The document outlines topics that will be covered in a course on global affairs and politics. It includes 14 sections that will be covered: introduction, nation states, types of governments, asking the right questions, thinking strategically about world politics, the evolution of political theories, nationalism, globalization and transnationalism, international organizations, national power and diplomacy, international law and morality, national and international security, international political economy and cooperation, and human rights, the environment and technology. The document provides an overview of the scope and content of the course.
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3.  Introduction
 Nation States – What is a Country?
 Types of Governments
 Asking the Right Questions
 Thinking About World Politics Strategically
 Evolution of World Politics – Introduction to Political Theories
 Nationalism
 Globalization and Transnationalism
 International Organizations
 National Power and Diplomacy
 International Law and Morality
 National and International Security
 International Political Economy and Cooperation
 Human Rights and the Environment and Technology
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5. “The world is a stage and all the men and women
merely players”
 ~ William Shakespeare, As You Like It
The Actors:
 States
 International Organizations (IGOs)
 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
 Multinational Corporations (MNCs)
 Individuals
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6. Anarchical International System
One in which there is no central authority to set and
enforce rules and resolve disputes.
This remains the main thrust of world politics, but
increasingly there is an alternative approach in
evidence
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7. • Society, Interest, Interaction, Safety, Prosperity, Authority,
Dispute Resolution
Dimension
Human organization
Interests
Interaction
Basis of safety
Basis of prosperity
Ultimate authority
Dispute resolution
Traditional Approach
National societies
National/self-interests
Competition
Self-protection
Self-help
Sovereign states
Power prevails
Alternative Approach
Global society
Global/mutual interests
Cooperation
Collective security
Mutual assistance
International organizations
Law prevails
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8. Q. Is the globalization approach pure fantasy?
Think of the individual in a society and how we
interact.
There is a sense of common good in a domestic
society.
A century ago the UN, the WTO, the EU, the ICC
would have been considered science fiction!
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9. Q1. How many countries are there in the world?
Q2. Are all countries equal?
Q3. What are the three biggest MNCs in the world?
What is their annual earnings?
Q4. Name three people who have changed the way
we look at the world through individual effort.
Why?
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10. Country= State
Sovereign
 The monopoly on the use of legitimate force within a
territory
A “state” is the sovereign entity of a territory
Please note:
 Public violence is an illegitimate use of force
 National Governments might delegate power
 Police, Military
 But the authority to use force originates from the state’s
permission
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11.  Sovereign entities are not supposed to meddle in the internal
affairs of other sovereign entities.
 This is mostly true today but was not always the case.
 A trivial analogy – Parents and Children and Kingdom A and B
 Where did it all start?
 Treaty of Westphalia
 Signed in 1648
 Ended the 30 Years War
 Established the principle of sovereignty (Westphalia Sovereignty)
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12.  Definition: the monopoly on the legitimate use of force
within a territory
 Dispute resolution between two or more sub-state actors
occurs through the sovereign states.
 Sovereigns are expected to ensure their sub-state actors do
not use force against foreign actors.
 Sovereign states control their own domestic affairs.
 Sovereign states do not meddle with internal issues in other
states.
 But states violate this rule all the time!
 US incursion into Pakistan to kill Bin Laden
 US in Libya
 Russia protecting South Ossetia from Georgia
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13.  Why do states violate the sovereign rule?
 Strong actors can violate sovereignty and get away with it.
 They can do this because there is no punishment.
 Why is there no punishment?
 Anarchy!
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14.  Who is sovereign over the sovereigns?
 No one!
 Domestic analogy: In Kodi
 A man kills his neighbor
 A bank robber steals millions in gold
 The party last night got a little too crazy – Project X
 Solution?
 The police come take care of it – provided there is strong domestic
policy
 In weak systems this might not be true.
 A mafia boss kills a rival
 A drug lord assassinates a rival cartel leader
 The local police is too weak to handle this situation
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15.  No one comes to arrest:
 US going into Pakistan
 NATO going into Libya
 USSR in Czechoslovakia
 USSR in Afganistan
 Life in International Relations is closer to the Mafia world
 World Police (United Nations ad-hoc military force) is either
too weak or non-existent to bring justice.
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16.  Definition: The lack of overall political authority
 In international relations, no one is sovereign over the
sovereign
 Anarchy is a world of “self-help”
 Solve it on your own
 Convince a friend to come help you
 The government isn’t going to come to your rescue
 Anarchy is NOT chaos
 Most states are not fighting
 Anarchy permits many different outcomes
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17.  If anything can happen, how do we predict or explain
outcomes?
