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  • 1. Joint Publication 3-13Information Operations 13 February 2006
  • 2. PREFACE1. Scope This publication provides doctrine for information operations planning, preparation,execution, and assessment in support of joint operations.2. Purpose This publication has been prepared under the direction of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefsof Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forcesof the United States in operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordinationand for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance forthe exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs)and prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides military guidance for useby the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publicationto restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in amanner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of theoverall objective.3. Application a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the commanders of combatantcommands, subunified commands, joint task forces, subordinate components of these commands,and the Services. b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such, this doctrine will be followedexcept when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.If conflicts arise between the contents of this publication and the contents of Service publications,this publication will take precedence unless the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normallyin coordination with the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has provided more currentand specific guidance. Commanders of forces operating as part of a multinational (alliance orcoalition) military command should follow multinational doctrine and procedures ratified bythe United States. For doctrine and procedures not ratified by the United States, commandersshould evaluate and follow the multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, whereapplicable and consistent with US law, regulations, and doctrine. For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: WALTER L. SHARP Lieutenant General, USA Director, Joint Staff i
  • 3. Preface Intentionally Blankii JP 3-13
  • 4. SUMMARY OF CHANGES REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3-13 DATED 9 OCTOBER 1998• Aligns joint information operations (IO) doctrine with the transformational planning guidance as specified by the 30 October 2003 Department of Defense Information Operations Roadmap• Discontinues use of the terms “offensive IO” and “defensive IO” but retains the recognition that IO is applied to achieve both offensive and defensive objectives• Removes information warfare as a term from joint IO doctrine• Updates the descriptions and interrelationship of the five core IO capabilities (electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, operations security, and military deception) and their associated supporting and related capabilities• Establishes the core capability of computer network operations, consisting of computer network attack, computer network defense, and computer network exploitation• Adds combat camera and realigns physical attack, information assurance, and counterintelligence under supporting IO capabilities• Adds defense support to public diplomacy and realigns public affairs and civil military operations under related IO capabilities• Adds a description of the information environment and discusses its relationship to IO and other military operations• Adds a discussion of the relationship of IO to strategic communication• Adds a separate chapter on intelligence and communications system support to IO• Expands the chapter on IO planning to address IO considerations in joint planning, situational aspects of IO planning, IO measures of performance and effectiveness, and the importance of interagency coordination in IO planning• Adds a discussion on the planning aspects of IO and theater security cooperation planning• Adds a separate chapter on multinational considerations in IO iii
  • 5. Summary of Changes Intentionally Blankiv JP 3-13
  • 6. TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGEEXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ ixCHAPTER I INTRODUCTION• Introduction ............................................................................................................... I-1• The Information Environment .................................................................................... I-1• Military Operations and the Information Environment ............................................... I-3• Principles of Information Operations .......................................................................... I-6• Strategic Communication ......................................................................................... I-10• Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations .................................. I-10CHAPTER II CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES• Introduction ............................................................................................................. II-1• Core Information Operations Capabilities ................................................................ II-1• Information Operations Supporting Capabilities ....................................................... II-5• Information Operations Related Capabilities ............................................................ II-8CHAPTER III INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ III-1• Intelligence Support to Information Operations ....................................................... III-1CHAPTER IV RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ IV-1• Authorities and Responsibilities .............................................................................. IV-1• Joint Information Operations Organizational Roles and Responsibilities .................. IV-2• Organizing for Joint Information Operations ........................................................... IV-3CHAPTER V PLANNING AND COORDINATION• Introduction .............................................................................................................. V-1• Information Operations Planning .............................................................................. V-1• Information Operations Planning Considerations ........................................................... V-2 v
  • 7. Table of Contents• Commander’s Intent and Information Operations .......................................................... V-7• The Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness ........................................................................................................... V-7CHAPTER VI MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS• Introduction ............................................................................................................ VI-1• Other Nations and Information Operations .............................................................. VI-1• Multinational Information Operations Considerations ............................................. VI-2• Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information Operations in Multinational Operations ................................................................. VI-3• Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning ............................ VI-3• Multinational Policy Coordination .......................................................................... VI-3CHAPTER VII INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND EXPERIMENTS• Introduction ............................................................................................................VII-1• Information Operations Education ..........................................................................VII-1• Information Operations Training ............................................................................. VII-2• Planning Information Operations in Joint Exercises.................................................VII-3• Information Operations Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise Evaluation ........................................................................................................... VII-7• Information Operations in Joint Experimentation ................................................... VII-8APPENDIX A Supplemental Guidance (published separately) ................................................... A-1 B Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities ................... B-1 C Communications System Support to Information Operations .............................. C-1 D References ......................................................................................................... D-1 E Administrative Instructions ................................................................................. E-1GLOSSARY Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................... GL-1 Part II Terms and Definitions ............................................................................... GL-4FIGURE I-1 The Information Environment ......................................................................... I-2 I-2 Information Quality Criteria ............................................................................ I-3 I-3 Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional) ................ I-7vi JP 3-13
  • 8. Table of ContentsII-1 Principles of Public Information ......................................................................... II-9IV-1 Information Operations Cell Chief Functions ..................................................... IV-4IV-2 Notional Information Operations Cell ............................................................... IV-5V-1 Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of Joint Planning .............................................................................................. V-4V-2 Example of the Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness ............................................................................ V-8B-1 Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities.......................... B-1B-2 Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations............ B-5B-3 Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera ........... B-8 vii
  • 9. Table of Contents Intentionally Blankviii JP 3-13
  • 10. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW • Discusses the Information Environment and Its Relationship to Military Operations • Discusses the Information Operations (IO) Core Capabilities Necessary to Successfully Plan and Execute IO to include Supporting and Related Capabilities in a Joint/Multinational Environment • Aligns Joint IO Doctrine with the Transformational Planning Guidance as Specified by the Department of Defense IO Roadmap for Achieving Information Superiority on the Battlefield • Provides an Organizational Framework for Integrating, Deconflicting, and Synchronizing IO Planning and Execution Activities for Supporting and Supported Combatant Command Staffs, National Intelligence Agencies, and Other Federal Agencies as Applicable • Outlines Planning Considerations for Developing an IO Career Force through Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experimentation Military Operations and the Information EnvironmentTo succeed, it is necessary Information is a strategic resource, vital to national security, andfor US forces to gain and military operations depend on information and informationmaintain information systems for many simultaneous and integrated activities.superiority. Information operations (IO) are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO in support of joint operations. The principal goal is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies. ix
  • 11. Executive Summary The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The information environment is made up of three interrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations CapabilitiesCore capabilities. IO consists of five core capabilities which are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. Of the five, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a major part in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first by EW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction with supporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing an adversary and other target audiences (TAs) by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the information environment.Supporting capabilities. Capabilities supporting IO include information assurance (IA), physical security, physical attack, counterintelligence, and combat camera. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment and contribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, but can also serve other wider purposes.Related capabilities. There are three military functions, public affairs (PA), civil- military operations (CMO), and defense support to public diplomacy, specified as related capabilities for IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinated and integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purpose and rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additional care and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMO staffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff.x JP 3-13
  • 12. Executive Summary Intelligence and Communications System Support to Information OperationsSuccessful planning, Before military activities in the information environment can bepreparation, execution, planned, the current “state” of the dynamic informationand assessment of environment must be collected, analyzed, and provided toinformation operations commanders and their staffs. This requires intelligence on relevant(IO) demand detailed and portions of the physical, informational, and cognitive propertiestimely intelligence. of the information environment, which necessitates collection and analysis of a wide variety of information and the production of a wide variety of intelligence products.Nature of IO intelligence In order to understand the adversary or other TA decision-makingrequirements. process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to achieve operational objectives, commanders and their staffs must have current data. This includes relevant physical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment as well as assessment of ongoing IO activities.Intelligence Intelligence Resources are Limited. Commanders and theirconsiderations in intelligence and operations directorates must work together toplanning IO. identify IO intelligence requirements and ensure that they are given high enough priority in the commander’s requests to the intelligence community (IC). Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The IC must implement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally, intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement or other sources. Intelligence Support to IO Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligence necessary to affect adversary or other TA decisions often requires that specific sources and methods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conduct the required analyses. Information Environment is Dynamic. Commanders and their staffs must understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentials for change in the dimensions of the information environment. xi
  • 13. Executive Summary Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection of physical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. Commanders and their staffs must have an appreciation for the subjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. Responsibilities and Command RelationshipsJoint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s (CJCSs) responsibilities for IO are both general (such as those to establish doctrine, provide advice, and make recommendations) and specific (such as those assigned in the Department of Defense [DOD] IO policy). The Operations Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-3) serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO and coordinates with the other organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IO responsibilities. The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO specific advice and advocate Joint Staff and combatant commands’ IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with other organizations and individuals on behalf of the CJCS.Combatant commands. Commander, United States Strategic Command’s (USSTRATCOM’s) specific authority and responsibility to coordinate IO across area of responsibility (AOR) and functional boundaries does not diminish the imperative for other combatant commanders to employ IO. These efforts may be directed at achieving national or military objectives incorporated in theater security cooperation plans, shaping the operational environment for potential employment during periods of heightened tensions, or in support of specific military operations. It is entirely possible that in a given theater, the combatant commander will be supported for select IO while concurrently supporting USSTRATCOM IO activities across multiple theater boundaries.Components. Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and execution of IO. IO planned and conducted by functional components must be conducted within the parameters established by the JFC. At the same time, component commanders and their subordinates must be provided sufficient flexibility and authority to respond to local variations in the information environment. Component commanders determine how their staffs are organized for IO, and normally designate personnel to liaise between the JFC’s headquarters and component headquarter staffs.xii JP 3-13
  • 14. Executive SummarySubordinate joint force Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of jointcommanders. operations. Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of relationship with the parent joint force IO staff as the Service and functional components. Subordinate JFC staffs may become involved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree, to include making recommendations for employment of specific capabilities, particularly if most of the capability needed for a certain operation resides in that subordinate joint task force.Organizing for joint IO. Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for IO to the J-3. When authorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating, integrating, and assessing joint force IO. The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executing joint IO responsibilities. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integrated and synchronized in all planning processes of the combatant command staff and that IO aspects of such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs. To integrate and synchronize the core capabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and appropriate staff functions, the IO cell chief normally leads an “IO cell” or similarly named group as an integrated part of the staff’s operational planning group or equivalent. The organizational relationships between the joint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance. Planning and CoordinationIO planning follows the The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplishsame principles and JFC objectives. Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate,processes established for negate, or harm other JFC military operations, as well as other USjoint operation planning. Government (USG) information activities. JFCs must ensure IO planners are fully integrated into the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the joint targeting coordination board in order to ensure full integration with all other planning and execution efforts. Other USG and/or coalition/allied information activities, when uncoordinated, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective. Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JFC IO staff planning, coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts in theAOR to effectively synergize and integrate IO capabilities.Planning considerations. IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC’s campaign or operations planning and must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IO are used in all phases of a campaign or xiii
  • 15. Executive Summary operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influence the amount of effort required for the remaining phases. The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to preclude other conflicts, requires an ability to integrate IO capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy through the establishment of information objectives that in turn are integrated into and support the JFC’s overall mission objectives. The combatant commander’s theater security cooperation plan serves as an excellent platform to embed specific long-term information objectives IO planning requires early and detailed preparation. Many IO capabilities require long lead-time intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IO support for IPB development differs from traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time and may have expanded collection, production, and dissemination requirements. Consequently, combatant commanders must ensure that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and requests for information (RFIs). As part of the planning process, designation of release and execution authority is required. Release authority provides the approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation of specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority. Execution authority is described as the authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and/or place. Normally, the JFC is the one execution authority designated in the execute order for an operation. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiring careful review and national-level coordination and approval.Commander’s intent and The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begininformation operations. before the specific planning is initiated. A commander that expects to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO related PIRs and RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis, in order for the intelligence products to be ready in time to support operations. At a minimum, the commander’s vision for IO should be included in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO as part of their overall concept, but may elect to provide it separately.xiv JP 3-13
  • 16. Executive SummaryMeasures of performance Measures of performance (MOPs) gauge accomplishment of IOand measures of tasks and actions. Measures of effectiveness (MOEs) determineeffectiveness. whether IO actions being executed are having the desired effect toward mission accomplishment: the attainment of end states and objectives. MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace results. IO MOPs and MOEs are crafted and refined throughout the planning process. Multinational Considerations in Information OperationsEvery ally/coalition Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts andmember can contribute to some have thorough and sophisticated doctrine, procedures, andIO by providing regional capabilities for planning and conducting IO. The multinationalexpertise to assist in force commander is responsible to resolve potential conflictsplanning and conducting between each nation’s IO programs and the IO objectives andIO. programs of the coalition. It is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into IO planning as early as possible so that an integrated and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning process. Integration requirements include clarification of allied and coalition partner’s IO objectives; understanding of other nations’ information operations and how they intend to conduct IO; establishment of liaison/deconfliction procedures to ensure coherence; and early identification of multinational force vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures to adversary attempts to exploit them. Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and ExperimentsA solid foundation of The development of IO as a core military competency and criticaleducation and training is component to joint operations requires specific expertise andessential to the capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highest professionaldevelopment of IO core levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competenciescompetencies. that are the capstone to American military power. The Services, United States Special Operations Command, and other agencies develop capabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law, policy, and lessons learned. At each level of command, a solid foundation of education and training is essential to the development of a core competency. Professional education and training, in turn, are dependent on the accumulation, documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations, exercises, and experimentation. xv
  • 17. Executive SummaryIO education The IO career force should consist of both capability specialistsconsiderations. (EW, PSYOP, CNO, MILDEC, and OPSEC) and IO planners. Both groups require an understanding of the information environment, the role of IO in military affairs, how IO differs from other information functions that contribute to information superiority, and specific knowledge of each of the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO into joint operations. IO planners are required at both the component and the joint level. Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive level knowledge of the information environment and the role of IO in supporting DOD missions.IO training Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine toconsiderations. prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions. IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent with the joint assignment process. Joint IO training focuses on joint planning-specific skills, methodologies and tools, and assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training. The Services determine applicable career training requirements for both their IO career personnel and general military populations, based on identified joint force mission requirements. CONCLUSION This document provides the doctrinal principles for DOD employment of IO. It has been designed to provide overarching guidance in the planning and execution of IO in today’s joint/ multinational security environment. It’s primary purpose is to ensure all of the capabilities comprising IO are effectively coordinated and integrated into our nation’s warfighting capability against current and future threats.xvi JP 3-13
  • 18. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION “The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.” Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress 1 December 18621. Introduction Information operations (IO) are integral to the successful execution of military operations.A key goal of IO is to achieve and maintain information superiority for the US and its allies.Information superiority provides the joint force a competitive advantage only when it is effectivelytranslated into superior decisions. IO are described as the integrated employment of electronicwarfare (EW), computer network operations (CNO), psychological operations (PSYOP), militarydeception (MILDEC), and operations security (OPSEC), in concert with specified supportingand related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automateddecision making while protecting our own. The purpose of this doctrine is to provide joint forcecommanders (JFCs) and their staffs guidance to help prepare, plan, execute, and assess IO insupport of joint operations. To apply IO across the range of military operations, the JFC integrateshis military actions, forces, and capabilities throughout the domains (air, land, sea, and space) ofthe operating environment in order to create and/or sustain desired and measurable effects onadversary leaders, forces (regular or irregular), information, information systems, and otheraudiences; while protecting and defending the JFC’s own forces actions, information, andinformation systems. The commander assesses the nature of the mission and develops the intentfor IO in all phases of an operation or campaign.2. The Information Environment a. The information environment is the aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systemsthat collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. The actors include leaders, decision makers,individuals, and organizations. Resources include the materials and systems employed to collect,analyze, apply, or disseminate information. The information environment is where humans andautomated systems observe, orient, decide, and act upon information, and is therefore the principalenvironment of decision making. Even though the information environment is considered distinct,it resides within each of the four domains. The information environment is made up of threeinterrelated dimensions: physical, informational, and cognitive (see Figure I-1). (1) The Physical Dimension. The physical dimension is composed of the commandand control (C2) systems, and supporting infrastructures that enable individuals and organizationsto conduct operations across the air, land, sea, and space domains. It is also the dimension wherephysical platforms and the communications networks that connect them reside. This includesthe means of transmission, infrastructure, technologies, groups, and populations. Comparatively,the elements of this dimension are the easiest to measure, and consequently, combat power hastraditionally been measured primarily in this dimension. I-1
