AUTHOR: TIGRAN TOROSYAN THE ORIGIN OF THE NAGORNO KARABAKH CONFLICT AND ITS ESCALATION INTO WAR Indeed, the study of a conflict cannot be exhaustive without a review of the historicaldevelopments preceding it. The present chapter treats the problems relating to the original causesand resumption of the Karabakh conflict in 1988 without touching upon its earlier history, whichis widely treated in a large number of works.1 The following lines by G. Starovoitova summarise the information conveyed by the majorityof these works, “Without going too far into the region’s ancient and medieval history, it shouldnevertheless be noted that the Armenian side can produce an impressive number of objectivesources suggesting that it has dominated the region for over a millennium. The Karabakhkhanate, incorporated into the Russian Empire in 1813, brought a Turkic population to the regionno earlier than the beginning of the eighteenth century, eventually establishing its rule over theArmenian majority. As in tsarist Russia, administrative boundaries were not drawn along ethniclines during this period in the region’s history.”2 A. Yamskov, who touched upon this problem in relation with another issue, reaches the sameconclusion: “As far as the Armenians are concerned, the problem is easy to resolve. TheArmenian population has been permanently living within the borders of Nagorno Karabakh for atleast two thousand years. It is also very well-known3 that in the 1920s, the Armenians constitutedabout 94 per cent of the permanent residents of the autonomous region.”4 In view of the fact that the Azerbaijanians led a nomadic life and historically NagornoKarabakh served them as a transit zone towards Alpine pastures, Yamskov considers that thisright of the Azerbaijanian nomads should be reckoned with during the resolution of the conflict. The Origin of the Karabakh Conflict The first quarter of the 20th century was marked with certain historical events well-documented in an abundance of works5 and bearing direct or indirect relation to the conflict ofKarabakh. This part of our work, however, does not thoroughly deal with that period: it will represent ananalysis of the events that were to prove decisive from the standpoint of the subsequentdevelopments and are still of great importance for the understanding of the logic and motivationof the contemporary processes. With this respect, of special significance are two issues, namelythe emergence of the state of ‘Azerbaijan’ and the roots of the Karabakh conflict. After the October Revolution of 1917, the newly-established Soviet Russian authorities facedthe task of consolidating their position not only in the capital, but also in the central parts of theformer Russian Empire. The period following the Revolution was marked with great instabilityin the remote regions of the Empire although the Bolsheviks made every possible endeavour tokeep the situation under control. In Transcaucasia this state of unsteadiness was especiallyflagrantly manifested in Baku, where reins of power shifted to the Baku Soviet Commune earlyin November (this body, however, had a very unstable rule). The instability that reigned in theremote regions of the Russian Empire during the first six months following its fall often grewinto anarchy thus creating quite favourable conditions for various forms of mutiny and armedclashes. Unprecedented as it was, great activity was observed within national parties. On 30 March1918, the Musavat Party of Caucasian Tatars rose in rebellion against the Commune of Baku.Two months later, three newly-established states were proclaimed in Transcaucasia: theRepublic of Armenia, the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan. Indeed, the restoration of Armenian and Georgian statehoods after the collapse of theRussian Empire was only natural. As for the establishment of the Democratic Republic ofAzerbaijan, which had advanced claims to the Provinces of Baku and Yelisavetpol as well as toNakhijevan, it can be explained in no other way but as the re-emergence of the Turkish factor inthe region as possessing quite a new quality. The territorial claims of the Democratic Republic ofAzerbaijan also pursued a definite objective, namely connection with Turkey via the routeNagorno-Karabakh-Zangezur-Nakhijevan. Of great interest are the assessments of this newly-emerged state offered by somecontemporary figures. One of them, B. Baikov, who held membership of the Russian NationalCouncil of Baku between 1918 and 1919, wrote the following, “To have a clear understanding ofthose standing behind the idea of that new state and of the goals it pursued, one should imaginewhat that newly-established republic was like in the light of history. Those two provinces (Bakuand Yelisavetpol) have never constituted a joint political entity. They have never had a commonname, let alone ‘Azerbaijan.’ This name is used with reference to one of the northern provincesof present-day Persia. The new state appropriated a geographical name which pertains to a partof another state.”6 The word ‘Azerbaijanian,’ as denoting the people living in this state and the language used bythem, was to come into being only years later, viz. as a result of the establishment of the state ofAzerbaijan. This is a rare example in universal history: the state founded entailed the emergenceof a people and a language whose names derive from the name of that state. Those whoassumed the ethnonym ‘Azerbaijanian’ or ‘Azerbaijani’ in 19367 did not even have a recognisedcommon name: they were referred to as Tatars,8 Mussulmans9 or Turkis10 and spoke the Turkishlanguage. This was established in a decree on the Nationalisation (Azerification) of the State Institutionsof the Azerbaijanian SSR issued by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan on 31 July1923: “From the moment of the establishment of Soviet rule in Azerbaijan, the Turkishlanguage, i.e. the majority language [in the country], was proclaimed as official language. “The language of communication with the Autonomous Oblast [Region] of Karabakh isArmenian.”11 The available indisputable facts come to attest to the truthfulness of the words of Professor ofMassachusetts University Alstadt stating that the Azerbaijanian identity originated in the Sovietperiod, for the Azeries, just like the Uzbek and the Kazakh, merely represented semi-nomadicTurkic tribes before the establishment of Russian rule in the region. Alstadt continues that forthem, clannish and family connections were the marginal elements of social organisation.12 During this period of immense significance to the future of the whole region of Transcaucasia,Turkey did not hide its interest in the events unfolding there and strove hard to secure itspresence in Baku, at the same time also settling the problem of the Armenians’ extermination.Although Turkey was not living through its best times, it was able to predict the inevitability ofthe emergence of new states and could not keep aloof from the ongoing events that were ofpivotal significance to it, given its far-reaching goals. Several days before the proclamation ofthe ADR, on 23 May 1918, Ambassador of Germany to the Ottoman Empire Bernsdorf wrote ina telegraph addressed to the German Foreign Office, that the Turks took control over theProvinces of Yelisavetpol and Baku with the support of the local Tatar population. He also addsin the same telegraph that the Turkish army kept on plundering the Armenian towns andslaughtering their inhabitants, being always accompanied by Kurdish and Tatar volunteers.13 Even after the declaration of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan, when the Musavat Partytook the reins of power in Baku, Turkey did not give up its plans for securing its militarypresence there, another fact proving that it did pursue far-reaching objectives. Moreover, whenthe first congress of the accredited representatives of the people of Nagorno Karabakh, heldbetween 22 and 26 July, renounced Musavatist Azerbaijan’s claims to Nagorno Karabakh andestablished a people’s government, this made Nagorno Karabakh another important target forTurkey. In a report dated Tiflis, 4 August 1918, General Kres von Kresenchtein, the Head of the
German Mission in Caucasia, wrote to Germany’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the Turks hadattempted to invade the purely Armenian Province of Karabakh and disarm the localpopulation. He warned that if they did not take any measures to prevent it, the mountaineers ofKarabakh who were able to defend themselves would inevitably struggle against the Muslims.14 On 15 September, the Turkish troops took Baku and what they did there first of all was toperpetrate a massacre among the Armenians living in the city, as evidenced by an eye-witness,B. Baikov: “The mass slaughter of the Armenians [launched] by the dregs from the very firstdays of the conquest of Baku was not prevented at all. It was stopped only after the local foreignconsuls as well as the Russian and Jewish public figures had made a number of speeches [againstit].”15 According to Officer of the German Secret Service East of Constantinople Wilhelm Litten,30,000 Armenians fell victim to the carnage in Baku.16 However, this was only the tip of the iceberg. The very existence of the Armenian-populatedregion of Karabakh posed a major obstacle for the realisation of the Turko-Tatar plans and due tothis fact, ten days later, on 24 September, the Turkish army units, led by Nuri Pasha, enteredKarabakh from the side of Aghdam and invaded Shushi, their ultimate goal being the subjugationof Nagorno Karabakh to Azerbaijan. The Armenians of the region were able to organise theirself-defence quite rapidly, and on 17 October, the large units of the Turkish occupation armywere defeated at Msmna. Nor was Turkey victorious on the other fronts so that a short time laterit was obliged to admit its defeat by the Entente. In accordance with the Peace Treaty of Mudrossigned on 30 October, the Turkish troops were pulled back from Transcaucasia. Within a shorttime (on 17 November), English troops were deployed in Baku, but this did not change thesituation of Karabakh Armenians for the better. On the contrary, the British Military Missionstationed in Shushi did not make the slightest attempt to settle the problems facing these peopleand appointed Sultanov as Governor General early in May 1919. This designation aroused astorm of protest both by the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh and the authorities of the Republicof Armenia, for it exposed an apparently biassed attitude towards one of the disputant partiesclaiming possession of the region in that atmosphere of ethnic tension. In addition, thatassignment was a rude challenge to the Armenians as