Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD
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Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD



Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD

Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD



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Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD Chapter 8 Physical Science from WAYS OF KNOWING THROUGH THE REALMS OF MEANING by William Allan Kritsonis, PhD Document Transcript

  • Copyright © 2011 by William Allan Kritsonis/All Rights Reserved 8 PHYSICAL SCIENCE INSIGHTS1. Empirical meanings require ordinary language and mathematics for their expression.2. Science is concerned with matters of fact.3. Knowledge in science is of the actual world.4. Scientific knowledge is factual.5. To know a science is to be able to formulate valid general de- scriptions of matters of fact.6. The scientific enterprise is aimed at the discovery of truth.7. Science is characterized by descriptions that are essentially abstract.8. Physical science provides descriptions of the world as experi- enced through the activity of physical measurement.9. Measurements are capable of yielding universal agreement.10. The ideal of knowledge in physical science is the expression of its propositions in mathematical form.11. Physical measurement provides the data that are the basis of knowledge in physical science. 155
  • 156 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING12. The student completely misunderstands science if he thinks that observations somehow speak for themselves.13. The investigator cannot learn anything by taking measure- ments at random.14. In science the observations follow from the generalizations; the generalizations do not (as commonly assumed) follow from the observations.15. Principles, generalizations, and laws are not directly inferred from the data of observation.16. Observations do not test the truth or falsity of hypotheses, but rather their scope and limitations.17. “Facts” usually refer to particular data of observation.18. “Hypotheses” are generalizations in need of testing by further observations.19. “Principles” are fundamental ways of representing physical processes.20. “Generalizations” are hypotheses whose scope of application has been well tested.21. “Laws” usually refer to generalizations that have been firmly established and precisely formulated.22. “Theories” are conceptual structures that provide explana- tions for laws.23. A “model” is any kind of pattern or structure that provides a satisfactory basis for theory construction.24. A “map” is a formal representation of an area.25. A theory or model provides an abstract pattern.26. Any particular model or theory is not to be accounted true or false in the guidance of observation and experimentation.27. The ultimate goal of science is theoretical understanding.28. There is no routine or foolproof system of hypothesis formation.29. In empirical science the deductions must finally be checked against sense observations.30. All empirical propositions are provisional, temporary holding good only within the limits established by prior tests and al- ways subject to revision in the light of new evidence.31. All physical sciences deal with patterns of matter (or energy) in motion under the influence of forces of interaction.32. Scientific inquiry is aimed at bringing some order and intelligibil- ity out of what appears to be a miscellaneous and unrelated profusion of phenomena.33. A law reveals a pattern common to many particular happen- ings.34. Theories bring many apparently diverse events within a single conceptual scheme.35. The search for principles, generalizations, laws, and theories is aimed at discovering similarities among different things and con- stancies among changing things.36. The essence of physical science is the discovery and formulation of general patterns among quantities derived from the process of physical measurement. ____________________
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 157The essence of symbolisms is formal expressive patterns created forpurposes of communication. Empirical meanings require ordinary lan-guage and mathematics for their expression. However, the formalismsused do not constitute empirical knowledge itself. Science, or system-atic empirical inquiry, is concerned with matters of fact, not withsymbolic conventions. Knowledge in language is of formal propertiesand relations within a symbolic design. Knowledge in science is of theactual world. It is of the world as it appears to be in sense experienceand as it is inferred to be on the basis of this experience. In short,while language knowledge is purely formal, scientific knowledge isfactual. CONTRASTING SYMBOLICS AND EMPIRICS The contrast between symbolics and empirics can further bestated as that between symbolic prescription and factual description.To know a language is to be skillful in the use of the rules prescribedfor discourse within the particular language community. To know ascience is to be able to formulate valid general descriptions of mat-ters of fact. Because language is prescriptive, knowledge of it does not yieldtruth, but only the power of intelligible expression. On the