  • 19. Chapter I THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT Where the information environment overlaps with the physical world Information systems and networks Physical Key characteristics: computers and Dimension communications systems, and supporting infrastructures Where information is collected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected Informational Dual nature - information itself and the medium Links physical and cognitive dimensions Dimension Key characteristics: information content and flow, information quality Where automated decision making takes place Where human decision making takes place Dimension of intangibles such as morale, unit Cognitive cohesion, public opinion, situational awareness Dimension Key characteristics: perceptions, emotions, awareness, and understanding Figure I-1. The Information Environment (2) The Informational Dimension. The informational dimension is where information iscollected, processed, stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected. It is the dimension where the C2of modern military forces is communicated, and where commander’s intent is conveyed. It consists ofthe content and flow of information. Consequently, it is the informational dimension that must beprotected. (3) The Cognitive Dimension. The cognitive dimension encompasses the mind ofthe decision maker and the target audience (TA). This is the dimension in which people think,perceive, visualize, and decide. It is the most important of the three dimensions. This dimensionis also affected by a commander’s orders, training, and other personal motivations. Battles andcampaigns can be lost in the cognitive dimension. Factors such as leadership, morale, unitcohesion, emotion, state of mind, level of training, experience, situational awareness, as well aspublic opinion, perceptions, media, public information, and rumors influence this dimension. b. Advancements in technology have enabled information to be collected, processed,stored, disseminated, displayed, and protected outside the cognitive process in quantitiesand at speeds that were previously incomprehensible. While technology makes great quantitiesof information available to audiences worldwide, perception-affecting factors provide the contextwhich individuals use to translate data into information and knowledge.I-2 JP 3-13
  • 20. Introduction c. There are criteria that define the quality of information relative to its purpose. Informationquality criteria are shown in Figure I-2. The varying purposes of information require different applicationsof these criteria to qualify it as valuable. Additionally, each decision relies on a different weighting of theinformation quality criteria to make the best decision. d. The finite amount of time and resources available to obtain information must beconsidered. Whether decisions are made cognitively or pre-programmed in automated systems,the limited time and resources to improve the quality of available information leaves decisionmaking subject to manipulation. Additionally, there are real costs associated with obtainingquality information — that is, information well-suited to its purpose —such as those to acquire,process, store, transport, and distribute information. The overall impact of successful IO improvesthe quality of friendly information while degrading the quality of adversary information, thus,providing friendly forces the ability to make faster, more accurate decisions. Quality criteria areshown in Figure I-2.3. Military Operations and the Information Environment a. Information is a strategic resource vital to national security. Dominance of theinformation environment is a reality that extends to the Armed Forces of the US at all levels.Military operations, in particular, are dependent on many simultaneous and integrated activitiesthat, in turn, depend on information, and information systems, which must be protected. INFORMATION QUALITY CRITERIA ACCURACY Information that conveys the true situation RELEVANCE Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand TIMELINESS Information that is available in time to make decisions USABILITY Information that is in common, easily understood format and displays COMPLETENESS Information that provides the decision maker with all necessary data BREVITY Information that has only the level of detail required SECURITY Information that has been afforded adequate protection where required Figure I-2. Information Quality Criteria I-3
  • 21. Chapter I b. In modern military operations, commanders face a variety of information challenges.Technical challenges include establishing and maintaining connectivity, particularly in austere and distributedlocations. Operational challenges include the complexities of modern combat against adversaries withgrowing information capabilities. For example, regardless of their size, adversaries, including terroristgroups, can counter US efforts through propaganda campaigns, or develop, purchase, or downloadfrom the Internet tools and techniques enabling them to attack US information and information systemswhich may result in tangible impacts on US diplomatic, economic, or military efforts. The global informationenvironment and its associated technologies is potentially available to everyone and as a result, USmilitary commanders face another challenge. Our adversaries now have the capability to pass information,coordinate, exchange ideas, and synchronize their actions instantaneously. c. The commander visualizes, plans, and directs operations — IO are a part of thoseoperations. The commander’s intent should specify a visualization of the desired effects to beachieved with IO and other operations for the staff to develop IO objectives. The commandermust not only be able to visualize the desired effects to be achieved with IO but also understandthe adversary’s capabilities to limit the impact of US operations while the adversary strives toacquire information superiority from the US. These effects can vary based on the objectives ofthe mission, ranging from disrupting an enemy commander in combat to assuring friendly nationsthrough combined/multinational military training/exercises during peacetime. The role of themilitary and the desired end state or effect, is dependent on the nature of the conflict. If conductinga humanitarian assistance mission, then generating goodwill for the services rendered anddeparting with a favorable impression of US activities becomes a primary objective. Thecommander’s intent must include the concept of how these effects will help achieve forceobjectives. d. Military forces operate in an information environment of constantly changingcontent and tempo. This evolution adds another layer of complexity to the challenge of planningand executing military operations at a specific time and in a specific location. A continuum oflong-, medium-, and short-term factors shape the information environment for which militaryoperations are planned and in which such operations are executed. Commanders and IO cellchiefs must be prepared to adapt or modify IO plans to meet their desired IO effects. (1) Long-term factors which may shape the information environment include thevarious ways by which humans: (a) Organize (nation states, tribes, families, etc.). (b) Govern. (c) Interact as groups (culture, sociology, religion, etc.). (d) Are regionally influenced (stability, alliances, economic relationships, etc.). (e) Are technologically advanced.I-4 JP 3-13
  • 22. Introduction (2) Medium-term factors may include the rise and fall of leaders, competition between groupsover resources or goals, incorporation of specific technologies into information infrastructure; and theemployment of resources by organizations to take advantage of information technology and infrastructure. (3) Short-term factors may include weather; availability of finite resources to supportor employ specific information technologies (ITs); and ability to extend/maintain sensors andportable information infrastructure to the specific location of distant military operations. e. The pervasiveness of the information environment in human activity combined with thespeed and processing power of modern IT enhances and complicates military efforts to organize,train, equip, plan, and operate. Today, technology has opened the way to an ever-increasingspan of control. f. US forces perform their missions in an increasingly complex informationenvironment. To succeed, it is necessary for US forces to gain and maintain informationsuperiority. In Department of Defense (DOD) policy, information superiority is described as theoperational advantage gained by the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterruptedflow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (1) The forces possessing better information and using that information to moreeffectively gain understanding have a major advantage over their adversaries. A commanderwho gains this advantage can use it to accomplish missions by affecting perceptions, attitudes,decisions, and actions. However, information superiority is not static; during operations, allsides continually attempt to secure their own advantages and deny useful information toadversaries. The operational advantages of information superiority can take several forms,ranging from the ability to create a common operational picture to the ability to delay an adversary’sdecision to commit reinforcements. (2) Recognizing information superiority can be difficult to attain over certain adversaries, butits advantages are significant. When it exists, the information available to commanders allows them toaccurately visualize the situation, anticipate events, and make appropriate, timely decisions more effectivelythan adversary decision makers. In essence, information superiority enhances commanders’ freedom ofaction and allows them to execute decisions, and maintain the initiative, while remaining inside theadversary’s decision cycle. However, commanders recognize that without continuous IO designed toachieve and maintain information superiority, adversaries may counter those advantages and possiblyattain information superiority themselves. Commanders can achieve information superiority by maintainingaccurate situational understanding while controlling or affecting the adversaries’ or TAs’ perceptions.The more a commander can shape this disparity, the greater the friendly advantage. g. Potential information adversaries come in many shapes: traditionally hostile countries who wishto gain information on US military capabilities and intentions; malicious hackers who wish to steal fromor harm the US Government (USG) or military; terrorists; and economic competitors, just to name afew. Potential adversarial information attack techniques are numerous. Some, particularly electronicmeans, can be prevented by the consistent application of encryption, firewalls, and other networksecurity techniques. Others are considerably more difficult to counter. Possible threat information I-5
  • 23. Chapter Itechniques include, but are not limited to, deception, electronic attack (EA), computer network attack(CNA), propaganda and psychological operations, and supporting signals intelligence (SIGINT)operations. h. With the free flow of information present in all theaters, such as television, phone, and Internet,conflicting messages can quickly emerge to defeat the intended effects. As a result, continuoussynchronization and coordination between IO, public affairs (PA), public diplomacy (PD), and our alliesis imperative, and will help ensure that information themes employed during operations involving neutralor friendly populations remain consistent. i. Legal Considerations in IO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiringcareful review. Beyond strict compliance with legalities, US military activities in the informationenvironment as in the physical domains, are conducted as a matter of policy and societal valueson a basis of respect for fundamental human rights. US forces, whether operating physicallyfrom bases or locations overseas or from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, arerequired by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the law of armed conflict(LOAC).4. Principles of Information Operations a. Success in military operations depends on collecting and integrating essential informationwhile denying it to the adversary and other TAs. IO encompass planning, coordination, andsynchronization of the employment of current capabilities to deliberately affect or defend theinformation environment to achieve the commander’s objectives. Figure I-3 describes how IOis integrated into joint operations. (1) Core capabilities (EW, CNO, PSYOP, MILDEC, and OPSEC) are integratedinto the planning and execution of operations in the information environment. (2) Supporting IO capabilities (information assurance [IA], physical security, physicalattack, counterintelligence [CI], and combat camera [COMCAM]) have military purposes otherthan IO but either operate in the information environment or have impact on the informationenvironment. (3) Related IO capabilities (PA, civil-military operations [CMO], and defense supportto public diplomacy [DSPD]) may be constrained by US policy or legal considerations. Whilethese capabilities have common interfaces with IO, their primary purposes and rules make themseparate and distinct. As a result, it is essential that commanders and their staffs coordinate theirefforts when exercising their functions within the information environment. b. IO are primarily concerned with affecting decisions and decision-making processes,while at the same time defending friendly decision-making processes. Primary mechanismsused to affect the information environment include: influence, disruption, corruption, or usurpation.I-6 JP 3-13
  • 24. INFORMATION OPERATIONS INTEGRATION INTO JOINT OPERATIONS (NOTIONAL) Core, Supporting, Audience/ Information Primary Planning/ Related Information Activities Objective Who does it? Activities Target Quality Integration Process Electronic Attack Physical, Destroy, Disrupt, Delay Usability Joint Operation Planning and Individuals, Governments, Electronic Warfare Informational Execution System (JOPES)/ Militaries Targeting Process Electronic Protection Physical Protect the Use of Electro- Security JOPES/Defense Planning Individuals, Businesses, magnetic Spectrum Governments, Militaries Electronic Warfare Physical Identify and Locate Usability Joint Intelligence Preparation of Militaries Support Threats the Battlespace(JIPB)/SIGINT Collection Computer Network Computer Network Physical, Destroy, Disrupt, Delay Security JIPB/JOPES/Targeting Process Individuals, Governments, Operations Attack Informational Militaries Computer Network Physical, Protect Computer Security JOPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis Individuals, Businesses, Defense Informational Networks Governments, Militaries Computer Network Informational Gain Information From Security JIPB/Targeting Process Individuals, Governments, Exploitation and About Computers Militaries and Computer Networks Psychological Psychological Cognitive Influence Relevance JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Operations Operations Militaries Military Deception Military Deception Cognitive Mislead Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Militaries Operations Security Operations Security Cognitive Deny Security JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Militaries Supporting Information Informational Protect Information and Security JOPES/J-6 Vulnerability Analysis Businesses, Governments, Capabilities Assurance Informatin Systems Militaries Physical Security Physical Secure Information and Usability JOPES/Defense Planning Businesses, Governments, Information Infrastructure Militaries Physical Attack Physical Destroy, Disrupt Usability JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Counterintelligence Cognitive Mislead Accuracy JIPB/Human Intelligence Collection Governments, Militaries Combat Camera Physical Inform/Document Usability, JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Accuracy Related Civil Military Cognitive Influence Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Governments, Militaries Capabilities Operations Public Affairs Cognitive Inform Accuracy JOPES/Joint Operation Planning Businesses, Governments, Militaries Public Diplomacy Cognitive Inform Accuracy Interagency Coordination Governments Figure I-3. Information Operations Integration into Joint Operations (Notional)I-7 Introduction
  • 25. Chapter I c. IO’s ability to affect and defend decision making is based on five fundamentalassumptions. Although each of these assumptions is an important enabling factor for IO, theywill not all necessarily be true for every operation. For any specific operation where one or more ofthese assumptions are not met, the risk assessment provided to the commander would be adjustedaccordingly. (1) Generally, the quality of information that is considered valuable to human andautomated decision makers is universal. However, the relative importance of each quality criterionof information (Figure I-2) may vary based on the influences of geography, language, culture,religion, organization, experience, or personality. (2) Decisions are made based on the information available at the time. (3) It is possible, with finite resources, to understand the relevant aspects of the informationenvironment to include the processes decision makers use to make decisions. (4) It is possible to affect the information environment in which specific decisionmakers act through psychological, electronic, or physical means. (5) It is possible to measure the effectiveness of IO actions in relation to an operationalobjective. d. Since human activity takes place in the information environment, it is potentially subjectto IO. However, only mission-related critical psychological, electronic, and physical pointsin the information environment should be targeted, directly or indirectly, by IO. Theplanning methodologies used to identify and prioritize such points in planning IO are discussedin Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.” e. IO capabilities can produce effects and achieve objectives at all levels of war andacross the range of military operations. The nature of the modern information environmentcomplicates the identification of the boundaries between these levels. Therefore, at all levels,information activities, including IO must be consistent with broader national securitypolicy and strategic objectives. f. Because IO are conducted across the range of military operations, and can make significantcontributions before major operations commence, the IO environment should be prepared and assessedthrough a variety of engagement and intelligence activities, all designed to make IO more effective. Inaddition to impacting the environment prior to the onset of military operations, IO are essential to post-combat operations. Therefore, integration, planning, employment, and assessment of core, supporting,and related IO are vital to ensuring a rapid transition to a peaceful environment. g. The ultimate strategic objective of IO is to deter a potential or actual adversary orother TA from taking actions that threaten US national interests. Additionally, IO actionsexecuted through civilian controlled portions of the global information environment, or whichmay cause unintended reactions from US or foreign populaces, must account for US policy andI-8 JP 3-13
  • 26. Introductionlegal issues, as well as potentially disruptive infrastructure issues, through civil-military coordination at alllevels. (1) IO may target human decision making or automated decision support systemswith specific actions. Technology allows automated decision making to be targeted withincreasing precision and affords more sophisticated ways to protect it. However, targetingautomated decision making, at any level, is only as effective as the human adversary’sreliance on such decisions. (2) The focus of IO is on the decision maker and the information environment in orderto affect decision making and thinking processes, knowledge, and understanding of the situation.IO can affect data, information, and knowledge in three basic ways: (a) By taking specific psychological, electronic, or physical actions that add,modify, or remove information from the environment of various individuals or groups of decisionmakers. (b) By taking actions to affect the infrastructure that collects, communicates,processes, and/or stores information in support of targeted decision makers. (c) By influencing the way people receive, process, interpret, and use data,information, and knowledge. h. All IO capabilities may be employed in both offensive and defensive operations.Commanders use IO capabilities in both offensive and defensive operations simultaneously toaccomplish the mission, increase their force effectiveness, and protect their organizations andsystems. Fully integrating IO capabilities for offensive and defensive operations requires plannersto treat IO as a single function. Commanders can use IO capabilities to accomplish the following: (1) Destroy. To damage a system or entity so badly that it cannot perform any functionor be restored to a usable condition without being entirely rebuilt. (2) Disrupt. To break or interrupt the flow of information. (3) Degrade. To reduce the effectiveness or efficiency of adversary C2 orcommunications systems, and information collection efforts or means. IO can also degrade themorale of a unit, reduce the target’s worth or value, or reduce the quality of adversary decisionsand actions. (4) Deny. To prevent the adversary from accessing and using critical information,systems, and services. (5) Deceive. To cause a person to believe what is not true. MILDEC seeks to misleadadversary decision makers by manipulating their perception of reality. I-9
  • 27. Chapter I (6) Exploit. To gain access to adversary C2 systems to collect information or to plant falseor misleading information. (7) Influence. To cause others to behave in a manner favorable to US forces. (8) Protect. To take action to guard against espionage or capture of sensitive equipmentand information. (9) Detect. To discover or discern the existence, presence, or fact of an intrusion intoinformation systems. (10) Restore. To bring information and information systems back to their originalstate. (11) Respond. To react quickly to an adversary’s or others’ IO attack or intrusion.5. Strategic Communication a. Strategic Communication constitutes focused USG efforts to understand and engage keyaudiences in order to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USGinterests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages,and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power. b. DOD efforts must be part of a government-wide approach to develop and implement a morerobust strategic communication capability. DOD must also support and participate in USG strategiccommunication activities to understand, inform, and influence relevant foreign audiences to include:DOD’s transition to and from hostilities, security, military forward presence, and stability operations.This is primarily accomplished through its PA, DSPD, and IO capabilities. c. DOD PA, DSPD, and IO are distinct functions that can support strategic communication.Synchronization of strategic communication-related PA, IO, and DSPD activities is essential foreffective strategic communication. d. Combatant commanders should ensure planning for IO, PA, and DSPD are consistentwith overall USG strategic communication objectives and are approved by the Office of theSecretary of Defense (OSD). Combatant commanders should integrate an information strategyinto planning for peacetime and contingency situations. Combatant commanders plan, execute,and assess PA, DSPD, and IO activities to implement theater security cooperation plans (TSCPs),to support US embassies’ information programs, and to support other agencies’ public diplomacyand PA programs directly supporting DOD missions.6. Importance of Information Operations in Military Operations a. History indicates that the speed and accuracy of information available to militarycommanders is the significant factor in determining the outcome on the battlefield. IO enablesI-10 JP 3-13
  • 28. Introductionthe accuracy and timeliness of information required by US military commanders by defending oursystems from exploitation by adversaries. IO are used to deny adversaries access to their C2 informationand other supporting automated infrastructures. b. Adversaries are increasingly exploring and testing IO actions as asymmetric warfare that can beused to thwart US military objectives that are heavily reliant on information systems. This requires theUS military to employ defensive technologies and utilize leading-edge tactics and procedures to preventour forces and systems from being successfully attacked. I-11
  • 29. Chapter I Intentionally BlankI-12 JP 3-13
  • 30. CHAPTER II CORE, SUPPORTING, AND RELATED INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES “The instruments of battle are valuable only if one knows how to use them.” Charles Ardant du Picq 1821 - 18701. Introduction IO coordinates and synchronizes the employment of the five core capabilities in support of thecombatant commander’s objectives or to prevent the adversary from achieving his desired objectives.The core capabilities are: PSYOP, MILDEC, OPSEC, EW, and CNO. There are five supportingcapabilities: IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, and COMCAM, and three related capabilities:PA, CMO, and DSPD. Together these capabilities enable the commander to affect and influence asituation. However, the potential for conflict between interrelated capabilities requires their employmentbe coordinated, integrated, and synchronized.2. Core Information Operations Capabilities a. Of the five core IO capabilities, PSYOP, OPSEC, and MILDEC have played a majorpart in military operations for many centuries. In this modern age, they have been joined first byEW and most recently by CNO. Together these five capabilities, used in conjunction withsupporting and related capabilities, provide the JFC with the principal means of influencing anadversary and other TAs by enabling the joint forces freedom of operation in the informationenvironment. b. Psychological Operations (1) PSYOP are planned operations to convey selected truthful information and indicators toforeign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behaviorof their governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of PSYOP is to induce orreinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. PSYOP are a vital partof the broad range of US activities to influence foreign audiences and are the only DOD operationsauthorized to influence foreign TAs directly through the use of radio, print, and other media. PSYOPpersonnel advise the supported commander on methods to capitalize on the psychological impacts ofevery aspect of force employment, and how to develop a strategy for developing and planning thedissemination of specific PSYOP programs, to achieve the overall campaign objectives. During a crisis,a PSYOP assessment team (POAT) deploys at the request of the supported commander. A POAT isa small, tailored team of PSYOP planners, product distribution/dissemination, and logistics specialists.The POAT assesses the situation, develops PSYOP objectives, and recommends the appropriate levelof support to accomplish the mission. A POAT can augment a unified command or joint task force(JTF) staff and provide PSYOP planning support. The senior PSYOP officer in the operational area,normally the joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF) commander, may also serve as the defacto joint force PSYOP officer. Working through the various component operations staffs, the joint II-1
  • 31. Chapter IIforce PSYOP officer ensures continuity of psychological objectives and identifies themes to stress andavoid. (2) PSYOP as an IO Core Capability. PSYOP has a central role in the achievement of IOobjectives in support of the JFC. In today’s information environment even PSYOP conducted at thetactical level can have strategic effects. Therefore, PSYOP has an approval process that must beunderstood and the necessity for timely decisions is fundamental to effective PSYOP and IO. This isparticularly important in the early stages of an operation given the time it takes to develop, design,produce, distribute, disseminate, and evaluate PSYOP products and actions. All PSYOP are conductedunder the authority of interagency-coordinated and OSD approved PSYOP programs. The PSYOPprogram approval process at the national level requires time for sufficient coordination and resolution ofissues; hence, JFCs should begin PSYOP planning as early as possible to ensure the execution ofPSYOP in support of operations. A JFC must have an approved PSYOP program, execution authority,and delegation of product approval authority before PSYOP execution can begin. JFCs should requestPSYOP planners immediately during the initial crisis stages to ensure the JFC has plenty of lead time toobtain the proper authority to execute PSYOP. PSYOP assets may be of particular value to the JFC inpre-/post-combat operations when other means of influence are restrained or not authorized. PSYOPmust be coordinated with CI, MILDEC, and OPSEC to ensure deconfliction and control, CI operationsare not compromised, and that all capabilities within IO are coordinated to achieve the objectivesestablished in planning. There must be close cooperation and coordination between PSYOP and PAstaffs in order to maintain credibility with their respective audiences, which is the purpose of the IO cell.PSYOP efforts are most effective when personnel with a thorough understanding of the language andculture of the TA are included in the review of PSYOP materials and messages. As the informationenvironment evolves, the dissemination of PSYOP products is expanding from traditional print andbroadcast to more sophisticated use of the Internet, facsimile messaging, text messaging, and otheremerging media. The effectiveness of PSYOP is enhanced by the synchronization and coordination ofthe core, supporting, and related capabilities of IO; particularly PA, MILDEC, CNO, CMO, and EW.For more discussion on PSYOP, see Joint Publication (JP) 3-53, Joint Doctrine for PsychologicalOperations. c. Military Deception (1) MILDEC is described as being those actions executed to deliberately mislead adversarydecision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversaryto take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces’mission. MILDEC and OPSEC are complementary activities — MILDEC seeks to encourage incorrectanalysis, causing the adversary to arrive at specific false deductions, while OPSEC seeks to deny realinformation to an adversary, and prevent correct deduction of friendly plans. To be effective, a MILDECoperation must be susceptible to adversary collection systems and “seen” as credible to the enemycommander and staff. A plausible approach to MILDEC planning is to employ a friendly course ofaction (COA) that can be executed by friendly forces and that adversary intelligence can verify. However,MILDEC planners must not fall into the trap of ascribing to the adversary particular attitudes, values,and reactions that “mirror image” likely friendly actions in the same situation, i.e., assuming that theadversary will respond or act in a particular manner based on how we would respond. There areII-2 JP 3-13