 Anarchy is a trivial explanation – explains everything and nothing
 We need more precise predictions and explanations
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18. Q1. What were the key aspects of the Treaty of
Westphalia?
Q2. Other examples of states violating the idea of
Westphalian sovereignty. Why can states get away
with it?
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21.  Despotism
 Rule by one individual with absolute power.
 Dictatorship
 Rule by individual with full power over country. Usually
militaristic control.
 Fascism
 Rule by leader base only. Focuses heavily on patriotism
and nationalism.
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22.  Absolute Monarchy/Emirate
 A king or a non-elected “royal” is in power. Rule by
inheritance. Ultimate governing body.
 Constitutional Monarchy
 Variant of monarchy where there is a monarch but with
powers limited by a constitution.
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23.  A religious institute or “God” as the head of state.
 Religious institute enforce law and policy in the state.
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24.  Rule by government chosen by an enfranchised population.
 No discrimination on who can vote (except for an minimum
age barrier)
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25.  Similar to a democracy but the there is a system of elected
representatives.
 Q – Identify the qualities that distinguish democracy from a
republic.
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26.  Usually a country that describes itself as “democratic
republic” in modern history is neither democratic nor
republic.
 They are usually some form of autocratic government.
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27.  Built on the economic foundations created by Karl Marx
and Fredrich Engels.
 A form of Oligarchy.
 Although the system should have the public’s best interest
in mind, historically they have devolved into autocratic
systems.
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28.  For your given country. Describe your ideal system of
government. Create your own system. You can research
other types of governments apart from the ones covered in
this course. Why is your government better than democracy?
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29.  Using what you have learnt about different systems of
governments, defend your assigned form of government in
terms of sustainability, equity, and moral superiority. Each
person has 3 minutes to speak and 2 minutes for rebuttal.
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31.  Two types of explanations:
 Proximate Cause: Why did this happen the way it happened?
 Underlying Cause: Why was this thing asking to happen?
 We prefer “underlying cause” to “proximate cause” because:
 Proximate gives us silly policy ideas
 Underlying cause tells us how to solve the problem.
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32.  Proximate Cause:
 The driver died because he went
through the wind shield of his
vehicle.
 What have we learnt?
 Don’t fly through the wind shield
of your vehicle. Don’t get into
car accidents.
 Underlying Cause:
 The driver died because he
wasn’t wearing his seatbelt.
 What have we learnt?
 Wear your seatbelt.
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33.  Proximate Cause:
 They lost because of poor
fielding.
 What have we learnt?
 Don’t field badly.
 Underlying Cause:
 They were bad fielders because
everyone was drunk.
 What have we learnt?
 Don’t drink and dive.
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34.  Proximate Cause:
 Archduke Franz Ferdinand was
assassinated.
 What have we learnt?
 Don’t let assassinations of dukes
happen.
 Underlying Cause:
 Military
technology
gave
countries a huge first strike
advantage.
 What have we learnt?
 First strike advantages cause
war. Build defensive weapons
not offensive.
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35.  Proximate Cause:
 Hitler was a bad person.
 Underlying Cause:
 Reparations from WW 1
bankrupted Germany, allowing
domestic institutions to fail.
 What have we learnt?
 Let all aspiring Austrian artists
into art school.
 What have we learnt?
 Be magnanimous in victory.
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36.  Proximate causes are shortsighted.
 Discovering underlying causes allows us to connect dissimilar
situations and make sensible recommendations about today’s
world.
 The process is difficult.
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37.  Watch the 2008 German Film “Die Welle” (The Wave) and
analyze the conditions that lead to a autocratic setup in a
nation state. Do you think it is possible that it might happen
in the world again?
 Consider the fact that this is based on a true story about the life of Ron
Jones and his experiment The Third Wave.
 Keep your answer to under 500 words. The homework grading rubric
applies.
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38.  The international realm is anarchic so how can we predict
what’s going to happen? How can we narrow down our
expectations?
 Solution: Analyze actor’s abilities and desires and find
plausible outcomes…
 We need to develop tools of strategy to understand how the
international world works.
 Narrow down and eliminate choices
 US will not bomb itself
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39.  There are about 200 odd states in the world
 How State 1 acts affects State 2’s outcomes
 How State 2 acts affects State 1’s outcomes
 How State 1 acts affects State 3’s outcomes
 Etc…
 States are strategically interdependent.
