Cobra II: The Inside Story of the
Invasion and Occupation of Iraq by
Bernard E. Trainor
A Perspective On What Went Wrong In Iraq
Written by the chief military correspondent of the New York Times and a
prominent retired Marine general, this is the definitive account of the
invasion of Iraq.
A stunning work of investigative journalism, Cobra II describes in riveting
detail how the American rush to Baghdad provided the opportunity for the
virulent insurgency that followed. As Gordon and Trainor show, the brutal
aftermath was not inevitable and was a surprise to the generals on both
sides. Based on access to unseen documents and exclusive interviews
with the men and women at the heart of the war, Cobra II provides
firsthand accounts of the fighting on the ground and the high-level planning

behind the scenes. Now with a new afterword that addresses what
transpired after the fateful events of the summer of 2003, this is a peerless
re-creation and analysis of the central event of our times.
Personal Review: Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and
Occupation of Iraq by Bernard E. Trainor
The war in Iraq has dominated the news for the past several years, and
recent months have seen several books emerge dealing with events
leading to the American-led invasion and its aftermath. Among the best of
these books is Cobra II, by New York Times chief military correspondent
Michael R. Gordon, and retired Marine Corp Lt. General Bernard E.
Trainor.
Cobra II deals largely with the run-up to war, and America's initial military
successes on the field. Well-written and thoroughly researched, the book
tracks events leading up to the March, 2003 invasion of Iraq and ends with
the reelection of the Bush Administration in 2004, recounting all of the
major battles and most of our early troubles with the occupation. Showing
the miscalculations on both sides that may have made the conflict
inevitable, the authors bring a wealth of experience and insight to the task
of making the chaos of battle intelligible to the outsider. And among the
revelations is that few of our leaders ever considered the possibility that
Saddam's posturing might be directed toward local enemies in the region--
a failure that, given the course of events in the years since, is tragically
ironic.
Initial Success and Future Problems
Disturbingly, they also show that many of our early successes were not
quite what they seemed. Much of the vaunted push to Baghdad came over
lightly-guarded terrain, from which the enemy had largely withdrawn in the
face of our superior forces. Still, the seeds of future problems were there
for all to see, and many of the soldiers in the field saw them. Unfortunately,
however, the civilians in the Pentagon, and the commanders on the scene
simply refused to listen to their warnings. The book also describes the
lengths to which Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld went to seize and
exercise total control over our venture into Iraq. Astonishingly, these
lengths included freezing the one official in the Bush Administration with
experience planning and executing a war plan, Secretary of State Colin
Powell, out of any substantial role in pre- or post-war planning. Rumsfeld's
Defense Department even went so far as to punish a general who
committed the sin of candor by publically acknowledging that the enemy
our soldiers were facing was different than the one they had war-gamed
against. His subsequent marginalization within the Pentagon sent a sharp
and unmistakable message to the rest of the uniformed military, signaling
that their job was to follow orders, not to tell Congress or the public about
any possible problems that might be lurking around the next dusty bend in
the road.
Continuing Problems

First coming to press as our problems were becoming apparent even to
most early supporters of the war, Cobra II also notes that the lack of
available "boots on the ground" seemed to be largely responsible for the
wide-scale looting and chaos that followed the invasion. Alarmingly, the
book suggests that our misreading of the enemy and our inability to
recognize and adapt to the changing developments on the ground reflect
the dysfunctional nature of our military institutions under Rumsfeld. These
problems include a prevailing assumption among many top military
planners that invading Iraq in 2003 would be little more than a reprise of
the successful Gulf War of 1991--problems that may not end with
Rumsfeld's departure from the Pentagon.
Cobra II succeeds in translating many of our blunders into terms and
concepts that the non-military layman can easily grasp. It gives us a
candid, professional analysis of events before and since the invasion. And
it provides the reader with a sobering assessment of what can go wrong
when optimism and resolve come to equate doubt or skepticism with
disloyalty.
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