  • 32. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesalways competing priorities for the resources required for deception and the resources required for thereal operation. For this reason, the deception plan should be developed concurrently with the real plan,starting with the commander’s and staff’s initial estimate, to ensure proper resourcing of both. Toencourage incorrect analysis by the adversary, it is usually more efficient and effective to provide a falsepurpose for real activity than to create false activity. OPSEC of the deception plan is at least asimportant as OPSEC of the real plan, since compromise of the deception may expose the real plan.This requirement for close hold planning while ensuring detailed coordination is the greatest challenge toMILDEC planners. On joint staffs, MILDEC planning and oversight responsibility is normally organizedas a staff deception element in the operations directorate of a joint staff (J-3). (2) MILDEC as an IO Core Capability. MILDEC is fundamental to successful IO. Itexploits the adversary’s information systems, processes, and capabilities. MILDEC relies uponunderstanding how the adversary commander and supporting staff think and plan and how both useinformation management to support their efforts. This requires a high degree of coordination with allelements of friendly forces’ activities in the information environment as well as with physical activities.Each of the core, supporting, and related capabilities has a part to play in the development of successfulMILDEC and in maintaining its credibility over time. While PA should not be involved in the provisionof false information, it must be aware of the intent and purpose of MILDEC in order not to inadvertentlycompromise it.For more discussion on MILDEC, see JP 3-58, Military Deception. d. Operations Security (1) OPSEC is a process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzingfriendly actions and other activities to: identify what friendly information is necessary for theadversary to have sufficiently accurate knowledge of friendly forces and intentions; deny adversarydecision makers critical information about friendly forces and intentions; and cause adversarydecision makers to misjudge the relevance of known critical friendly information because otherinformation about friendly forces and intentions remain secure. On joint staffs, responsibilitiesfor OPSEC are normally delegated to the J-3. A designated OPSEC program manager supervisesother members of the command-assigned OPSEC duties and oversees the coordination,development, and implementation of OPSEC as an integrated part of IO in the operational area. (2) OPSEC as an IO Core Capability. OPSEC denies the adversary the informationneeded to correctly assess friendly capabilities and intentions. In particular, OPSEC complementsMILDEC by denying an adversary information required to both assess a real plan and to disprovea deception plan. For those IO capabilities that exploit new opportunities and vulnerabilities,such as EW and CNO, OPSEC is essential to ensure friendly capabilities are not compromised.The process of identifying essential elements of friendly information and taking measures tomask them from disclosure to adversaries is only one part of a defense-in-depth approach tosecuring friendly information. To be effective, other types of security must complement OPSEC. Examplesof other types of security include physical security, IA programs, computer network defense (CND),and personnel programs that screen personnel and limit authorized access. II-3
  • 33. Chapter IIFor more discussion on OPSEC, see JP 3-54, Operations Security. e. Electronic Warfare (1) EW refers to any military action involving the use of electromagnetic (EM) anddirected energy to control the EM spectrum or to attack the adversary. EW includes three majorsubdivisions: EA, electronic protection (EP), and electronic warfare support (ES). EA involvesthe use of EM energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, orequipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying adversary combat capability.EP ensures the friendly use of the EM spectrum. ES consists of actions tasked by, or under directcontrol of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localizesources of intentional and unintentional radiated EM energy for the purpose of immediate threatrecognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. ES provides informationrequired for decisions involving EW operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance,targeting, and homing. ES data can be used to produce SIGINT, provide targeting for electronicor other forms of attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT). SIGINTand MASINT can also provide battle damage assessment (BDA) and feedback on the effectivenessof the overall operational plan. (2) EW as an IO Core Capability. EW contributes to the success of IO by using offensiveand defensive tactics and techniques in a variety of combinations to shape, disrupt, and exploit adversarialuse of the EM spectrum while protecting friendly freedom of action in that spectrum. Expanding relianceon the EM spectrum for informational purposes increases both the potential and the challenges of EWin IO. The increasing prevalence of wireless telephone and computer usage extends both the utility andthreat of EW, offering opportunities to exploit an adversary’s electronic vulnerabilities and a requirementto identify and protect our own from similar exploitation. As the use of the EM spectrum has becomeuniversal in military operations, so has EW become involved in all aspects of IO. All of the core,supporting, and related IO capabilities either directly use EW or indirectly benefit from EW. In order tocoordinate and deconflict EW, and more broadly all military usage of the EM spectrum, an electronicwarfare coordination cell (EWCC) should be established by the JFC to reside with the componentcommander most appropriate to the operation. In addition, all joint operations require a joint restrictedfrequency list (JRFL). This list specifies protected, guarded, and taboo frequencies that should notnormally be disrupted without prior coordination and planning, either because of friendly use or friendlyexploitation. This is maintained and promulgated by the communications system directorate of a jointstaff (J-6) in coordination with J-3 and the joint commander’s electronic warfare staff (or EWCC, ifdelegated).For more discussion on EW, see JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. f. Computer Network Operations (1) CNO is one of the latest capabilities developed in support of military operations. CNOstems from the increasing use of networked computers and supporting IT infrastructure systems bymilitary and civilian organizations. CNO, along with EW, is used to attack, deceive, degrade, disrupt,II-4 JP 3-13
  • 34. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesdeny, exploit, and defend electronic information and infrastructure. For the purpose of military operations,CNO are divided into CNA, CND, and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enablingoperations. CNA consists of actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny,degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers andnetworks themselves. CND involves actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect,monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity within DOD information systems andcomputer networks. CND actions not only protect DOD systems from an external adversary but alsofrom exploitation from within, and are now a necessary function in all military operations. CNE isenabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networksto gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Note that due tothe continued expansion of wireless networking and the integration of computers and radio frequencycommunications, there will be operations and capabilities that blur the line between CNO and EW andthat may require case-by-case determination when EW and CNO are assigned separate release authorities. (2) CNO as an IO Core Capability. The increasing reliance of unsophisticatedmilitaries and terrorist groups on computers and computer networks to pass information to C2forces reinforces the importance of CNO in IO plans and activities. As the capability of computersand the range of their employment broadens, new vulnerabilities and opportunities will continueto develop. This offers both opportunities to attack and exploit an adversary’s computer systemweaknesses and a requirement to identify and protect our own from similar attack or exploitation.The doctrinal use of CNO capabilities in support of IO is discussed further in Appendix A,“Supplemental Guidance,” to this publication. g. Mutual Support Among IO Capabilities. A more detailed description of how the IOcore capabilities mutually support one another is illustrated in the table at Appendix B, “MutualSupport Between Information Operations Core Capabilities.” This shows some of the positiveinterrelationships between the contributors to IO effects. For each positive contribution, there isalso the possibility of negative effects if these capabilities, which all operate in the informationenvironment, are not fully coordinated. The development of effective IO across the range ofmilitary operations depends upon a full understanding of this interrelationship among capabilities.Only then can they be properly and effectively integrated through the processes discussed inChapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”3. Information Operations Supporting Capabilities a. Capabilities supporting IO include IA, physical security, physical attack, CI, andCOMCAM. These are either directly or indirectly involved in the information environment andcontribute to effective IO. They should be integrated and coordinated with the core capabilities, butalso serve other wider purposes. b. Information Assurance (1) IA is defined as measures that protect and defend information and information systemsby ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes II-5
  • 35. Chapter IIproviding for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reactioncapabilities. IA is necessary to gain and maintain information superiority. IA requires a defense-in-depthapproach that integrates the capabilities of people, operations, and technology to establish multilayerand multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission accomplishment. IA must assumethat access can be gained to information and information systems from inside and outside DOD-controllednetworks. In joint organizations, IA is a responsibility of the J-6. (2) IA as a Supporting Capability for IO. IO depends on IA to protect informationand information systems, thereby assuring continuous capability. IA and IO have an operationalrelationship in which IO are concerned with the coordination of military activities in theinformation environment, while IA protects the electronic and automated portions of theinformation environment. IA and all aspects of CNO are interrelated and rely upon each other tobe effective. IO relies on IA to protect infrastructure to ensure its availability to positioninformation for influence purposes and for the delivery of information to the adversary.Conversely, IA relies on IO to provide operational protection with coordinated OPSEC, EP,CND, and CI against adversary IO or intelligence efforts directed against friendly electronicinformation or information systems.For detailed policy guidance, see DOD Directive (DODD) 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA),DOD Instruction (DODI) 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation. Joint policy isestablished in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3401.03, InformationAssurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND) Joint Quarterly Readiness Review(JQRR) Metrics, and CJCSI 6510.01 Series, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer NetworkDefense (CND). c. Physical Security (1) Physical security is that part of security concerned with physical measures designedto safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, anddocuments, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physicalsecurity process includes determining vulnerabilities to known threats, applying appropriatedeterrent, control and denial safeguarding techniques and measures, and responding to changingconditions. (2) Physical Security as a Supporting Capability for IO. Just as IA protects friendlyelectronic information and information systems, physical security protects physical facilitiescontaining information and information systems worldwide. Physical security often contributesto OPSEC, particularly in the case of MILDEC, when compromise of the MILDEC activity couldcompromise the real plan. IO plans may require significant physical security resources and this requirementshould be made clear to the J-3 as early as possible in the planning process.For more discussion on physical security, see JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine forCivil-Military Operations, and in general, JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.II-6 JP 3-13
  • 36. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilities d. Physical Attack (1) The concept of attack is fundamental to military operations. Physical attack disrupts,damages, or destroys adversary targets through destructive power. Physical attack can also beused to create or alter adversary perceptions or drive an adversary to use certain exploitable informationsystems. (2) Physical Attack as a Supporting Capability for IO. Physical attack can beemployed in support of IO as a means of attacking C2 nodes to affect enemy ability to exerciseC2 and of influencing TAs. IO capabilities, for example PSYOP, can be employed in support ofphysical attack to maximize the effect of the attack on the morale of an adversary. The integrationand synchronization of fires with IO through the targeting process is fundamental to creating thenecessary synergy between IO and more traditional maneuver and strike operations. In order toachieve this integration, commanders must be able to define the effects they seek to achieve andstaffs will incorporate these capabilities into the commander’s plan. Specifically, due to the fast-paced conduct of air operations, it is crucial that the planning and execution of both IO and airoperations be conducted concurrently to produce the most effective targeting plan. Considerationsof targeting are discussed in more detail in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.” e. Counterintelligence (1) CI consists of information gathered and activities conducted to protect againstespionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf offoreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, foreign persons, or internationalterrorist activities. The CI programs in joint staffs are a responsibility of the CI and humanintelligence staff element of the intelligence directorate. (2) CI as a Supporting Capability for IO. CI procedures are a critical part of guardingfriendly information and information systems. A robust security program that integrates IA,physical security, CI, and OPSEC with risk management procedures offers the best chance toprotect friendly information and information systems from adversary actions. CNO providesome of the tools needed to conduct CI operations. For the IO planner, CI analysis offers a viewof the adversary’s information-gathering methodology. From this, CI can develop the initialintelligence target opportunities that provide access to the adversary for MILDEC information,PSYOP products, and CNA/CNE actions.For more discussion on CI, see classified JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human IntelligenceSupport to Operations. f. Combat Camera (1) The COMCAM mission is to provide the OSD, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff(CJCS), the Military Departments, the combatant commands, and the JTF with an imagery capability insupport of operational and planning requirements across the range of military operations. COMCAMis responsible for rapid development and dissemination of products that support strategic and operational II-7
  • 37. Chapter IIIO objectives. The COMCAM program belongs to the Defense Visual Information Directorate, whichfalls under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs. When deployed, operational control ofCOMCAM forces can be delegated to any echelon of command at the discretion of the JFC andsubordinate commanders. COMCAM may be coordinated by the IO staff at the JFC, component,and subordinate unit levels. Most large JTF organizations will have a joint COMCAM managementteam assigned to manage COMCAM, and to assist in the movement of imagery. Additionally, there areusually one or more joint or component specific COMCAM teams assigned to the theater. Thesecomponent teams may be assigned to special operations forces (SOF) or other specific units. (2) Combat Camera as a Supporting Capability for IO. COMCAM supports allof the capabilities of IO that use images of US or friendly force operations, whether to influencean adversary or other TAs or support US forces or allies. They provide images for PSYOP,MILDEC, PA, and CMO use, but can also be used for BDA/measures of effectiveness (MOEs)analysis. COMCAM can also provide records of IO actions for subsequent rebuttal proceedings.However, COMCAM imagery must be controlled in order to ensure that OPSEC is maintainedand valuable information is not released to the adversary. The quality and format, includingdigital video/still photography, night and thermal imagery, means that COMCAM products canbe provided to professional news organizations by PA when they are unable to provide their ownimagery.For more discussion on COMCAM, see Field Manual (FM) 3-55.12 / Marine Corps ReferencePublication (MCRP) 3-33.7A / Naval Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures(NTTP) 3-13.12 /Air ForceTactics, Techniques and Procedures (Instruction) (AFTTP [1]) 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques,and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations.4. Information Operations Related Capabilities a. There are three military functions, PA, CMO, and DSPD, specified as related capabilitiesfor IO. These capabilities make significant contributions to IO and must always be coordinatedand integrated with the core and supporting IO capabilities. However, their primary purposeand rules under which they operate must not be compromised by IO. This requires additionalcare and consideration in the planning and conduct of IO. For this reason, the PA and CMOstaffs particularly must work in close coordination with the IO planning staff. b. Public Affairs (1) PA are those public information, command information, and community relationsactivities directed toward both external and internal audiences with interest in DOD. PA isessential for joint forces information superiority, and credible PA operations are necessary tosupport the commander’s mission and maintain essential public liaisons. PA’s principal focus isto inform domestic and international audiences of joint operations to support combatant commandpublic information needs (see Figure II-1). (2) PA as a Related Capability to IO. PA and IO must be coordinated and synchronizedto ensure consistent themes and messages are communicated to avoid credibility losses. As with otherII-8 JP 3-13
  • 38. Core, Supporting, and Related Information Operations Capabilitiesrelated IO capabilities, PA has a role in all aspects of DOD’s missions and functions. Communication ofoperational matters to internal and external audiences is just one part of PA’s function. In performingduties as one of the primary spokesmen, the public affairs officer’s interaction with the IO staff enablesPA activities to be integrated, coordinated, and deconflicted with IO. While intents differ, PA and IOultimately support the dissemination of information, themes, and messages adapted to their audiences.PA contributes to the achievement of military objectives, for instance, by countering adversarymisinformation and disinformation through the publication of accurate information. PA also assistsOPSEC by ensuring that the media are aware of the implications of premature release of information.The embedding of media in combat units offers new opportunities, as well as risks, for the media and themilitary; the PA staff has a key role in establishing embedding ground rules. Many adversaries rely onlimiting their population’s knowledge to remain in power; PA and IO provide ways to get the jointforces’ messages to these populations.For more discussion on PA, see JP 3-61, Public Affairs. c. Civil-Military Operations (1) CMO are the activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploitrelations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizationsand authorities, and the civilian populace. They are conducted across the range of military operations toaddress root causes of instability, assist in reconstruction after conflict or disaster, or may be conducted PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INFORMATION Information shall be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory requirements, unless its release is precluded by national security constraints or valid statutory mandates or exceptions. The “Freedom of Information Act” shall be supported in both letter and spirit. A free flow of general and military information shall be made available, without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed Forces and their dependents. Information shall not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the Government from criticism or embarrassment. Information shall be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect national security, or threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the Armed Forces. The Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) obligation to provide the public with information on DOD major programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination in the DOD and with other Government Agencies. Such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public. Figure II-1. Principles of Public Information II-9
  • 39. Chapter IIindependent of other military operations to support US national security objectives. CMO can occur infriendly, neutral, or hostile operational areas to facilitate military operations and achieve US objectives.CMO may include performance by military forces of activities and functions that are normally theresponsibility of local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, orsubsequent to other military actions. CMO may be performed by designated civil affairs (CA), by othermilitary forces, or by a combination of CA and other forces. Certain types of organizations are particularlysuited to this mission and form the nucleus of CMO. These units are typically CA and PSYOP units.Others, such as, but not limited to, other SOF, engineers, health service support, transportation, militarypolice and security forces, may act as enablers. Personnel skilled in the language and culture of thepopulation are essential to CMO. (2) CMO as a Related Capability to IO. CMO can be particularly effective inpeacetime and pre-/post-combat operations when other capabilities and actions may beconstrained. Early consideration of the civil-military environment in which operations will takeplace is important. As with PA, the CMO staff also has an important role to play in the developmentof broader IO plans and objectives. As the accessibility of information to the widest publicaudiences increases and as military operations increasingly are conducted in open environments,the importance of CMO to the achievement of IO objectives will increase. At the same time thedirect involvement of CMO with core, supporting and related IO capabilities (for instance PSYOP,CNO, and CI) will also increase. CMO, by their nature, usually affect public perceptions in theirimmediate locale. Distribution of information about CMO efforts and results through PA andPSYOP can affect the perceptions of a broader audience and favorably influence key groups orindividuals.For more discussion on CMO, see JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. d. Defense Support to Public Diplomacy (1) DSPD consists of activities and measures taken by DOD components, not solelyin the area of IO, to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the USG. (2) DSPD, PD, and IO. DOD contributes to PD, which includes those overt internationalinformation activities of the USG designed to promote US foreign policy objectives by seeking tounderstand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers and by broadening the dialoguebetween American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. When approved, PSYOPassets may be employed in support of DSPD as part of security cooperation initiatives or in support ofUS embassy PD programs. Much of the operational level IO activity conducted in any theater will bedirectly linked to PD objectives. DSPD requires coordination with both the interagency and amongDOD components.For more discussion on DSPD, see DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO).II-10 JP 3-13
  • 40. CHAPTER III INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS “To understand human decisions and human behavior requires something more than an appreciation of immediate stimuli. It requires, too, a consideration of the totality of forces, material and spiritual, which condition, influence or direct human responses. And because we are dealing with human beings, the forces which helped shape their actions must be recognized as multiple, subtle, and infinitely complex.” David Herlihy, The History of Feudalism1. Introduction Like all other aspects of joint operations, IO requires effective intelligence support. IO isintelligence intensive in particular and therefore successful planning, preparation, execution,and assessment of IO demand detailed and timely intelligence. This chapter briefly discusseshow intelligence supports the planning and execution of IO.2. Intelligence Support to Information Operations Before military activities in the information environment can be planned, the current “state”of the dynamic information environment must be collected, analyzed, and provided to commandersand their staffs. This requires intelligence on relevant portions of the physical, informational,and cognitive properties of the information environment, which necessitates collection and analysisof a wide variety of information and the production of a wide variety of intelligence products asdiscussed below. a. Nature of IO Intelligence Requirements. In order to understand the adversary orother TA decision-making process and determine the appropriate capabilities necessary to achieveoperational objectives, commanders and their staffs must have current data. This includes relevantphysical, informational, and cognitive properties of the information environment as well asassessment of ongoing IO activities. (1) Physical Properties of the Information Environment. Physical properties ofthe information environment include people, places, things, and capabilities of informationinfrastructure and adversary information capabilities. Examples include: (a) Geographic coordinates of adversary information infrastructure andcapabilities. (b) Organization of infrastructure and capabilities as well as identification of criticallinks, nodes, and redundant communication infrastructure. (c) Types, quantity, and configuration of information infrastructure and capabilities(with specific makes, models, and numbers). III-1
  • 41. Chapter III (d) Organizational planning, decision, and execution processes. (e) Enemy intelligence/feedback mechanism for gaining battlespace awareness,information, and knowledge. (f) Enemy computer attack, defense, and exploitation capabilities. (2) Informational Properties of the Information Environment. Informational propertiesof the information environment include those systems and networks where information is created,processed, manipulated, transmitted, and shared. It includes those properties relevant to the electroniccollection, transmission, processing, storage, and display of information. These properties may beelectronic or human-to-human or a combination of both. They describe the formal and informalcommunications infrastructure and networks, kinship and descent relationships, licit and illicit commercialrelationships and social affiliations and contacts that collectively create, process, manipulate, transmit,and share information in an operational area and among TAs. Examples of informational propertiesinclude: (a) Specification, capacity, configuration, and usage of information infrastructureand capabilities. (b) Technical design of information infrastructure. (c) Networks of human-to-human contact used for the transmission of information(couriers, rat-lines, dead-drops, etc.). (d) Social and commercial networks that process and share information andinfluence (kinship and descent linkages, formal and informal social contacts, licit and illicitcommercial affiliations and records of ownership and transactions, etc.). (e) Content and context. (3) Cognitive Properties of the Information Environment. Cognitive propertiesof the information environment are the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other humanattributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation ofinformation by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. Cognitive propertiesmay include: (a) Cultural and societal factors affecting attitudes and perceptions such aslanguage, education, history, religion, myths, personal experience, and family structure. (b) Identity of key individuals and groups affecting attitudes and perceptions,whether in the same or a different country as those they influence. (c) Identity and psychological profile of key decision makers, their advisors, keyassociates, and/or family members who influence them.III-2 JP 3-13