otherhand, the scientific enterprise is aimed at the discovery of truth. Con-ventions are never true or false; they are only more or less conve-nient or appropriate to specified purposes. The forms of descriptions inscience are likewise more or less convenient, but what is asserted iseither true or false (or probable). SCIENCE IS CHARACTERIZED BY DESCRIPTIONS Science is characterized by descriptions that are essentiallyabstract. It does not deal with the actual world in the fullness of itsqualitative meanings. Rather, certain carefully defined aspects ofthe experienced world are selected as the basis for scientific descrip-tions. Different sciences deal with different aspects of the experiencedworld, using different schemes of abstraction. In the present chapterwe shall deal with those aspects of the world that are the subjectmatter of physical science. PHYSICAL SCIENCE PROVIDES DESCRIPTIONS OF THE WORLD Physical science provides descriptions of the world as experi-enced through the activity of physical measurement. By “physicalmeasurement” is meant the quantitative assessment of material ob-jects by reference to agreed upon standards of mass, length, andtime. The world described in physical science is the world revealedthrough measurements made by standard balances, rulers, andclocks, or equivalent instruments. Anything whatever is an appropri-ate object of physical description, including stars, rocks, liquids, gas-es, plants, animals, and people. The only requirement is that thethings described be accessible to physical measurement. Because of the severe limitations imposed by the requirements ofphysical measurement, it is clear that physical science provides onlya limited description of the experienced world. It affords only knowl-edge of certain selected aspects of things. It does not express thewhole truth about the world. Physical science deals with the world
  • 158 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANINGas apprehended or inferred from certain narrowly specified classes ofsense experience, namely, the reading of scales on instruments that di-rectly or indirectly measure mass, length, and time. THE PROCESS OF PHYSICAL MEASUREMENT There are two reasons for using the process of physical mea-surement. The first is that such measurements are capable of yieldinguniversal agreement. The reading of measuring instruments is in prin-ciple the most simple and certain of operations. It requires only theability to perceive the position of a pointer on a scale. Being exactlydefined and demanding only the most elemental sensory capacities,physical measurements yield data on which agreement by all ob-servers is possible, subject only to errors of measurement that canbe progressively reduced by refinement of instruments and repeatedobservations. The second value of physical measurement is the opportunityit affords for mathematical formulation. Physical science is com-pletely quantitative. it takes no account of qualities of things thatare not expressible in numbers. For example, colors as directly per-ceived qualities have no place in physical science. Colors enter only inthe form of measurable wavelengths of light, that are expressiblenumerically. This quantification of the data of physical observationmakes available to the scientist the rich resources of the field ofmathematics, facilitating the process of inference and providing pow-erful and precise formulations of scientific ideas. The ideal of knowl-edge in physical science is the expression of its propositions in mathe-matical form. GENERALIZATIONS, LAWS, AND THEORIES Physical measurement provides the data that are the basis ofknowledge in physical science. The measurements are in themselves ofno scientific value. They yield scientific knowledge only when they areused to establish generalizations, laws, and theories. The goal ofscientific investigation is not the accumulation of particular observa-tions, but the formulation and testing of general laws. To understandthe methods of scientific inquiry, it is necessary to be clear as to howgeneralizations are obtained from the data of observation. The pro-cess is essentially indirect. Generalizations are not directly derivedfrom the particulars of observation by a chain of logical inference.It is truer to say that generalization comes first, as an imaginativeconstruction, and that the data of observation are then used to vali-date the generalization. In teaching science the importance of this pri-ority can hardly be exaggerated. The student completely misunder-stands science if he thinks that observations somehow speak for them-selves, yielding laws and theories by some straightforward process ofreasoning from the data of sense to the general propositions of sci-ence. The priority of generalization to observation is even morethoroughgoing than just indicated, for observation itself is guided byreference to what is to be established. The investigator cannot learnanything by taking measurements at random. He must carefully ar-range his observations and experiments with the aim of verifying somegeneralization he already has in mind. Therefore, in science the obser-vations follow from the generalizations; the generalizations do not(as commonly assumed) follow from the observations.
