Joint Publication 3-13Information Operations     13 February 2006
PREFACE1.   Scope    This publication provides doctrine for information operations planning, preparation,execution, and as...
Preface          Intentionally Blankii                              JP 3-13
SUMMARY OF CHANGES                 REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13                       DATED 9 OCTOBER 1998•   Aligns...
Summary of Changes                     Intentionally Blankiv                                         JP 3-13
TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                                                         ...
Table of Contents•    Commander’s Intent and Information Operations .........................................................
Table of ContentsII-1   Principles of Public Information ....................................................................
Table of Contents                    Intentionally Blankviii                                      JP 3-13
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY                              COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW    •   Discusses the Information Environment and Its R...
Executive Summary                           The information environment is the aggregate of individuals,                  ...
Executive Summary                       Intelligence and Communications System                          Support to Informa...
Executive Summary                           Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence.                ...
Executive SummarySubordinate joint force     Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of jointcommanders...
Executive Summary                          operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence       ...
Executive SummaryMeasures of performance     Measures of performance (MOPs) gauge accomplishment of IOand measures of     ...
Executive SummaryIO education        The IO career force should consist of both capability specialistsconsiderations.     ...
CHAPTER I                                        INTRODUCTION     “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stor...
Chapter I                      THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT                                               Where the informa...
Introduction      c. There are criteria that define the quality of information relative to its purpose. Informationquality...
Chapter I      b. In modern military operations, commanders face a variety of information challenges.Technical challenges ...
Introduction          (2) Medium-term factors may include the rise and fall of leaders, competition between groupsover res...
Chapter Itechniques include, but are not limited to, deception, electronic attack (EA), computer network attack(CNA), prop...
INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT OPERATIONS (NOTIONAL)       Core, Supporting,                             Au...
Chapter I     c. IO’s ability to affect and defend decision making is based on five fundamentalassumptions. Although each ...
Introductionlegal issues, as well as potentially disruptive infrastructure issues, through civil-military coordination at ...
Chapter I          (6) Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant falseor misleadi...
Introductionthe accuracy and timeliness of information required by US military commanders by defending oursystems from exp...
Chapter I            Intentionally BlankI-12                              JP 3-13
CHAPTER II                CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION                         OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES     “T...
Chapter IIforce PSYOP officer ensures continuity of psychological objectives and identifies themes to stress andavoid.    ...
Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesalways competing priorities for the resources required fo...
Chapter IIFor more discussion on OPSEC, see JP 3-54, Operations Security.       e. Electronic Warfare           (1) EW ref...
Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesdeny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infr...
Chapter IIproviding for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reactioncapabilitie...
Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities     d. Physical Attack           (1) The concept of atta...
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Jp3 13

  1. 1. Joint Publication 3-13Information Operations 13 February 2006
  2. 2. PREFACE1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for information operations planning, preparation,execution, and assessment in support of joint operations.2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forcesof the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordinationand for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance forthe exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs)and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for useby the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publicationto restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in amanner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of theoverall objective.3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatantcommands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands,and the Services. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followedexcept when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normallyin coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more currentand specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance orcoalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified bythe United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commandersshould evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, whereapplicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: WALTER L. SHARP Lieutenant General, USA Director, Joint Staff i
  3. 3. Preface Intentionally Blankii JP 3-13
  4. 4. SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 DATED 9 OCTOBER 1998• Aligns joint information operations (IO) doctrine with the transformational planning guidance as specified by the 30 October 2003 Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap• Discontinues use of the terms “offensive IO” and “defensive IO” but retains the recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive objectives• Removes information warfare as a term from joint IO doctrine• Updates the descriptions and interrelationship of the five core IO capabilities (electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, operations security, and military deception) and their associated supporting and related capabilities• Establishes the core capability of computer network operations, consisting of computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network exploitation• Adds combat camera and realigns physical attack, information assurance, and counterintelligence under supporting IO capabilities• Adds defense support to public diplomacy and realigns public affairs and civil military operations under related IO capabilities• Adds a description of the information environment and discusses its relationship to IO and other military operations• Adds a discussion of the relationship of IO to strategic communication• Adds a separate chapter on intelligence and communications system support to IO• Expands the chapter on IO planning to address IO considerations in joint planning, situational aspects of IO planning, IO measures of performance and effectiveness, and the importance of interagency coordination in IO planning• Adds a discussion on the planning aspects of IO and theater security cooperation planning• Adds a separate chapter on multinational considerations in IO iii
  5. 5. Summary of Changes Intentionally Blankiv JP 3-13
  6. 6. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGEEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ ixCHAPTER I INTRODUCTION• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1• The Information Environment .................................................................................... I-1• Military Operations and the Information Environment ............................................... I-3• Principles of Information Operations .......................................................................... I-6• Strategic Communication ......................................................................................... I-10• Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations .................................. I-10CHAPTER II CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1• Core Information Operations Capabilities ................................................................ II-1• Information Operations Supporting Capabilities ....................................................... II-5• Information Operations Related Capabilities ............................................................ II-8CHAPTER III INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1• Intelligence Support to Information Operations ....................................................... III-1CHAPTER IV RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ IV-1• Authorities and Responsibilities .............................................................................. IV-1• Joint Information Operations Organizational Roles and Responsibilities .................. IV-2• Organizing for Joint Information Operations ........................................................... IV-3CHAPTER V PLANNING AND COORDINATION• Introduction .............................................................................................................. V-1• Information Operations Planning .............................................................................. V-1• Information Operations Planning Considerations ........................................................... V-2 v
