Fourth generation warfare


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Fourth generation warfare

  1. 1. PB-100-89-10 Appmved for pvblrc releese; distr~butionrs unl~mded OCTOBER 1989 ...see pages 2-49
  2. 2. LieutenantGeneral LeonardP.WishartIll WlllitayReviewStaff CalonelPhillipW.Childwss ~fldwinchief UeuleMntCOrOnetDonaldG. Rhodes Aswdete Editor MaJuChrisJ. LeElanc ManagingEditor MajorJosBH. Rivera E m LeiinAmericanMibwrs Mr. PhiUipR. Dav~s M c t i mEditor Mr. D M.Giangrea, DsslgnEdRor fkmks8 Feaims-Vacant Mr. Charlesk MarlinsonIll MendDes@n ConsultingEditws CalmelSBrgloPedmh m a ~ l i e n A m ? y .BraziItanE d h UeutenantColonelCarlosValenzuela ChiJean-, SpanishEdhm, EyOrdgofmeSecretaryofthe Any' CadE.V u m General,UnitedStalesArmy ChlefofStaff m c i * WinfamJ. MoohnnII Brigadier General.UnitedStalesArmy TheAdplantGeneral Military Review ..-"".-"",US ARMY COMMAND ANDGENERALSTAFFCOLLEGE VOLUMEU I X .OCTOBER1989. NO 10 PmfesslonalBulletin100-89-10 CONTENTS 2 'WleChangingR c eof War: Untothe FourthGenemtion by WilliamS. Lind, CaptainJohn Schmitt,USManneCorps, ColonelJoseph W Sutton. USArm% ColonelKeithM. Nightengale, USArmy,and LieutenantColonelG I. Wilson,USMarineCorpsReserve 12 BdgMPromiseor BrokenDream? by Major RobertA. Strange, USArmy 22 Thelehnological Futureof War by beutenantColonelClaytonR. Newell, USArmy 29 Antimatefie! lchnology by ColonelJohn5.Alexander;USArmy. Ret~red 42 MiweWadare for AirknsB BaHle-Future by RobertA Sickler 52 BaHldieId NuclearWeapons andTacticalB~dlockinkurogse by Major Mrchael W. Cannon.USArmy 66 Q.E R-Hendewonandthe Challengeof Change by Major DavidA Fastabend,USArmy 78 West Point, URayerlRrtddge by TrumanR. Strobndge I 7 insights by CaptainDavidK Taggart USArmy B8 Summaries thebest fromother]ournals 90 Letters 82 CAkkFarum 93 BookReviews contemporaryreading for theprofess~onal
  3. 3. In this time of unprecedented change in US tntemational relations, membersof the Armed Forces face some exceptional challenges. The main challenge is to determtne what lies ahead. As we look out toward an ambiguousfuture, we must find answersto some important questtons. What will be the nature of warfare tn the future?What will be the major threat to US security?What type of organizations,arms and equipment will be needed for our military forces?What impact will new technology have on war- fighting in the next decade and beyond?In short, where do we need tu go and how do we get there? These are only a few of the perplexing questtons facing us as we confront the dual nature of our profession. We must be ready to fight tommorrow momtng's war w ~ ~ h today's armsand equipment,while concurrently identifyingthe requirementsforfuture war and chart~nga reasonable coursetoward those future requirements. Astough as the first part of our mlssion is, the second task is even harder. It ~nvolvesmaking well- reasoned decisions on such critical issues as force desien, weanons develo~mentand- . . procurement, development of doctrine and training for leaders and soldiers. With the abovequestions in mind, this issue of Militarr Rewiew presentssomearticles that focuson one aipect of the problem-the techno~o~~calfuture of war. Realizingfull well that not all future military problems w~llhave a technological solution, the authors, nonetheless, ponder the impact of present and fuhlre technology on the pro- fesston of arms and remind us that war-fightmg doctrtne and technology are insepara- ble. Although focusingon the material aspect of war,the authors emphasizerepeatedly the importance of the human element in war. Two of the articles In thts issue are winners tn our recent wrtting contest. Major Robert Strange's "Bright Promise or Broken Dream" won first place. Ha arttcle dts- cusses reasonable expectattons of future war, the impact of h~ghtechnology weaponry on war-fightingdoctrine, sociologicallim~tsgoverningthe use of militaryforcesand the future threat to US security. Lieutenant Colonel Clayton Newell's essay titled "The Technological Futureof War" took third place. In our focusonfuture technology,New- ell keeps us honest by remind~ngus that man remains the dominant figure tn war, the "l~febloodof the Army." The second place winner was Captain Kevin B. Smtth. His essay, "Back to the Trenches," is scheduled for future publicat~on. Finally, this issue inaugurates a short, new feature titled "CALL Forum." CALL $ the acronym for the Center for Army Lessons Learned located here at Fort LeavPky worth. It d~ssemtnatesto the Total Army combat-relevant lessons gleaned fr6w Armywtde training exercises,combat train~ngcenter rotattons, historical sourcis and doctrinal research. Our "CALLForum" section is designedto add to the dissemmation process by htghlighting a few relevant lessonslearned on one of the battlefield opejat- ing systems.
  4. 4. FACE7 R INTO THE FOURTH GENERATION William 8. Lind, Colonel Keith M. Nightengale, US Army, Captain John Schmitt, US Marine Corps, Colonel Joseph W. Sutton, US Army, and Lieutenant Colonel G. I. Wilson, US Marine Corps Reserve
  5. 5. THEPEACETIME soldier's principal task is to prepare effectivelyfor the next war. In order to do so, he must ahticipate what the next war will be like. isa difficult taskthat gets continuou~lymore dfiicult. General Franz Uhle-Wettlerof the Wesr German armywrites: "At an earlier time, a commander could be certain that a future war would resemble past and present ones. This enabled him to analyze appropriate tacticsfrompast and present. The troop commander of today no longer has thls possibility. He knowsonly thatwhoever failsto adapt the experiencesofthe lastwar will surely lose the next one.' If we look at the development of warfare m the modem era, we see three datinct genera- tions. In the United States, the Army and MarineCorpsarenow comingto gripswith the changetothe thiigeneration.Thii tiansitid entirelyforthe g d . However,thiigeneration w&e was conceptually developedbytheCer- man offensivein thespringof 1918.It isnow 70 years old.2 This suggesrssome interestingquestions: 0 Is itnot abouttlrneforafourthgeneration to appear! e If so, whatform might it take! These questions are of central importance. Whoever a first to recognize, understand and implement a generational change can gain a decis~veadvantage.Conversely,anation that is slow to adapt to generational change opens itself to catastrophicdefeat. Ourpurposehere islesstoanswertheseques- tions, than to pose them. Nonetheless, we will offer some tentative answers. To begin to see what thesem~ghtbe, the questionsmust be put into historical context. Three @enemtiens@fMarfare While military development is ,generally a continuous evolutionaiy process, the modem era has witnessed three watersheds in which changehas been dtalecticallycpalitative.Con- sequently,modem military development com- pnses three distinct generations. MILITARYREVIEW 0 October1989 First-generationwarfare reflectstacticsofthe era of the smoothbore musket, the tactics of line and column. These tactics were developed partially in response to technological factors- the line max~muedfirepower, rigid dnll was -enemtion wanfare was conceptuanj.devwbytheGerman offensivein thesprisgof1918.It isnow 70years old Thissuggestssome interest- h.gquestions:&itnotabout timefora fourthgenetstion toappear? Zfso, whatformmightit take? necessary to generate a high rateof fire, and so on-and partially in response to social condi- tionsand ideas,with the columnsof the French revolutionaryarmiesreflectingboth the 8anof the revolution and the low tralnmg levels of wnscnpted troops. Although rendered obso- lete by the replacement of the smoothbore by the rifled musket, vestiges of first-generation tactics survive today, especially in a frequently encountereddesire for linearity on the battle-" field.Operationalartin the first geneGtjon dl not existasa concept,althoughit waspractic d , eby individual commanders, most prominently Napoleon Ronaparte. Second-generationwarfare was a respohse to the rifled musket, breechloaders, barbed'wire, the machlnegun and indirectfire.~ & t &were based on fire and movement, and >they re- mained essentially linear. The def&e still attempted to prevent all penetrations; and in the attack, a laterally dspened iine advanced by rushes in smallgroups.Perhaps thepnncipal change from f~rst-generationtactics &asheavy reliance on ind~rectfire. Second-generation tactics were summed up m the French mvim, "the artillev conquers, the infantry occupies." Massed firepower replaced massed manpower. Second-generationtacticsremainedthebasisof US doctrineuntil the 1980s. and they are still
  6. 6. practiced by most US units in the field. While ideasplayeda rolein the development of second-generation tactics (particularly the idea of lateral dispersion), technology was the Whilethe basicconceptsofthird- genedbn racticswereinplace bytheend of1918,theadditionofanew rechnoiogi- calelement,tanks,broughtaboutamajor shiftat theopemtionallevelin World s M i wasblitzkrieg.ln the blitzkrieg,thebasis oftheopentiondart shiftedfromplace (asin B. H. Liddell Hart'sindirectapproach)to time. princ~paldriver of change. Technology man- ~fcsteditself both qualitatively,in such things as heavier artillery and bombing aircraft, and quantitatively,in the ability of an indusrrialized economy to fight a battle of materiel ( h f a t d - schlacht). The secondgeneration sawthe formal recog- nition and adopt~onof the operational art, lni- tially by the Pmssian army. Again, ideas and technology both drove the change. The ideas sprang largely from Pruss~anstudies of Napo- leon'scampaigns.Technologicalfactorsinclud- ed Helmuth von Moltke's real~zat~onthat mod- em tactical firepower mandated hartles of en- clrclement and the desire to exploit the capa- bilitiesof the railway and the telegraph. Third-generation warfare was also a response to the Increase m battlefield firepower. t four- ever, the driving force was pr~marilyideas. Aware that they couldnot prevail in a contest of materlelbecauseof their weaker industrialbase. the Germans developed radically new tactlcs in World War 1. Based on maneuver rather than amnion, th~rd-generat~ontactits were the first mly nonlinear tactics. The attack relied on ~nfiltrattonto bypass and collapse the enemyi combatforces,rather than seekingto closewith and destroy them. The defense was ~ndepth and often invited penetration, wh~chset the enemy up for a counterattack. While the basic concepts of third-generatlon tactics were in place by the end of 1918,the addition of a new technologicalelement,tanks, brought about a major shift at the operational level m World War 11. That shift wasblitzkrieg. In :he blitzkrieg,the basisof the operational art shifted from place (as in B. H. Liddell Hart's ~ndirectapproach) to time. This shift was ex- plicitly recognizedonly recently,In the work of Colonel JohnBoyd,US Air Force,Retired, and his OODA (observing,orienting, decidingand acting)Loop theory. Thus, we see nvomajor catalystsfor change m previous generational shifts: technology and ideas. Therefore, we should ask, what perspec- tive do we gain from these earlier shifts as we look toward a potential fourth generation of warfare! ElementsThat Carry8ver Earlier generat~onalshifts, especially the shift from the second to third generation, were marked by growing emphasison severalcentral Ideas. Four of these seem likely to carry over into the fourth generation, and ~ndeedto w- pand their influence. The first is missionorders. Eachgenerational change has been marked by greater d~spersion on the battlefield. The fourth-generation bat- tlefield 15 likely to include the whole of the enemy's society.Such dispersion,coupled with what seems likely to be increased importance for actions by ven, small groups of combatants, will require eventhe lowest levelto operateflex- lbly on the basis d t h e commander's intent. Second e decreasing dependence on cen- tralized logistics. Dispersion, coupled with in- creased value placed on tempo, w~llrequire a h~ghdegreeof abilityto liveoff the land and the enemy. Third is more emphasison maneuver. Mass, of men or firepower,wdl no longer be an over- whelming factor. In fact, mass may become a disadvantage,as ~twillbe easy to target. Small, October 1989* MILITARYREVIEW
