Market Efficiency and Empirical Evidence


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Market Efficiency and Empirical Evidence

  1. 1. Market Efficiency and Empirical Evidence Chapters 11 & 13
  2. 2. <ul><li>Do security prices reflect information ? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>An efficient capital market is one in which security prices adjust rapidly to the arrival of new information and, therefore, the current prices of securities reflect all relevant information. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Why look at market efficiency? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Implications for business and corporate finance </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Implications for investment </li></ul></ul>Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
  3. 3. Early Study on Market Behavior <ul><ul><li>In the 1950s, researchers couldn’t find any predictable pattern in stock prices. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Immediate conclusion was that these results appeared to support the irrationality of the market. </li></ul></ul>
  4. 4. Does randomness = irrationality? <ul><ul><li>Suppose researchers found that security prices are predictable and then developed a model to predict the prices. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Following this model, investors would reap unending profits simply by purchasing stocks that would appreciate in price and selling stocks that would decrease in price! </li></ul></ul>
  5. 5. Ramifications of Predictability <ul><ul><li>Suppose a model predicts that XYZ stock price (currently $100) would rise dramatically in three days to $110. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Obviously, everybody will want to BUY it; no one would want to SELL it. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The prediction of underpricing of a security would lead to an immediate price increase! </li></ul></ul>
  6. 6. Ramifications of Predictability <ul><ul><li>As soon as there is any information predicting that stock XYZ is underpriced, investors will flock to buy the stock and immediately bid up its price to a fair level. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>However, if prices are bid immediately to fair levels, given all available information, it must be that these prices increase or decrease only in response to new information. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>New information (by definition) must be unpredictable, which means that stock prices should follow a “random walk.” </li></ul></ul>
  7. 7. Random Walk Hypothesis <ul><li>If stock prices follow a random walk (with a trend), then future stock prices cannot be predicted based on past stock prices. </li></ul><ul><li>P t =  + P t-1 +  t </li></ul><ul><li>New information is a “surprise”. </li></ul><ul><li>When new information arrives, stock prices will adjust immediately. </li></ul>
  8. 8. Example: Positive Surprise Price Time New Information Arrives Stock Price of XYZ
  9. 9. Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) <ul><li>In 1970 Eugene Fama defined the efficient market hypothesis and divided it into 3 levels. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak Form Efficient </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Semi-Strong Form Efficient </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Strong Form Efficient </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Each differs with respect to the information that is reflected in the stock prices. </li></ul>
  10. 10. <ul><li>Weak Form: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all past market price and volume information. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Semi-strong Form: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all publicly available information about a firm. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Strong Form: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all information (public and private) about a firm. </li></ul></ul>
  11. 11. Relation of 3 Forms of EMH All Public Info All Public & Private Info Weak Semi-Strong Strong Past Market Info
  12. 12. EMH: Weak Form <ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all past market price and volume information </li></ul><ul><ul><li>It is impossible to make abnormal risk adjusted returns by using past prices or volume data to predict future stock prices. </li></ul></ul>
  13. 13. Technical Analysts <ul><li>Do not think the stock market is weak form efficient. </li></ul><ul><li>Believe that investors are emotionally driven and predictable. Therefore, you can exploit this predictability, as it shows up in past prices and volume. </li></ul><ul><li>“ Quants” – use computers to find patterns. </li></ul>