  7. 7. Table of Contents• Commander’s Intent and Information Operations .......................................................... V-7• The Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness ........................................................................................................... V-7CHAPTER VI MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ VI-1• Other Nations and Information Operations .............................................................. VI-1• Multinational Information Operations Considerations ............................................. VI-2• Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information Operations in Multinational Operations ................................................................. VI-3• Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning ............................ VI-3• Multinational Policy Coordination .......................................................................... VI-3CHAPTER VII INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND EXPERIMENTS• Introduction ............................................................................................................VII-1• Information Operations Education ..........................................................................VII-1• Information Operations Training ............................................................................. VII-2• Planning Information Operations in Joint Exercises.................................................VII-3• Information Operations Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise Evaluation ........................................................................................................... VII-7• Information Operations in Joint Experimentation ................................................... VII-8APPENDIX A Supplemental Guidance (published separately) ................................................... A-1 B Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities ................... B-1 C Communications System Support to Information Operations .............................. C-1 D References ......................................................................................................... D-1 E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-4FIGURE I-1 The Information Environment ......................................................................... I-2 I-2 Information Quality Criteria ............................................................................ I-3 I-3 Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional) ................ I-7vi JP 3-13
  8. 8. Table of ContentsII-1 Principles of Public Information ......................................................................... II-9IV-1 Information Operations Cell Chief Functions ..................................................... IV-4IV-2 Notional Information Operations Cell ............................................................... IV-5V-1 Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of Joint Planning .............................................................................................. V-4V-2 Example of the Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness ............................................................................ V-8B-1 Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities.......................... B-1B-2 Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations............ B-5B-3 Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera ........... B-8 vii
  9. 9. Table of Contents Intentionally Blankviii JP 3-13
  10. 10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW • Discusses the Information Environment and Its Relationship to Military Operations • Discusses the Information Operations (IO) Core Capabilities Necessary to Successfully Plan and Execute IO to include Supporting and Related Capabilities in a Joint/Multinational Environment • Aligns Joint IO Doctrine with the Transformational Planning Guidance as Specified by the Department of Defense IO Roadmap for Achieving Information Superiority on the Battlefield • Provides an Organizational Framework for Integrating, Deconflicting, and Synchronizing IO Planning and Execution Activities for Supporting and Supported Combatant Command Staffs, National Intelligence Agencies, and Other Federal Agencies as Applicable • Outlines Planning Considerations for Developing an IO Career Force through Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experimentation Military Operations and the Information EnvironmentTo succeed, it is necessary Information is a strategic resource, vital to national security, andfor US forces to gain and military operations depend on information and informationmaintain information systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities.superiority. Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO in support of joint operations. The principal goal is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies. ix
  11. 11. Executive Summary The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations CapabilitiesCore capabilities. IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment.Supporting capabilities. Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes.Related capabilities. There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil- military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.x JP 3-13
  12. 12. Executive Summary Intelligence and Communications System Support to Information OperationsSuccessful planning, Before military activities in the information environment can bepreparation, execution, planned, the current “state” of the dynamic informationand assessment of environment must be collected, analyzed, and provided toinformation operations commanders and their staffs. This requires intelligence on relevant(IO) demand detailed and portions of the physical, informational, and cognitive propertiestimely intelligence. of the information environment, which necessitates collection and analysis of a wide variety of information and the production of a wide variety of intelligence products.Nature of IO intelligence In order to understand the adversary or other TA decision-makingrequirements. process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to achieve operational objectives, commanders and their staffs must have current data. This includes relevant physical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment as well as assessment of ongoing IO activities.Intelligence Intelligence Resources are Limited. Commanders and theirconsiderations in intelligence and operations directorates must work together toplanning IO. identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure that they are given high enough priority in the commander’s requests to the intelligence community (IC). Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The IC must implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally, intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other sources. Intelligence Support to IO Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligence necessary to affect adversary or other TA decisions often requires that specific sources and methods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct the required analyses. Information Environment is Dynamic. Commanders and their staffs must understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions of the information environment. xi
  13. 13. Executive Summary Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection of physical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. Commanders and their staffs must have an appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. Responsibilities and Command RelationshipsJoint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCSs) responsibilities for IO are both general (such as those to establish doctrine, provide advice, and make recommendations) and specific (such as those assigned in the Department of Defense [DOD] IO policy). The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO and coordinates with the other organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities. The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO specific advice and advocate Joint Staff and combatant commands’ IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with other organizations and individuals on behalf of the CJCS.Combatant commands. Commander, United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM’s) specific authority and responsibility to coordinate IO across area of responsibility (AOR) and functional boundaries does not diminish the imperative for other combatant commanders to employ IO. These efforts may be directed at achieving national or military objectives incorporated in theater security cooperation plans, shaping the operational environment for potential employment during periods of heightened tensions, or in support of specific military operations. It is entirely possible that in a given theater, the combatant commander will be supported for select IO while concurrently supporting USSTRATCOM IO activities across multiple theater boundaries.Components. Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and execution of IO. IO planned and conducted by functional components must be conducted within the parameters established by the JFC. At the same time, component commanders and their subordinates must be provided sufficient flexibility and authority to respond to local variations in the information environment. Component commanders determine how their staffs are organized for IO, and normally designate personnel to liaise between the JFC’s headquarters and component headquarter staffs.xii JP 3-13
