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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011


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Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011

Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011

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  • 1. ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS Military and Security DevelopmentsInvolving the People’s Republic of China 2011 Office of the Secretary of Defense Preparation of this report cost the Department of Defense a total of approximately $73,212 in Fiscal Years 2010-2011. Generated on 2011 May06 RefID: 1-4AE81FF
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  • 3. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2011 A Report to Congress Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000Section 1246, “Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People‟sRepublic of China,” of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, Public Law111-84, which amends the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000, Section1202, Public Law 106-65, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit a report “in bothclassified and unclassified form, on military and security developments involving the People‟sRepublic of China. The report shall address the current and probable future course of military-technological development of the People‟s Liberation Army and the tenets and probabledevelopment of Chinese security strategy and military strategy, and of the military organizationsand operational concepts supporting such development over the next 20 years. The report shallalso address United States-China engagement and cooperation on security matters during theperiod covered by the report, including through United States-China military-to-militarycontacts, and the United States strategy for such engagement and cooperation in the future.”
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  • 5. EXECUTIVE SUMMARYChina’s rise as a major international actor is likely to stand out as a defining feature of thestrategic landscape of the early 21st century. Sustained economic development has raised thestandard of living for China’s citizens and elevated China’s international profile. Thisdevelopment, coupled with an expanding science and technology base, has also facilitated acomprehensive and ongoing military modernization program. The United States welcomes astrong, prosperous, and successful China that reinforces international rules and norms andenhances security and peace both regionally and globally.China is steadily assuming new roles and responsibilities in the international community. In2004, Chinese President Hu Jintao articulated new guidance for the People’s Liberation Army(PLA), including missions extending beyond China’s immediate territorial interests. Thiscatalyzed China’s growing involvement in international peacekeeping efforts, counter-piracyoperations, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and the evacuation of Chinese citizensfrom overseas trouble spots. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper asserts that China’s ―future anddestiny have never been more closely connected with those of the international community.‖Nonetheless, China’s modernized military could be put to use in ways that increase China’sability to gain diplomatic advantage or resolve disputes in its favor.Although the PLA is contending with a growing array of missions, Taiwan remains its ―mainstrategic direction.‖ China continued modernizing its military in 2010, with a focus on Taiwancontingencies, even as cross-Strait relations improved. The PLA seeks the capability to deterTaiwan independence and influence Taiwan to settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. In pursuit ofthis objective, Beijing is developing capabilities intended to deter, delay, or deny possible for the island in the event of conflict. The balance of cross-Strait military forces andcapabilities continues to shift in the mainland’s favor.Over the past decade, China’s military has benefitted from robust investment in modernhardware and technology. Many modern systems have reached maturity and others will becomeoperational in the next few years. Following this period of ambitious acquisition, the decadefrom 2011 through 2020 will prove critical to the PLA as it attempts to integrate many new andcomplex platforms, and to adopt modern operational concepts, including joint operations andnetwork-centric warfare.China has made modest, but incremental, improvements in the transparency of its military andsecurity affairs. However, there remains uncertainty about how China will use its growingcapabilities.The United States recognizes and welcomes PRC contributions that support a safe and secureglobal environment. China’s steady integration into the global economy creates new incentivesfor partnership and cooperation, particularly in the maritime domain. Although China’sexpanding military capabilities can facilitate cooperation in pursuit of shared objectives, they canalso increase the risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation. Strengthening our military-to-military relationship is a critical part of our strategy to shape China’s choices as we seek tocapitalize on opportunities for cooperation while mitigating risks. To support this strategy, theUnited States must continue monitoring PRC force development and strategy. In concert withour friends and Allies, the United States will also continue adapting our forces, posture, andoperational concepts to maintain a stable and secure East Asian environment. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China I
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  • 7. Table of ContentsExecutive Summary IChapter One: Annual Update 1 China’s Challenges and Opportunities in 2010 1 Developments in China’s National Security Leadership 1 Developments in the Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait 2 Developments in the Size, Location, and Capabilities of PRC Military Forces 2 Developments in China’s Space and Cyber Capabilities 5 Developments in China’s Defense Technology Acquisition 6 Challenges to Taiwan’s Deterrent Forces 7 China’s Foreign Military Engagement 7Chapter Two: Understanding China’s Strategy 9 Overview 9 Understanding Chinese Strategy 9 China’s Strategic Priorities 13 The New Historic Missions 16 Debates on Future Strategy 17 China’s Military Strategy 22 Secrecy and Deception 25Chapter Three: Force Modernization Goals and Trends 27 Overview 27 Anti-Access/Area Denial Capability Developments 28 Ballistic Missile Defense 32 Extended Operational Reach 32 Strategic Capabilities 33 Power Projection Beyond Taiwan 37Chapter Four: Resources for Force Modernization 41 Overview 41 Military Expenditure Trends 41 China’s Advancing Defense Industries 41 Trends and Projections 45 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China III
  • 8. Chapter Five: Force Modernization and Security in the Taiwan Strait 47 Overview 47 Beijing’s Taiwan Strategy 48 Beijing’s Courses of Action Against Taiwan 49Chapter Six: U.S.-China Military-To-Military Contacts 53 Overview 53 Military Relations in 2010 53 U.S. Strategy for Military Engagement 54 Opportunities and Challenges in U.S.-China Military-To-Military Relations 55Special Topic: China’s Evolving Maritime Strategy 57 The Rise of China’s Maritime Security Interests 57 The Evolution in “Maritime Consciousness” 57 Evolving Naval Strategy 57 New Security Interests Driving Requirements 58 New “Firsts” for the PLA Navy 59 China’s Maritime Interests 59 Sea Lane Protection 61 Great Power Status 61 Sea-Based Nuclear Forces 62 Overcoming Key Challenges 62 Assessing the Future 62Special Topic: China’s Military Engagement 65 Traditional Military Diplomacy 65 Combined Exercises 65 Peacekeeping Operations 66 Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief 67 Arms Sales 67 Conclusion 69Appendix I: 71China and Taiwan Forces Data 71Appendix II: 79Military-To-Military Exchanges 79 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China IV
  • 9. Glossary of AcronymsAAV: Amphibious Assault Vehicle MIRV: Multiple Independently Targeted Re-entry VehiclesAEW&C: Airborne Early Warning and Control MMCA: Military Maritime Consultative AgreementAPCSS: Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies MND: Ministry of National DefenseASAT: Anti-Satellite MR: Military RegionASBM: Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile MRBM: Medium-Range Ballistic MissileASCM: Anti-Ship Cruise Missile MRL: Multiple Rocket Launcherbcm: billion cubic meters NCO: Non-Commissioned Officerb/d: barrels per day NDU: National Defense UniversityC4ISR: Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, NFU: No First Use and Reconnaissance OMTE: Outline of Military Training and EvaluationCCP: Chinese Communist Party OTH: Over-the-HorizonCMC: Central Military Commission PLA: People’s Liberation ArmyCNO: Computer Network Operations PLAAF: People’s Liberation Army Air ForceCOMSAT: Communications Satellite PRC: People’s Republic of ChinaCONUS: Continental United States R&D: Research and DevelopmentDCT: Defense Consultative Talks S&ED: Strategic and Economic DialogueDDG: Guided-Missile Destroyer SAM: Surface-to-Air MissileDPCT: Defense Policy Coordination Talks SCO: Shanghai Cooperation OrganizationDSS: Defense Security Service SLBM: Submarine-Launched Ballistic MissileDSTL: Developing Sciences and SLOC: Sea Lines of Communication Technologies List SRBM: Short-Range Ballistic MissileEEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone SS: Diesel-Electric Attack SubmarineEU: European Union SSBN: Nuclear-Powered Ballistic MissileFAO: Foreign Affairs Office SubmarineFFG: Guided-Missile Frigate SSN: Nuclear-Powered Attack SubmarineGDP: Gross Domestic Product UAV: Unmanned Aerial VehicleGPS: Global Positioning System UCAV: Unmanned Combat Aerial VehicleHA/DR: Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief UN: United NationsICBM: Intercontinental-Range Ballistic Missile UNCLOS: UN Convention on the Law of the SeaIJO: Integrated Joint Operations USCG: United States Coast GuardLACM: Land Attack Cruise Missile USMC: United States Marine Corps Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China V
  • 10. (This page left intentionally blank)Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China VI
  • 11. CHAPTER ONE: ANNUAL UPDATE“In the next five years, our economy and society will develop faster, boosting comprehensivenational power. The developments will provide an even more stable material base to ourdefense and military buildup.” – PRC Defense Minster Liang GuanglieSeveral significant developments in China over the past year relate to the questions Congressposed in Section 1246 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (PublicLaw 111-84).CHINA’S CHALLENGES ANDOPPORTUNITIES IN 2010The government of China remained focused Much of the PLA’s success over the nexton maintaining economic development and decade will be determined by how effectivelyenhancing China’s security interests in 2010. it integrates emerging capabilities andThe Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has platforms into the force. By most accounts,built its legitimacy on the promise of the PLA is on track to achieve its goal ofeconomic growth, stability, and national building a modern, regionally-focusedunity. To ensure its position, the CCP closely military by 2020.monitors potential sources of domestic unrest, In tandem with the PLA’s improvedfrom unemployment and rising income capacities for regional military operations,disparities to pro-democracy movements and PRC officials in recent years haveethnic tensions. Additionally, Beijing is emphasized China’s sovereignty andseeking to balance a more confident assertion territorial interests with greater frequency.of its growing interests in the international Citing a violation of these ―core interests,‖ thecommunity with a desire to avoid generating PLA suspended military-to-military relationsopposition and countervailing responses from with the United States in January 2010,regional and major powers. An example of following U.S. approval of arms sales tothis could be seen in Beijing’s recalibrated Taiwan.rhetorical approach to regional territorialdisputes such as the South China Sea DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’Sfollowing the June 2010 Association of NATIONAL SECURITY LEADERSHIPSoutheast Asian Nations Regional Forum(ARF). Vice President Xi Jinping became a viceThe 11th Five Year Plan concluded in 2010 chairman of the CCP Central Militaryand was marked by new milestones in PLA Commission (CMC) at the 5th Plenum of theforce development and technology 17th Central Committee in October 2010.acquisition. Motivated by expanding Based on historical precedent, this moveeconomic and security interests, the PLA is could be the penultimate step to Xi becomingnow venturing into the global maritime the General Secretary of the CCP anddomain, a sphere long dominated by the U.S. Chairman of the Central Military CommissionNavy. Relations with Taiwan have continued (CMC). During the leadership transitionto improve, but the PLA shows no sign of process that is expected to unfold around theslowing its efforts to develop plans and 18th Party Congress in the fall of 2012, it iscapabilities for a cross-Strait contingency. not clear if President Hu Jintao will relinquish Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 1
  • 12. the Party General Secretary and CMC Consistent with a near-term focus onChairman positions, or if he will follow the preparing for Taiwan Strait contingencies,precedent set by Jiang Zemin in 2002 and China continues to base many of its mostretain the CMC Chairmanship for a number advanced systems in the military regionsof months, or even years, to facilitate the (MRs) opposite Taiwan. Although thesepower transition. capabilities could be employed for a variety of regional crisis or conflict scenarios, ChinaDEVELOPMENTS IN THE SECURITY has made less progress on capabilities thatSITUATION IN THE TAIWAN STRAIT extend global reach or power projection. Outside of peacetime counter-piracySince the election in Taiwan of President Ma missions, for example, China’s Navy has littleYing-jeou in March 2008, Beijing and Taipei operational experience beyond regionalhave made significant progress in improving waters. Although the PLA’s new roles andcross-Strait relations. Both Beijing and missions in the international domain reflectTaipei have emphasized expanding economic China’s expanding set of interests, regionaland cultural ties as a means of reducing contingencies continue to dominate resourcestension and sustaining the current positive and planning.cross-Strait atmosphere. Ballistic and Cruise Missiles. China hasBeijing and Taipei signed the Economic prioritized land-based ballistic and cruiseCooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) missile programs. It is developing and testingin 2010. Beijing has at times demonstrated several new classes and variants of offensiveflexibility on the issue of Taiwan’s missiles, forming additional missile units,participation in international forums, but has upgrading older missile systems, andalso continued to pressure players in the developing methods to counter ballisticinternational community to restrict this missile defenses.participation. The PLA is acquiring large numbers ofDespite the warming of cross-Strait ties, highly accurate cruise missiles, many ofChina continued its military modernization in which have ranges in excess of 185 km.2010, including specific efforts to provide a This includes the domestically-produced,credible range of military options in ground-launched DH-10 land-attacka Taiwan contingency. In the current decade cruise missile (LACM); the domesticallyto 2020, the PLA is likely to steadily expand produced ground- and ship-launched YJ-its military options for Taiwan, including 62 anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM); thethose to deter, delay, or deny third party Russian SS-N-22/SUNBURN supersonicintervention. ASCM, which is fitted on China’s SOVREMENNY-class DDGs acquiredDEVELOPMENTS IN THE SIZE, from Russia; and, the Russian SS-N-LOCATION, AND CAPABILITIES OF 27B/SIZZLER supersonic ASCM onPRC MILITARY FORCES China’s Russian-built, KILO-class diesel-China’s long-term, comprehensive military electric attack submarines.modernization is improving the PLA’s By December 2010, the PLA hadcapacity to conduct high-intensity, regional deployed between 1,000 and 1,200 short-military operations, including ―anti-access range ballistic missiles (SRBM) to unitsand area denial‖ (A2AD) operations. The opposite Taiwan. To improve theterms ―anti-access and area denial‖ refer to lethality of this force, the PLA iscapabilities that could be employed to deter or introducing variants of missiles withcounter adversary forces from deploying to, improved ranges, accuracies, andor operating within, a defined space. payloads. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2