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 159 Generalizations introduced in scientific investigation are called“hypotheses,” From the hypothesis, a plan of experiment and obser-vation is laid out. If the hypothesis is true, it is argued, then such andsuch observations could be made and such and such measures obtained.When the indicated measurements are taken, the hypothesis is eitherconfirmed or not confirmed. If the observations do not check with whatis expected from the hypothesis, the hypothesis is not necessarily re-jected. What may be required is a restriction of the conditions withinwhich the hypothesis holds. For example, from the hypothesis that the formula relating dis-tances to time for freely falling bodies is s = 1/2gt2 one can predict aseries of measurable length and time correspondences that can bechecked against actual observation. If observations do not agreewith predictions, the hypothesis is not at once rejected. It may be ar-gued instead that the formula holds true, but only on the conditionthat there is no air friction. The validity of this condition may bechecked by further experiments using evacuated vessels. ILLUSTRATION OF METHOD IN PHYSICAL SCIENCE Stephen Toulmin in The Philosophy of Science: An Introduc- 1tion provides an illuminating illustration of method in physical sci-ence by a discussion of optical phenomena. Geometrical optics is basedon the principle of the rectilinear propagation of light. What is thelogical status of this principle, that light travels in straight lines?The principle is not the consequence of any direct observation.Rather, it is a deliberately chosen way of representing optical phe-nomena, and it is justified by the fact that expected results, such asthe casting of shadows of specified positions and dimensions, are actu-ally observed. When in other experiments the principle appears not tohold, as, for example, in the passage of light from one medium to an-other of different density, the principle is not simply rejected. Instead,it is accepted as applying under the limiting conditions of homogeneityin the medium of transmission, and for this refracted light a new prin-ciple may be adopted, taking account of the change in direction thatoccurs on passage to a new medium (quantitatively expressed in Snel-l’s law). The phenomenon of refraction requires for its explanation newprinciples, from physical optics, in which light is regarded as a seriesof wave fronts. This is another way of representing light, justified byagreements of predictions with observations in experiments with re-fraction as well as other phenomena, such as diffraction and inter-ference. The wave principle also proves to have limitations. The waverepresentation turns out to be incapable of explaining certain otherphenomena, notably those of photoelectricity. Here a new represen-tation is introduced to the effect that light is made up of photons, ordiscrete packages of energy. The photon principle permits furtherquantitative predictions that can be tested by a variety of experi-ments and observations. ESSENTIAL POINTS TO REMEMBER1 Harper & Row, Publishers, Incorporated, New York, 1960.
  • 160 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING The essential points to be established are these: first, thatprinciples, generalizations, and laws are not directly inferredfrom the data of observation, and second, that observations donot test the truth or falsity of hypotheses, but rather theirscope and limitations. FACTS, HYPOTHESES, PRINCIPLES, GENERALIZATIONS, LAWS, AND THEORIES While no sharp lines can be drawn between facts, hypotheses,principles, generalizations, laws, and theories, the distinctions im-plied by these different terms are useful. “Facts” usually refer toparticular data of observation. As we have seen, the determinationof which facts are relevant and the methods of formulating observa-tions and experiments depend on the prior construction of hypotheses.“Hypotheses” are generalizations in need of testing by further obser-vations. “Principles” are fundamental ways of representing physicalprocesses, suggesting further consequences to be tested by experimentsand observations. “Generalizations” are hypotheses whose scope ofapplication has been well tested. “Laws” usually refer to general-izations that have been firmly established and precisely formulated.“Theories” are conceptual structures that provide explanations forlaws. AN EXAMPLE For example, the study of the behavior of gases yields certainobservable facts about pressure, volume, and temperature. Experi-ments can be performed to test the hypothesis that under constanttemperature, when the pressure of a given mass of gas is increased,its volume will decrease. This hypothesis, when confirmed by experi-ment, becomes a valid generalization. When quantitatively expressedby the mathematical relation PV = constant, it qualifies as a law(Boyle’s law). The principle implicit in this investigation is that gasesmay be treated as homogeneous compressible substances with suchmeasurable properties as pressure, volume, and temperature (eachspecified by experimental operations). The explanation for Boyle’slaw (and others, including Gay-Lussac’s law and Charles’ law) isprovided by a theory (the kinetic theory of gases), according to whicha gas is regarded as a collection of perfectly elastic molecules inrandom motion. THE USE OF MODELS IN FORMULATING THEORIES IN SCIENCE In the formulation of theories in science, use is made of models.A “Model” is any kind of pattern or structure that provides a satis-factory basis for theory construction. For example, the kinetic theo-ry of gases makes use of the model of mechanical interaction of col-
