernityStudents of parliamentary history are familiar with the ideaof Her Majestys Loyal Opposition . Marxism, as a socialhistorical phenomenon, has been Her Modem MajestysLoyal Opposition to modernity always critical of and fighting against her predominant regimes, but never questioningthe legitimate majesty of modernity and, when needed,explicitly defending it. Like many oppositions, Marxism hasalso had its stints in power, but its spells in government havebeen short-lived in their attractiveness and creativity, ratherprone to produce doubt and disillusion, and only throughthe exercise of the pragmatics of power have they persisted. Marxism is nevertheless the major manifestation ofthe dialectics of modernity, in a sociological as well astheoretical sense. As a social force, Marxism was a legitimate offspring of modem capitalism and Enlightenmentculture . For good or bad, right or wrong, Marxist p arties,movem ents and intellectual currents became, for atleast the hundred years from the late nineteenth to thelate twentieth century, the most important means toembrace the contradictory nature of modernity. Marxismsimultaneously affirmed the positive, progressive features
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXI S M 67of capitalism, industrialization, urbanization and massliteracy, of looking to the future instead of the past and ofkeeping ones eyes fixed on the ground of the present, and,on the other hand, denounced the exploitation, the humanalienation, the commodification and instrumentalizationof the social, the false ideology and the imperialism inherentin the modernization process. liberalism and Enlightenment rationalism, including,more recently, post-Marxist social democracy and posttraditional conservatism, have represented the afationof modernity and have raised no questions regarding science,accumulation, growth or development. Traditional conservatism, religious or secular, girded itself against the negativityof modernity. The Nietzschean intellectual tradition, fromNietzsche himself to Michel Foucault, has sniped continuallyat modernity, Christian and to a much lesser extent -Islamic democracy, Fascism, and Third World populism.Marxists were, on the whole, alone in both hailing modernity and its breaking of the carapace of rural idiocy and airingof the fumes of the opium of the people and in attackingit. Marxism defended modernity with a view to creatinganother, more fully developed modernity. Marxism was the theory of this dialectic of modernityas well as its practice. Its theory centred on the rise ofcapitalism as a progressive stage of historical developmentand on its contradictions : its class exploitation, crisistendencies and generation of class conflict. Once its mainlines had been drawn in bold strokes in The CommunistManifesto, the Marxian dialectical method also paidattention to the gender and national dimensions of modernemancipation. The first class antagonism, Friedrich Engelswrote in his Origin of the Family, Private Property, and theState, is that between man and woman, the first classsubjection that of women by men. l One of the most widely 1. F. Engels, Die Ursprung der Familie, des Privateigentums and des Staats ( 1 884),in Marx Engels W erke, vol . 2 1 , Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1 972, 6 9 .
68 FROM MARXI S M T O POST MARXI S M ?diffused books of the early Marxist labour movement wasAugust Bebels Woman and Socialism ( 1 8 8 3) .2 THE C ONCEPT O F MODERNITY I N MARXAs passionate political analysts, Marx and Engels closelyfollowed the national politics of their time, although mostof their writings about it were responses to particularcircumstances. From the late 1 8 60s onwards, however,they did focus on a problem with far-reaching implications : how one nations oppression of another affectedthe class conflict in each. The concrete case was England,the most advanced capitalist country, where, Marx andEngels concluded, social revolution was impossible without a preceding national revolution in Ireland. Marxistsof the multinational Austro-Hungarian and Russianempires soon had to pay more systematic theoreticalattention to the concept of nation and its relation to class .The major theoretical work to emerge from this effortwas O tto Bauers The Nationalities Question and SocialDemocracy ( 1 907) . But the strategic vision and the politicalpractice connecting Marxism and capital labour c onflictwith anticolonial and other struggles for national selfdetermination were first fully developed by VladimirLenin, in a series of articles written just before the FirstWorld War and then consolidated in his wartime studyImperialism ( 1 9 1 6) .32. Bebel was, of course, the leader of the foremost Marxist party, the GermanSocial D emocrats. The early Marxist labour movement, particularly in Centraland Eastern Europe, involved a unique (for the era) number of women inprominent positions: Angelica Balabanoff, Kata Dalstr6m, Alexandra Kollontai,Anna Kuliscioff, Rosa Luxemburg, Henriette Roland Holst, Vera Zasulich, ClaraZetkin and a few others. Marxist social democracy was also the first malepolitical movement to campaign for womens right to vote.3 . An excellent overview of the issues involved, as well as a concentratedselection of texts, is G. Haupt, M. Lowy and C. Weill, eds, Les marxistes et laquestion nationale, 1 848-1914, Paris: Franc;ois Maspero, 1 974.
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXI SM 69 To see Marx and Engels as dialecticians of modernityis a late-twentieth-century reading, an expre ssion of ap eriod in which critical social theory is asserting its relativeautonomy from economics and in which, above all, thevery value of modernity itself is being questioned from aperspective of post- rather than pre-modernity. However,it should be emphasized that although such readings,pioneered by B erman, are new, they are not arbitrarilyimposed.4 While never theorized or admitted into theclassical Marxist canon, a conception of modernitypervaded Marxs thought. In the first eight p ages of theW erke edition of The Communist Manifesto, we l e arn aboutmodem industry (three times) , modern b ourge oissociety (twice), the modern bourgeoisie (twice) , modernworkers (twice) , and once each about mod em statepower, modem productive forces and modern relationsof production . 5 And Marxs ultimate purpose in Capital,as he put it in his preface to the first edition, was todisclose the economic law of motion of modern society . Keeping hold of the two horns of modernity, theemancipatory and the exploitative, has been an intrinsic allydelicate task, more easily assumed by intellectuals thanby practical politicians. The Marxist tradition has thereforetended to drift from one characterization to another in itspractice of the dialectics of modernity. In the S e c ond International ( 1 889 1 9 1 4) and in the later social-democ ratictradition, the negative aspect increasingly tended to beovershadowed by an evolutionary conception of growingcountervailing p owers, of trade unions and working-clas sparties. The Comintern or Third International ( 1 9 1 9--43)and the subsequent C ommunist tradition, by contrast,focused on the negative and its p eripeteia by denouncing4. M. Berman, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, London: Verso, 1 983.5 . K. Marx and F . Engels , Manifest der kommunistischen Partei ( 1 848), in Ma7XEngels Werke, vol. 4, Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1972, 462 9.
70 FROM MARXIS M TO POST MARXIS M?the increasing evils of capitalism and holding out the hopefor a sudden revolutionary reversal. The purely intellectual current of critical theory or, asit was also called, the Frankfurt School, emphasized thecontradictoriness and negativity of modernity withoutissuing any cheques for a better future . The classical workof this kind of thought is Max Horkheimer and TheodorW. Adorno s Dialectic of Enlightenment, written during theSecond World War by two German Jews in American exile.While underlining that social freedom is inseparable fromenlightened thought, the theme of the book is the selfdestruction of the Enlightenment . 6 The latters calculatingcunning is elaborated in the Homeric myth of Ulysses; itsemancipated morality is expressed in the sado-masochisticfantasies of de Sade, its enlightenment of the people inthe mass deception of the culture industry. To them,the anti-Semites were Liberals who wanted to assert theiranti-liberal opinion . 7 The ticket-thinking of the Americanelectoral system was in itself, in its reduction of individualdifferences, anti-Semitic.8 The Marxist dialectics of modernity thus flickeredbetween the shadows cast by the death factories ofAuschwitz and the shafts of light cast by the growth andorganization of the working class . MOMENTS OF THE CRITICAL TRADITIONCritique and criticism emerged as major intellectualendeavours in Europe in the seventeenth century, focusingon the philological scrutiny of ancient texts, includingsacred texts.9 In the next century, the range broadened6 . Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic o Enlightenment, trans. fJohn Cumming, New York: Continuum, 1 997 ( 1 947), xiii.7. Ibid., 200.8 . Ibid., 206.9 . R. Koselleck, Kritik und Krise, Frankfurt: 1 992 ( 1 9 5 9 ) , 87ff.
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXISM 71into critiques o f politics, religion and reason. In Gennanyin the 1 840s, criticism enjoyed further expansion, afterdecades of postrevolutionary reaction, in the form of philosophical critiques of religion and politics . Engels and Marxbegan their lifelong c ollaboration by writing a s atire of theLeft Hegelian critical critique of Bruno B auer and others,The Holy Family, in 1 844. Nevertheless, the critical German theoretical tradition,which, taken broadly, included both Kant and the LeftHegelians, was carried over into Marxism. After all, Marxand Engels proclaimed themselves the heirs of Germanphilosophy, and Marxs major work was subtitle d Critiqueof Political Economy . In German or German-inspiredliterature, the critique of political e conomy long remaineda synonym for Marxism. The science to which Marx was committed thusincluded critique as a core element, and this critique wasmeant to be scientific . While Marx and Engel s saw notension between science and critique, the Western, mainlyanglophone, post- 1 9 6 8 academic reception of Marx drewa distinction between critical and scientific Marxism . l oLeaving aside the lineage and th e merit of such a distinction,Gouldners ideal type s clearly conveyed a divid e of c ognitive styles and strategies in marxisant academia at thattime. Yet this account gave critique a narrower meaningthan it had had before . Gouldners two Marxisms constitute a moment of the critic al tradition, rather than thetradition itself. I I The twentieth century has hardly lived up to the standardsset by Immanuel Kant and many others for the centuryof Enlightenment, namely the true [ezgentliche] era ofcritique . Rather, the place of critique in contempo rarysocial theory is better understoo d with refe rence to the10. A. Gouldner, The Two Marxisms, London: Palgrave Macmillan 198 0 .1 1 . A recent, more faithful elaboration of Marxs critique may b e fo und inR. Meister, Political Identity: Thinking Through Marx, Oxford: Blackwell, 1 990.
72 FROM MARX I S M T O P O S T MARXISM?original location and authors of critical theory: a tiny groupof brilliant German-Jewish exiles living in New York inthe late 1 9 30s. THE GROUND OF CRITICAL THE O RYAs a concept, critical theory was launched in 1 93 7 byMax Horkheimer, director of the exiled Frankfurt Institutefor Social Research, who was writing in New York for theInstitutes Paris-published, German-language journal. Hewas assisted by his associate Herbert Marcuse . 1 2 Themeaning of the term critical theory was a philosophicallyself-conscious, reflexive conception of the dialecticalcritique of political economy . 13 A key notion of theHorkheimer circle, later known as the Frankfurt School,critical theory replaced materialism . Horkheimersclosest intellectual associate, Theodor W. Adorno, wrotemuch later that the change of expression was not intendedto make materialism acceptable but to use it to makemen theoretically conscious of what it is that distinguishesmaterialism .14 That is indeed probable, becauseHorkheimers position towards the real b ourgeois worldwas rather more intransigent in 1 9 37 than it had been in1 9 32, when he had first become the Institutes directorand editor. On the other hand, Horkheimer was always a skilled andcautious operator. From the start, critical theory was morea code for, than a criticism of, dialectical materialism .A s such, it had a special, although not unproblematic,1 2 . H. Marcuse, Philosophie und kritische Theorie ( 1 937), in Kultur undGesellschaJt, vol. 1 , Frankfurt 1 9 6 5 .1 3 . M . Horkheimer, Traditionelle und kritische Theorie ( 1 937), i n MaxHorkheimer, Gesammelre Schri ften, vol. 4, A. Schmidt and G. Schmidt Noerr,eds, Frankfurt: Fischer, 1 9 88, 1 80 . See also Critical Theory: Selected Essays,trans. M. J. OConnell, New York: Herder and Herder 1 97 2 .1 4 . T . Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B . Ashton, N e w York: SeaburyPress, 1 973, 1 97 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXIS M 73link with the proletariat, and asserted the primacy o f theeconomy, writ l arge . 1 5 Forty years later, Herbert Marcus e,who in the thirties was one of the rising stars of the Institute,would argue that to the end, Marxist theory itself was[its] integrating force . 1 6 Critical theory as oppos ed to traditional theory,first laid out in Descartes Discourse on Method ( 1 6 3 7)and embodied in the sp ecial disciplines [Fachwissenschaften] first of all rejected the intellectua l divisionof labour, and with it all existing conceptions of the ory,in the social a s well as the natural sciences, whe therempiricist or not. It is a human stance [menschliches Verhalten] " wrote Horkheimer, that has society itself asits object . The vocation of the critical the o rist is thestruggle, to which his thinking belongs . C ritical theoryis one single elaborate existential judgement . 1 7 Whilerejecting a role in the existing division of labour, criticaltheorists do not stand outside or above cla ss e s . Betweenthem and the ruled class exists a dynamic unity,although that unity exists only a s conflict . Throughthe interaction between the theorist and the ruled class,the process of social change may b e accelerated . Thetask of critical the ory is to contribute to the transformation of the so cial whol e , which will occur onlythrough ever sharper social c onflicts . The theory, therefore, offers neither short-term amelioration nor gradualmaterial improvements . Nevertheless, critical the o ry istheory, chara cterized by formal conceptualization,deductive logic and experiential referenc e . Individualparts of it may also operate in traditional modes ofthought, that is, in ordinary s cientific analyses. It is1 5 . M. Horkheimer, Traditionelle und kritische Theorie, 1 87ff; and Nachtrag( 1 937), in M. Horkheimer, Gesammelte schriften, vol . 4, 2 2 2 .1 6 . S e e J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, trans. T . McCarthy,Boston: Beacon Press, 1 9 8 1 , 1 97 .1 7 . M. Horkheimer, Traditionelle und kritische Theorie , 1 80, 1 90, 20 1 .
74 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI SM?n e ither hostile to nor uninterested m empiricalrese arch . 1 8 The core of critical theory as theory is the Marxian conceptof exchange, out of which developed the real, worldencompassing capitalist society in Europe . 19 Critical theoryis in many places reduced to economism, but that doesnot mean that the economic is regarded as too important,rather that it is taken too narrowly. The process of socialformation [ Vergesellschaftung] , if it is taking place, needs tobe studied and analyzed not only in narrow economic terms,but also with regard to the functioning of the state, and tothe development of essential moments of real democracyand association . 2 0 It would be false, wrote Marcuse, todissolve the economic concepts into philosophical ones.Rather, on the contrary . . . relevant philosophical objectsare to be developed from the economic context. 2 1 It may be pertinent to briefly compare critical theoryin its original, classical form with another programmaticformulation of the place and use of social knowledge froma radical viewpoint, written almost simultaneously withHorkheimers text, and in the same city, by a professorat C olumbia University, which also served as a host forthe Frankfurt Institute in exile . Robert Lynds Knowledgefor What? appeared in 1 9 3 9 , as the p rinted version of alecture series at Princeton in the spring of 1 9 3 8 . Theconcerns and the long-term sociopolitical perspectives ofthe German philosopher and the American sociologist are,in many respects, similar. Lynd is also critical of theacademic division of labour. He criticizes empirical socialscience s tendency to take contemp orary institutions for1 8 . Ibid., 1 9 2 3, 1 9 9 200. The critical theorists very wide ranging interest inempirical research comes out most clearly in the contents of the Zeitschri jar ftSozialJorschung, the journal of the Institute.1 9 . Ibid., 20 1 .20. M . Horkheimer, Nachtrag, 2 2 2 3 .2 1 . H. Marcuse, Philosophie und kritische Theorie , 1 02 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXIS M 75granted. Instead, Lynd wants t o orient i t to what thepresent human carriers of tho s e institutions are gropingto b ecome , i . e . , to institutional change . 2 2 The dire ctionof such change to which Lynd commits hims elf i s als osimilar t o Horkheimers, namely, the marked extensionof democracy, not only in gove rnm ent but also in industryand other forms of endeavour, and the replacement ofprivate capitalism . 2 3 But the language and the mode of thought are verydifferent. Lynd does not fall back on a theoretical tradition,but argues from the p erspective of the empirical issuesof the day. His pragmatic conception of s ocial scienceSo cial sci ence will stand o r fall on the b a sis of itsservice ability to men as they struggle to live24 is viewedby Horkheimer with a sceptical frown. His historical-criticalperspective is not one of exploitation and class althoughhe does argue that class and class conflict deserve muchmore consideration by US social scientists - but a sortof anthrop ology of human cravings , as a yardstick forappraising existing institutions . 2 5 Lynds socialism is not avocation of struggle, but presents itself as the hypothesisthat capitalism does not operate and probably cannotbe made to operate, to assure the amount of generalwelfare to which the present stage of our technical skillsand intelligence entitle U S . 2 6 Th e diferent critical idiom typical of American radicalismwas carried on after Lynd most characteristically and influentially by C. Wright Mills in The Sociological Imagination( 1 9 5 9) . The three b asic questions of that imagination,which Mills took on with the obvious self-confidence and22. R.S . Lynd, Knowledge /or What?, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,1 939, 1 80, emphasis omitted.23. I bid 220. .,24. Ibid., 1 7 7 .2 5 . Ibid. , 1 92ff.26. Ibid., 220.
76 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?straightforward directness of the New World craftsman,were the same as those underlying most of the more convoluted, as well as much more elaborate and subtle, socialreflections of the Frankfurt S chool: What is the structureof this particular society as a whole?, Where does thissociety stand in human history? What are the mechanicsby which it is changing? and What varieties of men andwomen now prevail in this society and in this period? 27Adorno, H orkheimer, Marcuse et al. would, of course,have turned away in disgust at the notion of a mechanics of historical change . On the other hand, Millss fast-pacedprose attached no special interpretation of history to theword . The critical theorists also pursued other intereststhan social theory, including the theory of knowledge andthe history of theory, among other things . POPPER VERSUS ADO RNOIn 1 9 6 1 the German Sociological Association confronteda thorough and fundamentally antagonistic critique whenit invited Karl Popper to give an address on the logic ofthe social sciences, with Adorno as respondent. The formalencounter was polite, but in Germany a heated controversyensued which, to the anger of Sir Karl, became knownas the Positivismusstreit the po sitivism controversy. 2 8Popper, who rej ected the positivist label, presented hisviewpoint as criticist, the nucleus of which is a view ofscientific method as consisting of tentative attempts atsolutions to the problems tackled, solutions controlled bythe sharpest criticism . Popper explicitly attacked an27. C. W. Mills, The Sociological Imagin l uion, New York: Galaxy/OxfordUniversity Press, 1 9 67 ( 1 9 5 9), 6 .2 8 . K. R. Popper, The Frankfurt School: An Autobiographical Note , inFoundations o the Frankfurt School of Social Research, J. Marcus and Z. Tar, eds, fNew Brunswick: Transaction books, 1 984; T. Adorno et al., The Positivist Disputein German Sociology, trans. D. Adey and G. Frisby, London: Heinemann, 1 9 7 6 .
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARX I S M 77inductivist and naturalist conception of science, and recognized the value of an interpretative method of the logicof the situation in the social sciences .29 As a dialectician, Adorno found, to his surprise, manythings to agree with in Poppers criticist positio n, and hisargument was more a further reflection on Poppers thesesthan the presentation of a set of antitheses. Thi s did not,however, blunt his characteristic critical edge . 30 Adorno smain divergence fro m Popper concerned the object ofcriticism or critique in German, the same word is usedfor both. For Popper, the target of criticism was proposedsolutions to scientific problems, but for Adorno critiquehad to extend to the totality of society. Only wh en we canconceive of society as being different from wha t it is doesthe present society become a problem for us: only throughwhat it is not will it disclose itself as it is, and that, Iwould assume, is what it comes to in a sociology, whichdoes not, like most of its proj ects, true, limit itself topurposes of public and private administration . 3 1 The dialectic of critical theory developed beyond the2 9 . K R. Popper, Die Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, in Der Positivismusstreitin der deutschen Soziologie, H. Maus and F. Furstenberg, eds, Neuwied and Berlin:Luchterhand 1 9 6 2 , 1 0 6-7, 1 20.30. T. Adorno, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, in Der PosinVismusstreit inder deutschen Soziologie, 1 2 5 , 1 2 8 . The contrast between the elegant fencing ofAdorno and the unpleasant after the event arrogance of Poppe r comes throughin Adornos abstinence from any personal attacks in his 1 9 6 9 introduction aswell as in his 1 9 6 1 Korreferat. At the end of the latter, Adorno referred to acorrespondence preceding the meeting, in which Popper should have said thatthe difference between him and Adorno might be that he, Popper, believedthat they lived in the best of worlds but Adorno did not. While saying that theevil of societies was always difficult to judge, and that he was equally hostileto a standpoint theory, Adorno admitted that he found it difficult to assumethat there had been no better epoch than the one which had spawned Auschwitz.See ibid. , 1 4 1 2. Popper afterwards gave vent to a tirade of invective, whichmay be summed up as: Adorno has nothing whatever to say; and he says itin Hegelian language . Popper, The Frankfurt School, 1 67 .3 1 . Ibid. , 1 4 2 .
78 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM?Marxian critique of political economy. During the war,Horkheimer abandoned his plan to write a major treatiseon dialectics; instead he and Adorno put together a collectionof essays and fragments, Dialectic of Enlightenment ( 1 944) .The theme set the tone for the postwar Frankfurt S chool namely, the self-destruction of the Enlightenment writtenfrom a commitment to salvaging the enlightenment . 3 2 Thiswas still seen as an extension of Marxism, but FriedrichPollocks interpretation of Fascism as state capitalism, ofwhich Stalinism was also a variant, tended to push theclassical Marxian economic categories into the background,a process which is already evident in the changes betweenthe unpublished 1 944 version of Dialectic of Enlightenmentand the 1 947 Amsterdam edition.33 Horkheimers last majorwork, The Eclipse of Reason ( 1 947), centred on the critiqueof instrumental reason. After the war, when Adorno becamethe foremost critical theorist, die verwaltete Welt, the tragictimbre of which is unmusically rendered in English as theadministered world, became a central critical concept. Freudand his cultural critique were also incorporated in postwarcritical theory, most elaborately in Herbert Marcuses Erosand Civilization ( 1 955) . Yet the umbilical cord to the Marxian critique ofpolitical economy was never cut, even if little hope of anypo sitive dialectical outcome remained. This critiqueprovided the baseline for Marcuses critique of the ideology of industrial society . 34 It was present in Adorno spolemic with Popper, and it was eminently present in3 2 . M. Horkheimer and T. Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklarung ( 1 944), inHorkheimer, Gesammelte Schri ften, vol. 5, 597.3 3 . W. van Reijen and J. Braunsen, Das Verschwinden der K1assengeschichtein der Dialektik der Aufkliirung: Ein Kommentar zu den Textvarianten derBuchausgabe von 1 947 gegeniiber der Erstveroffentlichung von 1 944, inHorkheimer, Gesammelte Schri ften, vol. 5 .34. H . Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of AdvancedIndustrial Society, Boston: Beacon, 1 9 64.
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 79Adorno s final work, his spring 1 9 6 8 lectures p resentingan introduction to sociology. Here he took C . Wright Millsto task for remaining so tied to the ruling conventions ofsociology that he neglected the analysis of economicprocesses . 3 5 HABERMAS S NEW T ERRAINBy 1 9 68, however, JUrgen Habermas, Adorno s assistantand protege and Horkheimers successor to the Frankfurtchair of philosophy and sociology, was already at work,taking the critical project out of Marxian political economy.These new developments were originally motivated bychanges in capitalism itself, which produced new roles forpolitics, science and technology. For the Marxian conceptsof forces and relations of production the key concepts ofMarxs theory of the social dialectic Habennas substitutedlabour, which involved both instrumental action andrational choice, and symbolically mediated interaction orcommunicative action . In a series of lectures and essaysin the course of the 1 9 60s, Habennas laid out a newtheoretical terrain,36 on which he was later to erect his greattheoretical constructions, his Theory of Communicative Actionand his theory of law.37 Habermas abandoned the systemiccontradiction analyzed by Marxist theory, replacing it firstwith a distinction between different kinds of action andknowledge interests, and later with a conflict between thesocial system and the life-world . In spite of some quite valid claims to legitimacy,Habermas has not seen or presented himself, or evenwithout obj ection allowed others to present him, as the35. T. Adorno, Einleitung in die Soziologie, ed. C . GOdde, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,1 993, 237 8 .3 6 . J. Habermas, Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp1 9 68 .37. J . Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action.
80 FROM MARXISM TO POST MARXISM?heir o f critical theory, or as continuing the work of theFrankfurt School. On the other hand, critical social theoryof a wider sort is something which he has continued topractice in an unreservedly self-correcting and self-criticalmode . 3 8 A critical defence of modernity has remainedcentral to that practice .39 Historically or sociologically,there remains, then, across all differences of substantialtheory, an affinity between Marx and H abermas . 4o Habermas broke not only with the critique of politicaleconomy, but with the discourse of his predecessors in otherways. He has abandoned their fragmentary Essafstik forelaborate critical confrontations with other modes of thought.Indeed, Habermass way of developing his work throughlong presentations and discussions of work by others resembles Marx more than Adorno . His conceptions of communicative rationality and domination-free communicationconstitute an attempt to provide a nonnative foundation forhis own critical position, something with which neitherAdorno, Horkheimer nor Marcuse, steeped in the classicaltradition of German idealism, never bothered. 4 1 Critical theory is a philosophical reception of, reflectionon and elaboration of Marxs critique of political economy,3 8 . J. Habennas, Critical Theory and Frankfurt University, in Autonomy andSolidarity, ed. P. Dews, London: Verso, 1 992, 2 1 2 .3 9 . J. Habennas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, trans. F. Lawrence,Cambridge : MIT Press, 1 9 85 ; and Die Modeme ein unvollendetes Projekt,Leipzig: Reclam, 1 99 2 .4 0 . A quarter o f a century ago, the differences o f substance appeared paramountto someone who, from the viewpoint of an Anglo Saxon and Scandinavianstudent and young academic, wanted to establish the legitimacy of Marxisttheory where, prior to 1 9 68, this was instituti onally denied. I still think thedistinctions made then were correct with regard to content, and even that adefence of Marxism at that time was a positive contribution to social thoughtas critique, as well as science. However, the dismissive p olemical tone adoptedthen, now appears jejune. See G. Therborn, Jiirgen Habennas : A NewEclecticism , New Left Review 1: 67, May June 1 97 1 , 69 83 .4 1 . See J. H abermas, Ideologies and Society in the Postwar World, inAutonomy and Solidarity, 5 6 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARX I S M 81set in the context o f the traumatic events betw e en 1 9 1 4and 1 9 8 9 , from the slaughter of the First World War, theabortive revolution in the West and its crippled birth inRussia, the Depression, and the victory of Fascism withits institutionalization and rationalization of the pogromthat was the Holocaust - to the rise of Big Organizations,the Second World War and the one-dimensionality of theCold War. In its own very special tonality, critic al theoryexpresses a strand of radical reflexivity in the Europeanroad through modernity. Critical theorys classical texts were written on the run,in exile from the machinery of annihilation, in obscureeditions and increasingly in code . They were hidden fromview in the 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 60s, not only by competing worldviews but also by the critical theorists themselves .42 Whencritical theory resurfaced, it was in the context of mediaprominent anti-colonial revolts and the rise of a mass studentbody, and the classical texts were for the first time publishedfor a wide audience .43 The reception had its special irony:the encounter of a young generation of revolutionary hopewith an old one of revolutionary defeat, holding o ut againsthope . The affinity was closest with radical Americanacademia, which always had much less reason to harbourany practical hope than its European comrad e s . To thelatter, practice held out more promise than critique, whether42. Habermas, who in the late fifties was Adornos assistant, has told us th at theZeitschri jar Sozialj jt orschung, the 1 9 30s journal of the Institute, was kept in alocked coffer in the basement of the Institute. Until 1 968 Horkheime r also refusedthe entreaties of his publisher, S. Fischer, to republish his prewar essays in bookform. In spite of his triumphal return to Germany, becoming rector of the GoetheUniversity in Frankfurt and Honorary Citizen of the city, Horkheimer insistedon and managed to keep an American passport and an Institute retreat in NewYork. See Max Horkheimer: Die Frankfurter Schule in New York , in ]. Habermas, Philosophisch-politische Profile, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1 9 8 1 , 4 1 5 .4 3 . M . Horkheimers two volume Fischer edition o f Kritische Theone i n 1 96 8,and T. Adornos and M. Horkheimer s Dialektik der Aufklarung in 1 9 69, also by Fischer.
