• Like
08/13/12 - OBJECTION(S) TO 08/02/12 ORDER BY JUDGE TOM S. LEE - Motion To Disqualify
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

Thanks for flagging this SlideShare!

Oops! An error has occurred.

08/13/12 - OBJECTION(S) TO 08/02/12 ORDER BY JUDGE TOM S. LEE - Motion To Disqualify

  • 17,531 views
Published

 

Published in News & Politics
  • Full Name Full Name Comment goes here.
    Are you sure you want to
    Your message goes here
    Be the first to comment
    Be the first to like this
No Downloads

Views

Total Views
17,531
On SlideShare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
0

Actions

Shares
Downloads
3
Comments
0
Likes
0

Embeds 0

No embeds

Report content

Flagged as inappropriate Flag as inappropriate
Flag as inappropriate

Select your reason for flagging this presentation as inappropriate.

Cancel
    No notes for slide

Transcript

  • 1. OBJECTION(S) TO 08/02/12 JUDGE TOM S. LEE ORDER DEADLINE IS 10 DAYS FROM DATE OF ORDER: 08/16/12The following information ispertinent/relevant to understand UnitedStates of America President BarackObama’s and his LegalCounsel/Advisor/Grand Duke Of Ku KluxKlan Baker Donelson’s and theirCONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS Role and Interest in this Lawsuit. Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”) is Legal Counsel/Advisor for the United States of America Presidents (i.e. which includes President Barack Obama), United States Congressional Members, United States Supreme Court Justices, FEDERAL JUDGES ASSOCIATION, etc. http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/leggitt-lance-bresearchinfo http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/leggitt-lancesr- advisortopresidenthhscounselorgovofva http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/bd-oilfield-patents http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/duff-james-duff-legal-counsel-for-federal-judges- associationhighlighted 1) Page Kruger & Holland is the law firm Vogel Denise Newsome was employed at, at the time of her February 14, 2006 KIDNAPPING. 2) Baker Donelson appears orchestrated and directed the February 14, 2006, KIDNAPPING of Vogel Denise Newsome – i.e. working with its Clients: Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Spring Lake Apartment, Judge William Skinner, Constable Jon Lewis, and other CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS 3) Baker Donelson, it appears, then SWIFTLY moved to have its employees MOVED into the following positions for purposes of OBSTRUCTING and COVERING UP their CRIMES and that of their Client(s) – Spring Lake Apartment/Melody Crews, Hinds County Mississippi/Constable Jon Lewis/Willliam Skinner, and other Conspirators: (a) About 2006 – Lee Rawls was placed in the United State Department of Justice Federal Bureau of Investigation as CHIEF OF STAFF and also served as SENIOR Counsel to FBI Director/Robert Mueller 06/06/2006 – http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/062606- fbicomplaint-mississippi-matter 10/13/08 - http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/101308-fbi-complaint-gmm-properties 09/24/09 –http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/092409-fbicomplaint-storall 12/28/09 - http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/122809-fbicomplaint-ohio-supreme-court 06/09/10 - http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/060910-fbi-complaint-public-storage (b) About July 2006 – James C. Duff to the position of DIRECTOR of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts (c) About May 2007 - Bradley S. Clanton to the position of CHAIRMAN of the Mississippi Advisory Commission – i.e. provides assistance in INVESTIGATIONS, etc. to United States Commission on Civil Rights/United States Department of Justice 4) Hinds County Mississippi Constable Jon Lewis was the person ORDERED to carry out the KIDNAPPING of Vogel Denise Newsome. At the time of this KIDNAPPING, it appears that Jon Lewis was a member of Mississippi GOVERNOR Haley Barbour’s Administration – i.e. CHAIRMAN of the Mississippi Athletic Commission. Haley Barbour is a Client of Baker Donelson. http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/mississippi-athletic-commission-jon-lewis http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/bd-c-leelottiiigovbarbour 5) Judge Tom S. Lee is the Judge attempting to ABUSE his AUTHORITY and preside over the above reference lawsuit over Vogel Denise Newsome’s OBJECTIONS. Judge Tom S. Lee is one of Baker Donelson’s PURCHASED Judges/Justices. http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/baker-donelson-ties-to-judgesjustices-as-of120911 16, 2012
  • 2. 08/13/12 – USPS PROOF OF MAILING RECEIPTUSDC SOUTHERN DISTRICT MISSISSIPPI (Jackson)OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order By Judge Tom S. Lee
  • 3. VOGEL DENISE NEWSOME Post Office Box 14731 Cincinnati, Ohio 45250 (601) 885-9536 or (513) 680-2922 August 13, 2012VIA PRIORITY MAIL: Tracking No. 03113260000101213594United States District Court - Southern District (Jackson, MS)ATTN: J. T. Noblin (Clerk of Court)500 E. Court Street, Suite 2.500Jackson, Mississippi 39201 RE: Vogel Denise Newsome v. Page Kruger & Holland P.A., et al., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-00342, United States District Court Southern District (Jackson, MS) PLEASE NOTE: Newsome is requesting to be advised of ANY/ALL Conflict-Of-Interests in regards to this lawsuit.Dear Mr. Noblin: Attached please find the following document(s): 1) DVD containing Newsome’s OBJECTION(S) To August 2, 2012 Order Of Judge Tom S. Lee; Motion For DISQUALIFICATION; AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL and supporting Memorandum Brief with EXHIBITS in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure – i.e. for Costs efficiency purposes. 2) EXHIBIT “39” for the July 25, 2012 (DOC. NO. 19) submittal entitled, Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action). The Clerk advised Newsome that this Exhibit was corrupted. Newsome encloses TWO copies of the FIRST Page only of her pleading. Please stamp“FILED” one of these copies and return to her in in the self-addressed postage-paid envelopeenclosed. By copy of this letter, Newsome is providing opposing counsel with a copy of the abovereferenced pleading on DVD as well. Newsome has in good faith also placed these pleadings at thefollowing locations via the INTERNET due to the PUBLIC/GLOBAL/INTERNATIONAL interestsin matters involving her, United States of America President Barack Obama, United States ofAmerica Government, Florida A&M University Robert Champion matter, Trayvon Martin/GeorgeZimmerman matter, etc. which appears to have a DIRECT impact and/or connection to the recentand VICIOUS attacks and ONGOING Conspiracies (i.e. involving BAKER DONELSONBEARMAN CALDWELL & BERKOWITZ and their CLIENTS and PARTNER Law Firms asPHELPS DUNBAR, etc.) that have been leveled against Newsome for sharing information that arematters of PUBLIC interests. Therefore, please feel free to retrieve these pleadings, should problemsoccur with viewing, from http://www.slideshare.net/VogelDenise/reserved-for-objection-to-080212-judge-tom-s-lee-order and https://secure.filesanywhere.com/fs/v.aspx?v=8a7164865a6770a66d9d .
  • 4. IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT – JACKSON DIVISIONVOGEL DENISE NEWSOME PLAINTIFFV. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:12-cv-00342PAGE KRUGER & HOLLAND P.A., ET AL. DEFENDANTS PLAINTIFF’S OBJECTION(S) TO AUGUST 2, 2012 ORDER OF JUDGE TOM S. LEE; MOTION FOR DISQUALIFICATION AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL1 COMES NOW Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome (“Newsome” and/or “Plaintiff”) WITHOUT waiving herOBJECTIONS to Judge Tom S. Lee presiding over this matter in that a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST exist whichrequires RECUSAL as well as Newsome’s OBJECTIONS to Magistrate assignment in this matter and files this, herOBJECTION(S) To August 2, 2012 Order Of Judge Tom S. Lee; Motion For DISQUALIFICATION; AND DEMANDFOR JURY TRIAL (“OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order”) in the preservation of her rights and pursuant to FederalRules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) Rule 60: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure – Rule 60: Relief from Judgment or Order (b) Grounds for Relief from a Final Judgment, Order, or Proceeding. On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; . . . (3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief. See EXHIBIT “A” – Rule 60 of the FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.FRCP Rule 12(G) governing matters regarding consolidation of defenses and objections. To have this Lawsuit triedby a JURY (i.e. NOT Bench Trial before Judge Tom S. Lee and/or the Court) of Newsome’s peers pursuant to Rule38 of the FRCP and Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution as well as the Fourteenth Amendment of 1 NOTE: Boldface, underline, italics, HIGHLIGHTS, caps/small caps added for emphasis. Use of LEGAL RESOURCESAS: Federal Procedural Forms (Lawyers Edition), American Jurisprudence Practice and Procedures, United States CodeAnnotated, and other resource materials as guide in preparation of this document to aid in meeting pleading requirements asrequired by rules and laws governing said matters. Page 1 of 35