  7. 7. Perhapstheprincipal changehumbt-genemtion tacticswasheavyreliance onindirectfire.Second~enerationtactics weresummed uoin theFrenchmaxim. "theartilleryconquers,thginfantryoccupies,"l).iassed6repo;verreplacedmassedman- Dower.Second-eenemtion tacticsremained the basis ofUSdoctrine und the 1980s. $d theyarestiUpmcticedbymost USunitsin thefield. facllltlessuch as airfields dominate. fixedcammuntcatlonssltesand largeheadquar-<Fourth isa goalof collapsingthe enemy inter- ten wlll become raritles because of their YUL nally, rather than physically destroying him. nerablllry The same may be true of clvl~an Targetswill mclude such things as the popula- equtvalentssuch as sears of government. &wer tion's support for the war and the enemy's plants and ~ndusmalsltes(tncludlngFnolJ%edge culture. Correct ~dentif~cation as aell as manufacturing industries). guccess highly maneuverable, aglle forces will tend to entlty Majorm~l~tan, J of enemy strate- glc centers of gravln;will be highly Important. will depend heavily on effectiveness ~$]omt In hraad terms, fourth-generation warfare operations, as lrnes between respons~b~l~tyand seems likely to be w~delyd~spersedand largely rnlssion become very blurred. Agam, all these undefined; the distinction between war and eletl~entsare pre5ent m thlrd-gmeratwn war- peace will be blurred to the van~shingpoint. It fare-the fourth generation will merely accen- wtll be nonlinear. uossiblv to the oolnt of hav- tuate them mg no definablebartie 11nesor fronts. The d~r- tinctlonbetween "clvlllan" and "m~l~rary" A P@lentiaI~ e ~ ~ n @ ~ ~ ~ ~ D f i wmay disappear. Actlorn ~ 1 1 1occur concurrently FourthGenemfi~n throughout all partlc~pants'depth, lncludmg If we comblne the above general charac- thew soclety as a cultural, not just a physical, teristics of fourth-generatlon warfare w~thnew MILITARYREVIEW October 1989
  8. 8. Tbegrowtbofrobotics,remoteJ piloted vehicles,fowprobabilityofinterce t communicationsanddealint&ence mayofferapotential forradically&red tactics.In turn,growingdependenceonsuchtechnologymayopen thedoorw newvdnembilities,suchas thesusceptibilitytocomputer "viruses." technology, we see one posslble outline of the new generatlon. For example, directed energy may permit small elements to destroy targets they couldnot attackwith conventionalenergy weapons. Directed energy may permit the achievement of electromagnetic pulse effects without a nuclear blast. Research in supercon- ductivitysugges~the possibility of stormg and using large Quantities of energy ~nvery small pacGgesr~e>hnologically,it Ii'possible that a veryfewsoldierscouldhavethe samebattlefield effect aa a current brigade. The growth of robotics, remptely piloted vehicles, low probability of intercept commu- nications and artificial ~ntelligencemay offer a potential for radically altered tactics. In turn, growing dependence on such technology may open thedoortonew vulnerabilitiessuchasthe susceptibihtyto computer "viruses." Small, highly mobile elements, composed of very Intelligent soldiers armed with high- technologyweapons,may rangeoverw~deareas, seekingcr~ticaltargets.Targetsmay be more in the civilian, rather than the military, sector. Front-reartermswillbe replacedwith targeted- untargeted. This may in turn radicallyalter the way ~n which military servlces are organized and structured. Unitswill combinereconnaissanceandstrike functions. Remote, "smart" assets with pre- programmed artificial intelligencemav play a keyrole. Concurrently, the greatest de&nsive strengthsmay be the ability to hide from and deceivethese assets. The tactical andstrategiclevelswill blend as the opponent's pollt~calinfrastructure and civilian society become battlefield targets. It will be criticallyimportantto isolatethe enemy from one's own homeland, because a small number of people will be able to render great October19890 MILITARYREVIEW
  9. 9. dqage ina very shorrtime. Leaders will have to be masters of both the art of war and technology, a difficult combma- tion astwo differentmindsetsareinvolved.Pri- m& challengesfacingcommandenat alllevels wiil include target selection (which will be a political and cultural,not just a military, deci- spn), the ability to concentrate suddenlyfrom very wide dispersion and selection of subordi- nates who can manage the challenge of mini- mal or no supervision in a rapidly changing environment. A major challengewlll be han- dling the rremendous volume and potenttal overload of information without losingsight of the operationaland strategicobjectives. Psychological operations may become the dominant operationaland strategicweapon, in the form of medialinformation intervention. "Logicbombs" and computerviruses, including latent viruses,maybe used todisruptcivilian,as well as military, operations. Fourrh-generation adve~sarieswill be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion, to the point where skillful use of psychological. operations will sometimes preclude the com- mitment of combat forces. A major target will be theenemypopulation'ssupportof itsgovem- ment and the war. Televisionnewsmaybecome ThetechnologyOelfmustbe tramlatedintoweaponsthatareeffective in actualcombat Atpresent, ourresearch and developmentandprocurement pro- cesseshave meatdifz?cdtvmakinethis <b m ~TW manyskilled.:tramition. a more powerful operational weapon than armoreddivisions. Tniskindof hgh&olo~ fourth-generanon warfare may cmy in it the seeds of nuclear de- struction. Its effectiveness could rapidly elimi- nate the ability of a nuclear-annedopponent to wage war conventionally. Destruction or dis- ruption of vital rndusaial capacitres, political infrastructure and social fabric, coupled wrth sudden s k i in the balance of power and con- comitant emotions,could easlly lead to escala- tion to nuclear weapons. Thrs risk may deter fourth-generation wadare among nuclear- armed powers just as it deters major conven- clonal warFareamongthem today. A major caveat must be placed on the pos- sibility of a technologrcallydrrvenfourthgener- ation, at least in the US context. Even ~fthe, theyareeasytocounter,failoftheiro m complexityormakeimpossibledemanfi ontheiroperators : i . technological state of the art permits, ibigh- technologyfourth genemion-and hiis is not clearly the case-the technology itself must be translated into weapons that are effeaive m actual combat. At present, our resear!! and development @&D) and procurement pro- cwes have great dii~cultymaking this nansi- tion. They often ~roduceweapons that incor- porate high technology that is irrelevant. in combat or too complex to work m the chaosof combat. Too many so-called smart weapons MILITARYREVIEW* October 1989
  10. 10. Fourthgenetationw&e seem likelyto be widelydispersedandhgely undefined;the distinctionbetween war andpeace willbeblurredto the vanihing point It willbenonlinear,possibly to the pointofhavingnodefinablebattlelines orfronts. ..Actions willoccurconcw rentlythroughoutallpm'cipants'depth, includingtheirsocietyasac u l e not just aphysical, entity serve as examples. In combat, they are easy to counter,fail of thetr own complextty or make imposstble demands on thetr operators. The current US R&D and procurement processes may simply not be able to make the transrtion to a militarily effective fourth generation of weapons. A PotentialIdeamDrlweea Fourthle~emtioea Technology was the primary driver of the second generatron of warfare; Ideas were the prime drtverof the third. An idea-based fourth generationis also concervable. For about the' last 500 years, the West has definedwarfare. For a milttary to be effective,rt generally had to follow Western models. Be- cause the West's strength is technoiogy, it may rend to concetve of a fourthgenerationin tech- nologtcalterms. However,the West no longer dominatesthe world. A fourth generation may emerge from non-Westerncultural traditions such as found in lslamtc or Asiatic socteties. The fact that some non-Western areas, such as the Islamic world, are not strong in technology may lead them to develop a fourth generatton through ideasrather than technology. The genesis of an idea-based fourth genera- tion may be visible in terrorism. This is not to say that terrorism is fourth-generation warfare, but rather that elements of it may be signs pointing toward a fourth generation. Someelementsin terroram appearto reflect the previously qoted "cany-overs" from third- generation warfare. The more successful ter- rorists appear to operate on broad mission orders that carry clown to the level of the indi- vidual terronst. The "battlefield" is highly dis- persed and includes the whole of the enemy's society.Theterrorist livesalmost completelyoff the landandthe enemy.Terrorism a verymuch a matterof maneuver: the terrorist's firepoweris small,andwhere and when he appliesit is criti- cal. Terrorism must seek to collapsethe enemy from within, as it has little capability (at least currently)to tnflict widespreaddestruction. Two additional carry-overs must be noted, as they may be useful "signposts" pointtng to- ward the fourth generation. The first is a com- ponent of collapsingthe enemy. It is a shift in focus from the enemy's front to his rear. First- generatton warfare focused tactically and ope- rationally(when operationalart was practiced) on the enemy's front-his combat forces. Second-generation warfare remained frontal tactically, but at least in Prussi?~practice, tt focused operationally on the enemy's rear, through the emphasls on enc~rclement.The third generatton shtfted the tacttcal, as well as the operational,focus to the enemy's rear. Ter- rorism takes thts a major step further. It at- tempts to bypass the enemy's military entirely andsnikedirectlyat his homeland-at ctvilian targets. Ideally, the enemy's mtlitary 1s stmply tnelevant to the terrorist. The second signpost is the way terrortsm seeks to use the enemy's own strength agatnst him. This "judo" concept of warfare begins to manifest itself in the arcondgeneratton, in the campalgn and battle of encirclement. The enemy's fortresses, such as Mea and Sedan, became fatal traps. It was pushed further tn the third generation,where on the defensive,one sideoften tries to let the other penetrate,sohis own momentum makes him less able to turn and dealwith a counterstroke. Terrorists use a free society's freedom and October 1989 0 MILITARYREVIEW
  11. 11. Fourth-generationadvemarieswillbeadeptatmanipulatingthemedia to afterdomesticandworldopinion, tothepoint whereskillfuluseofpsychological operationswillsometimesprecludethecommitmentofcombatforces.A majortarget willbe theenemypopulationksupportofi~ governmentandthe war. Teevisionnews maybecomea morepawedoperationalweapon thanarmoreddihions. openness,itsgreateststrengths,against !t. They can move freely within our society, while ac- tivelyworklngtosubvertit.They use ourdemo- cratic.rights not only to penetrate, but also to defend themselves. If we treat them within our laws, they gain many protections;if we simply shoot them down, the television news can easilymake them appear to be the victims.TeF rorists can effecrlvely wage their form of war- fare, while being protected by the society they are attacking. If we are forced to set aside our own system of legalprotectionsto dealwith ter- rorists,they win another sort of victory. Terrorism alsoappearsto representasolution to a problem that has been generated by pre- vious generational changes, but not really addressed by any of them. It is the contradic- tion between the nature of the modem bat- tlefield and the traditional military culture. That culture,embodied in ranks,saluting,unl- forms, drill. and the like, is largelya product of first-generationwarfare. It is a cultureof order. At the tlme it evolved, it was consistent with the battlefield,which was itself dominated by order. The ideal army was a perfectly oiled machine, ax! was what the military cul- ture of order sought to produce. 1lowever,eachnewgenerationhas broughta major skit toward a battlefieldof disorder.The mllitary culture,which has remained a CU~NK of order, has become contradictory to the bat- tlefield. Even in third-generation warfare, the contradiction has not been insoluble. The Wehmht bridged it effectively, outwardly malntainlng the tradit~onalculture of order, while in combat demonstrating the adapt- ability and fluidity a disorderly mands. However, other militaries, such as the Britah,havebeen lesssuccessful at dealingwi$ the contradiction.They have often atrempted to carry the culture of order over onto the bkt- tlefield, with disastrous results. At ~iddu' $hs- berg, m the Boer War, 18 Boers defeate+,nvo British Guards bartallom that fought a$# on parade.) , L The contradiction between the mtlltary cultureand the natureof modemwar corZfronts a tradit~o~almilitary service with a dilemma. Terrorists resolve the dilemma by eliminating the tulture of order. Terromtsdo not have uni- forms,drill,salutingor,forthe most part, ranks. Potentially,they have, or could develop,a mili- tary culture that is comlstent wlth the disor- derly natureof modem war. Thefact that their MILITARY REVIEW 0 October 1989