  14. 14. Technical Analysts Price Time Stock First Starts Rising Buy Here Stock Price of XYZ
  15. 15. EMH: Semi-Strong Form <ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all publicly available information about a firm. </li></ul><ul><li>It is impossible to make abnormal risk- adjusted returns by analyzing any public information to predict future stock prices. </li></ul>
  16. 16. Fundamental Analysts <ul><li>Do not think the stock market is semi-strong form efficient. </li></ul><ul><li>They use publicly available information to identify firms that are worth more (or worth less) than everyone else’s estimate of their values. </li></ul>
  17. 17. EMH: Strong Form <ul><li>Stock Prices reflect all information (public and private) about a firm. </li></ul><ul><li>It is impossible to make abnormal risk- adjusted returns by analyzing publicly available information or trading based on private or “inside” information. </li></ul>
  18. 18. Trading On Inside Information <ul><li>Not legal to trade on inside information </li></ul><ul><li>SEC prosecutes offenders </li></ul><ul><li>Rules protect the small investor </li></ul>
  19. 19. Question… <ul><li>What is the meaning of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis to the Investment Industry? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>debate between active and passive portfolio management. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Billions of dollars are at stake! </li></ul></ul>
  20. 20. <ul><li>Active Management </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Security analysis </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Timing </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Passive Management </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Buy and Hold </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Index Funds </li></ul></ul>Active or Passive Management
  21. 21. <ul><li>Even if the market is efficient a role exists for portfolio management: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Appropriate risk level </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Tax considerations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Other considerations </li></ul></ul>Market Efficiency & Portfolio Management
  22. 22. Ironic Situation <ul><li>If the stock market is efficient, you may be better off buying index funds. </li></ul><ul><li>However, if everyone buys index funds, market would not be as efficient, because no one is willing to search for information. </li></ul>
  23. 23. Grossman-Stiglitz Theorem <ul><li>ASSUMPTIONS : </li></ul><ul><li>Two types of investors: </li></ul><ul><li>- Uninformed : Liquidity or noise traders </li></ul><ul><li>- Informed: Spend serious amounts of money to dig up information no one else has </li></ul>
  24. 24. Grossman/Stiglitz Theorem <ul><li>Informed: Do research until marginal benefit = marginal cost. </li></ul><ul><li>Uninformed: Do NO research. </li></ul><ul><li>Some of the informed have marginal benefits > marginal costs, some have marginal benefits < marginal costs. On average, marginal benefit = marginal cost. </li></ul>
  25. 25. Grossman/Stiglitz Theorem <ul><li>Example: </li></ul><ul><li>A manager of a $50 billion fund wants to increase returns 1/2% above what the market averages. How much is she willing to spend to do this?? </li></ul><ul><li>Willing to spend: </li></ul><ul><li>$50 billion x .005 = $ 0.25 billion </li></ul><ul><li>or </li></ul><ul><li>$250 million on research to find incorrectly priced stocks. </li></ul>
  26. 26. Grossman/Stiglitz Theorem <ul><li>So, the informed make the market efficient for the uninformed! Justification for professionals!! </li></ul><ul><li>If active managers fail to use information properly or have excessive transaction costs, they will do worse than a passive portfolio. </li></ul><ul><li>In equilibrium, investors should earn the same return investing in a passive index fund as in an actively managed fund after research & transaction costs. </li></ul>
  27. 27. The Hard Truth <ul><li>NO EASY MONEY! </li></ul>
  28. 28. Difficult to Determine If Market is Efficient <ul><li>If we can find people who beat the market based on skill, this would imply abnormal returns are possible and the market is not efficient. </li></ul><ul><li>Problem #1: </li></ul><ul><li>Difficult to distinguish luck from skill! </li></ul>
  29. 29. Newsletter Example <ul><li>Send out 8 newsletters for three years. Predict whether the stock market will rise or fall. How many will have a perfect record? </li></ul>There are 2 outcomes each year, or a total of eight possible outcomes for 3 years. So if each newsletter has different prediction, one will turn out to predict the movement exactly!!!!!