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40.  States are strategically inter-dependent.
 States know they are so.
 Intelligence is power.
 US spends so much money on intelligence. Why?
 Is there a way to scientifically study strategic interdependence?
 Game Theory!
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41.  Originally developed in the 1950s by Neuman and Nash to
study economic interactions.
 Applies very well to state level behavior.
 Note:
 Game theory is not black magic
 Does not capture all elements of reality
 It helps us model the world in simpler terms
 Cannot tell us anything new that good research will not unearth
 It maps assumptions to logically valid conclusions
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42.  Create some assumptions using research
 Conduct some analysis of those assumptions
 Reach logically valid conclusions
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43.  If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also
be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.
 Results are only as good as our assumptions
 Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too
open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions.
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44.  If your assumptions are silly, then your conclusions will also
be silly even though they might be logically valid conclusions.
 Results are only as good as our assumptions
 Assumptions need to be narrow in focus and concrete, too
open ended assumptions will lead to vagueness and nonconclusions.
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45.  Big Question:
 Under what conditions can two parties play nice with one another?
 Remember there is no authority figure!
 Incentive to cheat
 Example: Your roommate leaves Rs. 2000 outside.
 Disincentive to cheat – consequences
 If you steal the money you go to jail.
 But in the International World…
 Anarchy – no world police
 No laws forcing two states to play nice
 Is cooperation under these circumstances?
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46.  How can individually rational behavior lead to collectively bad
outcomes for all?
 Can the shadow of future interaction induce two states to
play nice with one another?
 No, if we know when the period of play ends.
 Yes, if we do not know when the period of play ends.
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47. The situation:
 Two students are caught by the Dean
 The Dean think that they were both smoking
 But the Dean can only smell smoke, he can’t prove it.
 Thus the Dean needs one of the students to rat out the
other.
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48.  The deal:
 If no one confesses to the smoking, the Dean can only punish
them for being out late.
 Punishment – Dorm pounding
 If one confesses and the other does not.
 The confessor gets off
 The other one gets expelled
 If both confess
 Both get suspended
 [DIAGRAM]
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49.  Imagine that they are working in their best interest.
 How will they react?
 Nash Equilibrium is for both to Confess even though it is
socially the worst possible outcome.
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50.  “Cult of the Offensive” and the Origins of World War I
 Tariffs and free trade policy
 Arms races and arms treaties (Cold War)
 “The Evolution of Cooperation” (Trench Warfare)
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51.  Reflection on Autocracy – “The Wave” due on 12-08-2013 by
midnight on Turnitin and hardcopy in your folder.
 Read up on World War I – Causes.
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54.  Serbia wanted a
united Yugoslavia
 June 28 – FF killed
 July 28 – AH
declares war on
Serbia
 July 28 – Russia
declares war on AH
 Aug 1 – Germany
declares war on
Russia
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55.  Aug 2 – Germany
invades Luxemborg
 Aug 3 – Germany
declares war on
France and Belgium
 Aug 4 – United
Kingdom
declares
war on Germany
 Aug 6 – AH declares
war on Russia
 Serbia declares war
on AH
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56.  Aug 11 – France
declares war on AH
 Aug 12 – UK
declares war on AH
 Aug 22 – AH
declares war on
Belgium
 Aug 23 – Japan
declares war on
Germany
 Aug 25 – Japan
declares war on AH
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57.  Nov 1 – Russia
declares war on the
Ottoman Empire
 Nov 5 – UK and
France declare war
on OE.
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58.  Archduke Franz Ferdinand
was assassinated by Serbian
Nationalists on 28 June 1914.
 The war started because a dude
with a funny mustache died
 Why are these states
preemptively declaring war
on one another?
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59. Offense is the best defense?
Military and political leaders at that time believed
that the offense had an enormous advantage – first
mover advantage.
 New technology: machine guns, chemical weapons,
railroads
 Believed that this technology favors the first mover.
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60.  Consider a world with 2 states
 Two strategies: Preemptive attack, Defend
 Outcomes – ranked by benefits
 I preempt, you defend. (Surprise attack! – I win!) - 3
 We both defend. (Peace) - 2
 We both preempt. (War) - 1
 I defend, you preempt. (I lose, I’m a sucker) - 0
 What do these assumptions mean?
 [DIAGRAM]
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61.  Regardless of Germany’s move, France is always better of
preempting.
 Therefore France preempts.