  • 42. Intelligence Support to Information Operations (d) Credibility of key individuals or groups and specification of their sphere of influence. (e) Laws, regulations, and procedures relevant to information and decision making,decision-making processes, capability employment doctrine, timeliness, and information content. (f) How leaders think, perceive, plan, execute, and assess outcomes of their resultsand actions from their perspectives. (g) Identify key historical events between the target country and the US, whichmay affect an individual or group’s attitudes and perceptions of the US, whether in the same ordifferent country as those they influence. (4) While these broad types of properties of the information environment illustrate the diversityof IO intelligence requirements, it is important to note that multiple sources and methods may be requiredto collect physical, informational, and cognitive properties of specific collection targets in order to fuseand analyze different properties in support of IO planning. For instance, if operational planning requiresintelligence on radio stations within an adversary country, that requirement may include the number andlocation of broadcast and transmission facilities (physical), the technical specifications of each station(informational), the identity of owners and key personnel, and the credibility or popularity of each station(cognitive). b. Intelligence Support to IO Planning. Intelligence support is an integral part of IOplanning. In particular, the joint intelligence preparation of the battlespace (JIPB) process providesa valuable methodology for identifying capabilities, vulnerabilities, and critical nodes within theinformation environment. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for JointIntelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, discusses JIPB support to IO. A sequential overviewof intelligence support to IO planning includes actions to: (1) Identify adversary information value, use, flow, and vulnerabilities relevant tospecific types of decision making. (2) Identify individual systems and target sets relevant to specified adversary or otherTA decision making. (3) Identify desired effects appropriate to individual systems and target sets. (4) Predict the consequences (non-objective related outcomes) of identified actions. (5) Coordinate with planning personnel to establish priority of intelligence requirements. (6) Assist in developing IO assessment criteria during planning and then assist inmonitoring and assessing IO during execution (which may extend before and after execution ofconventional operations). (7) Tailor assessment/feedback methodologies to specific operations. III-3
  • 43. Chapter III (8) Evaluate the outcome of executed IO activities/tasks. (9) Provide assessment for IO actions relative to JFC objectives and mission. c. Intelligence Considerations in Planning Information Operations (1) Information Environment Impact on Intelligence Support. The nature of theinformation environment has profound implications for intelligence support to IO. Members ofthe operational community and the intelligence community must understand these implicationsin order to efficiently request and provide quality intelligence support to IO. These implicationsare listed below. (a) Intelligence Resources are Limited. Information collection requirementsare almost limitless, especially for many types of IO. Commanders and their intelligence andoperations directorates must work together to identify IO intelligence requirements and ensurethat they are given high enough priority in the commander’s requests to the intelligence community(IC). (b) Collection Activities are Legally Constrained. The nature of the informationenvironment complicates compliance with legal constraints and restraints. Thus the IC mustimplement technical and procedural methods to ensure compliance with the law. Additionally,intelligence may be supplemented with information legally provided by law enforcement orother sources. Especially in the area of CNO, where the application of different domestic andinternational laws may be unclear, close coordination among the operational, legal, and lawenforcement communities is essential. (c) IO Intelligence Often Requires Long Lead Times. The intelligencenecessary to affect adversary or other TA decisions often requires that specific sources andmethods be positioned and employed over time to collect the necessary information and conductanalyses required for IO planning. Commanders and their staffs, including IO planners, must beaware of the relative lead times required to develop different types of intelligence both for initialplanning and for feedback during operations. To deal with these long lead times, the commandermust provide detailed initial guidance to the staff during the mission analysis and estimateprocesses. (d) The Information Environment is Dynamic. The information environmentchanges over time according to different factors. Physical changes may occur more slowly andmay be easier to detect than informational or cognitive changes. Commanders and their staffsmust understand both the timeliness of the intelligence they receive and the differing potentialsfor change in the dimensions of the information environment. The implication is that we musthave agile intellects, intelligence systems, and organizational processes to exploit this dynamicenvironment.III-4 JP 3-13
  • 44. Intelligence Support to Information Operations (e) Properties of the Information Environment Affect Intelligence. Collection ofphysical and electronic information is objectively measurable by location and quantity. While identificationof key individuals and groups of interest may be a relatively straightforward challenge, the relativeimportance of various individuals and groups, their psychological profiles, and how they interact is noteasily agreed upon nor quantified. Commanders and their staffs must have an appreciation for thesubjective nature of psychological profiles and human nature. They must also continue to pursue effectivemeans of trying to measure subjective elements using MOEs and other applicable techniques. (2) Coordination of Planned IO with Intelligence. Coordination should occur amongintelligence, targeting, IO, and collection management personnel. The requirement for accurateintelligence gain/loss and political/military assessments, when determining targets to attack andmeans of employment, is central to the integration of IO. (3) Foreign Perceptions and Human Factors Analysis. Assessing foreignperceptions is necessary for successful IO activities. Preparing the modern battlespace forsuccessful joint operations relies on a thorough understanding of the information environment,including foreign perceptions, TA analysis, and cultural analysis. Geographic combatantcommanders require IC support to continually assess foreign perceptions of support for theareas of responsibility (AORs) TSCP efforts, along with Joint Operation Planning and ExecutionSystem (JOPES) planning activities. Human factors analysis in conjunction with an understandingof the cultural environment are also important in avoiding projection of US cultural bias on TAs(mirror imaging). Intelligence resources contribute to assessing of foreign populations throughhuman factors analysis, influence net modeling, foreign media analysis, media mapping, polling/focus group analysis, and key communicators/sources of influence analysis. This is, for themost part, open source intelligence and must be interpreted and synthesized by country/culturalintelligence subject matter experts (SMEs). (4) Priority of Effort. The requirement to collect, analyze, and produce detailedintelligence of the granularity required for IO currently exceeds the resources of the IC. Assigningintelligence resources to IO as with all operations is regulated based on established requirementsand processes within the IC. It is imperative that intelligence requirements be coordinated andprioritized at each level of command. d. Sources of Intelligence Support (1) Through the intelligence directorate of a joint staff (J-2), IO planners and supportingjoint organizations have access to intelligence from the national and combatant command-levelintelligence producers and collectors. At the combatant command level, the theater joint intelligencecenter supports IO planning and execution and provides support to JTFs through established jointintelligence support elements. In multinational operations, when appropriate, the J-2 should shareinformation and assessments with allies and coalition partners. (2) The J-2 on each joint staff normally assigns specific J-2 personnel to coordinate with IOplanners and capability specialties through the IO cell or other IO staff organizations established by theJFC. III-5
  • 45. Chapter III Intentionally BlankIII-6 JP 3-13
  • 46. CHAPTER IV RESPONSIBILITIES AND COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS “Good will can make any organization work; conversely the best organization in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it work don’t believe in it.” James Forrestal1. Introduction This chapter describes the JFC’s authority for IO, specific responsibilities established inDODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO), and the Unified Command Plan, commandrelationships between the DOD components responsible for IO, the organization of combatantcommand and JTF staffs for IO, and joint boards, processes, and products related to IO.2. Authorities and Responsibilities a. Authorities. IO in one combatant command AOR may affect other AORs directly orindirectly. To address this complication, the President has given Commander, United StatesStrategic Command (CDRUSSTRATCOM) specific responsibility to coordinate IO (corecapabilities) across combatant command AOR boundaries. b. Responsibilities (1) Responsibilities for IO are established in DODD 3600.1, Information Operations(IO). The commanders of the combatant commands shall integrate, plan, execute, and assess IOwhen conducting campaigns across the range of military operations and shall identify and prioritizeIO requirements. IO shall be integrated into appropriate security cooperation plans and activities. (2) In accordance with change 2 to Unified Command Plan for Fiscal Year ’04CDRUSSTRATCOM integrates and coordinates DOD IO that cross AOR boundaries including: (a) Supporting other combatant commanders for planning. (b) Planning and coordinating capabilities that have trans-regional effects or thatdirectly support national objectives. (c) Exercising C2 of selected missions if directed to do so by the President or theSecretary of Defense (SecDef). (d) Planning, directing, and identifying desired characteristics and capabilitiesfor DOD-wide CND. (e) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities of CNA, conducting CNAin support of assigned missions, and integrating CNA capabilities in support of other combatantcommanders, as directed. IV-1
  • 47. Chapter IV (f) Identifying desired characteristics and capabilities for joint EW and planningfor and conducting EW in support of assigned missions. (g) Supporting other combatant commanders for the planning and integration ofjoint OPSEC and MILDEC.3. Joint Information Operations Organizational Roles and Responsibilities a. Joint Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS’s) responsibilities for IO are bothgeneral (such as those to establish doctrine, provide advice, and make recommendations) and specific(such as those assigned in DOD IO policy). The J-3 serves as the CJCS’s focal point for IO andcoordinates with the other organizations within the Joint Staff that have direct or supporting IOresponsibilities. The IO divisions of the Joint Staff J-3 provide IO specific advice and advocate JointStaff and combatant commands’ IO interests and concerns within DOD and interact with otherorganizations and individuals on behalf of the CJCS. CJCSI 3210.01 Series, Joint InformationOperations Policy, provides specific policy guidance on IO responsibilities and functions of the JointStaff. b. Combatant Commands (1) CDRUSSTRATCOM’s specific authority and responsibility to coordinate IO acrossAOR and functional boundaries does not diminish the imperative for the other combatantcommanders to coordinate, integrate, plan, execute, and employ IO. These efforts may be directedat achieving national or military objectives incorporated in TSCPs, shaping the operationalenvironment for potential employment during periods of heightened tensions, or in support ofspecific military operations. It is entirely possible that in a given theater, the combatant commanderwill be supported for select IO while concurrently supporting United States Strategic Command(USSTRATCOM) IO activities across multiple theater boundaries. As with other aspects ofjoint operations, joint IO should be accomplished through centralized planning and directionand decentralized execution. Joint-level planners should resist the temptation to plan in toogreat a level of detail. Plans that focus on objectives and end states rather than specific actionsimprove flexibility during execution and allow component staffs to develop plan details basedon resource availability, constraints, and other factors. The specifics of planning IO as an integralpart of joint plans are discussed in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.” (2) The Commander, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) shall, in additionto the responsibilities in section 2.b.(1) above, integrate and coordinate DOD PSYOP capabilitiesto enhance interoperability and support USSTRATCOM’s IO responsibilities and other combatantcommanders’ PSYOP planning and execution. USSOCOM shall also employ other SOF IOcapabilities as directed. c. Components. Components are normally responsible for detailed planning and execution ofIO. IO planned and conducted by the components must be conducted within the parameters establishedby the JFC. At the same time, component commanders and their subordinates must be providedsufficient flexibility and authority to respond to local variations in the information environment. ComponentIV-2 JP 3-13
  • 48. Responsibilities and Command Relationshipscommanders determine how their staffs are organized for IO, and normally designate personnel to liaisebetween the JFC’s headquarters and component headquarter staffs. d. Subordinate JFCs. Subordinate JFCs plan and execute IO as an integrated part of jointoperations. Subordinate staffs normally share the same type of relationship with the parent jointforce IO staff as the Service and functional components. Subordinate JFC staffs may becomeinvolved in IO planning and execution to a significant degree, to include makingrecommendations for employment of specific capabilities, particularly if most of the capabilityneeded for a certain operation resides in that subordinate JTF.4. Organizing for Joint Information Operations The principal staffs that may be involved in IO planning are the combatant command,subordinate joint force command(s), and component staffs. a. Combatant Command Organization. Combatant command staffs, supported bythe IC and other DOD combat support agencies and Department of State (DOS) representatives,can call on the expertise of personnel assigned to their component commands to assist in theplanning process. These staffs use the planning process specified by JOPES to carry out planningresponsibilities. The command which is designated the supported command receives guidanceand support from the President and SecDef and can call on the expertise and technical support ofall other designated supporting commands. (1) Combatant commanders normally assign responsibility for IO to the J-3. Whenauthorized, the director of the J-3 has primary staff responsibility for planning, coordinating,integrating, and assessing joint force IO. (2) IO Cell Chief. The J-3 normally designates an IO cell chief to assist in executingjoint IO responsibilities. The IO cell chief is the central point of contact on the combatantcommand staff for IO. The primary function of the IO cell chief is to ensure that IO are integratedand synchronized in all planning processes of the combatant command staff and that IO aspectsof such processes are coordinated with higher, adjacent, subordinate, and multinational staffs.In operational planning, the IO cell chief ensures that the IO portions of JOPES and TSCPproducts reflect the combatant commander’s guidance and are consistent with the operationalprinciples and elements of operational design discussed in JP 3-0, Joint Operations, and ChapterV, “Planning and Coordination,” in this publication. The IO cell chief is normally responsiblefor functions shown in Figure IV-1. (3) IO Staff. The IO cell chief is normally assigned responsibility for supervision of IOactivities for that portion of the J-3 staff designated as IO planners and for coordination with SMEswithin the joint force. The portion of the staff under the cognizance of the IO cell chief is normally givena specific numerical designation such as “J-39.” This staff section assists the IO cell chief and providesIO planning and core capability expertise within the staff and coordinates with other staffs and supportingagencies and organizations. During the execution of an operation, IO planners shall be available to thejoint operations center (JOC) or its equivalent to assist in integration, deconfliction, support, or adjustment IV-3
  • 49. Chapter IV INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL CHIEF FUNCTIONS Coordinating the overall information operations (IO) portion of the plan for the joint force commander (JFC). Coordinating IO issues within the joint staff and with counterpart IO planners on the component staffs. Coordinating IO activities to support the JFC concept of operations. Recommending IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives. Determining the availability of IO resources to carry out IO plans. Recommending tasking to the operations directorate (J-3) for joint organizations, staff, and elements (e.g., electronic warfare planners, military deception planners) that plan and supervise the various capabilities and related activities to be utilized. Consolidated J-3 tasking ensures efficiency in planning and executing integrated IO. Serving as the primary “advocate” for IO targets nominated for attack throughout the target nomination and review process established by the JFC. Coordinating the planning and execution of IO between the joint organizations (including components) responsible for each element of IO. Coordinating intelligence and assessment support to IO. Coordinating IO inputs from joint centers and agencies. Coordinating liaison with the Joint Information Operations Center, Joint Warfare Analysis Center, and other joint centers. Figure IV-1. Information Operations Cell Chief Functionsof IO activities as necessary. If IO manning permits and the J-3 or IO cell chief designates, IO staffpersonnel may be part of the JOC watch team or stand a separate watch. Due to the sensitivenature of some aspects of IO, all members of the IO staff should have the appropriate security clearanceand access necessary to fulfill their IO responsibilities. (4) IO Cell or Planning Organization. To integrate and synchronize the corecapabilities of IO with IO-supporting and related capabilities and appropriate staff functions, theIO cell chief normally leads an “IO cell” or similarly named group as an integrated part of thestaff’s operational planning group or equivalent. The organizational relationships between thejoint IO cell and the organizations that support the IO cell are per JFC guidance. These supportingorganizations provide guidance on the employment of their respective capabilities and activities.The specific duties and responsibilities of representatives from these supporting organizationsshould be established between the IO cell chief and the senior representative of each supportingorganization. Authorized staffing levels, mission, and location of JFC staff vis-à-vis eachcapability-level organization are among the considerations in determining how organizationsare represented in the cell. Figure IV-2 is intended as a guide in determining which members ofa joint staff should coordinate with IO planners. The JFC should tailor the composition ofthe cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Capability, staff function and organizational representationon the IO cell may include the following personnel listed and described below.IV-4 JP 3-13
  • 50. Responsibilities and Command Relationships NOTIONAL INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL J-3 RESIDENT OPSEC J-2 NONRESIDENT J-4 PLANNERS J-5 J-2 REP CHAPLAIN USSTRATCOM MILDEC J-5 REP LIAISON(S) OPSEC REP PLANNERS USSTRATCOM REPS (CNO, MILDEC REP SPACE CONTROL & GLOBAL STRIKE) J-6 JPOTF J-6 REP PSYOP REP (IA & CND) EWCC EW REP IO CELL CHIEF J-7 REP J-7 PAO REP PAO PHYSICAL PHYSICAL SECURITY STAFF SECURITY REP LEGAL REP JUDGE SECTION IO CELL J2X REP (CI) STO REP ADVOCATE STO CMO STAFF/CIVIL SOF REP CELL AFFAIRS REP JOINT FIRES CI STAFF JSOTF OFFICER COMPONENT SECTION (J2X) J2T REP LIAISONS JOINT FIRES OTHER STATE DEPARTMENT JCMOTF ELEMENT (JFE) REPS REP TARGETING SERVICE/FUNCTIONAL CELL (J2T) COMPONENTS ALLIES AND STATE DEPARTMENT SUPPORT REPS LIAISON CI Counterintelligence JSOTF Joint Special Operations Task CMO Civil-military Operations Force CND Computer Network Defense MILDEC Military Deception CNO Computer Network Operations OPSEC Operations Security EW Electronic Warfare PAO Public Affairs Office EWCC Electronic Warfare Coordination Cell PSYOP Psychological Operations IA Information Assurance Rep Representative IO Information Operations SOF Special Operations Forces JCMOTF Joint Civil-Military Operations Task Force STO Special Technical Operations JPOTF Joint Psychological Operations Task Force USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command Figure IV-2. Notional Information Operations Cell (a) EW Representative. Coordinates EW activities and acts as liaison betweenthe IO cell and the EWCC when formed (at the direction of the JFC). Serves as JointSpectrum Center (JSC) liaison officer and provides oversight of input and changes to theJRFL in the absence of an EWCC. When directed by the JFC, the EWCC will stand up andreside at the JFC component most appropriate to the ongoing operation, and will be directlyresponsible to the JFC, through the EW representative in the IO cell, for the coordination anddeconfliction of all EW activities and all military usage of the EM spectrum within the combatantcommander’s AOR. When an EWCC is active, the EWCC chief or his designated representativeshould be the EW representative at the IO cell. Coordinates closely with J-6 planners to deconflictfriendly IO in the EM spectrum. (b) CNO Representative. Coordinates integration and synchronization of CNOwith other IO capabilities and deconflicts CNO with other staff directorates and organizations represented IV-5
  • 51. Chapter IVin the IO cell. (c) PSYOP Representative. Coordinates to provide DSPD. Integrates,coordinates, and synchronizes the use of PSYOP with other IO capabilities, functions, agencies,and organizations represented in the IO cell. Serves as entry point for liaison from the JPOTF,the in-theater multinational PSYOP cells, and Joint PSYOP support element as appropriate. (d) OPSEC Representative. With assistance from each directorate, identifiesexisting threats and vulnerabilities, develops the critical information list, and implements OPSECcountermeasures. Serves as the joint communications security (COMSEC) monitoring activity(JCMA) point of entry into the staff. (e) MILDEC Representative. Coordinates combatant command or subordinatejoint force command MILDEC planning. (f) Special Technical Operations (STO) Representative. The STO representativeshould be an integral member of the IO cell to ensure STO planning is fully integrated and coordinated.STO read-ins are conducted throughout the IO staff based on mission requirements and governingsecurity directives. (g) USSTRATCOM Representative(s). Participates via collaborative systemsor in person when available. Acts as liaison to USSTRATCOM across AOR or functionalboundaries to support IO planning and execution. (h) J-6 Communication Systems and IA Representative. Facilitates IA andcoordination between information system planners and managers and members of the IO cell.Coordinates with the J-3 to minimize IO operations impact on friendly forces C2. Principalliaison with the joint network operations control center (JNCC). Identifies critical informationsystems and vulnerabilities of these systems and networks (non-secure internet protocol routernetwork, SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET], Joint Worldwide IntelligenceCommunications System, voice, video, data, satellite, and tactical communications). May assistcoordination between the J-3 and OPSEC planners with JCMA. (i) J-2 Representative. Coordinates collection requirements and analyticalsupport for compartmented and noncompartmented IO. May serve as liaison to the IO cell forother DOD intelligence agencies. Provides baseline assessment of the information environment. (j) Targeting Cell Representative. Represents the targeting cell(s) andcoordinates IO targets with the joint targeting coordination board (JTCB), if designated. (k) CI Representative. Coordinates IO inputs to CI activities which havesignificant roles in IO. Provides input on adversary collection capabilities for OPSEC planning. (l) Physical Security Representative. Provides physical security expertise andadvocates interests and concerns within the joint command, the host base, and the joint rear area asIV-6 JP 3-13
  • 52. Responsibilities and Command Relationshipsappropriate, during IO cell planning deliberations. May liaise between the IO cell and both the joint reartactical operations center and the base defense operations center when appropriate. (m) Logistics Directorate (J-4) Representative. Coordinates and integratesIO logistic considerations into the contingency planning process. Represents IO cell concernsto the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) process and assists IO cell members ingetting IO capabilities properly entered and synchronized on the time-phased force anddeployment list (TPFDL). During deployment, execution, and redeployment phases of anoperation, the J-4 representative can assist IO cell members in tracking movement of IO activitiesand their logistic support to and from the supported AOR. The J-4 representative relays IOplanning guidance for OPSEC to other J-4 staff personnel and provides logistic policy guidanceas appropriate. (n) Plans Directorate Representative. Coordinates integration andsynchronization of IO cell procedures and products into staff operational and theater planningprocesses. (o) Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate (J-7)Representative. Provides exercise planning, modeling and simulation (M&S), and lessonslearned process expertise and advocates exercise planning, M&S, and lessons learnedinterests and concerns. Serves as primary integrator of IO into exercises and M&S, especiallyat the JTF level. Ensures resulting lessons learned are incorporated into the Joint LessonsLearned Program, as appropriate. (p) PA Representative. Coordinates and deconflicts PAactivities with planned IO. (q) CMO Representative. Ensures consistency of CMO activities within thecombatant commander’s AOR that may support IO. Provides IO cell cultural advice and analysisof IO impact on civilian targets. Coordinates IO support to CMO as required. Provides interagencycoordination, intergovernmental coordination, and coordination with nongovernmentalorganizations (NGOs), and host nations. Provides feedback on IO MOEs. (r) Judge Advocate (JA) Representative. Advises planners to ensure IO complieswith domestic and international law and assists with interagency coordination and negotiation. (s) Special Operations Representative. Coordinates use of SOF within an AORor joint operations area in support of IO. (t) Service and Functional Component Representatives. These officers interfacewith the combatant command IO cell to provide component expertise and act as a liaison for IO mattersbetween the combatant command and the component. These representatives also may serve asmembers of one or more of the supporting organizations of IO (e.g., the STO cell). For mosteffective coordination between the combatant command IO cell and the component IO cells, the liaisonsmust be pre-designated, thoroughly familiar with the component’s IO plan, and of the appropriate rankto speak for the component when the component is at a separate location. IV-7