  • 13. China is developing an anti-ship ballistic and advanced surface combatants, including missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the aircraft carriers. Submarine tunnel facilities CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile at the base could also enable deployments (MRBM). Known as the DF-21D, this from this facility with reduced risk of missile is intended to provide the PLA the detection. capability to attack large ships, including China’s aircraft carrier research and aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific development program includes renovation Ocean. The DF-21D has a range of the ex-VARYAG, which could begin exceeding 1,500 km and is armed with a sea trials in 2011, although without maneuverable warhead. aircraft. It will likely serve initially as a China is modernizing its nuclear forces by training and evaluation platform, and adding more survivable delivery systems. eventually offer a limited operational In recent years, the road mobile, solid capability. China could begin propellant CSS-10 Mod 1 and CSS-10 construction of a fully indigenous carrier Mod 2 (DF-31 and DF-31A) in 2011, which could achieve operational intercontinental-range ballistic missiles capability after 2015. China likely will (ICBMs) have entered service. The CSS- build multiple aircraft carriers with 10 Mod 2, with a range in excess of support ships over the next decade. 11,200 km, can reach most locations China currently has a land-based training within the continental United States. program for carrier pilots; however, it will China may also be developing a new still take several additional years for road-mobile ICBM, possibly capable of China to achieve a minimal level of carrying a multiple independently combat capability on an aircraft carrier. targetable re-entry vehicle (MIRV). The PLA Navy is improving its over-the-Naval Forces. Since the 1990s, the PLA horizon (OTH) targeting capability withNavy has rapidly transformed from a large sky wave and surface wave OTH radars.fleet of low-capability, single-mission In combination with early-warningplatforms, to a leaner force equipped with aircraft, unmanned aerial vehiclesmore modern, multi-mission platforms. In (UAVs), and other surveillance andcontrast to the fleet just a decade ago, many reconnaissance equipment, the sky wavePLA Navy combatants are equipped with OTH radar allows the PRC to carry outadvanced air-defense systems and modern surveillance and reconnaissance over theASCMs, with ranges in excess of 185 km. western Pacific. The OTH radars can beThese capabilities not only increase the used in conjunction with reconnaissancelethality of PLA Navy platforms, particularly satellites to locate targets at greatin the area of anti-surface warfare (ASuW), distances from the PRC, therebybut also enable them to operate beyond the supporting long-range precision strikes,range of land-based air defenses. including employment of ASBMs.The PLA Navy possesses some 75 principal China continues to produce a new class ofsurface combatants, more than 60 submarines, nuclear-powered ballistic missile55 medium and large amphibious ships, and submarine (SSBN). JIN-class (Type 094)roughly 85 missile-equipped small SSBNs will eventually carry the JL-2combatants. The PLA has now completed submarine-launched ballistic missile withconstruction of a major naval base at Yulin, an estimated range of some 7,400 km.on the southernmost tip of Hainan Island. The JIN and the JL-2 will give the PLAThe base is large enough to accommodate a Navy its first credible sea-based nuclearmix of attack and ballistic missile submarines capability. Although DoD initially Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 3
  • 14. forecast the JL-2 would reach IOC by medium-range HHQ-16 vertically2010, the program has faced repeated launched naval SAM. These shipsdelays. significantly improve the PLA Navy’s area air defense capability, which will beChina has expanded its force of nuclear- critical as the PLA Navy expands itspowered attack submarines (SSN). Two operations into ―distant seas,‖ beyond thesecond-generation SHANG-class (Type range of shore-based air defense.093) SSNs are already in service and asmany as five third-generation Type 095 Air and Air Defense Forces. China basesSSNs will be added in the coming years. 490 combat aircraft within unrefueledWhen complete, the Type 095 will operational range of Taiwan and has theincorporate better quieting technology, airfield capacity to expand that number byimproving its capability to conduct a hundreds. Newer and more advanced aircraftrange of missions from surveillance to the make up a growing percentage of theinterdiction of surface vessels with inventory.torpedoes and ASCMs. The January 2011 flight test of China’sThe current mainstay modern diesel next generation fighter prototype, the J-powered attack submarines (SS) in the 20, highlights China’s ambition toPLA Navy’s submarine force are the 13 produce a fighter aircraft that incorporatesSONG-class (Type 039) units. Each can stealth attributes, advanced avionics, andcarry the YJ-82 ASCM. The follow-on to super-cruise capable engines over the nextthe SONG is the YUAN-class SS; as several years.many as four of which are already in China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleetservice. The YUAN-class SS might also (originally adapted from the Soviet Tu-include an air-independent power system. 16) with a new, longer-range variant thatThe SONG, YUAN, SHANG and the will be armed with a new long-rangestill-to-be-deployed Type 095 all will be cruise missile.capable of launching the long-range CH-SS-NX-13 ASCM, once the missile The PLA Air Force has continuedcompletes development and testing. expanding its inventory of long-range, advanced SAM systems and nowChina has deployed some 60 of its new possesses one of the largest such forces inHOUBEI-class (Type 022) wave-piercing the world. Over the past five years, Chinacatamaran hull missile patrol boats. Each has acquired multiple SA-20 PMU2boat can carry up to eight YJ-83 ASCMs. battalions, the most advanced SAMThese ships have increased the PLA system Russia exports. It has alsoNavy’s littoral warfare capabilities. introduced the indigenously designedThe PLA Navy has acquired a new HQ-9.generation of domestically produced China’s aviation industry is developingsurface combatants. These include at several types of airborne early warningleast two LUYANG II-class (Type 052C) and control system (AWACS) aircraft.DDGs fitted with the indigenous HHQ-9 These include the KJ-200, based on the Y-long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) 8 airframe, for AWACS as well aswith additional hulls under construction; intelligence collection and maritimetwo LUZHOU-class (Type 051C) DDGs surveillance, and the KJ-2000, based on aequipped with the Russian SA-N-20 long- modified Russian IL-76 airframe.range SAM; and as many as eightJIANGKAI II-class (Type 054A) guided- Ground Forces. The PLA has about 1.25missile frigates (FFG) fitted with the million ground force personnel, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 4
  • 15. approximately 400,000 of whom are based in to complete a regional network by 2012the three military regions (MRs) opposite and a global network by 2020.Taiwan. China continues to gradually China launched nine new remote sensingmodernize its large ground force. Much of satellites in 2010, which can perform boththe observed upgrade activity has occurred in civil and military applications.units with the potential to be involved in aTaiwan contingency. Examples of ground In 2010, Beijing also launched twounit modernization include the Type 99 third- communications satellites (one militarygeneration main battle tank, a new-generation and one civil), a meteorological satellite,amphibious assault vehicle, and a series of two experimental small satellites, and itsmultiple rocket launch systems. second lunar mission during the year.In October 2010, the PLA conducted its first China continues to develop the LongGroup Army-level exercise, which it called March V (LM-V) rocket, which is―MISSION ACTION (SHIMING intended to lift heavy payloads into space.XINGDONG).‖ The primary participants LM-V will more than double the size offrom the Beijing, Lanzhou, and Chengdu the Low Earth Orbit and GeosynchronousMilitary Regions practiced maneuver, Orbit payloads China is capable of placingground-air coordination, and long-distance into orbit. To support these rockets,mobilization via military and commercial China began constructing the Wenchangassets as they transited between MRs. Given Satellite Launch Center in 2008. Locatedthat these MRs are located along China’s land on Hainan Island, this launch facility isborders, the exercise scenario was likely expected to be complete by 2012, with thebased on border conflict scenarios. In initial LM-V launch scheduled for 2014.addition to providing large-scale mobility and Cyberwarfare Capabilities. In 2010,joint experience, the exercise allowed PLA numerous computer systems around thecommand staff to test their ability to plan and world, including those owned by the U.S.execute a large joint campaign while Government, were the target of intrusions,practicing communication between command some of which appear to have originatedelements across dispersed forces. This skill is within the PRC. These intrusions werecritical to responding to crises along China’s focused on exfiltrating information. Althoughperiphery. this alone is a serious concern, the accesses and skills required for these intrusions areDEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S SPACE similar to those necessary to conductAND CYBER CAPABILITIES computer network attacks. China’s 2010Space and Counterspace Capabilities. In Defense White Paper notes China’s own2010, China conducted a national record 15 concern over foreign cyberwarfare efforts andspace launches. It also expanded its space- highlighted the importance of cyber-securitybased intelligence, surveillance, in China’s national defense.reconnaissance, navigation, meteorological, Cyberwarfare capabilities could serve PRCand communications satellite constellations. military operations in three key areas. FirstIn parallel, China is developing a multi- and foremost, they allow data collectiondimensional program to improve its through exfiltration. Second, they can becapabilities to limit or prevent the use of employed to constrain an adversary’s actionsspace-based assets by adversaries during or slow response time by targeting network-times of crisis or conflict. based logistics, communications, and During 2010, Beijing launched five commercial activities. Third, they can serve BeiDou navigation satellites. China plans as a force multiplier when coupled with Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 5
  • 16. kinetic attacks during times of crisis or The PRC also utilizes a large, well-organizedconflict. network of enterprises, defense factories, affiliated research institutes, and computerDeveloping capabilities for cyberwarfare is network operations to facilitate the collectionconsistent with authoritative PLA military of sensitive information and export-controlledwritings. Two military doctrinal writings, technology, as well as basic research andScience of Strategy, and Science of science that supports U.S. defense systemCampaigns identify information warfare (IW) integral to achieving informationsuperiority and an effective means for Many of the organizations comprisingcountering a stronger foe. Although neither China’s military-industrial complex have bothdocument identifies the specific criteria for military and civilian research andemploying computer network attack against development functions. This network ofan adversary, both advocate developing government-affiliated companies and researchcapabilities to compete in this medium. institutes often enables the PLA to access sensitive and dual-use technologies orThe Science of Strategy and Science of knowledgeable experts under the guise ofCampaigns detail the effectiveness of IW and civilian research and development. Thecomputer network operations in conflicts and enterprises and institutes accomplish thisadvocate targeting adversary command and through technology conferences andcontrol and logistics networks to impact their symposia; legitimate contracts and jointability to operate during the early stages of commercial ventures; partnerships withconflict. As the Science of Strategy explains, foreign firms; and joint development of―In the information war, the command and specific technologies.control system is the heart of informationcollection, control, and application on the In the case of key national securitybattlefield. It is also the nerve center of the technologies, controlled equipment, and otherentire battlefield.‖ materials not readily obtainable through commercial means or academia, the PRC hasIn parallel with its military preparations, utilized its intelligence services and employedChina has increased diplomatic engagement other illicit approaches that violate U.S. lawsand advocacy in multilateral and international and export controls.forums where cyber issues are discussed anddebated. Beijing’s agenda is frequently in In August 2010, Noshir Gowadia wasline with the Russian Federation’s efforts to convicted of providing the PRC withpromote more international control over cyber classified U.S. defense technology.activities. China has not yet agreed with the Gowadia assisted the PRC in developing aU.S. position that existing mechanisms, such low-signature cruise missile exhaustas International Humanitarian Law and the system capable of rendering a cruiseLaw of Armed Conflict, apply in cyberspace. missile resistant to detection by infraredChina’s thinking in this area is evolving as it missiles.becomes more engaged. In September 2010, Chi Tong Kuok was convicted for conspiracy to illegallyDEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA’S export U.S. military encryptionDEFENSE TECHNOLOGY technology and smuggle it to Macau andACQUISITION Hong Kong. The relevant technology included encryption, communicationsChina relies on foreign technology, equipment, and Global Positioningacquisition of key dual-use components, and System (GPS) equipment used by U.S.focused indigenous research and development and NATO forces.(R&D) to advance military modernization. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 6
  • 17. CHALLENGES TO TAIWAN’S CHINA’S FOREIGN MILITARYDETERRENT FORCES ENGAGEMENTThere were no armed incidents in the vicinity China’s military engages with foreignof the Taiwan Strait in 2010 and the overall militaries to build relationships, improvesituation remained stable. However, the functional capabilities, and shape foreignPRC’s military modernization and the perceptions of China. PLA engagementdeployment of advanced capabilities opposite activities support China’s militarythe island have not eased, and the balance of modernization goals through acquisition ofmilitary force continues to shift in Beijing’s advanced weapons systems; increasedfavor. operational experience both within and beyond Asia; and access to foreign militaryTaiwan President Ma Ying-jeou’s defense practices, operational doctrine, and trainingreforms designed to streamline and methods.professionalize the military continue, butbudget shortfalls and escalating costs will China continues to conduct counter-piracylengthen the time necessary for operations in the Gulf of Aden. PLAimplementation. Navy ships have remained in the Gulf ofTaiwan plans to cut its military force to Aden since January 2009. In July 2011215,000 troops and transition to an all- the PLA Navy deployed its ninth escortvolunteer military by 2015, but recruitment formation. Outside of foreign ―goodwilland cost challenges may require a cruises,‖ this represents the PLA Navy’sreevaluation of the scope or implementation only series of operational deploymentsschedule. It will also reorganize several beyond the immediate western Pacificsupport commands and looks to civilianize its region.key defense research and development China’s Ministry of National Defensefacilities to improve efficiency and (MND) announced that by Decemberproductivity. 2010, it had comprehensively expandedConsistent with the provisions of the Taiwan foreign military relations throughRelations Act, Public Law 96-8 (1979), the establishment of military relations withUnited States continues to make available over 150 countries, including attachédefense articles and defense services to enable offices in 112 countries. 102 countriesTaiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense have military attaché offices in China.capability. Toward this end, in January 2010, The PLA continues sending over 170the Obama Administration announced its military delegations overseas every yearintent to sell to Taiwan $6.4 billion in and receiving over 200 foreign militarydefensive arms and equipment, including UH- delegations as part of high-level strategic60 utility helicopters; PATRIOT PAC-3 air consultations and professional andand missile defense systems; HARPOON technical missiles; Multifunctional Information In April 2010, China introduced itsDistribution Systems technical support for ―August First‖ aerial demonstration teamTaiwan’s Syun An command, control, to the international media and discussedcommunications, computers, intelligence, the PLA Air Force’s intention for thesurveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) team to perform in foreign countries.system; and OSPREY-class minehunting Combined Exercises. PLA participation inships. bilateral and multilateral exercises is increasing. The PLA derives political benefit through increased influence and enhanced ties Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 7
  • 18. with partner states and organizations. Such of the UN Security Council. China’sexercises provide the PLA opportunities to contributions have included engineering,improve capabilities and gain operational logistics, medical troops, civilian police, andinsights by observing tactics, command observers. In January 2004, China had 359decision-making, and equipment used by peacekeepers deployed to eight UNmore advanced militaries. peacekeeping missions, with no single contingent larger than 70 troops. As of During the recently completed 11th Five- January 2010, China had 2,131 peacekeepers Year Plan, the PLA held 32 joint exercise supporting 10 UN missions, with five and training events with foreign militaries. separate contingents larger than 200 troops. These activities covered issues such as counter-terrorism, maritime drills, ground In September 2010, China co-hosted its forces training, peacekeeping, and search first UN peacekeeping senior commanders and rescue. training course at the PRC MND Peacekeeping Center. In July, PLA and Brazilian special operations forces conducted China has maintained a force of 125 riot FRIENDSHIP-2010, a joint counter- police in Haiti, in support of the UN terrorism exercise, which included live stabilization force. After Haiti suffered a fire exercises supported by devastating earthquake in January 2010, fighter/bombers, transport aircraft, and these riot police provided escorts to the attack and transport helicopters. PRC medical team Beijing dispatched to the country for humanitarian support. China and Peru conducted ―PEACE ANGEL 2010,‖ a humanitarian medical China’s civilian and military leaders have rescue exercise in November. identified humanitarian assistance and disaster relief as an area for China to In early November, the PLA conducted cooperate with foreign partners and advance FRIENDSHIP ACTION-2010 with PRC interests. Albanian forces. This marked the PLA’s third exercise with foreign troops within As of early 2011, China had pledged 250 China and the first with a European million U.S. dollars to Pakistan for flood military. relief. This pledge of aid, which came after international criticism of China’s The PLA Air Force participated in two initial response, constituted China’s major international events in 2010; a largest-ever humanitarian aid package to a bilateral air exercise with Turkey and foreign nation. Beijing dispatched two of subsequently, PEACE MISSION 2010, its international search-and-rescue teams which was conducted under the auspices to aid Pakistan, and the PLA sent a of the Shanghai Cooperation medical team. In another first for China, Organization. This latter exercise the PLA deployed four military involved launching air operations from helicopters out of China to support the PRC bases to fly missions over relief effort. Kazakhstan. In July 2010, China’s Ministry ofPeacekeeping and Humanitarian Assistance/ National Defense announced that the PLADisaster Relief Operations. China’s had participated in at least 20 internationalparticipation in UN peacekeeping operations humanitarian rescue missions since 2002,increased six-fold during the six-year period and that its international rescue team hadfrom January 2004 to January 2010. China is joined six international rescue missionsnow the leading contributor of peacekeeping since its creation in 2001.personnel among the five permanent members Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 8