82 FROM MARXIS M T O P O ST MARXI SM?the practice of the existing working-class and labour movements or the practice of guidance by the new vanguardsbeing constructed. THE RELEVANCE O F THE FRANKFURT SCHOOL REVIVEDNow, in this second fin-de-siec1e, the Frankfurt momenthas returned. Adorno s words are much closer to the radicalmood of 2 0 0 8 than that of 1 9 6 8 : Philosophy, which onceseemed obsolete, lives on because the moment to realizeit was missed. The summary judgement that it had merelyinterpreted the world . . . becomes a defeatism of reasonafter the attempt to change the world had miscarried. 44To people of the twenty-first century, the critical critiqueby the Holy Family of the early 1 840s might appear closerthan the later Marxian critique of political economy. BrunoBauers concerns The Jewish Question, The GoodThing of Freedom , State, Religion and Party soundmore familiar than those of Engels and Marx revolution,materialism, socialism, communism.45 In any case, in this context, critical theory is a metonym.The original editorial assignment of critical theory wassomething much broader than critical theory in the literalsense, namely, the legacy of Marxism . While twentiethcentury Marxism is infinitely richer and broader than thetiny Western intellectual coterie that promulgates criticaltheory, it might be argued that, for all its limitations,critical theory has been the grandchild of Marx thatmost explicitly and persistently expressed an aspect ofthe historical quintessence of Marxism its reflection onthe dialectics of modernity. Marxisms sombre thinkers of44. T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, 3 .4 5 . F . Engels and K. Marx, Die heilige Familie o der Kritik de r kritischen Kritik( 1 844), in Marx Engels Werke, vol. 2 .
TWENTIE T H C EN TURY MARXISM 83th e negative dialectic who embraced individualist refusal,Adorno and Marcuse in particular, capture this dialecticno less and no more than the po sitive class diale cticheld out by Karl Kautskys The Social Revolution ( 1 902)and The Road to Power ( 1 9 09) . Kautsky represents oneperspective, while Dialectic of Enlightenment� MinimaMoralia� Negative Dialectics and One-Dimensional Manrepresent another. 46 C ritical theory is usually regarded as part of a largersubdivision of twentieth-century Marxism called WesternMarxism , a term launched in the mid- 1 9 5 0 s by MauriceMerleau-Ponty, who h as sometimes been included in ithimself. 47 Western Marxism has generally b e en treatedas a p antheo n of individuals and individual works thatexpress a certain intellectual mood, rather than as atradition or a movement . The set of Western Marxistshas always been fuzzy, although by general a greement,the current started after the October Revolution, as aWestern European reaction to it, a positive but specialreaction, beginning with Georg Lukacss History and ClassConsciousness and Karl Kors ch s Marxism and Philosophy,both publis h ed in 1 9 2 3 in German . Lukacs was a Germaneducated H ungari an philosopher an d aesthetician, andKorsch .a German professor of law. Both were prominentC ommunists in the abortive revolutions in Hungary andGermany, both were criticized as leftis t s an d p hil o sop hic a ldeviants by their comrades, and Korsch was excludedfrom the German C ommunist Party in 1 9 2 5 . In creatingthe label of Western Marxism, Merleau-P onty took hiscue from Korsch, who ironically referred to Soviet criticismof himself, Lukacs and two other Hungarian intellectu als,46. T. Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. ]ephcotc, London: New Left Books,1 974; T. Adorno, Negative Dialectics; H. Marcuse, One Dimensional Man.47 . M. Merleau Ponty, Les avenlUres de la dia1ectique, Paris: Gallimard, 1 955, chaps.2 and 3.
84 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM?Jozef Revai and Bela Fogarasi . 4 8 Merleau-Ponty appliedit mainly to Lukacs, contrasting his work, strongly influenced by Max Weber, to the o rtho dox C ommunist tradition, particularly Lenin s Materialism andEmpirio-Criticism ( 1 9 08) . It is generally agree d thatanother distinguished member of the first generation wasAntonio Gramsci, who b ecame the leader of the ItalianC ommunist Party in 1 924. Most of his written work iscontained in his Notebooks, which include a wide range oflucid and original political, cultural and social analyses, pennedwhilst incarcerated in a Fascist prison from 1 926 onwards.Perhaps his most famous article dealt with the October Revolution. It first appeared on 24 November 1 9 1 7 under thetitle The Revolution Against Capital : The revolution of theBolsheviks has materialized out of ideologies rather than facts. . . This is the revolution against the Capital of Karl Marx. 49 WESTERN AND OTHER MARXISMSA sociologist of knowledge or an ecumenical historian ofi d e a s might define Western Marxis m as a politicallyautonomous Marxist trend of thought in the advancedcapitalist countries after the O ctober Revolution . As such,it is differentiated both from the Marxisms of other partsof the world and from the practically institutionalized48. Korsch himself did not attach any importance to the label, to which he refersonly obliquely, with ironic quotation marks. See Marxisme et philosophie ( 1 923),trans. K. Axelos, Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1 9 64, 40. The main Soviet critic ofLukacs and his disciples, Abram Deborin (Lukacs und seine Kritik des Marxismus ( 1 924), in Kontroversen aber dialektischen und mechanistischen Materialisus,ed. O. Negt, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1 969, 1 9 2 and passim), does not use it atall. And what Korsch ironically referred to was not Western Marxism but "Western" Communists. It might also be added that the Soviet polemic with Lukacs,Korsch, Revai, et al. took place before Stalinism. Korschs main work, Marxismand Philosophy, appeared in two editions in the USSR in 1 924.49. A. Gramsci, La rivoluzione contro il Capitale ( 1 9 1 7) , in G. Gerrata andN. Gallo, eds, 2000 Pagine di Gramsci, vol. 1, Milan: II Saggiatore, 1 9 64, 2 6 5 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 85Marxism of p arties or political groupings . However,Western Marxism is a post hoc construction, having aparticular meaning even in the least partisan and mosterudite versions . Starting from the latter, as significantdefinitions, we shall here try to situate the phenomenonconnoted by Western Marxism somewhat differently,from a more distant vantage-point . The best treatments of Western Marxism have tendedto work from rosters of individuals . Thus, Perry Andersonlists, in order of age, Georg Lukacs (b . 1 8 8 5 ) , Karl Korsch,Antonio Gramsci, Walter Benj amin, Max Horkheimer,Galvano D ella Volpe, Herbert Marcuse, Henri Lefebvre,Theodor W. Adorno, Jean-Paul Sartre, Lucien Goldmann,Louis Althusser and Lucio Colletti (b . 1 924) . 50 The definingboundary is, first of all, generational. Western Marxismthus consists of a set of theorists who matured politicallyand theoretically only after the First World War, but whosepositions consolidated after the Second. To Anderson,the hidden hallmark of Western Marxism i s defeat, acharacteristic which is intelligible only in t erms of hissomewhat specialized periodization. He also contrasts Western Marxism with Trotskyism, of which he designatesErnest Mandel as a theoretically eminent exp onent. Martin Jay sees Western Marxism as created by a loosecircle of theorists who took their cue from Lukacs and theother founding fathers of the immediate p o st-World War Iera, Antonio Gramsci, Karl Korsch, and Ernst Bloch . 51After Adorno, Benjamin, Horkheimer and Marcuse, he addsLeo LOwenthal (also of the Frankfurt School) and MauriceMerleau-Ponty, and points out that the following were frequently admitte d to their ranks : Bertolt Brecht, Wilhelm Reich, Erich Fromm, the Council5 0 . P. Anderson, Considerations on W estern Marxism, London: New Left Books,1 976, 25 6 .5 1 . M. Jay, Marxism and Totality, Berkeley: University of California Pres s, 1 984, 3 .
86 F R O M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXI SM? Communists in Holland (Herman Gorter, Anton Pannekoek and others) , the A rguments group in France (in the l ate 1 9 5 0 s , Kostas Axelos, Edgar Morin and others) , and second-generation Frankfurt School members like Jiirgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt. And still others like Alfred Sohn-Rethel, Leo Kofler, Franz Jakubowski, Claude Lefort and Cornelius Castoriadis . 5 2While pointing out that Western Marxism had previouslymeant largely Hegelian Marxism, Jay basically acceptsAndersons more sociological definition . From these roll-calls, certain broad themes have emerged.Merleau-Ponty wanted to remind his readers of the youthof revolution and of Marxism manifested by Lukacss livelyand vigorous essay, its contrast to a scientific conceptionof Marxism, its attention to the superstructure, and itsinability to express the inertia of the infrastructures, of theresistance of economic and even natural conditions, of how"personal relations" become bogged down [lenlisement] in"things" . 53 Anderson highlights the shifts of these intellectualsfrom work on politics, economics and labour-movementinstitutions to academia and philosophy. After the SecondWorld War, all the survivors Gramsci and Benjamin had,in different ways, been hunted to death by Fascist regimes54were academic philosophers of professorial rank, exceptSartre, who had left a budding academic career to be a5 2 . The last two, who became quite influential in France after 1 9 68, were thekey figures of a splinter from Trotskyism, a group and a journal published in1 9 49 65 called Sacialisrne au Barbarie, from which also came the later theoristof postIDodernism Jean FranlYois Lyotard.5 3 . M. Merleau Ponty, Les aventures de la dialectique, 80, 8 8 .5 4 . Gramscis frail health was finally broken, i n 1 9 37, b y nine years i n Italianimprisonment. Benjamin killed himself while on the run from the Nazis, in1940.
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARX I S M 87writer. The movements most striking single trait . . . as acommon tradition is . . . perhaps the constant pressure andinfluence on it of successive types of European idealism.The work of the Western Marxists concentrated particularlyon epistemology and aesthetics, while also making thematicinnovations in Marxist discourse, among which Andersonstresses Gramscis concept of hegemony, the Frankfurtvision of liberation as a reconciliation with, rather than adomination of, nature, and the recourse to Freud . Runningthrough all these innovations is a common and latentpessimism. 55 Martin Jays work uses the concept of totality a s hiscompass through the territory of Western Marxism. Jayexplicitly refrains from arguing that totality is the onlypossible compass for such purposes, but since it was emphasized by Lukacs, it has certainly been at the centre ofWestern Marxism and has been submitted to variousdefinitions, elaborations and applications, which Jay pursueswith great skill. REREADING WESTERN MARXIS M IN RETROSPECTHowever defined, Western Marxism is a Nachkonstruktion,a post hoc construction, not a self-recognized group orcurrent. Nevertheless, a somewhat more distancedperspective than those of Merleau-Ponty, Anderson andJay makes possible a somewhat different historical positioning of Western Marxism, namely, as another historicalreading open to empirical falsification. If we take Lukacs as the key figure, and Historyand Class Consciousness as the central text, which seemsnon-controversial, we can locate the origin of WesternMarxism with some exactitude. 56 The original text was5 5 . P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, 56, 88, emphasis omitted.56. G. Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness, trans. R. Livingstone, London:Merlin Press Ltd, 1 97 1 .
88 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM?written in 1 9 1 8, before Lukacs joined the new HungarianCommunist Party. It is called Bolshevism as a MoralProble m . It poses with exemplary lucidity the issue of itstitle : whether democracy is believed to be a temporary tactic of the socialist movement, a useful tool to be employed . . . or if democracy indeed is an integral part of socialism. If the latter is true, democracy cannot be forsaken without considering the ensuing moral and ideological consequences . Bolshevism offers a fascinating way out in that it does not call for compromise . But all those who fall under the sway of its fascination might not be fully aware of the consequences of their decision . . . Is it possible to achieve good by condemnable means? Can freedom be attained by means of oppression?57In that article, Lukacs left the questions hanging, but hisWestern Marxism was an oblique way of answering yesto the last two . In 1 9 1 8 Lukacs was not at all attached to WesternMarxism in the sense of his 1 92 3 book and its laterreception indeed, his views were diametrically opposedto it. In the past, Lukacs wrote in 1 9 1 8, Marxs philosophy of history has seldom been sufficiently separated from his sociology. As a result, it has often been overlooked that the two constitutive elements of his system, class struggle and socialism . . . are closely related but by no means the product of the same conceptual system. The former is a factual finding of Marxian sociology . . . S ocialism, on the57. G . Lukacs, Bolshevism as a Moral Problem ( 1 9 1 8) , trans. J. Marcus,Social Research 44: 3, 1 9 77, 4 1 9, 423.
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 89 other hand, is the utopian postulate of the Marxian philosophy of history: it is the ethical obj e ctive of a coming world order. 58This is a Marxism filtered by neo-Kantianism, very muchprese nt in the Max Weber circle in Heidelberg of whichLukacs was then a part, and grafte d onto an orthodox, inpart left-wing, Marxism by Max Adler and the wholetendency of Austro -Marxi s m , which had develope d inVienna in the decade prior to the First World War andincluded Otto Bauer, Rudolf Hilferding, Karl Renner andothers in its ranks . The birth of Western Marxism consisted in conflating,or, if you prefer, transcending, the distinction betweenscience and ethics with a Hegelian dialectic of classconsciousness. Its first adumbration is Lukacs s first articleafter his return to Hungary as a Communist, Tactics andEthics, though the article was written b efore the shortlived S oviet Republic. Here, morally correct action is madedependent on knowledge of the hi s t orical philosophicalsituation, on class consciousness. It ends on a note, laterexpanded, particularly in the key essay History and ClassConsciousness, on reification and the consciousness of theproletariat: This calling to the salvation o f socie ty is theworld-historical role of the proletariat and only thro ughthe class consciousness of the prolet arians can you reachthe knowledge and the understanding of this road ofhumanity. 5 9 The immediate target in Karl Korschs Marxism andPhilosophy, the second canonical text of Western Marxism,is Austro-Marxism, exemplified by Rud o lf Hilferdingand his Finance Capital ( 1 909), which is attacked in the5 8 . I bid . , 420, emphasis omitted.5 9 . G. Lukacs, Taktik und Ethik ( 1 9 1 9), trans. M. Lesziik and P. Ludz, inSoziologische Texte, ed. P. Ludz, Neuwied and Berlin: Luchterhand, 1 9 67, 1 9 .
90 FR O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM?name of a Hegelian dialectic that rejects Austro-Marxismsdissolution of the unitary theory of social revolution intoscientific study and political prises de position. 60 C RITICAL THEORY AND THE OCTOBER REVOLUTIONOn the basis of this brief sketch a documentation whichcould and should have been largely extended in a morespecialized context we may draw some conclusions .Western Marxism arose as a European intellectual receptionof the October Revolution. The latter was interpreted as asuccessful abbreviation of Marxist thought, against Capitaland against facts according to Gramsci, overcoming bothmoral and scientific problems according to Lukacs andKorsch. H ailing the October Revolution also meant, ofcourse, hailing Lenins leadership, to which Lukacs paidhomage in 1 9 1 9,61 and from whom Korsch borrowed themotto of his Marxism and Philosophy. To link WesternMarxism with the anti-Leninist movement of this centuryis American leftists false consciousness . 62 On the other hand, the construction, diffusion andperception of a Western Marxism by Western Europ eanintellectuals in the late 1 9 5 0 s and 1 9 6 0s, and by NorthAmericans somewhat later, always implied an Easterndemarcati o n . The East , against whi ch WesternMarxism was implicitly contrasted, was seen in manydifferent forms, but clearly included the C o mmunistParty canon and the rival orthodoxies of S oviet postStalin i s m , S ino-Stalinism, Maoism and o rganizedTrotskyi s m . The main function of 1 9 6 0s WesternMarxism was to open up an intellectual horizon and afield of reflection, where theoretical and conceptual issues60. K. Korsch, Marxisme et philosophie, 92ff.6 1 . L. Lukacs, Taktik und Ethik, 1 9 .62. S . Aronowitz, The Crisis in Historical Materialism: Class, Politics and Culturein Marxist Theory, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1 9 8 1 , xiii.
TWENTI ETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 91could be dis cussed without being foreclosed by p artyline polemics or divisive political loyalties . While it is true that the prospect of revolution west ofRussia receded after 1 9 2 3, I do not think it is veryilluminating to characterize Westetn Marxism as a theorymarked by defeat. Not only was this obviously untrue ofits founding moment, but Andersons characterization nowappears to take too narrow or specialist an angle . Rather,all the members of his list became Marxists because theyregarded the O ctober Revolution as a decisive, worldhistorical event. Of the thirteen names on Andersons list,seven were Communists lifelong adherents, indeed,except for Korsch and Colletti. The Horkheimer circle,with four m embers on Andersons list, always stayedaloof from tangible political connections, but was clearlysympathetic to the USSR before the Second World Warand afterwards never heeded the sirens of Cold War antiC ommunist mobilization. Adorno and Horkhe imer bothsneered at the authoritarian regime s in EasternEurope but without openly denouncing them, andHerbert Marcuse wrote a sober and scholarly criticalstudy of Soviet Marxism ( 1 963) which ended by pointingout the rati onal, and p otentially critical, aspect of Sovietsocial philo s o phy. The remaining two, Goldmann andSartre, also moved in the orbit of the October Revolution Goldmann as a fervent disciple of the young Lukacs,Sartre circling the French Communist Party at varyingdistances, but in the p ostwar period always within thecircuit of proletarian revolution. B ecause of the importance of the October Revolutionand the US S R to the two classical generations o f WesternMarxism, I think it makes most sense to draw a lineafter the recent death of Henri Lefebvre, in mid- 1 9 9 1 .While there are a number of figures of the 1 968 generationwho might be called into service or who might rally to a continuation of something they would c all WesternMarxism, no one has, or could possibly have, the s ame
92 FROM MARXI SM TO POST MARXI S M ?relationship to the possibility of a working-class revolutionor to any remotely similar mixture of faith and disillusion.The way Habermas, Adorno s former assistant, broke outof the tacit orthodoxy of the Frankfurt School onto newground exemplifies this . THE PHILOSOPHICAL TURNThis account has not dealt with the question of whetherall or most Western Marxists were philosophers, and, ifso, why. Here the lists of Anderson, Jay, Merleau-Pontyand others are, at best, as reliable as the verdict of anacademic nominating committee, which, as every academicknows, is a qualified compliment. It may be that Andersonsargument is circular. All his names, with the possible andpartial exceptions of Benjamin and Gramsci, are philosophers, but how do we know that individuals other thanphilosophers stood a fair chance of joining the list? Jaysroster is also philosopher-dominated. 63 The absence ofsocial scientists and historians is virtlially complete . Yet,given the post hoc construction of Western Marxism, whatwe see here, I would suggest, is the interaction of twofactors: the intellectual climate in Europe at the time ofthe reception of the October Revolution, and the laterWestern European and North American image of WesternMarxism . In other words, philosophers were prevalent in 1 9 1 7, and latter-day Marxists have wanted to listen tophilosophers. It should first be remembered that a number ofintellectual paths and careers were not open to those whoidentified early with the October Revolution. Empiricalsocial science was little if at all established in Europe .63. Sohn Rethel might b e called a n economic historican, though Brecht was aplaywright, Reich and Fromm were above all psychoanalysts, and among theDutch Council Communists, Gorter was a poet and Pannekoek an astronomer.
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXISM 93Sociology remained strung between the politics of the bourgeois revolutions and the economics of the proletarianrevolution, and lived a precarious institutional existence . 64Economics departments were usually hostile to the critiqueof economics. Political science was only beginning to moveinto social studies of politics. Law faculties covered muchof what would later branch out into social disciplines, butwere still dominated by venerable tradition. Historiographywas still overwhelmingly hostile to any social-scientificintrusion. It seems that in the heartlands of Europe, philosophy wasthe academic discipline most open to peop l e who hadwelcomed the dawn of O ctober 1 9 1 7 . Philosophy was relatively remote from the powers and interests of the day; inaddition, it was clearly non-paradigmatic, harbouring anumber of schools. It was the medium in which the mostgeneral and important issues of humankind were discussedlife, history, knowledge, morals. But, like twentieth-centuryphilosophers in general, Marxist philosophers tended overtime to move in the direction of sociology, tho ugh usualywithout abandoning their academic origins. After the SecondWorld War, this sociological turn is clearly discernible inAdorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse, in Henri Lefebvre andhis original comrade Georges Friedmann, and in Sartre . 65 But, however defined, Western Marxism is� of course,only one strand of twentieth-century Marxism. Furthennore,64. G. Therborn, Science, Class and Society, London: New Left Books, 1 97 6 .6 5 . Adorno and the Frankfurt Institute went into social psychology an d group andindustrial sociology; Henri Lefebvre embarked upon a philosophical sociology ofeveryday life (Critique de la vie quotidienne, 2 vols, Paris: Grasset, 1 94 8-6 1 ) .Friedmann became, one might say, the founder of French industrial sociology.Sartre was concerned with demonstrating the value of the dialectical method to thesciences of man, which involved a run critical dialogue with existing sociology,as Sarte saw it (Critique de la raison diakctique, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1 960, 1 53) . Maurice Godelier went from philosophy to anthropology. In 1 964, the GramsciInstitute in Italy organized an important symposium on Marxism and sociology.
94 FRO M MARX I S M T O P O S T MARXI SM?any critical perspective on the latter must take into accountthat Marxism is not a self-contained universe of its owntheories, practices and polemics. Marxism, and with it criticaltheory, has been part of an intellectual and sociopoliticalhistory, with alternatives, rivals and opponents. Within sucha history, the proper location of critical theory in the narrowor specific sense can b e ascertained. MARXISM AND T H E ROUT E S THROUGH MODERNITYMarxism is not just any old theoretical corpus. As a distinctive cognitive p ersp ective on the modern world, it issurpassed in social significance in terms of numbers ofadherents only by the great world religions . As a modempole of identity, it is outdistanced only by nationalism. 66Marxism acquired its very special historical importanceby becoming, from the 1 8 8 0 s till the 1 970s,67 the mainintellectual culture of two major social movements of thedialectics of modernity: the labour movement and theanticolonial movement. In neither case was Marxismwithout important rivals, nor was its diffusion universal,uniform or without defeats. But none of its competitorshad a comparable reach and persistence . Marxism was also significant t o feminism, from thetimes of Clara Zetkin and Alexandra Kollontai to thoseof Simone de Beauvoir and, later, Juliet Mitchell, FriggaHaug and Michele Barrett. But in spite of their uniquelyprofeminist stance among male-dominated movements,Marxist parties and currents were regularly overshadowed66. There is not yet a study quite level with this enonnous subject. But thebest there is, which is excellent in many of its contributions, particularly bythe main editor himself, is Eric Hobsbawm et aI. , Stona del marxismo, 4 vols,Turin: Einaudi, 1 978 8 2 .6 7 . A s far a s the labour movement i n the most developed capitalist countriesis concerned, the terminus ad quem is rather the 1 9 60s.