  • 53. Chapter IV (u) Chaplain Representative. Chaplains, as noncombatants, should notparticipate in combatant activities that might compromise their noncombatant status; however,they may provide relevant information on the religious, cultural, and ideological issues at thestrategic and operational levels. (v) DOS Representative. DOS will coordinate with foreign and internationalorganizations that could be or are affected by the implementation of IO activities. Provides PDexpertise and advocates PD and DOS interests and concerns during IO cell planningdeliberations. The DOS representative provides a view of the PD capabilities that can be broughtto bear to achieve USG objectives within the military operational area, and makesrecommendations for interacting with civilian (and military) leaders, which can influence the outcome ofmilitary operations. (w) Support Organization Representatives. Representatives from variousorganizations providing support to IO, discussed in paragraph 4.c. below and not mentionedspecifically above, may participate in IO cell planning deliberations as directed in individualjoint staff procedures and standing operating procedures (SOPs).See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately), for additional organizationguidance and responsibilities. b. Joint Task Force Command Organization (1) The size of the IO staff, at the JTF level, is determined by the JTF commanderbased on a variety of factors including assigned mission and available resources. The standingjoint force headquarters core element (SJFHQ CE) is a part of each geographic combatantcommander’s staff that provides a trained and equipped standing, joint C2 element specificallyorganized to conduct joint operations. It facilitates JTF headquarters (HQ) formation either asan integrated part of the JTF commander’s HQ or from its location at the combatant commander’sHQ. If elements of the SJFHQ CE deploy, they become an integral part of the JTF HQ, not aseparate organization within the JTF HQ. SJFHQ CEs have IO sections that benefit from theSJFHQ CE’s cross-functional organization and planning methodology. (2) The primary purpose of a JTF IO staff is to focus IO planning and support withinthe JTF HQ. The JTF IO staff provides expertise to the other JTF HQ staff directorates and is thefocal point for coordinating and deconflicting individual core, supporting and related IOcapabilities with other staff functions, component and higher HQ staff, and supporting agenciesand organizations. JTF IO staff’s responsibilities include: (a) Participation in JTF planning. (b) Integration and synchronization of IO core, supporting, and related capabilities withinthe JTF. Processes are discussed in paragraph 5 below and in Chapter V, “Planning and Coordination.”IV-8 JP 3-13
  • 54. Responsibilities and Command Relationships (c) Oversight of the IO aspects of the JTF commander’s assigned missions. c. Organization of Support for IO. As discussed above, IO planners use other jointorganizations to plan and integrate joint IO. Support for IO comes primarily from withinDOD, but other government agencies and organizations, as well as some allied agencies andorganizations, may support IO. (1) Support from within DOD includes, but is not limited to, personnel augmentationfrom the Service IO organizations, USSTRATCOM’s Joint Information Operations Center,USSOCOM, US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) Joint Warfare Analysis Center(JWAC), Joint Program Office for Special Technology Countermeasures (JPO-STC), JSC,and JCMA. Additionally, through the various joint organizations that plan and direct core,supporting, and related IO capabilities, commanders and planners have access to thecomponent expertise necessary to plan the employment or protection of component systems orunits. (a) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA). NGA support for IO maybe coordinated through the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with a NGA representativeand can include: 1. Determination of the availability of the various types of existing geospatialreference data covering the area of interest. 2. Deconfliction of national and lower-level geospatial intelligence (GEOINT)collection activities. 3. GEOINT data and products describing the physical environment and theadversary’s locations, capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilities. 4. Geospatial data quality information (accuracy, currency, completeness,consistency) and appropriateness of the data for the intended use. 5. Visualization and spatial/spectral analysis of imagery and geospatialinformation in support of mission planning, rehearsal, execution, and post-mission assessment. 6. Disclosure and release of GEOINT to allies and coalition partners. (b) National Security Agency (NSA). NSA support for IO may be coordinatedthrough the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with a NSA representative and can include: 1. Information security technology, products, and services. IV-9
  • 55. Chapter IV 2. Vulnerability and threat analyses to support IA and the defense of US andfriendly information systems. 3. Determining exploitation risk for telecommunications systems. 4. Determining releasability of COMSEC materials to allies or coalitionpartners. 5. Providing technical expertise for CNO. 6. Conducting intelligence gain/loss assessments. 7. Collecting C2 targeting-related information. (c) Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). DIA support for IO may be coordinatedthrough the J-2 representative of the IO cell or directly with the DIA representative to include: 1. Intelligence for IO target selection and post-strike analysis. 2. Identifying friendly vulnerabilities and the most probable friendly targetswithin the adversary’s capabilities and concept of operations. 3. Developing all-source intelligence gain/loss and/or risk assessment of IOtargets. 4. Conducting political, military, and human factors assessments. (d) Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). DISA support for IO maybe coordinated through the J-6 representative of the IO cell or directly with the DISA representativeand includes: 1. Coordinating with DIA, NSA, and the Services to ensure sufficient databasesupport for planning, analysis, and execution of IO. 2. Assisting in disseminating adversarial CNA warnings. 3. Assisting in establishing a security architecture and standards for protectingand defending selected portions of the Global Information Grid. 4. Developing IA education, training, and awareness program guidelines, includingminimum training standards, for use by the JTF HQ, components, and subordinate JTFs. (e) JWAC. The JWAC assists the combatant commanders in their preparation andanalysis of joint operation plans (OPLANs) and the Service Chiefs’ analysis of weapon effectiveness.The JWAC provides analysis of engineering and scientific data and integrates operationalIV-10 JP 3-13
  • 56. Responsibilities and Command Relationshipsanalysis with intelligence. The JWAC normally supports a JTF through the supported combatantcommander. See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately). (f) JPO-STC. The JPO-STC provides the combatant commanders, ServiceChiefs, and operating forces with the ability to assess their critical infrastructure protectiondependencies and the potential impact on military operations resulting from disruptions tokey infrastructure components (e.g., electric power, natural gas, liquid petroleum, transportation,and telecommunications). JPO-STC also conducts technical assessments of emerging specialtechnologies to determine their potential impacts on military and civilian systems and proposescountermeasure solutions and/or response options. See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,”(published separately). (g) JSC. The JSC can provide the following direct support to the JFC throughthe EWCC or the EW representative to the IO cell. 1. Locational and technical characteristics about friendly force C2 systems. 2. Augmentation teams trained to prepare a JRFL or provide training andassistance in how to prepare a JRFL. 3. Augmentation teams trained to prepare a JRFL to locate and identifyinterference sources and recommend technical and operational fixes to resolve identifiedinterference sources or to provide training and assistance. 4. Assistance in the resolution of operational interference and jammingincidents. 5. Data about foreign communications systems frequency and location. 6. Unclassified communications systems area studies about the regionalcommunications systems infrastructure, to include physical and cultural characteristics, overviewof telecommunications systems, and EM frequencies registered for use within the geographicboundaries of each country in the region. (h) JCMA. The JCMA can provide the following direct support to the JFC throughthe IO cell: 1. COMSEC monitoring and analysis support. 2. A joint COMSEC monitoring and analysis team to provide direct,deployable joint COMSEC monitoring support. If tasked, the JCMA may manage all COMSECmonitoring. 3. Cryptographic or plain language system monitoring. IV-11
  • 57. Chapter IV 4. Timely, tailored reporting to supported commanders, to include near real timereporting of inadvertent disclosure of friendly critical information identified in the OPSEC process. (i) Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE). JCSE is a rapidly deployable,joint tactical communications unit under the operational control of USJFCOM that provides contingencyand crisis communications to joint forces. JCSE is composed of Active and Reserve Component forcesand is equipped with a wide array of tactical and commercial communications equipment. JCSE supportstime-sensitive operations. (2) Interagency Support. Non-DOD USG departments and agencies may have a role inplanning and executing IO. The expertise, programs, and activities of a wide variety of non-DOD USGagencies should be considered as part of the IO plan when appropriate. Combatant commandersestablish staff procedures specific to their AOR for requesting interagency support and coordination ofvarious aspects of joint operations. For more discussion on interagency coordination, see JP 3-08,Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization CoordinationDuring Joint Operations, Volume I. Normally combatant commanders work through designatedliaison representatives attached to their command. USSTRATCOM can assist joint commanders inrequesting interagency IO support when liaison representatives from specific organizations are not attached.Planning coordination of IO as an integral part of planning joint operations is discussed in Chapter V,“Planning and Coordination.” The following departments, agencies, and organizations are not all inclusivebut representative of possible interagency support and coordination required for IO. (a) DOS. DOS will coordinate with foreign and intergovernmental organizationsthat could be or are affected by the implementation of an IO plan. See Volume II of JP 3-08,Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization CoordinationDuring Joint Operations. (b) Other Representatives and Liaison Officers. The JFC should tailor thecomposition of the cell as necessary to accomplish the mission. Other representatives couldinclude, for example, the non-DOD intelligence community. See Volume II of JP 3-08,Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and Nongovernmental Organization CoordinationDuring Joint Operations. (3) Multinational Support. Chapter VI, “Multinational Considerations in InformationOperations,” discusses multinational support of IO.IV-12 JP 3-13
  • 58. Responsibilities and Command Relationships IV-13
  • 59. Chapter IV Intentionally BlankIV-14 JP 3-13
  • 60. CHAPTER V PLANNING AND COORDINATION “Master the mechanics and techniques; understand the art and profession; and be smart enough to know when to deviate from it.” Gen Anthony Zinni, CDRUSCENTCOM 1997-20001. Introduction IO planning follows the principles and processes established for joint operation planning.The IO staff coordinates and synchronizes capabilities to accomplish JFC objectives.Uncoordinated IO can compromise, complicate, negate, or harm other JFC military operations,as well as other USG information activities. JFCs must ensure IO planners are fully integratedinto the planning and targeting process, assigning them to the JTCB in order to ensure fullintegration with all other planning and execution efforts. Other USG and/or coalition/alliedinformation activities, when uncoordinated, may complicate, defeat, or render DOD IO ineffective.Successful execution of an information strategy also requires early detailed JFC IO staff planning,coordination, and deconfliction with USG interagency efforts in the AOR to effectively synergizeand integrate IO capabilities.2. Information Operations Planning a. IO planning must begin at the earliest stage of a JFC’s campaign or operation planningand must be an integral part of, not an addition to, the overall planning effort. IO are used in allphases of a campaign or operation. The use of IO during early phases can significantly influencethe amount of effort required for the remaining phases. b. The use of IO in peacetime to achieve JFC objectives and to preclude other conflicts,requires an ability to integrate IO capabilities into a comprehensive and coherent strategy throughthe establishment of information objectives that in turn are integrated into and support the JFC’soverall mission objectives. The combatant commander’s TSCP serves as an excellent platformto embed specific long-term information objectives c. IO planning requires early and detailed preparation. Many IO capabilities require longlead-time intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB). IO support for IPB developmentdiffers from traditional requirements in that it may require greater lead time and may haveexpanded collection, production, and dissemination requirements. Consequently, combatantcommanders must ensure that IO objectives are appropriately prioritized in their priorityintelligence requirements (PIRs) and requests for information (RFIs). In addition, the intelligencegain/loss from the application of an IO capability and the status of the target as a viable elementof the target system must be evaluated by the IC prior to execution. d. As part of the planning process, designation of release and execution authority is required.Release authority provides the approval for IO employment and normally specifies the allocation V-1
  • 61. Chapter Vof specific offensive means and capabilities provided to the execution authority. Execution authority isdescribed as the authority to employ IO capabilities at a designated time and/or place. Normally, theJFC is the one execution authority designated in the execute order for an operation.See Appendix A, “Supplemental Guidance,” (published separately), for additional guidance. e. Legal Considerations in IO. IO may involve complex legal and policy issues requiringcareful review and national-level coordination and approval. The United States constitution, USlaws, and international law set boundaries and establish precedence for military activity in the informationenvironment. Another country’s legal basis and limitations for military activity in the information environmentmay differ. US military activities in the information environment, as in the physical domains, are conductedas a matter of law and policy. US forces, whether operating physically from bases or locations overseasor virtually in the information environment from within the boundaries of the US or elsewhere, arerequired by law and policy to act in accordance with US law and the LOAC. (1) Legal limitations may be placed on IO. All military activities in the informationenvironment are subject to the LOAC. In order to determine whether there are any questions ofthe legality of particular IO tasks, such tasks must be reviewed by the appropriate JA and approvedby appropriate levels of the chain of command. Bilateral agreements to which the US is asignatory may have provisions concerning the conduct of IO and its supporting, or relatedcapabilities and should be consulted prior to action. A current list of treaties and other internationalagreements in force is found in Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties In Force. (2) IO planning at all levels should consider the following broad areas and consult theappropriate personnel for input: (a) Whether a particular use of IO may be considered a hostile act by othercountries. (b) Domestic, international, criminal, and civil law, affecting national security,privacy, and information exchange. (c) International treaties, agreements, and customary international law, as appliedto IO. (d) Structure and relationships among US intelligence organizations and the overallinteragency environment, including NGOs.3. Information Operations Planning Considerations This section is an overview of IO as a part of the joint operation planning processes and products,with a focus on common planning activities. The joint planning process steps are: planning initiation;mission analysis; COA development; COA analysis and wargaming; COA comparison; COA approval;and plan or order development. A more detailed discussion of the planning process can be found in JPV-2 JP 3-13
  • 62. Planning and Coordination5-0, Joint Operation Planning. Figure V-1 shows the IO cell actions and outcomes aligned with thejoint operation planning process and steps. a. Planning Initiation. Integration of IO into joint operations should begin at the initiationof planning. Key IO staff actions during this phase are: (1) Monitor the situation and receive initial planning guidance, review staff estimatesfrom applicable OPLANs and/or operation plans in concept format. (2) Convene the IO cell. The cell should use this opportunity to alert subordinatecommands/units of potential tasking with regard to IO planning support. For crisis action planning,regularly convene to review the situation and determine what preliminary planning actions shouldbe accomplished. For contingency planning, convene a meeting of the full IO cell or consultinformally with other members as needed. (3) Gauge initial scope of the IO role in the operation. (4) Identify location, SOP, and routine of other staff organizations that require IOinteraction and divide coordination responsibilities among IO staff. (5) Begin identifying information needed for mission analysis and COA developmentand availability of required information. (Continues through plan development.) (6) Identify IO planning support requirements (including staff augmentation and supportproducts and services) and issue requests for support according to procedures established locallyand by various supporting organizations. (7) Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs and RFIs, keeping in mind the long lead timesassociated with satisfying IO requirements. (Continues throughout contingency planning process.) (8) Provide input and recommendations on IO strategies and resolutions to conflictswith other plans. (9) Submit IO target nominations to JFC or component JTCB for IC review of intelligencegain/loss, and for JFC deconfliction and validation. (10) Ensure IO planners participate in all JFC or component planning and targeting sessionsand JTCBs. b. Mission Analysis. The purpose of mission analysis is to assess the assigned mission in orderto determine the commander’s objectives and tasks, and to prepare guidance for subordinate elements.Key IO staff actions during this phase are: (1) Identify specified, implied, and essential IO tasks. V-3
  • 63. Chapter V INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES AS PART OF JOINT PLANNING PLANNING IO CELL PLANNING IO CELL PLANNING ACTION PROCESS STEPS OUTCOME Planning Monitor situation. Request taskings to Initiation Review guidance and estimates. collect required Convene IO cell. information. Gauge initial scope of the IO role. Identify organizational coordination requirements. Initiate identification of information required for mission analysis and COA development. Validate, initiate, and revise PIRs/RFIs. Recommend IO strategies and conflict resolution. Mission Identify specified, implied, and essential IO tasks. List of IO tasks. Analysis Identify assumptions, constraints, and restraints relevant List of assumptions, to IO. constraints, and Identify IO planning support requirements (including restraints. augmentation) and issue requests for support. Planning guidance Initiate development of MOEs and MOPs. for IO. Analyze IO capabilities available and identify authority for IO augmentation deployment and employment. request. Identify relevant physical, informational and cognitive IO portion of the properties of the information environment. commanders Refine proposed PIRs/RFIs. restated mission Provide IO perspective in the development of restated statement. mission for commanders approval. Tailor augmentation requests to missions and tasks. COA Select IO core, supporting, and related capabilities to List of objectives to Development accomplish IO tasks for each COA. effects to IO tasks to Revise IO portion of COA to develop staff estimate. IO capabilities for Provide results of risk analysis for each COA. each COA. COA Analysis Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective. IO data for overall & Wargaming Identify key IO decision points. synchronization Recommend IO task organization adjustments. matrix. Provide IO data for synchronization matrix. IO portion of Identify IO portions of branches and sequels. branches and Identify possible high-value targets related to IO. sequels. Recommend IO CCIRs. List of high-value targets related to IO. COA Compare each COA based on mission and IO tasks. Prioiritized COAs Comparison Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus from an IO available IO resources. perspective with Pros Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective. and Cons for each COA. COA Approval No significant IO staff actions during COA approval. N/AFigure V-1. Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of Joint PlanningV-4 JP 3-13
  • 64. Planning and Coordination INFORMATION OPERATIONS CELL ACTIONS AND OUTCOMES AS PART OF JOINT PLANNING (cont’d) PLANNING IO CELL PLANNING IO CELL PLANNING ACTION PROCESS STEPS OUTCOME Plan or Order Refine IO tasks from the approved COA. Updated IO estimates Development Identify IO capability shortfalls and recommend solutions. based on selected Update continually, all supporting organizations COA. regarding details of the IO portion of plan details (access Draft IO appendices permitting). and tabs, supporting Advise supported combatant commander on IO issues plans. and concerns during supporting plan review and IO requirements to approval. TPFDD development. Participate in TPFDD refinement to ensure the IO force Synchronized and flow supports the CONOPS. integrated IO portion of operation plan. Plan No specific IO staff actions during plan refinement. N/A Refinement CCIR Commanders Critical Information MOE Measure of Effectiveness Requirement MOP Measure of Performance COA Course of Action PIR Priority Intelligence Requirement CONOPS Concept of Operations RFI Request for Information IO Information Operations TPFDD Time Phased Force Deployment Data Figure V-1. Information Operations Cell Actions and Outcomes as Part of Joint Planning (cont’d) (2) Identify assumptions, constraints, and restraints relevant to IO. (3) Initiate development of MOEs and measures of performance (MOPs). (4) Analyze IO capabilities available for the mission and identify level of approvalauthority for deployment and employment. (5) Identify relevant physical, informational, and cognitive properties (whether friendly,adversarial or neutral/third party) of the information environment that may impact the operation.Commanders and their staffs must avoid projecting US value sets on opponents (mirror imaging).Therefore, incorporating specific cultural, regional, and country experts into the IO planningprocess can help prevent developing plans based on inaccurate cultural assumptions. (6) Refine proposed PIRs and RFIs. (7) Provide IO perspective in development of restated mission for the commander’s approval. (8) Tailor the quantity and skill sets in augmentation requests to the specifics of mission andtasks as they are developed. (9) Based on intelligence and mission analysis, identify potential IO targets, compile an IOtarget development list, and nominate developed IO targets to the JFC’s standing joint target list. V-5
  • 65. Chapter V (10) Compile and maintain a target folder for each IO target nomination incorporating atleast the minimum data fields. Target folders will facilitate IC review and JFC deconfliction and commanderapproval for action. c. COA Development. The staff takes the output from mission analysis as key inputs toCOA development: initial staff estimates; mission and tasks; and JFC planning guidance. KeyIO staff actions during this phase are: (1) Select IO core capabilities that may be used individually or integrated with otheroptions to accomplish IO supporting tasks for each COA. (2) Revise the IO portion of COAs as required to develop the staff estimate. (3) Brief portions of each COA and include the results of risk analysis for each COA. d. COA Analysis and Wargaming. Based upon time available, the commander shouldwargame each tentative COA against adversary COAs identified through the JIPB process. KeyIO staff actions during this phase are: (1) Analyze each COA from an IO functional perspective. (2) Reveal key IO decision points. (3) Recommend IO task organization adjustments. (4) Provide IO data for use in a synchronization matrix or other decision-making tool. (5) Identify IO portions of branches and sequels. (6) Identify possible high-value targets related to IO. (7) Recommend commander’s critical information requirement for IO. e. COA Comparison. COA comparison starts with all staff members analyzing and evaluatingthe advantages and disadvantages of each COA from their perspectives. Key IO staff actions duringthis phase are: (1) Compare each COA based on mission and IO tasks. (2) Compare each COA in relation to IO requirements versus available IO resources. (3) Prioritize COAs from an IO perspective.V-6 JP 3-13
  • 66. Planning and Coordination f. COAApproval. There are no significant IO staff actions during COA approval. g. Plan or Order Development. During plan or order development, the IO staff developsthe IO portion of the plan or order. Key IO staff actions during this phase are: (1) Refine IO tasks from the approved COA. (2) Identify IO capability shortfalls and recommend solutions. (3) Facilitate development of supporting plans by keeping organizations responsiblefor development of supporting plans informed of IO plan development details (as accessrestrictions allow) throughout the planning process. (4) Advise the supported combatant commander on IO issues and concerns during thesupporting plan review and approval process. (5) Participate in TPFDD refinement to ensure the IO force flow supports the OPLAN. h. Plan Refinement. There are no IO specific staff actions during plan refinement.4. Commander’s Intent and Information Operations The commander’s vision of IO’s role in an operation should begin before the specific planningis initiated. A commander that expects to rely on IO capabilities must ensure that IO relatedPIRs and RFIs are given high enough priority prior to a crisis, in order for the intelligenceproducts to be ready in time to support operations. At a minimum, the commander’s vision forIO should be included in the initial guidance. Ideally, commanders give guidance on IO as partof their overall concept, but may elect to provide it separately. The commander may elect toprovide separate guidance on IO when a more focused and direct discussion about IO isappropriate. Commanders may find providing separate guidance on IO during exercises is avaluable tool for training their staffs to view IO as an integral part of their overall operationsconcept.5. The Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of Effectiveness a. MOPs gauge accomplishment of IO tasks and actions. MOEs determine whether IO actionsbeing executed are having the desired effect toward mission accomplishment: the attainment of endstates and objectives. MOPs measure friendly IO effort and MOEs measure battlespace results. Therelationship between these two measures is illustrated by examples in Figure V-2. IO MOPs andMOEs are crafted and refined throughout the planning process. b. In developing IO MOPs and/or MOEs, the following general criteria should be considered: V-7
  • 67. Chapter V (1) Ends Related. They should directly relate to desired effects required to accomplishobjectives. (2) Measurable. Effectiveness or performance is measured either quantitatively orqualitatively. In order to measure effectiveness, a baseline measurement must be established prior tothe execution, against which to measure system changes. (3) Timely. The required feedback time should be clearly stated for each MOE and/orMOP and a plan made to report within specified time periods. (4) Properly Resourced. The collection, collation, analysis, and reporting of MOEor MOP data requires personnel, budgetary, and materiel resources. IO staffs should ensure thatthese resource requirements are built into the IO plan during its development. EXAMPLE OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEASURES OF PERFORMANCE AND MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS Capability Measures of Measures of Performance (MOPs)* Effectiveness (MOEs)** Remarks Psychological Percentage of PSYOP Extent that PSYOP Often necessitates Operations products disseminated changed the further intelligence (PSYOP) demonstrated behavior requirements of the target audience Electronic Percentage of adversary Effect of attacks on MOE requires a Warfare command and control adversary C2 facilities’ change in a detectable (EW) (C2) facilities attacked ability to pass critical and measurable information activity Percentage of identified Observed adversary MOE requires Operations compromises of critical actions indicating lack of collation of all leaked Security information or indicators foreknowledge of information and (OPSEC) with OPSEC measures friendly operations comparison with applied adversary actions Days between updates Specific adversary MOE requires an Military on effectiveness of actions taken based on estimate of how the Deception deception plans friendly deception adversary is expected (MILDEC) activities to react if they do and if they do not believe the deception Computer Percentage of tasked Effect of network attacks MOE requires access Network network attacks on target systems to a measurable Operations conducted output or to the (CNO) adversary’s own reporting of the attack *MOPs are derived from CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). Most MOP are answered by internal statistic generation. **MOEs vary and are based on IO objectives and individual planned tasks. Figure V-2. Example of the Relationship Between Measures of Performance and Measures of EffectivenessV-8 JP 3-13
