An Archetype for European Security
Lt Col Ramon Martinez
U. S. Air Force National Defense Fellow
Graduate School of Intern...
AN ARCHETYPEFOREUROPEANSECURITY
.:SUMMARY
This paper examines the causes and solutions to the problem of
military security...
TABLE OF CONTENTS
An Uncertain Europe.. 1
A Scientific Analysis of War.. 2
International Wars.. 2
Alliances..... .12
'Pola...
AN iTN('F.RTAiN F.iTRnPF.
In a short span of time, Europe has witnessed a myriad of
changes. While the Union of Soviet Soc...
background, a new picture emerges and each truth gains meaning in
relation to the picture. It is the thesis of this paper ...
Batt3e De~dtYle
per
Nat£ern MonY_hs
1D7.
59.5
93.:0
65,-0
57::1!
45.;5
3f1.0
A~3..0
58:5
44.:D
52.0
106.0
78>:0
39.;11
101...
The following data from table 2 displays selected national
performances in total international war participation and, in b...
Yet, while reverting to a pre-nineteenth century alliance pattern
and experiencing a dramatic increase in minor power conf...
Attempting to clarify the classic polarity debate, Frank
Whelon Wayman asseverates the concept of polarity has different
m...
general war; however, in contrast to the twentieth century, wars
:..were low in magnitude, severity, and duration. In disc...
Throughout the entire period, empirical data manifest that 61%
of alliance constituents are disposed to remain neutral whe...
impossible.
Supporting and amplifying the hypothesis that alliances act as
a contagion mechanism, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and S...
execute foreign policies which subsequently threaten the security
of foreign nations. The actions and reactions of foreign...
Wallensteen asserts, "the record suggests that the pursuit of such
confrontations in general and among the major powers in
particular.j40 Although universalists and particularist periods
'a...
policies. Since, in many instances, major powers divided or
'controlled vanquished powers, they unfairly distributed burde...
27
1'~~ DISTRIBUTION OFPOWER AND GROWTIiRATE
A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler investigate the distribution
of power in the in...
` reveal that international wars are neither increasing nor
decreasing. Although international wars remain a constant huma...
policies avoided major/major power wars. Established after
;major/major wars, universalist policies coordinated constructi...
to establish a new international order based on the principles of
compensation, legitimacy, and a balance of power. The Gr...
defense requires small military forces.
Table 4 illustrates Europe has supported 12 enduring regional
rrivalries with 185 ...
'NATO established mechanisms eliminating conflicting international
economic policies, and promoted political, economic, an...
forces."SZ
National security issues will be primarily resolved through
political means. Former Soviet President Mikhail Go...
Organization, demised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, emerging
Commonwealth of Independent States, and French indepen...
strategically necessary nor politically viable.j54 The premises
establishing forward defense are no longer true. Given the...
The second belt, with a depth up to
150 kilometers from the front, contains
highly mobile counterattack forces. The
missio...
'posing an unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation. It employs a
r mix of nuclear and conventional forces in developing ...
environment. Europe manifests dynamically complex political,
economic, and social conditions. Crises easily escalate into ...
obligations are not limited to each individual, but also to society
as a whole. As a result of its obligations, the moral ...
force from European political conflicts, and on the other hand,
permanently maintaining an integrated military force in an...
3. Each delegate does not know whether the nation he is
representing has been "dealt a high (rich, strong nation)
or low (...
rights and duties are to be publicly avowed.70
c) Burdens and benefits are to be arranged so that they are
both: 1) to the...
original position begins its inquiry in a particular context
creating principles to evaluate established practices.
Witnes...
overwhelm their history and eradicate their culture.i74
The four proposed schemes seek restoring the status quo ante
the G...
When seeking to establish the appropriate military security
scheme, the delegates must determine both the desirability and...
unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation by using a mix of nuclear
and conventional forces. Providing the benefit of incl...
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
An archetype for european security   27 april 1993 - ramon martinez
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An Archetype for European Security examines the causes and solutions to the problem of military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that a Federation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible, and long-term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty and a just peace in Europe.

Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare research analysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war. Next presented and discussed are the following proposed military schemes: (1) end all alliances while nation-states maintain military forces only at the necessary level for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity; (2) a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) using a “Resilient Defense” strategy to manage the NATO irony; (3) the Western European Union; and (4) the Pan-European Army. Although not an exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a multitude of proposed schemes.

Proposing a thought experiment a la John Rawls, derived is a method evaluating any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position while imposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles of liberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirable and feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European Military Security is selected as the scheme promoting development within the context of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe.

Although Lieutenant Colonel Ramon Martinez (USAF, Retired) authored this study in 1993 as a National Defense Fellow, the study and its solution remains relevant today given the immediate and emerging conditions in the Ukraine, Crimea, and Russia, and NATO.

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An archetype for european security 27 april 1993 - ramon martinez

  1. 1. An Archetype for European Security Lt Col Ramon Martinez U. S. Air Force National Defense Fellow Graduate School of International Studies IIniversity of Miami April 27, 1993 i i e E `[ eI~ L
  2. 2. AN ARCHETYPEFOREUROPEANSECURITY .:SUMMARY This paper examines the causes and solutions to the problem of military security in Europe. Specifically, the thesis is that a modified North Atlantic Treaty Organization using a "Resilient Defense" strategy serves as a transitional scheme while a Federation for European Military Security is a desirable, feasible, and long term scheme for resolving the problems of uncertainty and a just peace in Europe. Presenting empirical data compiled by noted warfare research analysts, this paper discusses general trends associated with war. Next, presented and discussed are the following proposed military schemes: i) end all alliances while nation-states maintain military forces only at the necessary level for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity; 2) a North Atlantic Treaty Organization using a "Resilient Defense" strategy to manage the North Atlantic Treaty Organization irony; 3) the Western European Union; and 4) the Pan-European Army. Although not an exhaustive list, these four schemes are paradigmatic of a '.multitude of proposed schemes. 'Proposing a thought experiment, derived is a method evaluating .any proposed military scheme. Imagining an original position while imposed restrictions under a veil of ignorance, the principles of liberty, truth, and equality are selected in devising a desirable and feasible scheme. Lastly, a Federation for European Military Security is selected as the scheme promoting development within the context of an uncertain European future while maintaining a free, ..secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. The views and opinions expressed in this document represent the personal views of the author ottly, and should not in any way be construed to reflect any endorsement or confirmation by the Department of Defense, the Department of the Air Force, or any j other agency of the United 6tates Government. 4
  3. 3. TABLE OF CONTENTS An Uncertain Europe.. 1 A Scientific Analysis of War.. 2 International Wars.. 2 Alliances..... .12 'Polarization........ .15 Systems of Power.. 19 The Reliability of Alliances.. 19 Major Power Intervention.. 21 Universalist and Particularist Policies.. .... .22 Factors and Consequences of War............ 26 '.Population and Revenue.. 26 The Distribution of Power and Growth Rate.. ..... 28 Summary of the Scientific 'Analysis of War.. .. 28 End Alliances.. 30 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization.. .32 The Western European Union.. 37 The Pan-European Army................ 39 The Original Position and the ..'Federation.. .41 Conclusion.. ...46
  4. 4. AN iTN('F.RTAiN F.iTRnPF. In a short span of time, Europe has witnessed a myriad of changes. While the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is replaced by the Commonwealth of Independent States, East and West Germany '.:achieved reunification. The Warsaw Pact is dissolved and the 4Baltic Republics are independent. Czechoslovakia is granted a velvet divorce and Yugoslavia is fragmented and consumed by brutal armed conflicts between powerfully irreconcilable ethnic groups. With innumerable changes rapidly occurring in Europe during the 1990s, it is not clear what national military security policy President Clinton's administration should develop for this region. This paper intends to display that both short and long term policies can be coherently developed to provide for a relatively peaceful Europe. The mutable conditions currently manifested in Europe suggest a dynamically complex process introducing immense uncertainties in European military security. Since these alterations import risks, they pose a danger within the region. Europe presently consists of established and stable democracies and constitutional monarchies alongside new and fragile democracies. Federationalism and national and ethnic affiliation claim foreground attention as a .prevailing political principle of legitimacy; political and `economic concerns fluctuate between integration and disintegration; and military security structures experience vicissitudes of supranational, national, and multipolar networks. These changes, although filled with uncertainties and danger, provide the context for challenging Unites States' and Europe's foreign policy makers to use their imagination in developing military security schemes that adequately deal with the uncertainty of a European future, while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. The issue confronting policy makers is whether the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) can perform this function well. In approaching this issue, some general trends will be identified using compiled empirical data concerning wars in Europe. Next, four proposed military schemes for resolving this issue will be presented and discussed. Then, proposing a thought experiment to determine whether all security schemes for Europe have been exhausted, a method for deciding which military scheme to implement provided. Finally, deriving certain principles from this thought experiment, a different military security scheme emerges. Upon analyzing the empirical data and the dynamically complex phenomenon of European security, it is possible to develop alternatives that may appear contradictory. Each alternative has a kernel of truth and struggles to dominate the foreground of reality; however, if we momentarily step back and look at the 1