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARX I S M 95by religious and other conservative movements when itcame to attracting mass support among women. Marxism had its origin in Europe, and its dialecticalconception of history corresponded best to the Europeanroute to and through modernity, the road of e n dogenouschange through fully internal conflicts between forces forand against modernity, however conceived. Within European modernity, Marxism gained where competing forcesfor the allegianc e of the working class were weak and hadbecome discredited by defeat. To its immediate right wasliberalism or, in the Latin countries, radicalism . In Britainthe former was strong and vigorous; in France and, tosome extent, in the Iberian peninsula, the latter. On theright also was Christian democracy, but it b egan afterMarxism and b ecame important only in countries withstrong churche s that were autonomous from the statebureaucracy, which meant the C atholic Church in theLow Countries, the Rhineland, Southern Germany andItaly, and the militant (Gereformeerde) C alvinis t churchesof the Netherlands . To Marxisms left were anarchism,anarchosyndicalism and Russian populism. The anarchistswere soon marginalized in most places except Andalusia;the anarchosyndicalists were largely defeated in Italy andFrance, holding on mainly in Spain; and the populistssuffered severe defeats in late nineteenth-century Russia.The Marxist strongholds were Central running northsouth from S candinavia to central Italy and EasternEurope, where a working class was being formed withoutprior modern ideological experience . In autocratic Russia,with little intellectual freedom of expressi o n for anymodern ideas, Marxism became, after the defeats o fpopulism, the main language of th e intelligentsia. Germansocial democracy was the undisputed centre of gravity ofEuropean, and world, Marxism before 1 9 1 4 . German wasMarxisms main language, either directly or as the sourceof translation, even in countries whose cultural orientationwas predominantly Russian, such as Serbia o r Bulgaria,
96 FROM MARX I S M TO PO ST MARXI S M ?or French, such as Romania. Karl Kautskys Die Neue Zeit(New Times) was the leading journal . The First World War and its end had a strong butcomplex effect on European Marxism . The O ctoberRevolution attracted a significant cohort of workers andintellectuals to Marxism, and the new C ommunistparties started a vigorous programme of publication anddiffusion of works by Marx and Engels . In Germany acertain academic opening occurred, p articularly in socialdemocratically-governed Prussia, to which Frankfurtbelonged. But the Marxism of social democratic parties wasebbing away in C entral and Northern Europe, giving wayto pragmatic reformism save in Austria - until the fascisttakeover in 1 934 and in Norway, where a lively Marxismled by a set of bright historians-cum-politicians suddenlyflourished in and around a much radicalized Labour Party. In France and in B ritain, it took time for the newMarxist recruits to mature, helped neither by the continuingly vigorous non-Marxist traditions of the domesticlabour and progressive movements nor by the sectarianinstability of the new C ommunist parties . In Italy, Fascismsoon forced Marxists into prison, exile or silence . In Bolshevik Russia, Marxism blossomed, backed bygenerous academic endowments. Beginning in the early 1 9 30s, however, Stalinist terrorist orthodoxy produced aprolonged stifling of creative thought. Well before that,the original authoritarian features of the revolution hadconstrained the intellectual debate, leading, for instance,Georges Gurvitch and Pitirim Sorokin to leave Russia tobecome prominent (non-Marxist) sociologists in Paris andCambridge, Massachusetts, respectively. In the rest of Eastern Europe, the prospects forMarxism darkened. Most of the successor states to thefallen multinational empires were or soon became authoritarian, with little tolerance of any form of Marxism orother radical thought, except for Czechoslovakia, whichremained an increasingly beleaguered, nationalistically
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXIS M 91challenged left-of-centre democracy with a strong leftwing intellectual avant-garde, more aesthetic than theoretical . In any case, a pervasive nationalism marginalizedMarxism among students and intellectuals. EUROPEAN MARXI SM AFTER THE S E COND WORLD WARThe Second World War and its immediate aftennath changedthe intellectual landscape of Europe . The new Communistregimes opened Eastern Europe to an institutionalizationof Marxism, but under political regimes which furtheredit neither as critical theory nor a s science. A creative,abstract philosophical Marxism nevertheless developedfrom Yugoslavia to Poland, where it also managed, afterthe demise of Stalinism, to link up with so ciology andclass analysis in the works of Julian Hochfeld, S tefanOssowski and others . In East Germany the economichistorian Jiirgen Kuczynski put together a monumentalwork of social history and statistics in forty volumes, Historyof the Working Class under Capitalism. But after 1 9 68, mostcreative Marxism in Eastern Europe was silenced, exiledor abandoned . 6 8 I n Central a n d Northern Europe i n th e aftermath of theSecond World War, there was an intellectual turn towardsAmerica. This was the time when American empiricalsocial science, particularly sociology, political science andsocial psychology, were received and adopted in Europe,stimulated by generous American scholarships . 69 Whatcaught on most e asily were the more empiricist and conservative variants of US social science . Marxism was pu shed68. There were exceptions, such as the perceptive work on the trajectory ofnational movements by the Czech historian Miroslav Hroch.69. Adorno, freshly returned from America, was also playing the empirical cardin these years and was listened to as someone introducing empirical opinionresearch in West Germany. See R. Wiggershaus, Die Frankfurter Schule,Munich: Auflage, 1 9 8 6 , 50 lf
98 FROM MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXISM?to the margins of far-left politics . In France and Italy, bycontrast, Marxism reaped the fruits of the Resistance, alsobenefiting from the greater resilience of Latin high culturein the face of Americanization. Philosophy remained on itsintellectual throne; among French and Italian intellectuals,Marxism, or a dialogue with Marxism, became the dominantmode of discourse. Large and resourceful Communist partiesbacked it up, and Marxism was also the theoretical languagespoken in the socialist parties. In 1 949 the writings ofAntonio Gramsci were published, adding an original bodyof thought to the Marxist tradition, though for a long timeonly in Italy. Culture and intellectuals were thereby placedin the centre of analyses of politics and class power. Marxismguided postwar French historiography on the Revolution,academically consecrated by Georges Lefebvres and AlbertSobouls successive incumbencies of the Sorbonne Chairon the History of the French Revolution. It was also pertinentto the great Annales school of historians.7o Britain, finally, had its own empirical traditions and sowas not drawn into the American intellectual scene after thewar. A significant Marxist current gradually emerged fromCommunist student politics of the late 1 930s and early 1 940s, preceded by a cohort of distinguished natural scientists, historians of science and ancient historians.71 Britainswas the most important strand of empirical Marxism inEurope after the First World War. After 1 945, its core wasthe Historians Group of the Communist Party, which brokeup in 1 9 5 6. Before that, the group had successfully launchedthe scholarly j ournal Past and Present, which is still thriving.The postwar Marxist historians included Christopher Hill,7 0 . One of the best examples of a deep affinity with Marxism is the rather laterwork by Femand Braudel, Civilisation materielle, economie et capitalisme: XV eXVllle siecies, 3 vols, Paris: Armand C olin, 1 979.7 1 . J. D . B ernal, Gordon Childe, J. B . S . Haldane, Joseph Needham and others,crucially inspired by the visit of Boris Hessen and a Soviet delegation of historiansof science in 1 93 1 .
TWENTIETH CENTURY MARXISM 99Eri c H obsbawm and Edward Thompson, and in this milieumoved Raymond Williams, Maurice Dobb and GeorgeThoms on. While Isaac Deutscher had a different backgroundan d p olitics, as an historian and biographer of Trotsky andStalin he fits well into the picture of British Marxism. 72 While largely driven by it, social theory is not synchronizedwith political and social history. The late 1 9 50sand the first half of the 1 960s saw political Marxism inWestern Europe at an ebb. The Austrian, West Gennanand Swedish social-democratic parties divested theirprogrammes of any Marxist traces in 1 95 8 60 . Frenchsocialism had discredited itself in the Algerian war andtherewith its official Marxism. The Communist parties wereageing and isolated. The unexpected postwar boom was notmerely continuing; it was accelerating. However, some ofthe most influential works of Western European Marxismappeared at this time : Louis Althussers For Marx and Reading Capital ( 1 965), Isaac Deutschers trilogy on Trotsky( 1 9 54-63), Jean-Paul Sartres Critique of Dialectical Reason( 1 960), Edward Thompsons The Making of the EnglishW orking Class ( 1 9 63) .73 The London-based New Left Review,which was to become the worlds intellectually leadingMarxist journal, was founded in 1 9 60.7472. See further R. Samuel, British Marxist Historians, 1 8 80 1 980: Part One,New Left Review 1: 1 20 , March April 1 980, 2 1 96 .73. English language editions o f Althussers cited works appeared in 1 9 6 9 (ForMarx) and 1 97 0 (Reading Capital ), of Sartres Critique in 1 97 6 .7 4 . The most imponant Italian Marxist j ournal, Critica marrista, issued b y th eCommunist Pany, began publication in 1 962. The West German equivalents,Neue Kritik, Das Argument, Prokla and others, all came out of the student movement. In France the upheavals of 1 96 8 did not change the landscape of established serious left wing journals, none of which was very conducive to creativeMarxist theory. Les T emps Modernes, founded by Sartre right after the war, wasthe intellectually dominant journal, but was in a literary essay mould. So wasthe left wing Catholic Esprit. La Pensee was under tight Communist Panycontrol. LHomme et la Societe, with roots in 1 9 5 6 dissident Communism, wasprobably the journal most open to new Marxist thought.
1 00 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM? A BRIEF RESURGENCEThe political situation then changed dramatic ally with thestudent revolt an outcome of the new mass universitiesand the Vietnam War combined, and also inspired byChinas Cultural Revolution . At about the same time,the drying up of the labour markets paved the way for aresurgence of class conflict. The rapidly expanding subjectof sociology provided the main academic battleground.Marxism became both the political language and thetheoretical perspective for a generation of radicals whofound in it the best way to understand the phenomena ofcolonial wars and underdevelopment, as well as thedomestic socio-economic functioning of Western democracy. This neo-Marxism was a much larger wave than theoriginal Western Marxism but produced hardly anythingas spectacular. One reason for this was that politics and theory hadbecome much more differentiated. Even the most brilliantand reflective political writings of this period are largelyempirical. The theoretical and scholarly works, even ofpolitically active people, are very academic . The bestamong the former genre are undoubtedly Regis Debrayswritings on the revolutionary endeavours in LatinAmerica.75 S electing the most impressive works of th eoryand scholarship from the neo-Marxist current in Europeis much more difficult and controversial . But PerryAndersons monumental historical works, Passages fromAntiquity to Feudalism and Lineages of the A bsolutist State(both 1 974) , G.A. Cohens Karl Marx s Theory of History( 1 9 7 8 ) , and Nicos Poulantzass Political Power and SocialClasses ( 1 9 6 8) will be on most peoples short lists . Theyillustrate my argument very well.7 5 . R. Debray, Revolution dans la revolution?, Paris: Maspero, 1 967; and Lacritique des armes, Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1 974, 2 vols.
TWENTIETH C EN TURY MARXI S M 101 Neo-Marxism achieved Marxs inclusion in th e classicalcanon o f sociology and m ade Marxist or marxis a n tperspectives legitimate albeit minority views in mostacademic social science and humanities dep artments .Marxism entered anthropology primarily through thework of French anthropologists Maurice Godelier, ClaudeMeillassoux, Emmanuel Terray and others . And by linkingup with the neo-Ricardian work of Gramscis friend PieroSraffa, economists mounted the first serious theoreticalchallenge to triumphant marginalism, pitting C ambridge,England on the side of Ricardo and Marx - againstCambridge, Massachusetts.7 6 But when the radical politicalthrust began to peter out in the second half of the 1 970s,political Marxism evaporated rapidly. Academic Marxismalso receded significantly, sometimes abandone d for morenovel theoretical isms, sometimes submerged intoecumenical disciplinary practices . It has sustained itselfbest in sociology and historiography. MARXISM IN THE NEW WORLD SIn the New Worlds created by early modem conquest andmass migration, the theoretical and practical struggle formodernity was largely external, against colonial Europeand by the colonized aliens against the colonists . Neitherthe internal conflict of historical forces nor the classformation of the forces in action were as important asthey were in Europe . 77 The whole issue of the dialectic s76. M. Godelier, Horizon, trajets marxistes en anthropologie, Paris: F. Maspero,1 973; P. Sraffa, Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1 960; G. Harcourt and N.F. Laing, eds, Capitaland Growth, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1 97 1 .77. See further G . Therborn, The Right to Vote and the Four World Routesto/through Modernity, in State Theory and State History, ed. R. Torstendahl,London: S age, 1 992, 62 92; Routes to/through Modernity, in Global Modernities,M. Featherstone, S. Lash and R Robertson, eds, London: Sage, 1 995, 1 24-39 .
102 F R O M MARXISM T O P O S T MARXIS M ?of modernity, in p articular its class dialectic, wa s lesssignificant in the Americas and in O ceania. We shouldtherefore expect Marxism to have played a much moremodest role in the modern history of the New Worlds . Marxist parties of any social significance arose as rareexceptions, and then late, only after the Second WorldWar. Guyana, Chile and perhaps Cuba are the mainones. The Chicago publisher Charles H. Kerr became,around the turn of the century, a maj or intercontinentalcentre for the dissemination of Marxism in English, puttingout, among other things, the first English translations ofthe second and third volumes of Capital. Immigrants spreadMarxism to Latin America, where, for example, Argentinahad a translation of Capital well before Sweden and Norway.Nevertheless, Marxism did not establish significant roots. There was also a remarkable lack of creative individualcontributions . Sidney Hooks Toward the Understanding ofKarl Marx ( 1 933) and Paul Sweezys The Theory of CapitalistDevelopment ( 1 942) were solid and distinguished exegeses,but the only creatively original work of N ew-WorldMarxism in its first half-century or more was probablyJose Carlos Mariateguis Seven Essays of Interpretation ofPeruvian Reality ( 1 928), a remarkable combination of radicalEuropean thought including Pareto and Sorel with aLeninist Marxism and Latin American cultural vanguardism applied to a whole spectrum of issues from economics toliterature.78 However, after the S econd World War, Marxist scholarship also underwent a tilt to the West, similar tothat of science and scholarship in general, although in the78. Mariategui ( 1 8 9 5 1 9 3 0) was the founder of Peruvian Communism, a figurewith many similarities to Gramsci, and in part inspired by the same intellectualambience from a visit to Italy and Europe in 1 9 1 9 23 . It was with referenceto his Shining Path that Abimael Guzman named his notorious guerilla movement Sendero Luminoso . See further M. Becker, Mariategui and Larin A mericanMarxist Theory, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1 99 3 .
TWENTIETH-CENTURY MARXISM 103former case it took longer to mature. Marcuse was not givena very attractive offer to return to Germany, so he stayedin the US; apart from his later works, American Marxismreceived little from the anti-Fascist refugees. Paul Sweezyset up Monthly Review and the Monthly Review Press, whichbecame the most important international platfonn for seriouscritiques of political economy. The new Marxist theory ofthe underdevelopment of capitalism came to centre aroundMR, in the works of Paul Baran (1957) and Andre GunderFrank (1967), arguing that underdevelopment was not lackof development, but rather something which had developedout of global capitalism, as one constituent pole.79 FromLatin America in the mid-sixties came more sociologicallyoriented work on underdevelopment - above all, that ofthe Brazilian F. H. Cardos080 - often referred to as thedependency school, from its argument that LatinAmerican underdevelopment depended on its relations tothe metropoles of capitalism. The late 1960s upheavals on the North Americanacademic scene seem, on the whole, to have been moreintellectually productive and innovative than parallelevents in Europe or elsewhere. Highly creative contributions were suddenly made by a number of NorthAmerican Marxists, the two most successful of whomare rivals. One is the historiographical work of RobertBrenner on the relevance of class struggle to the rise ofmodernity. Brenners explicit and orthodox historicalmaterialist perspective was asserted and sustained in aseries of confrontations with other expert historians onthe importance of class conflict to the emergence ofindustrial capitalist Europe, these being assembled under79. P. A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth, New York: Monthly ReviewPress, 1957; A.G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America,New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967.80. F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependencia e desenvolvimento na AmericaLatina, Rio de Janeiro: Zahar, 1970.
1 04 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?the title The Brenner Debate. 8 1 More recently, Brennerhas made yet another major contribution to a central issueof historiographical debate, this time arguing anew for theclass character of the English Civil War. 82 The other is Immanuel Wallerstein, whose sociologicallyinformed works of scholarly synthesis may be morecontroversial than those of Brenner, but whose academicentrepreneurial acumen and achievements have had onlyone comparable Marxist parallel Max Horkheimer. 83 In 1 9 7 6 , Wallerstein launched his project of world-systemsanalysis the examination of the largest conceivable socialtotality around which he has built a research institute,a current within the American Sociological Associationand a global network of collaborators . Wallersteins dialectic of the capitalist world-system was explicitly directedagainst the then widespread evolutionary theory of the modernization of separate societies . This extraordinary creativity i n North AmericanMarxism also includes some very penetrating analyses ofthe labour process, again in conflict with each other (Braverman and Burawoy) ; the most ambitious analyses of class (Przeworski and Sprague, and Wright) ; and, asidefrom the work of Raymond Williams, the most innovative cultural inquiries ( Jameson and many others, here unjustly but necessarily omitted) . 84 Critical theory, then, has been received most warmly by left-wing academia in North8 1 . T. H . Aston and C. H. E . Philpin, eds, The Brenner Debate, C ambridge :C ambridge University Press, 1 98 5 .8 2 . R. Brenner, Merchants and Revolution, Princeton: Princeton U niversityPress, 1 9 9 3 .8 3 . I . Wallerstein, The Modern World System, 3 vols, New York : AcademicPress, 1 9 76 onwards.84. H. Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in theTwentieth Century, New York: Monthly Review Press, 1 974; M. Burawoy, Manufacturing Consent, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1 979, and The Politicsof Production, London: Verso, 1 985; A. przeworski and J. Sprague, Paper Stones.A History of Electoral Socialism, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1 9 86; E.O . Wright, Classes, London: Verso, 1 9 8 5 ; F. Jameson, Postmodernism, or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, Durhum: Duke University Press, 1 9 9 1 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARX I S M 1 05Am erica. However, its best output has been ab out, ratherth an of, critical theory.85 In this, the works of Martin Jayare exemplary. 86 Modernity in the colonial zone has been p articularlytraumatic, with its fulcrum around the relationship of theconquered to the conquest and to the conqueror. Probablyno one has captured the violent traumata involved betterthan Frantz Fanon, whose The Wretched of the Earth firstappeared in 1 9 6 1 , with a preface by S artre. It was theComintern that made possible and propagated throughthe Congres s of Oppressed Peoples in Baku in November1 920, the formation of the Anti-Imperialist League, theglobal instigation of anticolonial Communist p arties aMarxist interpretation of colonialism and an anticolonialist identification with Marxism. But the outcome of allthis was markedly more nationalists who used a Marxistvocabulary than actual Communists. 87 Marxism becamethe language of anticolonial movements and po stcolonialpowers, in Mrica particularly, from the Algerian FLN tothe Zimbabwean ZANU. But it was also very importanton the Indian subcontinent - especially in secularizedIndia and in Indonesia, pushed very early by an extraordinary group of Dutch leftists led by Henricus Sneevliet . Vietnam and French-ruled Indochina generally transformed a reception of French Marxism, culture andCommunist political education into a variety of originalforms, from phenomenological philosophy to the literally8 5 . The most creative American critical social theories have come from outsidethe Marxist tradition, such as A. Etzioni ( The A erive Society, New York: CollierMacmillan, 1 9 6 8 and The Moral Dimension, New York: Free Press, 1 988) and RUnger (Poliries: A W in Canstruerive Social Theory, 3 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge orkUniversity Press, 1 987).86. M. Jay, The Dialeerical Imaginarion, Boston: Little, Brown, 1 97 3 , and Marxismand Totality; see also S. E. Bronner, Of Cririeal Theory and Its Theorists, Cambridge:Blackwell Publishers, 1 994.87. See H. Carrere dEncausse and S. Schram, eds, Le marxisme et lAsic 1853- 1964, Paris: Armand Colin, 1 965; G. Padmore, Pan Africanism or Communism,London: Dobson, 1 9 5 6; C. Legum, Pan Africanism, London: Pal Mal Press, 1 962.
lO6 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXI SM?avuncular national C ommunism of Ho Chi Minh (UncleHo) and beyond to the sinister deliriums of Pol Pot. Themaoisant tum of the French left-wing intelligentsia in thelate 1 9 60s burnt most of the remaining bridges betweenthe mandarinates of Paris and Hanoi. Korea had the unique experience of becoming a nonWestern Gapanese) colony from as early as 1 9 1 0 . Hereagain, Western Marxism became the idiom of the anticol onial movement whi ch, with S o vi e t a s sistance,established a peoples republic in the North, whereMarxism became incorporated into a peculiar cult of theleader. The harsh class struggles and conflicts overdemocracy in the booming capitalist South have beenconducive to fostering recent intellectual currents ofMarxism, often of American academic inspiration, in thesocial sciences and in literary studies . Black African culture, very distant from the Marxiandialectic of modernity, has not (yet) been able to sustainany significant Marxist intelligentsia. The most importantMarxist intellectuals of Africa tend to be non-blacks, suchas Samir Amin, an Egyptian Dakar-based developmenteconomist of world fame;88 two East African class analystsof politics and law, Mahmood Mamdani and Issa Shivji,both of Indian descent; and the leadership of the SouthAfrican C ommunist Party which greatly influenced theANC who are mainly white . White South African academiahas also included an embattled left-wing current from thelate 1 9 60s onwards . In Indonesia, Marxism has been physically liquidated,both as an intellectual current and as a social force, in oneof the most extensive political pogroms ever staged (in 1 9 656) . In Pakistan it has, on the whole, been out-ranked byIslam, in an anything but fair competition. India, on theother hand, has preserved a significant and sophisticated8 8 . S. Amin, Laccumulation a l echelle mondiale, Paris: Editions Anthropos, 1 970.
TWENTIETH C ENTU RY MARXI SM 1 07Marxism, which originally entered the c ountry from theUS . 89 There is a tradition of high l evel Marxist or marxisant -e c ono mics, highlighted by the fact that the only non NorthAtlantic economists included in the Cambridge C ambridgecontroversy referred to ab ove were two Italians and threeIndians . 9 0 Above all, there is a lively and widespreadhistoriographical t r ad i tio n, induding the m a th ematician historian-polymath D.D. Kosambi, as well a s Bipan Chandra,Irfan Habib, Harbans Mukhia9 1 and the formidable gro upSubaltern Studies, directed by Ranajit Guha . 9 2 In Indiansociology, Marxism seems to have played a lesser role . 93 China was never fully colonized and therefore largelytrave ll e d the fourth main road through modernity. TheJapanese invasions of 1 93 1 and 1 937 did, however, putChina under acute colonial thr ea t, which gave rise t o ahighly original political Marxism in the 1 940s, th eo r eti c al lyas well as practically under the leadership of Mao Z ed o n g . In the countries of externally induced modernization,we should expect Marxism to have led a marginal existence,kept at bay by the modernizing faction in power and larg e lyalien to the populace dragged into modernity by the rulers.On the other hand, the opening to the importatio n of ideasshould also have led to an ea rly imp ort ati on of Marxi smand other radical ideas by whatever pro-modern factionsare out of power. The relative signifi c anc e of the twotendenci e s should depend on the amount of m odernizingcontinuity and the amount of repression. The larger thosetwo factors, the less Marxism there was .8 9 . G. Haupt and M. Reberioux, eds, La Deuxieme Internationale et lOrient,Pari s : Cujas, 1 9 67, p. 360.90. Harcourt and Laing, Capital and Growth.9 1 . A. J. Syed, ed., D. D. Kosambi on History and Society, B ombay: Universityof B ombay, 1 9 8 5 ; and Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism in ModernIndia, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1 9 7 9 .9 2 . R . Guha and G. C . Spivak, eds, Selected Subaltern Studies, O xford: OxfordUnivers ity Press, 1 98 8 .93. T.K. Oommen and P.N. Mukherji, eds, Indian Sociology, Bombay: P opularPrakashan, 1 98 6 .
1 08 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M? The former Ottoman Empire Turkey, Iran and theArab heartlands of Islam and Sino-Japanese East Asiaare the two maj or civilizations on this route to/throughmodernity. The former is on the continuist side of thespe ctrum and has never spawned any significantMarxism, theoretical or p olitical . Japan, on the other hand,was more than merely the first relay of Marxism into Asia. 94Its catastrophic defeat in 1 945 opened the terrain to at leasta socially significant middle-class Marxism centered aroundthe Communist and socialist parties and the student movement. Theoretically, it has been characterized by a strongorthodox critique of political economy, spearheaded by theworks o f Kozo Uno and more recently expressed by MishioMorishima, Makoto Itoh and others . 95 The historical routes to and through modernity and theirpolitical dynamics have largely determined the trajectoryof twentieth-century Marxism - not so much its substantialcontents as its periods of expansion and contraction, allowing for the delayed impact of crucial generational events . THE FUTURE OF DIALE CTICSAs an interpretation, a critique, an analysis and, occasionally, a government of modernity, Marxism is without rivalamong modern conceptions of society, although thegovernmental record of p oliticians with Marxist claims istoday widely regarded as full of failures . In intellectualterms, Marxism has maintained and developed itselfprimarily as historiography and, later, as s ociology, as asocially mediated rather than an economically directcritique of political economy. But within the normal94 . F. Andreucci, La diffusione e la volgarizzazione del marxismo, in E. Hobsbawn et al. eds, Storia del marxisme, vol. 2, Torino: Giulio Einaudi, 1 979; cf.M. Silverberg, Changing Song: The Marxist Manifestos of Nakano Shigeharo,Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1 99 0 .95 . M . Itoh, Value and Crisis: Essays o n Marxian Economics i n Japan, New York:Monthly Review Press, 1 980; M. Morishima, Marxs Economics: A Dual Theoryof V alue and Growth, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1 9 7 3 .
TWENTIETH C ENTURY MARXI S M 109pursuits of scholarship and science, all isms are boundto disappear sooner or later. Its true philosophical oeuvre,from Max Adler to Louis Althusser and G. A. Cohen,has centred on understanding Marx and Marxism itself. 96As such, it has b een an in-house philosophy. Alternatively,with Henri Lefebvre and Jean-Paul S artre, Marxistphilosophy has been a proto-sociology. Critical theory is only a Western moment of this globalhistory, albeit a very important one, bringing out, perhapsmore than any other variant, the problematic of Marxismas a dialectic of modernity. The conventional controversyof Marxism as a science or as a critique misses a decisivepoint. The scientific claims and self-confidence of Marxists,from Engels and Kautsky via the Austro-Marxists to Loui sAlthusser and his disciples, rested upon the assumptionthat the critique was, so to speak, already inherent inreality, in the actually existing labour movement. It wasonly when the latter could be written off that the crucialmoment of antiscientific critique emerged. At this juncture in history, after the exhaustion of theOctober Revolution and the decline of the industrial workingclass, the future relevance of the Marxian dialectic ofmodernity has to be thought anew. If there is anything validin ideas about the processes of economic and culturalglobalization, the division of humanitys saga into historyand post-history makes no sense.97 On the contrary, globalinterdependence and global chasms of misery and affiuenceare growing simultaneously. Polarizations of life chances,9 6 . True, they did address more general epistemological problems. Althusser(Pour Marx, Paris: Fran�ois Maspero, 1 965, back cover) originally presentedthe series, whose first items were For Marx and Reading Capital, as intendedto define and explore the field of a philosophy conceived as Theory of theproduction of knowledge. But in fact there is a narrowing focus towards s elfexamination in Marxism and its dialectic, if we go from Adle r (Kausalitit undTeleologie im Streit urn die Wissenscha/t, Vienna 1 904) to Adorno (NegativeDialectics) , Althusser (For Marx and Reading Capital ) and C ohen (Karl MarxsTheory of History: A Defence, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1 97 8 ) .9 7 . F. Fukuyama, The End of History, N e w York: Penguin, 1 99 2 .