  • 19. CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S STRATEGYOVERVIEWChina’s leaders characterize the initial two capabilities has increased concerns in thedecades of the 21st century as a ―strategic region about China’s intentions.window of opportunity.‖ They assess thatduring this period, both domestic and UNDERSTANDING CHINESEinternational conditions will be conducive to STRATEGYexpanding China’s ―comprehensive nationalpower‖ (zonghe guoli—综合国力), a term that China uses white papers, speeches, and articles as the principal mechanisms toencapsulates all elements of state power publicly communicate policy and strategy.including economic capacity, military might, Published on March 31, 2011, China’sand diplomacy. Speaking in December 2010, Defense White Paper for 2010 summarizesPRC Defense Minister Liang Guanglie four national defense ―goals‖ as:asserted that ―making the country prosperousand making the armed forces strong are two safeguarding national sovereignty,major cornerstones for realizing the great security and interests of nationalrejuvenation of the Chinese nation.‖ China’s development;leaders anticipate that a successful expansionof comprehensive national power will serve maintaining social harmony and stability;China’s overriding strategic objectives, which accelerating the modernization of nationalinclude perpetuating CCP rule; sustaining defense and the armed forces; and,economic growth and development;maintaining domestic political stability; maintaining world peace and stability.defending national sovereignty and territorial The Defense White Paper for 2010 notes thatintegrity; and securing China’s status as a China continues to implement the militarygreat power. strategy of ―Active Defense‖ and is enhancingIn the near term, the PRC regards stable ―national strategic capabilities‖ whilerelations with the U.S. and China’s neighbors maintaining China’s ―no first use‖ policy onas essential to stability and critical to nuclear weapons. China’s stated defensemaximizing this window of opportunity. At strategy is focused on fostering a securitythe same time, China’s growing economic and environment conducive to China’smilitary confidence and capabilities comprehensive development.occasionally manifest in more assertive While addressing many of the themesrhetoric and behavior when Beijing perceives presented in previous PRC Defense Whitethreats to its national interests or feels Papers, the latest version conveys somecompelled to respond to public expectations. important differences. The new documentThe PRC is particularly concerned that expresses confidence that the China’s positionregional actors might counterbalance China’s relative to other major powers has improvedrise through military development and substantially. Relations with the Unitedcoalitions. China publicly states that its rise is States are portrayed with a degree of concern,―peaceful‖ and that it harbors no ―hegemonic‖ while the current state of cross-Strait relationsdesigns or aspirations for territorial is presented in a favorable light. The latestexpansion. However, China’s lack of version highlights the PLA’s growing focustransparency surrounding these growing on military operations other than war, but Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 9
  • 20. overall, the document presents only Defense White Papers, establishment of aincremental new insights into the PLA’s MND spokesperson, the launch of an officialstructure, doctrine and capabilities. Overall, MND website, wider media coverage ofthe transparency of China’s military and military issues, and growing availability ofsecurity affairs has improved gradually in books and professional journals on militaryrecent years, highlighted by its publication of and security topics. Military Decision Making Structures and Processes in China The PLA is the armed instrument of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and organizationally, is subordinate to the Party apparatus. Career military officers are CCP members, and units at the company level and above have political officers responsible for personnel decisions, propaganda, and counterintelligence. Major decisions at all levels are made by CCP committees, also led by the political officers and commanders. The PLA’s highest decision-making body, the Central Military Commission (CMC), is technically a department of the CCP Central Committee, but is staffed primarily by military officers. The Chairman is a civilian, usually the General Secretary of the CCP and the President. Other members include the commanders of the service arms and the four general headquarters departments, and a number of Vice Chairmen. Vice President Xi Jinping, the anticipated successor to PRC President Hu Jintao, is one of three Vice Chairmen and the only other civilian on the CMC. China’s Ministry of National Defense is a relatively small office specializing in military-related tasks that are the responsibility of the civilian government rather than the armed forces, including foreign military relations, mobilization, recruitment, and civil support to military operations. The Minister of Defense is a uniformed military officer and CMC member. The PLA currently has less representation in key party decision-making bodies than in the mid-1990s or even the mid-2000s. With the passing of China’s revolutionary generation, fewer national leaders hail from a military background. However, PLA leaders are increasingly inclined to voice their thoughts and opinions on international affairs in the public domain. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 10
  • 21. The Chinese High CommandThe PRC Military Structure Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 11
  • 22. China’s Upcoming Military Leadership TransitionChina’s civilian and military leadership are expected to undergo extensive changes during the18th Party Congress, likely to be held in the fall of 2012. Vice President Xi Jinping wasappointed Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) in October 2010. It isunclear whether Hu will follow in the footsteps of his predecessor Jiang Zemin and remainCMC chairman for some period of time after relinquishing his other leadership roles.The uniformed CMC membership is also expected to experience a major transition during the18th Party Congress. Seven of the ten uniformed CMC members will almost certainly retirebased on age limits. In December 2010, Defense Minister Liang highlighted the PLA’s shifttowards a ―more rational‖ force structure as the Navy, Air Force, and Second Artillery Corpstake on a larger and more prominent place in the PLA.The three uniformed members expected to retain their CMC posts beyond 2012 are:General Chang Wanquan, Director of the General Armament Department (GAD), is the onlyground forces officer eligible by age to serve an additional term. A former commander of theShenyang Military Region (MR) and chief of staff of the Beijing MR, General Chang spentmost of his career in operations and training posts in the Lanzhou MR. He also served asdirector of the campaign teaching and research office at the National Defense University in thelate 1990s. In his current post as GAD director, Chang oversees foreign weapon procurementand domestic production, military testing, and the space and satellite programs. Two currentsenior CMC members, Chief of the General Staff Chen Bingde and director of the GeneralPolitical Department Li Jinai, are also former GAD chiefs, underscoring the emphasis the Partyhas placed on these elements of the PLA’s modernization program.Admiral Wu Shengli, the Commander of the PLA Navy, has presided over a substantialincrease in the Navy’s international engagement, including its ongoing counter-piracydeployment to the Gulf of Aden. A former destroyer captain in China’s East Sea Fleet andlater commandant of the Dalian Naval Vessels Academy who rose to become commander ofthe South Sea Fleet, Wu also served as a deputy chief of the general staff in the mid-2000s. Heis the second naval officer to serve on the CMC since the Navy, Air Force and 2nd ArtilleryCorps commanders were added to its membership in 2004.General Xu Qiliang, the Commander of the PLA Air Force is a former pilot who served muchof his career in the Nanjing MR opposite Taiwan. He rose to Chief of Staff of the Beijing MRAir Force and then Commander of the Shenyang MR Air Force. Along with Wu Shengli, hispromotion to Commander of his service followed a tour as a Deputy Chief of the General Staffin the mid-2000s. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 12
  • 23. CHINA’S STRATEGIC PRIORITIES Militarily, China’s sustained modernization program is paying visible dividends. DuringSince China launched its ―reform and 2010, China made strides toward fielding anopening,‖ in 1978, the essential elements of operational anti-ship ballistic missile,China’s strategy have remained relatively continued work on its aircraft carrier program,constant. Rather than challenge the existing and finalized the prototype of its first stealthglobal order, China has adopted a pragmatic aircraft. Despite continued gaps in some keyapproach to international relations and areas, large quantities of antiquated hardware,economic development that seeks to and a lack of operational experience, the PLAstrengthen the economy, modernize the is steadily closing the technological gap withmilitary, and solidify the CCP’s hold on modern armed forces.power. This approach reflects Beijing’sassumption that great power status over the China’s leaders speak about their strategiclong-term is best achieved by avoiding priorities in terms of what they call China’sconfrontation in the near-term. China’s ―core interests.‖ In a December 2010leaders routinely emphasize the goal of exposition on China’s foreign policy, Statereaching critical economic and military Councilor Dai Bingguo enumerated China’sbenchmarks by 2020 and eventually core interests as:becoming a world-class economic and The state system, political system, andmilitary power by 2050. political stability of China; that is theChina’s leaders appear to make decisions leadership of the CCP, the socialistbased on an array of interrelated and system, and the path of socialism withsometimes competing strategic priorities, Chinese characteristics.which include perpetuating CCP rule; The sovereignty and security, territorialsustaining economic growth and integrity, and national unity of China.development; maintaining domestic politicalstability; defending national sovereignty and The basic guarantee for the sustainedterritorial integrity; and securing China’s development of the economy and societystatus as a great power. Although evolving of challenges and growing capabilities The PRC leadership is also focused on thehave prompted adjustments over the past many potential problems that couldthree decades, the overarching strategic vision complicate or derail China’s growth trajectoryhas remained largely intact. or its strategy of ―peaceful development.‖ These include the following:During 2010, China continued on a pathtoward its long-term strategic objectives. Economics: Continued economicDespite domestic concerns over inflation, development remains the bedrock ofgrowing income disparities, and a possible social stability and underwrites China’shousing bubble, to date China’s economy military power. A wide range ofappears to have weathered the global economic factors could disrupt thiseconomic turmoil with relative success. In trajectory, including the rapid contraction2010, the PRC economy surpassed that of of a potentially overheated economy.Japan to become the world’s second largest. China’s leaders have already scaled backAlthough PRC leaders remain concerned over GDP targets for 2011-2015 to mitigatea number of economic challenges, many risk of overheating and to manageanalysts have suggested that China’s expectations. Other potential economiceconomic performance in recent years has risks for China include shifting globalendowed Beijing with greater confidence in trade patterns, resource constraints, orits economic model and in its relative attempts to challenge access to resources.strength. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 13
  • 24. Nationalism: Communist Party leaders Domestic Political Pressures: Regimeand military officials continue to exploit survival shapes the strategic outlook ofnationalism to bolster the legitimacy of China’s leaders and drives decisionthe Party and deflect domestic criticism. making. The Communist Party continuesHowever, this approach is inherently risk- to face long-term popular demands forladen, as these forces could easily turn improved government responsiveness,against the state or complicate China’s transparency and accountability. Ifpolicy process. Nationalistic appeals for a unmet, these factors weaken CCPmore muscular PRC posture, particularly legitimacy.during times of crisis, effectively Demographic Pressures: Demographicconstrain more moderate, pragmatic elites stresses will increase in the future,in China’s foreign policy establishment. creating a structural constraint on China’sAlternatively, PRC elites may point to ability to sustain high economic growthnationalism as a justification for their own rates as well as a social challenge for theinflexibility in dialogues with foreign CCP.interlocutors. Environment: China’s economicGrowing Expectations: China’s development has come at a highdevelopment has translated into greater environmental cost. China’s leaders areexpectations both at home and abroad for increasingly concerned that environmentalinvolvement in the international arena. degradation could undermine regimeOther nations have called on Beijing to legitimacy by threatening economicshoulder a greater role in solving development, public health, socialinternational problems, to a point at which stability, and China’s international image.some Chinese leaders worry about takingon more than they can handle. At the Cross-Strait Dynamics: Despite asame time, the domestic perception of reduction in tensions following the MarchChina’s growing status is producing 2008 election of Taiwan President Mapopular demands for a more assertive Ying-jeou, the possibility of a militarypursuit of China’s international interests. conflict with Taiwan, including U.S. military intervention, remains a pressing,Regional Balancing: China’s growing long-term focus for the PLA. In theeconomic, diplomatic and military absence of a peaceful cross-Straitpresence and influence in Asia and resolution or long-term non-aggressionglobally is raising concerns among many pact, the Taiwan mission will likelycountries about China’s ultimate aims – continue to dominate PLA modernizationand the threats this could present to them. and operational planning.These regional concerns could catalyzeregional or global balancing efforts. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 14
  • 25. China’s Territorial DisputesChina faces extensive territorial disputes along its land and maritime periphery. Next to thestatus of Taiwan, these disputes play a central role in PLA planning. Although China hasgenerally adopted a less confrontational posture towards its regional disputes since the late1990s (China has settled eleven land disputes with six of its neighbors since 1998), someregional actors fear China’s growing military and economic weight is beginning to produce amore assertive posture, particularly in the maritime domain.In addition to a longstanding and contentious border dispute with India, China has maritimeboundary disputes with Japan over the East China Sea and throughout the South China Seawith Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Taiwan. These have sparkedoccasional armed conflict, including a 1962 border conflict with India and a 1979 groundinvasion of Vietnam. In the South China Sea, China fought Vietnamese forces in the ParacelIslands in 1974 and near Fiery Cross Reef in 1988. In 1995, China occupied Mischief Reef,also in the Spratly Islands, amid protest from the Philippines. In 2002, Beijing and ASEANbrokered a Declaration on Conduct in the South China Sea. While non-binding, thedeclaration was followed by a period of relative stability.China’s broad claim to potentially all of the South China Sea remains a source of regionalcontention. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the Republic of China began publishingregional maps with a dashed line around the perimeter of South China Sea. After takingpower in 1949, the CCP maintained this claim. Both the PRC and Taiwan continue to basetheir South China Sea claims on that broad delineation. China increasingly regards the SouthChina Sea as a vital commercial and security corridor for East and Southeast Asia.In recent years, some of China’s neighbors have questioned Beijing’s long-term commitmentto peacefully and cooperatively resolve the remainder of its disputes. PLA Navy assets haverepeatedly circumnavigated the South China Sea since 2005, and civilian enforcement ships,sometimes supported by the PLA Navy, have occasionally harassed foreign vessels.Underscoring the volatility of these various disputes, a PRC-flagged fishing boat collidedwith Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the disputed Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea,triggering a highly charged political standoff between Tokyo and Beijing in September 2010. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 15
  • 26. China’s Disputed Territories. This map is an approximate presentation of PRC and other regional claims. China has remained ambiguous on the extent and legal justification for these regional claims. Three of China‟s major ongoing territorial disputes are based on claims along its shared border with India and Bhutan, the South China Sea, and with Japan in the East China Sea.THE NEW HISTORIC MISSIONS Provide a strong security guarantee for safeguarding the period of strategicIn 2004, Hu Jintao articulated a mission opportunity for national development.statement for the armed forces titled, the Provide a powerful strategic support for―Historic Missions of the Armed Forces in the safeguarding national interests.New Period of the New Century‖ (xin shijixin jieduan wojun lishi shiming— Play an important role in safeguarding ). These ―new world peace and promoting common development.historic missions‖ focus primarily onadjustments in the PRC leadership’s According to official writings, the drivingassessment of the international security factors behind the articulation of theseenvironment and the expanding definition of missions were: changes in China’s securitynational security. These missions were situation, challenges and priorities regardingfurther codified in a 2007 amendment to the China’s national development, and a desire toCCP Constitution. The missions, as currently realign the tasks of the PLA with the CCP’sdefined, include: objectives. Politburo member and CMC Vice Chairman Xu Caihou in 2005 asserted ―the Provide an important guarantee of historic missions embody the new strength for the party to consolidate its requirements imposed on the military by the ruling position. Party’s historic tasks, accommodate new Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 16