  30. 30. Newsletter Example <ul><li>8 newsletters sent out for three years. Predict whether the stock market will rise or fall. (R=Rise; F=Fall) </li></ul><ul><li>Yr 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 </li></ul><ul><li>1 R R R R F F F F </li></ul><ul><li>2 R R F F R R F F </li></ul><ul><li>3 R F R F R F R F </li></ul>
  31. 31. Applied to Professional Investors <ul><li>Record whether or not an investor beats the market each year for 10 years. </li></ul><ul><li>By pure chance there is a 50% probability an investor will beat the market in any given year (ignoring fees and expenses). </li></ul><ul><li>If there are 10,000 professional money managers, how many will have a perfect record of beating the market every year due to chance? </li></ul>
  32. 32. SOLUTION Possible Permutations (outcomes) over 10 years = 2 10 = 1024 Probability of being correct each year for 10 years = 1 / 1024 = 0.00097 Expected number of “gurus” = 10,000 x 0.00097 = 9.7
  33. 33. Efficient Market Testing <ul><li>Problem #2: Selection Bias </li></ul><ul><ul><li>If you had a scheme that worked would you announce it? </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>There may be hidden investors that do earn abnormal risk-adjusted returns. </li></ul></ul>
  34. 34. Efficient Market Testing <ul><li>Problem #3: Difficult to measure risk-adjusted returns </li></ul><ul><li>A. Dual test of the CAPM along with market efficiency! (Joint Hypothesis Problem) </li></ul><ul><li>B. Benchmark Error </li></ul>
  35. 35. Abnormal Returns <ul><li>Define Excess Return : (Asset Return – rf) </li></ul><ul><li>Suppose, last year, an investor’s portfolio had an excess return of 15% and the market had an excess return of 10%. Did the investor beat the market? </li></ul><ul><li>Non-Risk Adjusted Abnormal Return : </li></ul><ul><li>Abnormal Return i,t = (r i,t – rf t ) – (r mt - rf t ) </li></ul><ul><li>Abnormal Return i,t = 15% – 10% </li></ul><ul><li>= 5% </li></ul>
  36. 36. Risk-Adjusted Ab. Return   i <ul><li>Recall Example: Investor earned 15% </li></ul><ul><li>Market earned 10% </li></ul><ul><li>Assume the beta of the investor’s portfolio was 1.80. Determine the abnormal risk-adjusted return using the CAPM: </li></ul>α i = (r i,t – rf t ) - β i (r m,t - rf t ) α i = 15% - 1.80*10% α i = - 3%
  37. 37. Measurement Concerns! <ul><li>Is the CAPM the “right” model to use? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(Model or Specification Error) </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Did we use the “right” market proxy as our benchmark? </li></ul><ul><ul><li>(Measurement Error) </li></ul></ul>
  38. 38. Bottom Line: Market Efficiency Verification is Tough! <ul><li>If you found investors that beat the market on a risk-adjusted basis it could be because: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The market is inefficient </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The CAPM is not correct (model error) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Benchmark problem (measurement error) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>LUCK!!!! </li></ul></ul>
  39. 39. How to test for Market Efficiency? <ul><li>Try testing each form of the EMH: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Weak </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>see if there are patterns in past prices </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Semi-strong </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>see if new public information rapidly synthesized in market prices; can you profit from public information? </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Strong </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>see if private information can lead to profits </li></ul></ul>
  40. 40. Weak Form EMH Tests: Method #1 <ul><li>Positive (+) Serial Correlation : </li></ul><ul><li>(+) returns follow (+) returns for a given stock or (-) returns follow (-) returns for a given stock </li></ul><ul><li>Called “momentum” </li></ul><ul><li>Negative (-) Serial Correlation: </li></ul><ul><li>(+) returns follow (-) returns for a given stock or (-) returns follow (+) returns for a given stock. </li></ul><ul><li>Called “reversals” </li></ul>
  41. 41. Weak Form EMH Tests: Method #1 <ul><li>If we find (+) or (-) serial correlation, this is evidence against the weak-form EMH as it implies that past prices can be used to predict future prices. </li></ul><ul><li>Technical analysis looks for such patterns to exploit and earn abnormal returns. </li></ul>
  42. 42. Weak Form EMH Tests: Findings <ul><li>In the ‘50s and ‘60s it was shown that in general: </li></ul><ul><li>1. No evidence of serial correlation. The price of a stock is just as likely to rise after a previous day’s increase as after a previous day’s decline. </li></ul><ul><li>2. Therefore, stock prices follow a random walk. </li></ul>
  43. 43. Weak Form EMH Tests: Method #2 <ul><li>Use historical price information to analyze “abnormal returns” over various time horizons. </li></ul><ul><li>In general, this method involves investing in stocks that have performed in a certain manner in the past to see if these stocks will provide abnormal returns in the future. </li></ul>