110 F R O M MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXISM?if not of rival powers, are building in the develope dmetropoles. A dialectical understanding of this unity ofopp osites is called for today, hardly less than at the timeof Karl Marx. This is a new moment of critique, lackingthe s cientific backdrop of class as well as the apo calypticsof Korsch and Lukacs, and requiring a humancommitment b eyond the academic division of labour.But again, pace Habermas, a critique of prevailinge c onomics seems to be called for more urgently than athe ory of communicative action. Since neither capitalism nor its polarizations of lifecourses appear very likely to disappear in the foreseeablefuture, there is a good chance that the spectre of Marxwill continue to haunt social thought. 98 The most obviousway forward for social theorizing inspired by Marx willbe to look at what is currently happening to the venerablecouplet of the forces and relations of production on aglobal scale and their conflictual effects on social relations .Marxism may no longer have any solutions ready to hand,but its critical edge is not necessarily blunted. Finally, with the return of socialism from science to utopia,there is a good chance that men and women concernedwith critical social thought will tum with increasing interestto the great philosopher-historian of hope, Ernst Bloch, whopointed out that Marxism, in all its analyses the coldestdetective, takes the fairy-tale seriously, takes the dream ofa Golden Age practically. 99 The free society withoutexploitation and alienation which the critical dialecticianshoped for, sometimes against all odds, is perhaps not somuch a failure of the past as something that has not yetcome to pass .9 8 . See J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, Paris: Galilee, 1 9 9 3 .9 9 . E. Bloch, The Principle of Hope ( 1 95 9), trans. N . Plaice, S . Plaice andP. Knight, Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd, 1 9 86, vol. 3, 1 370, emphasis omitted.
3 Afte r Dialectics: Radical Social Theory in the North at the Dawn of the Twenty-first CenturyIf socialism and liberalism have both been central to modempolitical and social thought, then during the twentiethcentury it was socialism, in a loose ecumenical sense, thatwas the more successful of the two in terms of intellectualattraction and public support. 1 Socialism was emblazonedon the banners of mass parties in Brazil, Britain, China,France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico,Russia, S outh Africa in fact, virtually every major c ountryof the globe, with the exception of Nigeria and the US .It was embraced at least as a rhetorical goal by a rangeof locally powerful parties from Arctic social democratsto African nationalists . Socialism and Communism exercised1 . This text grew from an initial invitation to contribute to a collection ondifferent aspects of European social theory, focusing on the question of PostMarxism and the Left, and was later expanded for New Left Review. Any surveyof a field as broad as this will be liable to omissions and overs ights, as well asto the political, personal and generational inclinations of its author.
1 12 F R O M MARXI SM TO P O S T MARXIS M ?a powerful attraction over some of the most brilliant mindsof the last century: Einstein was a socialist, who wrote amanifesto entitled Why Socialism? for the founding issueof the US Marxist journal Monthly Review; Picasso was aCommunist, who designed the logo of post-Second WorldWar Communist-led peace movements. In spite of itsconservatively defined original task and its own staunchlyconservative traditions, the Swedish Academy has allottedthe Nobel Prize for literature to a series of left-wing writers,from Romain Rolland to Elfriede Jelinek. In the 1 9 60 s and 1 9 70s, following two springtides inthe aftermaths of the twentieth centurys two world wars,varieties of socialism reached their maximum influenceand transformational ambition, as did socialisms central,if not its sole, theoretical canon: Marxism . Geopolitically,the S oviet Union attained parity with the US, which wasdefeated by the Vietnamese Communists . The ChineseCultural Revolution was the largest attempt at radicalsocial change ever carried out, and was seen as a dazzlingred beacon by many p eople all over the world. Africanorth of the Limpopo was swept by decolonization andembarked on projects of socialist nation-building. In LatinAmerica the C uban Revolution inspired a hemisphericsurge of revolutionary socialist politics, followed by anotherexample, different but allied, in Chile . Trade-union movements in the most developedcountries reached their highest levels of affiliation in themid- 1 9 7 0 s . In Western Europe and the oceanic antipodes,social democracy was marching forward, both electorallyand in its reform programme. In Sweden from 1 9 6 8 to 1 9 7 6 , and in France between 1 9 78 and 1 9 8 1 , socialdemocrats presented their most radical concrete plans everfor social change . Militant working-class movements of strikes, demonstrations and workplace occupations shookFrance in May 1 968 and Italy in the autumn of 1 9 6 9 . Student m ovements, which in Europe had historically been mainly right-wing, emerged as powerful leftist forces
AFTER DIALECTICS 113across Europe, the Americas, large parts of Afric a fromSouth Africa to Ethiopia and, in less pronounced forms,the Arab North, Asia from Istanbul to Bangkok and Tokyo,and O ceania. Marx and Marxism pushed open the doorsto the a cademy in some of the major capitalist countries,achieving a strong influence there, even if they were neverhegemonic in any significant intellectual c entre outsideItaly and France. Then, suddenly, the high water withdrew and wasfollowed by a neoliberal tsunami. Socialist c onstructionswere kno cked down, many of them proving ramshackleor fake in the process; socialist ideas and Marxist theorieswere engulfed in the deluge . Privatization became theglobal order of the day, formul ated in the WashingtonC onsensus of the US Treasury, the IMF and the WorldB ank. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, not onlyliberal capitalism but also empire and imperialism havestaged a triumphant return, and with them the worldviews of the Belle Epoque . The explanation of this suddenturn, and why it happened in the last two decades of thetwentieth century, is a task far beyond the scope of thisbrief overview of the landscape of Left social theory afterthe neoliberal disaster . Some outline, however, must begiven of the changing p arameters within which suchtheorization has taken place, before a summary picture ofresponses can be provided. THE TURN O F MOD ERNITYWhether its analysis tends towards celebration and a cceptance or towards critique and rejection, social theorizationdepends on the social world it theorizes . A major reasonfor studying the present is to understand the power itexercises, and critiques of it are largely, if not absolutely,dependent on the hope of a possible different world. Suchhope, in tum, depends on the visibility, however faint, ofsome alternative power or force with the potential to carry
1 14 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM?the critique forward into active change. What happenedto socialism and Marxism in the 1 9 80s and 1 990s wasthat the alternative forces appeared to melt away. Whilethe inequalities of capitalism were increasing in mostcountries, while the global gap between rich and poor waswidening, and while the brutality of the rulers of the maincapitalist states was reaffirmed again and again, thedialectic of capitalism was imploding. Capitals new pushwas accompanied not by any strengthening of the workingclass and anticapitalist movements, nor by the opening ofa systemic exit into another mode of production at leastnot from a perspective visible to the naked eye . On thecontrary, labour was weakened and embryonic systemicalternatives either fell apart or were completely marginalized. The global confluence of left-wing political defeatsand social meltdowns in the last two decades of thetwentieth century was, by any measure, overwhelming. Any analytical assessment, however, has to take intoaccount the slow work of time. The ideas of most contemporary theorists were actually formed during earlierconjunctions of hope and power. Existing theory stillmainly registers the response of this preceding generationto the tum of the 1 9 80s and 1 990s; at the same time, anew layer of leftists is emerging from the World SocialForums, the antiglobalization movement and the IndoAmerican mobilizations from Chiap as to B olivia andbeyond. Meanwhile, the sociopolitical meaning of the newMuslim anti-imperialism is yet to be determined . I n the rich capitalist countries, the structural tum todeindustrialization and the mishandling by the centre-leftof the difficult conjuncture of mass unemployment andsoaring inflation during the 1 9 70s prepared the way forthe revenge of neoliberalism, spearheaded in industrializations country of origin. When the new economicdoctrine turned out to be an unexpectedly aggressivechallenge, the main powers that were supposedly buildingsocialism adopted different strategies . That of the S oviet
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 15Union would prove suicidal : trying to placate politicalliberalism while letting the economy spiral downwards bytolerating increasingly aggressive b arracuda b ites . TheChinese, and later the Vietnamese, took the free-marketroad: if capitalism is the only show on earth, we are goingto run it. After the failures and moral hollowness of theChinese Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party for all its former Maoist diatribes against capitalistroaders was the political force that was most committedto following that route. In Latin America, both reformist and revolutionaryhopes had been quenched in blood by the end of the 1 9 70s.In the Arab world, the successful Israeli attack in 1 9 67had shattered the secular Left. African client states of ColdWar Communism turned their coats with the disappearanceof their patrons . The huge Indonesian Communist Partyhad literally been massacred in 1 9 6 5 . Chilean Marxism,both socialist and Communist, never recovered from theblow of 1 9 7 3 . In Europe, the PCI has dissolved itself, andthe PCF has shrunk to the size of a large sect. But WestBengal, an Indian state with a population the size ofGermanys, has continued to re-elect its C ommunistgovernment, and a C aribbean Castroism has managed tosurvive, revivified by recent developments in Venezuelaand Bolivia. Red banners are still kept flying by sizeableminorities in southern Europe, from Portugal to Greece,and by the largest p arty of Greek Cyprus, the moderateAKEL. Perhaps with the exception of the latter, however,these are p arties of testimony rather than of hope. Thesocial-democratic aspirations of post-Communist Europehave come to little; its parties have tended to be eitherliberal, corrupt or both. Socialist hopes of p ost-apartheidSouth Africa have also come to nothing, although the ANCdoes provide an example of working democracy in Africa.The left-wing tum of Latin American countries in the2000s owes little to classical socialist or Marxist thought,deriving more inspiration from radical C atho licism in the
1 16 FRO M MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXISM?case of Brazil, from Latin American populism in Argentinaand Venezuela and from indigenous peoples mobilizationin B olivia - although the Movement to S o cialism ofPresident Evo Morales was largely built by former cadresfrom the left-wing miners union. Nevertheless, in each,and particularly in the Bolivian case, there is an articulateleft-wing socialist component. The world has not yet been made entirely safe forliberalism. New radical forces continue to emerge : populistmovements in Indo-America, waves of migration throwingup immigrants movements in the First World, and a wholegamut of political manifestations of Islam, from Islamistdemocracy to sectarian terrorism . The most interesting ofthese, crucial for coming developments, may be the adventof a social Islamism, comparable to the social Catholicismof Europe from the Netherlands to Austria a century ago .But the old cartography of roads to socialism has lost itsbearings. New compasses of the Left have to be made; itshould be expected that this will take some time. Marxism s Broken TriangleAs a minimum framework for situating recent turns ofleft-wing social theory, we need to look at how Marxistand socialist thought has been embedded in culturalhistory. This entails, first, a look at the specific constructionof Marxism as an ism and at the forces bearing uponthat structure. Secondly, Marxism and socialism shouldbe recognized as parts of a wider cultural ensemble, thatof modernity, and therefore affected by the vicissitudes ofthe latter. The history of Marxism may best be seen as atriangulation, growing out of both the historical situationand the extraordinary range of interests of its foundingfathers . The ism has three different poles, of varyingdistances from each other, not to mention varying polecoalitions . Intellectually, Marxism was first of all a historical
AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 17social science, in the broad Germanic sense ofWissenschaJt, fo cused on the operation of capitalism and,more generally, on historical developments determinedin the last instance by the dynamics of the forces andrelations of production. Secondly, it was a philosophy ofcontradictions or dialectics, with epistemological andontological ambitions, no less than ethical implications .Thirdly, Marxis m was a mode of politics of a socialist,working-class kind, providing a compass and a road-mapto the revolutionary overthrow of the existing order. Thepolitics was the overdetermining apex of the triangle,making the ism a social current, not just an intelle ctuallineage . Historical materialism, with the Marxian critiqueof political economy, and materialist dialectics, with thesocial philosophy of alienation and commodity fetishism,had their intrinsic intellectual attractions, but these wereusually conne cted to symp athies with, and o ftencommitment to, a socialist class politics . In Marx-ism,the relation of politics to science, historiography andphilosophy were always asymmetrical . If and whenpolitical leadership was differentiated from theoreticalleadership, it was always political power which gained theupper hand, although political leadership during the firsttwo generations after Marx usually required a cap acityfor theoretical argumentation. Marx, Engels, Kautsky the chief theoretician of thesocial-democratic Second International and Lenin, eachin his own way, mastered all three genres . Stalin andMao, too, dabbled in all three. However impressive theintellectual-cum-political versatility and expertise of thesefounding generations, such qualities were also an expressionof the early modernity of the late nineteenth century, whenintellectual discourse had as yet scarcely been subdividedinto separate disciplines, and of the natural preponderanceof politics. In the course of the twentieth century, the lengthof the sides of the triangle would be increasingly extended.Any serious attempt at understanding post-Marxism will
1 18 FROM MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM?have to deal with this triangle of social science, politicsand philosophy. The Marxism that emerged in Western Europe afterthe First World War was b asically philosophical inapproach; originally eschatologically connected to revolutionary politics (Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci) , it later eitherstood discreetly aloof from it (the Frankfurt School) orwas only indirectly related to it (Althusser, Lefebvre,Sartre) , even if its exponents were linked by party membership, as in the first two cases . 2 In spite of the hard sociological lessons of the Frankfurters in US exile, and ofthe scientific thrust of the Althus serians, EuropeanMarxist philosophers in this p eriod hardly ever engagedintellectually with Marxist social scientists or historians . A Marxist mode of politics never attracted enoughsupport to become consolidated in Western Europe as adistinctive political practice. It was always open to opportunistic enterprise and to authoritarian legitimation. Thismade what perhaps may be called the natural Marxistcoalition of politics and social science difficult and rare .There was, of course, one important link: the politicalcommitment to socialism, in the historical sense of adifferent kind of society. In the 1 9 60s, 1 97 0s, even in theearly 1 980s, this was a commitment not only of radicalintellectuals and youthful revolutionaries. It was professedby mass parties or by significant currents within them,such as the British Labour Party and continental WesternEuropean social democracies . There was also the actuallyexisting fact that a sizeable group of states, two of themvery powerful, were building socialism . Belief in theirachievement was limited, but the view that they at leastconstituted an ongoing social construction site even iftemporarily stagnant or perhaps decaying - was widespread. Socialist politics, in the ambiguous senses referred to,2. S e e P. Anderson, Considerations on Western Marxism, London: New LeftBooks, 1 9 7 6 .
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 19kept the Marxist triangle together, even if there was littlein it of specifically Marxist intent. But socialist politicsdisintegrated in the course of the 1 980s: b o gged downand driven to surrender in France; electorally crushed inBritain and pushed onto the defensive in S candinavia;abruptly turning rightwards for geopolitical and otherreasons in Southern Europe; abandoned or fatally undermined in Communist Eurasia; already crushed under themilitarist boot in Latin America. This pulled the carpetfrom under Marxism as a social science, its analyses losingany discernible potential audience . Marxist philosophy,like historiography and social science, came to rely onacademic appointments. Perhaps because it was immuneto empirical disproof, philosophy managed b etter, maintaining a link to marginal revolutionary politic s , esp eciallyin parts of Latin Europe. The Marxist triangle of social science, politics and philosophy has been broken in all likelihood, irremediably. Thisis not to say that socialist politics, premised on claims fora different, socialist society, have disappeared. Where theelectoral system allows its expression, support for such apolitics oscillates between 5 and 20 per cent o f the nationalvote, but it could grow. Political ideologies and orientationshave their ups and downs, and postsocialism may soonbe overshadowed by some new socialism. But the underdevelopment of Marxist political theory, together with thesocial restructuring of capitalist societies, makes it unlikelythat an ascendant socialist politics would be very Marxist.The zenith of the industrial working class has passed,while many previously neglected political subjects arecoming to the fore. Under non-repressive conditions, Marx-ism is unlikelyto exercise an attraction as social science or historiographyfor post- 1 9 9 0s cohorts of committed socialist s cholars. Bythe standards of physics or biology, the advances of socialscience and historical scholarship may look modest; theynevertheless represent enormous strides forward since the
120 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O S T MARXI SM?age of Das Kapital. Yet, as we have previously noted, sinceeach generation of social s cientists tends to find freshsources of inspiration among the classics of social thought,it seems most likely that Marx will be rediscovered manytimes over in the future; novel interpretations will b emade and new insights found though conducive t olittle ism-ish identification . Philosophers, on the otherhand, are habitually, rather than o ccasionally, bent overtheir predecessors. Whether Marx will achieve the 2,5 00-year longevity of Plato, Aristotle and Confucius is an openquestion, but the possibility cannot be ruled out. A ghostnever dies, as Derrida said. 3 The history of philosophytends ever to generate new techniques of reading. Challenge of PostmodernismLeft and Marxist social theory must also be situated withinthe broader cultural framework of modernity within whichit was first articulated, and by whose vicissitudes it willinevitably be affected. Just such a framework appearedaround 1 9 80 in the challenge of postmodernism. Whilep o stmodernism derived from the arts and from culturalphilosophy, it has also claimed to sp eak about society,about culture in an anthropological sense and abouthistory and the current historical situation of humankind .There is, then, an area of encounter and contest withcontemporary historiography and social science. Whatmight be the contribution from an analytical p ersp ectiveof historiography and empirical sociology? Obviously, there is no single correct definition of modernity and the modern. But the most fruitful definitions ofconcepts taken from general language tend to be the leastarbitrary and idiosyncratic ones, which usually implies arespect for etymological meaning and an abstention from3. J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, Paris: Galilee, 1 993, 1 63 .
AFTER D IALECTICS 121loading the definition with a priori connotations. Modernityshould thus be seen as a temporal orientation o nly. Modernity is a culture claiming to be modem, in the sense ofturning its back on the past - the old, the traditional, thepasse and looking into the future as a reachable, novelhorizon. Modem man/woman, society, civilization have adirection: forward, or, as it was phrased in the old GDRand in post-independence Ghana, Forward ever, backwards never . 4 Rather than trivializing the concept ofmodernity by attempting to translate it into a set of concreteinstitutions, whether of capitalism or p olitics, or into aparticular conception of rationality or agency so that it canmore easily be philosophically targeted, it is more usefulto deploy it solely as a temporal signifier, in order to allowit to retain its analytical edge . What would be the use of modernity the GermanAloderne in this sense? Why not follow Jamesons adviceof substituting capitalism for modernity?5 Modernity isuseful to many because of its broader, extra-economicconnotations . A cultural history of, say, Berliner Moderneis hardly synonymous with a history of capitalism inBerlin, and not necessarily o f illegitimate interest. 6Modernity directs attention to important semantic shifts,otherwise easily neglected. Take the word revolution,for example. As a premodern concept it p ointed backwards, rolling back, or to recurrent cyclical motions,4. See R. Koselleck, V ergangene Zukunft, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1 979, 3 1 4ff; J.Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne, Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1 9 85,14 15.5 . F . Jameson, A Singular Modernity, 2 1 5 .6 . Nor should social modernism be equated with the postwar social theory ofmodernization, as Jeffrey Alexander proposed some years ago. Modernizationwas a particular sociocultural theory of historical evolution, attacked by Wallersteinand others not from an antimodem position, but for its methodological nationalismand its rosy idealist evolutionism, looking away from capitalism, exploitation,colonialism and the development of underdevelopment. See J. Alexander,Modem, Anti, Post, Neo, New Left Review 1 : 2 1 0, March-April 2005 .
1 22 F R O M MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXI SM?as in Copernicuss On the Revolutions of the HeavenlySpheres or the French Enlightenment Encyclopedie, inwhich the main entry refers to clocks and clock-making .Only after 1 7 8 9 did revolution become a door to thefuture, as did, a little later, another re- term : reform . As a historical concept, modernity also requires us todistinguish and analyze different routes towards it, with theirenduring, if not unalterable, consequences. As was exploredin the preceding chapter, four major roads to and throughmodernity may be discerned: the European one of civil warand internal conflict; the New World path of settlement,with its external premodern Others both the corruptcountry of origin and the local natives; the traumaticroad of colonial conquest and anticolonial nationalism;and the reactive modernization from above, pioneeredby Japan. Finally, a time concept of modernity is also away of grasping the significance of postmodernity, as aquestioning of, or a loss of belief in, the future narrativesof the modem. Insofar as forward and backward, progressive and reactionary, have lost all meaning, we have entereda postmodern world. Marx and Marxism were quite modem in this sense,invoking the term again and again in The Communist Manifesto and Capital, the ultimate purpose of which was todisclose the economic law of motion of modem society,as Marx put it in his preface to the first edition of volumeone . 7 However, and this was crucial, it was a dialecticalconception of modernity, seen as inherently contradictory.The modernity of capitalism and of the bourgeoisie werehailed, but at the same time attacked as exploitative andalienating. This dialectical understanding of modernitywas, in a sense, the very core of Marxian thought. Itaffirmed the progressive nature of capitalism, of theb ourgeoisie, even of capitalist imperialist rule (in ways7. See M. B ennan, All That Is Solid Melts Into Air, London: Verso, 1 9 8 3 .
AFTER D I ALE CTICS 1 23that many would now find insensitive to the victims ofcolonialism) , while at the same time not only denouncingthem but also organizing the resistance against them . Inbroad cultural-historical terms, Marxism may be seen asHer Maj esty Modernitys Loyal Oppo siti o n . B But ifMarxism in this core cultural sense (as well as the recentchallenges to it) can only be understood in terms of itsdialectical conception of modernity, this latter also needsto be located in contradistinction to other importantmaster narratives of modernity. The most influential ofthese might be summarized as follows : Table 3 . 1 : Master Na rratives of Modernity THE PAST: THE FUTURE: Ignorance, superstition, subservience Emancipation: rational, individual enlightenment Oppression, unfreedom Emancipation/liberation: collective Poverty, disease, stagnation Growth, progress, development Conditions of nolless competition Survival of the fittest Rule bound, imitative Creative vitality Let US take the points in Table 3 . 1 in order. Firstly, ifthe Kantian notion of rational enlightenment has lostmuch of its appeal by the early twenty-first century, itshould be recognized that it remains at the centre of suchimportant controversies as, for example, how to explain,prevent and cope with HIV/AIDS and other lethal diseasesin Mrica and other parts of the world. Is witchcraft amajor source of sickness and death? Is penetration of avirgin a cure for AIDS? S econdly, the concept of collective emancipation or8. See Chapter 2 in this volume.
1 24 FROM MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXI SM?liberation has undergone a remarkable mutation over thep ast few decades as p art of the process of postmodernization. It has largely lost its former social referents theworking class, the colonized, women, gays and lesbiansand, above all, its earlier socialist horizons of emancipationfrom capitalism . But it has not disappeared. It re-emergestoday in militant liberal-democratic discourse, itself a formof right-wing modernism, where it now refers to liberationfrom a select group of anti-Western authoritarian regimes :C ommunist, post- C ommunist, or Muslim and Arab . InIndo-Latin America, on the other hand, emancipation hasacquired a new social urgency as indigenous p opulationsraise demands for a more equitable division of resources . Thirdly, horizons of growth and progress still governthe exp ectations of all modern economies, erstwhile constructions of socialism as well as every variety o fcapitalism, including the reigning neoliberalism . Growthand progress also constitute the continuing story thats cience tells of itself and form the creed of all contemporaryacademic authorities. Fourthly, the survival of the fittest and social Darwinismhave been given a new impetus by neoliberal globalization,after their postfascist quarantine . According to this view,only the fittest and the meanest will deserve to survive thefree-for-all of global competition. Fifth and finally, thecollapse of rule-bound artistic academicism has left artisticmodernism without a target, other than older modernists .The modern conflict between the avant-garde and traditionhas been replaced by a succession of fashions. Marx harboured all the above modern p erspectives,although collective human emancipation and economicdevelopment were most central to him . However, whatdistinguished Marx and Marxism from other strands ofmodernist thought was a fo cus on the contradictorycharacter of the modern era, and on these contradictionsand conflicts as its most important dynamics . Against the linear liberal proj ects of individualization,
AFTER D IALECTI C S 125 Table 3 . 2 : M arxi a n Dialectics of Capitalist M odern ity ADVA N C E : CONTRA D I CT I ON/CO N F L I CT: I n d ividualizatio n Atom ization , alienation Productivity development Exploitation and d i stri butive pola rization Outgrowing existin g relations of production Capita l i st exte nsion Proletarian u n ification and stre n gthen i n g G l obal ization Anti.imperi alist revoltsrationalization and growth a s the bases for modernization,Marxism set a dialectical p erspective of emancipationexplicitly affirming that capitalism and colonialism wereforms of exploitation as well as of p rogress, as c an be seenin Table 3 . 2 . The Marxist p erspective also differed fromthe Weberian notion of the rationalization of markets andbureaucracies as an iron cage . The contradiction s o fmo dernity, according t o Marx, were harbingers of radicalchange . The lab our movement in capitalist countries, thesocialist-feminist movement, the anticolonial liberationmovements and actually existing socialist countries, whatever their faults, were seen as carriers of a different future,of a modernist proj ect of emancipation. By the 1 9 9 0s,however, that belief in the future had been fundamentallyshattered . Postmodernism attacked all the grand narratives ofmodernity, while usually ignoring the dialectical conceptio n of Marxism . But all its sociopolitical advances, all itsconquests of ideological space, were against the modernistLeft . At the same time, right-wing modernism defeatedalmo s t all its traditionalist conservative rivals, m o stsuccessfully in Thatchers Britain for neoliberalism maybe seen as a high modernism of the Right and, as noted,it has scarcely been dented by postmodernist arguments .
1 26 FROM MARXISM TO P O ST MARX I S M?The reinvigorated American Right is a vivid illustrationof the current entanglements of modernity. 9 While theAmerican Right recruits its storm troopers from Christianfundamentalists, its hegemonic tenor arises from itswillingne s s to embrace the future , which it sees asbelonging to itself. l o (The theological celebration ofworldly success by mainstream Christian evangelicalismfacilitates, of course, this p owerful brew of secularmodernism and religious fundamentalism . ) S ignificantly,while the Lefts commitment to so cial revolution hasbeen silenced or muted, the American Right is trumpeting regime change . Modernity has not been abandoned a s an intellectualposition. It has been defended by theorists both from theThird Way and from the old Far Left. 1 1 In a well-fundedresearch and publishing programe at the German publisherSuhrkamp Verlag, Ulrich Beck has gone so far as to proclaima second modernity . But the sociopolitical challenge acrossthe whole Left Right spectrum has scarcely begun to beconfronted. In fact, Becks Risk Society, first published inGermany in 1 986 and a major theoretical work of recentdecades, did provide a possible b asis for a new conceptionof modernity: Risk may be defmed as a systematic way ofdealing with hazards and insecurities induced and introducedby modernization itself. Risks . . . are politically reflexive . 1 2This is an important societal conceptualization risk beinga key concept of economics that also found a politicalresonance in environmental circles . However, its critical edgeis blunted by two feature s: first, its basic blindness to what1 0 . J. Micklethwait and A. Wooldridge, The Right Nation, London, P enguin,2004, 346ff.I I . See for example J. Habermas, Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne; A .Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, Cambridge: Palgrave Macmillan, 1 989; U .Beck, A. Giddens and S . Lash, Reflexive Modernization, C ambridge : Polity,1 994; T. Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism, Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 1 99 6 .1 2. U. Beck, Risk Society, London: Sage Publications, 1992, 2 1 , italics omitted.
AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 27was happening rightwards of the centre on the p olitical s c ale,the aforementioned rise of right-wing liberal modernisminitially less strong in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxonworld, but p olitically triumphant well before itsenthronement in the most recent Grosse Koalition. Second,the specific institutional content of Becks new, l atersecond, modernity the demise of class, full employmentand the nation-state; the release of individuals fromindustrial institutions lays his perceptive grasp of a changedtime-frame open to charges of arbitrary selectivity, empiricalunreliability, or b oth . Postmodernist discourse has something important toteach, but it should be subjected to a symptomatic ratherthan a literal reading, as a questioning of non-dialecticalconceptions of modernity, as a symptom of the disorientationof the (ex-) Left, and as a form of myopia towards theworld beyond the North Atlantic . The postmodernizationof the world remains very uneven. At the fre nzied p aceof aesthetic discourse, postmodernism may even be over,as one of its former publicists put it in a second-editionepilogue . 1 3 In 2002 Jameson noted the end of the p o s tmodern general agreement, and in the last few years . . .the return to and the re-establishment of all kinds of oldthings . 1 4 B auman, in advanced age still tuned to the shifting sirens of the times, has turned to p eddling liquidmodernity instead of postmo dernity. 1 5 Nevertheless, thetwo decades of postmodernism, the 1 9 8 0 s and 1 9 9 0s,produced a rift in cultural so cial thought, itself a symptomof the politico-economic times, which has not b een overcome . The future as novelty, as difference, disappe aredbehind a smokescreen.1 3 . Hutcheon, The Politics of Postmodernism, 1 66 .1 4. Jameson, A Singular Modernity, 1 .1 5 . Z . Bauman, Liquid Modernity, Cambridge: Polity, 2000.
1 28 FROM MARXISM TO P O ST MARXI S M ? While ecological and feminist critique s of modernistvisions of growth, development and progres s have becomesignificant side-currents in the centres of capitalism oftenincorporated, in diluted forms, into the mainstream ofenlightened lib eralism Third World critiques of what wemay call, with a respectful bow to the Peruvian socialtheorist Anibal Quij ano, the coloniality of modernity, orthe coloniality of anticolonial nationalism, have hardlypenetrat e d the walls of North Atlantic s ocial theory. Thishas always been an important theme in Indian thought,if usually in a somewhat uneasy alliance with modernistnationalism, exemplified in the coop eration betweenGandhi and Nehru. At the Mumb ai S ocial Forum in 2004,a main-stage banner proclaimed People D o Not WantD evelopment, They Just Want to Live . This made somesense to the many recent Indian social movements pittinglocal, often tribal p e ople and ecologists against moderndam and other developmentalist proj ects. S e en alongsidethe terrible Mumbai slums, however, the attack on developmentalism appears less convincing. However, in a country like Bolivia, the coloniality ofmodernity is more palpable, evidenced in the countrys longp ost-independence history of racist politics and proj ects ofeconomic and cultural modernization that left the indigenous maj ority out in the cold and poverty of the altiplano.The platform of the current elected leadership of B olivia,President Evo Morale s and Vice-President A lvaro GarciaLinera, is neither traditionalist, modernist nor p o stmodernist. Intellectually as well as politic ally impressive,it is a b old attempt at clearing a path to an alternativemodernity, blazing a new trail for Marxism in the Andes. In summary, we may say that modernity turned at theend of the twentieth century, but in s everal directions : tothe right; into postmodernism; and into the oretical andpolitical searches for new modernities .
AFTER DIALECTI C S 129 DefinitionsNow that the broader politic al and cultural-intellectualparameters of recent social theorizing have be�n laid out,there remains a further preliminary question t o be askedbefore we can c onsider the current shap e of the field:What is so cial theory? The definition deployed here s e e ssocial theory a s strung between two ambitious poles: o n theone hand, p roviding a comprehensive explanatory framework for a set of s o cial phenomena; on the other, makingsense of such phenomena . In other words, this is anecumenical conception of theory that applies both toexplanation the more wide-ranging, the more important- and to Sinnstijtung, the constitution of meaning. In terms of the sense-making pole, the later salience ofphilosophy in the classical Marxist triangle of social science,philosophy and politics, and the formers far greaterresilience to empirical developments, mean that the contributions of p olitical and so cial philo sophy are of particul arimp ortance to an ove rvie w of recent s o cial the o ryemanating from the Left. In terms of the s e c ond pole,that of empirical social science, it should perhaps be reiterated that theory is not a separate field or a subdiscipline,a form of research-free armchair thinking, but the guidingcompass of empirical investigation . It was in these termsthat Pierre B ourdieu, for instance, criticized current AngloS axon conceptions of social theory. 1 6 Attention will alsob e given to that kind of theory in scientific acti on. It should be underlined at the outset that what followsis by no means a general survey of the intellectual production of the c ontemporary Left. A strict definition of socialtheory, centred o n the present, must exclude the work ofhistorians and scholars of intellectual history, and therebysome of the most gifted minds of the international Left .Another fruitful area for the Left during re cent years has16. See P. Bourdieu, Reponses, Paris: Seuil, 1 992, 86, 1 3 6ff.
1 30 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI SM?been that of geopolitics and interstate relations, yieldingimportant new work on imp erialism and imp erial power;but again, this involves little social theorizing as such Y However, the fact that in 2004 the British Academyorganized an official conference titled Marxist Historiography: Alive, Dead or Moribund? was a significanttheoretical event. The answer that clearly resonated wasAlive ! , with the qualification that what was alive was Marxthe diagnostician and not the prophet, as the academyspresident put it in his introduction. The editor of theensuing volume, the great Oxford medieval historian ChrisWickham, summed up his own field by saying that inmedieval economic and social history, far from Marxistideas being dead or moribund, they are everywhere . The challenges t o left-wing social thought p osed bypostmodernity and by the neomodern Right have beenmet in very different ways . Disregarding cases o f actualflight from radical thought, which fall outside the scopeof this article, I will first track new thematics in theresponses of left-of-centre scholars, and then attempt tolocat e some of the general shifts in their the o reticop olitical positionings . S ince restrictions of space permitneither lengthy exp ositions nor elaborate analyses of thesevariations, I have opted for a regional road-map, mainlyrestricted to Western Europe and North America . MODES O F THE LEFT S RESPONSE Europe s Theological TurnThe most surprising theoretical development in left-wingsocial philosophy in the past decade has been a new1 7 . The yearbook Socialist Register has been a central focus in this field, publishingwork by, among others, Aijaz Ahmad, Noam Chomsky, Sam Gindin, PeterGowan, David Harvey, Colin Leys, Leo Panitch, John Saul, Bob S utcliffe andEllen Wood.
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 131the olo gical turn. In the main, this has not meant an embraceof religious faith, although some fonner left-wing intellectualshave come to affirm an ethnoreligious Jewishness, and thereis often an indication of a particular personal relation, beyondbelief, to religion or to a religious figure as when RegisDebray writes: Three things have occupied my life [as athinker] , war, art and religion. 1 8 Rather, the theological turnhas manifested itself in a scholarly interest in religion andin a use of religious examples in philosophical and politicalargumentation. In contrast to the Latin American theologyof liberation, which was a religious commitment to socialjustice led by ordained Catholic priests, the European formis a theology of discourse. The principal work here is that of Debray who, in Lefeu sacre (2003) and God: An Itinerary ( 2 0 0 4 ) , has turne dhis literary talents to original scholarly investigationsinto the structures of the Judeo-Christian narratives, thereligious procedures of memorization, displacement andorganization, and the re-lit fires of religion around theworld. 1 9 Debray, however, had first developed these themesin his Critique of Political Reason ( 1 9 8 1 1 1 9 8 3 ) , considerations on the religious unconscious in politic s and politicalforms of the sacred; in fact, he began his adult religiousstudies with a biography of the eleventh-century PopeGregory, a work he read while imprisoned as a revolutionary in the small B olivian town of C amiri, whereChristian texts were the only uncensored reading matter. 20 Alain B adiou, a former Maoist and still an active farleft militant as well as a philosopher, refers to an old,poetic and personal relationship to Saint Paul, to whomhe turns in his search for a new militant figure . . . calledupon to succeed the one installed by Lenin . Badiou s1 8 . R. Debray, L e feu sacre, Paris: Fayard, 200 3 .1 9 . R. Debray, God: A n Itinerary, London: Verso, 2004.20. R. Debray, Critique of Political Reason, London: Verso, 1 9 8 3 .
1 32 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?apostle supposedly laid the foundations of universalismin his letter to the Galatian s : There is neither Jew norGreek, neither slave nor free, neither male nor female . 2 1Slavoj Z izek, for his part, elaborates the parallels b etweenPaul and Lenin into three pairs of guides : Christ/Paul,MarxlLenin and Freud/Lacan. But his main point in OnBelief (200 1 ) is to argue the authentic ethical value ofunconditional belief political rather than religiousmaking no compromises and including what Kierkegaardcalled the religious suspension of ethics . The ruthle s snessof Lenin and of radical religious fundamentalists is thuspresented as admirable. The Book of Job has also becomea topic of fascination for Z izek, as perhap s the first m oderncritique of ideology . 22 Meanwhile, in Empire, MichaelHardt and Antonio Negri hold out as an illumination ofthe future life of communist militancy the milder religiousexample of Saint Francis of Assisi . 23 In his own sober way,Jiirgen Habermas has also paid his respects to religion:As long as no better words for what religion can s ay arefound in the medium of rational discourse, it [communicative reason] will . . . coexist abstemiously with the former,neither supporting it nor comb ating it. 24 Haberm a s hasgone even further, accepting claims that his conceptionof language and communicative action nourishes itselffrom the legacy of Christianity . 2 5 For me, he writes, thebasic concepts of philosophical ethics . . . fail to c aptureall the intuitions that have already found a more nuancedexpression in the language of the Bible . 26 When the Soviet Union was crumbling, the German2 1 . Galatians 3: 28, quoted in A. Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation ofUniversalism, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003, 9 .22 . S. ZiZek and G . Daly, Conversations with Zitek, Cambridge: Polity, 2004, 1 6 1 .2 3 . M. Hardt and A . Negri, Empire, C ambridge, MA : Harvard University Press,2000, 4 1 3 .2 4 . J . Habermas, Religion and RationaliIy, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2 002, 2 4 .2 5 . Ibid. , 1 60 .2 6 . Ibid., 1 62.
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 133Marxist philosopher Wolfgang Fritz Haug, a dedicate dadmirer of Gorbachevs attempts at reform, sat down toread Augustines City of God in its original Greek thatis to say, a great theologians reflections on the fall ofRome . 27 The same work is also referred to by H ardt andNegri, who with typical stylistic acrobatics cast the churchfather together with the early twentieth-century AmericanWobblies ( From this p erspective the IW is the greatAugustinian project of modern times ) .28 This widespreadfascination with religion and religious examples, mainlyChristian, may be taken as an indicator of a broad culturalmood, for which p ostmo dernity seems to serve as a goodlabel. As an alternative future disappears or dims, whatbecome important are roots, experience and background.A classical European education, a maturation in a nonsecular milieu, and a middle age at a safe distance fromany demands of faith make Christianity a natural historicalexperience to look at. Most recently, Terry Eagleton, a tough and unrep entantMarxist literary and cultural theorist, has returned to theleft-wing Catholicism of his youth, defending C hristianityagainst atheistic onslaught and, in resonanc e with LatinAmerican liberation theology, writing on Jesus C hrist andthe Gospels in the light of the question of social revolution. 29 This remarkable theological genre among a section ofthe European intellectual Left has also rec e ntly beenbolstered by Roland Boers wide-ranging treatment ofbiblical Marxists and Marxist grapplings with religion,from Gramsci and Bloch to Eagleton and Z ize k . 3027. W. F. Haug, personal communication.28. M. Hardt and A. Ne gri , Empire, 207.29. See his Lunging Flailing, Mispunching, London Review of Books, 1 9 October ,2006, and his introduction to The Gospels in Versos Revolutions ! Series.30. R. Boer, Criticism of Heaven: On Marxism and Theology, Leiden: BRILL,2007 .
1 34 FROM MARXI SM TO P O ST MARXISM? American FuturismIn the much more religious US, no comparable Left theological turn is visible . There the Bible has been more orless monopolized by the Right, although the AfricanAmerican Left still has p owerful political preachers suchas Jesse Jackson and the o logi an-intellectu als such asC ornel West, self-characterized as a Chekhovian Christian . 3 1While European leftists are referring to Christian icons ofthe past, their American comrades are peering ever furtherinto the future short-term prospects never having lookedvery rosy for the North American Left. Yet among someof its best minds, expectations for the future have survivedboth the postmodernist onslaught and the collapse ofC o mmunism, and have asserted themselves in a newfuturism. It has two remarkable currents, the most strikingof which is a new utopianism, and the second is systemicand apocalyptic. In the last decade, a variety of American radical thinkershave turned their critical intelligence and creative energiestowards utopia. While waiting for new forms of politicalagency to emerge, there is no alternative to Utopia, asFredric Jameson has put it in a masterly contribution tothe field, analyzing utopian fantasy and utopian writingwith his characteristic critical brilliance, eruditio n and galactic range of associations. 3 2 Utopia serves a vital politicalfunction today, Jameson emphasizes, in that it forces usprecisely to concentrate on the [utopian] break itself: ameditation on the impo ssible, on the unrealizable in itsown right. 33 Jameson is only the most recent exponent in a spectacular arc of creative American utopianism, of which hestands at one pole, focusing on the utopian desire, its3 1 . G. Yancy, ed., Cornel West: A Critical Reader, Oxford: Blackwell, 200 1 , 347.3 2 . F. Jameson, Archaeologies of the Future, London: Verso 2006, xii.3 3 . Ibid., 232.
AFTER D IALECTI C S 135disruption of the future and its literary forms, above allscience fiction. In quite another register, the s ociol ogistErik Olin Wright launched the Real Utopias Pro j e ct in theearly 1 9 9 0s, a large-scale collective enterprise of radicaldrawing-board social engineering and formalized normative economics a subgenre different from Jamesonsbut not as much as their contrasting styles and referencesmay suggest. Both are fascinated by utopian imagination,one as an analyst of science fiction, the other as a writerand promoter of (social) science fiction . So far, the RealUtopias Project has produced five books, whil e Wrighthimself is writing an ambitious strategic conclusion thatproposes an understanding of socialism as an alternativeto capitalism, as a process of social empowerment overstate and economy, which will be published as EnvisioningReal Utopias. 34 Despite its impressive scale, and defiant stand againstthe headwind of the times, the design of the projectmay l o o k somewhat odd, particularly to northwesternEuropeans. The economic sections are classically utopianin their abstract evocations of a good society and generalabstention from strategic thinking about how existingsociety can be changed. But they are, on the o ther hand,often remarkably modest, perhaps overmodest, in theirtargets. Thus John Roemer, for instance, presents an ingenious scheme for coupon socialism, a market society whereproperty rights are invested in the coupon-holding adultcitizenry. At the same time, he finds the already existing34. J. Cohen and J. Rogers, eds, Associations and Democracy, London: Verso,1 99 5 ; ]. Roemer, ed. , Equal Shares: Making Market Socialism W ork, London:Verso, 1 996; S. Bowles and H. Gintis, eds, Recasting Egalitarianism: New Ruleso Accountability and Equity in Markets, States and Communities, London: Verso, f1 998; A. Fung and E. O . Wright, eds, Deepening Democracy: Institutional Innovationsin Empowered Participatory Governance, London: Verso, 2003; B. Ackerman,A. Alstott and P. Van Parijs, eds, Redesigning Distribution, London: Verso, 2006;E. O . Wright, Compass Points, New Le Review 4 1 , Sept Oct 2006. ft
136 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?Nordic redistribution by taxation too radical to emulate :I doubt that large heterogeneous societies will, in our lifetime, vote to redistribute income as much through thetaxation system as the Nordic s o cieties have . 35 In anothervolume, devoted to b asic income schemes and to stakeholder grants for all young adults, a critical voice (alsoAmerican) concludes the following from a comparisonwith actually existing Sweden: The fully developed welfarestate d e s e rves priority over B a sic Income b e caus e itacc omplishes what B asic Income does not: it guaranteesthat certain specific human needs will be met. 36 Asutopianism, the political aspect of the proj ect is moreinnovative in that it presents and discusses, theoreticallyand in different voices, four actually existing experimentswith local p articipatory democracy, ranging from Chicagoto West Bengal . 37 The geographer and urban historian David Harvey hasattempted a bold dialectical utopianism in Spaces ofHope (2 0 0 0) . Its proposed transcendence of the ninete enth-century gap between Marxian historical dialecticsand utopian constructions may not convince everybodywho is in principle symp atheti c . Whil e US-centre dglobalization may be in disarray, discrep ancies betweenideological promises and economic delivery, or difficulti e s created by market externalities, hardly constitutecontradictions in the Marxian sense of structural interdependencies-cum-incompatibilities.38 However, theoreticalcorrectn e s s is a minor point here . Harvey, who stillproudly teaches Marxs Capital, presents some interestingutopian p rinciples for an insurgent architect at work,3 5 . J. Roemer, A Future for Socialism, in Equal Shares, ed. J. Roemer, 3 7 .3 6 . B . Bergmann, A Swedish Style Welfare State o r Basic Income? WhichShould Have Priority?, in Ackerman et ai., eds, Redesigning Distribution, 14 1 .3 7 . See Fung and Wright, eds, Deepening Democracy.3 8 . D. Harvey, Spaces of Hope, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000,1 9 3-4.
AFTER D IALECTICS 137and appends a B ellamy-inspired utopian walk throughBaltimore in 2020, on which he self-critically reflects.39Once, in its darkest hours, Central European Marxismproduced a singular masterpiece on utopian thinking andanticipatory consciousness, Ernst Blochs three-volumePrinciple of Hope, published in Germany in 1 9 54 but writtenmuch earlier. In the current context, however, the genrehas not been flourishing on the eastern side of the Atlantic. In the 1 990s, when most people discussing transitionswere thinking about the Eastern European shift from socialism to capitalism, the message came from Binghamton, NewYork, that the world was in fact passing from c apitalismto something else, the character of which was still uncertain.We are living in the transition from our existing worldsystem, the capitalist world economy, to another world-systemor systems, Immanuel Wallerstein proclaimed in Utopistics,a work which defined its aim as the sober, rational andrealistic evaluation of human social systems, theconstraints on what they can be, and the zones op en tohuman creativity . 40 Giovanni Arrighi, then also at Binghamton, ran a parallelresearch project that reached similar if yet more dramaticconclusions. From his reading of world-system history,Arighi saw three possible outcomes to the ongoing crisi sof the regime of accumulation41 firstly, that the old centresterminate capitalist history through the formation of a truly39. From the rich North American fascination with utopias, one should also takenote of the 2000 issue of the annual Socialist Register on Necessary and Unnecessary Utopias and the captivating twentieth century history of East West utopiasand their passing, in S. Buck Morsss Dreamworld and Catastrophe, Cambridge,MA: MIT Press, London 2000.40. I. Wallerstein, Utopistics, New York: The New Press, 1 998, 35, 1 2. A collectiveresearch project had already summarized the character of the times in thesame terms: see The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the W orld System 1 94�2025,T. Hopkins and I. Wallerstein, eds, Atlantic Heights, NJ: Zed Books, 1 99 6 .4 1 . G. Arrighi, The Long T wentieth Century, London: Verso, 1 9 94, 355 6.
138 F R O M MARXIS M T O POST MARXISM?global world emp ire ; secondly, that a new guard a rise sbut lacks the necessary state- and war-maki ngcapabilities , whereupon capitalism (the "anti-market")would wither away; and thirdly, that capitalist historycome to an end by being burnt up in the horrors (orglory) of escalating violence . A crucial element of theworld-system, in this view, is the role of its economiccum-political hegemon. The current incumbent, the US,has been in irreversible decline since the 1 9 7 0 s . As in thepast, the current financial expansion of capitalism is anexpression of, and vehicle for, a profound crisis of existingworld-system hegemony. Capitalism is threatened fromtwo side s : by a long-term strengthening of the p ower ofworkers through global deruralization and proletarianization and by the weakening of states and of theircapacity for capital protection and social mediation, aresult of the discrediting and delegitimation of statereformism (what Wallerstein calls lib eralism ) . According to Wallerstein, the principal mechanism bywhich capitalists have been able to limit the politicalpressure caused by the secular historical trend towardsincreasing working-class strength, through democratization and other channels, has been the relocation of givensectors to other zones of the world economy that are onthe average lower-wage areas . But the problem today isthat, after five hundred years, there are few places left torun to . 4 2 Wallerstein is here giving a new twist to RosaLuxemburgs 1 9 1 3 argument about the breakdown ofcapitalism: C apitalism needs non-capitalist s ocialorganizations as the setting for its development, [but] itproceeds by assimilating the very conditions which alonecan ensure its existence. 43 At the time, Luxemburg was42. 1. Wallerstein, The Decline of American Power: the US in a Chaotic World,London: W. W. Norton, 2003, 5 9 , 228.43. R . Luxemburg, The A ccumulation of Capital, London: Routledge and KeganPaul, 1 9 63, 446.
AFTER DIALECTI C S 139thinking about non-capitalist areas a s necessary exp o rtmarkets and as providers of cheap foodstuffs . None o f those theses has attracted any wide agreement,even on the Left, in spite of the general intellectual respe ctfor their authors . The most tangible argument, but hardlythe most convincing, is the proposition that a scaling downof US power after its peaking meant a systemic crisis ofworld capitalism. Later formulations by Arrighi have beenmuch less apo calyptic, and a post-American hegemonyhas become more plausible with the continuing rise ofChina and the emergence of India as a majo r player. Theoverpowering historical importance of a relay race of capitalist hegemons continues to be assumed from FernandBraudel rather than unassailably argued to an audienceof the not (yet) convinced. The comparative work onhegemonic transitions by Giovanni Arrighi and BeverlySilver, Chaos and Governance in the Modern World System( 1 999), concludes with a set of plausible propositionsabout the likely implications of a new shift, while notpredicting any necessary termination of capitalism . 44Wallerstein sticks to his long-term-transition p erspective,but his analytical light seems to have become concentratedon the global geopolitics of the next twenty years ratherthan on systemic extinction.45 In a comparable vein, theEgyptian economist S amir Amin s recent Beyond USHegemony (2006) is a sober global analysi s with apragmatic left-wing geo strategic programme . The finalstep from the capitalist world-system to geop olitics and44. See G. Arighis discussion of R. Brenner and D. Harvey in Tracking GlobalTurbulence, New Left Review 20, March April 2003; Hegemony Unravelling1 , New Le Review 32, March April 2005; Hegemony Unravelling 2 , New ftLeft Review 33, May-June 200 5 .4 5 . For example see I . Wallerstein, Entering Global Anarchy, New Left Review22, July August 2003, and The Curve of American Power, New Le Review 40, ftJuly August 2006.
1 40 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARX I S M ?geo-economics has been taken only by the late AndreGunder Frank, throughout his life a scholarly heretic andiconoclast: best forget about it [capitalism] and get onwith our inquiry into the reality of universal history . 46 Displacements of ClassClass, formerly among the most imp ortant concepts inLeft discourse, has been displaced in recent years inpart, ironic ally, through the latters own defeat in thecap italist class struggle , but also because the developments of p o st-industrial demography have dislo dged itfrom its previous theoretical or geographical centrality.Class persists, but without a secure abode, and with itsphilosophical right to existence contested. Problematizingclass identity as class action deriving directly from exp erience, as Edward Thompson held in his marvellous andfor two decades immensely influential The Making of theEnglish Working Class ( 1 9 63) , and pointing to the importance of competing interpretations and dis cursive p olitics,as Gareth Stedman Jones and Joan S cott did in the 1 9 8 0s,was originally a a way to sharp en the focus of class analysis .But twenty years later, two prominent historians whoparticip ated in the cultural tum of social history havefound it necessary to plead with their colleagues for anacknowledgement of the persistence of class as a prediscursive or nondiscursive formation Y Class remains a central descriptive category in severalarenas : mainstream sociology; standard Anglo-Saxoninequality discourse, as part of the indispensable triad ofclass, gender and race; studies of social mobility; recentBourdieu-inspired studies of cultural practices and4 6 . A. G. Frank, ReOrient, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1 9 98, 3 5 2 .47. G . Eley and K. Nield, The Future of Class in History, An n Arbor, MI:University of Michigan Press, 2007, 1 94 .
AFTER D IALE CTICS 141consumption (Mike S avage e t al . ) . But most of the linksbetween this descriptive mainstream, on the one hand,and collective s ocial action and radical theorizing of suchaction, on the other, have been snapped. The social appearance of class has bec o me almostunrecognizable after being dropped into the acid of purep olitics, as in the political philosophy of discursivehegemony developed in Ernesto Laclau and ChantalMouffes Hegemony and Socialist Strategy ( 1 9 8 5 ) , arguablythe most intellectually powerful contribution of po stMarxist p olitical theory. Thus, for example, Laclaudismisses Slavoj Z izeks invocation of class and the classstruggle as just a succession of dogmatic assertions .48Antagonism becomes the new central concept. Laclaus p olitical philosophy has been further developedin his recent On Populist Reason (2005), which bringstogether his old interest in Peronism and Latin Americanpopulism, his post-Marxist political philosophy and a newerimmersion in Lacan. A heavy read at times, as a philosophyit fails to provide any tools for analyzing actual processesof social mobilization or explaining different outcomes,whether in terms of people or class. Its contact with theextramural world is through selected illustrations only. Onthe other hand, beyond the Streit der Fakultaen there ismuch in Laclaus work that rewards efforts to penetrate thesometimes dense veil of jargon. While peoples and othersocial forces cannot be constructed at random limits whicha philosophy of social logics has difficulties coping withit is important to bear in mind that, as Laclau points out,they are all, classes included, discursively mobilized, and thatthe success or failure of this mobilization is contingent; thatsocial change brought about by resistance or insurrection4 8 . See E. Ladau, Structure, History, and the Political, and S. ZiZek, C lassStruggle or Postmodemism? Yes Please, in J. Buder, E. Ladau and S. ZiZek,eds, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality, London: Verso 2000.