  12. 12. Terr01ts useafreesociety'sfreedomandopenness,itsgreateststrengths,againstit Theycan movefreelv within oursociem whileactivelyworkingtosubvert it Theyuse o& democraticrighk notonlytopenekte, butaho defend-themselves.Ifwek t themwithinourlaws,theygainmaflyprotecdom;ifwesim lyshoot them down,the teIe*ion news caneasilymakethemappear to&the victims. broaderculturemay be non-Westernmayfactll- tate thu development. Even in equipment, terrortsm may point toward signs of a change in generations. Typ- ically, an older generation requlres much greater resources to achieve a gtven end than does its successor. Today, the United States is spendlng$500million apieceforstealthbomb- ers. A terrorist stealthbomber IS a carthat looks like every other car,with a bomb in the trunk. Irrcsrism, Ichnology9and Beyold Agam,we arenot suggestingterrorism is the fourthgeneration.It isnot anew phenomenon, and sofar it has proved largely ineffective.4 However, what do we see ~fwe combine rep rorism with some of the new technology we have discussed?For example,what effecttveness might the terrorist have ~fhis car-bombwere a productof geneticengineeringratherthan high explosives? To draw our potential fourth generationout still further, what if we combined terrorism, high technology and the follow~ngelements! B A nonnational ortransnattonalbasesuch asan ideologyorreligion.Our nationalsecurity capabilities are designed to operate within a natlonstate framework. Outs~dethat frame- work, theyhavegreat dlfficulc~es.The drug war provides an example. Because the drug traff:c has no nationstate base, rt is very difficult to attack. The natlonstate shieldsthe drug lords, but cannot control them. We cannor attack them without violating the sovereignty of a fr~endlynation. A fourth-generationattacker could well clperatein a similarmanner,as some MiddleEastern terrorua already do. o A direct attack on the enemy's culture. Such an attack works from within, as well as from without. It can bypass not only the ene- my's mil~tary,but the state itself. The United States is already suffering heavily from such a cultural attack In the form of the drug traffic. Drugsdirectlyattackourculture.Theyhave the support of a powerful "fith column"-the drug buyers. They bypass the entire state apparatus, despite our best efforts. Some ideological ele- ments tn SouthAmerica seedrugsas aweapon; they call them the "poor man's ICBM [inter- continental ballistic mlsslle]." They prize the drugtrafficnot onlyforthemoney it brlngs in- through which we financethe war against our- October 1989 * MILITARYREVIEW
  13. 13. CHAWGlNG FACE selves-but also for the damage it does to the All of these elementsalreadyexist.They are hated North Americans. not the product of "futurism," of gazing into a Highly sophisticated psychological war- crystalball. We are simply asking,what would fare, especially through manipulation of the weface if theywereallcombined?Wouldsucha media, particularly television news. Some ter- combinationconstituteat least the beginnings rorists already h o w how to play this game. ofa fourth generation of warfare?One thought More broadly, hostile forces could easily take that suggests they might is that third- (not to advantageof a significantproduct or television speak of second.) generation militaries would reporting-the fact that, on television, the seemtohavelittlecapabilityagainstsuchasyn- enemy's casualtiescanbe almost as devastating thesis.This is typicalof generationalshifts. on the home front as are friendly casualties. If The purpose of this short article is to pose we bomb an enemy city, the pictures of enemy a question, not to answer it. The partla1 an- civilians dead, brought into every living room swers suggested here may. in fact, prove to be in the country on the eveningnews, caneasily false leads. But in view of the fact that third- turn what may have been a military succw generation warfare is now 70 years old, we (assumingwe also hit the militaq target) into a shouldbe askingowselveswhenthefourthgen- seriousdefeat. erationwlll anive and what it will bnng. 5 NOTES 1 BngaaerGeneriVF mUhlsWenbr.BarnfewC e o m E w Dengsr 1881),6 @ ( h e m ~ ~ ~ a o T e r n m M g y b , D * I W muSmyuansl5m 2 4 ~ q u B S t M s ~ ~ ~ C t o V W M u ~ p a ~ n l ~ o l ~ m ~ ~ d vCan 2 In~.1whlllydevelopedonmVIVletBct$CBImoperat&~vels thelenmndats NsmtomepontwtmaIE bgrmessItscurewnrm1 m M a y l ~ o tumvgintos m l & qmmxmm.0 canbe-led? CmI Eorganize 3 JohnA Ewllsh A W-mm l n t m 4 ( h m Preeger P u b l ~ h r ~ , eltenlv~~vhmutaganwwtW, f W ~ r n S L ~ a ~ m o f t h e ~ ~ C ~ ~ ~ ~ o f t chgress bmdanm, prerldmr of the Mdrtnry Refmm Insbrute, and an adwer to RepmwtanwDmny SnuihofOegon He hok anA B from D d Collegeand anM A fram h e t o n Umurmo He s dasa fegulnawadeforanned sotntesfnr S e m m Robert Tafr JT of O b and held a smularponm wth SenatorG m Hart of Colorado GLmel Kaih M N~ghtqyolec o m d rhe Ranger 7ianmg Brigade ar Fott Bmnmg. Georgra A graduateof the A m y War GUege,k ha snwl m a umeo of c o m d and staffasngnmpntr m rm6ame and Ranger ururs, mdudmg the lOlst A& D m m Emam. 82d Arrbome D~monm G r d and s d on rhe Army Staffasc& speonlpha das the d e w J3of the Inmwcwforce Coptamjohn F Sdvrua, US Mmme Cmps, s ~ w sIn rhe D m dew lop men^ Branch of the MAGTF Cenm Mrmw Gnpr Cornbar Dewlopment naco VngmYl He ha s d wth the 2d Mmme [)rw,ukre k %z&%?Wmpm Campmyof3d Eaunlum,6thMrmw,andCampmyA.2d L& A w e d V&k Eaunlum G h lJosephW Su~tonrr assigned w the A m Ann-Aw S@ Task k. H ~ , D e p m m ~ u o f r k A n n yHersagraduaceoftheUSMnrneCarps h m m d and G m d StaffCollegeandthe Army W n r G He hasdegnesfrom Ob,I&Mand Long Island utuwaes He har kld umous commandand staff ~ s t m mrs,mLchngc dofthe3d mamwed,mcncnlryanddcat& a scpldm, 7thCacnGy Leutenant Colonel G I Wkm. US Mmme CorpsAesm,LS am& to theFmt h h E&nnmy h c e . CmnpPendkm.Chlqha An mfamy officerand a logLlnnrm, he has w7oen on mneuver &, spml opernnons,logLlm, remotel) pbred wlucks.narcommm addrncred energy J MILITARYREVIEW October1989
  14. 14. FROM THE FIRST time a crouching cave dwellerpicked up a stick and used it to club his neighbor into submission,man has pursued advances in weapons technology so as to gain a decisive military advantage over hi opponents. Particularly in America's war expe- rience, the drive to undentand and master the art ofwar a oftenexplained in terms of the rela- tionship benveen the soldierand his weapons. In other words, the tools of warbecome a focal point for both the theory and doctrine of war- fare.Today,somemilitary wnters and war theo- nsts even gosofar as arguingthat technology is one of the two linchp~ns(theother being lead- ership) in America's mllitary machine. The unremitting pursuit of enhanced mdi- tary capabilitiesinvitesspeculationon the rech- nologicalfurareofwar. While suchmusingmay whet the appetiteforwonderweapons,itfailsto consider basic questions about technological advances in military weaponsand hardware. In the midst of thefrenziedscrambleto maintain a technologic edge, several essential questions must be considered and answered in some depth. First, what do we expect of high-tech systems and weapons? Second, in what way does the process of developing and fielding these new systems impmge on our war-fighting doctrine?Third, what sociologicalfactorspre- sage lim~tson the technology of the military force of the future?Finally-but first in impor- tance-what is the nature of the threat in futurewan? While technological advances in the mili- tary occur at an extraordinary pace, the aims remain fairly constant. The American experi- ence in warfightingled the military to rely ever more heavilyon firepower rather than maneu- ver. By bringing to the battlefield the mechan- ical advantages of indusmalization,we sought to increasethe lethalityofourweaponsin order to place our opponents in the untenable psi- tlon m which resistance equaled annihilation. Our culturally embedded belief that each individual is of inestimable value also led us to seek ways to use mach~ncsto aid and protect soldiersin all aspectsof warfighting.To a great extent, we now seek to replace man on the battlefield with an anay of advanced systems suchasremotelypilotedvehcles,roboticmine- field clearing systems, and "fire-and-forget" munitions. Ourquestforbiger, betterweaponshasbeen guided by our vision that the next major war "...would require powerful blows to be deliv. Ourculturallyembeddedbeliefthat a c hindividualisofinestimablevaluealso led ustoseek waystousemachines to aid andprotect soldietsinallaspectsofw w &king. Toagreat extent,wenowseek to replacemanon thebattlefieldwithan arrayofadimcedsptemssuchasremotely piloted vehicles,mbotic minefieldclearing systems,and U~d-forget"mutuli~ns. ered at an enemy stronger, more distant, and moreinaccessiblethan anywehaveyet encoun- tered. ..It will, therefore, be essential, should another war come, that the country be pre- pared in advancewith such advantagesin tech- nology as will permit victory without cata- strophic losses. .. The prospect that the United States might find itself involved'in another major war imposes upon us the nets- sity of seeking to achieve a ...techn~l ical margin overour opponents.'" YTechnological innovations always seem so promising as they are developed and th& first used on the battlefield.New weaponsAdhard- ware are seen as ways to save lives, to attain quick, decisive victories and to enhance com- mand and control systems. ParadoxicalljStech- nology has just the oppositeeffectson warfight- ing. S. L..A. Marshall's words of four decades agostillring m e today: " isunfortunately the casethat the massesof men are not capable of taking other than a superficial j klgment on the effectof new weapon^."^ t MILITARYREVIEW October 1989
  15. 15. && accuratetirefmm newton -rangeriflesbroketheback ofoneline infanayandcavalrycharges.Theintrogction ofthemachinegunmore thanoa~ser theeffectivenessoftheritle.Thetankaidedattackingforcesinovercomingmachine gun positions. Ystnoneofthese technologr'callyadvancedweaponschangedbattle dynamicsESTheyonlymadethebattlefields deadkrplace. Technological progress in modem wars has been impressive. Massed, accurate fire from new long-rangeriflesbroke the back of on-line infantry and cavalry charges.The introduction of the machinegunmore than offset the effec- tivenessof the nfle. The tank aided attacking forces in overcoming machinegun posnions. Yet none of these technologically advanced weapons changed battle dynamics. They only made the battlefield a deadlier place where the quick battle became extended in both time and space, and command and control be- came increasingly more difficult rather than simplified.-) Do technological advances determine the outcomeof wars between nations?It sometimes appearsthat the Un~tedStatessurelyhopes so. But wars are not won by viewing technological prowessas the way to victory on the battlefield any more than they are by following only one principle of war. When the US Army was deployed m strength in Vietnam, it used the "... tradi- tional American methods of seeking a quick result by stnking with massive firepower and technologyat the rootsand branchesof enemy strength."4Yet morethan three yearsaftercom- mitment of US ground forces, the North Viet- namese Army (NVA)and the Vietcong guer- rilla forces launched a major offensive (Ter 1968)against US bases and installationsin an effort to destroyboth the fighting strength and the US nationalwill to continue to supportthe war effort. At Khe Sanh, the NVA, with some armor support,encircleda US MarineCorpsencamp- ment. For five months the United Statesdem- onstrated its technological might by sustaining the tsolated Marines on a regular basis. The NVA threw its best forces and equipment into thebattle,but it couldnot gain an advantage in thefield. When the NVA finallyabandonedits October 1989 0 MILITAWREVIEW