  • 27. changes in our national development strategy, sea lanes, cyber warfare, security of space-and conform to the new trends in global based assets, conducting military diplomacy,military development.‖ and preparing for unexpected conditions and events.In a point reiterated in the latest PRC DefenseWhite Paper, economic development remains The PLA Navy’s ongoing deployment toa central task and the PLA is expected to conduct counter-piracy escort missions insupport China’s economic interests and the Gulf of Aden is one example ofsecurity. This poses new challenges for a China’s pursuit of its new historicmilitary that, until recently had virtually no missions.operational experience outside of its region. Another example was the 2010 voyage ofPresident Hu Jintao’s strategic guidance to the China’s first large hospital ship, whichmilitary reflects this view, calling on the PLA made stops in Asia and Africa. The shipto play a broader role in securing China’s is able to support combat operations, butstrategic interests, including those beyond its PRC official press reporting stresses theterritorial boundaries. In a March 2009 humanitarian aspects of the ship’sspeech to military delegates to China’s mission.National People’s Congress, President Hu Most recently, the PLA employed lifturged the military to concentrate on ―building assets to assist in the evacuation of PRCcore military capabilities,‖ but also ―the citizens from Libya. This marked theability to carry out military operations other PLA’s first noncombatant evacuationthan war‖ (fei zhanzheng junshi xingdong— operation (NEO).非战争军事行动). Hu maintained, ―with theprerequisite of satisfactorily completing all DEBATES ON FUTURE STRATEGYmissions—taking preparation for militarystruggle as the lead—the armed forces must China’s current strategy remains one ofparticipate actively in and support national managing the external environment to ensureeconomic construction and public welfare.‖ conditions are conducive to China’s economic development and military modernization.China’s 2010 Defense White Paper highlights This approach serves the paramount goal ofthe PLA’s evolving roles and missions, noting preserving the survival and leadership of thethat: CCP. Although this strategy appears to enjoy They organize preparations for military widespread acceptance among Beijing’s operations other than war (MOOTW) in foreign and security policy establishment, a scientific way, work out pre-designed military and academic writings reveal strategic programs against non- differences of opinion concerning the means traditional security threats, reinforce of achieving China’s broad national the building of specialized forces for objectives. emergency response, and enhance Although the view is increasingly articulated capabilities in counter-terrorism and that the time has come for China to discuss stability maintenance, emergency more candidly and pursue its national rescue, and the protection of security. interests, the prevailing voices within China’sAuthoritative PRC media describe these leadership have supported former paramount―military operations other than war‖ as leader Deng Xiaoping’s dictum from the earlyincluding: counter-terrorism, maintaining 1990s that China should, ―observe calmly;social stability, disaster relief and rescue, and secure our position; cope with affairs calmly;international peacekeeping operations. hide our capabilities and bide our time; beChina’s leaders have mentioned other ―non- good at maintaining a low profile; and neverwar military‖ activities including protecting claim leadership.‖ This guidance reflected Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 17
  • 28. Deng’s belief that PRC interests are best would have been impossible for the PLA toserved by focusing on internal development pursue just a decade ago. Proponents of aand stability while steering clear of direct more active and assertive PRC role on theconfrontation or antagonism with major world stage have suggested that China wouldpowers. In December 2010, State Councilor be better served by a firm stance in the face ofDai Bingguo specifically cited Deng’s U.S. or other regional pressure.guidance, insisting China adhered to a ―path There has also been an active debate amongof peaceful development‖ and would not seek military and civilian theorists in Chinaexpansion or hegemony. He asserted that the concerning future capabilities the PLA should―bide and hide‖ rhetoric was not a develop to advance China’s interests beyond―smokescreen‖ employed while China builds traditional requirements. Some seniorits strength, but rather an admonition to be officers and civilian theorists advocate anpatient and not stand out. expansion of the PLA’s power projectionSome PRC scholars question whether Deng’s capabilities to facilitate missions well beyondpolicy approach will continue to win support Taiwan and regional disputes. Publicly, PRCas China’s interests and power expand. officials contend that increasing the scope ofChina’s perceived security interests have China’s maritime capabilities is intended tochanged considerably since Deng’s era to build capacity for international peacekeeping,include a heavy reliance on maritime humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, andcommerce. China’s improving naval protection of sea lanes.capabilities enable roles and missions that Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 18
  • 29. China Debates its National Security Strategy in 2010Throughout 2010, a line of commentary in Western and Chinese media and academic circles,suggested that China has grown stronger relative to the United States, particularly as a result ofthe global financial crisis. Some commentators asserted that a more powerful China shouldmore proactively pursue its national interests. While this increasingly public debate indicatesthe CCP is allowing discussion of competing strategic priorities, there is little indication thatits senior leaders are abandoning Deng Xiaoping’s foreign policy legacy in the near term.The tension between managing China’s image and advancing China’s interests was revealedon several occasions in 2010. This included discussions of how Beijing should respond toSouth China Sea tensions and U.S.-South Korea joint exercises in the Yellow Sea. Much ofthe resulting commentary hailed perceptions that Beijing had taken a stronger stand on theseissues in line with its growing international weight. Some commentators argued that Chinaneeded to take a still stronger stand or asserted that on the contrary, Beijing lacked sufficientpower to sustain a more assertive position, despite a relative U.S. decline.An increasingly public debate in China regarding the exercise of national power reflects thefact that both assertive and accommodating behaviors come with a set of costs for Beijing.Many in China feel that the steady expansion of comprehensive national power entitles Chinato greater respect and deference. However, during the current ―strategic window ofopportunity,‖ the Chinese leadership remains wary of undermining their long-term objectives.By autumn 2010, commentary on security relations with the United States had moderated,probably due to efforts to smooth the way for President Hu Jintao’s planned early 2011 visit tothe United States. The official communiqué of the 5th Plenum of the 17th CCP CentralCommittee held from October 15-18, 2010: ―stressed that our country is still in the importantstrategic opportunity period.‖ We judge this to be a re-affirmation of Deng’s strategy ofcarefully preserving a stable environment for China’s development as opposed to a call forBeijing to take a more assertive stance. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 19
  • 30. Military and Security Aspects of Beijing’s Regional Energy StrategyChina’s engagement, investment, and foreign construction related to energy continue togrow. Beijing has constructed or invested in energy projects in more than 50 countries,spanning nearly every continent. This ambitious investment in energy assets is drivenprimarily by two factors. First, Beijing is increasingly dependent upon imported energy tosustain its economy. A net oil exporter until 1993, China still lacks trust in internationalenergy markets. Second, energy projects present a viable option for investing China’s vastforeign currency holdings.In addition to ensuring reliable energy sources, Beijing hopes to diversify both producers andtransport options. Although energy independence is no longer realistic for China, givenpopulation growth and increasing per capita energy consumption, Beijing still seeks tomaintain a supply chain less susceptible to external disruption.In 2009, China imported approximately 56 percent of its China’s Top Crude Oil Suppliers 2009oil and conservative estimates project that China willimport almost two-thirds of its oil by 2015 and three- Country Volume %quarters by 2030. Beijing looks primarily to the Persian Saudi Arabia 843 21 AddddddAra %Gulf, Central Asia, and Africa to satisfy its growing Angola bia 646 16demand for oil. Imported oil contributes to Iran 465 11approximately 10% of China’s total energy consumption. Russia 307 8 Sudan 245 6A second goal of Beijing’s foreign energy strategy is to Oman 234 6alleviate China’s heavy dependence on Sea Lines of Iraq 144 4Communication (SLOCs), particularly the South China Kuwait 142 3Sea and Strait of Malacca. In 2010, over 80 percent of Libya 127 3China’s oil imports transited the South China Sea and Kazakhstan 121 3Strait of Malacca. A crude oil pipeline from Kazakhstan Other 818 19to China illustrates efforts to increase overland supply. TOTAL 4,092In January 2011, a 300,000 b/d spur pipeline fromSiberia to Daqing began delivering crude to China. Volumes are in 1,000 barrels per dayChina also commenced construction on a pipeline Figures have been roundeddesigned to transport crude oil and natural gas fromKyuakpya, Burma, to Kunming, China, bypassing the Strait of Malacca. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 20
  • 31. China’s import transit routes/critical chokepoints and proposed/under construction SLOC bypass routes.Given China’s growing energy demand, new pipelines will only slightly alleviate China’smaritime dependency in either the Strait of Malacca or the Strait of Hormuz. The sheervolume of oil and liquefied natural gas imports to China from the Middle East will makestrategic SLOCs increasingly important to Beijing.In 2009 a pipeline that will deliver up to 40 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas peryear from Turkmenistan to China via Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan commenced operation.Another natural gas pipeline designed to deliver 14 bcm per year from Burma is in theinitial stages of construction and estimated for completion in 2013. Additionally Beijing isnegotiating with Moscow for two pipelines that could supply China with up to 69 bcm ofgas. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 21
  • 32. CHINA’S MILITARY STRATEGY Academic research suggests that the current guidelines most likely date to 1993, reflectingPLA theorists have developed a framework the impact of the 1991 Persian Gulf War andfor doctrine-driven reform with the long-term the collapse of the Soviet Union on PRCgoal of building a force capable of fighting military-strategic thinking. The guidelinesand winning ―local wars under conditions of were revised in 2002 and 2004, likelyinformatization.‖ Drawing upon foreign reflecting China’s perceptions of its evolvingmilitary experiences, particularly U.S.-led security environment and the changingcampaigns up to and including Operation character of modern warfare.ENDURING FREEDOM and Operation In practice, this strategic evolution hasIRAQI FREEDOM, Soviet and Russian prompted a major shift toward investments inmilitary theory, and the PLA’s own combat asymmetric, network-centric warfare andhistory, China is transforming across the A2AD capabilities that are intended to denywhole of its armed forces. elements of the modern battle space toChina relies on a body of overall principles potential enemies. According to the 2008and guidance known as the ―National Military Defense White Paper, these guidelinesStrategic Guidelines for the New Period‖ (xin emphasize fighting and winning local warsshiqi guojia junshi zhanlüe fangzhen— under conditions of informatization and 期国家军事战略方針) to plan and building toward integrated joint operations, with a stress on asymmetric warfare to ―makemanage the development and use of the armed the best use of our strong points to attack theforces. This is the closest equivalent in China enemy’s weak points.‖of the U.S. ―National Military Strategy.‖ Citing the need to ensure ―close coordinationThe current operational component of China’s between military struggle and political,National Military Strategic Guidelines for the diplomatic, economic, cultural, and legalNew Period is known as ―Active Defense‖ endeavors,‖ the guidelines also emphasize the(jiji fangyu—积极防御). Active Defense is importance of integrating multiplethe highest-level strategic guidance for all instruments of state power to ensurePLA activities and applies to all services. deterrence and prevent conflict.Tenets of Active Defense include the Naval Warfare. During the mid 1980s, thefollowing: CMC approved a specific naval component of ―Overall, our military strategy is ―Active Defense‖ called ―Offshore Defense‖ defensive. We attack only after being (jinhai fangyu—近海防御), which is attacked. But our operations are sometimes translated more literally as, ―Near offensive.‖ Seas Defense.‖ Offshore Defense is an ―Space or time will not limit our counter- overarching strategic concept that directs the offensive.‖ PLA Navy to prepare for three essential missions including: ―We will not put boundaries on the limits of our offenses.‖ keeping the enemy within limits and resisting invasion from the sea; ―We will wait for the time and conditions that favor our forces when we do initiate protecting the nation’s territorial offensive operations.‖ sovereignty; and, ―We will focus on the opposing force’s safeguarding the motherland’s unity and weaknesses.‖ maritime rights. The so-called ―near seas,‖ which remain a primary focus for the Navy, include the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 22
  • 33. Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and South China Senior civilian officials and PLA officers haveSea. Increasingly, the PLA is taking on argued that China’s economic and politicalmissions that reflect China’s expanding power is contingent upon access to, and use ofcommercial and diplomatic interests beyond the sea, and that a strong Navy is required tothe near seas, into the ―far seas‖ which include safeguard such access. Despite an increasinglythe Philippine Sea and beyond. PLA Navy public discussion concerning missions fartherdoctrine for maritime operations focuses on six from China, the Navy appears primarilyoffensive and defensive campaigns: blockade, focused on contingencies within the ―first andanti-sea lines of communication, maritime-land second island chains‖ (see map), withattack, anti-ship, maritime transportation emphasis on a potential conflict with, and naval base defense. forces over Taiwan or a territorial dispute. The First and Second Island Chains. PRC military theorists refer to two “island “chains” along China‟s maritime perimeter. The First Island Chain includes Taiwan and the Ryuku Islands, the Second Island Chain extends from Japan to Guam. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 23
  • 34. logistics capabilities. In September 2010, theGround Warfare. Under ―Active Defense,‖ PLA Air Force conducted an unprecedentedground forces are tasked with defending deployment of Su-27 fighter aircraft toChina’s borders, ensuring domestic stability, Turkey to participate in joint air exercisesand exercising regional power projection. with the Turkish Air Force. China has alsoPLA ground forces are transitioning from a been investing in stealth technology, asstatic defensive force allocated across seven evidenced by the appearance of its first stealthinternal MRs, oriented for positional, mobile, aircraft prototype in January 2011. However,urban, and mountain offensive campaigns; as with the Navy, it is likely that the Aircoastal defense campaigns; and landing Force’s primary focus for the coming decadecampaigns, to a more offensive and will remain on building the capabilitiesmaneuver-oriented force organized and required to pose a credible military threat toequipped for operations along China’s Taiwan and U.S. forces in East Asia, deterperiphery. Taiwan independence, or influence Taiwan toThe 2010 Defense White Paper asserts that settle the dispute on Beijing’s terms.the ground force has: Space Warfare. PLA strategists regard the emphasized the development of new ability to utilize space and deny adversaries types of combat forces, optimized its access to space as central to enabling modern, organization and structure, strengthened informatized warfare. Although PLA military training in conditions of doctrine does not appear to address space informatization, accelerated the operations as a unique operational digitized upgrading and retrofitting of ―campaign,‖ space operations form an main battle weaponry, organically integral component of other PLA campaigns. deployed new types of weapon Publicly, Beijing attempts to dispel any platforms, and significantly boosted its skepticism over its military intentions for capabilities in long-distance maneuvers and integrated assaults. space. In 2009, the commander of the PLA Air Force, General Xu Qiliang, publicallyThe ground forces appear to be leading the retracted his earlier assertion that thePLA’s effort to experiment with ad hoc, militarization of space was a ―historicmulti-service, joint tactical formations to inevitability‖ after President Hu Jintao swiftlyexecute integrated joint operations. contradicted him.Air Warfare. The PLA Air Force continues The PLA is acquiring a range of technologiesits conversion from a force for limited to improve China’s space and counterspaceterritorial defense to a more flexible and agile capabilities. A PLA analysis of U.S. andforce able to operate off-shore in both Coalition military operations reinforced theoffensive and defensive roles, using the U.S. importance of operations in space to enableand Russian air forces as models. Mission informatized warfare, claiming that ―space isfocus areas include: strike, air and missile the commanding point for the informationdefense, early warning and reconnaissance, battlefield.‖and strategic mobility. The PLA Air Force PLA writings emphasize the necessity ofalso has a leading role in China’s planning for ―destroying, damaging, and interfering withanti-access and area denial operations. the enemy’s reconnaissance... andThe PLA’s new missions are also driving communications satellites,‖ suggesting thatdiscussions about the future of the PLA Air such systems, as well as navigation and earlyForce, where a general consensus has warning satellites, could be among initialemerged that protecting China’s global targets of attack to ―blind and deafen theinterests requires an increase in the Air enemy.‖ The same PLA analysis of U.S. andForce’s long-range transportation and Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 24