  • 5. the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws of the United States governing said matters. In support of thisinstant “OBJECTION(S) TO 08/02/12 ORDER,” Newsome further states: 1. This instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order” is submitted in good faith and is not submitted for purposes of delay, harassment, hindering proceedings, embarrassment, obstructing the administration of justice, vexatious litigation, increasing the cost of litigation, etc. and is filed to protect and preserve the rights of Newsome secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other laws of the United States. I. OBJECTION(S) TO AUGUST 2, 2012 ORDER Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome OBJECTS to the August 2, 2012 Order executed by this Court’s JudgeTom Stewart Lee (“Tom S. Lee” and/or “Judge Lee”) and states the following for said OBJECTION(S): 2. Newsome’s OBJECTION(S) to the August 2, 2012 Order executed by Judge Tom S. Lee/this Court is NULL/VOID pursuant to Rule 60 of the FRCP and other statutes/laws governing said matters in that it: (a) Has been entered by mistake over Newsome’s OBJECTIONS to Judge Tom S. Lee. (b) Is an ABUSE of discretion by Judge Tom S. Lee. (c) KNOWINGLY, DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS intent entered with FRAUDULENT intent as well as CRIMINAL intent to deprive Newsome rights secured under United States statutes/laws governing said matters. (d) Is NULL/VOID! (e) Has been obtained as a direct and proximate result of BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome, for pecuniary/financial interests as well as other reasons KNOWN to this Court/Judge Tom S. Lee and the KEY role being played out in CONSPIRACIES and “Tacit Agreements” reached: TACIT AGREEMENT - Occurs when two or more persons pursue by their acts the same object by the same means. One person performing one part and the other another part, so that upon completion they have obtained the object pursued. Regardless whether each person knew of the details or what part each was to perform, the end results being they obtained the object pursued. Agreement is implied or inferred from actions or statements. Colonial Refrigerated Transp., Inc. v. Mitchell, 403 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1968) - Purpose of rule requiring party to inform court at time order or ruling is made to make known the action which he desires court to take, or his objection to action of court and his grounds therefor, is to inform trial judge of possible errors so that he may have an opportunity to reconsider his ruling and make any changes deemed advisable. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 46, 28 U.S.C.A. Jenkins v. General Motors Corp., 446 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1971) - Timely objection is necessary to bring to trial courts attention alleged errors in conduct of a trial. Page 2 of 35
  • 6. Fort Worth & D. Ry. Co. v. Harris, 230 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1956) - Federal Rule of Civil Procedure requiring a party to make known his objections and grounds therefor is not a mere technicality, but is of substance in the administration of business in the courts. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc. rule 46, 28 U.S.C.A.3. Newsome believes that the facts, evidence and legal conclusions provided herein as well as in her previous filings will sustain that the August 2, 2012 Order entered by Judge Tom S. Lee was entered for purposes of depriving Newsome DUE PROCESS as well as rights secured under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws of the United States.4. It appears from the facts and evidence presented in this lawsuit, this Court’s Judge Tom S. Lee is CONSPIRING with Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”) to allow the use of Defendants’ Legal Counsel/Attorney’s Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh as a “FRONTING” Firm for purposes of shielding/hiding their CRIMINAL/CIVIL violations as well as the BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome, EXTRAJUDICIAL sources that are at play which are having a direct impact on Judge Lee’s unlawful/illegal practices as well as the IMPROPRIETIES, etc. that exist out of view of Newsome and the PUBLIC/GLOBAL eyes. Liteky v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1147 (1994) - Revision made in 1974 to statute prohibiting judges participation in case which he has an interest or relationship to a party brought into the statute elements of general bias and prejudice recusal that had previously been addressed only in statute dealing with recusal of a district judge for bias in general; it entirely duplicated the grounds of recusal set forth in the latter statute but made them applicable to all justices, judges, and magistrates, not just district judges, and placed the obligation to identify the existence of those grounds upon the judge himself, rather than requiring recusal only in response to a partys affidavit. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455(b)(1). . . Revisions made in 1974 to statute dealing with disqualification of judge who has an interest in the case or relationship to a party require all interest or relationship and bias or prejudice grounds to be evaluated on an objective basis so that what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice, but its appearance; recusal is required whenever impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). . . . Catch-all provision of the disqualification statute as a broader reach than subsection setting forth specific grounds for disqualification, but the provisions have some ground in common and should not be applied inconsistently. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a, b). See EXHIBIT “N” - Liteky v. United States: The Extrajudicial Source Doctrine and Its Implications for Judicial Disqualification attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.5. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and other statutes/laws governing said matters, Judge Tom S. Lee is MANDATORILY (i.e. it is NOT discretionary) to RECUSE/DISQUALIFY himself from this lawsuit. Furthermore, Newsome does NOT consent to Judge Tom S. Lee presiding over this lawsuit and USURPING authority and ABUSING discretion in the handling of this lawsuit.6. UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: That Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine III, and Linda Thomas (hereinafter, “Named Defendants”) and their Legal Counsel/Attorney’s Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh do NOT dispute Newsome’s TIMELY demand as required by statutes/laws for a JURY Trial on any and all triable issues raised allowed under Rule 38 of the FRCP, the Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution and other statutes/laws governing said matters. See EXHIBIT “B” – Rule 38 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states in part: Rule 38. Right to a Jury Trial; Demand Page 3 of 35
  • 7. (a) Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution—or as provided by a federal statute—is preserved to the parties inviolate. (b) Demand. On any issue triable of right by a jury, a party may demand a jury trial by: (1) serving the other parties with a written demand—which may be included in a pleading—no later than 14 days after the last pleading directed to the issue is served; and (2) filing the demand in accordance with Rule 5(d). (c) Specifying Issues. In its demand, a party may specify the issues that it wishes to have tried by a jury; otherwise, it is considered to have demanded a jury trial on all the issues so triable. If the party has demanded a jury trial on only some issues, any other party may—within 14 days after being served with the demand or within a shorter time ordered by the court—serve a demand for a jury trial on any other or all factual issues triable by jury. and EXHIBIT “C” – Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. II. MOTION TO DISQUALIFY (“MotionToDisqualify”) Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome respectfully moves under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 that the Honorable TomS. Lee be disqualified from presiding as Judge in the above-entitled matter. In support of saidMotionToDisqualify, Newsome attaches her supporting Affidavit. See EXHIBIT “E” - Vogel Denise Newsome’sAFFIDAVIT of Disqualification of Judge Tom S. Lee attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forthin full herein. Newsome further states the following in support of MotionToDisqualify:A. PRIOR TO AUGUST 2, 2012 ORDER EXECUTED BY JUDGE TOM STEWART LEE KNOWLEDGE OF MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL REQUIRED WAS KNOWN TO COURT: 7. In keeping with Newsome’s May 12, 2012 pleading entitled, Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment; and Notice of Address (“Request for Conflict Of Interest Information”) – See Doc. No. 2 of this instant Lawsuit as well as EXHIBIT “D” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein, she AGAIN, respectfully REITERATES and moves under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 that the Honorable Tom S. Lee be DISQUALIFIED from presiding as Judge in the above-entitled matter. Newsome files with this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order” her Affidavit in support thereof as required by 28 U.S.C.A. § 144, to show that Judge Tom S. Lee has a personal bias and/or prejudice against her in favor of Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine III, and Linda Thomas (hereinafter “Named Defendants”) and their Legal Counsel/Attorney’s Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh. See EXHIBIT “E” – Vogel Denise Newsome’s AFFIDAVIT Of Disqualification Of Judge Tom S. Lee attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Berger v. U.S., 41 S.Ct. 230 (1921) - Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 144, providing that, when a party shall file an affidavit that the judge has a personal bias or prejudice against him, the judge shall proceed no further, but another judge shall be designated, and that such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that such bias or prejudice exists, when an affidavit legally sufficient is filed, the judge against whom it is filed cannot pass on the truth of the matters alleged or preside on the trial . Page 4 of 35
  • 8. 8. Based on the Affidavit, Newsome respectfully moves that the Honorable Judge Tom S. Lee proceed NO further in this action and that another judge be assigned to hear this case. Furthermore, that the Honorable Tom S. Lee declare himself DISQUALIFIED to sit as a Judge in this lawsuit and that another judge be assigned this lawsuit.9. This “MotionToDisqualify” has been TIMELY and properly submitted in compliance with 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and/or statutes/laws governing said matters. See “Request for Conflict Of Interest Information” Doc. No. 2/EXHIBIT “D” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. U.S. v. York, 888 F.2d 1050 (5th Cir. 1989) - In regard to statute pertaining to duty of judge to recuse himself, section which addresses appearances of impropriety, as well as section which addresses actual bias for conflict of interest on part of judge, both require timeliness. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a, b). Pomeroy v. Merritt Plaza Nursing Home, Inc., 760 F.2d 654 (5th Cir. 1985) - Literal ten- day requirement of rule that party alleging bias or prejudice of judge file an affidavit stating facts and reasons for belief that bias or prejudice exists not less than ten days before beginning of term at which the proceeding is to be heard no longer applies, since formal terms of court have been abolished. 28 U.S.C.A. § 144. Grambling University Nat. Alumni Assn v. Board of Suprs for Louisiana System, 286 Fed.Appx. 864 (5th Cir. 2008) - Plaintiffs motion for recusal, on ground that judges impartiality might reasonably be questioned, was untimely; while knowing facts underlying recusal argument plaintiff allowed case to linger for nearly ten months and only brought recusal motion after judge dismissed claims. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a).10. Newsome in support of her “Request for Conflict Of Interest Information” (Doc. No. 2) and this instant Motion, shows that the Honorable Tom S. Lee is disqualified from presiding as a judge in the above- numbered and entitled cause under provisions 28 U.S.C.A. § 455, due to: a) Bias and prejudice towards Newsome. b) Judge Lee’s direct and personal financial/pecuniary interest in this Lawsuit. c) Deprive Newsome of life, liberty, pursuit of happiness and property, etc. d) The SAME reasons giving rise to Judge Lee’s RECUSAL/DISQUALIFICATIONS in KKLM vs. Marsh USA, Joni B. Tyler vs. JPF1 and Joyce Walker vs. Captain D’s LLC, etc. - See EXHIBIT “F” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein – in that it appears that Baker Donelson has and is playing a MAJOR/KEY role in the running and controlling of this lawsuit; however, has relied upon its CONSPIRATOR Law Firm Phelps Dunbar LLP to act as a “FRONT” to shield/mask their criminal/civil wrongs from Newsome as well as the PUBLIC-AT-LARGE! e) Baker Donelson is Legal Counsel/Attorneys for Federal Judges Association. See EXHIBIT “S” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. f) Baker Donelson played a MAJOR/KEY role in having Judge Tom S. Lee appointed to the Judicial Bench. g) Baker Donelson and Named Defendants’ Counsel/Attorneys Phelps Dunbar SHARE/SWAP attorneys. See EXHIBIT “T” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Moreover, SHARE Clients. Information they are attempting to SHIELD/HIDE from Newsome as well as the PUBLIC-AT-LARGE! h) Judge Tom S. Lee has been named in other legal proceedings brought by Newsome before the United States of America Congress, etc. addressing his unlawful/illegal and judicial misconduct. i) Newsome is presently engaging in Congressional and/or further legal proceedings in which a reasonable person knowing the following facts and evidence regarding the Governmental positions held/controlled by Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz (“Baker Donelson”):  Chief of Staff to the President of the United States  United States Secretary of State Page 5 of 35
  • 9.  United States Senate Majority Leader  Members of the United States Senate  Members of the United States House of Representatives  Director of the Office of Foreign Assets Control for United States  Department of Treasury  Director of the Administrative Office of the United States  Chief Counsel, Acting Director, and Acting Deputy Director of United States Citizenship & Immigration Services within the United States Department of Homeland Security  Majority and Minority Staff Director of the Senate Committee on Appropriations  Member of United States President’s Domestic Policy Council  Counselor to the Deputy Secretary for the United States Department of HHS  Chief of Staff of the Supreme Court of the United States  Administrative Assistant to the Chief Justice of the United States  Deputy under Secretary of International Trade for the United States Department of Commerce  Ambassador to Japan  Ambassador to Turkey  Ambassador to Saudi Arabia  Ambassador to the Sultanate of Oman  Governor of Tennessee  Governor of Mississippi  Deputy Governor and Chief of Staff for the Governor of Tennessee  Commissioner of Finance & Administration (Chief Operating Officer) - State of Tennessee  Special Counselor to the Governor of Virginia  United States Circuit Court of Appeals Judge  United States District Court Judges  United States Attorneys  Presidents of State and Local Bar Associations See Exhibit “XVIII” of the Complaint in this Lawsuit as well as EXHIBIT “R” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. However, AFTER Newsome released this information to the PUBLIC – i.e. United States President Barack Obama, some of the members of his Administration and employees therein, the media, churches, selective public organizations, and United Nation/Foreign Leaders and their media – Baker Donelson moved swiftly to SCRUB this information. j) Judge Tom S. Lee is in a position in which he has now usurping powers in which he lacks and/or is prohibited to assert and attempting to perform dual roles as investigator and adjudicator – i.e. encroaching upon the duties and/or responsibilities of the Jury DEMANDED by Newsome in this Lawsuit. k) Judge Lee’s fulfillment of role in CONSPIRACY(S) with Named Defendants, their Counsel/Attorneys and other CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS in Conspiracies leveled against Newsome. l) Any/All other reasons known to Judge Tom Stewart Lee.aforementioned reasons, as more fully set forth in the Affidavit attached and incorporated by referenceas if set forth in full in this Motion. See EXHIBIT “E” – “Affidavit of Vogel Denise Newsome In Page 6 of 35
  • 10. Support of Motion to DISQUALIFY Judge Tom Stewart Lee” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Tumey v. State of Ohio, 47 S.Ct. 437 (1927) - Subjecting liberty and property of defendant to court, judge of which has direct, substantial, pecuniary interest against him, is denial of due process. U.S.C.A.Const.Amend. 14. Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2008) - There are three situations in which the Supreme Court has found presumptive bias on the part of a judge: (1) the decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, (2) an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him, and (3) a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker has the dual role of investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints.11. In order to preserve the issue of disqualification should further review become necessary, the record evidence will support that Newsome has done so. Through this instant pleading, her “Request for Conflict Of Interest Information” (Doc. No. 2), and her subsequent pleadings (Motions To Strike) filed in this instant lawsuit to REITERATE and PERSERVE this issue and protect Newsome’s rights. – Hardy vs. U.S., 878 F.2d 94 (2nd Cir. 1989).12. UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: That a CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST presently exist with the assignment of this lawsuit to Judge Tom S. Lee. The record evidence CLEARLY supports that Newsome has timely, properly and adequately NOTIFIED this Court of the Conflict-Of- Interest regarding Judge Tom S. Lee. See Doc. No. 2 – “Motion Conflict-Of-Interest Information. . .” [See EXHIBIT “D” - Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment; and Notice of Address attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. As a direct and proximate result of this Court to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of statutes and laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. As a direct and proximate result of this Court’s unlawful/illegal practices and failure to comply with the MANDATORY requirements of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any and all applicable statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has been irreparably injured/harmed and deprived rights – i.e. equal protection of the laws, privileges and immunities, and due process of laws guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws. See EXHIBIT “G” – FRCP Rule 26 and EXHIBIT “K” - 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 respectively attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Phillips v. Joint Legislative Committee on Performance and Expenditure Review Of The State of Mississippi, et al., 637 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1981) - [3] Under statute requiring a judge to disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might be reasonably questioned, judge need not accept all the allegations by moving party as true and, in fact, no motion at all is required; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his attention. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. . . . [3] Congress rewrote the second statute, section 455, in 1974. Subsection (b) of that section lists a number of specific situations in which a judge must recuse himself. . .Subsection (a), a more general provision, requires that Any justice, judge, or magistrate of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Section 455, unlike section 144, does not stipulate a formal procedure by which it must be raised. Like section 144, however, it may be raised by motion. Davis, 517 F.2d at 1051. Substantively, the two statutes are quite similar, if not identical.[FN6] FN6. To the extent that there is a difference, section 455 imposes the stricter standard: a movant under section 144 must allege facts to convince a reasonable person that bias exists, Parrish, 524 F.2d at 100, while under the broader language of section 455, he must show only that a reasonable person “would harbor doubts about the judges impartiality”, Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 5 Cir. 1980, 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (emphasis added), cert. denied, - - U.S. --, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980). See Comment, Disqualification of Federal Judges for Bias or Prejudice, 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. 236, 243-50 (1978). See Page 7 of 35