  16. 16. At Khe Sanh, theNVA, withsomearmorsupport,encircleda USMiwine Corpsencampment Forfivemonths the U ~ t e dStatesdemonstratedits technological might by sustainingtheisolatediWihesona regularbasis.TheNVA threw itsbest forcesand equipmentintothe bade, butit couldnot gainanadvantagein the field attempt, "... it conceded that overall failure was due to being wrecked by intensefirepower and technology. It [theNVA] would need four yearsto rebuild itsoffensivecapability."5 But rebuild it did. In 1972, the NVA resumed the offensive, atracking m the high- lands, primarilyat Binh Long. US forces again held the technological edgeanddestroyed80of the 100NVA tanks employed. US helicopters, . firing wire-guided antitank missiles, stopped some of the tanks. This new technology, the antitank guided mlsslle (ATGM), could have forced the NVA to change its Soviet-styledoc- trine. Instead,when South V~emarnwas over- run m 1975, the NVA used the same armor- intensiveSoviet doctrine in the offensive.6 If technology were dommnant in watfare, then the combined forces of the United States and Republic of South Vietnam should have won the war with ease. But in any protracted war, " 1s rarely dominant. Counter- measures are alwaysproduced,an advantage IS rarelyenjoyedfor long."7 Hatoncally, the mtrcduction of a new weaponon the battlefieldhas initiallyp r o d u c e d c stunningtacticalvictones. But the temporarily stym~edfield commander quickly leamed h s lessons,adapted comparableor offsettingt&h- nologies and continuedto fight. In rnw ses, suchasVietnam,them~htaryforcethat s3ered tactical defeatbecause of the enemy's weapons technology neverthelesscontinued to foliow a well-conceived, popularly supported k&tegx plan and ultimatelyprevailed m the war. lchnologyandDoctrine ' Does technological modemuat~on force changes in war-fighting doctrine! Again, the answerisno. A bnef reviewof the usean abbe of technology in a contemporary co ct sup- 1ports this conclusion. It also shops that few changesin war-fightingdoctrine arbneeded to MILITARYREVIEW6 October 1989
  17. 17. adapt to new technology. But first, what is docnine? The Army's tac- ticalwar-fightingmanualespousesthat doctrine is the "... condensed expression of its [an army's]approachto fighting campaigns, major operations,battles, and engagements."8 While that definitionis clearly stated,it has little util- ity in dealing with the effects technological advanceshave on our approachto warfighting. 1prefer Ferdinand Foch's concept that doctrine is the "...practicalapplication ..:of a certain number of principles ...which ...must log- ically vary according to circumstances while alwaystendingtowardsthe ...object~vegoal:'" Foch's example of the doctnnal application of a principle is useful here because it clearly illustrates the relationship between doctrine and technology: "A wild fowl fliesup in front of a sportsman; if it goesfrom right to left, he fires in front and to the left; if from left to right, he fires in front and to the right; d it comes towards him, he fireshigh;ifawayfromhim,he fireslow. In each of these cases, he applies in a vanabk way the jkd principle: to get three points F s eye, the sight and the quarry]upon one straightline ... at the moment the shot takes effect."1° In this case the technologically advanced shotgun is adapted to the objectrve of kllling a duck. The doctrine would still be the same whether the hunter used a slingshot, a bow or a spear for duck hunting. While the shotgun gives the hunter a definite advantage over the ducks, it does not affect the doctr~neof the interceptionof projectile and quarry. TheBritishcampaignin the FalklandIslands in April 1982,demonstratedsomeof the poten- tial for advanced technological developments in wadare. In response to the Argentine inva- sionof the Falklands,Br~tainlaunchedthe first elementsof an amphibious attack force in less than a week. The task force traveled 8,000 miles through open seas and accomplished its assigned mission by ejecting Argentine forces from the Falklands in less than three weeks. Such a feat would have been virtually impossi- ble 20 years ago. For several reasons, technology appeared to be the dominantfactor in the campaign.First,a Vulcan bomber conducted a 7,800 mile round- tripflighttodrop21 1,OOO-poundbombson the runway at PortStanley.Themission required 17 in-flight refuelings of the bomber over the ocean-a remarkable feat of communications and modem British submarine bottled up the entire Argentme navy. And just one French-builtExocet missile destroyeda British ship. Yet the entire campaign was doctrinally identical to almost any other amphibiousoper- ation in this century. "The Falklands [cam- paign] underlined that the latest technology, handled by trained men, will frequently defeat an amorphous mass- always usth the proviso that the miwrity can comewe rts strengthand has adequate resereres of similar quality to call upon [emphasisadded]."" SocLPalLimitsonIcAno9ogg In preparing for wars in the future, the US military is likely to discoverthat it will become most difficult to find the adequate reserves dic- tated by Kenneth Macksey's Technology in War proviso. Simply put, science and weapons de- velopment exceed the capacity of both the economy and society. That technology over- budgetary capacities is evident in current weaponsdevelopment and upgrade programs. The M1 Abrans main battle tank is the world's most capable tank; and at a price tag of about $2.6 mill~on,it is doubtless the most expensive. But certain technologies available when the tank ivas developed and produced wereomittedbecause of the already high price. Now the Army seeks to upgrade the MI Abrarnsto the MlA2 venion which, accord~ng to studies, should ". .. show a 54 percent improvementin performancein the offenseand 100 percent improvement when used in a defense emplacement."'2 The problem is that the upgrade costs nearly half a million dollars for each tank, a figure that the average US tax- October 1989 * MILITARYREVIEW
  18. 18. atoricall~theintroductionofanew weaponon thebattlefieldhasinitially producedstunningtacticalvictories.But thet e m p o d ysslymiedfkldcommanderquick- lylearnedhislessons,adaptedcomparableoroffsettingtechnol~*esandcontinuedto 6ghtInmanycases,suchas Y%tmqbhemiliOuyfame thatdered &defeat because ofthe enemyk weaponstechnologyneverthelesscontinuedtofollowa well-conceived, populwly supportedstmtegicp h and ultimatelyprevailed in the war. payer probably believesought tobe the costof a wholenew tank. The high cost of high technology plaguesall the services. The final cost of the advanced medium-rangeair-to-airmissile (AMRAAM)is afigurethat ishotly debatedby the GAO(gov- ernment accounting office),Congressand de- fense contractors, but it 1sgenerallyagreed to be more than $450,000 per missile. Gran- ted, the AMRAAM has an ~mpressivelist of "dealer options." It tracks the enemy aircraft with its own radar, wh~chis d~fficultto jam, and it can engage low-flyingaircraft. But the Sovietsmay already have an "...elementary homingdevicefortheir AA-I0 Alamomisslie, enabling~tto home in on and kill enemyfight- erswheneverthey turn on their radar to search for targets. ..If that is true, the final, ironic epitaph of the AMRAAM would be that ofan $11.2 billion magical missile [program]ren- dered obsoleteby a simplertechnology."" What PriceVicterp If ever technologyshouldhaveforced a deci- ston in battle, the Arab-Israel1War m October 1973was the t~meand the Egyptlan an& Syrian forces attacked Israel on two fronts on the Jewlsh Day of Atonement (Yom Kip@). The Arableaden correctlyassessedthe IsqeL' relaxed mil~tdryposture. The Egyptian' force bridged the Suez Canal and deployed dassed Soviet ATGMs across the front. Antiaircraft m~ssiles(SA-2 and SA-3,and the newer SA-6 and SA-7)and ZSU 23-4 alr defmse'w&ipons provided a protectwe umbrella over airfields and bndgeheads.14 These technologically advanced &eapons d~rectlytargetedIsrael's twomost powerfulcom- bat' arms, amor and tactical air. Despite Initla1 setbacks in the air and on the gound, litael soon preva~ledagalnsr the Arab fo ces. But the costof the 18daywarwas mcredl&: Egypt and Israel each spent more than $7 bllhon. The MILITARY REVIEW * October 1989
  19. 19. Arabs lost 2,000 tanks and more than 500 planes, while Israel lost 804 tanks and 114 planes.15 Yet it was not the Arabs' use of advanced Soviet weapons systems that unbalanced the war at the outset. The problem was that Israel failed to fight its docnine of preemptive air smkes.Thefailurearosefrombureaucraticiner- tia and competing political interests rather than from any technological disparitybetween the forces. Politics did more to determine the shapeof the battle than didtechnology. The media's rush to publicizethe lethalityof themodembattlefield and the supposedfutility offightingmechanizedwarfareobscuredseveral important features of the new technological battlefield.First,ATGMfuesaccountedforless than 25 percent of the tanks killed. As in past armorbattles,tanks killed tanks. Second, "old- fashioned" antiaircraft artillery accounted for more than 40 percent of the Israelidowned fighters. The statistical evidence refutes argu- ments that technology determinesbattle deci- sions.Thelesson that clearlyemerw from thii short, intense war is that'techn;ology drives technology,not warfighting. So, when the Soviet Un~onw~messedits tanksbeingdestroyedat arate of 50-to-1on the Syrianfront in 1973,it rushed to developreac- tive armor to restore its armored advantage. The United States in turn began developing antitank systems to neutralize reactive armor. As mentionedbefore,in the continuing,costly pursuit of the high*techedge in armored war- fare, technological advantages tend to neu- tralize one another. SocietalDragon Rigb-lchThrust Technological advance, despite its promi- nence in warfare sincethe mid-19th century, is not the major factor in determining the out- come of battles and engagements. Certainly, the military must be "...forward-looking and adaptable to changing technologies ..."I6 But IoresponsetotheArgentine invasionoftheFalkhds,Britainlaunched thefirst elementsofanamohibiousamck forceinless thana week. Thetask force tmveled 8,000milesh i u g hopenseasandaccomplisheditsassignedmission bv eiectinehentine forcesfrom theFalkIandF inless than three weeks. " §u&a f&t wouldhave been virtuallyimpossible20 years ago. ThaBritishtask Wcepmoodingto theFalklands. ThedeslmyerOlsrorgan(toregmund)was later damaaedbvashore-based ExocetmlssilestrlkinqIts stem&it&conducting ashorebombardment.-