  14. 14. Executive SummarySubordinate joint force Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of jointcommanders. operations. Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of relationship with the parent joint force IO staff as the Service and functional components. Subordinate JFC staffs may become involved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree, to include making recommendations for employment of specific capabilities, particularly if most of the capability needed for a certain operation resides in that subordinate joint task force.Organizing for joint IO. Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for IO to the J-3. When authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and assessing joint force IO. The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the combatant command staff and that IO aspects of such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs. To integrate and synchronize the core capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and appropriate staff functions, the IO cell chief normally leads an “IO cell” or similarly named group as an integrated part of the staff’s operational planning group or equivalent. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance. Planning and CoordinationIO planning follows the The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplishsame principles and JFC objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate,processes established for negate, or harm other JFC military operations, as well as other USjoint operation planning. Government (USG) information activities. JFCs must ensure IO planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the joint targeting coordination board in order to ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts. Other USG and/or coalition/allied information activities, when uncoordinated, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective. Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JFC IO staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts in theAOR to effectively synergize and integrate IO capabilities.Planning considerations. IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC’s campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IO are used in all phases of a campaign or xiii
  15. 15. Executive Summary operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence the amount of effort required for the remaining phases. The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to preclude other conflicts, requires an ability to integrate IO capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy through the establishment of information objectives that in turn are integrated into and support the JFC’s overall mission objectives. The combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plan serves as an excellent platform to embed specific long-term information objectives IO planning requires early and detailed preparation. Many IO capabilities require long lead-time intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IO support for IPB development differs from traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time and may have expanded collection, production, and dissemination requirements. Consequently, combatant commanders must ensure that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and requests for information (RFIs). As part of the planning process, designation of release and execution authority is required. Release authority provides the approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation of specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority. Execution authority is described as the authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and/or place. Normally, the JFC is the one execution authority designated in the execute order for an operation. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval.Commander’s intent and The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begininformation operations. before the specific planning is initiated. A commander that expects to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO related PIRs and RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis, in order for the intelligence products to be ready in time to support operations. At a minimum, the commander’s vision for IO should be included in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO as part of their overall concept, but may elect to provide it separately.xiv JP 3-13
  16. 16. Executive SummaryMeasures of performance Measures of performance (MOPs) gauge accomplishment of IOand measures of tasks and actions. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) determineeffectiveness. whether IO actions being executed are having the desired effect toward mission accomplishment: the attainment of end states and objectives. MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace results. IO MOPs and MOEs are crafted and refined throughout the planning process. Multinational Considerations in Information OperationsEvery ally/coalition Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts andmember can contribute to some have thorough and sophisticated doctrine, procedures, andIO by providing regional capabilities for planning and conducting IO. The multinationalexpertise to assist in force commander is responsible to resolve potential conflictsplanning and conducting between each nation’s IO programs and the IO objectives andIO. programs of the coalition. It is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into IO planning as early as possible so that an integrated and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning process. Integration requirements include clarification of allied and coalition partner’s IO objectives; understanding of other nations’ information operations and how they intend to conduct IO; establishment of liaison/deconfliction procedures to ensure coherence; and early identification of multinational force vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to adversary attempts to exploit them. Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and ExperimentsA solid foundation of The development of IO as a core military competency and criticaleducation and training is component to joint operations requires specific expertise andessential to the capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highest professionaldevelopment of IO core levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competenciescompetencies. that are the capstone to American military power. The Services, United States Special Operations Command, and other agencies develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law, policy, and lessons learned. At each level of command, a solid foundation of education and training is essential to the development of a core competency. Professional education and training, in turn, are dependent on the accumulation, documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations, exercises, and experimentation. xv
  17. 17. Executive SummaryIO education The IO career force should consist of both capability specialistsconsiderations. (EW, PSYOP, CNO, MILDEC, and OPSEC) and IO planners. Both groups require an understanding of the information environment, the role of IO in military affairs, how IO differs from other information functions that contribute to information superiority, and specific knowledge of each of the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO into joint operations. IO planners are required at both the component and the joint level. Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive level knowledge of the information environment and the role of IO in supporting DOD missions.IO training Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine toconsiderations. prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent with the joint assignment process. Joint IO training focuses on joint planning-specific skills, methodologies and tools, and assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training. The Services determine applicable career training requirements for both their IO career personnel and general military populations, based on identified joint force mission requirements. CONCLUSION This document provides the doctrinal principles for DOD employment of IO. It has been designed to provide overarching guidance in the planning and execution of IO in today’s joint/ multinational security environment. It’s primary purpose is to ensure all of the capabilities comprising IO are effectively coordinated and integrated into our nation’s warfighting capability against current and future threats.xvi JP 3-13