 Similarly, regardless of France’s move, Germany is always
better of preempting.
 Therefore Germany preempts.
 The PEACE outcome is inherently unstable even though this is
an overall more beneficial outcome for all.
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65. Big Question: Why is it so hard to implement free
trade?
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66.  Free trade is a historically new phenomenon.
 In the past, states used to set up high tariffs (import taxes) on
imported goods.
 Taxes are not fun – but taxes are good for bolstering domestic
companies.
 Recall from micro and macro that taxes raise consumer prices
and that generally leads to inefficiency.
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67. Mexico doesn’t have the best grape-producing
climate
 Thus El Vino Nacional must spend more money to produce
quality grapes.
 The company must pass on the additional costs to the
consumer or go out of business.
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68. California has great climate for grapes and makes
wine with ease.
 California companies can flood the Mexican market and put
El Vino Nacional out of business.
 But this funnels Mexican money out of Mexico and into
California.
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69.  If Mexico taxes the imported wine, los precios del Vino
Nacional will become competitive
 El dinero stays within Mexico
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70. California doesn’t have the best agave-producing
climate.
 Thus, California tequila companies must spend more money
to make good quality tequila.
 The company must pass on this cost to consumers.
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71. Mexico has great climate for agave and makes great
tequila.
 Mexican companies can flood the Californian markets put
the California tequila makers out of business.
 But this funnels American money out of the US and into
Mexico.
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72.  If USA taxes the imported tequila, California tequila makers
are competitive.
 Dollars stays within USA
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73. Tariffs everywhere
Mexico taxes imports from California
USA taxes imports from Mexico
Everyone loses.
[Strategic Model Diagram]
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74. New puzzle:
 The prisoner’s dilemma predicts that we have high tariffs
for both sides.
 This was true before WW2, but not true any longer, why?
 How have states managed free trade agreements recently?
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75. Test – 29 AUG
Essay type, short answers, and objective.
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77. In a world of anarchy what is the most important
force?
Having a powerful military allows you to have your
way.
But military power is relative not absolute:
The Roman Empire is more powerful than Italy is
today
So a state only makes a relative gain against a rival
if it builds and the rival does not.
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78. Making weapons costs money – opportunity cost
[DIAGRAM]
Outcome is to build for both states.
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79. If the outcome always states build weapons then
why do we have so many arms treaties?
Why are arms treaties sustainable?
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80. Can future interaction inspire cooperation today?
One shot – No, because players prefer to act
aggressively as it is in your best interest.
Some interactions are one shot – preemptive war
Some interactions are repeated – trade and arms
races.
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81. [DIAGRAM] – Moves from first round will be
disclosed publicly.
Question – Can the players cooperate in the first
round under threat of punishment in the second
round.
 Is “I will cooperate today, and if you cooperate today as
well, then I will cooperate tomorrow” a viable strategy?
Stage 1:
 Defect
Stage 2: Must optimize in this turn as it is the last.
 Defect
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82.  Stage 1
 Stage 2
…
…
…
 Stage N-2
 Stage N-1
 Stage N
 Defect – must optimize as it is the last period of play
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83. Cooperation is not possible in repeated games if the
length of the game is finite.
Endgame sabotages cooperation in earlier stages.
How much is $100,000 worth if the world ends:
 Tomorrow
 At the end of the year
 Ten years from now
What if the shadow of the future is indefinite?
 We do not know when the interaction is going to end
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84. The shadow of future fails to inspire cooperation if
the game has a definite end.
But interactions in the real world seem to be unlikely
to end.
 Can the states maintain cooperation?
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85. The Model:
 Play the Prisoner’s Dilemma repeatedly between two
states.
 After every period, they will play again with probability p.
 Note p is fairly large.
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86. “Tough Love” strategy:
 Begin by cooperating
 If at any point in the game a player defects, then defect for
the duration of the game…
So, would two grim trigger players have an incentive
to defect on one another?
[DIAGRAM]
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87. Today’s payoff: 1
Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(1)
The day after’s payoff: (p)2(1)
…
The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to
be 1/(1-p)
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88. Today’s payoff: 2
Tomorrow’s payoff: (p)(0)
The day after’s payoff: (p)2(0)
…
The sum of this infinite geometric series is going to
be 2.
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89. Cooperate: 1/(1-p)
Betray: 2 (Technically could be slightly more if the
betrayal happens after n rounds.)
However, if p> ½ then cooperating is in my best
interest.