  20. 20. many other factorsalso influence the ways and means available for use in war. Political inter- ests, bureaucratic inertia, an uneducated media reporting misleading information, and diplo- matic maneuverings all will affect future war- fighting.Our nation's indusmal capabil~tyand itsfinancialpower base will alsodeterminehow we engagein futurewars. Technologyis toomuch apartof the modem world to be ignored; but its adaptation to doc- mne is limited by budget constraints. The research and dwelopment offices of military and industriallaboratoriesarestuffedwithplans for wonder weapons that never survived con- gressionalbudget cuts. if technologywerepara- mount, then many of these weapons would have been produced and fielded, regardless of the cost. fReSoldier'sLapad The 1973MiddleEast War showed technol- ogy in weaponssystemshad clearlyoutstripped the ability of the soldier to employ weapons systems to their full effectiveness.17 How we fight wars 1s enhanced by technological ad- vances in weapons; but who we use to fight the war remainsthe same.The most important element in the technological struggle is often the least obvious,for it is the s o h whodrives both technologyand warfighting. All of our ~ntensityin developingadvanced weapons must be guided by the notion that "...the complexity of these weaponsalso im- plies that the quality of manpower required to operate them must be of the best."'"oday, one of theharshest socialdevelopmentsthe US military must deal with 1sthe fact that ". ..of the 3,248,000 freshmen who entered high school in 1982, only 2,382,000 graduated in 1986-an effective dropout rate of 26.7 per- cent." Unlesssomedramaticchangeoccursin the areaof education,the militaryof the future will ~ncludeconsiderablenumbersof thosewho have neither the educational background nor the inelmation to handle complicated tech- nologicalsystems. Target dmne hp%~-d bein0deslmved bya~imcteci- energyweapon at Kinland Air ForceBase, NewMexico In 1987. flechnology'sl adaptation to docnineis limitedby budgetconstl.ainis. Theresearchanddevelopmentoffices ofmilitaryandindustriallaboratoriesare s~hpeduihplans forwonderweaponsthatcnevers-ved congressionalbudgetcuts. lftechnologywerepatamount, thenm&y oftheseweaponswould havebeenpr8. In every groundwar of the 20th cedtufy,the infantrymancontinuedasoneof the threepnn- clpal arms. There is little evidence to.suggest this situation will changem futurewad. As an example, it is the soldier who, under fire, must guide the TOW (tube-launched, optiqlly tracked,*ire-guided) missile during its avehge 17-secondflight to an enemy tank. As the mili- tary strains to equipthe sold~erwith the best in technolog~cal capability and to substitute MILITARYREVIEW October 1989
  21. 21. TheMI A b m main battlem1.4isthe world'smost capabletank;andat aprice tagofabout$2.6million,itisdoubtlessthemostexpensive.But certaintech- nolopiesavaikblewhen the tank wasdevelooedandproduced wereomittedbecauseof~ ~ -~ ~ - - -- thealreadyhiphprice. Now theArmysee/&to up&tdetheMI ...the upgradecosts nearlyhaKa &on dollanforeach tank, afime that the average UStamayer probably believesoughttobe the costofawhole new iank, - machinesforhumanson the battlefield, it must recognize an unavoidable reality. The soldier must still be present to apply the technology available,because only man has the judgment to do so. Unfortunately, thus far in the history of wadare, as in other affairsof man, judgment has comefrom experience.And experience too often has come from uing bad judgment. At the same time, the Immense capabilitlea of the soldieron the battlefield cannot he over- looked. "The infantrymanas a vehicle for fire- power has the disadvantage of being fragile, prone to fatigue and a slow mover, although theseinherentcharacteristicscanbe relievedby transportinghim to the scene of combat in an armored vehicle,or by air. [His]shortcomings are more than compensated for by his tactical mobil~tyIn any terratn. ..He presents a small and inconspicuous target ... can easily hide himself and, glven a little ttme, can bumow underground ltke a mole. He also has gifts, excellent optical and acoustic sensors and a smallbut unsurpassedneural computer,one fit- ted to each model."z@ Where isthe Front The last concern forms the basis for all the others. What will future war be like?Where will it befought?Against whom?Inshort, what isthethreat against whichwemust pit ourtech- nologically superb military?General John R. Galvincautionsthat "whenwe think about the possibtlities of conflict we tend to invent fat ourselvesa comfortablevision of war, a theater with battlefieldswe know, conflictthat fitsour understandingof strategy and tactics,a combat October 1989 MILITARYREVIEW
  22. 22. BRIGHT PROMISE environment that isconsistent andpredictable, fightable w~ththe resources we have, one that fitsour plans, our assumptions,our hopes, and ow preconceived ideas."Z1 The US military concentrated its recent development effons on improving its capa- bilities on the large conventional battlefield. Should the next war require a significant com- mitment of resources other than our mighty Should thenext warrequirea sjgni6cantcommitment ofreso- other thanourmighty armor,antiarmorand air assee, we willface the twinproblems ofa hck oftlainedwtsonneland inadeauate resources...Lyattempt to considirthe technolorricaffutureof&arc must be- ein witha-kassessment thatfofuseson armor,antiarmorand air assets,we will facethe &heereandhow &$tin hehture, +in ~roblemsof a lack of rralned personnel noton how we&t like to&hL apd inadequate resources to commit to the - - fight. Consequently, any attempt to consider the technological future of warfare must begin with a threat assessment that focuseson where andhow we must fightin the future,not on how we might like to fight. In summary, technology may cause "... widespreaddestructionof high-cost, high-value weapon systems [which]will lead to a 'broken- backedwar' orastalemateof mutualexhaustion ...At one level,we are the inhab~ranrsof the taught world of the 1980's, ~ncreasinglyable to control our envlmnrnent, harnessing galloping technology, and prohing far beyond the con- finesof our own planet. At another,we are pris- onersof ourdevelopment and culture,and with all the mixed feelingsof our fathersand grand- fathers, we stand on the start Line [of the next war], waiting only forthe whistle."22 Allowingforthe unpredictablesuccessofour advanced technology, we must continue to apply time-testedand battle-provendocirinein fightingwars. At the sametime,weshouldcon- tinue to adapt new weapons technology into our military. But we should not expect too much from technology,because it doesnot win wars. Wars will continue to be won by well-led forces that use sound doctrine in applying the principlesof war to defeat an enemy. % NOTES { 1 Or Benlam8n H W~llhamr."The Immance ol Research aM Develop mnlta NarioMl Socuniy.' Mllary Review (February1959) 14 2. S L A Marshal.MenAgmslRm (NBV Y o n WilllamMamw andCo . 1947) 19 3 Tw~ofthebeUsrtmatmenlsolthIS~db~~cI~JOhn~a~PWOXs,me ~ a ~ e a t a e m a ~m ~ e ~ k o t c o m r n ~ r n 4 Wnnslh Macxsy, Techmo~ym Ukr en Ya* Prsnrlce Hal Pmm 19%) 1% 5 lbld 193 6 bid. 191-94l)gssnm 7 G e a w Wme RobenL Praizgmll Jr amUnRaamn edr Orher amsnsn, NewTechnoMg~ess~Non-r~ck,~~~WcI(TamloHeath8Co 1975L 122 a us Depanmenl ol the Army. Reld Mama IFM) 1W 5 Ommlinr (Wrnhtglm DC GwsmmenlPnnlmgOtflm,May 19WL6 9 FerdlMM FOCh b p t S BmJUIgmaniS (Nw,Yak HQIIB CO 19201 154 I0 lbid 156 11 MacWBy2.35 L 12 ~ m m n e l l yA ~ ~ ~ I O H ~ I I~itflund~~drngmM?uprpam'Ann? lims i ~ s h k v ~ s a s ~14 13 P B I ~can me mn~agm~mlrgulasd mlsstlenUS NWS k MDM~ R e m i 1 May 1989) 36 14 M a C W 197 I 39 mes st L Eoyar am Teml H Bell "Edlmatim"ha&~dnAgenbs RnmtmmeFamYirstRssnrenlaftht~nned~telarot~mncei~amp~ill.PA hlaj~nRt~benA Strangea an insmusn mththe D e b m r ofJomtmd Gmb~nui Oprrunom. US Amv Cummnd and General Smff College. Fwn Imwnwth. Kam Fie ha $4m V ~ m mand Kmu,ac uell a, m a uaneq of command and sraffa,sr~trnencl ~nrhe RcgulniAmy. Ann?N d G u d and theAmy Rermw MILITARY REVIEW October 1989
  23. 23. ARECENT issue of Officer Call, a peri* odicalpublishedby +e Amy's Chief of Public Affairs, contains the rather surprising statement that "technology is the lie b l d of new and improved Amy systems." The state- ment is surprisingbecause it apparentlys h i i the Army's focus away from its traditional life blood, soldters. Although technology plays an ever-increasingrole in thefutureofwar, therole of human beings musr determtne the tech- nologicalfuture of war. In War WithoutMen,a book aboutthe roleof robotsinfuturewars,the authors stress that "unless human belngs con- trol that future war, ~tmight develop in ways that would prove very costly to our descen- dants." If man is to conttol the technological future of war, then man must remain the life blood of the Atmy. We are in a technological age and there is every reason to believe that technology will exert an increasing influence on planning and conducting war. The future of war, however. dependsonman, not technology.Justasan a&-' lete canjump fartherwith a running start than from a standing start, we can explore the pos- sibilities of the technological future of war by stepping briefly into the past to get a running start, soto speak,into the future. Technology has always had an impact on war, but since the beg~nningof this century it has come to practically dominatethe prepara- tion for, and conduct of, war. Concern for the relationship between technology and war is a relatively recent development. Not too long ago, entire generationsof wamors could fight anddiewithlittle orno concernforadaptingto new weapons, simply because technology did not continually develop new weapons as has become commonplace today. In those times, weapons development just sort of happened when it happened. Ps slow and haphazard as the development of weapons was, however, the development of doctrine appropriate to new weapons when they did appear on the battlefield was even slower. "Psychological change," Michael How atdobservedin a 1986lectureon warand tech- nology, "always lags behiid technological change." The problem was not technologyper se, but the recognitionof a substantivechange in weapons technoldgy,which in turn necessi- Concernfortherdationship betweentechnologyandwarka & tivelyrecentdevelopment.Nottoolong ago, entiregenerationsofwarribiscould fight anddiewithlittleornoconcernfor aa'apdagtonewweapons,simply because technologydidnotcontinuallydevelop new weapons...weaponsdwebpment* sortofhappenedwhenit happened. tated a psychologicalchange mwarriorsto pro- duce docmne appropriateto the technological change. The culmination of technology out- running docnine was World War 1, in which massed armies spent four years slaughtering each other with 20th century weapons while the generals dithered with 19th century docwine. If the professtonof arms learnednothingeh rfromWorld WarI, it learnedthat if a littletech< _ _ nologyisgood,then alot of technologym e tbe better. Between world wars, the conservative militaryattitudeof shunningnew weapoh and technology that interfered with t h ~ j ~=dl- tional way of doing business changed.&here was, instead,aclose,almost desperate,&+brace oftechnologicalsolutionstov~rmally,e~ybat- tlefieldproblem. Solvingproblems with technology,however, is expensive. As a direct result of deinandiig the latest In technology to preparePforwar, armies,navies and air forcesnow actually have fewer weaponswith which to conduct=.!Not only are their expensive weapons fewei in number,the weaponsarenolongerparticularly new. Today's military forces rely on the same basicweapons they discovered in World War I, MILITARYREVIEW 0 October 1989