Sultanov was notorious for his flagranthatred for Armenians. Truly, the consequences of his appointment in that position soon revealedthemselves: within a month, i.e. on 4 June, the slaughter of the Armenian inhabitants of thevillages adjacent to Shushi was perpetrated under Sultanov’s poorly-veiled command and thepassiveness of the British Military Mission.17 In order to appease the situation in view of the consideration that “...the fate of NagornoKarabakh is to be determined at the Peace Conference and clashes are disastrous for thepopulation of Karabakh,”18 on 26 August, the National Council of Nagorno Karabakh signed aninterim agreement with Azerbaijan under which Nagorno Karabakh (the Districts of Shushi,Jevanshir and Jebrail) was provisionally put within the borders of Azerbaijan until the PeaceConference of Paris. Of special interest is the fact that by signing this agreement, the Democratic Republic ofAzerbaijan actually recognised—despite its territorial claims—the National Council of NagornoKarabakh as an equal legal entity and a legitimate body entitled to defend the interests ofNagorno Karabakh. Nevertheless, even this agreement did not put an end to the intrigues andviolations committed by Azerbaijan. The climax of all this was the invasion of the multi-ethniccity of Shushi by Tatar troops on 23 March 1920, followed by plunder, conflagration andmassacre amidst the local Armenian population. In the aftermath of this carnage, Shushi turnedinto a Tatar (later Azerbaijani - T. T.) citadel.19 Dwelling on these events in a report of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party ofRussia submitted at the first conference of the Communist Parties of Transcaucasia, G.Orjonikidze said, “In the Dashnaks’ times, the City of Shushi was devastated, with its Armenianpart being totally wiped out.”20
The 9th conference of the peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh, held between 23 and 29 April,annulled the interim agreement signed by the 7th conference and subsequently “...violated by theAzerbaijani Government as the Azerbaijani troops have launched attacks against the peacefulcivilian population of Karabakh and have slaughtered the inhabitants of Shushi and theneighbouring villages.”21 The conference also made a declaration about Nagorno Karabakh’s incorporation intoArmenia. The resolution of the conference was further reinforced with the Bolsheviks’ coming to powerin Azerbaijan on 28 April 1920. The new authorities of Azerbaijan did not recognise thelegitimacy of their predecessors and therefore, they did not acknowledge Soviet Azerbaijan as alegal successor of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan. Anyway, the Sovietisation of Azerbaijan was to rapidly become a serious factor in thesettlement process of the problem of Nagorno Karabakh, a factor that ran absolutely counter tothe interests of Nagorno Karabakh. Two months later, J. Stalin wrote the following to G.Orjonikidze in a telegram dated 8 July, “To my mind, it is impossible to endlessly manoeuvrebetween the parties and we should definitely take sides with one of them; in this case, indeed, itis Azerbaijan with Turkey. I have already spoken to Lenin: he does not mind this.”22 In May the Bolsheviks took power in Karabakh as well, but it did not prove of any essentialimpact on the general situation. It was the orientation of the foreign politics of the Republic ofArmenia and not that of Nagorno Karabakh that mattered most to Russia. After the Sovietization of Azerbaijan, Armenia had to direct its struggling forces not onlyagainst the Turkish and Azerbaijani troops, but also the 11th Red Army. In fact, Russia wasengaged in war against Armenia. In August the Republic of Armenia and the Soviet SocialistFederative Republic of Russia signed an agreement on cessation of arms. 23 Nevertheless, the11th Red Army remained as the most important tool for the implementation of the Russianpolicy in Transcaucasia, since the issue of the Sovietisation of the region comprised a core point,i.e. the question of the belonging of Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Karabakh that was of fatalsignificance to Armenia, Turkey and Azerbaijan. Not only did the 11th Red Army attempt tokeep these three disputed territories under control and impede the actions of the Armenian troopsthere, but it also often supported the Turkish and Azerbaijani army units in their movements. The Armenian Revolutionary Committee, established in Azerbaijan on 29 November,declared Armenia as a Soviet Socialist Republic. On 2 December, this Committee seized powerin Yerevan assisted by the 11th Red Army. Now the entire region of Transcaucasia was underthe Bolshevik rule and the settlement of all problems, including the so-called “disputedterritories” (Nagorno Karabakh, Zangezur, Nakhijevan) was dictated from Moscow. B. Legran,the accredited representative of SSFR in Armenia, was actively engaged in conductingnegotiations and kept daily contact with People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs G. Chicherin.However, it was Stalin and Orjonikidze that had a most decisive influence on the subsequentdevelopment of events. On 2 December, G. Orjonikidze, who held membership of the CaucasianBureau of the Russian Communist Party and of the Revolutionary Military Council of theCaucasian front, sent a telegram to Lenin and Stalin: “Convey to