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90. As long as we are likely to keep interacting with each
other indefinitely, then cooperation is possible as it
is in the best interest of both states.
Threat of future loss of gain (i.e. punishment) keeps
states in line even without a world police.
States must not know when the game is going to
end.
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92. Repeated play assumption was not sensible when
we were talking about war mobilization.
But most states most of the time are not in a state of
war. Why?
“Cooperate” and “Defect” are very restrictive
strategies.
 We need to allow states to bargain with one another.
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93. Why do states fight costly wars?
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94. If war is detrimental to both sides, why do you think
we have wars?
 Limit your answer to 300 words.
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95. A man falls over a wet floor and sues you for
negligence.
Your lawyer and his lawyer agree on the following:
 There is a 60% chance of the lawsuit will be successful.
 If he wins you have to pay him $40,000
 Going to court will cost each of you $10,000 in fees
regardless of outcome.
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96. Either you or him concede immediately
 Your payoff: -$40,000
 His payoff: 0
You reach an out of court settlement
 A settlement of less than $34,000 is better for you.
 A settlement of more than $14,000 is better for him.
You let the court decide the matter
 Your payoff: (-40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = -$34,000
 His payoff: (40,000)(0.6) – 10,000 = $14,000
 How should we expect the matter to be resolved?
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97. War produces a winner and a loser – unless the
power is very skewed, it is probabilistic.
Fighting is costly because it kills people and destroys
things.
So why can’t two states settle the matter of the
battlefield?
 Rationalist’s Explanation of War
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98.  Part 1: The Research
Question
 Assumptions
 War’s Inefficiency Puzzle
 Part 2: The Answers
 Preventive War
 Misinterpretation
Information
 Issue Indivisibility
 Preemptive War
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99.  BIG QUESTION: Can two perfectly intelligent, perfectly
unbiased leaders fight a war against each other?
 Let’s name some major wars in the last 100 years.
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100. Assume that states are a single entity, and their
leader is only interested in maximizing the overall
welfare of the state.
 Is this always true? NO
 Is this true some of the time? MAYBE
Leaders often justify wars using the unitary actor
assumption.
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101. I really suck at running our domestic economy.
Everything is terrible so I will start a war to distract
you from that. You’ll see I am a war hero and then
you will reelect me.
The media is too involved in a scandal about an
intern and me so I am going to bomb some country
in Africa that you’ve never heard of to distract them.
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102. This war is in the best interest of our national
security.
Fight them there so you don’t have to fight them at
home.
We have a moral obligation to intervene.
Stabilizing the region will secure our economic
interests.
 It’s about WE not ME.
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103.  The unitary actor assumption allows us to analyze the validity
of these explanations.
 The war dynamics we will discuss also affect states that are
not unitary actors.
 Although even with non-unitary actors we can extend the same
assumptions, but we will not cover that.
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105. Let us assume a scenario:
Venezuela discovers an oil deposit worth $80 billion
Columbia declares the deposit is actually in their
side of the border.
The sides call in their military and prepare for war.
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106. Venezuela will win the war
60% of the time – which
means they have 60%
chance of winning the $80
billion in the oil.
Cost of death, destruction,
and lost oil is about $15
billion, regardless of the
outcome.
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107. Columbia will win the war
40% of the time – which
means they have 40%
chance of winning the $80
billion in the oil.
Cost of death, destruction,
and lost oil is about $12
billion, regardless of the
outcome.
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108. Is war inevitable for these two countries?
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109. Expected Payoff from the
war:
(80)(0.6) – 15 = $33b
Venezuela must receive at
least $33 billion to be
satisfied.
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110. Expected payoff from the
war:
(80)(0.4) – 12 = 20
Columbia must receive at
least $20 billion to be
satisfied.
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111. Both countries have positive expected payoffs from
fighting.
 So war can be a rational choice for both parties.
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112. War is not rational here!
Venezuela and Columbia’s demands sum up to $53
billion.
The revenue from the oil is $80 billion to go around.
Where did the other $27 billion go?
 Cost of war - $15b + $12b
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113. Let x be Venezuela’s share of the settlement.
Then if x > 33 it satisfies Venezuela.
And if 80 – x > 20 then x also satisfies Columbia. Or
if x < 60.
Think of this as terms of trade.
Then x is mutually satisfactory when 33 < x < 60
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114. Any settlement that gives Venezuela $33 billion but
no more than $60 billion is preferable to war.