  • 11. also Note, Disqualification of Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 Harv.L.Rev. 736, 745-50 (1973). On the other hand, section 455, unlike section 144, does not require the judge to accept all allegations by a moving party as true. Indeed, the section requires no motion at all; the judge must disqualify himself if the facts cast doubt on his impartiality regardless of how or by whom they are drawn to his attention. See Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. RCA Corp., 5 Cir. 1978, 569 F.2d 251, 254-57, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859, 99 S.Ct. 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1979). Section 144, by contrast, requires allegation by affidavit within a stringent time limit and allows a party only one such affidavit in any case. If a party could bind a judge by his factual allegations in a section 455 motion, free from the formal requirements and more demanding standard of proof of section 144, the result would be a virtual open season for recusal. See 46 U.Chi.L.Rev. at 250. [4] The alleged bias of a judge must be personal as distinguished from judicial in nature in order to require recusal. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 144, 455. - - See EXHIBIT “I” – Phillips matter attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.Clearly the INTEGRITY of this Court has been compromised and the appearance of IMPROPRIETYis inevitable through Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s acts and projects an appearance that this Lawsuit can bewon through criminal acts – i.e. through bribes, blackmail, extortion, intimidation, threats, etc. - byDefendants and their counsel. Therefore, Judge Lee’s acts CLEARLY VIOLATE the Mississippi Code ofJudicial Conduct. See EXHIBITS “J” – Code of Judicial Conduct (Mississippi) and “V” - LITEKYvs. UNITED STATES - Jeopardizing Judicial Integrity attached hereto and incorporated by referenceas if set forth in full herein. 28 USC § 455 - Disqualification of justice, judge, or magistrate judge (a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. (b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: (1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding; (2) Where in private practice he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with whom he previously practiced law served during such association as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer has been a material witness concerning it; (3) Where he has served in governmental employment and in such capacity participated as counsel, adviser or material witness concerning the proceeding or expressed an opinion concerning the merits of the particular case in controversy; (4) He knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (5) He or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person: (i) Is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee of a party; (ii) Is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; (iii) Is known by the judge to have an interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; (iv) Is to the judge’s knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding. Page 8 of 35
  • 12. (c) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor children residing in his household. . . . See EXHIBIT “K” - 28 USC § 455 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. MANDATORY DISQUALIFICATION is required when “ONE” of the grounds specifically enumerated in statute applies – i.e. for instance, as in this instant lawsuit, grounds for Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s disqualification is required pursuant to 28 USC § 455 and/or the applicable statutes/laws governing said matters: Renteria v. Schellpeper, 936 F.Supp. 691 (1996) - [6] If one of grounds specifically enumerated in statute applies, disqualification of judge is mandatory whether or not reasonable person would question judges impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b). . . . [6] . . .If one of the provisions of section 455(b) applies then disqualification is mandatory whether or not a reasonable person would question the judges impartiality. Liljeberg v. Health Serv. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 859 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 2202 n. 8, 100 L.Ed.2d 855 (1988). UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: Judge Tom S. Lee is adamant and it appears is refusing to RECUSE himself as required by statutes/laws governing said matters. Therefore, it appears that the proper INVESTIGATION(S), as with other CORRUPT Judge(s) as G. Thomas Porteous, may be necessary in having Judge Lee removed from lawsuits involving Newsome. Furthermore, involving matters of PUBLIC Interest in which Judge Lee is associated may have to be resolved through IMPEACHMENT proceedings. Clearly it is obvious that Judge Tom Stewart Lee is placing his JUDICIAL FATE in the “banking” on and/or “placing all of his eggs” in the basket/relationship of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz. Newsome have already initiated further legal and proper CONGRESSIONAL actions involving Judge Tom Stewart Lee. Even if the United States Congress may be dragging its feet and/or attempting to OBSTRUCT such matters, ALL that is required of Newsome is to PROVE by facts, evidence and legal conclusions that proper legal recourse for redress has been met. See pleading filed at Doc. No. 2 of this instant Lawsuit – See EXHIBIT “L” – Docket Sheet for this action attached hereto. Newsome’s burden has been met and this Court has been timely, properly and adequately notified of same. It matters NOT that there are attempts by law firms such as Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz and members of such CONSPIRACIES that may be members of the United States of America Congress, Supreme Court of the United States of America, etc. OBSTRUCTING the ADMINISTRATION of JUSTICE, Newsome need only PROVE and SHOW through EVIDENCE that she has initiated legal actions and has done so. Legal actions which clearly appears may require additional measures permissible under the statutes/laws governing matters when the United States of America’s Congress, etc. FAILS to act to protect the INTEREST of the PEOPLE and/or PUBLIC-AT-LARGE!13. This instant pleading, the Request for Conflict Of Interest Information” (Doc. No. 2) and Newsome’s subsequent pleadings (i.e. Motions To Strike) support timely filing for purposes of preserving the issues raised should further review and/or legal action become necessary to resolve it. Judge Tom S. Lee under the general disqualification statute is to RECUSE and/or DISQUALIFY himself from this lawsuit. Noli vs. C.I.R., 860 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988). Named Defendants and their Legal Counsel/Attorney Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh do NOT rebut and/or dispute that a “CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST” exist and that Judge Tom S. Lee is adamant about proceeding in this lawsuit with KNOWLEDGE that he is MANDATORILY required to recuse himself. Furthermore, it is UNDISPUTED that Named Defendants and their Legal Counsel/Attorneys DELIBERATELY and with MALICIOUS intent, did KNOWINGLY fail to advise Newsome of the Conflict-of-Interest and, in FURTHERANCE of CONSPIRACIES (i.e. in which TOLLING DOCTRINE regarding statute of limitation applies to RESTART from each OVERT act of Named Defendants, their Counsel/Attorneys and those PARTY to such unlawful/illegal criminal acts) are proceeding before this Court and in this lawsuit in violation Page 9 of 35
  • 13. of the Mississippi Rules of Professional Conduct, Code of Judicial Conduct (Mississippi) as well as other statutes/laws governing said matters.14. In accordance with the statutes/laws governing said matters, Newsome has timely, properly and adequately PRESERVED said issues such as the CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST and other issues raised in her Motions to Strike the Defendants’ pleadings filed in this lawsuit. See for instance EXHIBIT “M” – “Waiver Of Loss Of Right To Disqualify Judge By Participation In Proceedings . . .” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.15. Statutes/Laws governing said matters require that a judge disqualify himself/herself under the “general disqualification” statute where he/she has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party. 22 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(1). Recusal under the subsection of the judicial qualification statute setting forth specific circumstances establishing partiality is MANDATORY, because the potential for conflicts of interest is readily apparent. U.S. vs. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).16. The facts, evidence and legal conclusions set forth in this instant pleading as well as in Newsome’s prior pleadings: a) Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment; and Notice of Address (Doc. No. 2) b) Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) (Doc. No. 12) c) Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) (Doc. No. 19) and Judge Tom S. Lee’s “RUSH TO ENTER A NULL/VOID ORDER” (Doc. No. 20) for purposes of providing Named Defendants, their Counsel/Attorneys and CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS to Conspiracies leveled against Newsome with an UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL and UNDUE advantage in this lawsuit with KNOWLEDGE of his “DUTY TO DISQUALIFY” as a direct and proximate result of the personal bias, prejudice, financial/pecuniary interest, conflict of interest, etc. and other reasons known to Judge Lee warranting his disqualification further SOLIDIFIES his disqualification to preside and sit as judge over matters in this Lawsuit. Newsome believes that a reasonable person given the facts, evidence and legal conclusions presented herein as well as in her previous pleadings filed with this Court, would be convinced Judge Tom S. Lee is biased and/or prejudice towards Newsome. Furthermore, have personal and financial/pecuniary interests in this lawsuit. Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. vs. John Labatt, Ltd., 299 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002).17. Judge Tom S. Lee has a disposition so EXTREME as to display a CLEAR INABILITY to render a fair judgment and CANNOT perform his duties as required under the OATH taken to become Judge, Code of Judicial Conduct, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and other statutes/laws governing said matters which warrants his DISQUALIFICATION/RECUSAL. U.S. vs. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104 (8th Cir. 2006).18. The general disqualification statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(1)) encompasses situations in which there is an actual conflict of interest, even if there is NO appearance of one, and also describes situations that create an apparent conflict because it provides examples of situations in which Judge Tom S. Lee’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Preston vs. U.S., 923 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1991)19. Statutes/Laws governing said matters are clear that any federal judge MUST disqualify himself/herself in any proceeding in which his/her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. In the instant lawsuit, Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s impartiality is reasonably questioned. Moreover, that BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome as well as Judge Lee’s personal and financial/pecuniary interest in the outcome of Page 10 of 35
