Presentation at Ministry of Finance, P.R. China-World Bank Summit on Subnational Debt Management and Restructuring, Nanning, Guangxi Province, P.R. China. October 22, 2015.
India: Restructuring Subnational Debt: Abha Prasad, Lead Debt Specialist, Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice, World Bank Group
1. India: Restructuring Subnational Debt
Abha Prasad
Lead Debt Specialist
Macroeconomics and Fiscal Management Global Practice,
World Bank Group
Presentation at the Ministry of Finance, P.R.China-World Bank Summit on Subnational Debt Management and Restructuring,
Nanning, Guangxi Province, P.R. China, October 22, 2015.
3. Three Phases of Subnationals’ Fiscal Performance
Pre-1998: “stable
fiscal indicators”
1998 to 2003: “fiscal slippage” 2004 onwards: “fiscal consolidation”
Measures taken:
National level
• 2003: Enactment of a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act
Subnational (States’) level
• 2004: 12th Finance Commission (12th FC) incentive schemes for Subnationals to initiate fiscal consolidation
Overview Reform Outcome
4. Two-pronged Approach to Reforms
Regulation
• Steps towards fiscal consolidation subnationals to:
• enact Fiscal Responsibility Legislation (FRL)
• eliminate revenue deficits by 2008-09
• reduce fiscal deficits to 3 percent
• set up guarantee redemption funds and sinking funds
Incentives
• Subnationals to:
• consolidate and reschedule outstanding loans to Centre (at lower interest rate),
subject to enactment of FRLs
• approach market directly for borrowings,
• Debt write-offs linked to reduction of revenue deficits
Overview Reform Outcome
6. Incentive: Debt Swap Scheme
Replaced high-cost debt of states with lower-cost borrowings, at market rates
• 20% of debt with interest rates >= 13% from Centre were prepaid
• Borrowed from market (rates averaged 7.5%)
• Also used low-cost borrowings from National Small Savings Fund
Result
– Interest savings of Rs.310 billion (US$7.1 billion)
– Saved 0.75 % in revenue per year (12th Finance Commission)
Debt outstanding remain unchanged, but servicing costs came down
Moved towards more transparent and market-based financing
Overview Reform Outcome
7. Incentive: Securitization “Power-Bonds”
• States issued “power bonds” to securitize losses of electricity utilities
– Almost 1.5% of GDP; Issued 15-year tax exempt “power bonds”
• Increased States’ liabilities by 22.8 percent during 2003–04 but subsequently several states pre-paid
• Efforts to contain moral hazard
• Announced as a one-time settlement measure
• Supplemented with reforms to ensure discipline going forward
• Participating states qualified for funds based on reform milestones and reduction of losses
Overview Reform Outcome
8. Continum: Reinforcing Incentives for Fiscal Discipline
13th Finance Commission (2012-15)
Debt relief scheme extended to States that
had not availed
Borrowing limits enforced by Centre based
on fiscal consolidation roadmap
14th Finance Commission (2015-20)
Continued the process
Ceiling on fiscal deficit/GSDP: 3%
Additional borrowing of 0.25% allowed if
Debt/GSDP ≤25%
interest payment/revenue receipts ≤10
Must have zero revenue deficit
Overview Reform Outcome
9. Key Deficit Indicators Pre- and Post-FRL
Non-special category states (NSC):
Group ‘A’ Top in real per capita incomes 2013-14 viz., Goa, Maharashtra, Haryana, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu.
Group ‘B’ Middle income states viz., Kerala, Punjab, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal
Group ‘C’ Low income - Rajasthan, Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Madhya Pradesh, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.
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SC: Special category states: Arunachal Pradesh; Assam; Himachal Pradesh; Jammu and Kashmir; Manipur;
Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagaland; Sikkim; Tripura; Uttara khand
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RD: Revenue deficit, GFD: Gross fiscal deficit, PD: Primary Deficit, GSDP: Gross state domestic product
Pre-FRL (1992-93) Post-FRL (2012-13)
Revenue Accounts
All 17 non-special category states had deficits 12 states recorded revenue surpluses
Gross Fiscal Deficit
15 states had fiscal deficits of over 3% Almost all lowered (even halved) fiscal deficits
Primary Deficit
Low income states had high primary deficit Most recorded surpluses
Deficit Indicators of States, Mean of Pre and Post FRL
Source: Reserve Bank of India, Study on State Finances, 2015
Overview Reform Outcome
10. Move to Market-Sourced Borrowing
Financing of Gross Fiscal Deficit: Less dependence on central loans
Source: RBI, Study on State Finances, several editions
Overview Reform Outcome
Coverage: Developing countries with particular focus on those subject to the WB’s NCBP
Pre1998: Sustainable debt and stable fiscal revenue indicators
1998-2003:Fiscal deterioration and spike in deficits primarily caused by upward revision in civil service salaries
2004: Concerted effort towards fiscal consolidation, including implementation of incentive-based schemes, resulting in an improvement in fiscal indicators
2003: Enactment of a Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management Act
To ensure medium- to long-term fiscal sustainability of central finances by imposing limits on borrowings, debts and deficits.
The subnational to enact Fiscal Responsibility Legislation (FRL) which prescribes specific annual fiscal targets, in order to avail debt relief
If some fiscally weak Subnationals are unable to raise funds, then they could borrow through on-lending from the Centre
(RBI State Finances Study 2004–05, p. 24)
It was mainly for debt contracted in the mid-1990s)
Following these recommendations Sikkim and West Bengal also enacted FRLs.
Pre-FRL (1992-93)
Post-FRL (2012-13)
Revenue Accounts
All 17 NSC states were in deficit
SC states had marginal surpluses in the revenue acct.
12 NSC states recorded revenue surpluses
- all low-income states
- 3 out of 5 group A
- 2 out of 5 group B
Surplus increased for SC due to large central transfers
Gross Fiscal Deficit
15 NSC states – GFD?GSDP > 3%
All ‘A’ most “C” lower GFD/GSDP to < 3%
SC states half GFD/GSDP
Primary Deficit
Group C record highest primary deficit pre-FRL
Primary deficits of all states came down
Group C states turned around post-FRL to record primary surpluses