  • 35. Offense as Defense PRC military strategists characterize ―Active Defense" as inherently defensive, suggesting that China strikes only ―after the enemy has struck.‖ Taken alone, this statement, which was reiterated in China’s 2010 Defense White Paper, seems clear. However, more detailed Chinese writings leave the actual significance far more ambiguous. In particular, it remains unclear what actions taken by an adversary might cross the threshold of an initial strike. The Science of Military Strategy, which is published by the PLA’s Academy of Military Science, asserts that the definition of an enemy strike is not limited to conventional, kinetic military operations. Rather, an enemy ―strike‖ may also be defined in political terms. Thus: Striking only after the enemy has struck does not mean waiting for the enemy‟s strike passively… It doesn‟t mean to give up the “advantageous chances” in campaign or tactical operations, for the “first shot” on the plane of politics must be differentiated from the “first shot” on that of tactics. [This section continues] if any country or organization violates the other country‟s sovereignty and territorial integrity, the other side will have the right to „fire the first shot‟ on the plane of tactics. If China loosely defines a ―strike‖ to encompass some political action, this significantly alters the purportedly ―defensive‖ nature of this strategic construct. This implies that PLA forces might be employed preemptively in the name of defense.Coalition military operations also states that SECRECY AND DECEPTION―destroying or capturing satellites and othersensors… will deprive an opponent of PRC military writings point to a workinginitiative on the battlefield and [make it definition of strategic deception as ―[luring]difficult] for them to bring their precision the other side into developingguided weapons into full play.‖ misperceptions… and [establishing for oneself] a strategically advantageous positionIntegrated Network Electronic Warfare. by producing various kinds of falsePRC military writings highlight the seizure of phenomena in an organized and plannedelectromagnetic dominance in the early manner with the smallest cost in manpowerphases of a campaign as among the foremost and materials.‖ In addition to informationtasks to ensure battlefield success. PLA operations and conventional camouflage,theorists have coined the term ―integrated concealment, and denial, the PLA draws fromnetwork electronic warfare‖ (wangdian China’s historical experience and the traditional role that stratagem and deceptionyitizhan—网电一体战) to describe the use of have played in Chinese statecraft.electronic warfare, computer networkoperations, and kinetic strikes to disrupt There is an inherent tension in Chinesebattlefield information systems that support strategic culture today, pitting a deep-seatedan adversary’s warfighting and power tendency to conceal military capabilities andprojection capabilities. PLA writings identify force development against a partial acceptance―integrated network electronic warfare‖ as that excessive secrecy inflames regional andone of the basic forms of ―integrated joint global anxiety about China’s rising power. Foroperations,‖ suggesting the centrality of over a decade PRC leaders have identified theseizing and dominating the electromagnetic so called ―China threat theory‖ as a seriousspectrum in PLA campaign theory. hazard to the country’s international standing and reputation, threatening the development of a persistent alignment of regional and global Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 25
  • 36. powers in opposition to China. In addition, or impossible to hide. Examples of suchextreme secrecy is increasingly difficult to capabilities include advanced aircraft, longreconcile with China’s role in the integrated range missiles, and modern naval economy, which depends upon Furthermore, missiles, space-based, andtransparency and the free flow of information counterspace systems must be tested andfor success. exercised before being operationally deployed with confidence. The PLA’s growingThere is perhaps another source of tension inventory of these new assets and the ranges atbetween the emerging reality of Chinese which they operate effectively prevents theirmilitary power and China’s tradition of concealment.secrecy, and that is the fact that many ofChina’s new military capabilities are difficult ―Three Warfares” The Chinese concept of "three warfares" (san zhong zhanfa— ) refers specifically to psychological warfare, media warfare, and legal warfare. It reflects China’s desire to effectively exploit these force enablers in the run up to and during hostilities. During military training and exercises, PLA troops employ the ―three warfares‖ to undermine the spirit and ideological commitment of the adversary. In essence, it is a non-military tool used to advance or catalyze a military objective. Psychological Warfare seeks to undermine an enemy’s ability to conduct combat operations through operations aimed at deterring, shocking, and demoralizing enemy military personnel and supporting civilian populations. Media Warfare is aimed at influencing domestic and international public opinion to build support for China’s military actions and dissuade an adversary from pursuing actions contrary to China’s interests. Legal Warfare uses international and domestic law to claim the legal high ground or assert Chinese interests. It can be employed to hamstring an adversary’s operational freedom and shape the operational space. Legal warfare is also intended to build international support and manage possible political repercussions of China’s military actions. China has attempted to employ legal warfare in the maritime domain and in international airspace in pursuit of a security buffer zone. In 2003, the CCP Central Committee and the CMC endorsed the ―three warfares‖ concept, reflecting China’s recognition that as a global actor, it will benefit from learning to effectively utilize the tools of public opinion, messaging, and influence. China likely hopes to employ these three concepts in unison, particularly during the early stages of a crisis, as they have a tendency to bolster one another. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 26
  • 37. CHAPTER THREE: FORCE MODERNIZATION GOALS AND TRENDSOVERVIEWSince the early 1990s PRC leaders have PLA continues building capabilities aimed notsustained an ambitious and broad-based only at Taiwan, but also to deter, delay or denymilitary modernization program intended to possible U.S. or allied intervention in a cross-transform the PLA into a modern force. Strait conflict. At the same time, a diminishedAlthough the PLA currently retains a large sense of urgency over Taiwan has enabled thenumber of legacy platforms and weapons, the PLA to devote attention to an expanding set ofpercentage of modern equipment in the force is regional and global missions. This includes agrowing rapidly. China has closed important focus on ―safeguarding China’s expandingtechnological gaps and achieved some national interests‖ and protectingcapabilities that are on par with or exceed ―sovereignty‖ as outlined in the New Historicglobal standards. Motivated by a growing set Missions, described in the previous chapterof economic and security interests, China’s By the latter half of the current decade, Chinaleaders have given the PLA a new and more will likely be able to project and sustain aexternally focused direction, as evidenced by modest-sized force, perhaps several battalionsChina’s growing naval presence on the global of ground forces or a naval flotilla of up to amaritime domain. dozen ships, in low-intensity operations farFor the PLA, this modernization effort remains from China. This evolution will lay thea work in progress. The first decade of the 21st foundation for a force able to accomplish acentury can be characterized as a period of broader set of regional and global objectives.ambitious PLA acquisition and development. However, it is unlikely that China will be ableAlthough this trend will continue in the years to project and sustain large forces in high-ahead, the more dominant theme of the 2010- intensity combat operations far from China2020 decade is likely to be training and prior to 2020.integration. Senior PRC leaders recognize that Despite significant improvements, the PLAthis period will prove critical to meeting the continues to face deficiencies in inter-servicePLA’s modernization objectives, and they cooperation and actual experience in jointhave demanded that the military engage in exercises and combat operations. Recognizingmore realistic training and organizational these shortcomings, China’s leaders continuereform. to stress asymmetric strategies to leverageThroughout the PLA’s modernization drive, China’s advantages while exploiting theTaiwan contingency planning has largely perceived vulnerabilities of potentialdominated the agenda. Even though cross- opponents. The PLA has also embarked onStrait tensions have subsided since 2008, human capital reform, intended to attract andTaiwan remains a critical mission, and the retain talented personnel. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 27
  • 38. Missile Flight Trajectory with Terminal Guidance. This graphic of an anti-ship ballistic missile‟s use of mid-course and terminal guidance to strike an aircraft carrier appeared in a 2006 article from the Second ArtilleryEngineering College. An essential element of China’s emergingANTI-ACCESS/AREA DENIAL A2AD regime is the ability to control andCAPABILITY DEVELOPMENTS dominate the information spectrum in allAs part of its planning for a regional dimensions of the modern battlespace. PLAcontingency, China is developing measures to authors often cite the need in modern warfaredeter or counter third-party intervention, to control information, sometimes termedincluding by the United States. Although ―information blockade‖ or ―informationmany of these capabilities were developed dominance,‖ and gain an informationwith a focus on Taiwan, they have broad advantage in the early phases of a campaignapplications and implications extending to achieve air and sea superiority. China isbeyond a Taiwan scenario. China’s approach improving information and operationalto this challenge, which it refers to as security to protect its own information―counter-intervention,‖ is manifested in a structures, and is also developing electronicsustained effort to develop the capability to and information warfare capabilities,attack, at long ranges, military forces that including denial and deception, to defeatmight deploy or operate within the western those of its adversaries. China’s ―informationPacific. The U.S. Department of Defense blockade‖ likely envisions employment ofcharacterizes these as ―anti-access‖ and ―area military and non-military instruments of statedenial‖ capabilities. China is pursuing a power across the battlespace, including invariety of air, sea, undersea, space, cyberspace and outer space. China’scounterspace, information warfare systems, investments in advanced electronic warfareand operational concepts to achieve this systems, counterspace weapons, andcapability, moving toward an array of computer network operations, combined withoverlapping, multilayered offensive more traditional forms of control historicallycapabilities extending from China’s coast into associated with the PLA and CCP systems,the western Pacific. such as propaganda, deception, and denial through opacity, reflect the emphasis and Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 28
  • 39. priority China’s leaders place on building guided missile destroyers with advancedcapability for information advantage. long-range anti-air and anti-ship missiles.In more traditional domains, China’s A2AD Maritime Strike Aircraft: FB-7 and FB-focus appears oriented toward restricting or 7A, B-6G, and the SU-30 MK2, armedcontrolling access to the land, sea, and air with ASCMs to engage surfacespaces along China’s periphery, including the combatants.western Pacific. For example, China’s Similarly, current and projected systems suchcurrent and projected force structure as the J-20 stealth fighter and longer-rangeimprovements will provide the PLA with conventional ballistic missiles could improvesystems that can engage adversary surface the PLA’s ability to strike regional air bases,ships up to 1,850 km from the PRC coast. logistical facilities, and other ground-basedThese include: infrastructure. PRC military analysts have Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles: Medium concluded that logistics and power projection Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs) are potential vulnerabilities in modern designed to target forces at sea, combined warfare, given the requirements for precision with overhead and over-the-horizon in coordinating transportation, targeting systems to locate and track communications, and logistics networks. moving ships. China is fielding an array of conventionally armed ballistic missiles, modern aircraft, Conventional and nuclear-powered attack UAVs, ground- and air-launched land-attack submarines: KILO, SONG, YUAN, and cruise missiles, special operations forces, and SHANG-class attack submarines capable cyber-warfare capabilities to hold targets at of firing advanced ASCMs. risk throughout the region. Surface combatants: LUZHOU, LUYANG I/II, SOVREMENNY-II-class Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 29
  • 40. Building Capacity for Conventional Precision StrikeShort-Range Ballistic Missiles (< 1,000 km). As of December 2010, the PLA hadsomewhere between 1,000-1,200 SRBMs. The total number of SRBMs represents little tono change over the past year. However, the PLA continues to field advanced variants withimproved ranges and more sophisticated payloads that are gradually replacing earliergenerations that do not possess true ―precision strike‖ capability.Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (1,000-3,000 km). The PLA is acquiring and fieldingconventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes againstland targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shoresout to the first island chain.Land-Attack Cruise Missiles. The PLA continues to field air- and ground-launchedLACMs, such as the YJ-63, KD-88, and DH-10 systems for stand-off, precision strikes.Ground Attack Munitions. The PLA Air Force has a small number of tactical air-to-surface missiles as well as precision-guided munitions including all-weather, satellite-guided bombs, anti-radiation missiles, and laser-guided bombs.Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles. The PLA Navy has or is acquiring nearly a dozen ASCMvariants, ranging from the 1950s-era CSS-N-2 to the modern Russian-made SS-N-22 andSS-N-27B. The pace of ASCM research, development, and production within China hasaccelerated over the past decade.Anti-Radiation Weapons. The PLA imported Israeli-made HARPY unmanned combataerial vehicles (UCAVs) during the 1990s and Russian-made anti-radiation missiles. Chinacontinues development of an indigenous version of the Russian Kh-31P (AS-17) known asthe YJ-91 and is starting to integrate this system into its fighter-bomber force.Artillery-Delivered High Precision Munitions. The PLA is developing or deployingartillery systems with the range to strike targets within or even across the Taiwan Strait,including the PHL-03 300 mm multiple-rocket launcher (MRL) (100+ km range) and theWS-2 400 mm MRL (200 km range). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 30
  • 41. Conventional Anti-Access Capabilities. The PLA‟s conventional forces are currently capable of striking targetswell beyond China‟s immediate periphery. Not included are ranges for naval surface- and sub-surface-basedweapons, whose employment at distances from China would be determined by doctrine and the scenario in whichthey are employed. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 31