  • 14. this Lawsuit. See EXHIBIT “U” - JUDICIAL BIAS AND FINANCIAL INTEREST AS GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION OF FEDERAL JUDGES attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Limeco, Inc. v. Division of Lime, 571 F.Supp. 710 (N.D.Miss.Greenville.Div.,1983) - Even if no bias or prejudice of judge may actually exist, it is enough to disqualify that there be mere appearance of partiality. U.S. v. Miranne, 688 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1982) - Under statute requiring judge to disqualify himself when his impartiality might reasonably be questioned, actual demonstrated prejudice need not exist in order for judge to be required to recuse himself. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). Bradshaw v. McCotter, 785 F.2d 1327 (5th Cir. 1986) - Fair tribunal on appeal requires not only an absence of actual bias but the absence of an appearance of bias.20. When a judge is the actual trier of fact, the need to preserve the appearance of impartiality is especially pronounced. LaSalle Nat. Bank vs. First Connecticut Holding Group, LLC, 287 F.3d 279, 58 Fed.R.Evid. Serv. 1216 (3rd Cir. 2002). In fact, the impartiality provision (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a)) requires NO determination of bias in fact (U.S. vs. Chantal, 902 F.2d 1018 (1st Cir. 1990), and thus applies even though NO actual bias or prejudice has been shown. Fletcher vs. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003). For instance, it is of NO consequence that Judge Tom S. Lee is not actually biased under the impartiality provision inasmuch as the statutes/laws governing said matters require not ONLY fairness to individual litigants, but also the PUBLIC’s CONFIDENCE in the judiciary, which may be IRREPARABLY harmed if this lawsuit is allowed to proceed before Judge Tom S. Lee who appears is TAINTED and DETERMINED to COMPROMISE this lawsuit. In Re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 353 F.3d 211 (3rd 2003). Thus, the statute governs circumstances that constitute an APPEARANCE of PARTIALITY, even though actual partiality has not been shown. Chase Manhatten Bank vs. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir 2003) Because of the recusal statute is to exact the APPEARANCE of IMPARTIALITY, recusal may be required even though the judge is not actually partial. Patterson vs. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003). U.S. v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152 (5th Cir. 1995) - Facts not known at the time of recusal motion are nonetheless considered in determining whether judge should have been recused, and statute governing recusal because of the appearance of partiality may be applied retroactively by rectifying oversight and taking steps necessary to maintain public confidence in impartiality of judiciary. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). Ryals v. Pigott, 580 So.2d 1140 (Miss.,1990) - Parties are expected to know Supreme Courts composition and reveal any information which might warrant justices recusal from case.21. The IMPARTIALITY provisions of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 places Judge Tom S. Lee under a self-enforcing OBLIGATION to recuse himself because the proper legal grounds exist. Glassroth vs. Moore, 229 F.Supp.2d 1283 (2002).22. Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification is REQUIRED if a reasonable FACTUAL basis exists for DOUBTING his IMPARTIALITY. U.S. vs. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003). Therefore, based upon the facts, evidence and legal conclusions set forth in this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order,” the supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “E” and Newsome’s pleadings filed in this Lawsuit, factual/legal basis exists for doubting Judge Lee’s impartiality.23. Because of the record evidence supporting Newsome’s May 12, 2012 “Request for Conflict Of Interest Information” (Doc. No. 2) and her subsequent Motions To Strike at Doc. Nos. 12 and 19 filed with this Court, it was NOT necessary for Judge Tom S. Lee/this Court to wait for Newsome to move for his DISQUALIFICATION before disqualifying himself in this lawsuit in which his IMPARTIALITY is reasonably questioned, as it is a judge’s DUTY to ENSURE that his/her presence does NOT TAINT the PROCESS of justice or the INTEGRITY of the United States Courts. Obert vs. Republic Western Ins. Co., 190 F.Supp.2d 279 (2002). See EXHIBIT “V” - LITEKY vs. UNITED STATES - Jeopardizing Judicial Integrity attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Page 11 of 35
  • 15. 24. Newsome would rather error on the side of caution and take the EXTRA precautions and file this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order” then not preserve said right and issues. Therefore, this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order” has in GOOD FAITH been submitted in that it appears that Judge Tom S. Lee has failed to remove himself sua sponte under the IMPARTIALITY provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and is ADAMENT and DETERMINED to DEFY the laws and TAINT the PROCESS and COMPROMISE the INTEGRITY of this United States Court for purposes of providing Named Defendants, their Counsel/Attorneys and CONSPIRATORS/CO-CONSPIRATORS with an UNDUE/UNLAWFUL/ILLEGAL advantage in this lawsuit. U.S. vs. Cooper, 283 F.Supp.2d 1215 (2003).25. FAILURE TO DISCLOSE: Judge Tom S. Lee has with MALICIOUS and CRIMINAL intent FAILED to DISCLOSE on the record circumstances that may give rise to a reasonable question about his IMPARTIALITY. In Re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th 2004). Therefore, it may become necessary to bring additional legal actions against Judge Tom S. Lee, in that this is a matter of PUBLIC/GLOBAL interest, to ascertain the TRUTH for his arbitrary acts and ROLE in CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome. Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S.Ct. 692 - Purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power, to make available common-sense judgment of the community as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps overconditioned or biased response of a judge. Chiarella v. U. S., 100 S.Ct. 1108 (1980) - One who fails to disclose material information prior to the consummation of a transaction commits common-law fraud only when he is under a duty to do so; the duty to disclose arises when one party has information that the other is entitled to know because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between them. Washington Mut. Finance Group, LLC v. Blackmon, 925 So.2d 780 (Miss.,2004) - Canon on disqualification of judge for having financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding requires recusal only if the judge owns an interest in a party litigant or, if he does not, there is a showing-not mere speculation-that he will be substantially affected by the decision of the case. Code of Jud.Conduct, Canon 3, subd. E(1)(c, d).26. Even where the facts may not suffice for recusal (however, in this lawsuit it does) on the ground that Judge Tom S. Lee has actual personal bias or prejudice toward Newsome as well as a financial/pecuniary interest in this lawsuit or to Defendants, those same facts may be examined as part of the inquiry into whether recusal is MANDATED on the ground that Judge Tom S. Lee’s PARTIALITY might reasonably be questioned. In Re Certain Underwriter, 294 F.3d 297 (2nd Cir. 2002).27. Newsome timely, properly and adequately submit her OBJECTION(S) to Judge Tom Stewart Lee’s August 2, 2012 Order staying proceedings for the reasons set forth in this instant (“OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order”) and supporting Affidavits and Exhibits and by so doing, PRESERVES said issue(s) regarding same. Judge Lee’s acts are a clear ABUSE of discretion, USURPATION of power in which he LACKED jurisdiction to enter Order, INFRINGES upon Newsome’s Constitutional Rights and other rights secured/guaranteed by statutes/laws and affect the fairness, integrity or PUBLIC reputation of judicial proceedings if left uncorrected. Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 1999) - [13] Court of Appeals may exercise its discretion to reverse under plain error review only when it finds an error that is clear and obvious under current law, that affects substantial rights, and that seriously would affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings if left uncorrected. [13] As a result, we review for plain error. We may exercise our discretion to reverse under plain error review only when we find an error that is clear and obvious under current law, that affects the defendants substantial rights, and that seriously would affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings Page 12 of 35
  • 16. if left uncorrected. See Marceaux, 124 F.3d at 734; United States v. Calverley, 37 F.3d 160, 162-63 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc). [20] A failure to make a procedural objection waives the error, precluding review by Court of Appeals. [20] Here, however, the Rushings object to the supplemental affidavits on the ground that KCS failed to comply with the procedural rules governing the admission of evidence. Specifically, the arguments merit rests on our interpretation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 and 56. A failure to make a procedural objection waives the error, precluding our review.FN11 Because the Rushings waived any objection to the affidavits untimeliness, we may not review the alleged error. FN11. See Donaghey, 974 F.2d at 650 n. 3 (finding procedural objections to admissibility of summary judgment evidence waived by failure to challenge in district court); McCloud River R.R. v. Sabine River Forest Prods., Inc., 735 F.2d 879, 882 (5th Cir.1984) (holding that party waived right to raise untimeliness of supplemental affidavit by failing to object or move to strike in district court); Hicks v. Harris, 606 F.2d 65, 68 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979) (refusing to review procedural objection to affidavit raised for the first time on appeal, without a motion to strike in the district court); Auto Drive-Away Co. of Hialeah, Inc. v. Interstate Commerce Comn, 360 F.2d 446, 448-49 (5th Cir.1966) (holding that, absent timely motion to strike, affidavits non-compliance with procedural rules waived); see also Calverley, 37 F.3d at 162 (discussing difference between waiver and forfeiture).28. REASONABLE PERSON STANDARD: Under the “IMPARTIALITY” provision of 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a), the GENERAL disqualification statute provides that Judge Tom S. Lee be disqualified in any proceeding in which is IMPARTIALITY might be reasonably questioned. Under this statute, it questions whether a reasonable person perceives a SIGNIFICANT RISK that Judge Tom S. Lee will resolve the case on a basis other than the merits. The answer being YES! Clemens vs. U.S. Dist. Court for Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). Meaning that in determining whether Judge Tom S. Lee should be disqualified for IMPARTIALTY under this provision, an objective or “reasonable person” standard is to be used to determine whether his IMPARTIALITY is to be QUESTIONED. S.E.C. vs. Loving Spirit Foundation Inc., 392 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2004); In Re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2004); Tyler vs. Purkett, 413 F.3d 696 (8th Cir. 2005) A truly disqualifying appearance MUST be determined by a reasonable person STANDARD and NOT by the ability of the complaining party to voice its concerns through the media. Chase Manhattan Bank vs. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir. 2003). U.S. v. Dozier, 707 F.2d 862 (5th Cir. 1983) - Statutory provisions impose a reasonable man standard for determining whether judge should recuse himself. Therefore, supporting why Newsome DEMANDS a Jury Trial on issue(s) raised and NOT have matters tried before a Judge because of the risk and temptation(s) exhibited to give in to criminal acts – i.e. such as BRIBES, BLACKMAIL, EXTORTION, THREATS, CONSPIRACIES, etc. - as shown from the facts, evidence and legal conclusions in this instant lawsuit, it is CLEAR that Judge Tom S. Lee is ADAMENT and determined to DEFY the statutes/laws governing said matters29. The reasonable person in this context means a well-informed, thoughtful observer, as opposed to a hypersensitive, cynical, and suspicious person. Sensley vs. Albritton, 385 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. 2004). Clemens vs. U.S. Dist. Court for Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005). The TEST for disqualification for IMPARTIALITY provision of the “GENERAL” disqualification statute is whether an OBJECTIVE observer with knowledge of ALL facts, evidence and legal conclusion(s) would QUESTION Judge Tom S. Lee’s IMPARTIALITY. Page 13 of 35