  5. 5. background, a new picture emerges and each truth gains meaning in relation to the picture. It is the thesis of this paper that NATO should be modified and treated as a transitional military scheme, and that a desirable and feasible cooperative security structure can be developed for resolving the long term .problems of uncertainty and a just peace in Europe. A SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR As a preliminary to analyzing the four proposed European military security schemes, it is best to present empirical data compiled by noted warfare research analysts. The objective is to identify and briefly discuss some regularities of behavior associated with international war, particularly European wars. Then, we will test the proposed military security schemes with the existing data to reveal their meaning. A plethora of empirical war studies have been generated; therefore, to properly analyze the proposed schemes, we must focus our attention on Europe. Due to the availability and comprehensiveness of the compiled empirical data, with few exceptions, the time-frame is limited to the period of 1815-1980. INTERNATIONAL WARS We begin the study using data compiled by historian Melvin Small and political scientist J. David Singer on the "Patterns in International Warfare, 1816-1980.° I Table 1 presents data regarding systemic and extra systemic wars. Systemic wars are `those fought between legitimately recognized members of an international system, and comprising a population of at least '500,000.2 Extra-systemic wars are those fought between members of the international system against independent or colonial entities rwhich did not qualify for membership in the system.3 Inter-state wars have at least one major power actively participating with each 'side sustaining at least 1,000 battle-connected fatalities.° ~ Melvin Small and J. David Singer, "Patterns In International Warfare, 1816-1980," in International War: An Anthology, ed. M. Small and J. D. Singer (Pacific Grove, CA., 1988), pp. 28-30. z Ibid., p. 27. 3 Ibid. ° J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, ~~Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1829-1965," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez I and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 43. 2 t f
  6. 6. Batt3e De~dtYle per Nat£ern MonY_hs 1D7. 59.5 93.:0 65,-0 57::1! 45.;5 3f1.0 A~3..0 58:5 44.:D 52.0 106.0 78>:0 39.;11 101.:0 S5.Q 83.0 5~.0 24.ti 89.0 45.E 61.E 53.0 1'7.0 4.;~1 5.0 41.:0 2~.0 43.0 b~.0 75.0 91.€s 59.D 31.0 X2.0 3$.O 11.Q 34.p 26,0 ~.: 6.0 42.:8 109.q SO,p 105.0 TABLE 1 International War, 183i~-19$O (C4ntinuedJ' Battle Nation 3dame crf --~Wat Deatha Months Pacific:11879-1883) 4610 6.A Brikish-Sulu {1$79)I 7~fl 84.4 Franca~ndochinese (1882-1$84)I 70iQ 35.0 Mandist:(1882-1685)C 33q 24.11 S.zno-French {I884-1885)' h7 D 95.t7 C"entxal American (1885):: 1C1~.~ 102.5 Serbo-Bulgariam (1885)T 84;5 99.4 S.ino-Sapanese (1894-1895) 42;5 53.5. E`ramco-klac~agasaan (1894-1895) 63>{7 ?Z.0 Cuban (1895-1895)C 22<0 ?7.Q ~tala-Ethippiarc-.:(1895-189b)2 58:9 68.0 P'irat Philippine (189{x-1898)C 8415 37.L3 fi>reco-Tyrl~ish I1897) 84;5 82.5. Spanish-,~Lnerican (189~)< 53,'5 75.t# Sacnn~ Philippine {1899-:-14D2yC; TD<~ 22.0. Boex (1899-1902}C 29.fl 92.13 8wrer Rehellieni,(19Dtf) _ 79id 66.x: I15,nden(1903~C 84,5 92.0 Kusso-Japanese (19045405) 11.:0 2b.0 G'~r7tY'a3 llrttex.i.can (19Db).: 1(14!5 &6.6. cen~rai 11merican {19D7) 104::5 $2.5 Spanish lHorAccan {1909-].910J 5~;.~ 49.5 Z'~a10-Turkish {1911-1912) 33.Q 36.0: Fi.t~st .14a~ka~ {x,912-7.413;) 17.:0 43.p; Seaand Balkan (1913) 18 0 88.0: World War Z (1914-1918); 2 f1 3.0': Russian Nationalj.ta.e$ {1917-1421aC 22.:0 25.!3:: Itusso~Pa2ish {1914-320} Y3.5 23.Q tlunJdzian-A2lies (1919): 48.;5 ~~~~ Greco-Turkish (1919-1922 ~2;U 1~.0 Itfffian_:~1921-i9~6)C 26.:6 14.x:. Druze {1925,592?)C 72.;5 39.0 S.ino-Soviet (1929) 78.:0 7G.0:`: Manchurian (1931-1933) 19,:0 31,D Chaacr {29321935) 11 b 17.0 Ita10-Ettf.iopiarlI1935-1~33ft) 330 59.0; Sirto-~Tapar~ese (1937-1541~ "~.0 14.b Chanykrafen~ (1938) 91.0 192.5:. Nomoha~ {1939) 270 £,4,~i Woz~ld Wad I3 (1939-1~1AS} 1 ;0 1.,0 Russo-~`innish (1939-19AC?~ 1C.'~ ?9.4 E'xanao-Thai (1940-1941).'. 9fi.:-5 40.0:: Indonesian (1945-19+15jC, 96.5 4Q.D'+ Indochinese (1945-1954)c 15.D 11,0'; Madagas~a~ I1947-1948)C; 9~.:Q 42.0` '4 I i i t {
  7. 7. The following data from table 2 displays selected national performances in total international war participation and, in bold print, identifies the nine nations comprising the major powers during 1815-1980. i) France, 1815-1940 and 1945-1980: 22 international wars, 14 systemic wars 2) England, 1815-1980: 19 international wars, 7 systemic wars 3) Russia, 1815-1917 and 1921-1980: 18 international wars, 13 systemic wars 4) Turkey/Ottoman Empire: 18 international wars, it systemic wars 5) Italy/Sardinia, 1860-1943: 12 international wars, 11 systemic wars 6) China, 1950-1980: 11 international wars, 10 systemic wars 7) ...Spain, 10 international .wars, 5 systemic wars 8) Japan, 1895-1945: 9 international wars, 9 systemic wars 9) United States, 1899-1980: 8 international wars, 7 systemic wars 10) Austria/Hungary, 1815-1918: 8 international wars, 6 systemic wars 11) Greece: 7 international wars, 7 systemic wars 12) .Germany/Prussia, 1815-1918 and 1925- 1945: 6 international wars, 6 systemic wars Table 2 reveals major powers have a propensity to become j involved in international war. The major powers place five of the [ first six positions and nine of the twelve in total international war participation. Corroborating the propensity hypothesis, political scientists Charles S. Gochman and Zeev Maoz adduce additional evidence on "Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816- E i` g t E
  8. 8. Yet, while reverting to a pre-nineteenth century alliance pattern and experiencing a dramatic increase in minor power conflicts, the twentieth century has been characterized by a balance of power system. Since empirical data shows alliance formations are generally followed by war, then the hypothesis that the balance of 'power maintained peace is highly suspect. Attempting to save the hypothesis, balance of power theorists contend polarized alliance systems are associated with war. These polarized alliance systems contribute to the difference between nineteenth and twentieth ''century alliance-war correlation. Balance of power theorists center the debate on whether multipolarity or bipolarity is conducive to a peaceful world. POLARIZATION 'The classic polarity debate focuses on two sides of the same coin, the balance of power theory. As the proponent of the bipolarity theory, Kenneth N. Waltz avows bipolarity provides the necessary conditions for a peaceful and stable world.14 Waltz reasons that an international nation state system, dominated by two superpowers with their respective blocs of allies, provides a great degree of certainty about the consequences of foreign policy. Additionally, Waltz proposes that since two superpower blocs deter 'attacks against each other, facilitate crisis management in controlling ally deviations, and inhibit misjudgments by reducing the amount of international actors, the international .system creates stability by introducing certainty. Countering with the thesis that multipolarity is conducive to stability, Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer claim an increasing number of interacting international actors generate a great degree i of uncertainty.ls Since multiple interactions are both complex and diverse, foreign policy makers would have to render cautious, deliberate, and rational decisions. As support, Deutsch and Singer aver that multipolarity introduces intermediaries as mediators, arbitrators, and offer neutral meeting grounds. Thus, introducing conflict reducing agents, multipolarity fosters a congenial 'atmosphere for managing crises. Lastly, Duetsch and Singer claim multipolarity is a more desirable international system because incremental international agents divert .attention .and expend `resources for each nation-state. 14 Frank Whelon Wayman, "Bipolarity and War: The Role of Capability Concentration and Alliance Patterns Among Major Powers, 1816-1965," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 186. ~s Ibid., 186. 15
  9. 9. Attempting to clarify the classic polarity debate, Frank Whelon Wayman asseverates the concept of polarity has different meanings in different contexts. Essentially, the polarity debate xevolves around the differences in the power nation-states wield and the set of relationships developed in the international system. iIllustrating that power concentration and alliance (cluster) 'configuration are conceptually distinct, Wayman .provides the following definitions: Definition 1: A system is power bipolar when capabilities are `so distributed that two dominant hostile powers are more powerful than other actors to a degree that give the dominant powers autonomy in self-defense.16 Definition 2: A system is power multiaolar when capabilities are more evenly distributed than in the .power bipolar countries, and when .hostility is high." Definition 3: A system is cluster bibolar when most or all of the states in the system are tightly packed into two political clusters, with high mutual hostility, and very few or no states play intermediate or cross-cutting roles. In the perfect form of tight cluster bipolarity, the members are all mutually closer to each other than any of them are to any member of the other cluster.1e Definition 4: A system is cluster multipolar when the states are more evenly distributed throughout the space, with many opportunities for intermediaries and .many cross-cutting loyalties to moderate hostility.19 Using historical data between 1919-1975, Wayman provides table 8 further explaining the conceptual distinctions.Z° As seen in table 8, the European state system was power and cluster multipolar during 1919-1939. During 1941-1945, with Allied and Axis powers juxtaposed, the European state system reflected cluster bipolarity but contained power multipolarity. The Cold War period of 1948-1955 manifested both power and cluster bipolarity. The period of detente evinced power bipolarity and cluster multipolarity during 1965-1975. .Concluding power bipolarity and ~a Wayman, p. 181. 17 Ibid. is Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid, p. .182. 16