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 161liding hard bodies, even though gas molecules themselves are not re-garded as actually being such entities. The model is useful becausewhen gas molecules are treated as if they were colliding elastic bod-ies, the resulting predictions are largely verified by experiments. Simi-larly, the Bohr model of the atom, in which the electrons are repre-sented as miniature planets revolving in elliptical orbits around a nu-clear sun, is not regarded as literally true, but only as a useful rep-resentation for atomic theory, giving a basis for explaining (amongother things) the observed frequencies of light revealed in spectrumanalysis. Not all models are mechanical or pictorial, as in the two casescited above. More common are mathematical models—formal sym-bolic patterns that fit the data of observation reasonably well. Forexample, a set of partial differential equations provides the model inthe Schrodinger theory of the atom, producing predictions as good asor better than those of the Bohr model, and with more predictive pow-er, flexibility, and elegance. MODELS AND THEORIES CONSTRUCTED Models and the theories constructed from them may perhapsbest be understood after the analogy of maps. A “map” is a formalrepresentation of an area, chosen for the purpose of directing travelin that region. Its usefulness derives from the fact that the relation-ships among the elements on the map are congruent with the relation-ships between places and things in the area mapped. A theory or mod-el (whether visual or mathematical) provides an abstract patternwhose structure in relevant respects is congruent with the structureof the physical world, as demonstrated by the agreement between ob-servations and predictions made from the theory or model. MODELS AND THEORIES It should be added that, as in the case of principles, generaliza-tions, and laws, any particular model or theory is not so much to beaccounted true or false as more or less successful in the guidance ofobservation and experimentation. Models and theories are mainlyjudged as to scope of application and degree of relevance to thephysical systems studied. THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF SCIENCE IS THEORETICAL UNDERSTANDING We return again to the point that the ultimate goal of scienceis theoretical understanding. Individual facts are not in themselves im-portant scientifically. Individual facts are significant only as theycontribute to generalizations, laws, and finally to theories that ex-plain all the lower levels in the hierarchy of scientific propositions.It is in this theoretical manner that physical science is concerned withdescriptions of the metrical features of material things. The descrip-tions sought are not of particular things, but of regular patterns ofchange in the measurable aspects of material bodies. THE CREATIVE IMAGINATION ACTIVELY PROJECTS POSSIBILITIES NO FOOLPROOF SYSTEM OF HYPOTHESIS FORMATION
  • 162 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING In the above discussion of scientific methods the primacy of thegeneral and theoretical has been stressed, but no indication has real-ly been given as to the basis for selecting the hypotheses, principles,and models to be tested experimentally. For the most part the choiceis made by noting similarities between new phenomena and more famil-iar ones and adapting to the new situation conceptual schemes thathave previously proved successful. There is no routine or foolproofsystem for hypothesis formation. The construction of fruitful concep-tual patterns to be tested by observation is essentially a work of thecreative imagination. The creative imagination actively projects pos-sibilities and reflectively sifts them by well-informed thought-experi-ments before undertaking any actual physical tests. METHODS OF THEORETICAL SCIENCE The methods of theoretical science are remarkably similar tothose of mathematics in that imaginative construction of conceptualschemes with deductive elaboration occurs in both fields. The one deci-sive difference is that in empirical science the deductions must finallybe checked against sense observations. In mathematics the only re-quirement is internal consistency within any given theory. In empiricalscience the chain of propositions must also be consistent with the re-sults of actual physical measurements. Because future observations might at any time fail to agreewith predictions made on the basis of earlier verified hypotheses, nogeneralization, law, or theory in science may be regarded as finallyand fully proved, no matter how accurate previous predictions havebeen. All empirical propositions are provisional, temporary holdinggood only within the limits established by prior tests and always sub-ject to revision in the light of new evidence.
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 163 A great amount of physical science is based on measurement. Precise calculation depends on precise data collection. People remember the stories about the astronauts skipping off of the atmosphere if their angle of entry was just a few degrees off. As a general rule, precession requires patience. How accurate can a lesson be if a teacher cannot get a child to sit still long enough to do an experiment?