Comrades Lenin and Stalin thefollowing: we have just received an announcement from Yerevan stating that Soviet rule hasalready been proclaimed there [and] the former authorities have been overthrown... YesterdayAzerbaijan made a declaration about shifting Nakhijevan, Zangezur and Nagorno Karabakh toSoviet Armenia.”24 The declaration of the Revolutionary Committee of Azerbaijan, adopted on 30 November andpublished in the Communist newspaper of Baku on 2 December, read slightly different from theaforementioned lines: “The territories of the Districts of Zangezur and Nakhijevan constituteinseparable parts of Soviet Armenia and the working peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh are grantedwith a full right to self-determination.”25 Two days later, on 4 December, the Pravda newspaper published an article in which Stalindeclared that the Soviet authorities had found a solution to the Armenian question, namely,
Azerbaijan had voluntarily annulled all its claims to the disputed territories and placedNakhijevan, Zangezur and Nagorno Karabakh into the possession of Soviet Armenia.26 The following day the authorities of Russia declared that “upon getting the news of therevolution made in Armenia and the establishment of Soviet rule there, the Soviet RussianGovernment immediately made a decision to place the disputed territories of Zangezur, NagornoKarabakh and Nakhijevan within [the borders of] Soviet Armenia.”27 Nevertheless, this period was to last but a very short time. Fully realising the danger thechange of the situation was fraught with, Turkey turned to drastic measures threatening Russiawith establishing alliance with its former enemy, the Entente. In February 1921, anti-Bolshevik revolts broke out in a number of settlements in Armenia andthe Bolsheviks lost the reins of power. Under these circumstances, the issue of the “disputedterritories” again became a subject of fervent discussions and multi-step, complicatedcombinations. First and foremost, the question of Nakhijevan was “cut off” from the generalproblem of the “disputed territories.” Russia’s stance concerning it was well-expressed andirreversible: “…as far as Nakhijevan is concerned, the final word remains with the representativeof Azerbaijan.”28 This is what Stalin wrote to People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of theRSSFR Chicherin on 6 March 1921. Within a short time, this decision was firmly established inthe Russo-Turkish Treaty of Moscow signed on 16 March. As a bilateral treaty which alsoincorporates solutions to problems directly relating to another two countries, i.e. Armenia andAzerbaijan, this document is extremely untenable, as assessed within the framework ofinternational law. The subsequent course of history, however, was not favourable for having itreconsidered. Practically, this was especially impossible given the fact that six months after theconclusion of the Treaty of Moscow, i.e. on 13 October, Turkey and the Soviet SocialistRepublics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed the Treaty of Kars, with Russia playing amost influential role in its conclusion. Formal as it was, this treaty represented an amendment tothe juridical flaws of the previous agreement. As of the spring of 1921, there did not exist the same clarity with regard to the NagornoKarabakh problem, but the clock of history had already begun turning back. The telegram G.Orjonikidze and S. Kirov addressed to the Chairman of Soviet Azerbaijan’s Council of Peoples’Commissars on 26 June still reflected some hopes of reaching a settlement acceptable for thepeople of Karabakh: “For the purpose of establishing truly friendly relations, it is necessary to beguided by the following principle while seeking a solution to the problem of Karabakh: noArmenian-inhabited village should be incorporated into Azerbaijan and in the same way, noMuslim-populated village should be incorporated into Armenia.”29 However, Azerbaijan, that had strengthened its positions and succeeded in removing thequestion of Nakhijevan from the agenda, was not slow in giving a resolute answer. The jointsession of the Political Bureau of Azerbaijan’s Central Committee and the Bureau forOrganisational Matters that was convened the following day, i.e. on 27 June, decided “… toconsider the separation of Armenian- and Turkish-inhabited settlements for the purpose ofshifting them to Armenia and Azerbaijan respectively as unacceptable from the standpoint ofadministrative and economic expediency.”30 By mid-April, the Armenian Bolsheviks had already suppressed the revolt with the support ofthe Russian Red Army and restored their power, but those two months were enough for Turkeyand Azerbaijan to settle all the problems they were interested in, although not so “easily” as thatof Nakhijevan. Of fatal significance proved two decisions adopted by the Caucasian Bureau ofthe Central Committee of the Communist (Workers’) Party of Russia. Two variants of resolvingthe problem of Karabakh were put under consideration at the session held on 4 July, viz. to leaveKarabakh within the borders of Azerbaijan or to incorporate the mountainous part of Karabakhinto Armenia. The session decided “… c) to incorporate the mountainous part of Karabakh intoArmenia [and] to hold a referendum in the mountainous part of Karabakh, with Orjonikidze,Myasnikov, Figatner [and] Kirov voting for it.