  • 68. Planning and Coordination c. Examples of IO MOPs: (1) Number of PSYOP products disseminated (weekly, monthly). (2) Percentage of adversary command and control facilities attacked. (3) Percentage of tasked CNAs conducted. (4) Number of CMO projects initiated. (5) Increased adversary radio transmissions within a desired frequency, due to EA. (6) Human intelligence reports of PSYOP broadcasts during Commando Solo missions. d. Examples of IO MOEs: (1) Quantitative MOEs (a) Percentage of degradation of a radar system over time as measured by anappropriate sensor. (b) Number and size of civil disturbances over time as reported by own forces. (c) Number of computer intrusions over time as measured by software. (d) Trends in target population position on a specific issue as gauged by publicopinion polls. (e) Number of troops surrendering as instructed by a PSYOP leaflet operation. (2) Qualitative MOEs (a) Target population position on a specific issue as gauged by a focus group orseries of focus groups. (b) Assessment of changes in supportiveness (or non-supportiveness) of publicstatements made by key leaders as measured against IO objectives and/or effects. (c) Assessment of changes in bias of foreign media outlets. (d) Instances of defections, surrenders, non-support of authorities attributed toimpact and/or credibility of loudspeaker broadcasts or leaflets. V-9
  • 69. Chapter V e. Challenges and Considerations. It can be difficult to isolate variables and establish a directcause and effect relationship, especially when assessing foreign public opinion or human behavior.Unforeseen factors lead to erroneous interpretations. For example, a traffic accident in a foreign countryinvolving a US Service member and a local civilian may bias an audience against US policies irrespectiveof otherwise successful IO. Lack of leadership, equipment, weapons, or sustenance may have as greatan influence on surrendering enemy soldiers as a PSYOP leaflet urging surrender. In contrast, a visit bya popular US official to a region may cause a positive spike in public opinion that cannot be credited toexecuted IO actions.V-10 JP 3-13
  • 70. CHAPTER VI MULTINATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS IN INFORMATION OPERATIONS “We are a strong nation. But we cannot live to ourselves and remain strong.” George C. Marshall 22 January 19481. Introduction Joint doctrine for multinational operations, including command and operations in amultinational environment, is described in JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations.The purpose of this chapter is to highlight IO-specific issues that are not covered in JP 3-16,Chapter IV, Section F “Information Operations.” IO in a multinational environment are alsocovered in the US sponsored America, Britain, Canada, and Australia Interoperability ProgramCoalition Operations Handbook, Chapter 10. This document includes IO checklists for staffand commanders assigned to a multinational IO operational environment.2. Other Nations and Information Operations a. Allies and coalition partners recognize various IO concepts and some have thoroughand sophisticated doctrine, procedures, and capabilities for planning and conducting IO. Themultinational force commander (MNFC) is responsible to resolve potential conflicts betweeneach nation’s IO programs and the IO objectives and programs of the multinational force (MNF).It is vital to integrate allies and coalition partners into IO planning as early as possible so that anintegrated and achievable IO strategy can be developed early in the planning process. Initialrequirements for integration of other nations into the IO plan include: (1) Clarification of allied and coalition partners’ IO objectives. (2) Understanding of other nations’ IO and how they intend to conduct these activities. (3) Establishment of liaison/deconfliction procedures to ensure coherence. (4) Early identification of MNF vulnerabilities and possible countermeasures toadversary attempts to exploit them. b. Regardless of the maturity of each nation’s IO capabilities, doctrine, tactics, techniques, orprocedures, every ally and/or coalition member can contribute to IO by providing regional expertiseto assist in planning and conducting IO. If allies and coalition partners have developed specific IOcapabilities, such capabilities may be tailored to specific targets and threats in ways that are not utilizedby the US. Such contributions complement US IO expertise and capabilities, and potentiallyenhance the quality of both the planning and execution of multinational operations. VI-1
  • 71. Chapter VI3. Multinational Information Operations Considerations a. Considerations in military operational planning processes, particularly for IO, whether JOPES-based or based on established foreign or alliance planning processes, should include: (1) Recognizing allied/coalition partner cultural values and institutions. (2) Recognizing allied/coalition partner interests and concerns. (3) Recognizing differences between the US and foreign moral or ethical values. (4) Understanding allied/coalition partners’ rules of engagement and legal constraintsconcerning military activities in the information environment. (5) Awareness of the complications of planning and execution in multiple languagesand their effect on the time taken to develop and execute plans. (6) Familiarity with allied/coalition partner IO doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. b. Sharing of information with allies and coalition partners. (1) Each nation has various resources to provide both classified and unclassified informationto a particular IO activity. In order to plan properly, all nations must be willing to share appropriateinformation to accomplish the assigned mission, but each nation is obliged to protect information that itcannot share with other nations. (2) Information sharing arrangements in formal alliances, to include US participation in UnitedNations missions, are worked out as part of alliance protocols. Information sharing arrangements in adhoc multinational operations where coalitions are working together on a short-notice mission, must becreated during the establishment of the coalition. (3) Using National Disclosure Policy (NDP) 1, National Policy and Procedures forthe Disclosure of Classified Military Information to Foreign Governments and InternationalOrganizations, and DODI O-3600.2, Information Operations (IO) Security ClassificationGuidance (U), as guidance, the senior US commander in a multinational operation must provideguidelines to the US-designated disclosure representative on information sharing and the releaseof classified information or capabilities to allied/coalition forces. NDP 1 provides policy andprocedures in the form of specific disclosure criteria and limitations, definition of terms, releasearrangements, and other guidance. The disclosure of classified information is never automatic.It is not necessary for allied/coalition forces to be made aware of all US intelligence, capabilities,or procedures that are required for planning and execution of IO. The JFC should requestapproval from higher command authorities to release IO-related information that has not beenpreviously cleared for allied/coalition partners.VI-2 JP 3-13
  • 72. Multinational Considerations in Information Operations (4) Information concerning US persons may only be collected, retained, or disseminated inaccordance with law and regulation. Applicable provisions include: the Privacy Act, Title 5 US CodeSection 552a; DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizationsnot Affiliated with the Department of Defense; Executive Order 12333, United States IntelligenceActivities; and DODD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD IntelligenceComponents that Affect United States Persons.4. Planning, Integration, and Command and Control of Information Operations in Multinational Operations a. The role of IO in multinational operations is the prerogative of the MNFC. The missionof the MNF determines the role of IO in each specific operation. b. Representation of key allies/coalition partners in the MNF IO staff ensures multinationalIO expertise and capabilities are effectively used, and the IO portion of the plan is coordinatedwith all other aspects of the multinational plan. c. MNF members may not have IO capabilities, and it may be necessary for the MNF HQto assist the subordinate MNFCs and their staffs in planning and conducting IO.5. Multinational Organization for Information Operations Planning a. When the JFC is also the MNFC, the joint force staff should be augmented by plannersand SMEs from allied/coalition forces. Allied IO capability specialists should be trained on USand allied/coalition IO doctrine, requirements, resources, and how allied/coalition forces arestructured to conduct IO. IO planners should seek to accommodate the requirements of eachallied/multinational force, within given constraints, with the goal of using all the available IOexpertise and capabilities of the multinational force. b. In the case where the JFC is not the MNFC, it may be necessary for the JFC J-3 to briefthe MNFC and staff on the advantages of using US IO capabilities and procedures toachieve MNF goals. The JFC should propose organizing a multinational IO staff usingorganizational criteria discussed earlier. If this is not acceptable to the MNFC, the JFC shouldassume responsibility for implementing IO within the joint force as a part of the multinationaloperations to support multinational mission objectives.6. Multinational Policy Coordination The development of capabilities, tactics, techniques, procedures, plans, intelligence, andcommunications support applicable to IO requires coordination with the responsible DOD componentsand allied/coalition nations. Coordination with allies above the JFC/MNFC level is normally effectedwithin existing defense arrangements, including bilateral arrangements. The Joint Staff coordinates VI-3
  • 73. Chapter VIUS positions on IO matters delegated to them as a matter of law or policy, and discusses thembilaterally, or in multinational organizations, to achieve interoperability and compatibility in fulfilling commonrequirements. Direct discussions regarding multinational IO operations in specific theaters are theresponsibility of the geographic combatant commander.VI-4 JP 3-13
  • 74. CHAPTER VII INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN JOINT EDUCATION, TRAINING, EXERCISES, AND EXPERIMENTS “The Romans are sure of victory . . . for their exercises are battles without bloodshed, and their battles bloody exercises.” Flavius Josephus Historian, 37-100 AD1. Introduction The development of IO as a core military competency and critical component to jointoperations requires specific expertise and capabilities at all levels of DOD. At the highestprofessional levels, senior leaders develop joint warfighting core competencies that are thecapstone to American military power. The Services, USSOCOM, and other agencies developcapabilities oriented on their core competencies embodied in law, policy, and lessons learned.At each level of command, a solid foundation of education and training is essential to thedevelopment of a core competency. Professional education and training, in turn, are dependenton the accumulation, documentation, and validation of experience gained in operations, exercises,and experimentation. This chapter discusses the education, training, joint exercise, andexperimentation necessary to achieve and maintain the goal of establishing IO as a corecompetency.2. Information Operations Education As DOD conceptualization of the information environment and the role of IO in militaryaffairs has evolved, the necessity of an IO career force has been realized. The basic tenets ofeducation and training necessary for this force are: a. The IO career force should consist of both core capability specialists (EW, PSYOP,CNO, MILDEC, and OPSEC) and IO planners. Both groups require an understanding ofthe information environment, the role of IO in military affairs, how IO differs from otherinformation functions that contribute to information superiority, and specific knowledge of eachof the core capabilities to ensure integration of IO into joint operations. b. Initial capability specialist training and education requirements are Service andcapability specific. Capability specialists may be officers or enlisted. As Service-trainedspecialists become more experienced and senior, their training and education must be broadenedto prepare them for responsibilities to plan and supervise the employment of other capabilitiesthat are employed in IO, and to synchronize IO with other aspects of joint operations and USGpolicy. c. IO planners are required at both the component and the joint level. Personnelassigned to IO planning must have a working knowledge of the various capabilities potentially VII-1
  • 75. Chapter VIIemployed in IO as well as appropriate planning processes, procedures, tools, and the legal andpolicy basis for the conduct of IO. d. Senior military and civilian DOD leaders require an executive-level knowledge of theinformation environment and the role of IO in supporting DOD missions.3. Information Operations Training a. Joint military training is based on joint policies and doctrine to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to strategic and operational requirements deemed necessary by combatantcommanders to execute their assigned missions. The basic joint IO training task is to educatethose personnel and organizations responsible for planning and conducting joint IO in thedoctrine found in this and other joint publications. b. IO training must support the IO career force and be consistent with the jointassignment process. Joint IO training focuses on joint planning-specific skills, methodologiesand tools, and assumes a solid foundation of Service-level IO training. c. The Services determine applicable career training requirements for both their IOcareer personnel and general military populations, based on identified joint force missionrequirements. Joint training requirements related to IO include both those recommended bythe nature of the information environment and those specific to the planning and execution ofIO. (1) Service-wide training of military personnel should account for the nature ofthe information environment and the fact that the actions of individual personnel can affectthe perceptions of foreign populations. The Services are responsible for sensitizing the entiremilitary population to the potential impact of their individual and collective actions on theperceptions of foreign populations, particularly when visiting or assigned to overseas locations,where cultural values and institutions differ substantially from the US norm. Prior to deploymentto locations outside the US, military personnel should receive cultural-specificindoctrination. The objective of such indoctrination should be to prevent inadvertentmisperceptions of US forces’ actions and conduct by foreign populations at the deployedlocation. Personnel expected to operate at length or covertly among foreign populations mustreceive more extensive cultural training. (2) Language and cultural skills are critical to IO. Language training in the pasthas focused on intelligence requirements. Additionally, the requirement for cultural training isincreasing. IO requires not only that appropriate messages and themes be translated accurately,but that joint forces have the language and cultural skills to understand how their actions andmessages, intended and unintended, are being perceived by the populations among which theyoperate. Misperception and misunderstanding are complicated and reinforced when jointforces do not have sufficient language and cultural skills to communicate effectively amongthe populations where they operate. The burden of acquiring proficiency in a foreign languageand culture cannot be placed primarily on the foreign population’s ability to learn English andVII-2 JP 3-13
  • 76. Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and ExperimentsWestern culture. Lack of sufficient language expertise and cultural understanding makes thejoint force dependent on foreign translators. Language training must provide sufficient numbers ofpersonnel fluent in those languages and conversant in those cultures where joint forces expect to operate.Language and cultural skills are required for those forces to interact effectively with foreign populationsand maintain awareness of foreign population perceptions during the course of any joint operation. (3) Specific IO capabilities, such as CND and OPSEC, also have trainingrequirements that are applicable to the general military population on a continuing basis.Such capabilities require an “all hands” effort and are dependent on individuals knowing theconsequences of their mistakes or inactions in following “proper procedures.” (4) Beyond these basic military-wide training requirements, the training of IO capabilityspecialists is a Service responsibility. The development of specific capability expertise shouldbe complemented by increasingly in-depth instruction appropriate to the student’s senioritylevel. More in-depth training should broaden the student’s perspective of the role of specificIO capabilities and their impact on the conduct of joint operations. Such training requiresreinforcement and enhancement throughout their careers. Only this continuity of Service trainingcan provide the foundation necessary to build joint IO planners and indoctrinate future seniormilitary leaders in the complexities and subtleties of military activity in the informationenvironment. (5) IO practitioners need education to help them learn how to think about IO. IOrequires very detailed analysis and skilled synthesis, fueled by specific subject matter expertiseand knowledge. IO requires its practitioners to synthesize and view problems/challenges asholistic and related instead of isolated. Hence, each part of IO relates to other parts, with actionsin one part of the world affecting other geographical areas and dimensions. IO education mustgive people a broad appreciation of how different cultures affect how people think, plan, andinterpret outcomes. IO planners also need education sufficient for conducting sophisticatedwargaming going back and forth from the mind of the friendly commander to the minds of otherparticipants in the conflict who have influence on friendly COAs.4. Planning Information Operations in Joint Exercises Effective employment of IO in joint operations depends on the ability of US forces to trainas they intend to fight. Joint exercises provide a unique opportunity to rehearse and evaluatecomponent IO capabilities in mutually supportive operations. The complexity of integratingIO into joint operations, and the impact that IO potentially has on other aspects of jointoperations, recommend the inclusion of IO in most joint exercises. a. Exercise planning is a separate process from JOPES planning which is used to develop OPLANs.While the development of an OPLAN using the JOPES planning process is usually part of the trainingthat takes place during joint exercises, exercise planning involves all the necessary preparationsto structure the exercise and facilitate training. Most joint exercises are scheduled at an annualexercise planning conference. The results of this conference are promulgated in a CJCS notice. CJCS- VII-3
  • 77. Chapter VIIsponsored exercises may be accessed through the Joint Training Information Management Systems viathe SIPRNET. (1) More information about the joint training program can be obtained from Chairmanof the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the ArmedForces of the United States. The tasks that must be accomplished during the planning stage foreach joint exercise are normally divided between those tasks that must be accomplished prior tothe initial planning conference (IPC) and those tasks that should be accomplished prior to themid-planning conference (MPC), which concludes the planning stage. (2) IO aspects of an exercise must be concerned with: (a) Identifying IO exercise objectives that are consistent with the overallobjectives in scope, purpose, and level of effort. (b) Integrating IO tasks and objectives into the JFC’s concept of operations. (c) Coordinating IO personnel and assets to participate as “Blue,” “Green,”and “Red” forces (if specific force participation has not already been designated by higherauthority). (d) Identifying personnel with IO expertise to participate as joint exercise controlgroup and “White Cell” members. (e) Determining IO M&S requirements and systems for the exercise andcoordinating their availability and funding. (f) Drafting the IO sections of the exercise directive and supporting plans (toinclude the exercise control plan). b. Exercise Planning Considerations. When employing IO in exercises, fundamentalplanning considerations include: (1) The exercise objectives and how they relate to IO. Planning IO objectives shouldinclude a review of the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), the Joint Mission Essential Task List,and the CJCS’ Recommended Training Issues for applicable objectives. (2) The type, location, and size of exercise, as well as the duration. (3) Accurate representation of operational target delivery environment. (4) Lessons learned from previous exercises and operations. The review of lessonslearned is an important and cost-effective way to avoid the documented mistakes of previousexercises and operations.VII-4 JP 3-13
  • 78. Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experiments (5) The number and type of IO capabilities and personnel appropriate for the type of exerciseand its objectives. (6) The type of control (free-play, semi-controlled, controlled, or scripted) for IOcapabilities necessary to most effectively accomplish the training objectives. (7) Defining exercise “play” area(s) in the information environment. Theinformation environment creates opportunities for remote participation of capabilities andpersonnel, but also requires concern for inadvertent collateral “damage” or other unintendedconsequences of exercise information actions not properly “confined.” IO capabilities thataffect the information environment from CNA or EA exercise activity have the potential toaffect or “interact” with the information environment outside the designated exercise area.Exercise planners must evaluate the potential for unintended effects throughout the exercise.Avoiding exercise conflicts with third party Internet or EM spectrum use, involves adherence toguidance provided in training area SOPs, as well as applicable local regulations, laws, treaties,and conventions. (8) Need to balance integrated IO training with other training. The potential forcapabilities such as EA and CNA to disrupt exercise play requires that participation of thosecapabilities be well planned. However, strictly isolated exercise of potentially disruptivecapabilities on test ranges and isolated computer networks can lead to false confidence in readinessand inaccurate exercise lessons. (9) The type of M&S systems to be used as part of the exercise. (10) The number of experienced IO evaluators required to properly monitor the exerciseand assist in developing lessons learned through the after action report (AAR) process. (11) Evaluation of possible adverse effects of compromising friendly operations,intelligence capabilities, and methods. “Real world” OPSEC and other security considerationsmust be taken into account when planning IO activities. Foreign intelligence organizationsoften monitor joint exercises to gather information about US capabilities, tactics, techniques, andprocedures. IO capabilities and support, participating virtually or from remote locations, should guardagainst the foreign intelligence collection that targets their communications links with other exerciseparticipants. c. Planning Tasks. The following tasks should be undertaken to ensure that IO is properlyintegrated into joint exercises when appropriate: (1) Developing specific, attainable IO exercise objectives. The identification andaccomplishment of these objectives increase the capability of effectively employing the IOresources and provide the vehicle to evaluate the training of IO personnel. Objectives must bemeasurable and compatible with overall exercise constraints. IO objectives should providespecific direction and should be derived from the UJTL or appropriate OPLAN tasks. Generalstatements of policy and rephrased definitions should be avoided in the development of objectives. VII-5
  • 79. Chapter VII (2) Providing sufficient opportunity to test the abilities of IO planners to coordinatemilitary information activity, accomplish exercise objectives, and satisfy training requirements.IO within an exercise must be stimulated through scenario design, asset participation, and scriptingof specific events in the master scenario events list (MSEL). (3) Designing the IO portion of an exercise scenario in such a way that appropriateassumptions are made about friendly and adversary IO capabilities, baseline perceptions ofappropriate individuals and groups, as well as how perceptions may change over the course ofthe exercise in reaction to all scripted events and exercise play. Baseline perception and IO-related intelligence must be provided in documentation that both Blue and Red forces receive atthe start of the exercise (STARTEX). Technical and safety requirements must be coordinatedwith appropriate range and/or J-6 personnel. IO requirements for M&S must be coordinated.IO experiments during the exercise must be coordinated. MOEs for IO must be identified anddocumented for exercise evaluators and lessons learned personnel. (4) Obtaining sufficient IO assets to support training objectives during exercise play.Specific asset availability may be difficult to firmly schedule months before an exercise. Scenariodesigners should assess the probability of key asset participation and, if necessary, draft backuptraining objectives and scenario specifics to allow for the loss of exercise assets because ofhigher priority operational requirements. (5) Scripting appropriate IO-related events to support training objectives during exerciseplay. Events scripted to stimulate IO play must be developed as an integrated part of the MSEL.Sufficient IO-related events must be provided to keep participating personnel challenged andachieve training objectives. Where necessary, branch and sequel MSELs must be developed toaccount for alternative exercise outcomes. (6) Creating as realistic an exercise environment as possible. Realism can be achievedby using friendly IO capabilities or by employing IO models and simulations, and incorporatingrobust IO response cells into the exercise environment. Response cells are especially useful for providinginteraction with national-level agencies or departments when conducting strategic influence campaignplanning or DSPD. In this regard, there must be an opposing force well-schooled in adversary informationtechniques in both a conventional and unconventional sense. When US IO planners plan IO actions,they must take into account the presence of realistic opposition forces that will be attempting to anticipateUS actions and set conditions for their own effects to work. This interplay also stimulates IO wargamingfor information superiority. (7) Ensuring adequate manning for IO staff functions and IO evaluation. IOplanners should nominate IO staff billets through the process being used to develop the exercisebillet documentation. In addition to the appropriate number of IO billets on the exercise jointstaff, IO observer/training billets and IO “white cell” billets may be appropriate, depending onthe scale and purpose of the exercise. If IO-related technology or tactics evaluations are to beaccomplished during the exercise, additional IO evaluation billets may be necessary.VII-6 JP 3-13
  • 80. Information Operations in Joint Education, Training, Exercises, and Experiments (8) Ensuring “real world” OPSEC is considered in the exercise planning. Coordinatewith appropriate authorities to ensure that adequate protection is applied for both simulators and realworld systems. These systems should be used at locations and in ways that minimize the success ofcollection by hostile intelligence systems. (9) Coordinating use of simulation to fulfill training objectives. Force-on-forcesimulations provide a capability to train battle staffs in the planning, execution, and evaluationof IO employment for any range of scenarios, from a small single-Service counterdrug exerciseto a multinational theater campaign. d. IO Exercise Planning Flow. The planning tasks discussed in the previous paragraphmust be accomplished within the framework of the three phases of exercise planning culminatingin the IPC, MPC, and final planning conference (FPC), respectively. Normally, the IPC occursapproximately eight months prior to the commencement of the exercise. The MPC follows theIPC by about four months. The FPC normally occurs about two months before the exercise.5. Information Operations Exercise Preparation, Execution, and Post-Exercise Evaluation The planning stage is only the first of four stages in the life cycle of each joint exercise. Theother three stages; preparation, execution, and post-exercise evaluation, also involve tasks andcoordination on the part of IO exercise staff personnel. a. Preparation Stage. During the preparation stage, the approved exercise directive andsupporting plans are distributed; pre-exercise training is developed and conducted; any exercisespecific databases are finalized and tested; and the exercise TPFDD is validated. During thisstage, milestones receive a final review and update; operation plans and orders are finalized;simulation gamer augmentees and AAR observer staffing is completed; and the AAR collectionmanagement plan is approved. The FPC is conducted to finalize actions required prior toSTARTEX. Key actions of the FPC include TPFDL refinement, and the concept of operationsand MSEL review as applicable. IO preparations during this period include obtaining necessaryclearances and notifications for IO activity (particularly EA and CNA), coordinatingimplementation of the exercise directive, and accommodating changes in personnel and assets. b. Execution Stage. During the actual conduct of the exercise, personnel responsible forIO should focus on ensuring the IO events in the MSEL occur as planned, the actual IO exerciseactivities remain focused on the training objectives, and that data/observations supporting theAAR process are properly collected and processed. Prior to the actual STARTEX, it may benecessary or useful to provide structured training on some aspect of IO as a means to achieveone or more of the training objectives. The specifics of such training (who instructs, who attends,where, etc.) should be worked out during the planning and preparation stages of the exercise. c. Post-Exercise Evaluation Stage. This period actually begins prior to the conclusion ofthe exercise. IO activity associated with this stage includes capturing and documenting lessons learned,participating in “hot wash” meetings, and coordinating the redeployment of participants and assets to VII-7