  10. 10. general war; however, in contrast to the twentieth century, wars :..were low in magnitude, severity, and duration. In discussing the differences between the nineteenth and twentieth century, J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey present some enlightening material. SYSTEMS OFPOWER In their article entitled, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power, 1820-1965," Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey claim two power systems operated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.''' The preponderance of power system operates under the assumption "there will be less war when there is: (a) a preponderance of power concentrated in the hands of a very few nations: (b) change, if any, toward greater concentration; and (c) a relatively stable rank order among, and intervals between, the major powers."25 In contrast, a parity and fluidity power system assumes "there will be less war when there is: (a) approximate parity among the major nations; (b) change toward parity rather than away from it: and (c) a relatively fluid power hierarchy."26 Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey discover that the preponderance of power system is associated with high magnitude war in the nineteenth century and the parity and fluidity power system is `associated with less war. Additionally, finding that the .:preponderance of power system is associated with less war in the twentieth century, the parity and fluidity power system is associated with high magnitude war. Since high magnitude war is .associated with specific power distributions in wars fought during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey conclude that power distribution influences the type of war that will be fought and is not a cause of war. THE RELIABILITY OF ALLIANCES The findings produced in the Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey study xeveal a dramatic change between the nineteenth and twentieth century regarding the effect of the concentration of power in the international system. Alan Ned 5abrosky provides an explanation of this change in his article entitled, "Interstate Alliances: Their ?^ Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey, pp. 37-66. ~s Ibid., p. 64. i i E ze Ibid. 'r 19 E t f
  11. 11. Throughout the entire period, empirical data manifest that 61% of alliance constituents are disposed to remain neutral when a member country becomes embroiled in war. Although displaying a 66% neutrality rate in the nineteenth century, the 1900-1945 era displays the lowest neutrality rate of 56~. While table 11 exhibits this era containing the highest alliance violation, Sabrosky adds "the apparently greater willingness of states in alliances to take sides in a war was not necessarily beneficial to their alliance partners."30 The 1946-1965 era indicates a 76$ neutrality rate. Demonstrating an unwillingness to get involved either alongside of or against their allies during the post 1945 war performance opportunities, Sabrosky infers that a 76% neutrality rate reflects a diminished importance and support of alliance networks, which coincides with the degeneration of the balance of power system in that same post 1945 period.31 Sabrosky discloses additional information on the reliability of alliances. Ascertaining that both major/major power alliances and minor/minor power alliances are generally reliable, major/minor power alliances are frequently violated. Clarifying his findings, Sabrosky avows that a major power intervening to assist a minor power acts as a contagion mechanism. MAJORPOWERINTERVENTION Corroborating yet adding to Sabrosky's analysis, Randolph M. Siverson and Joel King demonstrate that "a nation having an alliance with a belligerent is five times more likely to become 'involved in war."'Z Expatiating the two previous discourses, Manus I. Midlarsky states that combining major/major power conflicts with major/minor power conflicts have historically demonstrated instability within the international system during the twentieth century.33 Uniting the two distinct sets of conflicts mutually connects each discrete conflict issue into a grand conflict issue. Since the grand conflict issue prevents compromise over discrete issues, .conflict resolution is exacerbated, if not almost so Ibid., p. 178. 31 SabroskY, p. 197. 3Z Randolph M. Siverson and Joel Kinq, "Alliances and the Expansion of War," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 168 33 Manus 2. Midlarsky, "Preventing Systemic War: Crisis Decision-Making Amidst a Structure of Conflict Relationships," in the Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. j J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 215. 21 F e t II Ee
  12. 12. impossible. Supporting and amplifying the hypothesis that alliances act as a contagion mechanism, Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer affirm that 1816-1965 witnessed eight wars involving major power interventions.34 While three wars experienced only one major power ':intervention, only two wars comprised two major power interventions; however, the severest, largest, and longest wars :involved major powers intervening on both sides of the war. These three wars were: (1) World War I, 1914-1918; (2) World War II, 1939-1945; and (3) the Korean War, 1950-1953. Although major power interventions remained low during the nineteenth century (the Crimean War and the War of Italian Unification being the exceptions), Yamamoto and Bremer demonstrate twentieth century major powers manifested a proclivity to intervene in war. A major power's initial decision to intervene increases the probability of other major powers intervening. Since a major power's decision encourages other major powers to follow, Yamamoto and Bremer infer opposing major power interventions expand war and increase the severity, size, and duration of war. However, history 'illustrates major power intervention on only one side rapidly ends war. Summarizing the previous analyses, once a major power having an alliance with a belligerent major or minor power decides to intervene in war, then it is highly probable other major powers will intervene. Furthermore, knowing that a major power intervening to assist a minor power expands war, destructive wars occur when major powers intervene on both sides of a war. Combining resources, coordinating strategies, maintaining a multipolar power distribution with equal power between the belligerents, and sustaining an increasing polarization of alliances into two blocs, creates large, severe, and long wars. These general wars commonly occurred during the twentieth century. ITNIVER5ALIST AND PARTICULARIST.POLICIES Although most of the studies reviewed propound political realism, one cannot conclude political realists' practices produce peace. Not attributing war to the immutability of native forces fixed in the human constitution, political realists accurately reveal that war is a function of social institutions. The practices of the political realist exhibit a process by which national leaders, concerned with establishing security, develop and 34 Yoshinobu Yamamoto and Stuart A. Bremer, "Wider Wars and Restless Nights: Major Power Intervention in Ongoing War," in the Correlates of War: II, Testing Some Realpolitik Models, ed. J. D. Singer .(New York, 1980), II, p. 226. 22
  13. 13. execute foreign policies which subsequently threaten the security of foreign nations. The actions and reactions of foreign and domestic nations generate conditions ripe for a war. As the noted American philosopher, John Dewey, aptly states, "History does not prove the inevitability of war, but it does prove that customs and institutions which organize native powers into certain patterns in politics and economics will also generate the war-pattern.i3s Global history has marshaled evidence showing major power wars have been eschewed during certain epochs. Major powers have established and applied rules of behavior organizing constructive relations among themselves. Reviewing these epochs provides considerable knowledge in establishing social institutions and .;practices generating the peace paradigm. Adducing empirical evidence, Peter Wallensteen identifies two ,predominant major power policies implemented in different periods during 1816-1976. Table 12 illustrates universalist and particularist policy periods which organized major power relations during 1816-1976,36 Wallensteen defines universalist policies as ~~concerted 'efforts among major powers to organize relations between themselves to work out acceptable rules of behavior (general standards).j37 Table 12 reveals four universalist policy periods. Exhibiting four particularist policy periods, Wallensteen defines them as "policies which emphasize the special interest of a given power, even at the price of disrupting existing organizations or power relationships."38 Illustrating distinct policy patterns, table 13 provides significant revelations concerning both major and minor power relations.39 Table 13 shows that ten major/major power wars transpired lduring particularist periods. No major/major power wars occurred during universalist periods. Clarifying these findings, 3s John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York, 1930), p. 115. 36 peter Wallensteen, ° Universalism vs. Particularism: On the Limits of Major Power Order," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New York, 1992), p. 232. [Contributing author in an edited work] 3~ Ibid., p. 230. 3a Ibid. s9 Ibid., p. 234. 23 7 i i i i
  14. 14. Wallensteen asserts, "the record suggests that the pursuit of such