“On Narimanov’s suggestion it was decided to leave the final settlement of the issue for theCentral Committee of the Communist (Workers’) Party of Russia.”31 The voters for the reversed variant stipulating that Karabakh should remain within the bordersof Azerbaijan were Nazaretian, Narimanov and Makharadze. The following day (5 July), on Orjonikidze’s and Nazaretian’s demand the issue wasreconsidered in favour of leaving Nagorno Karabakh within the frontiers of Azerbaijan “out ofthe need for peace between the Moslems and the Armenians.”32 The final decision concerning the fate of Karabakh was not only unacceptable for theArmenian side, but also illegal, for the party-affiliated body of a third country had adopted adecision on the territorial problems concerning two other states and there was no bilateralagreement signed. Perhaps, it is not incidental that the minutes of this decision omit the results ofvoting. These drastic turns that seem rather strange at first sight actually have quite a simpleexplanation: the point is that this problem as well as all the subsequent issues were resolved inMoscow where no conventions were reckoned with and every resolution made was motivated bythe objectives of the Bolshevik leadership. In compliance with a decision made by the Central Executive Committee of Azerbaijan, on 7July 1923, the Autonomous Oblast (Region) of Karabakh was established, and a mixedcommittee of the representatives of the authorities of Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan wascharged with ascertaining its borders within a month. The borders of the newly-establishedautonomous region were drawn absolutely arbitrarily so that its territory left out considerableportions of Nagorno Karabakh from the west, north and south. In several years’ time, some othermajor settlements of Northern Artsakh, 10 in number, were placed within the territory ofShamkhor District. In the 1930s, Azerbaijan finally succeeded in stripping Nagorno Karabakh ofa common border with Armenia. The Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh who enjoyed an overwhelming majority thererepeatedly applied to the Soviet authorities with a petition to reconsider the issue of thebelonging of Nagorno Karabakh. There exists an abundance of factual material proving that theArmenian inhabitants of the region were constantly subjected to discrimination and pressure. Letus mention just a few examples to show this. The Soviet Union had eight autonomous regions. During the period between theirestablishment and the year 1986, in each of these regions the population initially grew by 60 percent and then became four times larger. The same, however, cannot be said about NagornoKarabakh, where the population increased by only 12 per cent, which runs counter to the birthrate registered in the region in those years. In addition, in the same years, the populations ofArmenia and Azerbaijan grew several times larger. In an interview given in 2002 Azerbaijan’s former president H. Aliyev did not even attempt toveil the state policy of discrimination that Azerbaijan implemented against Nagorno Karabakh:“That problem [i.e. the problem of Nagorno Karabakh - T. T.] has existed since the early 20thcentury. The Soviet period did not pass without difficulties either, but we kept the situation inNagorno Karabakh under control. How did we do that? “First of all, the Soviet regime was of great help to us. Besides, I made a great contribution tothe development of Nagorno Karabakh—I mean during the period when I was First Secretary. Inthe meantime, I tried to change the demography [of the region]. Nagorno Karabakh raised theissue of opening an Institute there. I decided to do so, but on condition that it should have threedepartments: Armenian, Russian and Azerbaijani. It was there and not to Baku that we sent theAzerbaijanis coming from the adjacent districts. We opened a large shoe factory in Stepanakert,but it did not have workforce, so we sent Azerbaijanis there from the neighbouring districts ofthe region. By using this and other means I attempted to make the number of Azerbaijanis inNagorno Karabakh larger and reduce the number of the Armenians.”33 This policy was typical of not only Aliyev, but also all the other leaders of Azerbaijan. Formore than fifty years the Armenian population of Nagorno Karabakh did not manifest any
growth: it was only in 1979 that their number became equal to the figures registered as of 1921,although the birth rate in the region was higher than the average in Transcaucasia. In addition,the correlation of the Azerbaijanis unfailingly increased as contrasted with that of theArmenians: thus, in 1921 the latter constituted 94.6 per cent of the region’s population; in 1979they formed 75.9 per cent, whereas during the same period, the former grew from 5 to 22.9 percent. Prominent Russian sociologist Zdravomislov provides a summary of reasons substantiatingthe petition of the Council of the People’s Deputies of the Autonomous Region of NagornoKarabakh for seceding from Soviet Azerbaijan and incorporating into Soviet Armenia. Althoughfar from being exhaustive, his list of reasons is, nevertheless, impressive: “Those who form anidea about the evolution of the conflict with the help of a map can consider that decision quitenatural: Nagorno Karabakh is separated from Armenia by a narrow strip of land. Most of thepopulation of the autonomous region were the Armenians who had long been suffering all thehardships of being granted autonomy only formally. There existed some problems connectedwith the teaching of the Armenian language at schools. Direct communication between Armeniaand the Autonomous Region of Nagorno Karabakh was very difficult to maintain as it was heldvia Baku and was controlled by the Azerbaijani authorities. Manpower policy in the region wasconducted to the advantage of the Azerbaijanis.”34During this period, Nagorno Karabakh was slowly living through exactly what had taken place inNakhijevan: Azerbaijan was consistently changing the demographic composition of the regionby violence, pressure and discrimination. Those in Nagorno Karabakh fully realised that as soonas the correlation of the Armenians and Azerbaijanis approached the limit of 50/50, that processwould drastically grow swifter, and the fate of Nakhijevan would become real for them as well:in 1988 the very last Armenian-inhabited village was forced into deportation in Nakhijevan andtoday it is totally stripped of its Armenian population.