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 165 Much of the above synopsis of methods in scientific investigationapplies to all branches of science and not only to physical science.The high degree of precision and quantification possible in the physicalsciences makes them the ideal toward which the other sciences aim.Nevertheless, there are representative ideas that belong specificallyto physical science. These will be considered in the remainder of thischapter. REPRESENTATIVE IDEAS BELONGING TO PHYSICAL SCIENCE The basic concepts of physical science derive from the definitionof physical measurement by means of rulers, clocks, and balances, ortheir equivalents. All physical sciences deal with patterns of matter(or energy) in motion under the influence of forces of interaction.Rulers measure space intervals and therefore material configura-tions. Clocks measure time intervals, which, in conjunction with spa-tial measurements, yield information about motion. Balances measurethe forces of interaction that effect changes in motion.Particles The fundamental model for analyzing any event in the physicalworld is that of particles moving in fields of force, the fields beingthemselves determined by the character and configuration of the in-teracting particles. The material world is built up in a hierarchy ofsuccessively complex configurations, beginning with certain elemen-tary particles, including electrons, neutrons, and protons, and morethan two dozen other particles that play important roles in estab-lishing stable patterns of interaction. The strongest interactions oc-cur within the most intimate material configurations, the atomic nu-clei. The weakest known interactions between elementary particlesare those of gravity. Intermediate in strength are the interactions inelectromagnetic fields and in the process of nuclear decay.Atoms The elementary particles are organized into more or less sta-ble energy distributions called “atoms,” each consisting of a nucleusof given mass and charge surrounded by one or more layers of orbit-ing electrons. The structural patterns of the various kinds of atomsare the basis for understanding the physical and chemical propertiesof all material bodies whatsoever. Each distinct atomic pattern be-longs to one element (e.g., hydrogen, sodium, carbon), and these ele-ments may be arranged in cycles according to the Periodic Table ofthe Elements, certain physical and chemical similarities among ele-ments belonging to the same cycle being explainable by their corre-sponding patterns of orbital electrons.Molecules Atoms interact to form still more complex structures called“molecules,” the combination possibilities of that depend upon the pat-terns of interaction between the electron systems of the constituentelements. The study of these structures and processes belongs to thefield of chemistry.Solid State Physics
  • 166 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING The study of the modes of atomic and molecular patterning oc-curring in crystals and metals is usually designated as the field ofsolid state physics. More random types of particle distributions arestudied in the theory of liquid flow (hydrodynamics) and in the theo-ry of gases. The statistical analysis of random molecular motions isthe key to all the phenomena connected with heat and forms the sub-stance of thermodynamics.Electromagnetic Theory Electromagnetic Theory deals with particles bearing electriccharges and with the fields of force resulting from these charges andtheir movements. Within this theory are comprehended not only thephenomena of electricity and magnetism in their ordinary sense, butalso those of light and of radio waves, infrared rays,X rays, gamma rays, and cosmic rays. In modern physics it has fur-ther been shown the field theory of these various forms of electro-magnetic radiation must be complemented by a particle theory, sincethe energy in such fields is not continuous, but “quantized,” i.e., comesin discrete units or packets (quanta). Specifically, the particle-fieldmodel is appropriate not only to the domains of atomic and molecularinteractions, but also to the study of energy distributions themselves.This is to be expected in view of the know equivalence of mass and en-ergy.Celestial Mechanics Gravitational interactions that become important with largeaggregations of matter, are most thoroughly analyzed in the studyof celestial mechanics. In this study planets, stars, and satellitesat great distances from one another can be treated as interactingparticles in gravitational fields of force, using models similar tothose applicable to the motion of charged particles in electromagnet-ic fields. The same fundamental ideas apply in every other branch ofphysical science. For example, Geology is concerned with the struc-tures and transformations of the material aggregates forming thecrust of the earth. This study requires the use of the same conceptualtools as in physics and chemistry for the analysis of the hierarchiesof material configurations, movements, and forces that effectchanges. THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES, GENERALIZATIONS, LAWS, AND THEORIESOrder and Intelligibility In the most general terms, scientific inquiry is aimed at bringingsome order and intelligibility out of what appears to be a miscella-neous and unrelated profusion of phenomena. A principle is a way ofordering sense perceptions according to some rational scheme. A lawreveals a pattern common to many particular happenings. Theoriesbring many apparently diverse events within a single conceptualscheme. The search for principles, generalizations, laws, and theories