  18. 18. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.” Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress 1 December 18621. Introduction Information operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of military operations.A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies.Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is effectivelytranslated into superior decisions. IO are described as the integrated employment of electronicwarfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), militarydeception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supportingand related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automateddecision making while protecting our own. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint forcecommanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO insupport of joint operations. To apply IO across the range of military operations, the JFC integrateshis military actions, forces, and capabilities throughout the domains (air, land, sea, and space) ofthe operating environment in order to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects onadversary leaders, forces (regular or irregular), information, information systems, and otheraudiences; while protecting and defending the JFC’s own forces actions, information, andinformation systems. The commander assesses the nature of the mission and develops the intentfor IO in all phases of an operation or campaign.2. The Information Environment a. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systemsthat collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers,individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect,analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans andautomated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principalenvironment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct,it resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up of threeinterrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive (see Figure I-1). (1) The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of the commandand control (C2) systems, and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizationsto conduct operations across the air, land, sea, and space domains. It is also the dimension wherephysical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includesthe means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively,the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power hastraditionally been measured primarily in this dimension. I-1
  19. 19. Chapter I THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT Where the information environment overlaps with the physical world Information systems and networks Physical Key characteristics: computers and Dimension communications systems, and supporting infrastructures Where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected Informational Dual nature - information itself and the medium Links physical and cognitive dimensions Dimension Key characteristics: information content and flow, information quality Where automated decision making takes place Where human decision making takes place Dimension of intangibles such as morale, unit Cognitive cohesion, public opinion, situational awareness Dimension Key characteristics: perceptions, emotions, awareness, and understanding Figure I-1. The Information Environment (2) The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is where information iscollected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2of modern military forces is communicated, and where commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists ofthe content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must beprotected. (3) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind ofthe decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think,perceive, visualize, and decide. It is the most important of the three dimensions. This dimensionis also affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other personal motivations. Battles andcampaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unitcohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well aspublic opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension. b. Advancements in technology have enabled information to be collected, processed,stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected outside the cognitive process in quantitiesand at speeds that were previously incomprehensible. While technology makes great quantitiesof information available to audiences worldwide, perception-affecting factors provide the contextwhich individuals use to translate data into information and knowledge.I-2 JP 3-13
  20. 20. Introduction c. There are criteria that define the quality of information relative to its purpose. Informationquality criteria are shown in Figure I-2. The varying purposes of information require different applicationsof these criteria to qualify it as valuable. Additionally, each decision relies on a different weighting of theinformation quality criteria to make the best decision. d. The finite amount of time and resources available to obtain information must beconsidered. Whether decisions are made cognitively or pre-programmed in automated systems,the limited time and resources to improve the quality of available information leaves decisionmaking subject to manipulation. Additionally, there are real costs associated with obtainingquality information — that is, information well-suited to its purpose —such as those to acquire,process, store, transport, and distribute information. The overall impact of successful IO improvesthe quality of friendly information while degrading the quality of adversary information, thus,providing friendly forces the ability to make faster, more accurate decisions. Quality criteria areshown in Figure I-2.3. Military Operations and the Information Environment a. Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of theinformation environment is a reality that extends to the Armed Forces of the US at all levels.Military operations, in particular, are dependent on many simultaneous and integrated activitiesthat, in turn, depend on information, and information systems, which must be protected. INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA ACCURACY Information that conveys the true situation RELEVANCE Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand TIMELINESS Information that is available in time to make decisions USABILITY Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays COMPLETENESS Information that provides the decision maker with all necessary data BREVITY Information that has only the level of detail required SECURITY Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required Figure I-2. Information Quality Criteria I-3
  21. 21. Chapter I b. In modern military operations, commanders face a variety of information challenges.Technical challenges include establishing and maintaining connectivity, particularly in austere and distributedlocations. Operational challenges include the complexities of modern combat against adversaries withgrowing information capabilities. For example, regardless of their size, adversaries, including terroristgroups, can counter US efforts through propaganda campaigns, or develop, purchase, or downloadfrom the Internet tools and techniques enabling them to attack US information and information systemswhich may result in tangible impacts on US diplomatic, economic, or military efforts. The global informationenvironment and its associated technologies is potentially available to everyone and as a result, USmilitary commanders face another challenge. Our adversaries now have the capability to pass information,coordinate, exchange ideas, and synchronize their actions instantaneously. c. The commander visualizes, plans, and directs operations — IO are a part of thoseoperations. The commander’s intent should specify a visualization of the desired effects to beachieved with IO and other operations for the staff to develop IO objectives. The commandermust not only be able to visualize the desired effects to be achieved with IO but also understandthe adversary’s capabilities to limit the impact of US operations while the adversary strives toacquire information superiority from the US. These effects can vary based on the objectives ofthe mission, ranging from disrupting an enemy commander in combat to assuring friendly nationsthrough combined/multinational military training/exercises during peacetime. The role of themilitary and the desired end state or effect, is dependent on the nature of the conflict. If conductinga humanitarian assistance mission, then generating goodwill for the services rendered anddeparting with a favorable impression of US activities becomes a primary objective. Thecommander’s intent must include the concept of how these effects will help achieve forceobjectives. d. Military forces operate in an information environment of constantly changingcontent and tempo. This evolution adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of planningand executing military operations at a specific time and in a specific location. A continuum oflong-, medium-, and short-term factors shape the information environment for which militaryoperations are planned and in which such operations are executed. Commanders and IO cellchiefs must be prepared to adapt or modify IO plans to meet their desired IO effects. (1) Long-term factors which may shape the information environment include thevarious ways by which humans: (a) Organize (nation states, tribes, families, etc.). (b) Govern. (c) Interact as groups (culture, sociology, religion, etc.). (d) Are regionally influenced (stability, alliances, economic relationships, etc.). (e) Are technologically advanced.I-4 JP 3-13
