Population of Japan in 2012 is 127 million people and falling due to decrease in birthrate.----- Meeting Notes (12-07-25 11:35) -----Don Cayo on Japan preparedness for EQ/Tsunami
Prof Asai from Sapporro Medical School did medical response/work in Miyato City and in Fukushima Nuclear Plant.
7.3 Magnitude (Japan Meteorological Agency scale) When an earthquake hit the city of Kobe, they said that it was unexpected, unprecedented, and not prepared. They said that it was the worst disaster in post-W.W.II period of Japan. The area had been prepared for water related disasters but not earthquakes. The earthquake affected one of the highly urbanized areas in Japan, Kobe city, so it revealed the physical vulnerability of urban infrastructures, how fragile it was, as well as social vulnerability of people whose lives were dependent on the urban system to function. While the March 11 earthquake, affected a large area of north eastern Japan, commonly called, Sanriku Shore, has been affected by numbers of earthquakes and tsunamis in the past yet, when this happened, the government said that it was “unprecedented”. The communities were aware of the tsunami risk, but what they said was that it was beyond their expectation. “Unprecedented.” Something they had not thought of happening. It was a largest seismologic event that Japan has experienced as long as the historical record exists. The tsunamis affected the coastal lines severely that revealed different types of vulnerability from the Kobe disaster. It is the vulnerability of small villages and towns of fishermen and farmers who have stronger ties to their geographic locations that are the foundation of their livelihood. Therefore, the option for relocation has created very complex and difficult decision-making process for them. The March earthquake has become the most expensive disaster in Japan and the world. US$210 to 310 billion (USD=JPY 80.5).
Haiti and convergence of NGO’s and materials… how to store and manage.
IAEA Summary of reactor status at the end of March
Wayne Greene, Ph.D.President, Pacific NorthwestPreparedness Society
VANCOUVER SUN DECEMBER 26TH"No place on earth was better prepared forsomething like the 9.0-magnitudeearthquake and monster tsunami thatstruck northeast Japan in March and fewcould match the organization andresources deployed in its aftermath.”Don Cayo, Vancouver Sun December 26, 2011
EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CYCLEPreparedness Respons e Mitigatio Recovery n
MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI - DIMENSIONS OF THE DISASTER• Magnitude 9 quake and tsunami (4th largest)• 27,600 people dead or missing• 90% of deaths due to drowning• Previous tsunami in 1896, 1933 and 1960• Some communities had up to 50% of their land destroyed• Destruction of 100,000 buildings, 1,500 roads, 48 bridges, 15 railways, ports, sewage treatment plants and schools is estimated at $200-$300 billion• A total of 387,000 evacuees were at 2,200 shelters without water and heating and low supplies of food and medicine• A month after the disaster 130,000 people still in shelters
(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THEHOUSE (MARCH)
(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THEHOUSE (JUNE)
(3) NAOTORI – KEEP YOUR EYE ON THEHOUSE (SEPT)
MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE ANDTSUNAMI(2) Direct Lessons from Kobe?• Rapid deployment of 100,000 SDF forces to Sendai; 120,000 blankets, 120,000 bottles of water; 100,000 liters of gasoline, plus food• Quick acceptance by Japan of international assistance, and better efforts for getting overseas teams on-site rapidly• US military assistance from Okinawa and Yotsuya• Many other local governments sent aid in the form of food, medicine and emergency personnel
MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)(3) Crisis Management Problems• Nuclear power plant drama distracted national government from the humanitarian crisis in the Sanriku coast• Local governments along the coast (mainly less than 100,000 popl.) overwhelmed and lost mayors, staff and capacity to respond
MARCH 11 GREAT EASTERN EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI (CONT.)(4) Surviving the Tsunami: what worked and what didn’t?(a) Structural measures: • Sea walls (10m high in Taro) NO • 3-storey evacuation buildings NO(b) Non-structural measures: • Early warning systems (EQ occurred at 14.46; tsunami warning at 14.49) (YES) • Pre-disaster education (schools in Ishinomaki-city) YES • Sanriku culture of “Tendenko” (look out for yourself) YES
KOBE AND MARCH 11 EARTHQUAKES Kobe March 11th Earthquake EarthquakeMag. 6.9 Mw (7.3 JMA) 9.0 MwDate January 17, 1995. March 11, 2011. 2:46 pm 5:46 amLocation Urban area Coastal and rural regionHazards Seismologic, fires Seismologic, tsunamis, firesDeaths 6,434 15,844 (+ 3,451 missing)Buildings 104,906 117,542Cities, 25 (cities and towns) 241 (cities, towns, andtowns villages) White Paper 2011: 22
POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES(1) Structural Reforms to Japan’s Crisis Management System and Preparedness:• Revised Anti-Disaster Basic Law in December 1995 changed many structural and legal problems attached to dispatching troops for disaster relief and rescue work• National government instituted an Office of Crisis Management in 1998 under the direct control of the Prime Minister• Many local governments upgraded their disaster management systems, incorporating new information technologies
POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES(2) Nation-wide Support System for Disaster Emergency Response:• National Police Agency• Fire and Disaster Management Agency• Coast Guard• Self-Defense Forces• Inter-prefectural support agreements• Medical transportation action plan• Designation of emergency hospitals• Designation of heliports
POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES(3) Support for Retrofitting Older Infrastructure:• Seismic Building Retrofitting Act, 1995• Subsidies for seismic diagnosis of buildings• Seismic retrofitting of large buildings• Seismic retrofitting of houses in dense residential areas
POST-KOBE COUNTERMEASURES(4) Other:• Support system for volunteer activity• Promotion of community self-defense organizations• Revision of Compensation Framework for victims (Natural Disaster Victims Relief Law, 1999)• Revision of Local Tax Laws
“CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS DEMAND ADIFFERENT NATIONAL RESPONSE THAN DO`ROUTINE’ DISASTERS”(1) preparedness and response(2) communicating risks(3) international assistance(4) critical infrastructure
FUKUSHIMA DISASTER On 11 March 2011 the Prime Minister of Japan declared a nuclear emergency following a problem with the cooling system power supply at nuclear reactors at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. The emergency declaration followed the 11th March, 9.0- magnitude earthquake off the countrys northeast coast.
FUKUSHIMABefore the earthquakeOf 6 reactors: 4 were running normally and 2 were in cold shutdown for maintenanceFirst few minutes after the earthquakeThe 4 active reactors „scrammed‟ or shut downExternal power was lost but the auxillary power kicked in to keep the water moving
FUKUSHIMAAfter the earthquake:Tsunami flooded parts of the plant, shutting down the auxiliary powerNo cooling to take the residual heat outside the reactor core.Heat inside the fuel elements generated steamWater levels decreased gradually uncovering parts of the fuel elementsCladding breached leading to release of fission products and generated hydrogenSeveral explosions occurred because of HydrogenLoss of water in the spent fuel pool leading to release of gaseous and aerosol fission products
FUKUSHIMA DAIICHI NUCLEARPOWER GENERATING STATION
B.E.I.R. HUMAN EXPERIENCE Early martyrs Radium Dial Painters Tuberculosis Patients Survivors of Atomic Bombings Ankylosing Spondylitis Patients Uranium Miners
EFFECTS: SOMATIC AND GENETIC Radiation effects are called somatic if they become manifest in the exposed person and genetic if they affect their descendants.
SOMATIC EFFECTS, RISK FACTORS Cancers indistinguishable from those causednaturally Solid tumours (breast, lung, thyroid and GI ) greater numerically than leukemia Risk is greater for women - breast and thyroidcancer Age effects are important, age independent risk estimates may be inappropriate. Synergistic effects may be important
ANNUAL DOSE RATES Cosmic 0.45 External 0.26 Internal 0.27 Other <0.01 ~1.0 mSv/ year
MAXIMUM PERMISSIBLE DOSESWorkers (members of public) 5 mSv per yearAtomic Radiation Workers (ARWs ) 50 mSv per year
JAPANESE PARLIAMENTARY PANEL- JULY 5, 2012a. Disaster was “made in Japan”b. Japanese culture: Reflexive Obedience Reluctance to Question Authority “Sticking with the Program”c. Collusion between Government, the Regulators and Tepcod. Government and Regulators not fully committed to protecting public health and safetye. The central government failed to convey severity of accident
PANEL RECOMMENDATIONS, JULY 5, 20121. Permanent committee in National Diet2. Reform of the crisis management system3. Establish system to deal with long-term public health effects4. Dramatic corporate reform of Tepco*5. New regulatory body6. Develop a system of independent investigation commissions *Tepco: Tokyo Electric Power Company
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORTH AMERICA(1) More federal/provincial resources to protect against catastrophic disasters; importance of protecting critical infrastructure and local government buildings(2) Customize risk reduction at the local level based on topography, physical features and land-use planning(3) Early warning systems are effective when they are properly perceived