  44. 44. Abnormal Returns defined <ul><ul><li>General Formula: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>AR i,t = Actual r i,t – Benchmark i,t </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>i = stock/portfolio </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>t = time </li></ul></ul>
  45. 45. <ul><ul><li>1) Method #1: “Market Model” </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Actual r i,t – Actual r m,t </li></ul><ul><ul><li>2) Method #2: Actual vs. Expected </li></ul></ul><ul><li>a) Use the CAPM (or another model) to calculate a predicted return </li></ul><ul><li>b) Subtract the predicted return from the actual return </li></ul><ul><li>c) = Alpha i if using the CAPM </li></ul><ul><li>Alpha i = Actual r i,t – (rf t + B i [Actual r m,t – rf t ]) </li></ul>Abnormal Returns Method CAPM
  46. 46. CAR: Cumulative Abnormal Return <ul><li>Methodology: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Addition of a series of abnormal returns. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>For example, a “3-day CAR” would use a pricing model like the CAPM to calculate alpha each of the three days. Then, the three calculated alphas would be summed to get the “3-day CAR.” </li></ul></ul>
  47. 47. Example: Calculating CAR <ul><li>Use the CAPM as the relevant risk-adjustment model to calculate the 3-month CAR for the above fund. Assume the fund’s Beta is 1.2 and the rf is 2%. </li></ul>Month Return S&P500 1 18% 15% 2 21% 12% 3 21% 20%
  48. 48. Example: Calculating CAR Alpha i = Actual r i,t – ( rf t + B i * [Actual r m,t – rf t ] ) Alpha i,1 = .18 - ( .02 + 1.2 * [ .15 - .02 ] ) = .18 - .176 = .004 Alpha i,2 = .21 - ( .02 + 1.2 * [ .12 - .02 ] ) = .21 - .14 = .07 Alpha i,3 = .21 - ( .02 + 1.2 * [ .20 - .02 ] ) = .21 - .236 = -.026 3 month CAR = Month Return S&P500 1 18% 15% 2 21% 12% 3 21% 20%
  49. 49. Tests of Weak Form EMH Short Horizons <ul><li>Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) </li></ul><ul><li>Investigate whether buying winners (stocks that have done well in the past) and selling losers (stocks that have done poorly in the past) can generate significant positive returns over future holding periods. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Measure stock rates of return over the past 3 – 12 months. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Rank the stocks from highest to lowest and then divide the sample into deciles. “Losers” are the bottom decile and “winners” are the top decile. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Follow the returns for the next 3 – 12 months. </li></ul></ul>
  50. 50. Evidence: Jegadeesh and Titman <ul><li>Winners outperforms losers over the short run. Most significance is found over the next 6 months based upon the past 12 months. </li></ul><ul><li>Abnormal profit opportunities. </li></ul><ul><li>Short Run: Momentum </li></ul>
  51. 51. Test of Weak-Form EMH Long-Term Horizons <ul><li>DeBondt and Thaler (1985): </li></ul><ul><li>Create “Loser” and “Winner” portfolios based on past 36 months of CARs. Top decile are Winners, bottom decile are Losers. </li></ul><ul><li>Examine CAR’s for next 36 months. </li></ul><ul><li>“ Losers” outperforming “winners”, </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Consistent with an overreaction followed by a correction. </li></ul></ul>
  52. 52. More Recent Tests of Weak-Form EMH – De Bondt
  53. 53. Semi-Strong Form EMH Testing <ul><li>Areas we’ll review: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Event Studies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Long-run abnormal return studies </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>“ Anomalies” </li></ul></ul>
  54. 54. Example: Event Study Price Time New “Good” Information Arrives Stock Price of XYZ
  55. 55. Event Study Results <ul><li>Most (but not all) studies support the Semi-Strong Form of the EMH. </li></ul><ul><li>Those that support it include analyses of stock splits, mergers and most corporate reorganizations. </li></ul><ul><li>One study that doesn’t offer support is the event of a security being listed on an exchange (shows positive abnormal returns after the listing announcement). </li></ul>
  56. 56. Keown and Pinkerton, 1981 CARs for target firms around takeover announcement. <ul><li>Identify 194 firms that were take-over targets in a merger. </li></ul><ul><li>Measure average CAR for these firms during the days before and after the announcement of the proposed merger. </li></ul><ul><li>Find no excess returns after announcement. </li></ul>
  57. 57. Evidence: Keown & Pinkerton
  58. 58. Bernard and Thomas, 1989 Event: Quarterly Earnings Surprises <ul><li>Measure the abnormal risk-adjusted return after an earnings surprise. </li></ul><ul><li>Earnings Surprise = </li></ul><ul><li>Actual Quarterly EPS – Forecasted Earnings </li></ul><ul><li>If the stock market is efficient, any surprise when earnings are announced should be reflected rapidly in the stock price and (+) or (–) alphas should not be possible trading on the information after it is released. </li></ul>
  59. 59. Evidence: Bernard and Thomas <ul><li>Rank from highest to lowest by magnitude of earnings surprises and place stocks into decile portfolios. </li></ul><ul><li>See if trading on earnings surprises results in subsequent abnormal returns. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Remember: Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs) are the daily alphas summed up over time. </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Find “drift” in returns after announcements – inconsistent with market efficiency </li></ul></ul>