  • 42. The air and air defense component of China’s 500 km. China is proceeding with theregional strategy includes long-range, research and development of a missileadvanced SAMs, such as the Russian SA-10 defense ―umbrella‖ consisting of kineticand SA-20 PMU1/PMU2, as well as the energy intercept at exo-atmospheric altitudesindigenous HQ-9. Beijing will also use (>80 km), as well as intercepts of ballisticRussian-built and domestically produced missiles and other aerospace vehicles withinfourth-generation aircraft (e.g., Su-27/F-11 the upper atmosphere. In January 2010,and Su-30 variants) as well as the indigenous China successfully intercepted a ballisticF-10 to compete for local air dominance. The missile at mid-course, using a ground-basedPLA Navy would employ Russian Su-30MK2 missile.fighters, armed with AS-17/Kh-31A anti-shipmissiles, B-6G bombers, and FB-7 fighter- EXTENDED OPERATIONAL REACHbombers for maritime interdiction.Additionally, acquisition and development of In addition to preparing for a Taiwanlonger-range UAVs and UCAVs will expand contingency, the PLA has been developingChina’s options for long-range new platforms and capabilities that willreconnaissance and strike. extend its operational reach to address other concerns within the East and South ChinaIn January 2011, initial images of China’s 5th Seas, and possibly to the Indian Ocean andgeneration J-20 stealth fighter were posted on beyond the second island chain in the westernthe Internet. Although the appearance of this Pacific.prototype underscores the level of PRCinvestment in advanced defense systems, the In describing the modernization tasks for eachDefense Department does not expect the J-20 of the service arms, China’s Defense Whiteto achieve an effective operational capability Papers in 2008 and 2010 emphasized mobilityprior to 2018. China faces several hurdles as and operations at greater distances fromit moves toward J-20 production, including China’s mainland. The main avenues for thethe mastery of high performance jet engine PLA to realize these capabilities are throughproduction. its naval, ballistic missile, and air forces. The PLA Navy: The PLA Navy is at theBALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE forefront of efforts to extend operational reach beyond China’s regional waters.China’s existing long-range advanced SAM China’s 2010 Defense White paper assertsinventory offers limited capability against that ―recent emergency rescue and disasterballistic missiles, but advertises a capability relief operations, counter-terrorism exercises,against cruise missiles. The SA-10 was and… training [demonstrate]… a notableoriginally designed to counter low-flying improvement in the PLA’s capabilities ofcruise missiles, a capability enhanced in the equipment support in long-distance and trans-later model SA-20 systems. The SA-20 regional maneuvers, escort operations inPMU2, the most advanced SAM Russia offers distant waters, and complex battlefieldfor export, also has the advertised capability environments.‖to engage ballistic missiles with ranges of1000km and speeds of 2,800 m/s. The PLA Navy has demonstrated the capability to conduct limited deployments ofChina’s HQ-9 long-range SAM system is also modern surface platforms outside the secondadvertised (through its export variant FD- island chain, including nine separate2000) to protect against low-altitude cruise deployments to the Gulf of Aden to supportmissiles and is expected to have a limited sustained counter-piracy operations fromcapability to provide point defense against 2009 through mid 2011. The PLA Navy alsotactical ballistic missiles with ranges up to has acquired new classes of ships to support Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 32
  • 43. conventional military operations as well as another milestone in out-of-area operations inhumanitarian assistance and disaster relief 2010 by deploying Su-27 fighter aircraft tomissions, including the Type 071 amphibious Turkey for joint exercises. Although the PLAtransport dock and the hospital ship, which Air Force has encountered some difficulty inthe Chinese call the ―Peace Ark.‖ expanding its fleet of long-range heavy transport aircraft, it marked a new milestoneThe PLA Navy’s investment in platforms in February 2011, when it employed four IL-such as nuclear-powered submarines and its 76 long-haul transport aircraft to assist withfirst aircraft carrier suggest China is seeking evacuating Chinese citizens from Libya. Thisto support additional military missions mission marked the PLA Air Force’s firstbeyond a Taiwan contingency. overseas deployment to evacuate PRCChina has invested in several civilian port citizens.projects throughout Asia and along the IndianOcean. Although such investments may PLA Ground Force. Although the PLA’s large ground force has not experienced theimprove peacetime logistical support options same dramatic modernization as otherfor the PLA Navy, not to mention enhancing branches of the PLA, it has steadily improvedPRC soft power in the region, they are not a capabilities in certain areas. Much, but notsubstitute for military bases. Without all, of this effort has focused on unitsoverseas military bases, China will be garrisoned nearest Taiwan. For example, aconstrained in its ability to project and sustain new amphibious assault vehicle has enteredpower beyond the immediate region. A service in key units, improving the PLA’sdecision in Beijing to abandon its capability to conduct amphibious attacks.longstanding and self-imposed policy against Throughout the PLA, small numbers ofoverseas basing would signal that China seeks modern main battle tanks, armored vehicles,a greater blue water combat capability. self-propelled artillery, and air defenseSecond Artillery Corps: As detailed weapons have entered service in selectedelsewhere in this report, China’s ballistic units. Concurrent with this modernization,missile force is acquiring conventional PLA ground force training has begun tomedium-range and intermediate-range emphasize combined arms operations andballistic missiles, extending the distance from long-range mobility.which it can threaten other countries withconventional precision or near-precision STRATEGIC CAPABILITIESstrikes. China has made steady progress in recent yearsThe PLA Air Force: The PLA Air Force is to develop offensive nuclear, space, and cyberdeveloping longer-range versions of the B- warfare capabilities—the only aspects of6/BADGER bomber that, when equipped with China’s armed forces that are currently globala long-range land-attack cruise missile, will in nature. In the case of cyber and spaceenable strikes as far as the second island weapons, however, there is little evidence thatchain. The J-20 will eventually give the PLA China’s military and civilian leaders have fullyAir Force a platform capable of long range, thought through the global and systemicpenetrating strikes into complex air defense effects that would be associated with theenvironments. employment of these strategic capabilities.During the Shanghai Cooperation Additionally, China is both qualitatively andOrganization’s Peace Mission exercise in quantitatively improving its strategic missileSeptember 2010, PLA Air Force B-6s forces.conducted long-range bombing missions inKazakhstan while operating out of Urumqi inwestern China. The PLA Air Force reached Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 33
  • 44. Nuclear Forces. China’s nuclear arsenal to communicate with submarines at sea, andcurrently consists of approximately 55-65 the PLA Navy has no experience in managingintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), a SSBN fleet that performs strategic patrolsincluding the silo-based CSS-4 (DF-5); the with live nuclear warheads mated to missiles.solid-fueled, road-mobile CSS-10 Mods 1 and Land-based mobile missiles may face similar2 (DF-31 and DF-31A); and the more limited command and control challenges in wartime,range CSS-3 (DF-3). This force is although probably not as extreme as withcomplemented by liquid-fueled CSS-2 submarines.intermediate-range ballistic missiles and road- Beijing’s official policy towards the role ofmobile, solid-fueled CSS-5 (DF-21D) nuclear weapons continues to focus onMRBMs for regional deterrence missions. maintaining a nuclear force structure able toThe operational status of China’s single XIA- survive an attack, and respond with sufficientclass ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and strength to inflict unacceptable damage on themedium-range JL-1 submarine-launched enemy. The new generation of mobileballistic missiles (SLBM) remain missiles, maneuvering and MIRV warheads,questionable. and penetration aids are intended to ensure theBy 2015, China’s nuclear forces will include viability of China’s strategic deterrent in theadditional CSS-10 Mod 2s and enhanced face of continued advances in U.S. and, to aCSS-4s. The first of the new JIN-class (Type lesser extent, Russian strategic intelligence,094) SSBN appears ready, but the associated surveillance, and reconnaissance; precisionJL-2 SLBM has faced a number of problems strike; and missile defense capabilities.and will likely continue flight tests. The date Beijing has consistently asserted that itwhen the JIN-class SSBN/JL-2 SLBM adheres to a ―no first use‖ (NFU) policy,combination will be fully operational is stating it would use nuclear forces only inuncertain. response to a nuclear strike against China.China is also currently working on a range of China’s NFU pledge consists of two statedtechnologies to attempt to counter U.S. and commitments: China will never use nuclearother countries’ ballistic missile defense weapons first against any nuclear-weaponsystems, including maneuvering re-entry state, and China will never use or threaten tovehicles, MIRVs, decoys, chaff, jamming, use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-thermal shielding, and anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon state or nuclear-weapon-free zone.weapons. PRC official media also cites However, there is some ambiguity over thenumerous Second Artillery Corps training conditions under which China’s NFU policyexercises featuring maneuver, camouflage, would apply, including whether strikes onand launch operations under simulated what China considers its own territory,combat conditions, which are intended to demonstration strikes, or high altitude burstsincrease survivability. Together with the would constitute a first use. Moreover, someincreased mobility and survivability of the PLA officers have written publicly of thenew generation of missiles, these technologies need to spell out conditions under whichand training enhancements strengthen China’s China might need to use nuclear weaponsnuclear force and enhance its strategic strike first; for example, if an enemy’s conventionalcapabilities. attack threatened the survival of China’s nuclear force, or of the regime itself.The introduction of more mobile systems will However, there has been no indication thatcreate new command and control challengesfor China’s leadership, which now confronts a national leaders are willing to attach such nuances and caveats to China’s ―no first use‖different set of variables related to doctrine.deployment and release authorities. Forexample, the PLA has only a limited capacity Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 34
  • 45. Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. China is capable of targeting its nuclear forces throughout the region and most of the world, including the continental United States. Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF¬31A, and JL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear force.Beijing will likely continue to invest and synthetic aperture radar imaging. In theconsiderable resources to maintain a limited next decade, even as Beijing fields a largernuclear force, also referred to by some PRC and more capable array of reconnaissancewriters as ―sufficient and effective,‖ to ensure satellites, it probably will continue to employthe PLA can deliver a damaging retaliatory commercial satellite imagery to supplementnuclear strike. its coverage. China currently accesses high- resolution, commercial electro-optical andSpace and Counterspace. China’s space synthetic aperture radar imagery from all ofactivities and capabilities, including ASAT the major providers including Spot Imageprograms, have significant implications for (Europe), Infoterra (Europe), MDA (Canada),anti-access/area denial efforts in Taiwan Strait Antrix (India), GeoEye (United States), andcontingencies and beyond. Digital Globe (United States).Reconnaissance: China is deploying imagery,reconnaissance, and Earth resource systems Manned Space: China’s most recent manned mission, Shenzhou-7, concluded in Septemberwith military utility. Examples include the 2008. Shenzhou-7 included China’s firstYaogan satellites, the Haiyang-1B, and the spacewalk as well as the launch andHuanjing disaster/environmental monitoring rendezvous with an autonomoussatellite constellation. China is planning eight microsatellite. China will continue itssatellites in the Huanjing program that are manned space program, including bothcapable of visible, infrared, multi-spectral, manned and unmanned docking, with the Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 35
  • 46. goals of establishing a permanently manned BeiDou-2 constellation, intended tospace station by 2020 and landing a human on eventually provide a worldwide PNT service,the moon by 2030. independent of foreign control. By 2012, the BeiDou 2 constellation is expected to providePosition, Navigation, and Timing (PNT): regional services with approximately 10Since the 1990s, China has used the U.S. satellites. The PRC plans to complete theGlobal Positioning System (GPS) for a wide BeiDou-2 system by 2020, with 35 a satellitevariety of military, civil, and commercial constellation offering global coverage.applications. Building on this foundation,China is pursuing several avenues to reduce Communications: China usesits dependence on GPS and become a major communications satellites for both regionalsupplier of PNT services and user equipment. and international telecommunications inCurrently, the PRC is increasing its use of support of civil and military users, includingRussia’s GLONASS, deploying its own satellite television, Internet, and telephony.BeiDou-2 (Compass) system as well as a China also maintains a single data-relaysecond independent satellite system called satellite launched in mid-2008, the TianLian-CAPS, while augmenting these overhead 1. China has recently entered the worldsystems with a variety of ground-based market by exporting satellites andsignals. infrastructure to Venezuela and Nigeria. Although the satellite built and launched forThe experimental BeiDou-1 system consisted Nigeria failed, China continues to market itsof just three satellites, providing both civil services worldwide, to customers such asand military services to China. China is Pakistan, Bolivia, Laos, and Vietnam.replacing BeiDou-1 with the much larger PLA Underground Facilities Since the early 1950s, the PLA has employed underground facilities (UGFs) to protect and conceal its vital assets. China’s strategic missile force, the Second Artillery Corps (SAC), has developed and utilized UGFs since deploying its oldest liquid-fueled missile systems and continues to utilize them to protect and conceal their newest and most modern solid-fueled mobile missiles. As early as the mid 1990’s Chinese media vaguely acknowledged the existence of UGFs that support the SAC. Since December 2009, several PRC and foreign media reports offered additional insight into this obscure tunnel network, which reportedly stretches for over 5,000 km. Given China’s nuclear policy of ―no first use‖ and until recently its limited ballistic missile early warning capability, Beijing had assumed it might have to absorb an initial nuclear blow prior to engaging in ―nuclear counterattack.‖ Nuclear survivability was particularly critical given China’s relatively small number of nuclear weapons and the development by potential adversaries of modern, precision munitions. In recent years, advanced construction design has allowed militaries to go deeper underground to complicate adversarial targeting. Although secrecy and ambiguity remain China’s predominant approach in the nuclear realm, occasional disclosure of information on some missile-related UGFs is consistent with an effort to send strategic signals on the credibility of its limited nuclear arsenal. These public disclosures include images of tunnels, modern network-based security and control centers, and advanced camouflage measures. Categories of military facilities which make good candidates for UGFs include: command posts; communications sites; storage for important weapons and equipment; and protection for personnel. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 36
  • 47. ASAT Weapons: In January 2007, China and information to form a combinedsuccessfully tested a direct-ascent ASAT fighting strength; [and,] whether or notweapon against a PRC weather satellite, we are capable of applying effectivedemonstrating its ability to attack satellites in means to weaken the enemy side‟slow-Earth orbit. China continues to develop information superiority and lower theand refine this system, which is one operational efficiency of enemycomponent of a multi-dimensional program to information equipment.limit or prevent the use of space-based assets The PLA is investing in electronicby potential adversaries during times of crisis countermeasures, defenses against electronicor conflict. attack (e.g., electronic and infrared decoys,In addition to the direct-ascent ASAT angle reflectors, and false target generators),program, China is developing other kinetic and computer network operations (CNO).and directed-energy (e.g., lasers, high- China’s CNO concepts include computerpowered microwave, and particle beam network attack, computer networkweapons) technologies for ASAT missions. exploitation, and computer network defense.Foreign and indigenous systems give China The PLA has established information warfarethe capability to jam common satellite units to develop viruses to attack enemycommunications bands and GPS receivers. computer systems and networks, as well asChina’s nuclear arsenal has long provided tactics and measures to protect friendlyBeijing with an inherent ASAT capability, computer systems and networks. These unitsalthough a nuclear explosion in space would include elements of the militia, creating aalso damage China’s own space assets, along linkage between PLA network operators andwith those of whomever it was trying to China’s civilian information technologytarget. professionals. Under the rubric of Integrated Network Electronic Warfare, the PLA seeksCiting the requirements of its manned and to employ both computer network operationslunar space programs, China is improving its and electronic warfare to deny an adversaryability to track and identify satellites—a access to information essential to conductprerequisite for effective, precise combat operations.counterspace operations.Information Warfare. PRC military thinkers POWER PROJECTION BEYONDhave written extensively on information TAIWANwarfare, reflecting a strong conceptualunderstanding of its methodology and China continues to invest in militarypotential utility. For example, a November programs designed to improve extended-2006 Liberation Army Daily commentary range operations. Current trends in China’soutlines: military capabilities could provide China with a force capable of conducting a range of [The] mechanism to get the upper hand military operations in Asia well beyond of the enemy in a war under conditions Taiwan. of informatization finds prominent expression in whether or not we are China’s political leaders have also charged capable of using various means to obtain the PLA with developing capabilities for information and of ensuring the effective military operations other than war such as circulation of information; whether or peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter- not we are capable of making full use of terrorism operations. These capabilities hold the permeability, sharable property, and the potential to make positive contributions in connection of information to realize the the delivery of international public goods, but organic merging of materials, energy, also increase Beijing’s options for military Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 37