1 42 FRO M MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXIS M ?has an irreducible political moment of articulation andl eadership; and that popular mobilizations of the excluded,the exploited or the underprivileged can take different forms,including fascist ones. Etienne B alibar, once Althussers star pupil, has stayedcloser to the Marxist tradition. His important 1 987 essayFrom the Class Struggle to the Struggle without Classes?,republished in 1 997, did not answer its own question in anyclearly post-Marxist mode. While stressing the wider universality of antagonism, Balibar also concluded that the classstruggle can and should be thought as one determining structure, covering social practices, without being the only one. 49 To the recent philosophy of struggle without classescorresponds the sociology of classes without struggle. Classis well established, largely thanks to the analytical edgeand empirical tenacity of John Goldthorpe, as a central concept of intergenerational mobility studies, which havebecome a technically advanced but intellectually isolated subdiscipline . As a category of distribution, class retains its place in sociology. Standard American sociologicaldiscourse on distribution and inequality always refers to class, gender and rac e , b oth in alphab etical and in non alphab etical order. A maj or journal on public health, based at Johns Hopkins, pays persistent, systematic attention to class dimensions of (ill) health and mortality though the fact that its e ditor, Vicente Navarro, was part of the anti Franco underground in Spain may not be irrelevant here . There is as yet no global class analysis corresponding to the many national class maps produced by Marxists of the 1 9 60s and 1 970s, and these earlier pictures may well be seriously challenged. 50 The reconnection of class with race49 . E. B alibar, La crainte des masses, Paris: GaliU:e, 1 997, 242, emphasis in theoriginal.50. Although see, for example, K. van der Pijl on North Atlantic class relations,Transnational Classes and International Relations, London: Routledge, 1 998; L.Sklair, The Transnational Capitalist Class, Oxford: WileyBlackweU, 200 1 ; and B .Silver o n the working class, Forces of Labor, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 2003 .
AFTER D IALE C T I C S 1 43and nation, largely suspended after the generation of Leninand Otto Bauer, is a theoretical advance, but the emphasisis now very differentY Compared with contemp oraryracism , class and class emancipation are no longercentral concerns . In a characteristically incisive conceptualanalysis, Balibar has demonstrated the curiously underdeveloped position of the proletariat in Capital, but hehas not taken it up a s a challenge; his contemporary socialanalysis has focused rather on the issues of nation, bo rder,citizenship and Europe.52 On the other hand, the postmodernist onslaught has largely put an end to feministarticulations of sex and gender presented in relation toclass; typically, a recent overview of third-wave feminismmakes no reference to class whatsoever. 5 3 Europe provided the origins of the concept and thetheory of class, which emerged early on the Europeanroad to modernity in internal conflicts between, on onehand, the prince the aristocracy and the higher clergy,and on the other, the Third Estate, the nation, thecommoners, the bourgeoisie, the people . Because of itsenduring Eurocentrism, Marxist theory has never properlyacknowledged or taken into proper comparative accountthe fact that Marx and later socialists inherited a classdiscourse from the French Revolution and from thep olitical economy of the British Industrial Revolution.European class mobilization and politics and Europ eanworking-class movements became models for the rest ofthe world. Europe still has significant parties claiming torepresent labour, and trade unions remain a substantialsocial force there . Nevertheless, in terms of analysis andsocial theory, class has been faring better in North America.5 1 . E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein, Race, nation, druse, Paris: La Decouverte, 1 988.52. E. Balibar, La crainte des masses, 22 1 50; Politics and the Other Scene, London:Verso, 2002; We, the People of Europe?, Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 2004.53. S . Gillies, G. Howie and R. Munford, eds, Third W ave Feminism, Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan 2004.
1 44 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI S M?The work of Erik Olin Wright has played a central rolein securing a legitimate location for Marxist class analysiswithin academic sociology. In a characteristically elegantapproach, a recent contribution structures the issue byasking, If class is the answer, what is the question? Wrightdiscerns six types of question which will frequently haveclass as part of their answers : • Distributional location: How are p e ople objectively located in distributions of material inequality? • Subjectively salient groups: What explains how people, individually and collectively, subjectively locate themselves and others within a structure of inequality? • Life chances: What explains inequalities in life chances and material standards of living? • Antagonistic conflicts: What social cleavages systematically shape overt conflicts? • Historical variation: How should we characterize and explain the variations across history in the social organization of inequalities? • Emancipation: What sorts of transformations are needed to eliminate oppression and exploitation within capitalist societies?54Wright then defines his own work, and that of Marxismgenerally, as primarily concerned with answering the lastquestion, while other approaches concern themselves withthe rest. The question is, however, formulated in a remarkably oblique way. It is not, for instance, What social processis crucial to the elimination of capitalist oppression andexploitation? To which the classical Marxist answer hasbeen: class struggle . Nor is it, What are the principal forcesmaintaining, or capable of changing and ending, capitalist5 4 . E. O . Wright, ed., Approaches to Class Analysis, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 200 5 .
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 145o ppression and exploitation? To which Marxists haveanswered: the bourgeoisie (o r the capitalist class) and theworking class, respectively. What exists of recent work on class struggles in theworld tends to come fro m North Ameri c a . S al ientexamples would be Beverly Silvers theoretically innovativeForces of Labour, or the global working-class overview inSocialist Register 2002. A decisive question for the futureof capital and labour in the world is how strong andcapable the new masses of urban labour in China, Indiaand other large Asian countries will become . However, there has also been a displacement, or at leasta marginalization, of class in some late offshoots of worldsystem analysis, obscuring it with perspectives focused oncontinents and continental populations. Such was theimplication of Gunder Franks characteristically hereticalslogan referred to above, Forget about c apitalism .Giovanni Arghi is less provocative, but his major newwork, pre- rather than post-Marxist, Adam Smith in Beijing,is ultimately concerned with relations among peoples ofEuropean and non-European descent, relations that Smithhoped would become more equal and mutually resp e ctfulwith world trade. There is no discussion about whethernew inter-civilizational relations would mainly be arapprochement of capitalists, managers and professionalsacross continents and civilizations, or about the prospectsof a new post-Marxist slogan, Upper and upp er-middleclasses of the world, unite ! You can best preserve yourprivileges by sticking together! Exits from the StateIn the 1 9 60s and 1 9 70s, the state was a major object ofcontending Marxist the orization . Its current, more starklycapitalist character may have removed it from the fro ntie ro f intellectual curiosity, and most of that interest hasmelted away, although Claus Offes post-Marxist critical
146 FROM MARXI S M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?analyses p resent a significant exception. 55 But there havebeen many different exits from the state . Firstly, we could distinguish the move from analysis ofthe national capitalist state and its modes of class rule tothe global network. Under the assumption that the nationstate, or at least its sovereignty, has declined in significance, political interest has turned to globalization andimperial global networks . Insofar as this involves a stepaway from methodological nationalism,56 the shift iswarranted . However, the bold claims of loss of state sovereignty have so far never been properly empirically argued.In any time perspective longer than a few decades, it mayeven be s eriously questioned. What was national sovereignty a hundred years ago in Africa, in Asia, in LatinAmerica? How sovereign were the then-new B alkan states?Were not the state boundaries of travel and migrationmuch more porous .a century ago than today? Nor canthe current world situation be properly understood beforethe position and capacity of the nation-state of the UShave been seriously investigated. Perhaps a global analysisof contemporary states would be more fruitful than focusing on a stateless globe? This is not the place to answersuch questions only to take notice of their not beingproperly answered, or even raised, by the mainstream shiftin the centre of theoretical gravity. Another move away from the state has involved a turnto civil society, as a basis for opposition to authoritarianrule and, in more utopian visions, as the best site for new social constructions . 57 The old concept whose distinctionfrom the state goes back to Hegel was revived by anti Communist dissidence in the f mal years of the decomposition of Eastern European C ommunism. It soon gained a worldwide reception, Left and Right, as a referent for5 5 . C. Offe, Modernity and the State, Cambridge: Polity, 1 99 6 .56. U. Beck, Macht und Gegenmacht im globalen Zeitalter, Frankfurt: SuhrkampVerla g KG, 2002, ch. 2 .5 7 . J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso, 1 98 8 .
AFTER DIALE C TI C S 147many different movements and strivings for CIVICautonomy. In Eastern Europe, civil-society dis course als ohad th e function o f keeping out any serious discussionabout political economy and the restoration of capitalism until the latter had become a fait accompli. C ivil societyas a concept has had a programmatically idealistic career,rather than having furthered analyses of variable patternsof sociability, association and collective conflict. A third exit from state theory was provided by movingto the more abstract level of political philosophy. Theautonomy or specificity of the political, in relation tomodes of production and to class structures, has been acentral theme of several major thinkers . A seminal workhere, once again, was Laclau and Mouffe s Hegemony andSocialist Strategy, with its sophisticated treatment of theclassical political-philosophy problem of universalism andparticularism, and their discursive substitution of thehegemonic struggles of particular interests for the struggleof classes . Drawn from completely different sources ofphilosophical inspiration, Habermass grand theory ofcommunicative action presented a normative programmeof a universalistic dialogical politics. 5 8 Fonner disciples of Louis Althusser have made distinctivenew contributions to radical political philosophy. 59 Balibar,the most circumspect and perhaps the most influentialamong them, has brought skilled textual readings to bearboth on pre-Marxian political philosophy eSpinoza,Rousseau, Locke, Fichte) and on the political theorization58. J. Habennas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 2 vols, Boston, MA: BeaconPress, 1 984-87. In an interesting abstention from argument, Ladau and Moufedismiss Habennass ideal of a non exdusive public sphere of rational argumentas a conceptual impossibility. A tyranny of concepts? See E. Ladau and C.Moufi"e, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, 2nd edition, London: Verso, 2000, xvii.59. J. Ranciere, Aux bords du politique, Paris: Gallimard 1 990; E. Balibar, Masses,Classes, Ideas, New York: Routledge 1 994; A. Badiou, Politics and Philosophy:An Interview with Alain Badiou, appendix to A. Badiou, Ethics, London:Verso, 200 1 .
148 F R O M MARX I S M TO POST MARXIS M?of violent antagonisms. Alongside the traditional left-wingpolitics of emancipation and transformation, Balibar hasreflected on a politics of civility, regulating the conflictof identifications . 6 0 Violence here appears more physicallytangible and more ambiguous, even dubious, in meaning,rather than in the cathartic form discussed by Sartre andFanon. While the anticapitalist nature of his project is veryexplicit and his philosophical erudition conspicuous,Slavoj Z izeks political philosophy appears more like astance than a reasoned deduction. A compulsively productive writer and formidable polemicist, with a seeminglyinexhaustible supply of cinematic and other contemporarycultural apercyus, Z izek has become an emblematic figureof contemporary radical iconoclasm. His Tito-era Slovenianb a c kground, as a former Communist turned antiCommunist dis sident, provides him at the same time witha classical left-wing political formation and with impeccably respectable liberal credentials . This combination hasin recent years made Z izek the only Leninist with an admiringWestern following. 6 1 Like that of most other radicalphilosophers today, Z izeks anticapitalist project is veryvague; this provoked an ill-tempered exchange betweenhim and Laclau, each accusing the other o f a politicalproject meaning nothing at all . 62 More noteworthy is anacknowledged ambivalence in Z izeks political position.His fascination with Lenin is accompanied by a seeminglyequivalent admiration of the authentic conservative who,like the British Empire Tories admired by Kipling, is notafraid of the necessary dirty work . 6 360. E. Balibar, La crainte des masses, ch. 1 .6 1 . S . Zizek, ed., Revolution a t the Gates, London: Verso, 2002.62. E. Ladau, Structure, History and the Political, in Butler et aI., eds, Contingency,Hegemony, Universality, 206; S . Zizek, Holding the Place, ibid . , 3 2 1 .6 3 . S . Zizek, The Ticklish Subject, London: Verso, 1 999, 236; Conversations withZitek, 5 0- 1 .
AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 49 Marxist state theory was more than anything else acritique of capitalist democracy, and had its sharpestanalytical edge when capitalism was trying to take coverunder liberal democracy. S ince about 1 9 80, it has felt noneed of such drapery, asserting itself in its own right andexplicitly seeking to rein in existing liberal democracy bymaking central banks independent of it and by trying torestrict economic policy options a priori by c onstitutionalor equivalent clauses. Under the impact of this, as wellas the imp act of globalization discourse on the new impo tence o f the state, radical political thought h a s paidincreasing attention to potentials for radical dem o c racy ,a project pushed b y the philosopher Chantal Mouffe andbest manifested by the lusophone legal-cum-political theorydeveloped by the B razilian Roberto Mangabeira Ungerand the Portuguese Boaventura de Sousa S antos . It should be added that while (post-) Marxists haveplayed truant from the state, sterling contributions toanalyzing the making of the European nation-states havebeen made from different perspectives by Michael Mannand Charles Tilly. 64 Return of SexualityThe distinction between (biological) sex and ( social)gender was first elaborated by Ann Oakley in 1 9 7 2, andthe question of the construction and transformation ofgender constituted a key theoretical focus for socialist andmainstream feminism in the 1 9 70s and 1 9 80s.65 But thegivenness of sex has more recently come under attack,sometimes in ways similar to the questioning of any nondiscursive givenness of class . The intellectual reas sertion64. M. Mann, The Sources of Social Power, vol. 2, C ambridge: C ambridgeUniversity Press, 1 9 93; C. Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States,AD 990 1 990, Oxford: WileyB1ackwell, 1 99 0 .6 5 . A. Oakley, Sex, Gender and Society, London: MT Smith, 1 972.
1 50 FROM MARXISM TO POST MARXISM?of sexuality has come from the American philosopherJudith Butler sex itself is a gendered category 66 andin theorizations from the French battleground of philosophy and p sychoanalysis . 6 7 O akley herself has concededthe untenability of the sex gender distinction. 6 8 Politically,the givenness of sex has been powerfully challenged byassertive homosexuality. The latter has achieved a certainspecific the oretical presence in Anglo-S axon academiaunder the b anner of queer theory . In a large body oftheory, inequalities between heterosexual men and womenhave b een overshadowed by discourses on homo- andtrans sexuality, constituting new though extremely minoritarian theoretical fields. Again, the displacement of genderhas a noteworthy similarity with the displacement ofclass . While raising awareness of human and socialcomplexity in important ways, neither tendency is likely,qua displacement, to be a helpful contribution to humanemancipation. The surge of literary-philosophical p ostmodernism infeminist discourse broke most of the links between feministtheory and the Left that had earlier come under the headingof socialist feminism. 69 Scandinavian welfare-state-orientedfeminists experienced the encounter with postmodernistfeminism as a shock.70 The cosmopolitan literary theoristToril Moi has felt compelled to provide an answer to thequestion What is a woman? for academic feminist milieux66. J. Butler, Gender Trouble, New York: Routledge, 1 990, 7 .6 7 . K. Oliver, French Feminism Reader, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000; D .Cavallaro, French Feminist Theory: An Introduction, London 2003 .6 8 . A. Oakley, A Brief History of Gender, in Who s Afraid of Feminism?,A. Oakley and J. Mitchell, eds, London: Continuum, 1 997, 29 5 5 .6 9 . S e e A. Oakley and J . Mitchell, eds, Who s Afraid of Feminism? For a globalmaterialist account of sex, gender and reproductive relations over the past century,see G. Therbom, Between Sex and Power: Family in the World, 1 900-2000, London:Routledge, 2004.70. Hildur Ve and Karin Waemess, oral communication.
AFTER D I ALE CTICS 151apparently disoriented a s to the answer.7 1 Yet it is also strikingthat feminism is today far more salient than the Left in theEuro-American world. The return of sexuality is also manifest in current Marxistand post-Marxist philosophy, in its eager pre o ccupationwith psychoanalysis. Z izek was trained as a Lacanian;Lac1aus recent work on populism is much interested inLacans objet petit a and other topics of the master. Belatedly,Balibar has followed his teacher, Althusser, into studies ofFreud and Lacan for instance in his Three Concepts ofPolitics albeit in a cautious and selective manner. 72 Homage to NetworksClassical nineteenth-century sociological the ory fo cusedon modes of social connectivity, distinguishing association from community. Mid-twentieth-century sociologyconcentrated on the group, whether primary or secondary,and on organizations. More recently, the network has replacedthe concept of structure or organization in s ocial theory.Network analysis of social connectivity has a b ackgroundin social p sychology, above all in the sociometric studiesof friendships in school milieux and in postwar communitystudies by anthropologists and family s ociologists . Theconcept was also used in US studies of the diffusion ofideas . From the 1 9 60s on, it was used to develop mathematical models for access, diffusion and power structure si n an expanding number of areas, from vacancy chains t osexual contacts and global city patterns. The key theoreticalfigures have been Harrison White and his students.73 Thenotion of the network reached a wider public in the 1 9 80s7 1 . T. Moi, Sex, Gender and Body, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.7 2 . E. Balibar, Masses, Classes, Ideas, ch. 7; Politics and the Other Scene.7 3 . H. White, Identity and Control, Princeton, Nl: Princeton University Press,1 9 92; J. Rule, Theory and Progress in Social Science, Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1 997, ch. 5 .
152 F R O M MARXISM T O P O ST MARXISM?through business-management studies that attempted tograsp and generalize the success of Toyota and otherJapanese corporations . Further interest was stimulated, ofcourse, by the electronic revolution and the Internet.Michael Mann made networks of interaction a central,though loosely used, concept in his monumental work onpower, with a view to avoiding any systemic or boundednotion of society .74 Networks are looser and more open than both groupsand organizations . They focus on individual actors andtheir resources, rather than on constituted collectivities,and they form channels for markets as well as for bureaucracies, movements and classes. As such, networks arehighly imp ortant social connections, tying togethercomplex, loosely coupled social systems. Their rise tocentre-stage in contemporary social theory and analysisshould be seen not only as deriving from intellectualdiscovery, but also as indicating changes in social relations .It was the post-Marxist sociologist Manuel C astells whoarticulated the network society in a magisterial work ofsocial analysis, setting out from new management conceptions and information technology without trying to relateit to previous sociological theory.75 Since then it hasbecome a key analytical concept in the influential neoMarxist enterprise of Hardt and Negris Empire (2000)and Multitude (2004) , in which both the global sovereignand its opposition are presented as network powers. Onthe other hand, while crucial to recent p ost- and neoMarxist s o cial theorizing, the network itself has nopolitical affiliation. Nor has it been subjected to any analytical critique or any scrutiny of its relative acumen and the74. M. Mann, Sources of Social Power, Cambridge: C ambridge University Press,1 9 86 . Two volumes have b een published thus far.7 5 . M. Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, 3 vols,Oxford: WileyBlackwell, 1 99 6 9 8 .
AFT E R DIALECTI C S 153boundaries of its indubitable fruitfulness. I t i s a conc eptstill enjoying its honeymoon undisturbed. Political EconomiesEuropean Western Marxism had always regarded politic aleconomy from something of a distanc e, and it is notsurprising that this should have widened over recentdecade s . Exceptions to the rule endure, among them theecologically oriented world-economic analyses of ElmarAltvater. 76 Until his premature death a few years ago, EgonMatzner carried on the classical Central EuropeanMarxis t tradition of e conomic analys i s . Anglo- S axonradicalism, by contrast, has always contained a strongcurrent of critical political economy, Marxist as well a snon-Marxist. While the spirited and forceful engagementwith liberal economics by British left-wing neo-Ricardiansof the 1 9 60s the aforementioned C ambridge, England,versus Cambridge, Massachusetts, debate on capital theory does not seem to have sustained any enduring encroachments on the dominion and self-confidence of liberalism,radical political economy in the Anglo-Saxon world is stillvery productive . Its major achievements in recent yearshave tended to derive from creative dis ciplinary cro s s fertilizations of e conomics and history, e c onomics andpolitical science, and economics and philo sophy. S elf-consciously heterodox, world-systems analysis hasbeen a vital force for critical social analysis. Developedfrom the mid- 1 9 7 0 s by Wallerstein and o thers, andcurrently being extended in new directions by Arrighi, ithas also proved stimulating to colleagues outside, andoften in disagreement with, the schoo l . Though pioneeredby so ciologists, the analysis is predominantly economic76. For example, E. Altvater, Der Preis des Wohlstands oder Umweltpliinderungund neue W elt(un) ordnung, Munster: Verlag Westfalisches Dampfboot, 1 9 9 2 .
1 54 F R O M MARXIS M TO P O S T MARXI S M ?and historical, while its attention to global power relationsadds a crucial political dimension. To date, it has proveda more fruitful approach than recent plunges into theoriesof globalization. With a unique sense of the limits of theself in history, Wallerstein has already warned his followersand collaborators of the projects coming demise; the basisfor his prediction was precisely its degree of success andits implicit recognition as a viable global analysis . 77 Onemay add that once the planetary world has been recognizedas a central, indeed as the most important, focus for socialanalysis, the rise of a number of different approaches toglobal studies is to be expected. The imminent-end-of-capitalism theses of Arrighi andWallerstein have b een noted above . Two other maj or,much more down-to-earth combinations of economicsand history avoid epochal power-shift theses or speculations . Robert Brenner, who first made his name withan account of the origins of capitalism so striking andiconoclastic as to engender the Brenner debat e ,discussed in chapter 2, h a s now produced a n economichistory of p ostwar advanced capitalism, The Economicsof Global Turbulence (2006) . 78 The driving analyticalforces here p owering through a wealth of empiricaldetail and its temporal vicissitudes are the tendency toovercapacity and a decline in profit rate . From Oxford,the late Andrew Glyn has provided a succinct and highlyreadable overview of recent capitalist development andits effects on human welfare .79 Brenner envisagescontinuing turbulence; Glyn saw declining prospects forrich-country workers and ended by questioning the7 7 . I. Wallerstein, The Rise and Future D emise of World Systems Analysis ,Review, xxi: 1, 1 99 8 .7 8 . See T . H . Aston and C . H . E . Philpin, eds, The Brenner Debate, Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1 985; R. Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence,London: Verso, 2006.7 9 . A. Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 200 6 .
AFTER D IALECTI C S 1 55meaning of further growth, opting for that curious utopiaof resignation, the Basic Income . Arrighi has recently returned t o Adam S mith in hismajor work on the new significance of C hina, theaforementioned Adam Smith in Beijing. In a c onvincingrereading of The W ealth of Nations, Arrighi shows howS mith the market economist was enveloped by Smith theEnlightenment moral p hilosopher concerned with globaljustice . Secondly, Arrighi argues that the failure of theProject for a New American C entury and the ris e ofC hina have brought the world closer to inter-national,inter-civilizational equality than it ever was . This is notjust because of the size and velocity of C hines e economicgrowth, but also because of its character, driven by marketopportunities without dispossession of the direct producers on the land and by intensive, low-cost but healthyand educated labour. The Chinese economy took off from the late 1 970s withhousehold agrarian production and with Township andVillage Enterprises for the (domestic) market, withoutdispossessing the rural p opulation of their means of subsistence, which is a different path of development from thatof European capitalism. But whether this warrants Arghishistorical and contemporary extrapolations is more doubtful. Starting from an analysis of recent China, Arghi arguesthat [t] he separation of agricultural producers from themeans of production has been more a consequence ofcapitalisms creative destruction than one of its preconditions,80 as Robert Brenner also has argued. Current Chinesemanufacturing triumphs certainly appear to be based onthe labour of a dispossessed working class, occasionallyeven falling into slavelike conditions, while rural educationand health care are, at least to some extent, falling by the80. G . jing, New York: Verso, 2007, 365 Arghi, Adam Smith in Bei
1 56 F R O M MARXISM TO P O S T MARXIS M?wayside with the introduction of fees which put thembeyond the reach of the poor. Arrighi has written a tourde force, but in the twenty-first century, national modelsof progres sive political economy have become much harderto sell . A recent, highly ambitious project at S anta Fe aims toproduce a radical political economy by bringing togethereconomics and political science . So far, its main output isGlobalization and Egalitarian Redistribution, edited byPranab B ardhan (an economist at Berkeley) , SamuelBowles (an economist and the director of the BehavioralS ciences Program at the Santa Fe Institute) and MichaelWallerstein (a political scientist at Yale) . For all its equationsand diagrams, the works lessons on the possibilities forredistributive policies under global constraints fairlysubstantial, the editors conclude may not be that novel .But it is also noteworthy for two other reasons : first, thep ower of its political-cum-economic modelling, on whichone participant, Adam Przeworski, has proved masterful,previously within an explicitly Marxist approach; andsecond, the generous mainstream economic backing fromthe Russell S age Foundation for a project on PersistentInequality in a Competitive World . The main straddler of economics and philosophy isprobably Amartya S en, but there have b e e n manyinterfaces between analytical philosophy and analyticaleconomic s . The tum of John Roemer from mathematicaleconomics to radical economic ethics from A GeneralTheory of Exploitation and Class ( 1 9 82) to Theories ofDistributive Justice ( 1 9 9 6) is an interesting trajectory and -remains, from a Left viewpoint, an honourable one .Economics and sociology were brought together in Lesstructures sociales de leconomie, one of the last major worksof Pierre B ourdieu . A penetrating investigation of theFrench housing market, it deploys some of his keyconcepts, such as the habitus of dispositions and the field of force and conflict, both in the empirical research
AFTER D I ALECTI C S 1 57and in a generalizing theoretical critique . 8 1 In Banking onDeath and Age Shock, Robin Blackburn has produced anambitious left-of-centre recasting of pension strategy foran ageing society, which builds on Rudolf Meidnersproposal for a share levy from corp orations to financesocial development. 8 2 P olitical economy also includes what is usually labelledinstitutional economics , non-Marxist but usually left-ofcentre . Many of its modern classics are now submergedunder neoliberal lava: Ragnar Frisch, Gunnar Myrdal, JanTinbergen. But below the pantheon there is still a vibrantsubculture of critical institutional economics. In its maincentres, Britain and France, this is still largely situatedwithin economics, but also benefits from elements ofsociological inquiry. In France, the main school has beenregulation theory; central representatives have includedMichel Aglietta, Robert Boyer and Antoine Reberioux.83In Britain, the post-Marxist Geoffrey Hodgson hasreturned to consider the relations between economics andhistory, as well as evolutionary theory. 84 THE REPERTOIRE OF P O SITIONSS ocial theorizing is still related to indeed, committedto specific political positions, and a sociological historyof the field must give some account of these, while steeringclear of the twin temptations of apology and denunciation.8 1 . P. Bourdieu, Les structures sociales de leconomie, Paris: Seuil, 2 000.82. R. Blackburn, Banking on Death, London: Verso, 2002; Age Shock: HowFinance is Failing Us, London: Verso, 2006.8 3 . M. Aglietta and A. Reberioux, Corporate Governance Adri ft, Cheltenham,UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005; R. Boyer and Y. Saillard, eds, Theorie dela regulation, Paris: La Decouvette, 1 9 9 5 ; J. R. Hollingsworth and R. Boyer,eds, Contemporary Capitalism: The Embeddedness of Institutions, C ambridge :Cambridge University Press, 1 99 7 .84. G. Hodgson, After Marx a n d Sraffa, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan,1 9 9 1 ; G. Hodgson, M. !toh and N. Yokokawa, Capitalism in Evolution,Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, 200 1 .