  • 81. Chapter VIIparent commands. The form and format for documenting lessons learned can be found in CJCSI3150.25 Series, Joint Lessons Learned Program.6. Information Operations in Joint Experimentation a. Conceptualization of the information environment and military activity in it continue to evolve.The joint experimentation (JE) process provides the means to conduct structured analysis of specific IOconcepts, concept of operations, doctrine, and capabilities in a controlled environment. This process iscrucial to establishing, gauging, and validating proposed IO tactics, techniques, procedures, and capabilitiesin order to allocate resources efficiently. b. CJCSI 3180.01, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processesfor Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, is the policy documentthat guides JE. USJFCOM develops the JE campaign plan and coordinates it through Joint StaffJ-7, with inputs from the combatant commanders, Services, Joint Staff, OSD, and defense agencies.USJFCOM submits the JE campaign plan for CJCS approval through the JROC process (to includeproviding briefings to the JROC Joint Review Board). c. Recommendations resulting from joint IO experiments and other assessments aresubmitted to the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resource, and Assessment Directorate, in accordancewith CJCSI 3180.01 Series, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) ProgrammaticProcesses for Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations, and otherDOD guidance, as required.VII-8 JP 3-13
  • 82. APPENDIX A SUPPLEMENTAL GUIDANCE (PUBLISHED SEPARATELY) This appendix is a classified supplement provided under separate cover. The classifiedappendix expands on information contained in this publication. A-1
  • 83. Appendix A Intentionally BlankA-2 JP 3-13
  • 84. MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES OPSEC MILDEC PSYOP PHYSICAL EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION SECURITY OPERATIONS Concealing Concealing Concealing friendly Concealing EW units Concealing essential SECURITY competing contradicting delivery systems and systems to deny elements of friendly (OPSEC) observables. indicators while from enemy offensive information on extent information (EEFI). Degrading general conveying selected information of electronic attack Reducing the SUPPORTS BY information and operations (IO) until it and electronic situation information activities requiring to enhance effect of indicators. is too late for the warfare support physical security. observables. adversary to react. (EA/ES) capabilities. Hiding tools of Limiting information Denying information physical security thus and indicators that to the enemy on the preventing adversary could compromise success of offensive from gaining access. MILDEC operations. IO. Information has adequate protection. MILITARY Influencing adversary Providing information Influencing adversary Influencing adversary Masking troop DECEPTION not to collect against compatible with to underestimate to underestimate activities requiring (MILDEC) protected units/ PSYOP theme. friendly physical friendly EA/ES safeguards. activities. destruction capabilities. SUPPORTS BY capabilities. Causing adversary to underestimate Influencing adversary friendly OPSEC to defend command APPENDIX B capabilities. and control (C2) elements/systems that friendly forces CORE CAPABILITIES do not plan to destroy. PSYCHOLOGICAL Disseminating rules Creating perceptions Causing populace to Broadcasting PSYOP Targeting adversary OPERATIONS of engagement. and attitudes that leave targeted areas products on audiences to reduce (PSYOP) Countering MILDEC can exploit. to reduce collateral adversary the need for physical SUPPORTS BY propaganda and Integrating PSYOP damage. frequencies. security. misinformation. actions with MILDEC. Developing Minimizing resistance Reinforcing the messages for and interference by deception story with broadcast on other local population. information from service EW assets. other sources. MUTUAL SUPPORT BETWEEN INFORMATION OPERATIONS Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations CapabilitiesB-1
  • 85. B-2 MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d) OPSEC MILDEC PSYOP PHYSICAL EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION SECURITY Appendix B PHYSICAL ATTACK Preventing or Conducting physical Degrading adversary Destroying adversary Reducing physical SUPPORTS BY degrading adversary attacks as deception ability to see, report, C2 targets. security needs by reconnaissance and events. and process Destroying electronic attacking adversary surveillance. Degrading adversary information. systems adversary systems able to capabilities to see, Degrading adversary use. penetrate information report, and process ability to jam PSYOP system (INFOSYS). observables. broadcasts. ELECTRONIC Degrading adversary Using EA/ES as Degrading Providing target Using electronic WARFARE (EW) electromagnetic deception measures. adversarys ability to acquisition through protection (EP) to SUPPORTS BY intelligence, Degrading adversary see, report, and ES. safeguard surveillance, and capabilities to see, process information. Destroying or communications used reconnaissance (ISR) report, and process Isolating target upsetting susceptible in protecting operations. against competing audience from assets with EA. facilities. protected units and observables. Causing information. activities enemy to misinterpret Creating barrier of information received white noise to mask by his electronic unit maneuvers. means. INFORMATION Ensuring INFOSYS Providing INFOSYS Ensuring availability Ensuring INFOSYS Ensuring EW assets Providing for ASSURANCE (IA) confidentiality. assets for conducting of INFOSYS for are available for are available. INFOSYS SUPPORTS BY MILDEC operations. PSYOP. physical destruction authentication. tasks. COMPUTER Attacking enemy Providing the Another means of Nonlethal attack of Used with EA. Conducting risk NETWORK ATTACK computers before deception story providing the PSYOP selected targets, assessment to (CNA) they can detect our through computers. theme. which allows lethal determine EEFI. attacks on other consequence of 2d SUPPORTS BY targets. and 3d order CNA effects. COMPUTER Detecting enemy Protecting the Preventing the Protecting fire Used in conjunction Erect firewalls to NETWORK attempts to acquire MILDEC plan resident compromise of support C2 systems. with EP. protect intrusion into DEFENSE information. inside computers. PSYOP message networks. before release. (CND) SUPPORTS BY Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)JP 3-13
  • 86. MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d) OPSEC MILDEC PSYOP PHYSICAL EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION SECURITY PHYSICAL Protecting operation Restricting access by Ensuring products do Safeguarding Safeguarding SECURITY plans and operation level of security and not contain classified availablity of equipment used in SUPPORTS BY orders. number of personnel. information INFOSYS to use in EW. physical destruction. COUNTER- Countering foreign Countering foreign Conducting None Providing electronic Countering foreign INTELLIGENCE (CI) human intelligence HUMINT operations. countersignal countermeasures. HUMINT operations. SUPPORTS BY (HUMINT) operations. Identifying threat ISR operations to allow capabilities. broadcast of PSYOP messages IA CI CNA CND OPSEC Concealing physical and Ensuring EEFI are concealed Concealing CNA capabilities. Denying enemy knowledge SUPPORTS BY electronic INFOSYS locations. from enemy collection assets. about CND capabilities. MILDEC Overloading adversary Giving the adversary a cover Providing MILDEC targets and Causing enemy to believe our SUPPORTS BY intelligence and analysis story so his intelligence system deception stories to enhance CND is greater than it actually capabilities. collects irrelevant information. CNA. is. Protecting and defending Causing enemy to believe all friendly INFOSYS. CND tools are in place. PSYOP Enhancing the ability of IA in the Providing messages in enemy Convincing enemy not to do Providing information about SUPPORTS BY minds of the enemy. decision makers mind that can something by describing effects non-military threat to computers be revealed by CI to determine of a CNA if they take in the area of operations. enemy true intentions. undesirable actions. PHYSICAL ATTACK Attacking adversary systems Destroying appropriately Supplementing CNA by Destroying or degrading enemy SUPPORTS BY capable of influencing friendly nominated adversary collection destroying or degrading hard CNA facilities before they attack INFOSYS availability and assets. targets. friendly computers. integrity. EW Using EP to protect equipment. None Supplementing CNA with EA. Using EP to protect personnel, SUPPORTS BY facilities, and equipment. Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)B-3 Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities
  • 87. B-4 MUTUAL SUPPORT WITHIN INFORMATION OPERATIONS CAPABILITIES (cont’d) IA CI CNA CND Appendix B IA Ensuring INFOSYS are available Ensuring links with higher Taking actions to ensure SUPPORTS BY to conduct CI. headquarters to pass CNA availability, integrity, requests. authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation of computers. CNA Attacking enemy computers Exploiting enemy intelligence Attacking enemy ability to SUPPORTS BY before enemy attacks friendly collection. attack friendly computers. computers. CND Supporting IA of information Detecting, identifying, and Protecting CNA weapons from SUPPORTS BY passed via computer networks. assessing enemy collection enemy detection. efforts against computers. PHYSICAL Safeguarding INFOSYS by Safeguarding personnel, and Safeguarding INFOSYS from Determining applicable risk and SECURITY implementing security preventing unauthorized access sabotage, espionage, damage, threat levels. SUPPORTS BY procedures. to equipment, installations, or theft. materiel, and documents. CI At certain echelons, helping Confirming results of CNA. Detecting, identifying, SUPPORTS BY ensure information integrity. assessing, countering, and neutralizing enemy intelligence collection. Figure B-1. Mutual Support Within Information Operations Capabilities (cont’d)JP 3-13
  • 88. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS OPSEC MILDEC PSYOP PHYSICAL EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION SECURITY OPERATIONS Limiting information Limiting information Limiting information Electronic protection Should be no conflict. SECURITY that can be revealed that can be revealed that can be revealed (EP) and OPSEC may (OPSEC) CAN to enhance deception to develop PSYOP to enemy to develop have different goals. story credibility. themes. targets. CONFLICT BY MILITARY Revealing information Limiting PSYOP Limiting targeting to Limiting electronic Negating the DECEPTION OPSEC normally theme selection. allow survival and attack (EA) targeting deception story by (MILDEC) CAN seeks to conceal. Limiting information conduct of critical of adversary physical security that can be revealed adversary command information systems preventing our CONFLICT BY and control (C2) (INFOSYS) to allow transmitting a to develop PSYOP themes. functions. survival and conduct realistic deception of critical adversary story. C2 functions. PSYCHOLOGICAL Revealing information Limiting deception Limiting targeting of Limiting EA against Should be no conflict. OPERATIONS OPSEC normally story selection if adversary C2 adversary (PSYOP) CAN seeks to conceal. deception story infrastructure to communications CONFLICT BY contains untruths. allow conveying of frequencies to allow PSYOP themes. PSYOP themes to be conveyed. PHYSICAL ATTACK Causing firing Limiting selection of Limiting means Limiting opportunities If need-to-know CAN CONFLICT BY systems to reveal deception means by available to convey for communications considerations limit their locations. denying or degrading PSYOP themes by intrusion by denying access to targeting elements of adversary denying or degrading or degrading data. C2 infrastructure adversary C2 elements of adversary necessary to process systems. INFOSYS. deception story. ELECTRONIC Revealing EW assets Limiting selection of Reducing frequencies Limiting targeting of Revealing what prematurely. deception measures available to convey adversary C2 physical security is WARFARE (EW) by denying or CAN CONFLICT BY PSYOP themes. systems. trying to protect (EA). degrading use of EP should not adversary C2 systems. conflict. Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information OperationsB-5 Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities
  • 89. B-6 POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont’d) OPSEC MILDEC PSYOP PHYSICAL EW PHYSICAL DESTRUCTION SECURITY Appendix B INFORMATION Should be no conflict. Reinforcing the Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. EP and IA must be Should be no conflict. ASSURANCE (IA) deception story deconflicted. CAN CONFLICT BY COMPUTER Attack selected on May result in Preventing the enemy Attacking same target Need to deconflict Revealing CNA NETWORK ATTACK enemy targets may attacking wrong target from receiving the with nonlethal and which systems attack source that should be (CNA) CAN provide information if coordination not PSYOP message. lethal weapons which targets. protected. on friendly activities. made with MILDEC wastes both time and CONFLICT BY ammunition. COMPUTER Should be no conflict. Reinforcing the Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. NETWORK deception story DEFENSE (CND) CAN CONFLICT BY COUNTER- Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict Should be no conflict. Killing sources. Electronic warfare Should be no conflict. INTELLIGENCE (CI) support may be CAN CONFLICT BY needed for other activities. IA CI CNA CND OPSEC CAN Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CONFLICT BY MILDEC Presenting data the enemy will Giving the adversary a cover Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CAN CONFLICT BY believe versus assuring data is story that inadvertently supports not revealing to enemy. his collection plan. PSYOP CAN Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CONFLICT BY Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations (cont’d)JP 3-13
  • 90. POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITHIN THE CAPABILITIES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS (cont’d) IA CI CNA CND PHYSICAL ATTACK Attacking incorrect adversary Destroying insufficient number Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CAN CONFLICT BY systems capable of influencing of adversary collection assets. friendly INFOSYS availablity and integrity. EW CAN Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CONFLICT BY IA CAN Having insufficient INFOSYS Not having available links with Should be no conflict. CONFLICT BY available to conduct CI. higher headquarters to pass CNA requests. CNA Should be no conflict. Attacking enemy computers Should be no conflict. CAN CONFLICT BY before exploiting hostile intelligence collection efforts. CND CAN Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. CONFLICT BY PHYSICAL Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. Should be no conflict. SECURITY CAN CONFLICT BY CI CAN Ineffective CI can negate Should be no conflict. CI revealing how networks are CONFLICT BY information integrity. protected. Figure B-2. Potential Conflicts Within the Capabilities of Information Operations (cont’d)B-7 Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities
  • 91. B-8 SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA Appendix B INFORMATION CIVIL MILITARY DEFENSE SUPPORT TO COMBAT CAMERA PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY INFORMATION Influencing/informing Conducting counter- Ensuring accuracy of Coordinating guidance to OPERATIONS populace of CMO activities propaganda and protection information. COMCAM teams with (IO) and support. from misinformation/rumor. Maintaining relevance of commanders Neutralizing Developing essential information. information/objectives. SUPPORTED BY misinformation and hostile elements of friendly Timeliness of information. Assisting in expeditious propaganda directed information (EEFI) to Usability of information. transmission of critical against civil authorities. preclude inadvertent public COMCAM images. disclosure. Completeness of Controlling information. electromagnetic spectrum Synchronizing psycholo- for legitimate purposes. gical operations (PSYOP) Security of information. and operations security (OPSEC) with PA strategy. CIVIL MILITARY Providing information to Providing information on Providing information to Using COMCAM OPERATIONS support friendly knowledge civil-military operations inform interagency capabilities to record (CMO) of information environment. center activities to support elements on local priority civic action Synchronizing public affairs (PA) strategy. information environment. projects. SUPPORTS BY communications media and Synchronizing information Synchronizing Synchronizing imagery assets and message with communications media communications media assignments with other IO capabilities. and message. and messages with other COMCAM team leader. Coordinating command Identifying, coordinating, IO capabilities. and control target sets with and integrating media, Establishing and targeting cell. public information, and maintaining liaison or Establishing and host-nation support. dialogue with indigenous maintaining liaison or personnel and NGOs. dialogue with indigenous Supporting DPSD with personnel and feedback on strategic nongovernmental communications themes. organizations (NGOs). Supporting PSYOP with feedback on PSYOP themes. Providing news and information to the local people. Figure B-3. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat CameraJP 3-13
  • 92. SUPPORT ROLES OF INFORMATION OPERATIONS, CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS, PUBLIC AFFAIRS, DEFENSE SUPPORT TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY, AND COMBAT CAMERA (cont’d) INFORMATION CIVIL MILITARY DEFENSE SUPPORT TO COMBAT CAMERA PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS OPERATIONS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PUBLIC Developing information Producing accurate, Developing information Managing release of key AFFAIRS (PA) products to protect timely, and balanced products to protect US images through PA SUPPORTED BY soldiers against the effects information for the public. actions consistent with channels. of misinformation or Coordinating with civil strategic communications Coordinating for COMCAM disinformation. affairs specialists to verify themes and objectives. coverage and access to Coordinating with IO facts and validity of Coordinating with key events and planners to ensure a information. interagency planners to operations. consistent message and ensure a consistent maintain OPSEC. message. Supporting Providing assessment of counterpropaganda by media coverage. countering misinformation. Providing assessment of effects of media coverage to OPSEC planners. Providing assessment of essential nonmedia coverage of deception story. DEFENSE Providing a link to Providing a link to Providing a link to Providing a link to SUPPORT TO interagency for interagency for interagency for interagency for PUBLIC coordination and guidance coordination and guidance coordination and guidance coordination and guidance on strategic on strategic on strategic on strategic DIPLOMACY communications themes communications themes communications themes communications themes (DSPD) and activities. and activities. and activities. and activities. SUPPORTS BY COMBAT Providing responsive Providing responsive Providing responsive Providing responsive CAMERA imagery coverage of imagery coverage of imagery coverage of imagery coverage of (COMCAM) events in the operational events in the operational events in the operational events in the operational area. area. area. area. SUPPORTS BY Figure B-3. Support Roles of Information Operations, Civil-Military Operations, Public Affairs, Defense Support to Public Diplomacy, and Combat Camera (cont’d)B-9 Mutual Support Between Information Operations Core Capabilities
  • 93. Appendix B Intentionally BlankB-10 JP 3-13
  • 94. APPENDIX C COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEM SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS1. Introduction Joint communications systems support the warfighting commander across the range ofmilitary operations. DOD communications systems are designed, acquired, and linked accordingto principles that provide for flexible, adaptable use in a wide variety of applications. Normally,IO is planned, directed, and supported on the resident command or organizational communicationssystems which support other communications requirements. Personnel responsible for IO or IOsupport at each DOD component use communications systems available to other commandpersonnel in compliance with appropriate IA, information management, and administrativepolicies. The IO cell chief, or other designated person, provides communications system supportrequirements through staff procedures established locally. Whether core capability staff sectionssubmit their communications support requirements through the IO cell chief is command specific.At each command, IO communications requirements are prioritized with other unit ororganizational communications requirements. During operational planning, IO and capability-specific frequency and bandwidth requirements are negotiated as part of the JOPES or otherdesignated planning process.For more discussion on communications system support, see JP 6-0, Communications SystemSupport.2. Joint Force Communications System Directorate a. The J-6 is responsible to the JFC for providing the communications system to supportreliable, timely information flow in support of unified action. The operational arm of the J-6 isthe JNCC. JNCCs play a vital role in IO, particularly in the IA process, where they providecommunications and network connectivity throughout the chain of command. The J-6 establishesa JNCC to manage all communications systems deployed in the operational area. The JNCCrequires timely support from subordinate command’s communications control centers to directnetwork operations (NETOPS) and retain situational awareness of force networks. b. The JNCC serves as the single control agency for the management of the jointcommunications system in an operational area. The JFC may task subordinate Service orcomponent commanders to provide personnel augmentation to the J-6 to ensure the appropriatesubject matter expertise exists within the JNCC. Combatant commanders and componentcommanders should designate a single office within their communications staffs to coordinatewith the J-6. c. The JNCC may incorporate the use of a joint network management system, which mayinclude the joint defense infrastructure control system. These systems play a high-level role inthe network planning, monitoring, and control of the system, illustrating the network commonoperational picture used in combat operations. C-1
  • 95. Appendix C3. Communications System Directorate Responsibilities a. Exercises staff supervision of all communications system assets. Publishescommunications system plans, annexes, and operating instructions to support the assigned mission,furnishing direction to subordinate commands regarding provision of communications systemassets required to support the JFC. This may include assigning primary responsibility forcommunications to a subordinate or component command. The J-6 also assigns responsibilityfor lateral communications between subordinate commands. b. Provide overall management of the communications system supporting the JFC. c. Review and coordinate communications system plans prepared by subordinate commands. d. Upon requesting CJCS-controlled transportable assets, including JCSE assets, inaccordance with CJCSI 6110.01A, CJCS-Controlled Communications Assets, and otherestablished procedures, exercises staff supervision when deployed to the operational area. e. Ensure interoperability of the joint communications system.4. Joint Network Operations Control Center Responsibilities a. Exercise technical management over communications control centers belonging todeployed components and subordinate commands. b. Serves as the single control agency for management of the joint communications networksand infrastructure. c. Perform planning, execution, technical, and management functions. d. Develop/disseminate standards/procedures and collect/present communications systemmanagement statistical data.For more discussion on NETOPS and JNCC see JP 6-0, Communications System Support.C-2 JP 3-13
  • 96. APPENDIX D REFERENCESThe development of JP 3-13 is based upon the following primary references.1. Executive Branch Documents a. National Security Strategy. b. Unified Command Plan FY 04 (through Chg 2). c. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities.2. Department of State Documents Department of State Publication 9434, Treaties In Force.3. Department of Defense Documents a. IO Roadmap. b. DODD 3222.4, Electronic Warfare (EW) and Command and Control Warfare (C2W)Countermeasures. c. DODD S-3321.1, Overt Psychological Operations Conducted by the Military Servicesin Peacetime in Contingencies Short of Declared War. d. DODD 3600.1, Information Operations (IO) (SD 106 Formal Coordination Draft). e. DODD 5122.5, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (ASD(PA)). f. DODD 5200.27, Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations notAffiliated with the Department of Defense. g. DODD 5205.2, DOD Operations Security (OPSEC) Program. h. DODD 5240.1-R, Procedures Governing the Activities of DOD Intelligence Componentsthat Affect United States Persons. i. DODD 5240.2, DOD Counterintelligence (CI). j. DODD 8500.1, Information Assurance (IA). k. DODD O-8530.1, Computer Network Defense (CND). D-1
  • 97. Appendix D l. DODI O-3600.02, Information Operations (IO) Security Classification Guidance (U). m. DODI 3608.11, Information Operations Career Force. n. DODI 5240.4, Reporting of Counterintelligence and Criminal Violations. o. DODI 5240.6, Counterintelligence (CI) Awareness, Briefing, and Reporting Programs. p. DODI 5240.10, Counterintelligence Support to the Combatant Commands and theDefense Agencies. q. DODI 8500.2, Information Assurance (IA) Implementation. r. DODI O-8530.2, Support to Computer Network Defense (CND). s. National Military Strategy (2004).4. Joint Policy, Doctrine, and Other Publications a. CJCSI 1800.01B, Officer Professional Military Education Policy. b. CJCSI 3110.05C, Joint Psychological Operations Supplement to the Joint StrategicCapabilities Plan FY 2002. c. CJCSI 3113.01, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater EngagementPlans. d. CJCSI 3141.01B, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Operation Plans. e. CJCSI 3150.25B, Joint Lessons Learned Program. f. CJCSI 3170.01E, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. g. CJCSI 3180.01, Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) Programmatic Processesfor Joint Experimentation and Joint Resource Change Recommendations. h. CJCSI 3210.01A, Joint Information Operations Policy. i. CJCSI 3210.03, Joint Electronic Warfare Policy. j. CJCSI 3211.01C, Joint Policy for Military Deception. k. CJCSI 3213.01B, Joint Operations Security.D-2 JP 3-13
  • 98. References l. CJCSI 3401.03A, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND)Joint Quarterly Readiness Review (JQRR) Metrics. m. CJCSI 6510.01D, Information Assurance (IA) and Computer Network Defense (CND). n. CJCSM 3113.01A, Theater Engagement Planning. o. CJCSM 3122.01, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume I(Planning Policies and Procedures). p. CJCSM 3122.02C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) Volume II(Crisis Action Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and DeploymentExecution). q. CJCSM 3122.03A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II, PlanningFormats and Guidance. r. CJCSM 3122.04A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution System Volume II –Supplemental Planning Formats and Guidance. s. CJCSM 3141.01A, Procedures for the Review of Operation Plans. t. CJCSM 3500.03A, Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States. u. CJCSM 3500.04D, Universal Joint Task List (UJTL). v. CJCSM 3500.04C, Series 01, Classified Supplement To The Universal Joint Task List(UJTL). w. CJCSM 6510.01, Defense-In-Depth: Information Assurance (IA) and Computer NetworkDefense (CND). x. JP 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). y. JP 1-04, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Legal Support to MilitaryOperations. z. JP 2-0, Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. aa. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations. bb. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. cc. JP 2-01.3, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Intelligence Preparationof the Battlespace. D-3
  • 99. Appendix D dd. JP 2-03, Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) Support to Joint Operations. ee. JP 3-0, Joint Operations. ff. JP 3-01.4, JTTP for Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (J-SEAD). gg. JP 3-03, Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations. hh. JP 3-05.2, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Special Operations Targetingand Mission Planning. ii. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and NongovernmentalOrganization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. I. jj. JP 3-08, Interagency, Intergovernmental Organization, and NongovernmentalOrganization Coordination During Joint Operations Vol. II. kk. JP 3-09, Joint Fires. ll. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in the Theater. mm. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare. nn. JP 3-14, Joint Doctrine for Space Operations. oo. JP 3-30, Command and Control for Joint Air Operations. pp. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations. qq. JP 3-53, Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations. rr. JP 3-54, Operations Security. ss. JP 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations. tt. JP 3-58, Military Deception. uu. JP 3-60, Targeting. vv. JP 3-61, Public Affairs. ww. JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning. xx. JP 5-00.2 Joint Task Force Headquarters.D-4 JP 3-13