  22. 22. Introduction (2) Medium-term factors may include the rise and fall of leaders, competition between groupsover resources or goals, incorporation of specific technologies into information infrastructure; and theemployment of resources by organizations to take advantage of information technology and infrastructure. (3) Short-term factors may include weather; availability of finite resources to supportor employ specific information technologies (ITs); and ability to extend/maintain sensors andportable information infrastructure to the specific location of distant military operations. e. The pervasiveness of the information environment in human activity combined with thespeed and processing power of modern IT enhances and complicates military efforts to organize,train, equip, plan, and operate. Today, technology has opened the way to an ever-increasingspan of control. f. US forces perform their missions in an increasingly complex informationenvironment. To succeed, it is necessary for US forces to gain and maintain informationsuperiority. In Department of Defense (DOD) policy, information superiority is described as theoperational advantage gained by the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (1) The forces possessing better information and using that information to moreeffectively gain understanding have a major advantage over their adversaries. A commanderwho gains this advantage can use it to accomplish missions by affecting perceptions, attitudes,decisions, and actions. However, information superiority is not static; during operations, allsides continually attempt to secure their own advantages and deny useful information toadversaries. The operational advantages of information superiority can take several forms,ranging from the ability to create a common operational picture to the ability to delay an adversary’sdecision to commit reinforcements. (2) Recognizing information superiority can be difficult to attain over certain adversaries, butits advantages are significant. When it exists, the information available to commanders allows them toaccurately visualize the situation, anticipate events, and make appropriate, timely decisions more effectivelythan adversary decision makers. In essence, information superiority enhances commanders’ freedom ofaction and allows them to execute decisions, and maintain the initiative, while remaining inside theadversary’s decision cycle. However, commanders recognize that without continuous IO designed toachieve and maintain information superiority, adversaries may counter those advantages and possiblyattain information superiority themselves. Commanders can achieve information superiority by maintainingaccurate situational understanding while controlling or affecting the adversaries’ or TAs’ perceptions.The more a commander can shape this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage. g. Potential information adversaries come in many shapes: traditionally hostile countries who wishto gain information on US military capabilities and intentions; malicious hackers who wish to steal fromor harm the US Government (USG) or military; terrorists; and economic competitors, just to name afew. Potential adversarial information attack techniques are numerous. Some, particularly electronicmeans, can be prevented by the consistent application of encryption, firewalls, and other networksecurity techniques. Others are considerably more difficult to counter. Possible threat information I-5
  23. 23. Chapter Itechniques include, but are not limited to, deception, electronic attack (EA), computer network attack(CNA), propaganda and psychological operations, and supporting signals intelligence (SIGINT)operations. h. With the free flow of information present in all theaters, such as television, phone, and Internet,conflicting messages can quickly emerge to defeat the intended effects. As a result, continuoussynchronization and coordination between IO, public affairs (PA), public diplomacy (PD), and our alliesis imperative, and will help ensure that information themes employed during operations involving neutralor friendly populations remain consistent. i. Legal Considerations in IO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiringcareful review. Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US military activities in the informationenvironment as in the physical domains, are conducted as a matter of policy and societal valueson a basis of respect for fundamental human rights. US forces, whether operating physicallyfrom bases or locations overseas or from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, arerequired by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the law of armed conflict(LOAC).4. Principles of Information Operations a. Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential informationwhile denying it to the adversary and other TAs. IO encompass planning, coordination, andsynchronization of the employment of current capabilities to deliberately affect or defend theinformation environment to achieve the commander’s objectives. Figure I-3 describes how IOis integrated into joint operations. (1) Core capabilities (EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC) are integratedinto the planning and execution of operations in the information environment. (2) Supporting IO capabilities (information assurance [IA], physical security, physicalattack, counterintelligence [CI], and combat camera [COMCAM]) have military purposes otherthan IO but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the informationenvironment. (3) Related IO capabilities (PA, civil-military operations [CMO], and defense supportto public diplomacy [DSPD]) may be constrained by US policy or legal considerations. Whilethese capabilities have common interfaces with IO, their primary purposes and rules make themseparate and distinct. As a result, it is essential that commanders and their staffs coordinate theirefforts when exercising their functions within the information environment. b. IO are primarily concerned with affecting decisions and decision-making processes,while at the same time defending friendly decision-making processes. Primary mechanismsused to affect the information environment include: influence, disruption, corruption, or usurpation.I-6 JP 3-13
  24. 24. INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT OPERATIONS (NOTIONAL) Core, Supporting, Audience/ Information Primary Planning/ Related Information Activities Objective Who does it? Activities Target Quality Integration Process Electronic Attack Physical, Destroy, Disrupt, Delay Usability Joint Operation Planning and Individuals, Governments, Electronic Warfare Informational Execution System (JOPES)/ Militaries Targeting Process Electronic Protection Physical Protect the Use of Electro- Security JOPES/Defense Planning Individuals, Businesses, magnetic Spectrum Governments, Militaries Electronic Warfare Physical Identify and Locate Usability Joint Intelligence Preparation of Militaries Support Threats the Battlespace(JIPB)/SIGINT Collection Computer Network Computer Network Physical, Destroy, Disrupt, Delay Security JIPB/JOPES/Targeting Process Individuals, Governments, Operations Attack Informational Militaries Computer Network Physical, Protect Computer Security JOPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis Individuals, Businesses, Defense Informational Networks Governments, Militaries Computer Network Informational Gain Information From Security JIPB/Targeting Process Individuals, Governments, Exploitation and About Computers Militaries and Computer Networks Psychological Psychological Cognitive Influence Relevance JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Operations Operations Militaries Military Deception Military Deception Cognitive Mislead Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Militaries Operations Security Operations Security Cognitive Deny Security JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Militaries Supporting Information Informational Protect Information and Security JOPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis Businesses, Governments, Capabilities Assurance Informatin Systems Militaries Physical Security Physical Secure Information and Usability JOPES/Defense Planning Businesses, Governments, Information Infrastructure Militaries Physical Attack Physical Destroy, Disrupt Usability JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Counterintelligence Cognitive Mislead Accuracy JIPB/Human Intelligence Collection Governments, Militaries Combat Camera Physical Inform/Document Usability, JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Accuracy Related Civil Military Cognitive Influence Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Capabilities Operations Public Affairs Cognitive Inform Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Militaries Public Diplomacy Cognitive Inform Accuracy Interagency Coordination Governments Figure I-3. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional)I-7 Introduction
