DITEN NATO M&S COE                                              University of GenoaEvaluation of Delay/Disruptive Tolerant...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                      University of Genoa                 Outline•   Introduction to Delay/Disrupti...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                    University of Genoa             DTN concept•   The DTN architecture embraces th...
DITEN     NATO M&S COE                        University of Genoa            DTN concept   DTN solution applies when End-...
DITEN       NATO M&S COE                     University of Genoa      DTN application scenarios   Emergency operations, i...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                                    University of GenoaDTN Architecture Bundle Protocol DTN archite...
DITEN     NATO M&S COE                                                                           University of GenoaDTN ar...
DITEN   NATO M&S COE                                    University of Genoa  DTN as an overlay solution– DTN architecture ...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                                 University of Genoa    Information storage Int Nodes   Another im...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                    University of Genoa    Information storage Int Nodes•   This feature differenti...
DITEN    NATO M&S COE                      University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy The new idea is to use DTN ...
DITEN     NATO M&S COE                      University of GenoaNetwork Resilience and Cyber Defence                       ...
DITEN     NATO M&S COE                                   University of GenoaNetwork Resilience and Cyber Defence          ...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                    University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy   Effect of the attack     ...
DITEN    NATO M&S COE                      University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy If network nodes use the DT...
DITENNATO M&S COE              University of Genoa    Preliminary results                                                P...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                                    University of Genoa          Very simple model         S       ...
DITEN          NATO M&S COE               University of Genoa                Very simple model Single IP packet generated...
DITENNATO M&S COE                                                                              University of Genoa        ...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                     University of Genoa               M&S Pillar More accurate Protocol Model; P...
DITEN          NATO M&S COE                 University of Genoa              Cyber Hyper-Domain   DTN in Software Defined...
DITEN          NATO M&S COE                                                            University of Genoa              Cy...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                     University of Genoa          Cyber Defence CAX Cyber Hyper-Domain M&S Distri...
DITEN      NATO M&S COE                       University of Genoa          Cyber Defence CAX   Assure Information Superio...
DITEN   NATO M&S COE                                                     University of GenoaContact :NATO M&S COE:        ...
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Evaluation of Delay/Disruptive Tolerant Network Solutions in Networks under Intentional Attack

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Presented during 7th NATO CAX Forum. Hotel Ergife, Rome, 24th September 2012

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Evaluation of Delay/Disruptive Tolerant Network Solutions in Networks under Intentional Attack