  24. 24. and the ideasforsomeof thoseweaponseven go back as far as the 15th century and the fertile mind of Leonardo da Vinci. Today,armiesrely on tanks,airforcesrely on airplanes, and navies rely on a~rcraftcarriers andsubmarinesfor their combat power. Each of "Psychologicalchange,"[observed MichaelHoward]"alwayslags behind technologicalchange'!..Theculrnin. ationoftechnologyoutrunningdocnine was WorldWarI, in whichmassed armiesspentfouryears slaughtering eachotherwith 20thcenturyweapons whilethegene& dithered with 19th centurydoctrine. these weapons systems saw active service in World War I, experienced development during the Interwar period and then dominated the conductof World War 11. Since then they have been refined to virtual perfection. Although critlu of each system periodically predlct its demise, each remains dominant in ~ t sarea of specialuation:the tank on land, the airplaneln the air,the alrcraft carrier on the surfaceof the sea and the submarinebeneath it. S~nceWorld War I1 only one truly new and revolutionaryweapon has enrered the arsenals of the world. The awesome power of nuclear weapons ended World War 11 and tntroduced the nuclear age of warfare. Nuclear weapons have not, however, been used in anger since. While they have perhaps revolutionized thtnk- tng about and preparing for war, nuclear weap- ons themselves have not yet substantively changedthe actualconduct of war. The wars fought since 1945 have relied on the tradittonal weapons of the 20th century: tanks, airplanes, aircraft carriers and sub- marines. Although technology has certainly refined them all into electronic and mechan- ical marvels,they remain the same basic weap- ons systems introduced in World War I. While onemay arguethat helicoptersorjet enginesfor aircraft were rrtvolut~onar~,they are really sim- ply refinements of the heavier-than.air flying vehicle. In the conduct of war, the let aircraft hason occastonprovedtobe toofast tobe effec- tive, and the helicopter, although used in com- bat, has yet to actually prove itself on a high- technology battlefield. We will apparently reach the end of the 20th century using the sameweaponswe had at its beginning. With the 20th century's tradit~onalweapons becoming too expensive and too complex for practicalroutineuse in trainingorevencombat and nuclear weapons generally deemed too powerfulforanypracticaluse,the technological futureof war dependsmore on man's ability to retain controloverhis creattonsthan it doeson creating new weapons. Whtle technology ia a creation of man, and man must retain control of what he creates, technology already exerts some control over its creator. The authors of War Without hlen caution that "humans must take measures to ensure that mankind remains In control of [those]metal creaturescapable of great destruction." Although their warning refers to robots, it is timely because from the strategicperspectiveof war, technology already influences the actions of men. Nuclear weap ons, the ult~matetechnology in weaponry (at least for the moment),have already taken con- trol of strategy aince In the mlnd of man they are too terrihle to actually be used. The devel- opers of the technology, therefore, find them- selves in the paradoxical position of creating the ultimate weapon without being able to use it. From the strategic perspective, the prepara- tion for war has surpassed man's capability to conductwar. From the tactical perspective of war, the sit- uation IS a bit different. Man IS nying hard to reverse the historic experience of having tech- nology drive docrrmedevelopment.In its pos- ture statementpreparedfor the lOlst Congress, the US Army looks to the future with an Alr- Land Battle-Futureconcept, "intendedto guide October1989. MILITARY REVIEW
  25. 25. Nucleardetmatlonata Nw9d.atestsitedunm Since World Warnonlyone trulynewand revolutionaryweaponhas entered thearsenalsoftheworld. ..Nuclearweapons,theultimatetechnologyin weaponry(at leastfor themonent),havealreadytakencontrolofstrategysinceinthemind of man theyare tooterribletoactuallybe used. Thedevelopersofthetechnolorntherefore, iind themselvesin theparadoxicalposition ofcreatingtheultimate weapon kwithoutbeingableto useit the development ... doctrine, equipment, organizations, training, leader development, and support." This system of drivlng tech- nology with doctrlne becomes poss~bleonly whentechnologicaladvancesarerapid andm~l- ltary acceptance of new technology is wide- spread. Wlth no new weapons availableat the tactical level, however, the result 1sslmply the continuing refinement of existing weapons. Thedoctrinedoesnot reallydrivethesearchfor revolutionarynew weapons;it srmply demands further refinementsof the 20th century tradi- tional weapons that remain comfortable co~n- panlons to another generatlon of wamoss Between the technologicai pad& of nuclear strategy and the tactlcal conse$ktlsm of traditional 20th century weaponry,lies the gray area of operatlonal an, the perspective of war thus far least affected by technology. But even from the operationalperspective,of war, whlch accord~ngto US Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operanom, requires the essen- tially nontechnolog~calattr~butesof "broad vlslon,the abllltyto antlclpate,a careful under- standing of the relationsh~pof means to ends, and effectivejo~ntand comblnedcooperation," MILITARY REVIEW October 1989
  26. 26. An F-117A"stealth"fighterof the 4450thTacticalGroup. Withnonewweaponsavailable at the tacticallevel,however,theresult iPsimplythe continuingrefinementof exisringweapons. Thedoctrinedoesnot reallydrivethesearchforrevolutionarynew weapons;itsimplydemandsfurtherrehe- mentsofthe20thcenturytraditionalweaponsthatremaincodortable compmbns toanothergenerationofwarnbrs, technology plays an ever-increasing role in the conductof war. The effect of technology on operational art remains to be seen, but it would seem that the increasedcapabilitiesof commandand control systems, which allows commanders to extend their vision and coordinateeffect~vejo~ntand combined operations,could only help the con- duct of war from the operational perspective. ChrisBellamy,however,writingin The Futureof Land Warbre, a book that concentrateson the operational level of war, cautions that whtle command and control systemshave "keptpace with, and perhaps exceeded, the rate of Im- provements in mobility and commun~cations themselves" they also "may actuallybe slowing thingsdown" byincreas~ngthe sizeof the head- quarters required to maintam those mcreas- ingly complex systems. Similarly, Martin van Creveld points out in Command in War that "[tlhemore availabieinformation ...the long- er time needed toprocessit, and the greaterthe danger of failing to distrnguish between the relevant and the irrelevant,the important and the unimportant, the reliable and the unrelia- ble, the true and the false." Technologymay be threatening to overwhelm mank control of operational art just as nuclear weapons have apparently stagnated strategy. And once again there ~sthe possibility of the creation holding the creator hostage. Perhaps thls is all to the good. The tech- nological future of war may turn out to ellmi- nate war, or at least reduce its scale. Predicting the future, however, depends on how far one looksinto thefuture. Bellamylimitedhisanalp sisof the future of land warfare to a quarterof a century simply "because major weapons sya- tems be~ngintroduced or envisaged at the tune of wr~tingare likely to be In serviceduringthat perlad." L~mitingthe distance based on weap- ons keeps predict~onswithin the bounds of 20th Century traditional weapons. While this may lead to fairly accurate predictions in the short term, it may also limit the imagination to simplywhat we know rather than stimulatinga search for what we need to know for the tech- nologlcalfuture of war. Lookingtoofar into thefuture,however,may produce such fantast~cvisions of war and tech- nology that the fundamentally conservative militarymind will simplyreject them. It 1sone thing to use technology to Improve familiar items such as tanks or airplanes,but it is qulte October 1989 0 MILITARYREVIEW
  27. 27. another to accept Robert A. Heinlein's vision in hi sciencefiction novel of the 1950s. Star- ship Tmpers, where mobile infantry m self- contained fighting suits routinely drop from spaceshipscommandedby womenontothe sur- face of planetsfarfromEarth to wage war. Thetechnological futureof war correlatesto the structureof war Itself.Generallythe higher the perspective of war, the greater influence technology now has. If one can make the assumption that there is probably a general desire among the nuclear powers to avoid destroying the world, then from the strategic perspectiveman bows to the demands of tech- nology. The latest answer to nuclear weapons, the Strategic Defense ln~t~ative(SDI), would put the defense agalnsr them wholly in the realm of technology. Writing m the Bulktin of Atomic Scienrists,]ohnMauling,aveteranof the Manhattan Project,characteruesSDIas "tech- nology that completely removes all human involvementexcept that connectedw~thbe~ng a target." This latesttechnologicaldevelopmentin the preparation for war has apparently spurred greater efforts for arms control between the superpowers.One of the reasons glven for the increased acceptance of arms control IS that there is now technology to police the agree- ments. The technological future of war from the strategicperspectiveliesforthe moment in arms control to prevent, or at least llm~t,the actual conduct of war. From the tactical perspective of war, man continuesto adapt technologyto h ~ sdemands, andsofar,the creatorretainscontrolof h ~ screa- tions. While the m~lltaryhas apparently ac- cepted that technology has an increasingly dominantrole inwar,from the tact~calpeppec- tlve the weapons have remained comfortably familiar.Forasocietythat hasseenman gofrom theb~rthofpowered a ~ rflightto supersonicpas- From thetacticalperspectiveofwar,mancontinuestoadapt technologyto * his demands,andso far,thecreatorretainscontrolofhiscreations.Whilethermlrtary has apparentlyacceptedthattechnologyhas an increasinglydominantrolein war, from the tacticalperspectivethe weaponshaveremainedcomfortablyfamiIiar... Thenextgenerationofwarriorswill6ghtpretty muchas the lastgeneration did, ifthey&ht atall. I
  28. 28. Whilecommandandcontrolsystems have "keptpacewith,andperhapsex. ceeded,therateofimprovemenixin mobilityandcommunicationsthemselves" theyako "mayactuallybeslowing things down"byincreasingtheste ofthe head. quartersrequiredtomaintainthose increasindycomplexsystems. sengertravel in lessthan a century,has seenthe telephonebecome an essentialitem of dailylife in half a century,and has seen &levision grow from a fad into an internationalsystem of infor- mation exchange in a quarterof a century,the weapons of war have not really changed very much. This basic conservatism does not pro- vide a very high probability for change in the foreseeable future.The next generationof war- riors will fight pretty much as the last genera- tion did, if they fight at all. Viewingthe technologicalfbtureof war from the operationalperspectivepresents a confused picture. On the one hand, man may be running out of room on Earth to deploy large non- nuclear mtlitaryforceswith their fullpanoply of combat, combat support and combat service support systems necessary to conduct high- intensity conventional warfare. On the other hand, man is not quite ready to take ha wan into space, where presumably there will be ample room to deploy and use even the most exotic weaponry. Robert O'Connell concludes his book, Of A m and Men, a study of man's relationshipto his weapons, with the observa- tion that if nuclear weapons continue to exist (and there is no reason to believe that they would not), "it seems appropriate that their venuebe deepspaceratherthan oursmall,blue planet." From the operational perspective of war, where military forces are used to achieve national objectivesby force,the actual conduct of war isoutgrowingplanetEarth.The ultimate result may be an lncreastng reluctanceto wage war, looking instead to other means of settling disputes among members of the international communityof nations. Whatever the future holds, man must main- tain domtnance over the weapons of war; any other circumstance will simply be the end of man. Man's mind, the societythat mind builds and the wamor ethos of the period will decide the technological future of war. Paul Kern, a professor of ancient history,writing of milltary technologyin Greekwarfare in the ioumal War andSociety,remindsus that this has alwaysbeen so. "The way a societyfights a war." he writes, "is a product of both the military technology and the attitudes and values of that society." American societyat least,now looks to afuture that holds little prospect of general war, al- though that same society will apparently sup- port short, limited wars waged with the latest technology. The conduct of war from any perspective depends more and more on complex tech, nology. It may be that the only way man can maintain control of that technology is to never use the weapons it produces. The technological future of war may be a paradox in which tech- nologyeventuallyelimmatesthe very activity it is trying to improve. % Lmuenant Colael C l q m R Newll a the c h i H u d Sen~esI h c u ~ m . Cente~farhlhtary Hamy. W m h ~ .DC He recetwd a B.S.frvmAnzm Stare Umwmcy and a agradme ofthe USAmy Commandand General StaffCuUege. He hnsserved ~ 7 t hhe USAmy InteBgence Centerand Schwl.IhHunchucn,Awmw; u7th he US Amy Gmceptr Adym Agmcy. Be&, Marylad and as drecm, lonu OperahmiCrmrepo. Depmnent of MPtmyStrategy.Plannmgand opera am^^. USArmy War CoUege,CmLskh a r k ,Pmnsylunw Ha amck"Fogand Encm, chd€nges toh d a n d ~onnol."appea~edm &August 1987 Mllltary Revlew October1989 MILITARY REVIEW