REFERENCES 1 Asenbauer H. On the Right of Self-Determination of the Armenian People of Nagorno-Karabakh. New York. 1996. Chorbajian L.,Donabedian P., Mutafian C. The Caucasian Knot. The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London & New Jersey, 1994. 2 Starovoitova G. Sovereignty after Empire. Self-Determination Movements in the Former Soviet Union. Institute of Peace (USA), 1996.http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks19/chap3_19.html 3 Àçåðáàéäæàíñêàÿ ñåëüñêîõîçÿéñòâåííàÿ ïåðåïèñü 1921 ãîäà: Èòîãè. Áàêó, 1924, ò. 3, âûï. 17 (Agricultural Census of Azerbaijan (1921):Total Results. Baku, 1924, vol. 3, part 17). 4 ßìñêîâ À. Òðàäèöèîííîå çåìëåèñïîëüçîâàíèå êî÷åâíèêîâ èñòîðè÷åñêîãî Êàðàáàõà è ñîâðåìåííûé àðìÿíî-àçåðáàéäæàíñêèé ýòíîòåððèòîðèàëüíûéêîíôëèêò. Ôàêòîð ýòíîêîíôåññèîíàëüíîé ñàìîáûòíîñòè â ïîñòñîâåòñêîì îáùåñòâå. Ðåä.: Îëêîòò Ì., Ìàëàøåíêî À., Ìîñêâà, 1998, ñ. 171 (Yamskov, A. TheTraditional Use of Land by the Nomads of Historical Karabakh & the Contemporary Armeno-Azerbaijani Ethno-Territorial Conflict. In: TheFactor of Ethno-Confessional Originality in the Post-Soviet Society. Edited by Olkot, M. & Malashenko, A. Moscow, 1998, p. 171). 5 Íàãîðíûé Êàðàáàõ â 1918-1923 ãã. Ñáîðíèê äîêóìåíòîâ è ìàòåðèàëîâ. Åðåâàí, 1992; Íàãîðíûé Êàðàáàõ â ìåæäóíàðîäíîì ïðàâå è ìèðîâîé ïîëèòèêå.Äîêóìåíòû è êîììåíòàðèé. Ñîñò., îòâåò. ðåä. Þ. Ã. Áàðñåãîâ. Â 2 ò., ò. 1, Ì., 2008 (Nagorno Karabakh between 1918 and 1923. Collection ofDocuments and Materials. Yerevan, 1992; Nagorno Karabakh in International Law & World Politics. Documents and Comments. Compiled byEditor-in-Chief Barseghov, Yu. G. In 2 volumes, vol. 1, Moscow, 2008); Chorbajian L., Donabedian P., Mutafian C. The Caucasian Knot.The History and Geopolitics of Nagorno-Karabagh. London & New Jersey, 1994). 6 Áàéêîâ Á. Ë. Âîñïîìèíàíèÿ î ðåâîëþöèè â Çàêàâêàçüå (1918-1920ã.ã.). Àðõèâ ðóññêîé ðåâîëþöèè, ò. IX, Áåðëèí, 1923 (Baikov, B. L.Memoirs about the Revolution in Transcaucasia (1918 to 1920). Archives of the Russian Revolution, vol. 9, Berlin, 1923). 7 Àëåêïåðîâ À. Èññëåäîâàíèÿ ïî àðõåîëîãèè è ýòíîãðàôèè Àçåðáàéäæàíà, Áàêó. 1960, ñ. 71 (Alekperov, A. Studies of the Archaeology andEthnography of Azerbaijan. Baku, 1960, p. 71). 8 The Armenian Genocide during the First World War/W. and S. Gust (ed.) in Cooperation with Taner Akcam: Documents from GermanState Archives. [A-2187.DE/PA-AA/R14100.DuA Dok. 395(re). 1918-05-23-DE-001]. 9 Äîêëàäíàÿ çàïèñêà ïîëíîìî÷íîãî ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ ÀçÑÑÐ â ÐÑÔÑÐ Á. Øàõòàõòèíñêîãî Ïðåäñåäàòåëþ Ñîâíàðêîìà Â. Ëåíèíó. ÏÀÀÔ ÈÌË, ô.1022, îï. 5, ä. 56, ë. 1 (The Report of the Accredited Representative of Soviet Azerbaijan in the Soviet Socialist Federal Republic of Russia, B.Shakhtakhtinski, to Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars V. Lenin. Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism: Fundof Azerbaijan, fund 1022, list 5, file 56, p. 1). 