  60. 60. Evidence: Bernard and Thomas
  61. 61. Evidence: Bernard and Thomas <ul><li>For positive earnings surprises: </li></ul><ul><li>Larger earnings surprises lead to higher positive abnormal returns. </li></ul><ul><li>The upward drift in the stock price continues a couple of months after the earning announcement! </li></ul><ul><li>For negative earnings surprises: </li></ul><ul><li>Larger negative earnings surprises lead to larger losses as measured by the abnormal return. </li></ul><ul><li>The downward drift in the stock price continues a couple of months after the earning announcement! </li></ul>
  62. 62. Evidence of Long-Run Abnormal Risk-Adjusted Returns <ul><li>After IPOs and after seasoned equity offerings (-) (Loughran and Ritter 1995) </li></ul><ul><li>After share repurchase announcements (+) (Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen, 1995) </li></ul><ul><li>After dividend initiations (+) and omissions (-) (Michaely, Thaler, Womack, 1995) </li></ul>
  63. 63. Loughran and Ritter, 1995 Graph shows the return of the portfolio of firms that have IPOs or SEOs. The idea is that abnormal returns are negative – firms predictably underperform after equity issues.
  64. 64. Ikenberry, Lakonishok, Vermaelen, 1995 Graph shows the return of the portfolio of firms that announce stock repurchase minus the return of several benchmarks. The idea is that abnormal returns are positive and growing.
  65. 65. Michaely, Thaler, Womack, 1995 Graph shows the return of the portfolio of firms that initiate and that omit dividends. The idea is that abnormal returns are positive for initiations and negative for omissions even after the event.
  66. 66. Further Semi-Strong EMH Tests: “Anomalies” <ul><li>Challenges to the EMH </li></ul><ul><ul><li>In the 1980’s and 1990’s, empirical evidence accumulated that provided evidence against the semi-strong and weak form EMH. Evidence is labeled as “anomalies.” </li></ul></ul><ul><li>Two of the best-known anomalies: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>The Size Effect </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Size = Price * Shares Outstanding </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>The BV/MV Effect </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>BV / MV = Book Value / Market Value </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Ratio that compares how the market is pricing the book value of assets. </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>
  67. 67. The Size Anomaly <ul><li>First explored by Banz (1981) </li></ul><ul><li>Portfolios of small cap stocks earn positive abnormal risk-adjusted returns (+ alphas). </li></ul>
  68. 68. The Size Effect <ul><li>January Anomaly : Most of the abnormal returns of small firms occur in January! (tax loss selling?) </li></ul>
  69. 69. Can Size be a measure of risk? <ul><li>Possible sources of risk for small caps </li></ul><ul><li>Neglected by analysts and institutional investors, so there is less information, which implies higher risk. </li></ul><ul><li>Less Liquidity : Higher trading costs. Bid-ask spreads are wider, and broker commissions are larger. </li></ul>
  70. 70. Further findings regarding BV/MV <ul><li>Fama and French (1992) also find that: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Portfolios of smaller firms have higher CAPM adjusted returns than portfolios of larger stocks </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Portfolios of stocks with high BV/MV ratios (value stocks) have higher CAPM adjusted returns than portfolios of low BV/MV ratios (growth stocks). </li></ul></ul>
  71. 71. Value vs. Growth (mid-large caps)
  72. 72. Value vs. Growth (small caps)
  73. 73. Can BV/MV be a measure of risk? “Value Puzzle…” <ul><li>It is not evident why value stocks should be riskier than growth stocks. Value stocks have lower standard deviations than growth stocks after controlling for size! </li></ul>
  74. 74. Volatility Analysis: growth vs. value
  75. 75. Explanation for Size and BV/MV Results <ul><li>It could be that the Market is Semi-Strong Efficient, but… </li></ul><ul><li>There are measurement errors </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Benchmark Error (wrong Market proxy) </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>CAPM is a forward looking model while we are testing it with historic (or ex-post) data. </li></ul></ul><ul><li>CAPM may not be the proper risk adjustment model. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>[Joint Hypothesis Problem!] </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>If the CAPM is wrong, then abnormal risk-adjusted returns using this model are wrong. </li></ul></ul>
  76. 76. <ul><li>It could be that the Market is Semi-Strong Efficient, but… </li></ul><ul><li>Small cap stocks and higher BV/MV stocks generate higher returns because they are riskier. However, this risk is not captured by Beta </li></ul><ul><li>Problem : Lack of a theoretical model to explain why size and style (value vs growth) are important risk factors. The CAPM had an elegant, logical theory underlying it; this has none! </li></ul>Explanation for Fama-French Results: Market Beta needs help?