158 FROM MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXI S M?Fig u re 3 . 1 : Current Left Theoretico-Political Positions Marxism Resilient Marxism ! M a rxo l ogy & S c i e n t i fi c Marxism Neo-Marxism Post Marxism Socia l ism Capitalism Non-Ma rxist Left Postsocia l ism Non-Marxist Left ThoughtFigure 3 . 1 distinguishes two p oles, in relation to which thepolitics of recent left-wing thought might be located. Oneis theoretical: Marx and Marxism, as an intellectual tradition. The other is political: socialism, whose goal is a socialorder distinctively different from capitalism. (Socialismhas looser meanings too, but they do not pertain here.)The two axes form a system of coordinates, which may bedeployed as a heuristic searching device, though the resultsshould not be seen as a permanent address book. The diagram should, of course, be seen as a very approximate map, aiming to convey relative positions correctlybut making no claims about the scale of distances . Whatit shows first of all is that theory and politics are twodifferent dimensions, even among politically committedsocial theorists . Secondly, it suggests a new distance fromsocialism, in the sense of a distinctive, a ctually attainabletype of so ciety. Elaborating a conception of a socialistalternative has become a minority concern among theintellectual Left, although this does not, in most cases,imply a step into the capitalist fold.
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 59 In a continental comparison, left-of-centre intellectualcurrents in North America, both Marxist and non-Marxist,tend to be more to the left of Figure 3 . 1 s meridian thantheir European equivalents. On the whole, the resilience ofthe small North American Left stands out in comparisonwith the larger but much softer and more often disheartenedforces of Europe . It is the US that has produced such intransigent left-wing best-selling writers as Noam Chomsky and,more recently, Mike Davis . 85 The annual Socialist Regis terwas launched in the mid- 1 960s as a very British enterprise,but is now, in the new millennium, edited from Toronto .The classical left-wing journals of the US, like MonthlyReview and Science and Society, may now be shadows oftheir former selves, but they have survived. The hugeAmerican academic culture is still capable of sustaining arange of Left publications . Recent meetings of the AmericanSociological Association have been much more explicitlyradical than the European meetings. (True, European leftwing academics have more opportunities for extramuralpractice.) The great right tum occurred earlier in the US,with elements of the 1 9 4 0 s and 1 9 5 0 s trotskisant Leftbecoming cold warriors by the early 1 970s, spawning ageneration of rabid neoconservatives. The remainder of theAmerican Left was never hopeful about the immediatefuture, and would also be further removed from the blowsand reverberations of the Soviet implosion, the defeats ofEurocommunism and the surrenders of Eurosocialism . PostsocialismIf a certain distanc e from any explicit socialism hascharacterized most of the Euro-American Left recently,the elaboration of a postsocialist left-of-centre agenda has85. N. Chomsky, Deterring Democracy, New York: Verso, 1 9 9 1 ; M. Davis, Planetof Slums, London: Verso, 2006.
1 60 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXISM?become a specific project. The wasteland of triumphantThatcherism was a natural breeding-ground for postsocialis m . One effort was John Keanes celebration of civilsociety, as scornful of social democracy and its unworkable model of state-administered socialism as it was oftotalitarian communism. 86 In the last years of the ColdWar this p osition was riding high; a decade of capitalistimmiseration of large parts of Eastern Europe following1 9 8 9 elicited no qualification, or even comment, from theauthor. 87 A few years later, the sociological theorist AnthonyGiddens proclaimed his move Beyond Left and Rightin a book full of Thatcherite sneers at social democracyand the welfare state. 88 Brusquely dismissing the notionthat there could be any third way in the classic leftistsense b etween welfare socialism and CommunismGiddens in fact turned out to have prepared the groundfor a short-lived but nevertheless contemporarily uniquepolitico-theoretical p ostsocialist alliance that was soon,in its turn, dubbed the Third Way . For some years,Giddens became the officious theoretician of the Britishprime minister and his New Labour regime, giving anintellectual gloss to a party that had lost or rather severed any connection to first way social democracy, in thewake of a series of traumatizing defeats dealt by a ruthless (though always civically minoritarian) neoliberalism . Fora time, this proj ect did compris e a genuine relationbetween social theory and politics, although of a differentkind to that presupposed by the Marxist-socialist triangle dis cussed above . I t should be noted that, i n Europe atleast (there may still be some East Asian interest) , theattractions of the Third Way ended with the Realpolitik8 6 . J. Keane, Democracy and Civil Society, 2 6 .87. J. Keane, Introduction t o th e New Edition, Democracy and Civil Society.88. A. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right, Cambridge: Polity, 1 994, 73ff.
AFTER DIALECTICS 161o f invading tanks although i n contrast to Cze choslovakiain 1 96 8 , the tanks were headed out of the country andinto Iraq, with the Blair government a leading force inthe aggression. 89 Ideological controversy aside, Giddens s defence of theThird Way six years later provided an exemplarysummary, accurate yet concise, of the most importantcriticisms that had been levelled against it, to which heresponded with a wide range of social-scientific references . 90A sometime collaborator of Giddens, Ulrich Beck is aradical cosmopolitan democrat, for whom the Communismand socialism of Europes first modernity are now usedup ideas.91 The 1 9 9 8 autodissolution of Italys Democratic Partyof the Left and its eventual merger into the DemocraticParty in 2007 constitute, at least in form, even more ofa disavowal of social-demo cratic leanings than the BlairBrown proj ect of New Labour . Its courtier-theorist doesnot seem to b e in sight yet . Non-Marxist LeftSocial democracy, by far the maj or component of the nonMarxist Left, has produced few theoreticians of wideambition in recent years . The work of the Swedishsociologist Walter Korpi has largely centred on empiricalanalysis of social-policy institutions, but his explanatory89. Postsocialism has also had a generational dimension. In 1 994, Ralph Milibanddied; a prominent Marxist political scientist, author of The State in CapitalistSociety ( 1 969), Milibands unrepentant Socialism for a Sceptical Age ( 1 994) waspublished posthumously. In the same year his son, David, who was to b ecomeforeign secretary, edited an anthology, Reinventing the Left, i n which Giddenstabled a postsocialist agenda.90. A. Giddens, The Third Way, Cambridge: Polity, 1 99 8 ; The Third Way andIts Critics, Cambridge: Polity, 2000.9 1 . V. Beck, Risk Society; and Macht und Gegenmacht, 407.
1 62 FROM MARXISM TO P O S T MARXI SM?theorizations of power resources and the democratic classstruggle, together with his scientifically robust defence ofthe welfare state, are important contributions to s ocialtheory. 92 Politically, too, Korpi has remained a staunchsocial democrat. S candinavian social democracy has hadits share of recent defeats and demoralizations, hitting theDanes above all . But on the whole, it is still a major forceleft-of-centre. French sociology has generally remained left-of-centre ,even while the media and the principal intelle ctualplatforms in Paris have veered sharply to the right. 9 3 Duringthe 1 99 0s, the most outstanding contribution was that ofPierre Bourdieu . Out of the spotlight in the heyday of ruedUlm Marxism, Bourdieu built up a fonnidable reputation as a top-class social researcher before emerging latein life as the foremost intellectual spokesman of the anticapitalist Left, not only in France but in Europe generally.His was a powerful voice against the capitalist misery ofthe world even though he did not hold out the prospectof a socialist horizon, nor did he ever condone the existingorder. 94 There has been little radical programmatic thinking insocial democracy anywhere since the ambitious butpolitically ill-fated wage-earner-funds p roposal by theSwedish blue-collar unions, for a while reluctantly adoptedby the Swedish Social Democratic Party. Most distressinghas been the absence of any significant s ocial-democraticvisions in Eastern Europe . It is instead a B razilianAmerican legal philosopher, Roberto Mangabeira Unger,92. W. Korpi, The Democratic Class Struggle, London: Routledge, 1 9 83; W.Korpi and J. Palme, The Paradox of Redistribution and Strategies of Equality,American Sociological Review 6 3 : 5 , 1 99 8 .93. A. Touraine, Beyond Neoliberalism, Oxford: Polity, 2 00 1 .94. P. Bourdieu et al ., La misere du monde, Paris: La S euil, 1 993 ( The W eightof the World, S tanford 1 999); P. Bourdieu, Contre-feux, Paris: Liber Raions d agir,1 998 (Firing Back: Against the T yranny of the Market, New York: New Press,2003) .
AFTER DIALE C T I C S 1 63who has had the imagination to write What Should theLeft Propose? an answer to that very question. His appealto the petty-bourgeois longing for a condition of modestprosperity and independence and to a universal desirefor national sovereignty may sound timid. But his proposalsfor institutional change are potentially far-reaching. Theseare guided by five institutional ideas : high domesticsavings and taxation as a basis for national independence;social policy based on empowerment and capacity; democratization of the market economy and achievement of an upward tilt in the return to labour ; a universalresponsibility for c aring work; and a high-energydemocratic politics. 95 The World Social Forums, one of the most importantand inspiring developments in left-wing p olitics in the newmillennium, have so far spawned little social theory; thePortuguese legal scholar B oaventura de Sousa S antos has,however, made a sterling contribution in trying to analyzeand interpret this complex and heterogeneous movement.96At the same time, themes of inequality or working conditionsunder capitalism, long central to the Left, have also beentheorized in radical ways outside it . The c ontrastingapproaches of Richard Sennett, highly literary anddescriptive, and of Charles Tilly, always rigorously systematic, provide two powerful examples . 97 Radical socialtheory remains a big house, with many doorways.95. R. Mangabeira Unger, What Should the Left Propose?, London: Verso, 2005,1 66, 24-3 1 .9 6 . See the Verso series, Reinventing Social Emancipation: Towards New Manifestos,London: Verso, 2006 and forthcoming.9 7 . R. Sennett, Respect in a World of Inequality, New York: Allen Lane, 2003;R. Sennett, The Culture of the New Capitalism, New Haven, CT: Yale UniversityPress, 2006; C. Tilly, Durable Inequality, Berkeley: University of CaliforniaPress, 1 9 98; D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and C. Tilly, Dynamics of Contention,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200 1 .
1 64 FROM MARX I S M TO P O S T MARXIS M? Marxology and Scientific MarxismThe northeastern quadrant of Figure 3 . 1 is not necessarilyempty. It is logically possible, today more than ever, toabstain from any anticapitalist practice or ideologicalstance while nonetheless finding Marx to b e an insightfuland intellectually stimulating analyst of capitalism . PaceBurawoy and Wright, such a position is not necessarilydegenerate, cynical or pessimistic .98 Given the normalcultural-political emb eddedness of social science, however, we should expect this field to b e very spars elypopulated. The most salient contemporary example ofthis po sition is the Indian-British economist MeghnadDesai, appointed by Tony Blair to the House of Lords.With the help of its library, he has written a spiritedaccount of the dynamics of capitalism, in which Marxj oins hands with H ayek. Marxs Revenge (20 0 2) is arehabilitation of Marx the social scientist of capitalistpolitical economy, originally inspired by a rereading ofLenin and the classical Marxist economists, while takingan agnostic position as to whether any postcapitalistsocial order is possib l e . Here we may als o situate BritishAcademy Marxist historiography. The last years of the twentieth century saw two remarkable synthetic readings of Marx: Specters ofMarx by JacquesDerrida ( 1 9 9 3) and The Postmodern Marx by Terrell C arver ( 1 9 9 8) . Derrida and Carver both saw Marxes, in the plural;both underlined, in a sympathetic yet critical way, thepolitical significance of Marx, but as a historical figure,out of joint with the Marxism of any contemporary movements . Derrida now placed his own whole oeuvre ofdeconstruction within a certain tradition of Marxism,within a certain spirit of Marxism, while illuminating his9 8 . M. Burawoy and E. O. Wright, Sociological Marxism, in Handbook ofSociological Theory, ed. J. Turner, New York: Springer, 2002, 484.
AFTER DIALECTI C S 165reading with literary pyrotechnics . 99 Carvers postmodernismwas a mild one, which did not c onfront modernity o rthe Enlightenment and manifested itself mainly in aperceptive analysis of Marxs language and writing strategies in various texts . 1 00 Post-MarxismPost-Marxism is used here in an open sense, referring towriters with an explicitly Marxist background, whoserecent work has gone beyond Marxist problematics andwho do not publicly claim a continuing Marxist commitment. It is not tantamount to ex-Marxism, nor does itinclude denunciation or renegacy; development and newdesires, yes, maybe even divorce, but only on amicableterms . The boundaries between post- and neo-Marxismhave become blurred in recent times, and some importantwriters E tienne Balibar, for example may well be listedunder both rubrics. Here, no critical evaluation is investedin the grouping; however, the term neo-Marxist will beused only for theoretical projects which both signal asignificant departure from classical Marxism and retainan explicit commitment to it. Ladau and Mouffe, accepting a post-Marxist label, referto the reappropriation of an intellectual tradition, as wellas the process of going beyond it . 1 0 1 Hegemony and SocialistStrategy, discussed above, may be regarded as one of themost important contributions from this position. Deployinga series of formidable abstractions, the authors toil throughclassical Marxist political theory, from German and Russiansocial democracy to Gramsci. But the crux of their project99. J. Derrida, Spectres de Marx, 1 5 1 . See also the discussion of Derridas bookin Ghostly Demarcations, ed. M. Sprinker, London: Verso, 1 99 9 .1 0 0 . T . Carver, The Postmodem Marx, Manchester: Manchester University Press,1998, 2 . 1 0 1 . E . Ladau and C . Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, ix.
1 66 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?remains the French Revolution in itself a venerabletradition, from Marx and Lenin to Gramsci and the callfor radical democracy, in which a socialist dimension isto be achieved by deepening the democratic revolution . German critical theory was arguably the first majorcurrent of post-Marxism, politically implicit in the frozensilence of Adorno and Horkheimer after the Second WorldWar, loftily explicit in the work of Jirgen Habermas . Asa post-Marxist, Habermas has remained an intellectualand theoretician of a liberal (in the American sense) Left,b ecoming a left-of-centre conscience of the West Germannation far less radical than Sartre but more widelyhearkened to . In recent years, he has grappled with them oral issues surrounding genetic engineering and hasstruggled to come to terms with the increasingly violentand disagreeable implications of a Westbindung with theUS a b ond to which Habermas, as a German antinationalist, has always been committed. In the context ofthe invasion of Iraq, there occurred an interesting, moreEuropeanist rapprochement between Habermas andDerrida. 1 02 For this overview, however, it is Habermassprogramme of dialogical politics laid out in his magnumopus on communicative action and his defence of modernity as an unfinished project that have to be underlined. 1 03Claus Offe, once Habermas s student, and a long-timepost-Marxist, is one of the few who, as a prominentpolitical scientist, has continued the 1 9 60s 7 0s Marxistpreoccupation with the state, among other things takingit into the post-C ommunist states of Eastern Europe. 1 04 The current professorial successor of the Frankfurt School is Axel Honneth. His most important work has1 02 . G. Borradori, Philosophy in a Tim e of Terror: Dialogues with Jurgen Habermasand Jacques Derrida, Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 2003.1 03 . J. Habermas, Theory of Communicative Action; Der Philosophische Diskurs derModerne.1 04. C. Offe, Modernity and the State.
AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 67conc erned the struggl e for recognition, initiated as atopic for modern social philo sophy by Hegel s analysisof the dialectic of the master slave relatio n . Honnethhas further differentiated this into three spheres : l ove,law and solidarity. l 0 5 In a debate with the Americanphilosopher Nancy Fraser, who was spurred by strident USidentity politics into defending redistribution, Honnethargued for a nonnative theory of experiences of injusticethat would be broader than the more or less utilitariananthro p o l o gy of M arxism . l 06 From an egalitarianperspective, as I have argued elsewhere, recognition maybe seen as a crucial aspect of existential equality, one ofthree fundamental dimensions of (in) equality; givenHonneths background, the modernist optimism of his observations on moral progress may also be worth noting. 1 07 Po st-Marxism has not been limited to textual reinterpretation; it may equally well take the form of newempirical forays or social commentary. Two of the mostextraordinary works to emerge from a Marxist backgroundare the landmark sociological analysis of world society byManuel Castells, noted ab ove, and the strikingly ambitioushistorical mediology o f Regis Debray. The latter beginsfrom a critique of the Marxist concept of ideology, andan engagement with the Althus serian dis cussion ofide ological state apparatuses , opening out onto a longueduree exploration of the materiality of mediated communication, or the mechanics of [cultural] transmission,with a particular focus on Judaism and Christianity. I DS1 0 5 . A. Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of SocialConflict, Cambridge, MA: Polity, 1 99 5 .1 06. N . Fraser and A. Honneth, Redistribution o r Recognition?, London: Verso2003, 1 27 .1 07 . G. Therborn, Understanding and Explaining Inequality, i n Therbom,ed., Inequalities of the World, London: Verso, 2006, 1 86ff.1 08 . R. Debray, Media Manifestos, London: Verso, 1 9 96; Transmitting Culture,New York: Columbia University Press, 2000.
1 68 FRO M MARXIS M TO P O ST MARXI S M ?Theoretically original and skilfully crafted, these worksare first of all contributions to social analysis rather thanto social theory; as such, they are outstanding achievements. Finally, the prolific output of social commentaryby Zygmunt B auman has had a strong transnationalresonance; at heart, this is a sociological variety of p ostmodernism . Baumans recent writings travel light,burdened neither by research nor by the oretical analytics,but borne up by an unusual life wisdom, a trainedobservers eye and a fluent pen. 1 09 Neo-MarxismFor all its political defeats, the intellectual creattvIty ofMarxism has not come to an end. The last decade hasseen the emergence of at least two highly original, hardhitting discourses, which explicitly derive from and buildupon Marxist legacies. We have already noted the irreverentphilosophical p olitics of Slavoj Z izek, who has not onlyradically renewed Marxist cultural criticism but vigorouslydefends an iconoclastic Marxism against conformist liberalscoundrels . Z izeks oeuvre includes a spirited defence ofclassical modernity and the extensive use of popularcinema in cultural-philosophical commentaries. He hasflown in the face of conventional wisdom to the extent ofintroducing, with commentary, a new selection of Leninswritings from 1 9 1 7 . 1 1 0 Z izeks exhortation to repeat Leninposits an openness to the possibilities for radical socialchange in an app arently hop eless situation, followingdisastrous defeat in Lenins case, the First World Warand the breakup of the Second International .1 09 . Z. B auman, Intimations of Postmodernity, London: Routledge, 1 9 92;Liquid Modernity.1 1 0. See respectively: Did Somebod Say T y otalitarianism?, London: Verso, 2002,4; Ticklish Subject; Revolution at the Gates.
AFTER D IALE CTICS 1 69 The s e c o n d maj o r manifestation o f n e o - Marxism,H ardt and Negri s Empire and Multitude, claims to havefound the revolutionary exit of the twenty-first century:This is a revolution that no p ower will contro l becausebio-power and communism, co-op eratio n and revolutionremain together, in l ove, simplicity, and also inno cence.This is the irrepre ssible lightness and joy of b eingc ommunist. Or again : The p o ssibility of democracy on a global scale is emerging today for the first time . . . After this long season o f violence and contradictions . . . the extraordinary accumulation of grievances and reform propo sals must at s ome point be transformed by a strong event, a radical insurrectionary demand . . . In time, an event will thrust u s like an arrow into that [already] living future . 1 l 1Hardt and Negri also refer to the Lenin o f State andRevolution as an inspiration for the destruction ofsovereignty, though here combined with the Madisonianconception of checks and balances. The two bodies ofwork have several features in common, in addition to theirupbeat radicalism and international publishing success.Both are essentially works of political philosophy if one -accepts that Z izeks main b ooks are The Sublime Object ofIdeology ( 1 9 89) and The Ticklish Subject ( 1 999) ratherthan of social theory. Negri and Zizek are p rofessionalphilosophers, while Negris former Paris student Hardt isa literary theorist with a philosophical orientation. Bothsets of authors write with verve and gusto in a baroquestyle of assemblage, displaying an impressive erudition anda capacity for association which encompasses a great1 1 1 . Respectively: M. Hardt and A. Negri, Empire, 4 1 3, italics omitted; Multitude,Cambridge, MA: Penguin Putnam, 2004, xi, 358.
1 70 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXI SM?number of fields and traditions, at high speed and withlittle time for historical contextualization or empirical investigation. Different variants of dissident C ommunism, anda more similar mainstream-Communist family of origin,form the political backgrounds of Negri and Z izek: respectively, the spontaneist and violent Italian Far Left, and ameandering Slovenian C ommunism-cum-dissidence. Theyare also in line with Western Marxist practice in the senseof reading and using Marx through the lenses of othergreat European intellectual traditions primarily thepsychoanalysis of Lac an, but also a philosophical spectrumwith Heidegger at its centre in the case of Z izek, and thephilosophy of Spinoza in the case of Negri. Moreover,their dazzling style as thinkers has attracted readers farremoved from their own political or philosophical stance. One of Z izeks most recent books, The Parallax View,presents itself as his most substantial work in many years .It revolves around a well-chosen metaphor: parallax i s theapparent displacement of an object (the shift of its positionagainst a background) caused by a change in observationalposition that provides a new line of sight . But thisambitious volume, in the authors usual style of far-rangingassociations, anecdotes, cinematography and polemicalshock, also shows the diminishing returns of this sort offree-wheeling critique. While Z izek still draws some interesting apen;:us out of his hat, many of his thematic discussions lack both a cutting edge and analytical depth forexample, his patient rebuttal of the Lacanian Jean-C laudeMilners Zionist ranting; his respectful scepticism towardsAlain Badious exalted defence of revolutionary terror;or his Napoleonic analogy in support of his thesis of thehistorical necessity of the Stalinist outcome of the O ctoberRevolution. I 1 21 1 2 . S . Zizek, The Parallax View, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2 0 0 6 , 253ff,292 3, 326ff.
AFTER DIALECTICS 171 While Z izek may say, I have nothing whatso ever to dowith sociology, 1 1 3 the work of Hardt and Negri doesdirectly pertain to social analysis their Fran co-Italianphilosophical mode of writing notwithstanding. Theirapproach centres around two key concepts, Empire andmultitude, both taken from Spinoza . Hardt and Negri interpret Spinozas imperium simply as sovereignty, and in theirwork the concept has nothing of the material concretenessof, say, the Roman or the British empires. Rather, it is aglobal network to which sovereign power has migratedfrom the nation-states, and in this sense is a step forward ,as these authors of a self-proclaimed postmodemity assertin a typically modernist way. The concomitant to Empireis the multitude , which here replaces the Marxist proletariat and the people of classical democratic theory. Themass workers of Negri s ultraleft Italy of the 1 9 60s 7 0sare now writ (globally) large as mass intellectuality . Themultitude is similarly comprised of all the planets workersand poors , now increasingly interrelated across asmoothed world space of withering civil s o ciety anddeclining national boundaries, by common kn o wledge andcommon relationships . Its expanding practice will bringabout global democracy, a future that is already living .Socialism remains absent from this prophetic vision. 1 1 4 In their emphasis on information and networks, especiallyas the new locus for sovereignty, there is a diagnostic similarity between Hardt and Negris work and the empiricallygrounded, end-of-millennium analysis by C astells. Themost important divergence between them concerns socialdifferentiation. In contrast to one global multitude in anexpanding, virtuous spiral of commonality, 1 I 5 Castellsdefines the truly fundamental social cleavages of theInformation Age :1 1 3 . S . Z izek and G . Daly, Conversations with Ziiek, 3 2 .1 1 4 . Respectively: M . Hardt a n d A. Negri , Empire, 4 3 , 3 3 6 ; Multitude,348-50, 3 5 8 .1 1 5 . M . Hardt and A. Negri, Multitude, 350.
172 F R O M MARXI S M T O POS T MARXISM? First, the internal fragmentation of labour between informational producers and replaceable generic labour. Secondly, the social exclusion of a significant segment of society made up of the discarded individuals whose value as workers/consumers is used up, and whose relevance as p eople is ignored. 1 1 6A major empirical work on the workers of the world,Silvers Forces of Labor, alluded to above, concludes on anote similar to C astellss: there is no reason to expect that just because capital finds it profitable to treat all workers as interchange able equivalents, workers would themselves find it in their interests to accept this. Rather, insecure human beings (including workers) have good reasons to insist on the salience of non-class borders and boundaries (e.g., race, citizenship, gender) . 1 1 7While the best-sellers o f Hardt and Negri, like those ofZ izek, testify to the continuing creativity and attractivenessof Marxist traditions, sociologically minded readers at leastare likely to be sceptical of the formers invocation ofSpinozan claims that prophetic desire is irresistible andthat the prophet can produce its [sic] own people . l 1 s A Resilient LeftThe recent traj ectory of Marxism also includes a modeof resilience, cutting its path through thickets of adversityacross an altered, unmapped terrain. The London-basedNew Left Review, having become the generally recognized1 1 6 . M. Castells, The Information Age, vol. 3, 346, italics omitted.1 1 7 . B. Silver, Forces of Labor, 1 77 .1 1 8 . M. Hardt and A . Negri, Empire, 6 5 .
