sia has emerged from centuries of stagnation to produce the most sustained economic boom in modern history - all in little more than a generation. Shuman's expertise and openness combine to produce one of the most important books on economic development - "The Miracle." South Korea leads the group, with a 15,046% growth in GNP/capita from 1965 - 2007; Japan's was "merely" 4,133%, China's 2,260%, and India's 764%. East Asia's 1981 poverty rate (surviving on $1.25/day, or less) led the world at nearly 80%; this fell to 18% by 2005. (During the same period sub-Saharan Africa remained at 50%.) Goldman-Sachs predicted in 2003 that by 2050 the Indian and Chinese economies together would double that of the U.S.
Shuman's focus is on both reporting how each economy blossomed, and then synthesizing underlying potentially explanatory factors. Five theories are most prominent:
1)"There is something special about Asians" - eg. Confucianism's stress on societal order and devotion to a strong work ethic (early Hyundai shipbuilders working 17-hour-days; Chinese factory workers working 12-hour-days for 28 or so days/month), savings (up to 50%) and education. (Akin to earlier studies crediting Protestantism's "The Lord helps him who helps himself" for the success of capitalism in the West.") Shuman also could have referenced politically-incorrect yet credible studies concluding that Asians benefit from about a ten IQ-point lead over average Caucasians. Regardless, Shuman challenges this theory, asking "Why not earlier?"
2)A second theory is that Asian leaders did a superior job of planning - despite contradicting seemingly superior U.S.-backed laissez-faire ideology. Examples include selecting particular industries to promote (eg. steel, shipbuilding, chemicals, electronics, metals, machinery - Japan, South Korea), assisting them with government funds, protection from foreign competition on their home turf, discounts on energy, lowered local taxes on their products, and wresting foreign assistance with new technology and patents. Other aspects include sometimes picking leaders of the new industries, forcing them to succeed vs. international competition in other lands, and forcing out corporate leaders who failed to succeed. Finally, it was also particularly interesting to note that some aspects correlated with strategic thinking by U.S. leaders. South Korea, for example, seemingly deliberately planned that every new plant had to be one of the largest in the world, and most efficient - very similar to Jack Welch's dictate that G.E. must be #1 or #2 in every area it competed in - guaranteeing it would not suffer scale dis-economies.
3)A third theory is that Asians simply took advantage of American-supported free-trade and military support for stability, while also boosting the education of their peoples and infrastructure (eg. transportation, power networks). Again, however, Shuman challenges such thinking with "Why not eg. Africa as well?"
4)Shuman sees nationalism as a fourth explanatory theory. The transformational Asian leaders sought strong growth to lift their people's standard of living, as well as a defense against the Communist or U.S. threat (eg. South Korea, Taiwan; China). Ironically, part of Deng's motivation in China was also to favorably impress citizens in Taiwan and Hong Kong in hopes of later peacefully re-uniting with them. These leaders also often set demanding goals for themselves - Ikeda, Japan's PM beginning in 1960, set a goal of doubling national income by 1970 - not only did Japan succeed, but confidence in his goal led many Japanese to boost the economy by spending on basic appliances (B&W TVs, refrigerators, washers), and later upgrading to color TVs and buying cars. Similarly, China's Deng supported a 1982 goal of boosting output in 2000 to levels 4X those then current.
Deng, like Obama's assistant, Rahm Emmanuel, was of the "let no crisis go to waste" school. He and his supporters took advantage of failing harvests to encourage and support radical thinking - eg. "privatizing" the collective farms. (Six months after Deng's approval, this spread to 75% of its farms.) Shuman also points out that China's approach differed from its Asian neighbors, with considerable government withdrawal from business areas formerly dominated - eg. government-owned enterprises. However, readers mush not make too much of that distinction - China still kept core actions of selecting and assisting new industries.
The author also notes that, with one exception, (Singh, in India) the leaders were not economists, but were quick to borrow from nations demonstrating early success (Japan was first). (Similarly, many leading American business leaders had no economic/management training - eg. Gates, Welch, Jobs, etc.)
Shuman also is quite impressed by the creativity of innovative and driving early Asian business leaders - eg. Morito (Sony), those involved in developing the Toyota Production System (TPS) that turned "Fordism" on its head, China's head of Leveno, Hyundai's founder, etc. China's recent battery and solar power entrepreneurs, not mentioned, are nonetheless also supportive of Shuman's thinking. Finally, "The Miracle" also quotes Asian leaders with crediting the U.S. for providing security and stability to the region.
5)A fifth potential explanatory theory is that strongman or single-party rule throughout much of Asia, did away with divisive arguments and interminable decision-making delays (think U.S. politics). Interestingly, South Korea's strongman Park, most credited with its economic transformation, was also posthumously selected in 1996 as the "dictator they' most like to clone." (Economic benefit trumps political freedom.) Clearly China's Deng, Suharto, and Japan functioned similarly - especially at the onset of their transformation.
Which theory is correct? My opinion is that each has truth; reality is probably a combination of them all.
My only criticism of "The Miracle" is that Shuman's thinking about long-term consequences for the U.S. are superficial. He believes, correctly, that continuation improves relations between the U.S. and Asia - but this is likely only up to a point. China's increasing concerns over holding U.S. financial assets is evidence that things may get tougher.
More importantly, however, Shuman fails to realize that what's good for Asia (more free trade) may not be good for the U.S. Further, he misses the significance of Sony's Morito refusing a major manufacturing contract to build transistor radios with Bulova's name on them - Morita's point was to give Sony greater control of its destiny, and gain access to the bulk of profits accruing to non-manufacturing activities (eg. China receives only 25-35% of the consumer price for items it manufactures). Similar
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