  25. 25. Chapter I c. IO’s ability to affect and defend decision making is based on five fundamentalassumptions. Although each of these assumptions is an important enabling factor for IO, theywill not all necessarily be true for every operation. For any specific operation where one or more ofthese assumptions are not met, the risk assessment provided to the commander would be adjustedaccordingly. (1) Generally, the quality of information that is considered valuable to human andautomated decision makers is universal. However, the relative importance of each quality criterionof information (Figure I-2) may vary based on the influences of geography, language, culture,religion, organization, experience, or personality. (2) Decisions are made based on the information available at the time. (3) It is possible, with finite resources, to understand the relevant aspects of the informationenvironment to include the processes decision makers use to make decisions. (4) It is possible to affect the information environment in which specific decisionmakers act through psychological, electronic, or physical means. (5) It is possible to measure the effectiveness of IO actions in relation to an operationalobjective. d. Since human activity takes place in the information environment, it is potentially subjectto IO. However, only mission-related critical psychological, electronic, and physical pointsin the information environment should be targeted, directly or indirectly, by IO. Theplanning methodologies used to identify and prioritize such points in planning IO are discussedin Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.” e. IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war andacross the range of military operations. The nature of the modern information environmentcomplicates the identification of the boundaries between these levels. Therefore, at all levels,information activities, including IO must be consistent with broader national securitypolicy and strategic objectives. f. Because IO are conducted across the range of military operations, and can make significantcontributions before major operations commence, the IO environment should be prepared and assessedthrough a variety of engagement and intelligence activities, all designed to make IO more effective. Inaddition to impacting the environment prior to the onset of military operations, IO are essential to post-combat operations. Therefore, integration, planning, employment, and assessment of core, supporting,and related IO are vital to ensuring a rapid transition to a peaceful environment. g. The ultimate strategic objective of IO is to deter a potential or actual adversary orother TA from taking actions that threaten US national interests. Additionally, IO actionsexecuted through civilian controlled portions of the global information environment, or whichmay cause unintended reactions from US or foreign populaces, must account for US policy andI-8 JP 3-13
  26. 26. Introductionlegal issues, as well as potentially disruptive infrastructure issues, through civil-military coordination at alllevels. (1) IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systemswith specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted withincreasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. However, targetingautomated decision making, at any level, is only as effective as the human adversary’sreliance on such decisions. (2) The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in orderto affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation.IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways: (a) By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add,modify, or remove information from the environment of various individuals or groups of decisionmakers. (b) By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates,processes, and/or stores information in support of targeted decision makers. (c) By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data,information, and knowledge. h. All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations.Commanders use IO capabilities in both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously toaccomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations andsystems. Fully integrating IO capabilities for offensive and defensive operations requires plannersto treat IO as a single function. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following: (1) Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any functionor be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (2) Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information. (3) Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 orcommunications systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade themorale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisionsand actions. (4) Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information,systems, and services. (5) Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true. MILDEC seeks to misleadadversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality. I-9
  27. 27. Chapter I (6) Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant falseor misleading information. (7) Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to US forces. (8) Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipmentand information. (9) Detect. To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion intoinformation systems. (10) Restore. To bring information and information systems back to their originalstate. (11) Respond. To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or intrusion.5. Strategic Communication a. Strategic Communication constitutes focused USG efforts to understand and engage keyaudiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USGinterests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages,and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power. b. DOD efforts must be part of a government-wide approach to develop and implement a morerobust strategic communication capability. DOD must also support and participate in USG strategiccommunication activities to understand, inform, and influence relevant foreign audiences to include:DOD’s transition to and from hostilities, security, military forward presence, and stability operations.This is primarily accomplished through its PA, DSPD, and IO capabilities. c. DOD PA, DSPD, and IO are distinct functions that can support strategic communication.Synchronization of strategic communication-related PA, IO, and DSPD activities is essential foreffective strategic communication. d. Combatant commanders should ensure planning for IO, PA, and DSPD are consistentwith overall USG strategic communication objectives and are approved by the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD). Combatant commanders should integrate an information strategyinto planning for peacetime and contingency situations. Combatant commanders plan, execute,and assess PA, DSPD, and IO activities to implement theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs),to support US embassies’ information programs, and to support other agencies’ public diplomacyand PA programs directly supporting DOD missions.6. Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations a. History indicates that the speed and accuracy of information available to militarycommanders is the significant factor in determining the outcome on the battlefield. IO enablesI-10 JP 3-13
  28. 28. Introductionthe accuracy and timeliness of information required by US military commanders by defending oursystems from exploitation by adversaries. IO are used to deny adversaries access to their C2 informationand other supporting automated infrastructures. b. Adversaries are increasingly exploring and testing IO actions as asymmetric warfare that can beused to thwart US military objectives that are heavily reliant on information systems. This requires theUS military to employ defensive technologies and utilize leading-edge tactics and procedures to preventour forces and systems from being successfully attacked. I-11
  29. 29. Chapter I Intentionally BlankI-12 JP 3-13
  30. 30. CHAPTER II CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES “The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.” Charles Ardant du Picq 1821 - 18701. Introduction IO coordinates and synchronizes the employment of the five core capabilities in support of thecombatant commander’s objectives or to prevent the adversary from achieving his desired objectives.The core capabilities are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. There are five supportingcapabilities: IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and COMCAM, and three related capabilities:PA, CMO, and DSPD. Together these capabilities enable the commander to affect and influence asituation. However, the potential for conflict between interrelated capabilities requires their employmentbe coordinated, integrated, and synchronized.2. Core Information Operations Capabilities a. Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a majorpart in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first byEW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction withsupporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing anadversary and other TAs by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the informationenvironment. b. Psychological Operations (1) PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviorof their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital partof the broad range of US activities to influence foreign audiences and are the only DOD operationsauthorized to influence foreign TAs directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOPpersonnel advise the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts ofevery aspect of force employment, and how to develop a strategy for developing and planning thedissemination of specific PSYOP programs, to achieve the overall campaign objectives. During a crisis,a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) deploys at the request of the supported commander. A POAT isa small, tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution/dissemination, and logistics specialists.The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate levelof support to accomplish the mission. A POAT can augment a unified command or joint task force(JTF) staff and provide PSYOP planning support. The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area,normally the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) commander, may also serve as the defacto joint force PSYOP officer. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint II-1