  77. 77. New Risk-Adjustment Model: Fama-French 3-Factor Model <ul><li>Fama & French (1993) </li></ul><ul><li>Size and BV/MV represent risk factors not explained by beta. Add 2 additional factors as explanations for return. </li></ul><ul><li>r it -rf = α + ß 1 *(r mt -rf) + ß 2 *SML t + ß 3 *HML t </li></ul><ul><li>Fama-French Factors are available from French’s Website if you are interested: </li></ul><ul><li> </li></ul>
  78. 78. More on Anomalies <ul><li>January effect: returns are higher in January than in other month of the year, especially for small stocks. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Explanations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Information </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Window-dressing </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Tax-loss selling </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Chen and Singal (2004) suggest that tax-loss selling is the most likely reason. </li></ul></ul>
  79. 79. More on Anomalies <ul><li>January effect: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment implication: </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Not easy to directly profit from the January effect. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Tax-loss selling is undesirable. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>e.g., Assume an investor with a marginal tax rate of 15% bought $10,000 worth of stock at the beginning of the year. Currently the shares are worth $4,000. If the average January effect is 8% for the first five-day in January, will the investor be better off selling the stock at the end-of-December or at the beginning of January after capturing the 8% January effect? </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Benefits of selling in December: </li></ul></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Benefits of selling in January: </li></ul></ul></ul></ul>
  80. 80. More on Anomalies <ul><li>December effect: documented by Chen and Singal (2003). Large stocks gain in December, especially during the last five trading days of the year. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Explanation </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Delay of selling winner stocks in December to defer capital gain realization. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Tradable opportunity exists </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>SPY, or S&P 500 Futures Contract </li></ul></ul></ul>
  81. 81. More on Anomalies <ul><li>Weekend effect: Stock returns are typically highest on Friday, and lowest on Monday. </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Explanations </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Individual investors behavior. </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Institutional investors behavior </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Speculative short sellers behavior (Chen and Singal (2003)) </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><li>Investment implications </li></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Difficult to profit from the weekend effect directly </li></ul></ul></ul><ul><ul><ul><li>Buying stocks with high short interest on Monday, and sell stocks with high short interest on Friday. </li></ul></ul></ul>
  82. 82. STRONG FORM EMH TESTS <ul><li>Are abnormal risk-adjusted returns possible if you trade using private information? </li></ul>
  83. 83. Evidence on Insiders <ul><li>Corporate insiders are required to report their transactions to the SEC. </li></ul><ul><li>They are not supposed to trade when in the possession of “material” information. </li></ul><ul><li>Even with regulation, they achieve positive risk-adjusted abnormal returns. </li></ul>
  84. 84. Insider Trading <ul><li>Remember, this is illegal! </li></ul>
  85. 85. Efficient Markets Summary <ul><li>Are Markets Efficient?? </li></ul><ul><li>Many say there is evidence suggesting that it is not efficient. </li></ul><ul><li>But critics counter this argument by saying that testing flaws cause unreliable outcomes. </li></ul><ul><li>The debate continues… </li></ul>
  86. 86. Assignments <ul><li>Chapter 11: </li></ul><ul><ul><li>Problems 1-10, 14, 15,17-22, 24, 30 </li></ul></ul>