  15. 15. confrontations in general and among the major powers in particular.j40 Although universalists and particularist periods 'account for few major/minor confrontations escalating into major/minor powers wars, 38.5 and 61.5% of major/minor wars occurred during the universalist and particularist periods, respectively. These findings suggest universalist policies coordinated constructive and cordial relations among the major powers; however, universalist and particularist policies encouraged interventions against minor powers. Universalist policies were generally established after major power wars. Major powers devised universalist policies to: maintain their status as the victors of war; inhibit defeated major powers from recovering; and coordinate major powers' foreign policies. Wallensteen avers universalist policies provided the added benefit of installing friendly regimes and creating new constitutions in the vanquished countries. Thus, universalist policies reduced the threat of friendly and vanquished countries' domestic policies and created a perceived notion of certainty. When major powers accept certain rules of behavior as binding and act according to those rules, history shows there are periods with an absence of major/major power wars. Differences among major powers are reconciled without force and the autonomy of the major powers are recognized, respected, and maintained. Wallensteen's 'study reveals universalist policies have been successful in developing cooperative foreign relations and implementing reconciling mechanisms for major powers. Although universalist periods redirected major power efforts toward increasing intervention in minor power affairs, this does not conceal the fact that universalist policies were partially applied. Instead of developing cooperative international relations and using reconciling mechanisms for all nations, the major powers intended to establish a world order specifically benefiting the major powers. Refusing to alter existing arrangements, universalist 'policies assigned minor powers a subordinating relation to major powers. Thus, while preventing major/major power confrontations, 'universalist policies attained limited success. Universalist policies did not recognize nor respect the autonomy of minor powers. Excluding minor powers in global security issues, the threat and use of force persisted as the preferred method of attaining foreign policy goals. Predicating the term discrete universalist policies, major powers devised practices establishing constructive relations amid the prevailing powers and collectively benefitted. Using discrete universalist policies, prevailing major powers regulated a specific world order based on accepted rules guiding their relations; however, minor powers and defeated major powers were relegated particularist ao Wallensteen, p. 246. 25 r I j:. f
  16. 16. policies. Since, in many instances, major powers divided or 'controlled vanquished powers, they unfairly distributed burdens and benefits, and excluded non-predominating powers in global security issues. Therefore, the non-predominating powers concluded the .:arrangements were unjustified. Not being privy to the arrangements, the non-predominating powers initiated unilateral actions invariably resulting in war. FACTORS AND. CONSEQUENCES OF WAR Analysts are concentrating on war's economic consequences and the distribution of power. Since most wars occur because opposing belligerent powers anticipate different results in realizing their goals by conducting war, then what factors are critical in realizing the goals of war? Once war ends, what is the long term impact on the power of the states involved? Discerning the critical factors and the long term consequences of war provides a practical organon for reducing war and diminishing its effect. POPULATION AND REVENUE Stephen Rosen investigates the conditions associated with triumphant war termination. Using Singer and Small's list of international wars, Rosen determines that the side attaining the .'lowest population percentage loss won 30 out of 40 (75~) international wars.' Table 13 illustrates that countries initiating war with larger populations than .their .opposing 'countries won 27 out of 30 (90~) cases.42 Although 18 (600) cases show defeated powers losing more lives, victorious powers had larger populations and sustained higher population losses in 12 cases (40%). Population loss rates derive their importance because of the population size of belligerent nations. Presumably a nation maintaining a larger population may lose more lives yet become victorious. Selecting wealth as measuring a nation's destructive potential, Rosen divulges government revenue is the definitive factor in winning war. Presenting in table 14 a "Summary of Data on Correlates of War Performance," Rosen shows that revenue provides 79~ (31 out of 39 cases) probability of victory.43 Nations possessing wealth and lower population loss won 26 out of 41 Steven Rosen, "War Power and the Willingness to Suffer," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan (New york, 1992), p. 266. az Ibid., p. 267. a3 Ibid. '~ P. 271. 4 26
  17. 17. 27
  18. 18. 1'~~ DISTRIBUTION OFPOWER AND GROWTIiRATE A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kugler investigate the distribution of power in the international system after World War I and II.44 Organski and Kugler use gross national product to measure national capabilities. They find all 18 nations involved in World War I or World War II returned to their prewar national capabilities within twenty years. Organski and Kugler ascertain that following an end to war victorious and neutral nations are minimally affected in the near future, but defeated nations incur severe short-term losses. In the long run, victorious and neutral nations display a period of slow recovery and attain a prewar growth rate, but defeated nations manifest the phoenix factor. Exhibiting and maintaining an acutely accelerated recovery period, defeated nations renew their expected prewar growth rate and typically surpass victorious nations within 18-20 years. Thus, the distribution of power and the growth rate return to a pattern as if war had never been initiated. Two world wars have not significantly . altered national growth .nor the distribution of power. Organski and Kugler claim that nations receiving the most United States foreign assistance after World War II experience the worst recovery rates.45 Although a victorious nation may inhibit 'a defeated nation's recovery, their findings suggest recovery and foreign assistance are independent. Their claim contradicts the hypothesis stating recoveries of defeated nations are a result of victorious nations providing substantial foreign assistance. Si:fNIMARY OF THE SCIENTIFIC ANALYSIS OF WAR The purpose of this research is to find, present, and explain some regularities of behavior associated with international wars, particularly European wars. Ea the quest to devise a desirable and feasible military security scheme, reviewing a multitude of ':statistical research on war provides the opportunity to identify the factors associated with war and peace. Attempting to provide an integrated explanation of the current knowledge of war, this ';paper uses that cumulation to test the proposed European military `security schemes. 'Studies on the patterns of international warfare, 1816-1980, 44 A.F.K. Organski and Jacek Kuqler, "The Cost of Major Wars: The Phoenix Factor," in The Scientific Study of Peace and War: A Text Reader, ed. J. A. Vasquez and M. T. Henehan .(New York, 1992), PH. 279-305. as organski and Kugler, p. 303. 28
  19. 19. ` reveal that international wars are neither increasing nor decreasing. Although international wars remain a constant human activity, major powers exhibit the highest propensity to engage in international war. Major powers maintain the greatest number of enduring rivalries and display the highest incidence of extra regional rivalries. Since over half the nations comprising the international system avoided international war, one can safely conclude it is highly probable international war is not endemic to the entire system. Research shows that alliance formation suggests nation states anticipated war because of underlying political, economic, diplomatic, social, and military events. Empirical evidence illustrates that the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries and the twentieth century manifested alliances being followed by war within five years. Appearing as an aberration, the nineteenth century exhibits a negligible amount of alliances followed by war. Contrasting with the alliance followed by war phenomenon, few wars were preceded by alliances. Thus, data shows alliances are not a cause of war. Although political realist theorists contend balance of power I rsystems are associated with peace, twentieth century wars are ,.'characterized by balance of power systems. Disclosing power concentration and alliance (cluster) configuration are conceptually `distinct and statistically independent, adduced evidence exhibits twentieth century war is associated with alliance bipolarity while cluster multipolarity is followed by peace. The twentieth century characterized by two world wars of great magnitude, severity, and duration, and delineated by a multiple distribution of power polari2ed into two alliance blocs. The nineteenth century is 1 depicted without general wars. "Identifying two distinct power systems operating in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the international system's distribution of power influences the type of war to be fought, but is not a cause of war. In the twentieth century balance of power `;systems are associated with high magnitude wars, but parity and fluidity systems are associated with less war. The converse relationship occurs in the nineteenth century. Research illustrates major/minor power alliances are the most :frequently violated alliances. Additionally, combining major/major power conflicts together with major/minor power conflicts historically exhibits marked instability during the twentieth century. Major powers intervening to assist minor powers act as a contagion mechanism. Since a major power's decision encourages other major power to follow, opposing major powers assisting minor powers increases war's severity, size, and duration. War is a function of social institutions; however, history provides testimony illustrating major powers using universalist 29