  31. 31. Chapter IIforce PSYOP officer ensures continuity of psychological objectives and identifies themes to stress andavoid. (2) PSYOP as an IO Core Capability. PSYOP has a central role in the achievement of IOobjectives in support of the JFC. In today’s information environment even PSYOP conducted at thetactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must beunderstood and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This isparticularly important in the early stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design,produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. All PSYOP are conductedunder the authority of interagency-coordinated and OSD approved PSYOP programs. The PSYOPprogram approval process at the national level requires time for sufficient coordination and resolution ofissues; hence, JFCs should begin PSYOP planning as early as possible to ensure the execution ofPSYOP in support of operations. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority,and delegation of product approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin. JFCs should requestPSYOP planners immediately during the initial crisis stages to ensure the JFC has plenty of lead time toobtain the proper authority to execute PSYOP. PSYOP assets may be of particular value to the JFC inpre-/post-combat operations when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. PSYOPmust be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and control, CI operationsare not compromised, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectivesestablished in planning. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PAstaffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences, which is the purpose of the IO cell.PSYOP efforts are most effective when personnel with a thorough understanding of the language andculture of the TA are included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. As the informationenvironment evolves, the dissemination of PSYOP products is expanding from traditional print andbroadcast to more sophisticated use of the Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and otheremerging media. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination ofthe core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO, and EW.For more discussion on PSYOP, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Joint Doctrine for PsychologicalOperations. c. Military Deception (1) MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversarydecision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversaryto take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities — MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrectanalysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny realinformation to an adversary, and prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. To be effective, a MILDECoperation must be susceptible to adversary collection systems and “seen” as credible to the enemycommander and staff. A plausible approach to MILDEC planning is to employ a friendly course ofaction (COA) that can be executed by friendly forces and that adversary intelligence can verify. However,MILDEC planners must not fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values,and reactions that “mirror image” likely friendly actions in the same situation, i.e., assuming that theadversary will respond or act in a particular manner based on how we would respond. There areII-2 JP 3-13
  32. 32. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesalways competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the resources required for thereal operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan,starting with the commander’s and staff’s initial estimate, to ensure proper resourcing of both. Toencourage incorrect analysis by the adversary, it is usually more efficient and effective to provide a falsepurpose for real activity than to create false activity. OPSEC of the deception plan is at least asimportant as OPSEC of the real plan, since compromise of the deception may expose the real plan.This requirement for close hold planning while ensuring detailed coordination is the greatest challenge toMILDEC planners. On joint staffs, MILDEC planning and oversight responsibility is normally organizedas a staff deception element in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). (2) MILDEC as an IO Core Capability. MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. Itexploits the adversary’s information systems, processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies uponunderstanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan and how both useinformation management to support their efforts. This requires a high degree of coordination with allelements of friendly forces’ activities in the information environment as well as with physical activities.Each of the core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of successfulMILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time. While PA should not be involved in the provisionof false information, it must be aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertentlycompromise it.For more discussion on MILDEC, see JP 3-58, Military Deception. d. Operations Security (1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions and other activities to: identify what friendly information is necessary for theadversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversarydecision makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversarydecision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information because otherinformation about friendly forces and intentions remain secure. On joint staffs, responsibilitiesfor OPSEC are normally delegated to the J-3. A designated OPSEC program manager supervisesother members of the command-assigned OPSEC duties and oversees the coordination,development, and implementation of OPSEC as an integrated part of IO in the operational area. (2) OPSEC as an IO Core Capability. OPSEC denies the adversary the informationneeded to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. In particular, OPSEC complementsMILDEC by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprovea deception plan. For those IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities,such as EW and CNO, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities are not compromised.The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures tomask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach tosecuring friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examplesof other types of security include physical security, IA programs, computer network defense (CND),and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access. II-3
  33. 33. Chapter IIFor more discussion on OPSEC, see JP 3-54, Operations Security. e. Electronic Warfare (1) EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) anddirected energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the adversary. EW includes three majorsubdivisions: EA, electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involvesthe use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, orequipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under directcontrol of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localizesources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threatrecognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. ES provides informationrequired for decisions involving EW operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance,targeting, and homing. ES data can be used to produce SIGINT, provide targeting for electronicor other forms of attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). SIGINTand MASINT can also provide battle damage assessment (BDA) and feedback on the effectivenessof the overall operational plan. (2) EW as an IO Core Capability. EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensiveand defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarialuse of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. Expanding relianceon the EM spectrum for informational purposes increases both the potential and the challenges of EWin IO. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility andthreat of EW, offering opportunities to exploit an adversary’s electronic vulnerabilities and a requirementto identify and protect our own from similar exploitation. As the use of the EM spectrum has becomeuniversal in military operations, so has EW become involved in all aspects of IO. All of the core,supporting, and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit from EW. In order tocoordinate and deconflict EW, and more broadly all military usage of the EM spectrum, an electronicwarfare coordination cell (EWCC) should be established by the JFC to reside with the componentcommander most appropriate to the operation. In addition, all joint operations require a joint restrictedfrequency list (JRFL). This list specifies protected, guarded, and taboo frequencies that should notnormally be disrupted without prior coordination and planning, either because of friendly use or friendlyexploitation. This is maintained and promulgated by the communications system directorate of a jointstaff (J-6) in coordination with J-3 and the joint commander’s electronic warfare staff (or EWCC, ifdelegated).For more discussion on EW, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. f. Computer Network Operations (1) CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations. CNOstems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems bymilitary and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt,II-4 JP 3-13