 Such a settlement exists
 Bargaining is mutually preferable to war. Say 50-50 split.
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115. Why do states sometimes choose to resolve their
differences through the inefficient means of war
when bargaining, in theory, leaves both parties
better off.
 Maybe the assumptions are not agreeable. Maybe there is
a mathematical quirk to the numbers?
 We are going to study this in more detail.
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116. Using your understanding of the recent Syrian
situation, and what we have learnt about the
rationality for war, argue a case for President Obama
requesting the Congress to approve military action
against Syria.
The homework rubric will apply
Keep your essay to under 750 words.
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118. To prevent a shift in the balance of power
A war to prevent an inevitable war
 Self fulfilling expectations
Examples:
 Pearl Harbor
 The 1967 6-Day War
 The 2003 Gulf War II
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119. Preventive war without the permission of the UN is
illegal.
 The Bush Doctrine declared that these expectations are
unrealistic
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121. A hypothetical situation:
 Consider two tribes Og and Ug
 Og has game, and Ug does not
 What happens?
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122. System-Level Causes
The distribution of power
The anarchial nature of the system
System-level economic factors
System-level biosphere stress
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123. State-Level Causes of War
Militarism
Externalization of Internal Conflict
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124. Individual-Level Causes of War
Human Characteristics
Individual Leaders’ Characteristics
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126. The nature and limits of terrorism
Distinguish between domestic and international
Terrorism:
 Violent
 Carried out by individuals, non-government, covert
government
 Target civilians
 Uses clandestine methods
 Attempts to influence politics
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128. Between 1968 and 2006, more than 10,000
international terror attacks and over 14,000 deaths
Domestic terrorism is more common
Middle East leads the terror charts with more than
60% of all attacks
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133.  Choose a terrorist organization listed below and research the
causes and rationality behind their formation and
motivations of the organization and identify potential
resolutions.
 United Liberation Front of Assam
 Hamas
 Hezbollah
 Hizbul Mujahideen
 Jaish-e-Mohammed
 Lakshar-e-Taiba
 Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia
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135. Chanakya and Machiavelli
 Chandragupta Maurya and The Medici
 Arthashastra and The Prince
Sun Tzu’s The Art of War
Development of political theory from the medieval
times.
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136. Realist (Realpolitik) – a zero sum game.
Classic and Neo Realism
 Difference in root of conflict
 Inherent distrust v. anarchy
 No place for morality or ideology in foreign policy
Realism – Emphasis on power
 Secure your own country’s interest
 Establish a balance of power
 “Peace through strength” ~ Ronald Reagan
 Do not waste power on peripheral goals
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137. Human Nature
 Pessimistic, self interest
and competitive
Core Concepts
 Power, conflict
Reality
 Largely objective
Political Stakes
 Zero-sum
Conflict in System
 Central and Inevitable
International System
 Anarchic
Cause of Conflicts
 Pursuing self Interest
Best Path to Peace
 Balance of Power
Key Organizations
 States
Morality
 None
Policy Prescriptions
 Self Interest
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138. People and countries are capable of finding mutual
interests and cooperating to achieve them by
working
through
and
with
international
organizations and international law.
 Shutting down of Guantanamo Bay
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139. Liberals reject the realists’ contention that politics is
inherently and exclusively a struggle for power.
Unlike realists, for liberals, morality plays a large role
in the play for power.
Altruism is a weapon for realists.
Non-zero sum game.
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140. Classical is a direct descendant of idealism.
Unlike realists, classic liberals are optimistic about
human nature.
 Jean-jacques Rousseau – “The Social Contract”
 Humans join together in society because it is easier to survive.
Neoliberalism developed in the 1970s and 80s.
Competition between states in the anarchic world
causes conflict – parallel to Neorealism.
However, unlike the Neorealists, Neoliberals believe in a
complex interdependency of states in the anarchic world
which may help promote internationalism.
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141. Cooperation does not mean that they are unwilling
to use military power.
However, place emphasis of legitimacy on the UN
and IGOs.
Surrender some sovereignty to improve themselves
 European Union
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142. “There is nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it
so” ~ Hamlet
Political realities are mindsets
Politics is driven by class warfare – Marx and Engels
… or by structures such as states and organized
religion – Feminists
States are held together by means of force for the
structure, not the people.
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144. Is nationalism a good thing?
Why do we feel patriotic? Is it for the land or for the
people living in it?
How would the world be different if we did not
enforce patriotic emotions?
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