  20. 20. policies avoided major/major power wars. Established after ;major/major wars, universalist policies coordinated constructive and cordial relations among the major powers. While particularist policies emphasize the special interest of a given power, universalist and particularist policies encouraged and produced 'major power interventions. against minor. powers. Employing discrete universalist policies, major powers created ' practices intentionally benefiting the prevailing powers, unfairly extending burdens to the vanquished major powers, and assigning 'minor powers subordinating relations. Since defeated major powers and minor powers considered these practices unjustified, they initiated unilateral actions using particularist policies. Economic and demographic factors are the principal elements contributing to winning or losing wars. While government revenue and lower population loss rates are two essential elements, total government revenue is the decisive factor in winning wars. World wars do not alter the long term impact of economic growth and the distribution of power. Defeated nations manifest the phoenix factor. They renew their expected prewar growth and surpass the victorious nations within 18-20 years. 'This paper has identified and discussed general trends associated with international war, particularly European wars. Next, this paper will present and discuss four proposed European '..military security schemes. Then, this paper uses the general trends associated with war to test the proposed military security schemes and reveal their meaning. END ALLIANCES Proposing to end all European alliances, the first scheme recommends each nation-state maintain military forces only at the level necessary for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. This scheme identifies the necessary 'functions of the state as providing security for its citizens, ;upholding its legal authority, and preserving a shared perspective on a particular way of life. This scheme assumes a European future with no military security threats nor rivalries. Shortly after the termination of the Napoleonic War and the Congress of Vienna settlement, Europe conformed to this proposed scheme during 1820-1825, called the unipolar period. Wayman states, "a system is unipolar if none of the states in the system are hostile enough to each other to induce mutual fear and aggressive designs.j46 The Great Powers attempted 46 Wayman, p. 182. 30
  21. 21. to establish a new international order based on the principles of compensation, legitimacy, and a balance of power. The Great Powers compensated their expensive efforts through territorial aggrandizement. The Great powers restored and maintained the pre- Napoleonic rules of Europe by conveniently claiming the principle of legitimacy. Discouraging unilateral aggression among themselves, the Great Power maintained a balance of ,power.... Although the Great Powers did not wage war among themselves during the unipolar period, this paper has shown the Great Powers have intervened in minor power affairs. The Great Powers adopted the Troppau Protocol of October 1820 and declared they would not accept revolutionary action as legally binding. They intervened in revolutions occurring in Naples, the Piedmont, and Spain; however, When perceived as to their advantage, the Great Powers encouraged Balkan independence and intervened on behalf of the Greeks in their revolt against the Ottoman Empire. Identifying unipolar periods as extremely unstable and indubitably the most war prone, Jack S. Levy affirms, unipolar periods exhibit the majority of general or n na7 hegemonic wars producing the highest duration and magnitude. Contradistinguishing the unipolar period, the 1990s are characterized by a monopolar power system. In a speech broadcasted by CNN, President Bill Clinton asseverated, "We are the world's only superpower."'$ Presently, the United States represents this monopolar power system with its status as the world's only military superpower. Possessing nuclear weapons, France, Great Britain, and Russia have the ability of unduly influencing the behavior of nation-states not possessing nuclear weapons. Thus, without the nuclear umbrella of the United States, non-nuclear European nation- states remain unprotected and the transatlantic link is not preserved. This scheme disregards the fact the United States is historically, politically, and culturally tied to Europe, and sustains vital economic and military interests in Europe. Without United States involvement, Europe will maintain a highly unstable multipolar power and alliance configuration. This scheme does not adequately address national rivalries, military threats, nor social, ethnic, and economic deterioration. Maintaining a military force is a function of: a) the size of the territory, population, and revenue; b) lines of trade and communication; c) natural resources; d) technological capacity; e) perceived threats; and f) the extensiveness of national political obligations. Considering these factors, European major powers would still maintain large military forces. For example, Russian defense requires maintaining a large military force while BeNeLux a~ LevY~ P. 356. 48 President Bill Clinton, CNN, television network, 23 April 1993. '31
  22. 22. defense requires small military forces. Table 4 illustrates Europe has supported 12 enduring regional rrivalries with 185 disputes and seven extra-regional rivalries with 98 disputes. Since history suggests continued European rivalries and wars, neither unipolarity nor necessary military force levels inhibit war without universalist policies. Unfortunately, discrete universalist policies historically redirect major power efforts toward increasing intervention in minor power affairs; therefore, it is highly probable minor power leaders will respond to long term security issues by augmenting their military power through alliances. These alliances will: lead to a multipolar distribution of power; tighten the alliance configuration; encourage particularist policies among minor powers; increase security threats; escalate arms; and prepare nations for war. Crises will escalate into a large, long, and severe war. With major powers sustaining negligible long term impacts through the phoenix factor, minor power conditions scarcely improve. This military security scheme aptly captures the notion that state must remain independent, equal, secure, and control its own .;possessions to perform its function well. States are not to be acquired, controlled by other states, nor interfered with in their internal affairs. Maintaining large armed forces increases insecurity and produces arms escalation. Accumulating a :prohibitively large national debt diverts resources and burdens citizens during peace and war. This scheme lacks universalist policies constructively regulating relations amid all European states. Confidence building measures need to be developed. Technology must be shared and verification procedures are needed to extend warning time. Lastly, a forum encouraging cooperation and dialogue is needed to establish and direct these practices. The second scheme proposes the North Atlantic Treaty organization is the relevant forum. TIIE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGA1vIZATION Taking effect on August 24, 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an alliance formulated to preserve international peace, justice, and security, and promote the stability and well-being of independent, sovereign, and democratic states. Assigned this mandate, as an inter-governmental organization, NATO attempts to peacefully settle international disputes, and refrain from threatening or using force in any way inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations. In the event it cannot deter war, NATO countries treat an attack against any of its member countries as an attack against all. In accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, each member country reserves the right to exercise individual and/or collective self-defense to restore and maintain peace, justice, and security. Fostering cooperation instead of competition among its members, 32
  23. 23. 'NATO established mechanisms eliminating conflicting international economic policies, and promoted political, economic, and military collaboration. Thus, the intent of the alliance is: i) convincing communism it could not feasibly attain its goals; 2) containing West Germany; and 3) ensuring the United States abandoned isolationism by maintaining a transatlantic link. Committed to defending the territorial integrity of each member state, NATO uses the strategy of flexible response and forward defense. NATO developed this strategy during a divided Europe containing a threatening Warsaw Treaty Organization and offensively oriented Soviet armed forces. This strategy requires deterring war or transgression by deliberately linking conventional war with an escalating nuclear war. Positioning defensive forces along the length of the inter-German border, NATO forces would use deep-strike weapons extending a zone by which Warsaw Treaty and Soviet second echelon forces would be attacked, disrupted, and delayed in East Europe before engaging the main NATO defensive forces; therefore, NATO strategy manifested an offensive defense. Impelled by dramatic social, political, and economic "imperatives, the European security landscape is radically altered. One must determine whether NATO still provides the necessary framework for establishing peace, justice, and security, .during this perplexing epoch. 'Under the tutelage of former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the former Soviet Union acquiesced in 1990 to a united Germany with NATO membership. The key to persuading the Soviet Union relinquishing its prohibition was illustrating that an isolated united Germany was unpredictable and more dangerous to 'European stability than a united Germany within NATO. Assuaging 1Soviet apprehension, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl proposed to: "limit German forces to 370,000 within three or four years after reunification;49 "refrain from producing, holdin~, or commanding atomic, biological, and chemical weapons;i 0 and "contribute tens of billions of Deutsche marks to further the economic reconstruction of East Germany and the Soviet Union."sl After the Soviet Union agreed to drop its veto, President Gorbachev 'and Chancellor Kohl agreed to negotiate removing 360,000 Soviet . troops out of Germany. With a reunified Germany, dissolved Warsaw .Treaty 49 Charles Lane, Melinda Liu, and Elizabeth Tucker, "A Bitter Homecoming,° .Newsweek, (July 30, 1990), p. 26. so Ibid. sl Scott Sullivan, "Can Germany be Contained?," Newsweek, (July 30, 1990), p. 28. 33