  1. 1. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaEvaluation of Delay/Disruptive TolerantNetwork (DTN) Solutions in Networksunder Intentional Attack Speaker: Authors: LT(N) Eng. Alessandro CIGNONI PhD Marco CELLO LT(N) Eng. Alessandro CIGNONI Prof. Mario MARCHESE Page 1
  2. 2. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Outline• Introduction to Delay/Disruptive Tolerant Network (DTN)• DTN as a Strategy for Information Assurance and Infrastructure Network Reliability• Cyber Hyper-Domain• M&S for Cyber Battle Labs and CAX Page 2
  3. 3. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa DTN concept• The DTN architecture embraces the concepts of occasionally-connected networks• The basis for this architecture lies on the Interplanetary Internet• Various operational environments, including those subject to disruption and disconnection and those with high-delay;• Deep space is one specialized example• Other networks to which DTN architecture applies Page 3
  4. 4. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa DTN concept DTN solution applies when End-to-end connection is : not permanently guaranteed; intentionally and not intentionally interrupted; operating with very large delays; operating intermittently Page 4
  5. 5. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa DTN application scenarios Emergency operations, interventions in hazardous areas,… Page 5
  6. 6. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaDTN Architecture Bundle Protocol DTN architecture and Bundle Protocol– DTN architecture based on the introduction of an overlay above transport or other lower layer protocols– The essential point is that in such an overlay, delays and disruptions can be handled at each DTN ‘hop’ in a path between sender and dest– Nodes on the path can provide storage– The DTN architecture does not require contemporaneous end-to- end connectivity Page 6
  7. 7. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaDTN architecture Bundle protocol– The basic unit of data in the Bundle Protocol is a “bundle” which is a message that carries application layer protocol data units– The BP can interface with different lower layer (usually transport) protocols through “Convergence Layer Adapters”, (CLAs) Application Application Bundle Bundle Bundle CLA x CLA x CLA z CLA z Lower Layer x Lower Layer x Lower Layer z Lower Layer z (e.g. transport,…) (e.g. transport,…) (e.g. transport,…) (e.g. transport,…) Other Layers Other Layers Other Layers Other Layers Network x Network x Network z Network z Network x Network z Page 7
  8. 8. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa DTN as an overlay solution– DTN architecture is suited for acting as overlay on top of a heterogeneous network– By installing a Bundle Protocol Agent (BPA) on end-points and nodes at the border of homogeneous segments, the end-to-end path can be divided into many DTN hops.– On each DTN hop different CLAs can be used Page 8
  9. 9. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Information storage Int Nodes Another important difference between DTN and traditional TCP/IP networking is related to information storage In standard networks information is persistently stored only at end nodes This may not be the case in challenged networks. In DTN networks information is persistently (long-term) stored at intermediate DTN nodes Page 9
  10. 10. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Information storage Int Nodes• This feature differentiates the DTN architecture also from PEPs.• In contrast, bundles can be stored at intermediate nodes for extended durations, and also be saved in persistent memory Page 10
  11. 11. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy The new idea is to use DTN to increment Infrastructrure Network Resilience, mitigating the effects of an intention attack to network links/nodes; The attack is considered as a bandwidth reduction up until no bandwidth availability Page 11
  12. 12. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaNetwork Resilience and Cyber Defence Page 12
  13. 13. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaNetwork Resilience and Cyber Defence Network Resilience to: Protect Core Infrastructure Assure Information Superiority in the Cyber Battle Field - Sithuation Awarness - Common Operational Picture Page 13
  14. 14. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy Effect of the attack Attack Bandwidth Cancellation Link Disruption and no service Page 14
  15. 15. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaDTN as Network Defense Strategy If network nodes use the DTN architecture, can this help managing and mitigating the negative effect of the attack? Even if the hypothesis must be deeper verified, preliminary analysis support the idea Page 15
  16. 16. DITENNATO M&S COE University of Genoa Preliminary results Page 16
  17. 17. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Very simple model S 1 2 3 D Links behavior modeled as 4 independent continuous Time Markov Chains πG stationary probability of Good state (no interruption); πB stationary probability of Bad state (interruption) TB sojourn time in Bad state (exponentially distributed with parameter λB) 1/λB average sojourn time in Bad state Tx transmission time Page 17
  18. 18. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Very simple model Single IP packet generated by S to D; TCP/UDP latency (must wait to complete a path) – (πB/ λB) 4 + 4Tx DTN latency – 4(πB/ λB) + 4Tx Page 18
  19. 19. DITENNATO M&S COE University of Genoa Very simple model Comparison of TCP/IP and DTN latency 300 Latency between S and D [s] 250 200 TCP/IP latency 150 DTN latency 100 50 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 Sojourn Time in Bad state [s] Page 19
  20. 20. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa M&S Pillar More accurate Protocol Model; Protocol Behaviour Simulation - NS3 Based / OPNET Based Network Infrastracture Simulation – OPNET Based Page 20
  21. 21. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Cyber Hyper-Domain DTN in Software Defined Networking Hypothesis: Cyber Hyper Dimensional or Cyber Hyper-Domain – Free BSD Jials – Stanford Clean Slate Projects Page 21
  22. 22. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Cyber Hyper-Domain Hyper-Dimentional Cyber Domain (men-driven and/or autonomus cognitive processes to inter- dimension switch); – Time – Space – Virtual Space – Autonomous Systems Domains /Topology / Routing Strategies and Protocols Different NetworkTopology and Routing Strategy are separated in different Jails. Page 22
  23. 23. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Cyber Defence CAX Cyber Hyper-Domain M&S Distributed Battle Labs Interconnection Men and Autonomous Agents CAX in the simulated Cyber Hyper-Domain Page 23
  24. 24. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of Genoa Cyber Defence CAX Assure Information Superiority in the Cyber Hyper-Domain which directly translates into Power Superiority in the Battlefield Page 24
  25. 25. DITEN NATO M&S COE University of GenoaContact :NATO M&S COE: DITEN – University of Genoa:LT(N) Eng. Alessandro CIGNONI Prof. Mario Marchesesesto.natomes.areadottrina02@smd.difesa.it mario.marchese@unige.it PhD Marco Cello marco.cello@unige.it Page 25

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