  29. 29. DUE TO A LACK OF PHOTOGRAPHIC CONTRAST BETWEEN TEXT AND BACKGROUND.THI~ PAGE ' Dm NOT REPRODUCE WELL. TECHMOLO Colonel John B. Alexander, US Army, Retired Withthecostofnewweaponssystemsescalatingatanunaccept- ablepace, alternative means for defeatingand degrading threat capabilitiesmust beexplored.Theauthoroffmthat antimateriel technologv, as developed through virtualprototyping, p!ovides numerousmethodsfor attaining ''sofikills" and substanha1deg. radationofweaponsand uniteffectiveness. ODERN armed forces are mcreasingly The term soft kill was in vogue for a while dependent on machine locomotion. but was dropped when some military leaders Hence, offens~veand defensive weapons have misunderstood ~tas meanlng "less than effec- been devised to forcefully damage or destroy tive." Other terms that have been used to con- military vehicles causing what is known as vey the general concept include "mhion kill" "hard kill," the result of proximate explosion(s) or "operatlonalkill." All of theserermsarevery or impact of projectiles. Recent technologyhas vague, as they do not describea clearly defina- lent impetus to another class of weapons that ble objective and refer to "kill" instead of sys- mcapacitatea milltary machine without brute tem degradation. With many of the proposed force attack, achievmg what has previously weapons systems in this category, the most been termed "soft kill" or more recently "anti- probableeffectwillbe thedegradationof acriti- materiel technology." This article outl~nes cal component or subsystem of the attacked an approach to t h i k n g about such antima- weaponsplatform. teriel-technology as electromagnetic pulse, isotropic ~ ~ g h t , ti@Burinter- inhibitos and crew In the or plane
  30. 30. - -- or near total destruction of that weapons plat- form. The categorieswere dead or not dead- no ambiguity. It was easy to determine which categorythe platform fell into, asthere was usu- ally a pile of wreckage. Thiisimple categoriza- tion gave commanders and soldierson the bat- Thesurvivabilitydesignedinto manycurrentandfutureweaponssystems makesahardi d both verydiflicultand imp-acticalwithoutemployingnuclear weapons.It will be virtuallyimpossibleto build conventionalweaponssystems, orfamiliesofweapons,that canproduce a hard killforall threatplatforms whenthe numberofpotenhialtargetsisconsidered. tlefield a great deal of confidence ln the ef- fectivenessof their weapons. It also gave rise to what may be called the "burning cinder" or "smoldering hulk syndrome. That is, troops wanted to see a pile of wreckage or bumlng cmder on the battlefield to be assured that an opponent's weapons platform was destroyed or "killed." A frequentlycited example of the desire to be absolutely certain that an enemy weapons system is totally out ofcommissioncomes from the Israeli pursuit of the Egvptian armored forces across the Sinai in 1973. It was reported that as each lsraeliunit came In visual contact with an Egyptian tank, one or two antitank rounds were fired Into it. Tanks that had been destroyedearly in the retreat were hit over and over again as each reinforcing unit passed by. These tanks became bullet sumps for large quantitiesof Israeli rounds. Grven the status of war at that point, the Israelis thought they could afford the luxury of expendmg mulr~ple rounds per target. The most important point is that in combat, soldiers were not psychologi- cally prepared to take the chance that there might be any possib~litythat the enemy might have afightingcapability in their rear area. While the redundantkill approachdoespro- vide high confidence, it will simply not be affordable on futuremid- to high-intensity bat- tlefieldswithlimitednumbersof very expensive munitions. US docnine has always recognized the necessity forfire disciplinebut it has rarely been practiced in combat. In recent years, par- ticularlyduring the Vietnam War, we relied on ovenvhelmingfirepowerto overcomeall obsta- cles. We employedartillery and axcraft against snipersand had "mad minutes"(a large volume of fire from all availableweapons) before mov- ing out in the morning,just to be surethat the enemywasnot lurkingabout.Wetend tojustify these large ammunition expendituresby citing the advantages gained by suppressive fires. Although a case can be made for the value of suppression during combat maneuvering, too frequently those fires are used to make the shooterfeel good (safe) instead of for their real tacticalbenefit.Ourhistorydoesnot reflect the discipline that will be required to defeat large numbers of hard targets. That is not to say it cannot be done. AntimaterielIchno8ogy Ixanomy Forthe purposesof this article,I havechosen to use "antimatenel technology" to describe a broad spectrumof techniquesfor attack.Estab- lishing the taxonomy of antimateriel tech- nology weapons systems is most difficult, as there u no clear consensusof the demarcation betweenhardandsoftsystems.Frequently,they may be best delineatedfrom what antimateriel technologysystemsarenot. Antimaterrel technologies are those that do not penetrate protective armor by use of brute physical force. Examples of the brute force approach Include chemicaland lanetic energy penenaton of antiarmorweapons and theblast or fragmentationeffectsof artillery fire. Those effectsdestroy the target by means of overcom- ingthe protectivemeasuresby shearforce.Tni approach requires expenditure of relatively large amounts of energy to destroy very hard October1989 * MILITARYREVIEW
  31. 31. ANTIMATERIEL TECHNOWGY An lsraellCenturiontankwith wartof11sletttrack 1 t & Thetwobestexamplesofdegradationwithoutcatastrophicfailurearemobility kills and firepowerkills.Znonecase,aaarmored vehiclemaybephysicallystopped and unabletomovefora sigdcantperiod oftimebutisstill capableofdelivering aimedtireontarges withinitsfieldofviewandrange. Zntheotherrase, anannored vehiclemay be fully mobileand yet unabletoshoot targets such as tanks, armored personnel cat- riers or self-propelledartillery.Shipshave been designed as relatively hard systems through applicationofth~ckarmor,whereasaircraftowe much of their physical survivabilityto maneu- verability, electronic countermeasures and redundant subsystems. Planes and submarines both rely heavily on signature reduct~onto escape detection by all but the most sophlsti- cated techniques. They also have carefully designed compartments,which allowsthem to sustain substantial structural damage and st111 survive, often with the capacity to complete their mission. The survivability designed Into many cup rent and future weapons systems makes a hard killboth very difficult and impract~calwithout employingnuclear weapons. It wlll be virtually MILITARYREVIEW October 1989 impossible to build conventionalweapons sys- tems,orfamiliesof weapons,that canproducea hard kill for all threat platforms when the number ofpotentialtargetsisconsidered ~ n d - materiel technology offers a viable altema$e that candefeat the threat, whoeverthatma , e at any given time, at the operationallevel.?,. Antimateriel technologies tend to beriess energy intensive and may or may not'induce catastrophic failure. Frequently, antimateriei mechanismsproduce a degradation in wapon system functioningwithout totally decorfimis- sioning that system. The two best examples of degradation without &tastrophic failure are mobility kills and firepower kills. In one case; an armored vehicle may be physicallystopped and unable to move for a significant period of time but is still capableof deliveringaimedfire 31
  32. 32. At thetoplevehofleadership, theneed foralternatives tohard kill weapomhasbeen+andgenerally accepted Whatisneedednowisan unde~ standingofthenecessitytodevelopand employantimaterieltechnologyweapons tobeinculcated throughoutthemilitary. on targets within its field of view and range. In the othercase,an armoredvehicle may be fully mobile andyet unableto shoot.This allowsthe vehicle freedom to move to a location to make repairs or to continue m an attackfor the shock value afforded by speed and numbers of armoredvehicles. In either case,firepoweror mobility kill, the weaponssystemmay appear to be totally opera- tional. It is impossible to look at the platform and quickly determineitscombat status. Exten- siveobservationoveraperiodof timeisrequ~red to definitively determine its status. This inability isone of the drawbacksto antimateriel technologysystems.Thisisparticularlystressful when units are in direct combat. However, when employed in the deep battle, kt11 assess- ment concernsare greatly lessened. In the 1967Arab,Israeli Warwe learned that "what can be seen can be hit; what can he hit can be killed." Clearly, lethality on the bat- tlefield had taken a major leap forward follow- ing the end of World War 11. In the 22 years sincethat Mid-Eastwar, technology has greatly enhanced both the ability to protect hard tar- gets and the capability to locate and h ~ tthose targetswith extremeprecision. Majoreffortandenormousexpensehavegone into the armorlantiarmor(A') "do-loop." The A3 weapons are constantly increasing in sue, strength and technological sophistication.For each improvementin armorthere is a new pen- etrator;for new penetratorsthere is new armor. The cyclegoes on and on. A myriad of harden- ing and other survivabilityprograms have pro- vided incremental improvement in the capa- bility of weaponssystemsto remain effective in an extremely hostilebattlefield environment. Similar competition can be observed between technological advances in air defense and changes in aviation doctrine accompanied by survivability programs. Artillery improve- ments have generated increased emphasis on counterbattery location and fires, while the demand for more communicationrunsagainst effortsforsecurityand antijamrequirements. Oneoutcomeof thoseprogramshasbeen the greatly increased cost and complexity of new weaponssystemsandthe requirement forexten- siveretrofitof fieldedsystemsthat must remain in the inventory. For each advance there has been a countermove, usually followed by a counter-counterinitiative. There are direct costs in procurement of each system and indi- rect costs in additionalweight and ~om~lexity. Thebottom line isthat at somepoint inthe not toodistant future,weaponssystemswillbecome so complex and expensivethat they will not be viewed as affordable by the taxpayers or Congress. TheAmtimaterielAltermatiwe Alternativesolutions exist to hard kill of all threat targets. The application of these solu- tions requires both development of new doc- trine and a new mindset on the part of mllitary leaders at all levels. While the doctrinal changes do not represent a radical departure from the present, they do require that the United States adopt a policy accepting calcu- lateddegradationof an opposingforceasacrite- rjon for success. This infers a willingness to employ weapons systems that reduce the func- tioning of threat systemsbut without the abso- lutedestructionof all elementsof that force.Of course the requirement to service targets with hard kill weapons will remain a primary con- cern. Antimateriel technology will comple- ment, not replace,hard kill. The changeinmindset will be moredifficult for many soldiers, especially those who are October 1989 MILITARY REVIEW