AFTER D IALE CTI C S 1 73flagship of left-wing social thought, at least in the Anglophone world and in fact hors pair in other languageareas, including in the francophone and hispanophoneworlds (there is now a Spanish edition, which joins itsItalian, Greek and Turkish stable-mates) successfullyrelaunched itself in 2000 with a manifesto of intransigence,of uncompromising realism . 1 1 9 Perry Anderson, the guiding spirit of the NLR for more than forty years as well asthe pilot of the relaunch, is not only a major Marxisthistorical scholar but also a master of intellectual critique,and is capable of applying those critical powers to Marxismitself. 1 2 0 Historically, the NLR might best be called a neo-Marxistj ournal, always keen on theoretical innovations, with amuted enthusiasm for straight political economy andplainly uninterested in exegesis and concomitant polemics .Brilliance and radicalism have been the NLR criteria forpublication, never orthodoxy of whatever kind. This comesat a price of short-term political insignificance, althoughthe journal has always cultivated contributions from andon radical social movements, from the student movementof the 1 9 60s to the altennondialiste movements of the2000s. And NLRs outspoken political radicalism has notprevented its being included in the Social S cience CitationIndex. Some other important mouthpieces of EuropeanMarxism have also survived above all, three Germanpublications, Das Argument, Prokla and Sozialismus(originally entitled Contributions to Scientific Socialism),which have yet to confront a generational succession;but also the British j ournal Capital and Class. The1 1 9 . P. Anderson, Renewals, New Left Review 2: 1, January February 2 000, 1 4 .1 20. P. Anderson, In the Tracks of Historical Materialism, London: Verso, 1 983;A Zone ofEngagement, London: Verso, 1 992; The Origins OfPoslmodernity, London:Verso, 1 998.
174 F R O M MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?philosophical-feminist couple Wolfgang Fritz and FriggaHaug still direct Das Argument, and the economist ElmarAltvater guides Prokla (an acronym for Problems of ClassStruggle) . More generally intellectual or directly politicallyoriented journals have been more vulnerable. The FrenchLes T emps Modernes survived the death of Sartre and deBeauvoir but is no longer a major Left publication. Theonce very lively British publication Marxism Today foldedwith the ending of the Soviet Union. In Italy, the Rivistadel Manifesto gave up in 2004. New journals have also been started up, often withpowerful publishers backing. Historical Materialism is putout by the Dutch academic publisher Brill in Leiden. TheAmerican-based Rethinking Marxism is published byRoutledge, which is now also taking over the relaunched(although still under its old editor) late Cold War antiS oviet journal Critique as a Journal of Socialist Theory .American Cold War survivors Monthly Review and Scienceand Society have also weathered the American victory. Theoriginally British annual Socialist Register is now editedfrom Toronto . Even France has a couple of postcrisisj ournals, such as the banner-flying, philosophicallyoriented Actuel Marx. Insofar as they have soldiered on, the EuropeanCommunist parties and their successors have mostlyshown little intellectual Marxist resilience. Most of theEastern European ex-CPs have situated themselves wellto the right of Scandinavian social democracy. The oncelargest Western European C P, the Italian, has, as wehave noted, rec ently broke with social democracy toembrace plain demo cracy . The innovative and selfcritical East German fonner PDS and its Rosa LuxemburgFoundation, however, do retain some commitment toMarxism, as do the two remaining orthodox parties, theGreek and the Portuguese. The Great Encyclopaedia of resilient Marxism is theHistorisch-Kritisches Worterbuch des Marxismus, directed by
AFTER D IALE CTI C S 175the Haugs and published by Das A rgument in Hamburg,in cooperation with the Free University of Berlin and theHamburg University of Economics and Politics . In itshigh-level intellectual doggedness, the Dictionary is aunique exemplar of the refusal to surrender. C onceivedin the 1 980s and launched in 1 994, it is planned to extendto some fifteen or more volumes . Although largely a Gennanproject, its eight hundred collaborators include EtienneBalibar, Pablo Gonzalez C asanova and other internationalfigures. It has a bilingual website : www.hkwm . de .Volume 6 , which appeared in 2004, took us u p to Justice .At its planned two-year pace, the project will b e completedin 2022 . Marxism here is not only understood in itsbroadest ecumenical sense, but also read across a widesociocultural register. To take some random examples,there are entries on Brecht, double-work and Dummheitin der Musik (stupidity in music) . The 1 990s also saw an ambitious attempt at an exegeticalreconstruction of Marxs critique of political economy,Moishe Postone s Time, Labor and Social Domination( 1 99 3), and a valiant and pedagogical defence of dialecticalthinking by another American, Bertell Ollmans DialecticalInvestigations ( 1 9 93) . 1 2 1 Postones reading takes theconcepts of value and commodity one level of abstractionfurther from socio-economic analysis, into a conception ofsocial domination reminiscent of Max Webers iron cageof rationalization which subjects people to impersonal,increasingly rationalized structural imperatives andconstraints that cannot adequately be grasped in terms ofclass domination . . . It has no determinate locus. 1 2 2 As1 2 1 . Oilman has continued his dialectical teaching into the new millennium,now provided with a choreography of dialectical investigation, Dance of theDialectic, Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 2003, 1 69 .1 22 . Postone summarizing his own book, Critique and Historical Transformation, Historical Materialism 1 2 : 3, 2004, 5 9 .
1 76 FROM MARXI S M TO P O S T MARXISM?commercial evidence for a resilient interest in Marxism,one might also cite the multivolume Retrospective onMarx and his work put out by Routledge in the 1 99 0 s, ofwhich the eight volumes on Marxs social and politicalthought, edited by Bob Jessop, are the most pertinenthere. 1 2 3 A monumental document of resilience, though of lessthan encyclopaedic format, is the Critical Companion toContemporary Marxism (2007) , 1 2 4 almost eight hundredpages long, put out by the j ournal Historical Materialismand edited by the French philosophers Jacques Bidet andStathis Kouvelakis . Bidet has made another large-scaleattempt at a reconstruction of Marxism, on the basis ofthe du al m arket- and organization-b ased matrix ofmodernity . The Companion has a predominantly Frenchphilosophical tone and is published with subsidies fromthe Ministere fran9aise charge de la culture, in spite of beingput out in English in the Netherlands but covers a wideground, mainly of textual explication and contemporaryintellectual history. Its most interesting contribution is adetailed, albeit not explanatory, overview by Andre Toselof the recent fate of Marxism, as philosophical theory andas scholarship, in Italy and France. Individual examples of resilience are plentiful and, onceagain, extend across a far wider disciplinary field than thatof social theory. But two deserve to be added to thisinevitably p artial and limited selection . Among the fewpolitical survivors of the French evenements of 1 9 68, DanielBensaid is a leading Trotskyist cadre and the author ofthe well-written Marx for Our Times. On the other side ofthe Channel, Alex Callinicos is probably the most prolific123. B. Jessop and C . Malcolm Brown, eds, Karl Marxs Social and PoliticalThought, 4 vols, London: Routledge, 1 990; second series, Bob Jessop and RussellWheatley, eds, London: Routledge, 1 9 9 9 .1 24 . Brill: Leiden.
AFTER DIALE CTI C S 177o f contemporary Marxist writers, with a wide-ranging 5philosophical, s ocial and p olitical bibliography. 1 2 In a recent, s omewhat unsystematic collection of autobiographies by s ociologists of the 1 9 6 0 s cohort, two inparticular, by Michael Burawoy and Erik Olin Wright,keep the banner of Marxism flying. 1 2 6 Burawoy, an incisive,theoretically driven ethnographer of work, and Wright�the no less theoretically driven researcher of class structures�have also signalled a joint project to build sociologicalMarxism. 1 2 7 How far this will develop in practice remainsto be seen, but as a plan it is the most ambitious scholarlypro ject of resilient Marxism, with great potential . Whileinnovative in intention building its reassertion of theMarxist political agenda as well as its c ore analytics, minusthe theory of value, makes resilient a more apt epithethere than neo . Burawoy and Wri ght s s o ci o l o gicalMarxism has an explicitly normative a s well as scientificcommitment, linked to the political project of challengingcapitalism as a social order . Its sociological core is theconcept of class as exploitation, with a research agendathat follows fro m a the ory of the c ontradictory reproduction of contradictory class relations essentially, aMarxian analysis of capitalism and its p olitical and ide o logical institutions, though shorn of the o riginal shistorico-philo s o phical wrapping . Intrinsic here i s th eassumption that th e capitalist dialectic i s still operating,though in a somewhat smoothed-over fashion: First, the dynamics of capitalist devel opment generate changes in technology, the labour process, cl ass1 2 5 . As a small sample, see, for example, A. Callinicos, Against Postmodernism,An Anti Capitalist Manifesto; The Resources of Critique, Cambridge: Polity, 20 06.1 2 6 . A. Sica and S . Turner, eds, The Disobedient Generation, Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 200 5 .1 2 7 . Burawoy and Wright, Sociological Marxism, 459 86.
178 FRO M MARXI S M T O P O ST MARXISM? structure, markets, and other aspects of capitalist relations, and these changes continually pose new problems of social reproduction . . . Second, class actors adapt their strategie s in order to take advantage of the weaknesses in existing institutional arrange ments. Over time, these adaptive strategies tend to erode the ability of institutions of social reproduction to effectively regulate and contain class struggles . 1 28Reproduction is especially problematic and conflictual forclass relations : S ocial relations within which antagonisticinterests are generated will have an inherent tendency togenerate conflicts, in which those who are harmed will tryto change the relation in que stion. 1 29 Instead of going onto demonstrate the p ower of this programme, the authorsveer off into one of their pet utopias, the universal basicincome; but that should not detract from the immensevalue of their concise, concrete and j argon-free restatementof Marxism as a contemporary science. While aware ofthe implications attendant upon a nineteenth-centuryism, Burawoy and Wright retain it as a marker ofbelonging to and continuing a tradition. 1 3 0 LOOKING AHEADWhat emerges, first of all, from this overview is the uneveneffect of the broken triangle of classical Marxism politics,social science and philosophy. In the North Atlantic region(and the rest of the world is not so different, with a fewlocal exceptions in Indo-Latin America) , Marxist politicshas either disappeared or become completely marginalized;at best, as a sympathetic observer of Kerala, Tripura or1 28 . Ibid . , 4 7 3 .1 29 . Ibid . , 474.1 3 0 . Ibid. , 460n.
AFTE R DIALE C T I C S 179West Bengal might put it, it has been suspended. Thesocialist horizon, bright red just three decades ago, hasvanished. On the other hand, left-wing intellectual creativity hasnot ceased. Its greatest moments may have passed : notonly the moment of Marx and Engels, but also th at ofthe Second International, from Kautsky to Lenin; ofWestern Marxism from Lukacs to Gramsci; of Easternand Southern Marxism from Mao to Mariategui; even themore recent moments of Althus ser, Bourdieu and theirdifferent national equivalents. But there is much m oreof an intellectual Left production today than, say, fortyor fifty years ago . The left-wing generation of the 1 9 60s,particularly of thos e radicalized before the romanticmoment of 1 968, has not surrendered. The value o f thethematic changes in discourse, noted above, is debatable,but they do not appear to be promising objects of denunciation. The existing repertoire of positions is unlikely toplease everyone, but it does nevertheless include rallyingpoints for ne arly everybody on the Left. However, formative generational experiences tend tohave enduring effects, and this writers critical distance is,of course, suspect. His views are those of someone fromthe 1 9 60s generation, writing about his contempo raries,about his comrades or former comrades . What abo ut theprospects ahead? C apitalism still produces, and will continue to produce,a sense of outrage . To that extent, a line of continuityfrom the nineteenth through the twentieth and twentyfirst centuries will remain, in resistance as well as incritique. Coming philosophers are almo st certain topublish new readings of Marx. Twenty-first-century anticapitalist resisters and critics are unlikely to forget thesocialist and communist horizons of the past two hundredyears . But whether they will see the dawn of a differentfuture in the same colours is uncertain, perhap s evenimprobable . New cohorts of anticapitalist social scientists
1 80 FROM MARXI S M TO PO ST MARXISM?will certainly emerge, and many will read Marx, but itmay b e doubted whether many will find it meaningful tocall themselves Marxists . The classical Marxist trianglehas been broken and is most unlikely to be restored. The resilience of the 1 960s Left spans an importanthistorical caesura. This was the generation that lived b oththe peak of working-class strength in develope d capitalism and the beginning of its decline. It saw both the imageof revolution, in 1 968, and the implosion of the revolutionary perspective in 1 9 89-9 1 , a perspective that hadopened up in 1 78 9 and 1 9 1 7 . In the interim, it experiencedthe genuine sex and gender revolution of the late twentiethcentury. It was the generation which lived through, andcriticized, the climax of North Atl antic capitalism andwhich went on to witness the return of East and S outhAsia to the front stage of the world. For contingent, practical rea sons spaceltimeavailability and linguistic limitations this overview hasbeen confined to the North AtlanticlNorth American area.That is still the base whence the most deadly bombersand missiles take off, but it is no longer the chief fronton which the destiny of capitalism in the twenty-firstc entury will b e decided. Hence the extraordinaryimp ortance of global theorizing and, even more, of globalempirical investigations . The new radical elan of Latin America awaits its majoranalyses. From the cross-fertilization of domestic placeholding Indian Marxism and the postcolonial creativityof South Asias brilliant intellectual diaspora should comesomething which rises to the level of the regions risingimpo rtance and intriguing complexity. The small left-wingChinese intelligentsia has the incomparable advantage ofa front-row seat for the current turn of world history. Theseare s ources from which invaluable contributions can beexpected to spring, not only towards b etter understandingsof the world but also towards perspectives of change . In the current situation, a certain defiant humility seems
AFTER D IALECTICS 181t o be the most adequate intellectual stance. Defiancebefore the forces of capital and emp ire , however powerful .Humility before the coming new world and the learningand unlearning that it will call for.
Index Locators in italics indicate illustrations .Actuel Marx (journal) , 1 7 4 Alexander, Jeffrey, 30, 1 2 1 -6n6Adam Smith in Beijing (Arghi), al-Jazeera, 5 3 145, 1 55 Althusser, Louis, 8 5 , 9 9 , 1 09,Adler, Max, 89, 1 09 1 1 8, 1 47Adorno, Theodor W. Altvater, Elmar, 1 5 3, 1 74 critical theory and, 1 66 American Right, 1 26 Eastern European regimes American Sociological and, 9 1 Association, 1 59 materialism and, 7 2 Amin, Samir, 5 1 , 1 06, 1 3 9 Mills and, 79 anarchism, 95 Popper and, 7 6-77 anarchosyndicalism, 9 5 sociology and, 93 Anderson, Perry, 8 5 , 9 1 , 9 2 , Western Marxism and, 85 1 00, 1 7 3reAdorno, Theodor W. : Works Anderson, Perry: Works Dialectic of Enlightenment, 70, Lineages of the A bsolutist State, 78, 83 1 00 Korreferat, 77n30 Passages from Antiquity to Minima Moralia, 83 Feudalism, 1 00 Negative Dialectics, 83 anticolonialism, 1 05 , 1 06Africa, 1 1 , 49-5 1 Anti-Imperialistic League, 105AFRIC OM (United States antimodernism, 34-3 8 Africa Command) , 5 0 Argument, Das (journal) , 1 73,AKP Gustice and Develop 1 74 ment Party [Turkey] ) , Arrighi, Giovanni, 1 37-3 8 , 1 3 9, 40-4 1 1 4 5, 1 5 3 , 1 5 5-56
1 84 INDEXASEAN (Association of South Braudel, Fernand, 1 3 9 east Asian Nations) , 54, 5 5 Brazil, 4 5ATTAC (Association for the Brenner, Robert, 1 03-4, 1 54, 1 55 Taxation of Financial Brenner Debate, The (Brenner) , Transactions for the Aid 1 04 of Citizens), 3 5 Bretton Woods, 1 5Augustine, Saint, 1 3 3 Britain, 1 6, 9 6 , 9 8-9 9Austro-Marxism, 89 British Academy, 1 30authoritarianism, 20 British Industrial Revolution, 1 43Badiou, Alain, 1 3 1-32 Buddhism, 40Balibar, E tienne, 1 42 , 1 43 , Burawoy, Michael, 1 7 7 1 47-48, 1 5 1 , 1 65 Bush, George W. , 42, 44, 6 3Bank of the South, 4 5 Bush administration, 4 6 , 63-64Baran, Paul, 1 0 3 Butler, Judith, 1 5 0Bardhan, Pranab, 1 5 6Barrett, Michele, 94 Callinicos, Alex, 1 7 6-7 7Bauer, Otto, 68, 89 Calvinist churches, 9 5Bauman, Zygmunt, 1 27, 1 68 Cambodia, 5 5Beauvoir, Simone de, 94 Canada, 1 0, 47Bebel, August, 68 Candini, Nestor Garcia, 34Beck, Ulrich, 1 2 6, 1 27 , 1 6 1 capital, transnational, 1 4- 1 6Beck, Ulrich: Works Capital and Class (journal) , 1 7 3 Gross Koalition, 1 27 capital balance, 1 3n6 Risk Society, 1 2 6 capitalism, 4n2, 48, 6 1 -62, 1 1 3,Belle Epoque, 1 1 3 1 3 8-3 9, 1 79Benjamin, Walter, 8 5 , 86, 9 2 capitalist modernity, 1 2 5Bensaid, Daniel, 1 7 6 Capital (Marx) , 69, 7 1 , 1 02,Beyond Left and Right 1 22 (Giddens) , 1 60 Cardoso, Fernando Henrique,Beyond US Hegemony (Amin), 1 03 139 Carver, Terrell, 1 64Bidet, Jacques, 1 7 6 Castells, Manuel, 1 5 2, 1 67,Binghamton (NY) , 1 37 1 7 1 -72Bin Laden, Osama, 4 2 Catholic ChUrch, 95Blair, Tony, 60, 6 3 Catholicism, 40, 1 1 5-1 6Bloch, Ernst, 8 5 , 1 1 0, 1 37 Central European Marxism, 1 5 3Boer, Roland, 1 3 3 Chandra, Bipan, 1 07B olivar, Simon, vii Chaos and Governance in theBolshevism as a Moral Modem World System (Arrighi Problem (Lukacs) , 88 and Silver) , 1 3 9Boron, Atilio, 33 Chavez, Hugo, 45Bourdieu, Pierre, 1 29 , 1 5 6, 1 62 Cheney, Dick, 63Bowles, Samuel, 1 5 6 China
IN D E X 185 Africa and, 49 CPI (M) (Communist Party of Communism in, 24, 56 India [Marxist] ) , 5 4 Cultural Revolution, 1 1 2 in Mumbai, 3 5 development in, 9, 5 6 Critical Companion to economics and, 1 1 , 1 5 5-5 6 Contemporary Marxism (Bidet geopolitics in, 5 6 and Kouvelakis, eds), 1 7 6 Marxism in, 56, 1 07 critical theoryChomsky, Noam, 1 5 9 Adorno and, 1 66Christian democracy, 9 5 classical texts of, 8 2Christianity, 40 development of, 7 7-7 8City of God (Augustine), 1 3 3 German critical theory, 1 66civil society, 1 46, 1 60 Horkheimer and, 72-73,ClAS C O (Latin American 1 66 Council of Social Sciences), Marcuse and, 7 2 73 , 3 3-34 October Revolution and,class, 27, 56, 1 4 0-4 5 90-92Clinton, Hillary, 64 political economy and, 80CODES RIA (Council for the reception of, 1 04-5 Development of Social Western Marxism and, 83-84 Science Research in Africa) , criticism, 70-72, 7 7-78 34 critique, 2 6-27, 7 0-72, 7 7-78Cohen, Gerald Allan, 1 00, 1 0 9 Critique (journal) , 1 74C old War, 1 , 49 Critique of Dialectical Reasoncollectivism, 4-5, 20 (Sartre) , 99Colletti, Lucio, 85, 9 1 Critique of Political Reasoncolonialism, 1 05 (Debray) , 1 3 1Comintem, 69-7 0, 1 0 5 Cuba, 1 1Communism, 24, 5 5 , 5 6 , 64, Cuban Revolution, 1 6, 1 1 2 1 02n78 Czechoslovakia, 9 6-97Communist Manifesto, The (Marx) , vii, 67, 69, 1 22 Darwinism, 29, 3 2Communist Party, 50, 5 3 , 54 Davis, Mike, 1 9, 1 5 9Companion to Social Theory Debray, Regis, 1 00, 1 3 1 , 1 67 (Turner, ed.), x Debray, Regis: WorksCongo-Kinshasa, 5 0 Critique of Political Reason,C ongress o f Oppressed Peoples, 131 1 05 feu sacre, Le, 1 3 1Copernicus, Nicolaus, 1 22 God, 1 3 1corporations, 3n l , 1 3- 1 4 deference, 4-5, 1 9-2 1C orreia, Rafael, 45 deindustrialization, 1 8, 3 1 -32Council for the Development of Delanty, Gerard, x Social Science Research in democracy Africa (C ODESRIA) , 34 Christian, 9 5coupon socialism, 1 3 5 social, 1 1 2, 1 6 1 -6 3
1 86 INDEXDemocratic Front for the Encyclopedie, 1 2 2 Liberation of Palestine Engels, Friedrich, 3 8 , 67, 68, (DFLP) , 5 3 71, 1 17Democratic Party (Italy) , 1 6 1 enlightenment, 27, 5 8-59, 60,Democratic Party of the Left 67, 7 1 (Italy) , 1 6 1 environmentalism, 3 1 -32, 3 7D errida, Jacques, 1 64, 1 6 6 Envisioning Real UtopiasDesai, Meghnad, 1 64 (Wright) , 1 3 5-3 6Descartes, Rene, 7 3 Eros and Civilization (Marcus e) ,Deutscher, Isaac, 9 9 78development, 1 6, 3 7 Europe, 47-4 9 , 1 3 0-3 3 , 1 43 ,develop mentalism, 3 7 1 5 9, 1 74DFLP (Demo cratic Front for See also Eastern Europe; the Liberation of Palestine) , Western Europe 53 European Left, 1 59Dialectical Investigations European Marxism, 9 6 , 9 7- 1 0 1 , (Oilman) , 1 7 5 1 73Dialectic of Enlightenment evangelicalism, 2 1 (Horkheimer and Adorno ) , 70, 7 8 , 8 3 Fanon, Frantz, 1 0 5dialectics, 1 0 8- 1 0 feminism, 22-23, 94-95 , 1 4 9-5 1Discourse o n Method (Descartes ) , feu sacre, Le (Debray) , 1 3 1 73 Finance Capital (Hilferding) ,Dobb, Maurice, 9 9 8 9-90 Fogarasi, Bela, 83-84Eagleton, Terry, 1 3 3 Forces o Labour (Silver), 1 45, 1 72 fEast Asia, 1 8 For Marx (Althusser) , 9 9East Asian outward-development France, 9 6 , 9 8 , 1 1 2 model, 8- 1 1 Frank, Andre Gunder, 1 03, 1 40,E astern Europe, 47-48, 9 1 , 1 45 9 6-9 7 , 1 62 Frankfurt S chool, 70, 7 2 , 8 2-84Eclipse of Reason, The Fraser, Nancy, 1 67 (Horkheimer) , 7 8 French Revolution, 2 7 , 1 4 3Economics of Global Turbulence, Friedmann, Georges, 9 3 The (Brenner) , 1 54 Fritz, Wolfgang, 1 74economies, political, 1 08, 1 53-57, From the Class Struggle to the 1 7 5, 1 8 0 Struggle without ClassesEcuador, 4 5 (Balibar) , 1 4 2Edwards, John, 4 6 fundamentalism, 20-2 1Einstein, Albert, 1 1 2 futurism, 1 3 4-40empire, 1 1 3Empire (Hardt and Negri) , 1 32, gender, 1 49-5 0 1 5 2, 1 69 General Theory of Exploitationemployment, 1 8- 1 9 and Class, A (Roemer) , 1 5 6
IND EX 1 87geo p oli tic s H ege lian Marxism, 8 6 in Mrica, 4 9-5 1 Hegemony and Socialist Strategy in Europe, 47-4 9 (La cl au and M ouffe ) , 1 4 1 , in North America, 4 5-47 1 47, 1 6 5 in Northeast Asia, 5 5- 5 6 Her Maj estys Loyal Opposi- in South Asia, 5 3- 5 5 tion, 66, 1 23 in Southeast Asia, 5 5 Hi1ferding, Rudolf, 8 9-90 after the Soviet Union, 4 1 -45 Hill, Christopher, 9 8 in West Asia, 5 1 -5 3 Hindutva, 4 0German Greens, 6 3 Historian s Group of theGermany, 9 6 Communist Party (Great Social Democratic Party of, Britain), 98 68n2 historical materialism, 38, 1 1 7G-20/G-22, 5 4 Historical Materialism (journal) ,Giddens, Anthony, 1 60 1 74, 1 7 6glo baliz ati on, 32 Historisch-Kritisches Worterbuch desGlobalization and Egalitarian Marxismus (encycl opaedia) , Redistribution (Bardhan, ed . ) , 1 74-7 5 156 History and Class ConsciousnessGlyn, Andrew, 1 5 4- 5 5 (Lukacs) , 8 3 , 87-8 8 , 8 9God (Debray) , 1 3 1 History of the Condition of theGodelier, Maurice, 1 0 1 W orking Class underGoldmann, Lucien, 8 5 , 9 1 Capitalism (Kuczynski) , 9 7Go l dth o rp e , John, 1 42 Hizbollah, 4 0Gorbachev, Mikhail, 4 8 Hobsbawm, Eric, 9 9Gouldner, Alvin Ward, 7 1 Hochfeld, Julian, 9 7Gramsci, Antonio, 84, 8 5 , 86, Ho Chi Minh, 1 0 6 8 7 , 90, 9 2 , 9 8 Holy Family, The (Engels andGross Koalition (Be c k) , 1 27 Marx) , 7 1Guha, Ranajit, 34, 1 0 7 homosexuality, 1 5 0Gulf Press, 5 3 Honneth, Axel, 1 66-67Gurvitch, Georges, 9 6 Hook, Sidney, 1 02 Horkheimer, MaxHabermas, Jiirgen, 79-82, 92, critical theory and, 7 2 - 7 3 , 1 3 2, 1 47 , 1 6 6 166Habib, Irfan, 1 07 Eastern European regimesHamas, 40 and, 9 1Handbook on European Social social s c i e nc e and, 7 5 Theory, The (Delanty, ed. ) , x so ciology and, 9 3Hardt, Michael, 1 2 3 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 3 , Wallerstein and, 1 04 1 5 2, 1 69, 1 7 1 Western Marxism and, 85Harvey,D avid, 1 3 6-37 Horkheimer, Max: WorksHaug, Frigga, 94, 1 74 Dialectic of Enlightenment, 70,Haug, Wolfgang Fritz, 1 3 3 78, 83