  • 17. Fifth Circuit: Potashnick v. Port City Const. Co., 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980) - Goal of judicial disqualification statute is to foster appearance of impartiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. Chitimacha Tribe of Louisiana v. Harry L. Laws Co., Inc., 690 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1982) - Goal of statute governing disqualification of district court judges is to foster impartiality by requiring even its appearance. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. U.S. v. Anderson, 160 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 1998) - The goal of recusal statute is to avoid even the appearance of partiality. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(a). Other Courts: In Re Brooks, 383 F.3d 1036 (2004) – Whether reasonable and informed observer would question the judge’s impartiality. Comfort vs. Lynn School Committee, 418 F.3d 1, 200 Ed. Law Rep. 541 (1 st Cir. 2005) – Whether objective, knowledgeable member of the public would find a reasonable basis for doubting judge’s impartiality. U.S. vs. Cherry, 330 F.3d 658 (4th Cir. 2003) – Whether another with knowledge of all of the circumstances might reasonably question the judge’s impartiality. Patterson vs. Mobil Oil Corp., 335 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2003) – Whether a reasonable and objective person, knowing all the facts, would harbor doubts concerning the judge’s impartiality. Fletcher vs. Conoco Pipe Line Co., 323 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2003) – Disqualification is required if a reasonable person who knew the circumstances would question the judge’s impartiality. Clemens vs. U.S. Dist. Court for Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2005) – Whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. U.S. vs. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 68 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 837 (10th Cir. 2005) – A judge must recuse him or herself if sufficient factual grounds exist to cause a reasonable, objective person, knowing all the relevant facts, to question the judge’s impartiality. Thomas vs. Tenneco Packaging Co. Inc., 293 F.3d 1306, 53 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 318 (11th Cir. 2002) – Whether an objective, fully informed lay observer would entertain significant doubt about judge’s impartiality. Hewlett-Packard Co. vs. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 882 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1989) – What a reasonable person would believe in view of all the facts.30. It is important to note that the reasonable person’s knowledge of all of the circumstances is a VITAL element of this standard, and the decision whether Judge Tom S. Lee’s “IMPARTIALITY might REASONABLY BE QUESTIONED” should not be made in disregard of any relevant facts. Sao Paulo State of Federative Republic of Brazile vs. American Tobacco Co. Inc., 535 U.S. 229, 122 S.Ct. 1290, 152 L.Ed.2d 346 (2002). Therefore, it should be noted that Judge Tom S. Lee’s actual state of mind or prejudice is NOT at issue (U.S. vs. Nickl, 427 F.3d 1286, 68 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 837 (10th Cir. 2005)) and any doubts MUST be resolved in FAVOR of RECUSAL. U.S. vs. Patti, 337 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 2003).31. For a violation of the statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 455) to occur, it requires that Judge Tom S. Lee disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his IMPARTIALITY might reasonably be questioned does NOT require scienter - Scienter Defined: 1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act’s having been done knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal Page 14 of 35
  • 18. punishment. 2. A mental state consisting of an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th Edition) Even if Judge Tom S. Lee wanted to assert “lack of knowledge of a disqualifying circumstance” bearing on the question of remedy, it does NOT eliminate the possibility that his IMPARTIALTY might easily be questioned by other persons based on the facts, evidence and legal conclusions set forth in this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order,” the supporting Affidavit at EXHIBIT “E” and Newsome’s Motions To Strike at Doc. Nos. 12 and 19 filed in this Lawsuit. Liljeberg vs. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 366, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 433 (1988). See EXHIBIT “__” - __ attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.32. The record evidence supports Judge Tom S. Lee’s bias and/or prejudice towards Newsome being personal and extrajudicial. Therefore, warranting his recusal. U.S. vs. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966). U.S. vs. Jamieson, 427 F.3d 394, 68 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 825, 2005 FED App. 0430P (6th Cir. 2005).33. KNOWLEDGE OF EVIDENTIARY FACTS: The facts, evidence and legal conclusion in this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order” as well as Newsome’s pleadings filed in this lawsuit will support Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification because he has personal knowledge of the disputed evidentiary facts concerning this lawsuit. W. Clay Jackson Enterprises Inc. vs. Greyhound Leasing & Financial Corp., 467 F.Supp. 801 (1979).34. Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification is further required in that his KNOWLEDGE of disputed facts consist of matters of EXTRAJUDICIAL source. U.S. vs. Widgery, 778 F.2d 325 (7th Cir. 1985); Hale vs. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 17 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 928, 1 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 1602 (8th Cir. 1985).35. The record evidence will further support Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification in that he has UNDERLYING KNOWLEDGE as the claims raised in this lawsuit and has a direct personal and financial interest in its outcome. Plechner vs. Widener College Inc., 569 F.2d 1250, 24 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 921, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 313 (3rd Cir. 1977) In re Murchison, 75 S.Ct. 623 (1955) - No man can be a judge in his own case, and no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome. . . The interest which will disqualify a man from trying a case depends on circumstances and relationships.36. MATERIAL WITNESS: The facts, evidence and legal conclusions in the Complaint filed in this lawsuit and Newsome’s subsequent pleadings (i.e. including instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order”) supports that Judge Tom S. Lee may become a MATERIAL witness concerning any/all matters of controversy in this lawsuit; therefore AUTOMATICALLY requiring his disqualification. Newsome looks forward to discovery proceedings as well as the “INITIAL Disclosure” information that Named Defendants and/or their Counsel Attorneys are MANDATORILY required release to her. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Rhode Island vs. Delta Dental of Rhode Island, 248 F.Supp. 2d 39 (2003). Newsome further looks to have any/all such evidence presented to a JURY for purposes of deciding any and/all disputes raised in this Lawsuit. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 (1991) - Judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial.37. INTEREST OF JUDGE LEE: Aside from Judge Tom S. Lee’s FINANCIAL interest in this lawsuit, he must disqualify himself based on his KNOWLEDGE and other DIRECT interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(4). Furthermore, Judge Tom S. Lee, it appears, may become a party to this instant lawsuit – i.e. this is why Newsome listed “UNNAMED” Defendants as “DOES 1 – 100” in the Complaint based on additional facts and Page 15 of 35