  24. 24. forces."SZ National security issues will be primarily resolved through political means. Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev averred, "The character of contemporary weapons leaves no country any hope of safeguarding itself solely with military and technical means, for example by building up a defense system, even the most powerful one. The task of ensuring security is increasingly a political problem, to be resolved only by political means."s3 The impacts of Russian crises remain tenuous at best. If Russia perceives itself surrounded by hostile powers, then it will 1 likely justify a siege mentality; it will subsequently initiate an arms build-up and be coupled with nationalistic fervor. Since Russian troops are within Russian territory and tables 1 and 2 reveal Russia has a propensity to engage in European wars, then i;NATO's new roles are reassuring West European nations and deterring Russian aggression against the democratically elected governments of Eastern Europe. French independence from the NATO integrated military command significantly contributes to instability during a multipolar power and alliance configuration. As depicted in tables 1 and 2, French bellicosity is illustrated by its greatest propensity to engage in international wars and its historical role in minor power interventions. Maintaining nuclear and conventional forces independent of the NATO integrated military command conjoined by 'their bellicose propensity serves as an intimidating national instrument for influencing the behavior of European nations. Since `France has the highest propensity for engaging in international wars and interventions, NATO's additional role is minimizing French bellicosity and ensuring French commitment to European defense. Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO~s military threat is significantly abated yet altered. In an article entitled "Is NATO So Successful It Deserves to Die?," Fen Osler Hampson asserts, "NATO's strategy of forward defense that is based on the scenario `of surprise attack across a front that no longer exists and in a world in that total surprise is no longer possible, is neither sZGeneral Makmut Gareyev, "Novaia Voennaia Politika," Krasnaia Zvezda (February 8, 1988), p. 1, english translation found in S Nelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO (New York, 1991), p. 27. s3 Mikhail Gorvachev, Address to the Twenty-Seventh Communist Party Congress, S. Nelson Drew and others, The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment, (New York, 1991). pp. 26-27. 35
  25. 25. Organization, demised Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, emerging Commonwealth of Independent States, and French independence of NATO integrated military command, NATO is confronting the NATO irony: Russian troops are deployed within a NATO member state; NATO's new purpose is deterring Russian aggression against the democratically elected East European governments; and NATO~s additional purpose is minimizing French bellicosity while ensuring French commitment to European Defense. At the time of this writing, Russia maintains ten divisions deployed in a reunified Germany; however, President Boris Yeltsin asseverated Russia will withdraw its troops from German soil by the end of 1993. Emerging democratic governments, free market economies, and East European nationalism dissolved the political cohesion between East European nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States, particularly Russia. The demise of the Warsaw Treaty Organization created East European demands of Russian troop withdrawals. While .'maintaining 2.7 million troops, Russia completed troop withdrawals from the Czech Republic, the Republic of Slovakia, and Hungary. Russia is presently withdrawing troops from Poland, and will withdraw troops from the Baltic Republics after completing withdrawal from Germany. This indicates the .end of Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe. Russia is focusing inward to rebuild itself after experiencing `political, economic, and social turmoil. The Commonwealth of Independent States is fragmented and many member states are displaying antagonistic behavior toward Russia. Russia, therefore, is using troop withdrawals to protect its political sovereignty and territorial integrity.. Russia has eliminated the threat of a surprise attack on NATO. Russia's troop withdrawals from Eastern Europe has removed ,Operational Maneuver Groups, Independent Tank Regiments, and assault crossing units. The military front is at the Russian 'border; this increases the warning time of an impending Russian 'attack and logistically impedes sustaining Russian offensive capabilities against West European nations. The Russian military changed its doctrine from the inevitability and subsequent winning of international war to its prevention. General Makhmut Gareyev asseverated, "What is new here is the fact that, whereas military doctrine used to be defined as a system of views of the preparation of war and the waging of war, its substance is now based on the prevention of war. The tasks of preventing war is becoming the supreme goal, the nucleus of military doctrine, the basic function of the state and the armed 34
  26. 26. strategically necessary nor politically viable.j54 The premises establishing forward defense are no longer true. Given the NATO irony is associate with decreasing defense budgets and force reductions, NATO must establish a new strategy to remain relevant 'for European military security. The authors of the book entitled, "The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain `Environment," claim a "Resilient Defense" strategy appropriately manages the NATO irony within the presently imposed political and fiscal constraints. Providing conventional stability in Europe during this epoch, Resilient Defense is a strategy providing NATO the capability of :defending Europe with a 50 percent NATO force level reduction; 'however, through early detection and reaction to belligerent advances and additional reserve reinforcements, NATO can deter and defeat a belligerent nation. Using force on force maneuvers and relying on rapid reserve forces mobilization and deployment, this strategy presents a defensive defense. Since NATO forces would 'maintain a defensive orientation and not present a credible offensive threat, Resilient Defense countervails an unstable multipolar power and alliance configuration. Using light and maneuverable military forces, Resilient Defense conducts defensive operations in forward, maneuver, and rear area belts. As envisioned by the authors, the first, second, and third belts are described as followed: The first belt is a modified area :defense with a depth of approximately 50 '.kilometers. Once the Soviets complete the withdrawal of their forces from eastern Germany, this belt could be extended significantly eastward. It is designed to meet the initial thrust of an enemy attack with sufficient combat power to canalize the enemy and force him to reveal his main axes of attack. No token force, this first belt has the capability to inflict serious flamage and cause attrition in enemy forces, thereby requiring them to commit their second echelon forces. In some sectors this could involve delaying tactics similar to those employed in a covering force mission, or mobile defense techniques, ouch as repositioning to subsequent defensive positions, but it is fundamentally an area defense throughout the depth of the belt. The defense would have to accept enemy main force attacks, but should hold the shoulders of any penetration, in essence positioning the enemy .force far 54 Fen Osler Hampson, "Is NATO So Successful it Deserves to Die?," ed. W. F. Danspeckgruber (Boulder, CO, 1991), p. 246. 36
  27. 27. The second belt, with a depth up to 150 kilometers from the front, contains highly mobile counterattack forces. The mission of the forces in this belt is to blunt the penetration by severing the attacking force's logistical support, destroying its combat forces, rejecting the .'attack, and restoring the defensive line. The final belt consists of rear area security forces, theater combat service support, and operational reserves.ss Since France and Russia maintain nuclear forces outside the NATO structure, deterring war would still require a flexible response strategy. Until nuclear weapons are significantly reduced, nuclear deterrence remains an element of NATO strategy. Without the United States link to European security, excluding monopolar power system provides the necessary conditions for creating a regional multipolar power and alliance configuration. Table 8 reveals the European state system manifested multipolar power and alliance configuration system in the period after World War I and before Hitler's pinnacle as the Fuhrer of Germany. This highly unstable international system lead to World War II. NATO provides a frame work for ensuring security during this rapidly changing European environment. Although NATO can provide European security in the short term, NATO does not address future European security needs and challenges. While NATO is coordinating political and military activities among member nations, Eastern 'Europe and Russia are painfully experiencing political, economic, social, and military upheaval in their transition to democracy. Without universalist policies constructively regulating relations amid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate for realizing European security. Maintaining restricted membership, NATO does not provide a forum for encouraging cooperation and dialogue among all European nations. Thus, maintaining a modified NATO is provisional until a new scheme can help define, develop, and maintain a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. THE WESTERN EUROPEAN iTNION The resuscitation of the Western European Union (WEU) appears as the appropriate forum for providing a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. Adopting its "Platform on European Security Interests" in October 1987, the WEU declared to defend the signatories at its borders. .The WEU promotes the strategy of S. Nelson Drew and others, "The Future of NATO: Facing an Unreliable Enemy in an Uncertain Environment,".(New York, 1991), pp. io6-io7. 37
  28. 28. 'posing an unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation. It employs a r mix of nuclear and conventional forces in developing a coherent European defense structure. The WEU provides the benefit of including France in European security structure. France wishes to remain independent from U.S. military domination in Europe and refuses to participate in the NATO integrated military command. The WEU reassures and displays French commitment to defending Europe, particularly Germany. Additionally, since the WEU is designed to coordinate European security policies the WEU could check French national interests. Reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, the WEU attempts to establish a particular European order by solely coalescing the interest of its small membership. Since it contains less membership than NATO, the WEU does not adequately address the military security issues of Europe in general nor all of Western Europe. Despite the fact troops were deployed under the auspices of the WEU to the Persian Gulf during Operation Desert Storm, troop employment was decided on an independent and sovereign nation-state 'basis. Since the WEU does not plan, coordinate, or direct military operations, each signatory must still decide when military engagement is appropriately justified. The WEU is simply a forum 'for expressing and coordinating signatory views on .European military security. Since the WEU contains British and French nuclear forces, the WEU would provide nuclear deterrence without the U.S. link; however, the WEU, with its limited membership, would become a British and French dominated forum. The smaller member states and non-WEU states (except possibly Russia) would be unable to adequately protect or pursue their national interests under the threat of nuclear blackmail. Bjorn Moller states, "although a stronger WEU would lead to genuine change by creating a truly lindependent European deterrent, the resulting multipolarization in the West might also promote nuclear proliferation and destabilize 'the entire international system."sb In summary, the United States would provide a monopolar power ';system in a multipolar European alliance configuration. History demonstrates that without a monopolar power system, Europe would develop into a multipolar power system and a tightening of the multipolar alliance configuration would trigger an arms race. An arms race would develop into a bipolar alliance configuration. The WEU's limited membership and nuclear emphasis promotes a competitive instead of cooperative European .military security sb Bjorn Moller, "A New Security System for Europe?," ed. W. F. Danspeckgruber, (Boulder, CO), p. 255. 38