  • 48. coercion to gain diplomatic advantage, remained an irritant in the bilateraladvance interests, or resolve disputes in its relationship. Bilateral trade in 2010 reachedfavor. nearly $60 billion. The two neighbors have held several rounds of dialogue over disputedAnalysis of China’s weapons development territorial claims. Sino-Indian defense tiesand deployment patterns suggests Beijing is were institutionalized in 2007 with thealready looking at contingencies beyond establishment of an Annual DefenseTaiwan as it builds its force. For example, Dialogue. Though India cancelled high-levelnew missile units outfitted with conventional, military exchanges following China’s denialtheater-range missiles at various locations in of a visa to a senior Indian general in 2010,China could be used in a variety of non- both sides agreed to resume exchanges inTaiwan contingencies. Given the fact that April 2011. During his December 2010 tripTaiwan can be reached by land-based to New Delhi, Premier Wen Jiabao attemptedaviation, China’s aircraft carrier program to smooth over differences following a year ofwould offer very limited value in a Taiwan uneasy relations, but he did not addressscenario and would require additional navalresources for protection. However, it would serious irritants. A high degree of mistrust continues to strain the bilateral relationship.enable China to extend its naval air To strengthen its deterrent posture relative tocapabilities elsewhere. Airborne Early India, the PLA has replaced liquid-fueled,Warning and Control (AEW&C) and aerial- nuclear-capable CSS-2 IRBMs with morerefueling programs would also facilitate advanced and survivable solid-fueled CSS-5extended air operations. Advanced destroyers MRBM systems. China is also investing inand submarines could protect and advance road development along the Sino-IndianChina’s maritime interests up to and beyond border. Although this construction isthe second island chain. China’s primarily aimed at facilitating economicexpeditionary forces (three airborne divisions, development in western China, improvedtwo amphibious infantry divisions, two roads could also support PLA border defensemarine brigades, and about seven special operations. India is also improvingoperations groups) are improving with the infrastructure along its northeastern border.introduction of new equipment, better unit- New Delhi remains concerned by China’slevel tactics, and greater coordination of joint close military relationship with Pakistan andoperations. Over the long-term, Beijing’s growing footprint in the Indianimprovements in China’s C4ISR, including Ocean, Central Asia, and and over-the-horizon sensors,could enable Beijing to identify, track, and Russia. Beijing continues to view Moscow astarget military activities deep into the western a useful international partner. DespitePacific Ocean. awareness that some Russian interests are not consistent with those of China, Moscow andChina’s increasing focus on humanitarian Beijing share many overlapping interests, andassistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) China benefits greatly from a more stable andmissions will require a unique set of peaceful northern border. Sino-Russiatechnological developments, including large bilateral cooperation continues on a range ofships and strategic airlift, to support these international issues, especially in Central Asiamissions. Of course, many of these HA/DR where the two jointly manage the Shanghaicapabilities would also enhance the PLA Cooperation Organization (SCO).ability to support military operations alongand beyond China’s borders. Despite this cooperation, Russia has concerns about China’s rise, while PLA strategistsIndia. China deepened its ties with India continue to regard Russia as a potential long-through increased trade and high-level term security challenge. China shifted itsdialogues in 2010, though border tensions Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 38
  • 49. strategic orientation to the south and east Over the past five years, China has begunfollowing the collapse of the Soviet Union, demonstrating a more routine naval andbut Beijing retains significant force structure civilian enforcement presence in the Southin the Lanzhou, Beijing, and Shenyang China Sea. In several instances, particularlyMilitary Regions, in addition to its in 2009, China’s use of force and coercion toconventional and strategic missile forces, to push it disputed maritime territorial claimsmaintain deterrence. elicited concern among many of its Asian neighbors.Central Asia. China has several importantinterests in Central Asia. Most notably, China Although the PRC remains wary of triggeringis interested in acquiring energy and natural regional opposition and may have adjustedresources. Beijing has pursued multiple certain tactics, Beijing appears eager toagreements with energy-rich Central Asian strengthen its claim to the disputed regionstates. This includes a pipeline deal that will over the long-term. This includes legalextend from Turkmenistan through efforts as well as the deployment of moreUzbekistan and Kazakhstan into China. capable naval and civilian law enforcement ships. A more robust presence would positionBeijing is also interested in Central Asia from China for force projection, blockade, anda domestic security perspective. From the surveillance operations to influence thedomestic security standpoint, Beijing hopes to critical sea lanes in the region, through whichundermine support for China’s Uighur some 50 percent of global merchant trafficseparatists, who share religious, ethnic, and passes.linguistic connections to groups in CentralAsia. Beijing believes that Islamic radicalism Competition for resources, including oil, gas,and competing political ideologies could and fishing rights, coupled with strongdestabilize an already fragile security nationalistic sentiments continues to drivesituation in Western China. territorial disputes among several South China Sea claimants. Although tensions in thisChina has used the multilateral Shanghai hotly disputed region subsided after the-Cooperation Organization, which it co- 1990s, signs of friction re-emerged in 2007,founded, to address border security, counter- particularly between China and Vietnam.terrorism, and regional security. Beijing hasalso conducted bilateral and multilateral In response to the 2004 articulation of theexercises with SCO member states to enhance PLA’s ―New Historic Missions,‖ China’sChina’s regional influence and build cohesive senior military leaders began developingopposition to Uighur activities. concepts for an expanded regional maritime strategy and presence. For example, in 2006,South China Sea. Before the CCP took PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli called forpower in 1949, the Chinese government a ―powerful navy to protect fishing, resourceregarded the South China Sea as a region of development and strategic passageways forgeostrategic interest and a part of China’s energy.‖ Many of these ideas echo the―historical waters.‖ As early as the 1930’s, debates in the late 1980s and early 1990s overthe Republic of China was considering a building PLA naval capabilities. However,broad line delineating the South China Sea as the rise of Taiwan contingency planning asChinese territory. The ―U-shaped‖ dashed the dominant driver of PLA forceline that began appearing on Chinese maps in modernization in the mid-1990s, and1947 continues to define PRC claims to the especially after 2001, largely sidelined theseSouth China Sea. Until recently, however, discussions. The 2008 and 2010 Defensethe PLA Navy’s limited operational reach White Papers reflect greater attention to theconstrained Beijing’s military options in the PLA’s expanding mission set.South China Sea. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 39
  • 50. As part of its military modernization effort, capabilities. China’s ability to deploy a moreChina has increasingly shifted resources away robust strategic and conventional militaryfrom the PLAN’s North Sea Fleet to the presence off its southern coast is having aSouth Sea Fleet, greatly expanding the latter’s growing impact on regional rivalries and power dynamics. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 40
  • 51. CHAPTER FOUR: RESOURCES FOR FORCE MODERNIZATIONOVERVIEWThe PLA has decreased reliance on foreign Estimating China’s Actual Militaryweapons acquisitions as China’s defense- Expenditures.industrial and research bases mature. The Department of Defense estimates China’sHowever, the PLA still looks to foreign total military-related spending for 2010 wasassistance to fill some critical near-term over $160 billion, using 2010 prices andcapability gaps. China continues to leverage exchange rates.foreign investments, commercial jointventures, academic exchanges, the experience Estimating actual PLA military expendituresof repatriated PRC students and researchers, is a difficult process due to the lack ofand state-sponsored industrial/technical accounting transparency and China’s stillespionage to increase the level of incomplete transition from a commandtechnologies and expertise available to economy. Moreover, China’s publishedsupport military research, development, and military budget does not include majoracquisition. Beijing’s long-term goal is to categories of expenditure, such as foreigncreate a wholly indigenous defense industrial procurement. China’s legislature has notsector, augmented by a strong commercial made public any details of the role, if any,sector, to meet the needs of PLA that it plays in exercising oversight of themodernization and to compete as a top-tier PLA budget. However, public calls withinproducer in the global arms market. China’s China for greater budget transparency,leaders can draw from diverse sources to generally in response to sustained andsupport PLA modernization, including: systemic official corruption, suggest thatdomestic defense investments, indigenous improvement in government transparency as adefense industrial development, a growing whole could develop over time.research and development and science and The United States and other countriestechnology base, dual-use technologies, and continue to urge China to increaseforeign technology acquisition. transparency in military spending. In August 2010, China submitted a report on its militaryMILITARY EXPENDITURE TRENDS expenditures to the UN Secretary General, theOn March 4, 2011, Beijing announced a 12.7 third such report in as many years. China’spercent increase in its military budget to report was submitted in the UN Simplifiedapproximately $91.5 billion. This increase Reporting Form, which provides minimalcontinues more than two decades of sustained information on major budget categories, inannual increases in China’s announced contrast to the more detailed Standardizedmilitary budget. Analysis of 2000-2010 data Reporting Form used by countries practicingindicates China’s officially disclosed military greater defense transparency.budget grew at an average of 12.1 percent ininflation-adjusted terms over the period. CHINA’S ADVANCING DEFENSEAlthough the military budget increases are INDUSTRIESslightly larger than the percentage increases Since the late 1990s, China’s state-ownedof its overall economic growth of 10.2 percent defense and defense-related companies haveover the same period, the actual change in the undergone a broad-based transformation.implied burden of the official defense budget Beijing continues to improve its businesson the economy appears negligible. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 41
  • 52. practices, streamline bureaucracy, broaden technology companies in particular, includingincentives for its factory workers, shorten Huawei, Datang, and Zhongxing, maintaindevelopmental timelines, improve quality close ties to the PLA.control, and increase overall defense In contrast, enterprises producing high-industrial production capacity. Beijing is also performance computers, advancedemphasizing integration of defense and non- applications software, and specialized top-enddefense sectors to leverage the latest dual-use semiconductors/microprocessors—key to thetechnologies and the output from China’s evolution of increasingly advanced andexpanding science and technology base. capable defense microelectronics andAugmented in part by direct acquisition of applications, but with limited counterparts inforeign weapons and technology, these the PRC civil-industrial sector—havereforms have enabled China to incorporate experienced slower progress. The aviationmid-1990s technology into the development and ordnance sectors have similarly sufferedand production of most of its advanced from a limited number of spin-off benefits,weapon systems. Some systems, particularly despite partnerships between foreignballistic missiles, incorporate cutting-edge multinational corporations and domestictechnologies in a manner that rivals even the’s most modern systems. Sector-by-Sector Analysis. Progress acrossCivil-Military Integration. Developing China’s defense industry sectors has beeninnovative dual-use technology and an uneven. Production trends and resourceindustrial base that serves both military and allocation appear to favor missile and spacecivilian needs is a high priority for China’s systems, followed by maritime assets (bothleadership. President Hu expressed in his surface and sub-surface), aircraft, and groundpolitical report to the CCP’s 17th Party force materiel. In all areas, China is increasingCongress in October 2007: the quality of its output and surge production We must establish sound systems of capabilities, if not capacities. However, many weapons and equipment research and of China’s most advanced systems are still manufacturing… and combine military based heavily on foreign designs copied through reverse engineering, highlighting a persistent efforts with civilian support, build the weakness in China’s capability for overall armed forces through diligence and system design and integration. thrift, and blaze a path of development with Chinese characteristics featuring Missile and Space Industry: China produces a military and civilian integration. broad range of sophisticated ballistic, cruise, air-to-air, and surface-to-air missiles. Many ofChina’s defense industry has benefited from China’s primary final assembly and rocketintegration with a rapidly expanding civilian motor production facilities have receivedeconomy and science and technology sector, upgrades over the past few years, likelyparticularly elements that have access to increasing production capacity. In addition toforeign technology. Progress within supplying China’s military, complete systemsindividual defense sectors appears linked to and missile technologies could also be marketedthe relative integration of each, through for export. Surge production for these systemsChina’s civilian economy, into the global could result in a significantly higher output ofproduction and research and development SRBMs and perhaps double the number of(R&D) chain. For example, the shipbuilding MRBMs per year. China’s space launch vehicleand defense electronics sectors, benefiting industry is expanding to support satellite launchfrom China’s leading role in producing services and the manned space program.commercial shipping and information Shipbuilding Industry: China operates atechnologies, have witnessed the greatest vibrant and globally competitive shipbuildingprogress over the last decade. Information Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 42
  • 53. industry. By some measures, China is the partners to fill gaps in critical technicallargest shipbuilder in the world. Shipyard capabilities could still limit actual surgeexpansion and modernization have increased output.China’s shipbuilding capacity and capability, Aviation Industry: China’s commercial andgenerating benefits for all types of military military aviation industries have advancedprojects, including: submarines; surface from producing direct copies of early Sovietcombatants; naval aviation, including aircraft models to developing and producingcarriers; and lift assets. China continues indigenous aircraft. These include improvedrelying on foreign suppliers for some versions of older aircraft and modern fourthpropulsion units and to a much lesser degree, generation fighters. China’s commercialfire control systems, cruise missiles, surface- aircraft industry has importedto-air missiles, torpedo systems, sensors, and high-precision and technologically advancedother advanced electronics. Modular machine tools, electronics, and othershipbuilding techniques will allow China to components that can also be used in thespread production across multiple locations, production of military aircraft. However,increasing both efficiency and output. China China’s ability to surge production in thehas already demonstrated an ability to surge aircraft industry will be limited by its reliancesubmarine and amphibious production. on foreign sourcing for aircraft engines andArmament Industry: China’s ground force avionics, as well as the lack of skilledmodernization includes production of new personnel and facilities.tanks, armored personnel carriers, and Foreign Technology Acquisition. Key areasartillery pieces. There have been advances in where China continues to rely most heavilyalmost every area of PLA ground forces with on foreign technologies include: guidance andnew production capacity to accommodate control systems, engine technology, andsurge requests. China’s reliance on foreign Percent Modern 2000 2004 2008 2010 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 Naval Surface Forces Submarine Forces Air Forces Air Defense ForcesPLA Modernization Areas, 2000 – 2010. This graphic compares the expansion of modern operational systemswithin the PLA in 2000, 2004, 2008, and 2010.Footnote: For surface combatants ―modern‖ is defined as multi-mission platforms with significant capabilities in at least twowarfare areas. ―Modern‖ for submarines is defined as those platforms capable of firing an anti-ship cruise missile. For air forces,―modern‖ is defined as 4th generation platforms (Su-27, Su-30, F-10) and platforms with 4th generation-like capabilities (FB-7).―Modern‖ SAMs are defined as advanced, long-range Russian systems (SA-10, SA-20), and their PRC indigenous equivalents(HQ-9). Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 43