  • 19. evidence obtained through “INITIAL DISCLOSURE” mandatorily required and discovery proceedings. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(5)(i). See Complaint at Doc. No. 1.38. The facts, evidence and legal conclusion supports that Judge Tom S. Lee have interests that could be SUBSTANTIALLY affected – i.e. meaning an interest in the subject matter of this lawsuit and/or the Defendants, Counsel/Attorneys, etc. to it. In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2nd Cir. 1988)39. FINANCIAL INTEREST: Based upon the facts, evidence, legal conclusions and further investigations and discovery to be conducted in this lawsuit, Judge Tom S. Lee is to disqualify himself because of his KNOWLEDGE that he has a FINANCIAL interest in the subject matter in controversy and/or Defendants and their Counsel/Attorneys in this instant lawsuit. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455. See EXHIBIT “K” attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full therein.40. Statutes/Laws governing Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification because his interest in the outcome of lawsuit is pecuniary and, therefore, BIAS is CLEAR. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(f). Should it become necessary, Newsome believes that the proper legal action against Judge Tom S. Lee which may require the subpoena of his FINANCIAL information (i.e. Tax Returns, Business Investments, Stocks, etc.) will further support that Newsome’s DEMAND for RECUSAL has been made in GOOD FAITH and PROPERLY before this Court before the entry of the NULL/VOID August 2, 2012 Order executed by Judge Lee to stay proceedings. See EXHIBIT “O” – August 2, 2012 Order attached hereto. Highlands Ins. Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 27 F.3d 1027 (5th Cir. 1994) - In order for appellant in civil case to prevail with new argument on appeal he must show: (1) that error occurred; (2) error was plain, which means either clear or obvious; (3) plain error must affect substantial rights; and (4) not correcting error would seriously affect fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Fed.Rules Civ.Proc.Rule 51, 28 U.S.C.A. Ford v. United Gas Corp., 254 F.2d 817 (5th Cir. Miss. 1958) - A litigant may not, speculating on verdict without making objections, keep silent while matters are transpiring in trial court and then put trial judge in error by assigning error in appellate court in respect of them, except in case of plainly prejudicial error.41. Judge Tom S. Lee has a MANDATORY duty to inform himself about his personal financial interests and this MANDATORY duty continues throughout the litigation. In Re McCarthey, 368 F.3d 1266 (10th 2004).42. Judge Tom S. Lee bears the principal burden of COMPLIANCE with the statute(s) requiring his disqualification when it is clear he has a FINANCIAL interest in the litigation and/or Defendants (28 U.S.C.A. § 455(b)(4)) since the statute’s provisions are DIRECTIVE and REQUIRE some reasonable INVESTIGATION and action on Judge Lee’s OWN initiative. Chase Manhattan Bank vs. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 343 F.3d 120 (2nd Cir 2003)43. Judge Tom S. Lee has KNOWLEDGE of the Law Firm of Baker Donelson Bearman Caldwell & Berkowitz’ and their Clients (i.e. such as Liberty Mutual Insurance Company’s) FINANCIAL interest in the outcome of this Lawsuit. Moreover, Baker Donelson’s usage of Named Defendant’s counsel (Phelps Dunbar) as a FRONTING firm representing Named Defendants while “PULLING THE SHOOTS” and “CONTROLLING” the outcome of this lawsuit “BEHIND THE SCENES.” Furthermore, the record evidence will support that Judge Tom S. Lee’s KNOWLEDGE of nonparties (i.e. as Baker Donelson, etc.). Judge Tom S. Lee having KNOWLEDGE: a) Of his BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome. b) His direct personal, substantial and pecuniary interest in the outcome of this Lawsuit. Page 16 of 35
  • 20. c) That Newsome is seeking legal action against him before the United States of America Congress. d) That Newsome as early as May 12, 2012, timely, properly and adequately submitted for filing with this Court her pleading entitled, Request for Conflict of Interest Information, Notice of Opposition to Magistrate Judge Assignment; and Notice of Address which addresses concerns of CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST regarding Judge Tom S. Lee. See EXHIBIT “D” at Pages 2 and 4 attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. e) That he is a MATERIAL witness to the criminal/civil wrongs – i.e. such as CONSPIRACIES – leveled against Newsome and is playing a KEY/MAJOR role in said conspiracies. f) Judge Tom S. Lee is in a position in which he is usurping powers in which he lacks jurisdiction and/or is prohibited to assert and attempting to perform dual roles as investigator and adjudicator – i.e. encroaching upon the duties and/or responsibilities of the Jury DEMANDED by Newsome in this Lawsuit. Buntion v. Quarterman, 524 F.3d 664 (5th Cir. 2008) - There are three situations in which the Supreme Court has found presumptive bias on the part of a judge: (1) the decision maker has a direct personal, substantial, and pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case, (2) an adjudicator has been the target of personal abuse or criticism from the party before him, and (3) a judicial or quasi-judicial decision maker has the dual role of investigating and adjudicating disputes and complaints. Therefore, requiring Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification. Draper vs. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2004).44. Newsome DEMANDS Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification in this Lawsuit as a direct and proximate result of his “FINANCIAL” interest – i.e. however small and/or other active participation in the affairs of Named Defendants and/or their Legal Counsel Phelps Dunbar as well as that of Baker Donelson and the interest of their Clients’ Insureds, etc.. 28 U.S.C.A. § 455(d)(4). Thus, requiring Judge Tom S. Lee’s disqualification no matter how insubstantial the financial interest and regardless of whether or not the interest actually creates an appearance of impropriety. Liljeberg vs. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 108 S.Ct. 2194, 100 L.Ed.2d 855, 47 Ed. Law Rep. 366, 11 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 433 (1988).45. Judge Tom S. Lee, as a matter of law, is DISQUALIFIED from presiding over this lawsuit in that he has is BIAS and PREJUDICE toward Newsome, has a FINANCIAL/PECUNIARY interest in this lawsuit, has KNOWLEDGE of extrajudicial matters regarding Newsome to which he is and/or may be a party, may be a MATERIAL WITNESS in legal proceedings to which he has been named in other lawful actions brought by Newsome, has been appointed for purposes of COMPROMISING and TAINTING these proceeding, and has FAILED to NOTIFY all parties to this lawsuit as to the CONFLICT-OF- INTEREST and the grounds requiring his DISQUALIFICATION. Should it become necessary to bring legal against Judge Tom S. Lee, Newsome intends to SUBPOENA any and/or all of his personal financial records (i.e. Tax Returns, Stocks Portfolio, etc.) for presentation to JURY in the TRIAL on this matter.46. Defendants’ Page Kruger & Holland, P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine III, and Linda Thomas and their Legal Counsel/Attorney’s Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh at the time of executing and submitting Defendants’ Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and the supporting Memorandum Brief KNEW that it was frivolous, WITHOUT merits and provided with FRAUDLENT intent and for purposes of: purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Named Defendants and their Counsel. Therefore, warranting the relief set forth in this instant “OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order.” Page 17 of 35
  • 21. 47. Pursuant to Rule 8 (i.e. specifically (b)) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”), Named Defendants’ Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss fail to meet the pleading requirements for responses. Said Rule 8 states in part: Rule 8. General Rules of Pleading (a) Claim for Relief. A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain: (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the courts jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief. (b) Defenses; Admissions and Denials. (1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must: (A) state in short and plain terms its defenses to each claim asserted against it; and (B) admit or deny the allegations asserted against it by an opposing party. (2) Denials—Responding to the Substance. A denial must fairly respond to the substance of the allegation. (3) General and Specific Denials. A party that intends in good faith to deny all the allegations of a pleading—including the jurisdictional grounds—may do so by a general denial. A party that does not intend to deny all the allegations must either specifically deny designated allegations or generally deny all except those specifically admitted. (4) Denying Part of an Allegation. A party that intends in good faith to deny only part of an allegation must admit the part that is true and deny the rest. (5) Lacking Knowledge or Information. A party that lacks knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief about the truth of an allegation must so state, and the statement has the effect of a denial. (6) Effect of Failing to Deny. An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied. If a responsive pleading is not required, an allegation is considered denied or avoided. (c) Affirmative Defenses. (1) In General. In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense, including: • accord and satisfaction; • arbitration and award; • assumption of risk; • contributory negligence; • duress; • estoppel; • failure of consideration; • fraud; • illegality; Page 18 of 35
  • 22. • injury by fellow servant; • laches; • license; • payment; • release; • res judicata; • statute of frauds; • statute of limitations; and • waiver. (2) Mistaken Designation. If a party mistakenly designates a defense as a counterclaim, or a counterclaim as a defense, the court must, if justice requires, treat the pleading as though it were correctly designated, and may impose terms for doing so. (d) Pleading to Be Concise and Direct; Alternative Statements; Inconsistency. (1) In General. Each allegation must be simple, concise, and direct. No technical form is required. (2) Alternative Statements of a Claim or Defense. A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically, either in a single count or defense or in separate ones. If a party makes alternative statements, the pleading is sufficient if any one of them is sufficient. (3) Inconsistent Claims or Defenses. A party may state as many separate claims or defenses as it has, regardless of consistency. (e) Construing Pleadings. Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice. See EXHIBIT “P” – Rule 8 of FRCP attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.48. While Newsome’s Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss (“MTSMTStay”) meet the pleading requirements of Rule 8 of the FRCP, Defendants’ Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss FAIL to address the issues raised NOR rebut the FACTS, EVIDENCE/EXHIBITS and LEGAL CONCLUSION supporting Newsome’s MTSMTStay. This Court’s record/docket in this lawsuit remains SILENT on the issues raised and the TIME for Named Defendants to provide a REBUTTAL to each and every issues raised has EXPIRED/LAPSED – i.e. has been WAIVED by Named Defendants and any claim(s) alleging FAILURE to provide a timely response because of RELIANCE on Judge Tom S. Lee’s August 2, 2012, will be met with a “MOTION TO STRIKE” in that Named Defendants and their Counsel/Attorney Phelps Dunbar/W. Thomas Siler, Jr./Jason T. Marsh having KNOWLEDGE that Judge Tom S. Lee’s August 2, 2012 was obtained through CRIMINAL and FRAULENT means – i.e. moreover, as a direct and proximate result of BIAS and PREJUDICE towards Newsome as well as the FINANCIAL/PECUNIARY interest of Judge Tom S. Lee and other reasons KNOWN to them reached in the CONSPIRACY(S) leveled against Newsome to OBSTRUCT the administration of justice. Therefore, as a matter of law, statements/averments in Newsome’s MTSMTStay are deemed ADMITTED and/or TRUE!49. Named Defendants and/or their Counsel/Attorney have FAILED to file a TIMELY response to Newsome’s Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action). Any such pleadings that Named Defendants and/or their Counsel/Attorney may attempt to file in response to this Motion to Strike will be met with a similar filing by Newsome to STRIKE that pleading as well. The laws are clear that the August 2, 2012 Order by Judge Tom S. Lee was not FINAL and that it is subject to rebuttal pleadings. Moreover, Named Defendants’ acknowledging and encouraging Newsome to continue to file; therefore, Page 19 of 35
