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Case Study Barrow V[1]. Greenville Isd
 

Case Study Barrow V[1]. Greenville Isd

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Public School Law - Dr. William Allan Kritsonis

Public School Law - Dr. William Allan Kritsonis

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    Case Study Barrow V[1]. Greenville Isd Case Study Barrow V[1]. Greenville Isd Document Transcript

    • Bechtold, Bickham, & Singh Prairie View A&M University PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW ADMN 5023 William Allan Kritsonis, PhD Professor Parent’s Rights Submitted by Rebecca Bechtold, Michele Bickham, and Soul Singh June 22, 2009 1
    • Bechtold, Bickham, & Singh Parent’s Rights INTRODUCTION “Parental rights do not become null and void just because the parent is a teacher. The decision of whether or not to consider an employee for a job should never be based on where the applicant chooses to educate her own children. Neither the state nor any school official has the right to dictate how an employee’s child should be raised,” said ADF-allied attorney Kelly Shackelford, president of Liberty Legal Institute. For this report, we will look at a public school teacher’s right to educate their children the best way one sees fit and their right to promotions even if the children attend a private institution. Case One United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit Karen Jo Barrow, Plantiff-Appellants v. Greenville Independent School District, et al., Defendants-Appellees Docket No. 05-11151 LITIGANTS Plaintiff – Appelant: Karen Jo Barrow Defendants – Appellees: Greenville Independent School District BACKGROUND Karen Jo Barrow was a teacher in the Greenville Independent School District. When the Assistant Principal position at Greenville Middle School became available, the future principal of the middle school encouraged Barrow to apply. Barrow was interested in and qualified for the position. At the direction of Dr. Herman Smith, superintendent of GISD, a senior school official asked Barrow if she would move her children from a private Christian school to public school so that Barrow could be considered for the job. Barrow affirmed her interest in the job but stated she wouldn't sacrifice her children’s' religious education. After Barrow's name was placed in the pool of applicants, Dr. Smith directed Assistant Superintendent for personnel, William Smith, to see if Barrow would be willing to move her children to public school. She was not, and another person was hired for the job. 2
    • Bechtold, Bickham, & Singh FACTS Barrow sued Smith and GISD in federal district court under 42 USC§ 1983, claiming a denial of constitutional rights, disparate impact and treatment in violation of Title VII, and several violations of state law. 42 USC states: “every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia”. GISD moved for summary judgment, which the court granted in part and denied in part. Regarding 42 USC § 1983, the court concluded that the GISD Board of Trustees, not Smith, was the policymaker because Smith only recommended candidates while the Board had final approval. The district court also held that the circumstance that the Board rubber-stamped Smith's recommendations was legally irrelevant and that a patronage requirement was not custom or practice establishing GISD policy. DECISION The court granted summary judgment for GISD on the Title VII claims, except as to Barrow's reasonable accommodation claim, concluding that the failure to promote was due to Barrow's choice to put her children in private school, not because of her religion or the religious nature of the private school she chose, and that Barrow presented no evidence of disparate impact upon constitutionally protected conduct. The court denied summary judgment on the state law claims, except as to the claim for injunctive relief. The court concluded that the GISD Board of Trustees, not Smith, was the policymaker because Smith only recommended candidates while the Board had final approval. DICTA A school district has no vicarious liability under 42 USC § 1983. Rather, it is liable for the unconstitutional conduct of its policymakers, including persons to whom it has delegated policymaking authority in certain areas. It was determined that, under Texas law, school boards make policy and superintendents administer. It pointed to Texas law giving the school board “exclusive authority to manage and govern the public free schools of the district.” IMPLICATIONS Texas statute directs school districts to adopt a personnel policy giving superintendents "sole authority to make recommendations to the board regarding the selection of all personnel, except that the board may delegate final authority for those decisions to the superintendent....If 3
    • Bechtold, Bickham, & Singh the board rejects the superintendent's recommendation, the superintendent shall make alternative recommendations until the board accepts a recommendation." Hence the superintendent's power to recommend comes from the legislature, not from the board of trustees, although the board retains the power to accept or reject those recommendations and to fire the superintendent. Standing alone, Barrow's argument has purchase because the superintendent has "sole authority" to recommend. But it cannot prevail against the backdrop of Texas's legislative scheme, which generally makes the board the policymaker and the superintendent the head administrator. 4