  • 100. References yy. JP 6-0, Communications System Support. zz. Joint Forces Staff College IO Planning Handbook (2003). aaa. Standing Joint Task Force Standard Operating Procedures (Draft). bbb. USJFCOM Standard Operation Procedure & Tactics, Techniques, and Proceduresfor the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (Core Element), 14 July 2004. ccc. USJFCOM Joint Warfighting Center Pamphlet 3: Doctrinal Implications of theStanding Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ), 16 June 2004. ddd. The Privacy Act, Title 5 US Code Section 552a.5. Multi-Service and Service Publications a. FM 3-13 Information Operations: Doctrine, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures. b. Naval Warfare Publication 3-13, Navy Information Operations. c. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, Information Operations. d. United States Air Force Concept of Operations for Information Operations. e. A Concept for Information Operations (USMC document). f. FM 3-55.12 / MCRP 3-33.7A / NTTP 3-13.12 / AFTTP(I) 3-2.41, Multi-Service Tactics,Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Combat Camera Operations. D-5
  • 101. Appendix D Intentionally BlankD-6 JP 3-13
  • 102. APPENDIX E ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS1. User Comments Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on this publication to:Commander, United States Joint Forces Command, Joint Warfighting Center, ATTN: Doctrineand Education Group, 116 Lake View Parkway, Suffolk, VA 23435-2697. These commentsshould address content (accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing, andappearance.2. Authorship The lead agent and the Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this publication is the Director forOperations (J-3).3. Supersession This publication supersedes JP 3-13, 9 October 1998, Joint Doctrine for Information Operationsand JP 3-13.1, 7 February 1996, Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C2W).4. Change Recommendations a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication should be submitted: TO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J3-DDGO// INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J7-JEDD// CDRUSJFCOM SUFFOLK VA//DOC GP// Routine changes should be submitted electronically to Commander, Joint Warfighting Center,Doctrine and Education Group and info the Lead Agent and the Director for Operational Plansand Joint Force Development J-7/JEDD via the CJCS JEL at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine. b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs ofStaff that would change source document information reflected in this publication, that directoratewill include a proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its proposal. The MilitaryServices and other organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff/J-7 when changes tosource documents reflected in this publication are initiated. E-1
  • 103. Appendix E c. Record of Changes: CHANGE COPY DATE OF DATE POSTED NUMBER NUMBER CHANGE ENTERED BY REMARKS __________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________________________________5. Distribution of Printed Publications a. Additional copies of this publication can be obtained through the Service publicationcenters listed below (initial contact) or USJFCOM in the event that the joint publication is notavailable from the Service. b. Individuals and agencies outside the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, andcombat support agencies are authorized to receive only approved joint publications and joint testpublications. Release of any classified joint publication to foreign governments or foreignnationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense Attaché Office) to DIA ForeignLiaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-7400. c. Additional copies should be obtained from the Military Service assigned administrativesupport responsibility by DOD Directive 5100.3, 15 November 1999, Support of the Headquartersof Unified, Specified, and Subordinate Joint Commands. By Military Services: Army: US Army AG Publication Center SL 1655 Woodson Road Attn: Joint Publications St. Louis, MO 63114-6181 Air Force: Air Force Publications Distribution Center 2800 Eastern Boulevard Baltimore, MD 21220-2896 Navy: CO, Naval Inventory Control Point 700 Robbins Avenue Bldg 1, Customer Service Philadelphia, PA 19111-5099 Marine Corps: Commander (Attn: Publications) 814 Radford Blvd, Suite 20321 Albany, GA 31704-0321E-2 JP 3-13
  • 104. Administrative Instructions Coast Guard: Commandant (G-OPD) US Coast Guard 2100 2nd Street, SW Washington, DC 20593-0001 Commander USJFCOM JWFC Code JW2102 Doctrine and Education Group (Publication Distribution) 116 Lake View Parkway Suffolk, VA 23435-2697 d. Local reproduction is authorized and access to unclassified publications is unrestricted.However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified joint publications must be inaccordance with DOD Regulation 5200.1-R, Information Security Program.6. Distribution of Electronic Publications a. The Joint Staff will not print copies of electronic joint publications for distribution.Electronic versions are available at www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET), or http://nmcc20a.nmcc.smil.mil/dj9j7ead/doctrine/ (SIPRNET). b. Only approved joint publications and joint test publications are releasable outside thecombatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified joint publication toforeign governments or foreign nationals must be requested through the local embassy (DefenseAttaché Office) to DIA Foreign Liaison Office, PO-FL, Room 1E811, 7400 Defense Pentagon,Washington, DC 20301-7400. E-3
  • 105. Appendix E Intentionally BlankE-4 JP 3-13
  • 106. GLOSSARY PART I — ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMSAAR after action reportAOR area of responsibilityBDA battle damage assessmentC2 command and controlCA civil affairsCDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic CommandCE core elementCI counterintelligenceCJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of StaffCJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructionCJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manualCMO civil-military operationsCNA computer network attackCND computer network defenseCNE computer network exploitationCNO computer network operationsCOA course of actionCOMCAM combat cameraCOMSEC communications securityDIA Defense Intelligence AgencyDISA Defense Information Systems AgencyDOD Department of DefenseDODD Department of Defense directiveDODI Department of Defense instructionDOS Department of StateDSPD defense support to public diplomacyEA electronic attackEM electromagneticEP electronic protectionES electronic warfare supportEW electronic warfareEWCC electronic warfare coordination cellFPC final planning conferenceGEOINT geospatial intelligenceHQ headquarters GL-1
  • 107. GlossaryIA information assuranceIC intelligence communityIO information operationsIPB intelligence preparation of the battlespaceIPC initial planning conferenceIT information technologyJ-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staffJ-3 operations directorate of a joint staffJ-4 logistics directorate of a joint staffJ-6 communications system directorate of a joint staffJ-7 Operational Plans and Joint Force Development Directorate, Joint StaffJA judge advocateJCMA joint communications security (COMSEC) monitoring activityJCSE joint communications support elementJE joint experimentationJFC joint force commanderJIPB joint intelligence preparation of the battlespaceJNCC joint network operations control centerJOC joint operations centerJOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution SystemJP joint publicationJPO-STC Joint Program Office for Special Technology CountermeasuresJPOTF joint psychological operations task forceJRFL joint restricted frequency listJROC Joint Requirement Oversight CouncilJSC Joint Spectrum CenterJTCB joint targeting coordination boardJTF joint task forceJWAC joint warfare analysis centerLOAC law of armed conflictM&S modeling and simulationMASINT measurement and signature intelligenceMILDEC military deceptionMNF multinational forceMNFC multinational force commanderMOE measure of effectivenessMOP measure of performanceMPC mid-planning conferenceMSEL master scenario events listGL-2 JP 3-13
  • 108. GlossaryNDP national disclosure policyNETOPS network operationsNGA National Geospatial-Intelligence AgencyNGO nongovernmental organizationNSA National Security AgencyOPLAN operation planOPSEC operations securityOSD Office of the Secretary of DefensePA public affairsPD public diplomacyPIR priority intelligence requirementPOAT psychological operations assessment teamPSYOP psychological operationsRFI request for informationSecDef Secretary of DefenseSIGINT signals intelligenceSIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router NetworkSJFHQ standing joint force headquartersSME subject matter expertSOF special operations forcesSOP standing operating procedureSTARTEX start of the exerciseSTO special technical operationsTA target audienceTPFDD time-phased force and deployment dataTPFDL time-phased force and deployment listTSCP theater security cooperation planUJTL Universal Joint Task ListUSG United States GovernmentUSJFCOM United States Joint Forces CommandUSSOCOM United States Special Operations CommandUSSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command GL-3
  • 109. PART II — TERMS AND DEFINITIONSair tasking order. A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties, capabilities and/or forces to targets and specific missions. Normally provides specific instructions to include call signs, targets, controlling agencies, etc., as well as general instructions. Also called ATO. (JP 1-02)battlespace. The environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JP 1-02)campaign plan. A plan for a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. (JP 1-02)civil-military operations. The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil- military operations may be performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. Also called CMO. (JP 1-02)combatant command. A unified or specified command with a broad continuing mission under a single commander established and so designated by the President, through the Secretary of Defense and with the advice and assistance of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Combatant commands typically have geographic or functional responsibilities. (JP 1-02)combatant command (command authority). Nontransferable command authority established by title 10 (“Armed Forces”), United States Code, section 164, exercised only by commanders of unified or specified combatant commands unless otherwise directed by the President or the Secretary of Defense. Combatant command (command authority) cannot be delegated and is the authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command. Combatant command (command authority) should be exercised through the commanders of subordinate organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate joint force commanders and Service and/or functional component commanders. Combatant command (command authority) provides full authority to organize and employGL-4 JP 3-13
  • 110. Glossary commands and forces as the combatant commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. Operational control is inherent in combatant command (command authority). Also called COCOM. (JP 1-02)combat camera. The acquisition and utilization of still and motion imagery in support of combat, information, humanitarian, special force, intelligence, reconnaissance, engineering, legal, public affairs, and other operations involving the Military Services. Also called COMCAM. (JP 1-02)command and control. The exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. Also called C2. (JP 1-02)command and control warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)command relationships. The interrelated responsibilities between commanders, as well as the operational authority exercised by commanders in the chain of command; defined further as combatant command (command authority), operational control, tactical control, or support. (JP 1-02)communications security. The protection resulting from all measures designed to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from the possession and study of telecommunications, or to mislead unauthorized persons in their interpretation of the results of such possession and study. Communications security includes: cryptosecurity, transmission security, emission security, and physical security. Also called COMSEC. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)computer intrusion. An incident of unauthorized access to data or an automated information system. (JP 1-02)computer network attack. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. Also called CNA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)computer network defense. Actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect and respond to unauthorized activity within Department of Defense information systems and computer networks. Also called CND. (This term and its definition GL-5
  • 111. Glossary modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1- 02.)computer network exploitation. Enabling operations and intelligence collection capabilities conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks. Also called CNE. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)computer network operations. Comprised of computer network attack, computer network defense, and related computer network exploitation enabling operations. Also called CNO. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)concept of operations. A verbal or graphic statement, in broad outline, of a commander’s assumptions or intent in regard to an operation or series of operations. The concept of operations frequently is embodied in campaign plans and operation plans; in the latter case, particularly when the plans cover a series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. The concept is designed to give an overall picture of the operation. It is included primarily for additional clarity of purpose. Also called commander’s concept or CONOPS. (JP 1-02)coordinating authority. A commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more Military Departments, two or more joint force components, or two or more forces of the same Service. The commander or individual has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In the event that essential agreement cannot be obtained, the matter shall be referred to the appointing authority. Coordinating authority is a consultation relationship, not an authority through which command may be exercised. Coordinating authority is more applicable to planning and similar activities than to operations. (JP 1-02)counterintelligence. Information gathered and activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons, or international terrorist activities. Also called CI. (JP 1-02)cryptosecurity. The component of communications security that results from the provision of technically sound cryptosystems and their proper use. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)cyberspace. The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks. (JP 1-02)data. Representation of facts, concepts, or instructions in a formalized manner suitable for communication, interpretation, or processing by humans or by automatic means. AnyGL-6 JP 3-13
  • 112. Glossary representations such as characters or analog quantities to which meaning is or might be assigned. (JP 1-02)deception. Those measures designed to mislead the enemy by manipulation, distortion, or falsification of evidence to induce the enemy to react in a manner prejudicial to the enemy’s interests. (JP 1-02)defense support to public diplomacy. Those activities and measures taken by the Department of Defense components to support and facilitate public diplomacy efforts of the United States Government. Also called DSPD. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)defensive information operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)directed energy. An umbrella term covering technologies that relate to the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. Also called DE. (JP 1-02)electromagnetic spectrum. The range of frequencies of electromagnetic radiation from zero to infinity. It is divided into 26 alphabetically designated bands. See also electronic warfare. (JP 1-02)electromagnetic spectrum management. Planning, coordinating, and managing joint use of the electromagnetic spectrum through operational, engineering, and administrative procedures. The objective of spectrum management is to enable electronic systems to perform their functions in the intended environment without causing or suffering unacceptable interference. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)electronic warfare. Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. Also called EW. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. a. electronic attack. That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic energy, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability and is considered a form of fires. Also called EA. EA includes: 1) actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy’s effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception, and 2) employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (lasers, radio frequency weapons, particle beams). b. electronic protection. That division of electronic warfare involving passive and active means taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability. Also called EP. c. electronic warfare support. That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by, or under GL-7
  • 113. Glossary direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning and conduct of future operations. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting, and homing. Also called ES. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence, provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack, and produce measurement and signature intelligence. See also directed energy; electromagnetic spectrum. (JP 1-02)emission security. The component of communications security that results from all measures taken to deny unauthorized persons information of value that might be derived from intercept and analysis of compromising emanations from crypto-equipment and telecommunications systems. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)fires. Actions using lethal and nonlethal weapons to produce a specific effect on a target. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-0.)fire support. Fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. (JP 1-02)fire support coordination. The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons. (JP 1-02)geospatial intelligence. The exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical features and geographically reference activities on the Earth. Also called GEOINT. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 2-03.)Global Information Grid. The globally interconnected, end-to-end set of information capabilities, associated processes and personnel for collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing information on demand to warfighters, policy makers, and support personnel. The Global Information Grid includes owned and leased communications and computing systems and services, software (including applications), data, security services and other associated services and National Security Systems. Also called GIG. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)human factors. In information operations, the psychological, cultural, behavioral, and other human attributes that influence decision making, the flow of information, and the interpretation of information by individuals or groups at any level in a state or organization. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)GL-8 JP 3-13
  • 114. Glossaryinformation. 1. Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. 2. The meaning that a human assigns to data by means of the known conventions used in their representation. (JP 1-02)information assurance. Measures that protect and defend information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. This includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. Also called IA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information environment. The aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information operations. The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own. Also called IO. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information security. The protection of information and information systems against unauthorized access or modification of information, whether in storage, processing, or transit, and against denial of service to authorized users. Also called INFOSEC. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information superiority. The operational advantage derived from the ability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information system. The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components for the collection, processing, storage, transmission, display, dissemination, and disposition of information. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)information warfare. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)integration. 2. The arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole. (JP 1-02)intelligence preparation of the battlespace. An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential GL-9
  • 115. Glossary area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called IPB. (JP 1-02)interagency coordination. The coordination that occurs between agencies of the US Government, including the Department of Defense, for the purpose of accomplishing an objective. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-08.)joint fires. Fires produced during the employment of forces from two or more components in coordinated action toward a common objective. See also fires. (JP 1-02)joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace, and key waters. See also fire support; joint fires. (JP 1-02)joint targeting coordination board. A group formed by the joint force commander to accomplish broad targeting oversight functions that may include but are not limited to coordinating targeting information, providing targeting guidance and priorities, and refining the joint integrated prioritized target list. The board is normally comprised of representatives from the joint force staff, all components, and if required, component subordinate units. Also called JTCB. (JP 1-02)leveraging. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)military deception. Actions executed to deliberately mislead adversary military decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions, and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly forces mission. Also called MILDEC. See also deception. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 3-58.)offensive information operations. None. (Approved for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)operation. 1. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic, operational, tactical, service, training, or administrative military mission. 2. The process of carrying on combat, including movement, supply, attack, defense, and maneuvers needed to gain the objectives of any battle or campaign. (JP 1-02)operational art. The employment of military forces to attain strategic and/or operational objectives through the design, organization, integration, and conduct of strategies, campaigns, major operations, and battles. Operational art translates the joint force commander’s strategy into operational design and, ultimately, tactical action, by integrating the key activities at all levels of war. (JP 1-02)GL-10 JP 3-13
  • 116. Glossaryoperations security. A process of identifying critical information and subsequently analyzing friendly actions attendant to military operations and other activities to: a. identify those actions that can be observed by adversary intelligence systems; b. determine indicators that hostile intelligence systems might obtain that could be interpreted or pieced together to derive critical information in time to be useful to adversaries; and c. select and execute measures that eliminate or reduce to an acceptable level the vulnerabilities of friendly actions to adversary exploitation. Also called OPSEC. (JP 1-02)physical security. 1. That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. 2. In communications security, the component that results from all physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment, material, and documents from access thereto or observation thereof by unauthorized persons. See also communications security. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)psychological operations. Planned operations to convey selected information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. The purpose of psychological operations is to induce or reinforce foreign attitudes and behavior favorable to the originator’s objectives. Also called PSYOP. (JP 1-02)public affairs. Those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. Also called PA. (JP 1-02)public diplomacy. Those overt international public information activities of the United States Government designed to promote United States foreign policy objectives by seeking to understand, inform, and influence foreign audiences and opinion makers, and by broadening the dialogue between American citizens and institutions and their counterparts abroad. (JP 1-02)reachback. The process of obtaining products, services, and applications, or forces, or equipment, or material from organizations that are not forward deployed. (JP 1-02)space. A medium like the land, sea, and air within which military activities shall be conducted to achieve US national security objectives. (JP 1-02)space control. Combat, combat support, and combat service support operations to ensure freedom of action in space for the United States and its allies and, when directed, deny an adversary freedom of action in space. The space control mission area includes: surveillance of space; protection of US and friendly space systems; prevention of an adversary’s ability to use space systems and services for purposes hostile to US national security interests; negation GL-11
  • 117. Glossary of space systems and services used for purposes hostile to US national security interests; and directly supporting battle management, command, control, communications, and intelligence. (JP 1-02)strategic communication. Focused United States Government (USG) efforts to understand and engage key audiences in order to create, strengthen or preserve conditions favorable for the advancement of USG interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all elements of national power. (Approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)synchronization. 1. The arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time. (JP 1-02)target audience. An individual or group selected for influence. Also called TA. (This term and its definition modify the existing term and its definition and are approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02.)transmission security. The component of communications security that results from all measures designed to protect transmissions from interception and exploitation by means other than cryptanalysis. (This term and its definition are provided for information and are proposed for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02 by JP 6-0.)vulnerability analysis. None. (Approval for removal from the next edition of JP 1-02.)GL-12 JP 3-13
  • 118. JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY JP 1 JOINT WARFARE JP 0-2 UNAAF JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0 COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS LOGISTICS PLANS SYSTEMSAll joint doctrine is organized into a comprehensive hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint Publication(JP) 3-13 is in the Operations series of joint doctrine publications. The diagram below illustrates an overviewof the development process: STEP #1 Project Proposal STEP #5 l Submitted by Services, combatant commands, or STEP #2 Assessments/Revision Joint Staff to fill extant operational void Program Directive l J-7 validates requirement with Services and l The combatant commands receive l J-7 formally staffs with combatant commands the JP and begin to assess it during Services and combatant use l J-7 initiates Program Directive commands l 18 to 24 months following l Includes scope of project, publication, the Director J-7, will references, milestones, and solicit a written report from the who will develop drafts combatant commands and Services on the utility and quality of l J-7 releases Program each JP and the need for any Directive to Lead Agent. urgent changes or earlier-than- Lead Agent can be Service, scheduled revisions combatant command or Joint Staff (JS) Directorate l No later than 5 years after development, each JP is revised Project Proposal Assess- Program ments/ Directive Revision ENHANCED JOINT JOINT WARFIGHTING DOCTRINE CAPABILITY PUBLICATION CJCS Two Approval Drafts STEP #4 STEP #3 CJCS Approval Two Drafts l Lead Agent forwards proposed pub to Joint Staff l Lead Agent selects Primary Review Authority (PRA) to develop the pub l Joint Staff takes responsibility for pub, makes required changes and prepares pub for l PRA develops two draft pubs coordination with Services and combatant commands l PRA staffs each draft with combatant commands, Services, and Joint Staff l Joint Staff conducts formal staffing for approval as a JP

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