  33. 33. By employinglong-rangeorstay-behindantimaterieltechnologysystems desienedtodemadeenemvmobilim the temw remired bv threatdoctrine canbe seriodYinhibitled.Sr~U&ru~tio&'ininobihypa~emsd k pin theenemyrearcan have cascadingeffecectsfurther along.A 1-hourdelayofanenemyforcedeepini s own territory...-could be criticalto d e USforce thaimustengage.mgetsat &e FLQT. directly opposed by a potentially belligerent adveaary. At the top levels of leadership, the need for alternativesto hard kill weapons has been recognized and generallyaccepted. What isneeded now isan understandingof the neces- sity to develop and employ antimateriel tech- nology weapons to be inculcated throughout the military. These systems should be under- stood and accepted for their ability to make majorcontributionson the battlefield Thereare somehistorical examplesthat sup- port antimateriel solut~ons.One of the most ancient techniques, and one that has con- tinued application, IS the use of smoke to degrade mobility and firepower. Today, multl- specaal obscurants serve to block sensors that can "see" beyond the visual range, thus degrad- ing enemy weaponssystemsand ~ncreasingsys- temsurvivability.Other examples include th World War 11use of meconing to luG aircraft into welldefendedareas,which increasedtheir vulnerability while detractingthem frompeir assignedtargets. There area number of advantag&64rrent adoption of an antimateriel technolqgy ap- proach. First and foremost, it willBe ifective in fightingat the operat~onallevelof war. Effec- tive attacks againstdeep targetsare a precondi- tion forthe accomplishmentof the laqd force's mission.' By employing long-rangeror stay- hehwd antimater~eltechnology systems de- signed to degrade enemy mobility, the tempo required by threat doctrine can be seridusly inhibited. Small disrupt~onsin mob~lity'pat- terns deep m the enemy rear can have caicad- ing effectsfurther along. A 1-hourdelayof an MILITARYREVIEW* October 1989
  34. 34. -- enemy force deep in its own territory could result in that force failing to reach its assigned deploymentposition untilseveralhours afterits scheduled time of attack. That period could be criticaltothe USforcethat must engagetargets Theweaponssystems derived from thesetechnologiesare wellsuited to attacking thetraditionalSoviet vulnera- bilitiesofconstrainedlogisticalnetwarks, dependenceonmass,and centri&zed decisionand controlsystems. at the f o m d l i e of own troops @TOT),in that suchadisruptionwouldreducethenumber of enemyarmoredvehiclesthat directlyoppose them at any given time. The time saved will providecommanders an opportunityto obtain more intelligence,make better estimatesof the situation, communicateoperationsorders and exerclse the mobility required to defeat a numerically superior armored force. This 1s a critical advantage that has been repeatedly demonstrated through field exercisesand mod- eling.TheUScommander'sabilitytomakekey decisions and reposition forces faster than the threat can respond plays a major role in decid- ing the outcomeof the battle. Theuseof antimaterieltechnologiesfitswell with the emergrng doctrine of competitive strategies by emphasizing our traditional strength of scientific innovatton(creativetech- nology). The weapons systems derived from - these technologies are well suited to attacking the traditional Soviet vulnerabilities of con- strained logisttcal networks, dependence on mass, and centralized dccislon ana control sys- tems. For the most part, proposed antlmateriel weaponssystemsmay be used tokeeptroopsout of harm's way, thereby assistingin maintaining the necessarysuperiorforceagility.2 Compared with hard kill weapons, most antimateriel weapons will achieve lower cost per kill. Many proposed antimateriel systems are area weapons thatcan suu:&Uy engage multiple targets simultaneously. As examples, the use of isompic light to flash-blmd oppo- nents would affect the o p t i c a V i e d sensors of anysystem that waslooking in the direction of the explosion. High-power microwave (HPM)weapons could eliminate communica- tions systems and other susceptibleelectronics that were located within the footprint of the microwavepulse. Inboth of theseexamples,the total energy required to adverselyaffect the tar- get is probably far less than that required to physically destroy that target with kinetic or chemicalenergy. Another application of antimateriel tech- nology asanenergy-efficientareaweaponcould be to employ substancesthat interrupt engine functtoning.ProfessorHoenigof theUniversity of Arizona proposed such a technique several years ago,only to have his ideasrejected.' Antimateriel weapons systems may be employedin afashionsimilarto engineeruse of barriers and minefields. Those techniques are never employed alone,but are used to canalize the enemy force and are covered by fire. Anti- materiel systems can likewise canalize the enemy into designatedkill zonesand be used to increase the probability of kill(Pk)of weapons systemsdesignedto penetratearmor. As an example, since maneuverability of a platform decreases the probability of h ~ t(Ph) and the P,, if an armored vehtde could be causedto stall,even temporarily, then hard kill mechanisms such as SADARM, Hellfire or Copperhead would be more effective. The P, will increase as the mobility of the targets decreases. In another approach, d soil traf- fickability could be altered in selected areas, then the threat forces would be forced to stay with established road networks. This action would then enhance both Phand Pkfor smart weaponsbyreducingthe searchareaforthe on- board sensors. At closer ranges it may be desirableto make antunaterielsystemsavailableto ltght &try. October 1989 MlLlTAFWREVIEW
  35. 35. Aim& bothhelicoutersand "fastmovers."arevervsensifiveto theineestionof foreignmaterielintodeirengines. hedevdopnentdf&me substan& designed toinduceenginefailurewould beoneavoroachtoair defense.- a. Whiletheairmine'ssubsmncecould bemadeinvisible,theremaybe advantagestocombiningitwitha wloredgas...Oncekilois]observedotheraircraii cmshiag,theywouldstayoutofthecloud. ..Later,thecoloredsmokecould be employed withoutthenoxioussubstancewithequaleffectindeterringenemya i r c h By havinga system that inducesenginefailure, the infannyman can choose to extricate him- self from a position in dangerof being overmn by thefastervehicles,orto allow timefor aimed fireeat a stationary target by hi antitank weapon system. Such a concept could greatly assist in the dilemma faced by military com- manders concerned with the mtroductlon of light infannyunits in the mid-tohigh-intensity battlefield dominated by annored and mecha- nized infantryforcessupportedby self-propelled artillery. There is also a potential air defense role for ant'm~aterieltechnology. Aircraft, 'bbtl$ heli- copters and "fast movers," are very seryittw to the ingestion of fore~gnmatenel in& their engines. The development of airbomt sub- stancesdesigned to induceenginefailurewould be .one approach to air defense. These sub- stancescouldbe dispersedin the pathof aircraft and would cause temporav intemption or cat- astrophicfailure. Electromagneticallyinduced enginestdl or fogging of the canopy repreBent otherantimaterielpossibilities. In any case, the threat aircraft would be deterred from comple- tion of its assignedmission. MILITARYREVIEW* October1989
  36. 36. By combining emerging technologies, ad- vanced applications for air defense can be conceptualid. If noncooperative identifica- tion, friend or foe (IFF)technologies were cou- Because ofthemeedwitb which newtechno1cgik.s&becomingavailable, therewillbean wentneed toget train- ing anddoctrinec&eveloper~inGolvedin planning withmaterieldevelopatan &phase. Thisgeneratesaiqukrnent foradvancedmod* capW+s. ..The p-t L**m=sl= chaw- ing, butwhrars nottgstenoughto keep upwithadvancesinweaponssystems. pled with an engine-inhibitingaerosol,then air mines could be employed to control airspace not physicalIymered by existingF o d Area Air Defense' (FAAD)systems. Even with IFF incorporation, the introduction of these sys- tems would add to the complexity of air d t c conml. While the air mine's substance could be made invisible, there may be advantages to combiningit with a coloredgas. Bymaking the cloud visible, pilots would have the option of flying through it or not. Once they observed other aircraft crashing, they would stay out of the cloud. A positive v i d amition factor could then be generated. Later, the colored smokecould be employedwithout the noxious substancewith equal effect in deterringenemy aircraftfrom enteringthe area. Antimatetiel systems also offer great oppor- tunity in support of installation security. An advantagein their applicationin thisrole isthe relativelycontrolled environment in which to operate. Chemical concentrations can be gen- erated at any density necessary to accomplish the mission. As an example, an embassycould install nonlethal chemical generators in the gatesto the compound. Thesegeneratorscould be activated either manually by the guards,or by sophisticated sensors designed to detect explosives. This nonlethal approach would have dramatic diplomatic value if terrorists couldbe capturedaliveor at least deterredfrom their objective. Hew Lquirements of Command With most areaweaponsthere is a fratricide issue.That problem can be resolved if properly addressed in the development of doctrine but needs considerable thought. The command and control of such systems will require strict discipline.Somesystemsmaynot besuitablefor closecombat but could be decisivein the d e e ~ battle. The commander responsible for employ- ment of these systems must have some under- standingof how the technologies work so that he can use them safely and effectively. The commander using antimaterielsystems will be faced with a significantly more complex bat- tlefield. Although it is not anticipatedthat the commander will be a scientist, a basic knowl- edge of physics, chemistry and weapons engineering may become much more impor- tant than inthe past. It is not too earlytobegin considerationof includingbasicsciencereviews in the cumcula of our service schools at all levels. Of course every effort will be made to make new technologies as transparent as possible to thesoldier.Still, troopswill need to knowmore than just which way to point a weapon, both from the perspective of the effects of the weapon on the enemy and for personal safety. For instance, knowing how to protect oneself from electromagnetic weapons may become equally important as the knowledge of present dangers from nuclear, biological or chemical threats. Thii is exemplifiedby the addition of laser protection already required for forward- deployedunits. ElectromagneticWeapons Electromagneticweaponsrepresenta classof antimaterielsystemsthat are gradually malung 36 October1989 MILITARYREVIEW
  37. 37. Thet e c h n o k forStineraviclassicantimatetieltechnolow andwas successftllydemonstratedun>ei fieldconditionsseveralyears ago. §&lacking i thedeterminationofforcestructureanddoctrineonhowto 6 d tthissvstem.It wasnot clearhow manyStingrayswouldberequiredtopmtect wh?ste fake, how cargets would behandedoffforhard kilL andhow commandem wouldem~fovthesvstem toensure thatfriendlyforceswerenotalsoa61ected ' their way onto the battlefield. So far this has been a piecemeal approach, with individual technologies and systemsbeing introducedand developed in semi-isolation. Lasers were first employed on ground-based weapons as range finders and later considered as defensive,then offensive, weapons as increased power levels became available. Propagation and power requirements will most likely keep the use of groundsystemlasersto low to mediumpower in the nearterm."holeburners" have not met their promised potential after many yearsof research and development. The use of lasers as weapons on the bat- tlefield has been held up becaisg $f the inability to determine command an4,qonaol issuesand a lackof confidencein cost&id oper. ational effectiveness analyses. The Stingray,as anexample,isa low-energylaserweaporisystem designed to assist m the defenseof arlarmored force.' The technology for Stingray ;is classic antimateriel technology and was sucwsfully demonstrated under field conditions several years ago. Still lacking is the determinatidnof forceStruCNeanddocaineonhowtofightthis system. It was not clear how many Stingrays would be required to pmtect what size force, how targets would be handed off for hard kill, MILITARYREVIEW October 1989 37