10 Ïðîòîêîë ñîâìåñòíîãî çàñåäàíèÿ Ïîëèòáþðî è Îðãáþðî ÖÊ ÀçÊÏ. ÖÏÀ ÈÌË, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 117, ë. 41-42 (Minutes of the Joint Sitting of thePolitburo and Buraeu for Organisational Affairs of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijani Communist Party. Central Party Archives of theInstitute of Marxism and Leninism, fund 64, list 2, file 117, pp. 41-42). 11 Äåêðåò ÀçÖÈÊà î íàöèîíàëèçàöèè (àçåðáàéäæàíèçàöèè) ãîñóäàðñòâåííûõ ó÷ðåæäåíèé â Àçåð. ÑÑÐ. Ñîáðàíèå óçàêîíåíèé è ðàñïîðÿæåíèéÐàáî÷å-Êðåñòÿíñêîãî Ïðàâèòåëüñòâà ÀÑÑÐ â 1923 ã., ñ. 399. “Áàêèíñêèé ðàáî÷èé,” 1 àâãóñòà 1923 ã. (The Decree of the Central ExecutiveCommittee of Azerbaijan on the Nationalisation (Azerification) of State Institutions in the Azerbaijani SSR. In: Collection of Statutes & Decreesof the Workers’ and Peasants’ Government of the Azerbaijani SSR in 1923, p. 399. Bakinski Rabochi, 1 August 1923). 12 Alstadt A. The Azerbaijani Turks. Stanford. 1992, pp. 8-9. 13 The Armenian Genocide during the First World War/W. and S. Gust (ed.) in Cooperation with Taner Akcam: Documents from GermanState Archives. [A-2187.DE/PA-AA/R14100.DuA Dok. 395 (re). 1918-05-23-DE-001]. 14 The Armenian Genocide during the First World War/W. and Sigrid Gust (ed.) in Cooperation with Taner Akcam: Documents fromGerman State Archives. [A-34415.DE/PA-AA/R14104.DuA Dok. 424 (re.gk). 1918-08-15-DE-001]. 15 Áàéêîâ Á. Ë. Âîñïîìèíàíèÿ î ðåâîëþöèè â Çàêàâêàçüå (1918-1920 ãã.). Îïóáë. â ñáîðíèêå “Àðõèâ ðóññêîé ðåâîëþöèè,” ò. IX, Áåðëèí, 1923(Baikov, B. L. Memoirs about the Revolution in Transcaucasia (1918 to 1920). Archives of the Russian Revolution, vol. 9, Berlin, 1923). 16 Hopkirk P. On Secret Service East of Constantinople. London: John Murray, 1994. 17 Äîíåñåíèå ïðåäñòàâèòåëÿ áðèòàíñêîé âîåííîé ìèññèè â Øóøå ïðàâèòåëüñòâó Àçåðáàéäæàíà î ðåçíå àðìÿí è ïîãðîìàõ â ã. Øóøå, ïðèëåãàþùèõ êãîðîäó ñåëåíèÿõ è ïîòâîðñòâå ýòîìó øóøèíñêîãî ãåíåðàë-ãóáåðíàòîðà. Íàöèîíàëüíûé àðõèâ Àðìåíèè (ÍÀÀ), ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 309, ë. 165. Çàâåðåííàÿêîïèÿ (The Dispatch of the Representative of the British Military Mission in Shushi to the Government of Azerbaijan on the Slaughter andPogrom of the Armenians in the City of Shushi, and in the Villages Adjacent to it, and on the Connivance of the Governor General of Shushi atall that. In: National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 309, p. 165. Attested Copy). 18 ÍÀÀ, ô. 57, îï. 5, ä. 202, ë. 3-4 è îá. Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (National Archives of Armenia, fund 57, list 5, file 202, pp. 3-4; AttestedCopy. Typescript). 19 See Gore, P. W. ‘Tis Some Poor Fellow’s Skull. Post-Soviet Warfare in the Southern Caucasus. Lincoln, 2008. 20 Ïîëèòè÷åñêèé îò÷åò Êàâáþðî ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á), ñäåëàííûé Ã. Îðäæîíèêèäçå íà ñúåçäå êîììóíèñòè÷åñêèõ îðãàíèçàöèé Çàêàâêàçüÿ. “Áàêèíñêèéðàáî÷èé,” 1922 ã., 24 ôåâðàëÿ (The Political Report of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist (Bolsheviks’) Party ofRussia, Made by G. Orjonikidze at the Congress of the Communistic Organisations of Transcaucasia/. In: Bakinski Rabochi, 1922, 24 February). 