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 167is aimed at discovering similarities among different things and con-stancies among changing things. For example, the general gas equa-tion, PV = RT, shows that when a given body of gas undergoeschanges due to heating or cooling, expansion or contraction, increaseor decrease of pressure, something remains constant, namely, thequantity PV/T.Laws of Motion Every law expresses relationships that remain invariant de-spite changes in variable factors. Laws of motion are constant pat-terns that changing things exhibit. Therefore, while the planets movearound the sun, constantly changing their positions and velocities,Kepler’s laws of planetary motion express the fact that certain re-lations among these changing factors remain unchanged. The theoryof relativity, beginning with the premise that physical measurementsare definable only in relation to arbitrarily designated frames ofreference, culminates in the formulation of laws that are invariantunder changes in frames of reference and in the discovery of an impor-tant metric invariant, specifically, the speed of light in a vacuum.Constancy Amid Change The idea of constancy amid change is particularly well illus-trated in the various laws (or principles) of conservation in physicalscience. For example, according to the law of conservation of energy,in any closed or isolated system, while energy may change from oneform to another (e.g., from energy of position to kinetic energy toheat energy), the total amount of energy in the system remains un-changed. Similarly, according to the law of conservation of mass,when a given body of material undergoes physical and chemicaltransformations, the total mass of the material remains unchanged.While it is now known that this principle does not hold except forclosed systems and with the understanding that mass and energy areinterchangeable, it is still of great value in scientific investigation,as in the study of chemical reactions. These and other conservationprinciples, including the conservation of momentum and the conserva-tion of parity—a discovery in nuclear physics—are powerful conceptsfor exploring unchanging properties and relations of changing things,specifically contributing to the rational ordering of physical phenom-ena. Much of physical science deals with how things work and why they work that way. Teachers want students to gain understanding of the world around them.
  • 168 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING Scientific inquiry is aimed at bringing order and intelligibility to the light of the student. How important is it for teachers to follow through in teaching the student how to use that knowledge?
  • 170 PART TWO: FUNDAMENTAL PATTERNS OF MEANING THE ESSENCE OF PHYSICAL SCIENCE IS DISCOVERY AND FORMULATION In summary, the essence of physical science is the discovery andformulation of general patterns among quantities derived from theprocess of physical measurement. These patterns express constanciesthat hold, within specified limits and under stated conditions, through-out the changes occurring in the interaction of material entities with-in given fields of force. WAYS OF KNOWING1. Why are symbolisms important for purposes of communications?2. Why is systematic empirical inquiry concerned with matter of fact and not with symbolic conventions?3. Why is knowledge in science concerned with the real world?4. Why is language knowledge considered purely formal?5. Why is scientific knowledge considered purely factual?6. What does it mean to know a science?7. Why is language considered prescriptive?8. Why is science aimed at discovering the truth?9. Why is science characterized by descriptions that are essen- tially abstract?10. Why is measurement critically important to physical science?11. What are some severe limitations imposed on physical science because of physical measurement?12. What are two reasons for applying the process of physical measurement on physical science?13. When do physical measurements have scientific value?14. How does one understand the methods of scientific investigation?15. Why is it necessary to be clear as to how generalizations are obtained from the data of observation?16. Why can’t the investigator learn by taking measurements at random?17. What are generalizations called that are introduced in scien- tific investigation?18. Can you provide an imaginative illustration of method in physi- cal science?19. What essential points in physical science should be established relative to principles, generalizations, and laws?20. Why is the use of models helpful in formulating theories in sci- ence?21. What is the ultimate goal of science?22. Are there any routines or foolproof systems of hypothesis for- mulation?23. How should the creative imagination of a person be implemented in hypothesis formulation?24. What are the methods of theoretical science?25. Why is it said that all empirical propositions are provisional or temporary?26. From what devices do basic concepts of physical science derive their physical measurements?27. What is the fundamental model for analyzing any event in he physical world?28. In the most general terms, what is the purpose of scientific in- quiry?
  • PHYSICAL SCIENCE 17129. What is the essence of physical Science?