  29. 29. environment. Europe manifests dynamically complex political, economic, and social conditions. Crises easily escalate into war in these conditions. The contagion of war will be nurtured without universalist policies constructively regulating relations among all European states. As an alternative to three suggested schemes, Jim Hershberg proposes developing a Pan-European Army.s~ THEPAN-EUROPEAN ARMY The Pan-European Army, whose primary mission is removing military force from European political conflicts, would be 4 comprised of military forces from each European nation, Russia, Canada, and the United States. The integrated military force would be deployed in each European nation; however, the composition of 'the integrated military force would meet or exceed the national military force of each nation hosting the integrated army. The Pan-European Army, according to Mr. Hershberg, would be an `effective security institution replacing antagonistic alliances, .'the Western European Union, and the monolithic NATO alliance presently accepted by Canada, the United States, Russia, and Germany. The integrated military force would: i) secure national `borders by minimizing precarious military build-ups; 2) provide rpro-democratic and anti-communist representation; 3) reduce the misapprehension of German unification by dispersing German military forces in Europe and subordinating German military forces under the Pan-European Army infrastructure; 4) replace Russian occupation armies and allow the former Warsaw Pact nations to join the rest of 'Europe; and 5) ensure immediate and reliable mutual verification.sa The Pan-European Army questions the right to political sovereignty and territorial integrity. As Michael Walzer contends, shared experiences and values, and the free cooperative relationship of society lead to the creation of a state.59 'Relating these essential elements to society, a state is an association of human beings dedicated in a cooperative venture of establishing the juridical conditions of its society. This 'definition enables one to see that a state incurs moral obligations derived directly from the consent of free, equal, and independent human beings united in the pursuit of a better way of life. In particular, the state has the obligations of protecting the freedom 'and life of its members, and maintaining a just order. These 57 Jim Hershberg, "A Pan-European Military?: Combining Blocs Could Answer Everyone's Security Needs," The Washington Post, June 17, 1990, Section D, p. 3. 'sa Hershberg, p. D3. s9 Michael Walzer, "Just and Unjust Wars," .(New York, 1977) p. 54. 39
  30. 30. obligations are not limited to each individual, but also to society as a whole. As a result of its obligations, the moral standing of a state is judged by how well it performs its functions with its members, its society, and against the competing claims of other states. The shared experiences and values, and the free cooperative relationship of society require that an association with assigned basic rights and duties be responsible and accountable to a particular society. However, this association must occur in a particular area of land with a boundary drawn explicitly delineating this free association. Hannah Arendt claims, "To be a citizen means among other things to have responsibilities, obligations, and rights, all of which make sense only if they are territorially limited."~ Thus, to perform its functions well, political sovereignty and territorial integrity are essential elements for a state. A state uses different means to perform its functions. As an instrument of the state, the function of the military is using 'force or the threat of force to preserve the highest human values of society, i.e., to preserve a way of life.b~ Thus, for society to exist, it must be able to defend itself through the reasonable use of force to: 1) protect the innocent from unjust attack; 2) restore rights wrongfully denied; and 3) reestablish a just order. Essentially, the military profession performs its function in response to a constituted authority within a delineated area to preserve a way of life. Sir John Winthrop Hackett states, "until man is a great deal better than he is, or is ever likely to be, the requirement will persist for a capability which permits the ordered application of force at the insistence of a properly constituted authority."62 Maintaining an integrated military force equaling or exceeding the national military force of each hosting nation jeopardizes the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of a state. A national military force is responsible and accountable to a particular state and its society. The integrated military force is not responsible nor accountable to the hosting nation; it is responsible and accountable to the international organization 'maintaining the force. Mr. Hershberg~s Pan- European Army does not `:clearly draw the line between, on the one hand, removing military bo Hannah Arendt, "Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy," ed. and trans. by Ronald Beiner,(Chicago, IL., 1982), p. 44. 61 Malham M. Wakin, "War, Morality, and the Military Profession,° ed. M. M. Wakin, {Boulder, CO., 1986), p. 8 62 Sir John Winthrop Hackett, "The Military in the Service of the State," ed. M. M. Wakin, (Boulder, CO., 1986) p. 105. 40
  31. 31. force from European political conflicts, and on the other hand, permanently maintaining an integrated military force in an independent nation-state. In the former case, you are trying to lcontain violence. In the latter case, you are occupying a nation- state. "This then, is the weakness of the Pan European Army. The distinction between removing military force from European political conflicts and occupying a nation-state becomes an extremely fine line and is easily converted into a slippery slope argument. The ;test of the rightfulness of the Pan European Army is to ask if each nation constituting the integrated military force would agree :hosting it. Not only East European nations and Germany should agree hosting the Pan-European Army, but as constituents the United States, Canada, Russia, Britain, France and each West European nation should be willing to host the integrated military force. For if a nation-state is not willing to host the Pan-European Army, it is uttjust. 1'HE ORIGINAL POSITION AND TIIE FEDERATION This paper presented four schemes providing European military :'security. However, presenting rebuttals to the schemes is merely expressing empty platitudes with nothing to offer in its place. Have we exhausted all measures of military security schemes for Europe? How do we decide which is the proper military security scheme to institute in Europe? John Rawls in his book entitled, "A `.:Theory of Justice," provides the initial response. It is the 'military security scheme "that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of .their association."63 'Amending Rawls' idea to incorporate our present theme, imagine hypothetical situation called the original position, in which delegates of nations choose together, in one joint act, the military security scheme for :Europe. Assume we impose the following restrictions: 1. Each delegate is responsible with making a rational 'selection for an appropriate European military security scheme; 2. Each delegate is responsible for maximizing the security and/or welfare of a nation; however, each delegate does not know which nation he is representing; 63 John Rawls, "A Theory of Justice,° ,(Cambridge, MA., 1971), p. il. 41
  32. 32. 3. Each delegate does not know whether the nation he is representing has been "dealt a high (rich, strong nation) or low (poor, weak nation) card;"~ 4. .All delegates are 'equal and have the same rights in the procedure for choosing the European military scheme; each can make pro~osals, submit reasons for their acceptance, and so on;..s and 5. The delegates must reach a unanimous decision in selecting the European military security scheme. In the original position the delegates accomplish their 'selection under a veil of ignorance, thus, ensuring no nation is advantaged or disadvantaged in selecting a military security system ':through chance or the contingency of geographic or social circumstances. Since all the delegates are under similar circumstances and unable to design military security schemes favoring a particular nation-state, the delegates would arrive at a fair agreement because they would select a military security :scheme "which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.p67 Assume the delegates in this bargaining game have a general sense of humanity but know only that we live in smaller distributive communities called nations. In an original position and under a veil of ignorance, the delegates would agree to the following principles: a) ..Basic rights and duties apply equally to each nation and allow the most extensive liberty compatible with a like liberty for all.ba That is, the policies and actions of each nation must coexist with the policies and actions of all the other nations,69 b) Declarations of intent and action, and rules assigning ~ Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Ethics,".(New York, 1986), p. 38. bs J. Rawls, p. 19. 66 IY~1CI. ~ p. 12. 6~ Ibid., p. 13. 68 Ibid.. pp. 63-64. 69 Ibid., pp. 63-64. 42 l I