21 Ïîñòàíîâëåíèå IX ñúåçäà êðåñòüÿíñòâà Íàãîðíîãî Êàðàáàõà îá àííóëèðîâàíèè âðåìåííîãî ñîãëàøåíèÿ, çàêëþ÷åííîãî ðåøåíèåì VII ñúåçäà ñïðàâèòåëüñòâîì Àçåðáàéäæàíà. ÍÀÀ, ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 581, ë. 98 (The Resolution of the 9th Congress of the Peasantry of Nagorno Karabakh on theAbrogation of the Interim Agreement Signed on Decision of the 7th Congress with the Government of Azerbaijan. National Archives ofArmenia, fund 200, list 1, file 581, p. 98). 22 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 1, ä. 4018, ë. 1. Òåëåãðàôíûé áëàíê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 1, file 4018,p. 1. Message Form). 23 ÍÀÀ, ô. 200, îï. 1, ä. 581, ë. 262 (National Archives of Armenia, fund 200, list 1, file 581, p. 262). 24 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 1, ä. 3318, ë. 1-2. Ïîäëèííèê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 1, file 3318, pp. 1-2.Original). 25 Ãàçåòà “Êîììóíèñò,” Áàêó, 2 äåêàáðÿ 1920 ã. (Communist, Baku, 2 December 1920). 26 Ãàçåòà “Ïðàâäà,” No. 273, 4 äåêàáðÿ, 1920 ã. (Pravda, No. 273, 4 December 1920). 27 Ãàçåòà “Ñëîâî,” 7 äåêàáðÿ, 1920 ã. (Slovo, 7 December 1920). 28 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 558, îï. 11, ä. 824, ë. 8. Ïîäëèííèê (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 558, list 11, file 824, p. 8.Original). 29 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 229, ë. 1-2 (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 85, list 18, file 229, pp. 1-2). 30 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 117, ë. 41-42. Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (State Russian Archives of Social and Political History, fund 64, list 2,file 117, pp. 41-42. Attested copy. Typescript). 31 Ïðîòîêîë çàñåäàíèÿ ïëåíóìà Êàâáþðî ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á) è ïîñòàíîâëåíèå î âêëþ÷åíèè Íàãîðíîãî Êàðàáàõà â ñîñòàâ Ñîâåòñêîé Àðìåíèè è î ïåðåíåñåíèèâîïðîñà íà îêîí÷àòåëüíîå ðåøåíèå â ÖÊ ÐÊÏ(á). ÖÏÀ ÈÌË, ô. 64, îï. 2, ä. 1, ë. 118, ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 58, ë. 17. Êîïèÿ. Ìàøèíîïèñü (Minutes of the PlenarySession of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist (Bolsheviks) Party and Resolution on the Incorporation of NagornoKarabakh into Soviet Armenia and on Confining the Issue to the Final Decision of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist(Bolsheviks) Party. Central Party Archives of the Institute of Marxism and Leninism, fund 64, list 2, file 1, p. 118; fund 85, list 18, file 58, p. 17.Copy. Typescript). 32 ÐÃÀÑÏÈ, ô. 17, îï. 13, ä. 384, ë. 67, Çàâåðåííàÿ êîïèÿ; ô. 85, îï. 18, ä. 58, ë. 18. Ìàøèíîïèñü (State Russian Archives of Social and PoliticalHistory, fund 17, list 13, file 384, p. 67, attested copy; fund 85, list 18, file 58, p. 18. Typescript).
33 “Áàêèíñêèé ðàáî÷èé,” 25 èþëÿ, 2002 ã., Nî. 139 (24318) /Bakinski Rabochi, 25 July 2002, No. 139 (24318); www.Zerkalo.az.24.07.2002/. 34 Çäðàâîìûñëîâ À. Ìåæíàöèîíàëüíûå êîíôëèêòû â ïîñòñîâåòñêîì ïðîñòðàíñòâå. Ì., 1999, ñ. 15 (Zdravomislov, A. Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in thePost-Soviet Space. Moscow, 1999, p. 15).