  34. 34. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesdeny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations,CNO are divided into CNA, CND, and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enablingoperations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny,degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers andnetworks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect,monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems andcomputer networks. CND actions not only protect DOD systems from an external adversary but alsofrom exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE isenabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networksto gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Note that due tothe continued expansion of wireless networking and the integration of computers and radio frequencycommunications, there will be operations and capabilities that blur the line between CNO and EW andthat may require case-by-case determination when EW and CNO are assigned separate release authorities. (2) CNO as an IO Core Capability. The increasing reliance of unsophisticatedmilitaries and terrorist groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2forces reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of computersand the range of their employment broadens, new vulnerabilities and opportunities will continueto develop. This offers both opportunities to attack and exploit an adversary’s computer systemweaknesses and a requirement to identify and protect our own from similar attack or exploitation.The doctrinal use of CNO capabilities in support of IO is discussed further in Appendix A,“Supplemental Guidance,” to this publication. g. Mutual Support Among IO Capabilities. A more detailed description of how the IOcore capabilities mutually support one another is illustrated in the table at Appendix B, “MutualSupport Between Information Operations Core Capabilities.” This shows some of the positiveinterrelationships between the contributors to IO effects. For each positive contribution, there isalso the possibility of negative effects if these capabilities, which all operate in the informationenvironment, are not fully coordinated. The development of effective IO across the range ofmilitary operations depends upon a full understanding of this interrelationship among capabilities.Only then can they be properly and effectively integrated through the processes discussed inChapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities a. Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, andCOMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment andcontribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, butalso serve other wider purposes. b. Information Assurance (1) IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systemsby ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes II-5
  35. 35. Chapter IIproviding for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reactioncapabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. IA requires a defense-in-depthapproach that integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayerand multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must assumethat access can be gained to information and information systems from inside and outside DOD-controllednetworks. In joint organizations, IA is a responsibility of the J-6. (2) IA as a Supporting Capability for IO. IO depends on IA to protect informationand information systems, thereby assuring continuous capability. IA and IO have an operationalrelationship in which IO are concerned with the coordination of military activities in theinformation environment, while IA protects the electronic and automated portions of theinformation environment. IA and all aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other tobe effective. IO relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability to positioninformation for influence purposes and for the delivery of information to the adversary.Conversely, IA relies on IO to provide operational protection with coordinated OPSEC, EP,CND, and CI against adversary IO or intelligence efforts directed against friendly electronicinformation or information systems.For detailed policy guidance, see DOD Directive (DODD) 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA),DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation. Joint policy isestablished in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.03, InformationAssurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) Joint Quarterly Readiness Review(JQRR) Metrics, and CJCSI 6510.01 Series, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer NetworkDefense (CND). c. Physical Security (1) Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designedto safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, anddocuments, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physicalsecurity process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriatedeterrent, control and denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to changingconditions. (2) Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO. Just as IA protects friendlyelectronic information and information systems, physical security protects physical facilitiescontaining information and information systems worldwide. Physical security often contributesto OPSEC, particularly in the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity couldcompromise the real plan. IO plans may require significant physical security resources and this requirementshould be made clear to the J-3 as early as possible in the planning process.For more discussion on physical security, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine forCivil-Military Operations, and in general, JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.II-6 JP 3-13
  36. 36. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities d. Physical Attack (1) The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical attack disrupts,damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive power. Physical attack can also beused to create or alter adversary perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable informationsystems. (2) Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO. Physical attack can beemployed in support of IO as a means of attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy ability to exerciseC2 and of influencing TAs. IO capabilities, for example PSYOP, can be employed in support ofphysical attack to maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary. The integrationand synchronization of fires with IO through the targeting process is fundamental to creating thenecessary synergy between IO and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. In order toachieve this integration, commanders must be able to define the effects they seek to achieve andstaffs will incorporate these capabilities into the commander’s plan. Specifically, due to the fast-paced conduct of air operations, it is crucial that the planning and execution of both IO and airoperations be conducted concurrently to produce the most effective targeting plan. Considerationsof targeting are discussed in more detail in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.” e. Counterintelligence (1) CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf offoreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or internationalterrorist activities. The CI programs in joint staffs are a responsibility of the CI and humanintelligence staff element of the intelligence directorate. (2) CI as a Supporting Capability for IO. CI procedures are a critical part of guardingfriendly information and information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA,physical security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best chance toprotect friendly information and information systems from adversary actions. CNO providesome of the tools needed to conduct CI operations. For the IO planner, CI analysis offers a viewof the adversary’s information-gathering methodology. From this, CI can develop the initialintelligence target opportunities that provide access to the adversary for MILDEC information,PSYOP products, and CNA/CNE actions.For more discussion on CI, see classified JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human IntelligenceSupport to Operations. f. Combat Camera (1) The COMCAM mission is to provide the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS), the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and the JTF with an imagery capability insupport of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations. COMCAMis responsible for rapid development and dissemination of products that support strategic and operational II-7

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