  • 23. they having KNOWLEDGE as well that they had an OBLIGATION and DUTY to protect any claims/issues through timely rebuttal pleadings.50. Named Defendants and/or their Counsel/Attorney having KNOWLEDGE at the time of Judge Tom S. Lee’s August 2, 2012, that said Order was NULL/VOID for lack of jurisdiction, done in furtherance of CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome and purposes of delay, harassment, obstructing justice, increasing costs of litigation, embarrassment, sham/frivolousness, unduly burdensome, provided for purposes of committing fraud upon this Court, and other reasons known to Named Defendants and their Counsel.51. UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: That Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss and supporting Memorandum Brief in this lawsuit is premised on claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against “STATE” and/or “Government” employers/officials/employees. UNISPUTED is the fact that Newsome’s instant lawsuit is a premised on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 – Equal Rights Under The Law which allows for one to “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens . . .” Therefore, NOT even with a MAGNIFYING GLASS will a JURY and Court find any such § 1983 claims as asserted by the Defendants in this lawsuit.52. UNDISPUTED IS THE FACT: Due to the Conflict-Of-Interest, BIAS, PREJUDICE towards Newsome, FINANCIAL/PECUNIARY interest and other reasons known to Judge Tom S. Lee requiring his DISQUALIFICATION and/or RECUSAL, as a matter of law, he LACKS jurisdiction to preside as Judge in this instant Lawsuit and the matters therein and has CLEARLY ABUSED discretion which he also LACKED to exercise for violations under 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and other statutes/laws of the United States governing said matters.53. For this Court to grant Defendants’ Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss, Newsome would be prejudiced and deprived equal protection of the laws, equal immunities and privileges and due process of laws. Rights secured/guaranteed under the United States Constitution and other governing laws.54. IMMUNITY: The statutes/laws are clear that any claims of defense that Judge Tom Stewart Lee may assert that he may be entitled to avoid legal actions that may be brought by Newsome against him will be FRIVOLOUS in that he is KNOWINGLY, WILLINGLY and with MALICIOUS intent engaging in CRIMINAL/CIVIL wrongs prohibited by law and in violation under the Code of Judicial Conduct, 28 U.S.C.A. § 455 and any/all statutes/laws governing said violations and prosecution for same. Furthermore, because Judge Tom Lee prior to the August 2, 2012 execution of Order having KNOWLEDGE that he clearly LACKED all jurisdictional powers to execute same; nevertheless proceeded for purposes of fulfilling his role in CONSPIRACIES leveled against Newsome and deprive her rights secured/guaranteed under the Constitution and other laws of the United States governing said matters. Mireles v. Waco, 112 S.Ct. 286 (1991) - Judicial immunity is overcome in only two sets of circumstances: judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in judges judicial capacity; and judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in complete absence of all jurisdiction. Stump v. Sparkman, 98 S.Ct. 1099 (1978) - Judge will not be deprived of immunity because action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to liability only when he has acted in clear absence of all jurisdiction. Page 20 of 35
  • 24. III. JURY TRIAL TIMELY DEMANDED IN THIS LAWSUIT While the record evidence will support TIMELY “JURY DEMAND” by Plaintiff Vogel Denise Newsome(“Plaintiff” and/or “Newsome”) through the Civil Cover Sheet (See EXHIBITS “Q” – Civil Cover Sheet and “X” -RIGHT To A JURY Trial In CIVIL Actions attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in fullherein) and said demand appears on the Docket Sheet of this Court, through her Complaint and referenced thereinwith a designation also made beginning at Page 136, as well as through Newsome’s subsequent “Motions to Strike”in further preservations of those issues/claims raised with those address in this instant OBJECTION(S) To August 2,2012 Order Of Judge Tom S. Lee; Motion For DISQUALIFICATION; AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL(“OBJECTION(S) To 08/02/12 Order”), Newsome states to this Court and:TO DEFENDANTS: Page Kruger & Holland, P.A. Thomas Y. Page Louis G. Baine, III Linda Thomas c/a Their Legal Counsel/Attorneys Phelps Dunbar LLP W. Thomas Siler, Jr. Jason T. Marsh That “JURY DEMAND” in this Lawsuit has been timely, properly and adequately made. 55. That as early as about June 6, 2012, Pursuant to Rule 5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Defendants Defendants Page Kruger & Holland, P.A., Thomas Y. Page, Louis G. Baine III, and Linda Thomas (hereinafter, “Named Defendants”) were timely, properly and adequately served with “JURY DEMAND” in this Lawsuit through her Complaint. See Doc. No. 1: Paragraph Page Paragraph Page ¶ 56 21 ¶ 178 75 ¶ 99 39 ¶ 200 ¶ 103 41 ¶ 218 87 ¶ 108 43 ¶ 239 95 ¶ 120 49 ¶ 262 109 ¶ 141 62 ¶ 299 116 ¶ 170 71 ¶¶ 310 thru 312 136 56. Newsome through her subsequent pleadings entitled (i.e. which clearly reflect Jury Demand): d) Motion to Strike Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) e) Motion to Strike Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss and Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Stay All Proceedings Pending A Ruling On Defendants’ Motion To Dismiss; Motion for Rule 11 Sanctions of and Against Defendants; and Motion for Default Judgment (Jury Trial Demanded in this Action) Page 21 of 35
  • 25. AGAIN reiterated her DEMAND; moreover RIGHT to “JURY TRIAL” on any/all triable issues and does NOT waive said right to have issues/claims tried by a Jury! Therefore, the record sustains that TIMELY “Jury Demand” made as to any/all DISPUTABLE issue(s)/claims in this Lawsuit.57. Newsome further demands a JURY trial (i.e. NOT a Bench Trial) on triable issues. Newsome is proceeding in this instant lawsuit as a PAYING Litigant and the Docket Sheet in this matter clearly reflects “JURY DEMAND: Plaintiff.” See EXHIBIT “L” attached hereto and incorporated by reference. Furthermore, asserts article at EXHIBIT “W” – REexaming The RIGHT To Trial By JURY attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein.58. The facts, evidence and legal conclusions set forth in Newsome’s Complaint and subsequent pleadings (Motions To Strike) at Doc. Nos. 12 and 19 supports that there are genuine issues of material facts that are in dispute. Therefore, a JURY trial is MANDATORILY required under Rule 38 of the FRCP, Seventh Amendment of the United States and other statutes/laws governing said matters to resolve questions of facts, disputes and/or conflicts regarding the claims/issue(s) raised. See EXHIBIT “Y” - The RIGHT To A JURY Decision On QUESTIONS of FACT Under The Seventh Amendment attached hereto and incorporated by reference as if set forth in full herein. Hare v. City of Corinth, Miss., 949 F.Supp. 456 (N.D.Miss.E.Div.,1996) - Essential characteristic of federal system is the manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it assigns trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence if not the command of Seventh Amendment, assigns decisions of disputed questions of fact to jury. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 7. [22] [23] As already noted by the court in this case, this court has determined that there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the actions of the . . . defendants amount to deliberate indifference in this case. These same defendants now argue to the court that “[t]his court made [its previous] holding based upon a set of undisputed facts leaving only a legal question to be decided. If this court cannot determine after diligent research and the benefit of hindsight whether the defendants actions were deliberately indifferent based upon a set of undisputed facts, then the defendants should certainly could not in July, 1989, . . . The ultimate factual determination of whether or not these defendants were deliberately indifferent is itself a disputed question of fact. See, e.g., Estate of Cole by Pardue v. Fromm, 94 F.3d 254, 260 (7th Cir.1996); Miller v. Schoenen, 75 F.3d 1305, 1311 (8th Cir.1996); Kirk v. Simpson, 35 F.3d 566, 1994 WL 443461, *1 (6th Cir.(Tenn.)); Archibeque v. Wylie, 16 F.3d 415, 1994 WL 41272, *3 (10th Cir.(N.M.)); Greason v. Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 835 (11th Cir.1990). Its determination is the responsibility of the jury in this case, and does not rest with this court as it is a determination of fact: The federal system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the manner in which, in civil common- law actions, it distributes trial functions between judge and jury and, under the influence—if not the command—of the Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the jury. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996) (quoting Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 537, 78 S.Ct. 893, 901, 2 L.Ed.2d 953 (1958)). This court is nevertheless fully capable of making findings of fact as well as conclusions of law if the parties wish to waive their right to a jury trial in this case. That it is not this courts place to make this factual determination at the summary judgment stage lends no decisive weight to the determination of whether the defendants are actually entitled to the protection of qualified immunity. There remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the actions of the . . Page 22 of 35