  33. 33. rights and duties are to be publicly avowed.70 c) Burdens and benefits are to be arranged so that they are both: 1) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged; and 2) attached to offices and positions open to all under ..conditions of fair equality of opportunity." In developing a European military security scheme under a veil of ignorance, the delegates would realize that a cooperative system both fairly assigning rights and duties and distributing burdens and benefits would ensure each nation could achieve its own goals. After establishing the principles under which each nation would willingly act upon, the delegates would promulgate the following rules• a) Each nation may maintain a military force, but only to defend its people, political sovereignty and territorial integrity. b) Each nation's military force is to manifest a defensive defense force structure with a credible limited troop '1eve1 reflecting its mission of defending its people, ..`political sovereignty, and territorial integrity. c) Establish a Military Security Federation with the primary mission of planning for the collective self-defense of 'Europe. Peace, containing violence, and the security of Europe are its primary goals. d) Each nation is to have only one vote with no veto power authorized to any nation. e) ..Any plan or recommendation affecting the collective self- `defense of Europe requires a two-thirds majority vote. f) No independent and sovereign nation may acquire another independent and sovereign nation. g) No independent and sovereign nation shall forcibly. interfere in the constitution and government of another nation. In the original position, the delegates use their knowledge of the world in developing a cooperative practice. Instead of functioning as a decontextualization or abstract theory, the 70 Immanuel Kant, "Kant's Political Writing," ed. Hans Reiss, (New York, 1983), p. 23. ~~ Arendt, pp. 48-49. 43 i
  34. 34. original position begins its inquiry in a particular context creating principles to evaluate established practices. Witnessing the turbulent Thirty Years' War, the "Quest for Certainty" became the political, social, philosophical, theological, and military preoccupation of Europe; it is still manifested in the twentieth century. The Treaty of Westphalia imposed a system based on stability and hierarchy from what was perceived as a world of chaos. The treaty created the sovereign 1 nation-states system. In his book entitled, "Cosmopolis," Stephen Toulmin states, "Those who reconstructed European society and culture after the Thirty Years' War took as guiding principles stability in and among the different sovereign nation-states, and hierarch within the social structures of each individual states."Z Assuming immutable truths and universal laws underlie the world of appearances, the Europeans disregarded changing human conditions and created an international system reflecting conformity and predictability. Thus, the four schemes seek ',preserving stability and permanence and realizing fixed goals. John Dewey avers, "Love of certainty is a demand for guarantees in advance of action. Ignoring the fact that truth can be bought only ';by the adventure of experiment, dogmatism turns truth into an insurance company. Fixed ends upon one side and fixed ~~principles"-that is authoritative rules-on the other, are props for a feeling of safety, the refuge of the timid and the means by which the bold prey upon the timid.X73 Since the delegates are placed in an original position under a veil of ignorance, the delegates cannot lay claim to certainty; they must proceed from the assumption that the world is filled with uncertainty, ambiguity, and disagreement. Thus, the delegates create a practice encouraging diversity and adaptability to evolving human problems. Perceiving the world as if history had ended and attained a set of fixed relationships among nation-states, the four schemes omit the fact that Europe has a stake in the future of emerging 'European nations, called non-state nations. Since the four schemes limit membership to sovereign nation-states in a hierarchical system, non-state nations upset the delicate balance of the international system. Thus, perceived as a threat, non-state nations are either disregarded, cleansed, or eradicated. Donald Dewey declares, "Common to all of them is the daily reality of being enclosed within a state that, at best shares a contingent history and culture, and that, in the worst of cases, has sought to n Stephen Toulmin, "Cosmopolis: The Hidden Agenda of Modernity," ..(New York, 199.0), p. 128. 73 J. Dewey, p. 237. 44 '.I I
  35. 35. overwhelm their history and eradicate their culture.i74 The four proposed schemes seek restoring the status quo ante the German reunification, Warsaw Treaty Organization demise, and Soviet Union dissolution. These schemes attempt legitimizing a world order firmly entrenched in the international system; they accomplish little that would result in upsetting the nation-state system. The delegates in the original position use the principles of '. liberty, truth, and equality to transform the practices of the old international system. They establish a practice adapting to rdiverse peoples, cultures, and traditions. By including all nations having a stake in the security and future of Europe, the delegates address the issues of equality and the limits of power. Stephen Toulmin asseverates, "The task is not to build new, larger, and yet more powerful powers, let alone a "world state" having absolute, worldwide sovereignty. Rather, it is to fight the inequalities that were entrenched during the ascendancy of the nation-state, and to limit the absolute sovereignty of even the best-run nation-states.j75 The original position forces the delegates not to judge a ';practice in isolation from the rest of human life, but from the rinterests of all those affected. In the original position the delegates establish a practice providing fair treatment and opportunity for each nation, enabling each nation to develop within their own context, and creating a long term forum publicly 'recognized for resolving conflicts in Europe. The four proposed schemes extrapolate from present conditions and postulate socio-politico-military and economic trends continuing unabated. The venerable philosopher, Immanuel Kant, once declared, "the imagination is the ability to make present what is absent.j76 Upon imagining a hypothetical situation called the original position, the delegates project the future and attend to non-state nations as well in developing a military security scheme. Since extrapolating excludes the future and non-state nations, the four proposed schemes' preoccupations with preserving stability devises unadaptable schemes incapable of responding to evolving human problems. Placed under a veil of ignorance, the delegates pursue justice, progress, and resolving conflicts through dialogue and not merely through the threat or use of force. 04 Donald Dewey, "The Hidden Nations of Western Europe," in Global Studies: Western Europe, ed. Dr. Henri J. Warmenhoven (Guiford, CT., 1991), p. 186. ~s Toulmin, Pp. 192-193. ~s Kant, p. 65. i 45 l
  36. 36. When seeking to establish the appropriate military security scheme, the delegates must determine both the desirability and 'feasibility of each scheme. A desirable scheme identifies those values or goals which will realize and maintain the conditions necessary for the well-being of its citizens. In the original :position, the veil of ignorance "identifies the most desirable of the alternative arrangements since it picks out the arrangement that we would select under a regime of enforced impartiality."~ A feasible scheme selects the option which efficiently and effectively achieves its goals. With the constraints placed in the original position, "the arrangement we would choose there, assuming that we choose sensibly, must be one that would seem feasible in the light of that general information."7e The most desirable and :feasible scheme creates a Federation for European Military Security. The federation is the long term military security .structure capable of dealing with the uncertainty of a European :'future while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. CONCLUSION Intending to demonstrate that both short and long term policies can be coherently developed, this paper has discussed for four schemes proposed for maintaining a relatively peaceful Europe... Proposing to terminate all European alliances, the first scheme recommends each nation-state maintain military forces at the level necessary only for defending its political sovereignty and territorial integrity. Incorrectly assuming a European future with no military threats nor rivalries, history demonstrates this scheme is destabilizing, heightens the risk of conflict, and does not provide a mechanism for avoiding war. Confronted with the NATO irony, NATO's military threat is significantly abated yet altered. With decreasing defense budgets and force reductions, the Resilient Defense strategy countervails an unstable multipolar power and alliance configuration; however, without universalist policies constructively regulating relations amid all European states, NATO lacks the comprehensive mandate for realizing European security. Thus, a modified NATO is provisional until a new scheme defines, develops, and maintains a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. Declaring to defend the signatories at its borders, the resuscitated Western European Union uses the strategy of posing an ~ Chandran Kukathas and Philip Pettit, "Rawls: A Theory of Justice and its Critics," (CA., 1990), pp. 58. ~a Ibid., p. 20. 46
  37. 37. unacceptable risk to a belligerent nation by using a mix of nuclear and conventional forces. Providing the benefit of including France in a military security scheme of Europe, the Western European Union checks French national interests. Insisting on French and British dominated nuclear forces, excluding Russian, United States and Canadian membership, and containing less membership than NATO, the Western European Union promotes a competitive military security environment and does not adequately address the military security issues of Europe. Comprised of military forces from European nation-states, Russia, Canada, and the United States, the Pan-European Army's mission would be removing military force from European political conflicts. Maintaining a Pan-European Army questions the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of the participating nation- states. This particular concept of an integrated military force ,ambiguates the distinction between the justification of containing violence in political conflicts and the excuse of occupying European nation-states. If all nation-states of the integrated military force are not willing to host the force on their own soil, then this institution is unjust. This paper proposes a thought experiment to determine whether security schemes have been exhausted, and provides a method for deciding which military scheme to implement. Imagining an original position while imposed restrictions under the veil of ignorance, convention delegates would devise a fair European military security scheme. Agreeing to comply to the principles of liberty, truth, and equality, the delegates select a desirable and feasible scheme called the Federation for European Military Security. The 'delegates establish a practice promoting development within the context of an uncertain European future, while maintaining a free, secure, just, and relatively peaceful Europe. 47

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