  • 54. enabling technologies such as precision foreign collectors, including the PRC,machine tools, advanced diagnostic and attempted to obtain information andforensic equipment, applications and technologies from each of the 20 categories ofprocesses essential to rapid prototyping, and the Developing Sciences and Technologiescomputer-assisted design/manufacturing. List (DSTL). The DSTL is a compendium ofChina often pursues these foreign scientific and technological capabilities beingtechnologies for the purpose of reverse developed worldwide that have the potentialengineering or to supplement indigenous to enhance or degrade U.S. militarymilitary modernization efforts. capabilities significantly in the future.Russia has been China’s primary weapons The DSS report described China’s scienceand materiel provider, selling Beijing and technology collection priorities as:advanced fighter aircraft, helicopters, missile guidance and control systems, advancedsystems, submarines, and destroyers. Relying energy technologies, nanotechnology, spaceon Russian components for several of its and counterspace systems, nuclear forces,production programs, China purchased innovative materials, aeronautics andproduction rights to Russian weapon designs. astronautic mechanisms, computer-aidedHowever, this trend is changing as China manufacturing and design, and informationbecomes more self-sufficient in development technologies. The PRC continues to targetand production. these technologies.Israel previously supplied advanced military The U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureautechnology to China, but has reformed its of Industry and Security and the Departmentexport control regime through the passage of of Justice identified at least 26 major casesa Defense Export Control Act in July 2007 since 2006 linking China to the acquisition ofand the adoption of implementing regulations technologies and applications cited above, asin December 2007. well as to current and future warship technology, electronic propulsion systems,Since 2003, China has pressured European controlled power amplifiers with militaryUnion (EU) Member States to lift the applications, space launch technical data andembargo on lethal military sales to China that services, C-17 aircraft, Delta IV rockets,the EU imposed in response to China’s 1989 infrared cameras, information related to cruisecrackdown on demonstrators. In their Joint missile design, and military-gradeStatement following the 2004 EU-China accelerometers. Additional technologies citedSummit, European and PRC leaders in these cases consisted of microwavecommitted to work towards lifting the integrated circuits; weapon scopes; restrictedTiananmen embargo. Although the issue night-vision equipment and data;remains on the EU agenda, there is no satellite/missile thermal insulation blankets;consensus among the EU Member States on controlled electronic components; travelinglifting the embargo in the near future. wave tubes used with satellite and radarIn addition, economic espionage, supported systems; microwave amplifiers with radarby extensive open source research, computer applications; export controlled technical datanetwork exploitation, and targeted related to plasma technology for UAVs;intelligence operations also enables China to carbon fiber material for aircraft, rockets,obtain technologies to supplement indigenous spacecraft, and the uranium enrichmentmilitary modernization efforts. process; and, extended range programmableIn its 2008 report, Targeting U.S. logic devices.Technologies: A Trend Analysis of Reporting The PRC’s continuing efforts to acquire U.S.From Defense Industry, the Defense Security military and dual-use technologies areService (DSS) found that in the previous year, enabling the PRC science and technology Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 44
  • 55. base to diminish the U.S. technological edge superconducting technologies, and highlyin areas critical to the development of military efficient energy materials technologies;weapons and communications systems. Advanced Manufacturing: PrioritiesAdditionally, the technologies China has include extreme manufacturingacquired could be used to develop more technologies and intelligent serviceadvanced technologies by shortening PRC advanced machine tools;R&D cycles. Advanced Energy Technologies:TRENDS AND PROJECTIONS Priorities include hydrogen energy and fuel cell technologies, alternative fuels,China’s National Medium- and Long-Term and advanced vehicle technologies;Program for Science and TechnologyDevelopment (2006-2020), issued by the State Marine Technologies: Priorities includeCouncil in February 2006, seeks to transform three-dimensional maritimeChina into an ―innovation-oriented society by environmental monitoring technologies,2020.‖ The plan defines China’s science and fast, multi-parameter ocean floor surveytechnology focus in terms of ―basic research,‖ technologies, and deep-sea operations―leading-edge technologies,‖ ―key fields and technologies; and,priority subjects,‖ and ―major special items,‖ Laser and Aerospace Technologies areall of which have military applications. also high priorities.Basic Research. As part of a broad effort to Key Fields and Priority Subjects. China hasexpand basic research capabilities, China identified certain industries and technologyidentified five areas that have military groups with potential to provide technologicalapplications as major strategic needs or breakthroughs, remove technical obstaclesscience research plans requiring active across industries, and improve internationalgovernment involvement and funding: competitiveness. Specifically, China’s material design and preparation; defense industries are pursuing advanced manufacturing, information technology, and manufacturing in extreme environmental defense technologies. Examples include conditions; radar, counterspace capabilities, secure aeronautic and astronautic mechanics; C4ISR, smart materials, and low-observable technologies. information technology development; and, Major Special Items. China has also nanotechnology research. identified 16 ―major special items‖ for which In nanotechnology, China has progressed it plans to develop or expand indigenousfrom virtually no research or funding in 2002 capabilities. These include core electronicto being a close second to the United States in components, high-end universal chips andtotal government investment. operating system software, very large-scale integrated circuit manufacturing, next-Leading-edge Technologies. China is generation broadband wireless mobilefocusing on the following technologies for communications, high-grade numericallyrapid development: controlled machine tools, large aircraft, high- Information Technology: Priorities resolution satellites, manned spaceflight, and include intelligent perception lunar exploration. technologies, ad hoc networks, and virtual reality technologies; New Materials: Priorities include smart materials and structures, high-temperature Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 45
  • 56. Status of Aircraft Carrier DevelopmentsDuring the next decade China is likely to fulfill its carrier ambitions, becoming the lastpermanent member of the UN Security Council to obtain a carrier capability. In April 2011,China’s Xinhua state news agency posted the newspaper’s first pictures of the former Sovietcarrier (Kuznetsov-class Hull-2) under renovation in Dalian, proclaiming that China will soonfulfill its ―70-year aircraft carrier dreams.‖ In June 2011, PLA Chief of the General Staff,Chen Bingde, finally confirmed China’s carrier program.Throughout 2010, the PRC continued refurbishing Kuznetsov Hull-2 (the ex-VARYAG),which China purchased from Ukraine in 1998. This carrier will likely begin sea trials in 2011,and the ship could become operationally available, although without aircraft, by the end of2012. However, it will take several years for an operationally viable air group of fixed androtary wing aircraft to achieve even a minimal level of combat capability. The PLA Navy hasinitiated a land-based program to begin training navy pilots to operate fixed-wing aircraftfrom an aircraft carrier. This program will probably be followed in about three years by full-scale ship-borne training aboard Kuznetsov Hull-2.China has demonstrated an interest in foreign carrier-borne fighters and carrier aviation, but itappears that a domestic carrier aircraft production program is progressing. Currently in flighttesting, the carrier aircraft, known as the J-15, is reportedly an unlicensed copy of a RussianSu-33, which China obtained from Ukraine in 2004. China is also looking abroad foroperational expertise. In May 2009, Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim announced thatthe Brazilian Navy would provide training to PLA Navy officers in aircraft carrier operations.However, Brazil’s limited capabilities in this area and the extensive problems associated withBrazil’s own carrier program raise some questions as to the implications of the offer.In addition to the Kuznetsov-class carrier, the PLA Navy will likely build several additionalcarriers in Chinese shipyards. In March 2009, PLA Navy Admiral Wu Huayang affirmed,―China is capable of building aircraft carriers… Given the level of development in ourcountry, I think we have such strength.‖ Construction of China’s first indigenous carrier,which would likely have a similar displacement and design of the Kuznetsov Hull-2, couldbegin as early as 2011. If China commences construction in 2011, the PLA Navy could haveits first indigenous carrier achieving operational capability as early as 2015. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 46
  • 57. CHAPTER FIVE: FORCE MODERNIZATION AND SECURITY IN THETAIWAN STRAITOVERVIEWChina’s acute focus on Taiwan has served for Security in the Taiwan Strait is largely atwo decades as the dominant force shaping function of dynamic interactions between andPLA modernization. Although China’s other among mainland China, Taiwan, and theemerging interests increasingly compete for United States. Although the PLA probablyattention and resources, defense planners lacks the necessary military power tocontinue to regard Taiwan as the PLA’s successfully conduct a full-scale amphibiousprimary mission. Beijing seeks the military invasion of Taiwan, it is working to closecapability to deter Taiwan moves toward perceived capability gaps in the coming years.independence. This mission has catalyzed Furthermore, Taiwan’s relatively modestefforts to deter, delay, or deny the possible defense spending has failed to keep pace withintervention of U.S. forces in a cross-Strait ambitious military developments on theconflict. Although cross-Strait ties have mainland.improved steadily since 2008 and the prospect Taiwan has historically relied upon multipleof a near-term crisis appears low, the PRC factors to deter PLA aggression: the PLA’sremains focused on developing the inability to project sufficient power across theprerequisite military capabilities to eventually 185 km Taiwan Strait; the Taiwan military’ssettle the dispute on Beijing’s terms. technological superiority; the inherentSince the election of Taiwan President Ma geographic advantages of island defense; andYing-jeou in March 2008, China and Taiwan the possibility of U.S. intervention. China’shave embarked on a period of improved increasingly modern weapons and platformseconomic and political ties. The two sides (over a thousand ballistic missiles, an anti-have expanded trade and economic links, such ship ballistic missile program, increasinglyas direct shipping, flights, and mail across the modern ships and submarines, combatStrait. The United States welcomes and aircraft, and improved C4ISR capabilities)encourages this trend as a means to reduce threaten to negate many of those factors upontensions and bridge differences between the which Taiwan has depended.two sides. Nevertheless, there is no indication Taiwan has taken important steps to build itsthat China’s long-term objectives have war reserve stocks, grow its defense industrialchanged. base, improve joint operations and crisisIn October 2010, senior PRC officials response capabilities, and increase its officerindicated that the two sides were in no rush to and noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.address thorny political or military issues, but These improvements have partially addressedwould focus on improving economic Taiwan’s eroding defensive advantages.cooperation. Consistent with that statement, Taiwan released its first Quadrennial Defensethe PRC has not taken steps to reduce its Review in March 2009, and is followingmilitary forces facing Taiwan. China has through on that report by creating an all-continued to develop a wide range of weapons volunteer military and reducing its activeand capabilities designed to provide credible military end-strength from 275,000 tomilitary options in a Taiwan contingency. 215,000 personnel to create a ―small butThis includes efforts to deter or limit the smart and strong force.‖ Under this plan,effectiveness of potential U.S. intervention. which is slated for completion by December Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 47
  • 58. 2014, the cost savings from a smaller force BEIJING’S TAIWAN STRATEGYwill free up resources to increase volunteer Through the employment of both ―carrots andsalaries and benefits. However, the additional sticks‖ Beijing apparently seeks to deterpersonnel costs needed to initially attract and Taiwan moves toward independence andretain personnel under the volunteer system achieve eventual unification. The PRC strivescould divert funds from foreign and to integrate the two economies whileindigenous acquisition programs, as well as advancing cultural and historic ties.near-term training and readiness. Politically, China has sought to expand tiesU.S. policy toward Taiwan is based on our with the KMT Party on Taiwan whileone China policy, based on the three Joint attempting to isolate political entities withCommuniqués and the Taiwan Relations Act more overtly pro-independence leanings. The[Public Law 96-8 (1979)]. U.S. policy PRC employs economic enticement,opposes any unilateral changes to the status propaganda, and political engagement inquo in the Taiwan Strait by either side. The pursuit of these objectives.United States continues to support peaceful The military component of China’s Taiwanresolution of cross-Strait differences in a strategy is likely intended to create anmanner acceptable to the people on both impression on Taiwan that accommodationsides. with China is ultimately in the island’s bestConsistent with the Taiwan Relations Act, the interest. This approach appears to include aUnited States has helped to maintain peace, heavy focus on amphibious operations, longsecurity, and stability in the Taiwan Strait by range strike, and anti-access and area denialproviding defense articles and services to capabilities, which are intended to alterenable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self Taiwan’s threat calculus as well as that of anydefense capability. To this end, the Obama party considering intervention in a cross-StraitAdministration announced in January 2010 its crisis.intent to sell to Taiwan US$6.4 billion worth Beijing appears prepared to defer the use ofof defensive arms and equipment, including: force as long as it believes long term UH-60 utility helicopters; reunification remains possible and the costs of PATRIOT PAC-3 air and missile defense conflict outweigh the benefits. Although systems; Beijing often emphasizes its preference for ―peaceful unification‖ under the principle of HARPOON anti-ship cruise missile ―one country, two systems,‖ it has never training; renounced the possibility of using force to Multifunctional Information Distribution achieve this end. Beijing likely calculates Systems technical support for Taiwan’s that the prospect of employing military force Syun An C4ISR system; and, is an important point of leverage in this relationship. OSPREY-class minehunting ships. Historically, the PRC has alluded to severalIn addition, the U.S. Department of Defense, events or conditions that might prompt it tothrough transformation of the U.S. Armed employ military force in pursuit of its TaiwanForces and global force posture realignments, policy. These conditions have evolved overis maintaining the capability and capacity of time in response to political developments onthe United States to defend against Beijing’s Taiwan, the evolution of PLA capabilities,use of force or coercion against Taiwan. and Beijing’s perception of Taiwan’s foreign relations. These circumstances have included: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 48
  • 59. formal declaration of Taiwan BEIJING’S COURSES OF ACTION independence; AGAINST TAIWAN undefined moves toward Taiwan The PLA is capable of increasingly independence; sophisticated military action against Taiwan. internal unrest on Taiwan; Should Beijing resolve to employ military force against Taiwan, some analysts assert the Taiwan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons; PLA would mobilize forces in a manner that indefinite delays in the resumption of optimizes speed of engagement over strategic cross-Strait dialogue on unification; deception. Others contend that Beijing would sacrifice preparations in favor of tactical foreign intervention in Taiwan’s internal surprise, with the goal of forcing rapid affairs; and, military and/or political resolution before foreign troops stationed on Taiwan. other countries could respond. If a quick resolution is not possible, Beijing would seekArticle 8 of China’s March 2005 ―Anti- to:Secession Law‖ states that Beijing may use―non-peaceful means‖ if ―secessionist deter potential U.S. intervention byforces… cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession highlighting the potential cost to the U.S.from China;‖ if ―major incidents entailing and targeting the resolve of the U.S.Taiwan’s secession‖ occur; or, if public and leadership;―possibilities for peaceful reunification‖ are failing that, delay intervention and seekexhausted. The ambiguity of these ―redlines‖ victory in an asymmetric, limited, quickpreserves Beijing’s flexibility. war; or, fight to a standstill and pursue a political settlement after a protracted conflict. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 49
  • 60. Disposition of PLA Forces in Nanjing Military Region.Maritime Quarantine or Blockade. merchant traffic. The PLA employed thisAlthough a traditional maritime quarantine or method during the 1995-96 missile firings andblockade would have a short-term impact on live-fire exercises. However, there is a riskTaiwan, such an operation would tax PLA that Beijing would underestimate the degreeNavy capabilities. PRC military writings to which any attempt to limit maritime trafficdescribe potential alternative solutions to and from Taiwan would triggerincluding air blockades, missile attacks, and countervailing international pressure andmining to obstruct harbors and approaches. military escalation. Currently, ChinaBeijing could declare that ships en route to probably could not effectively enforce a fullTaiwan must stop in mainland ports for military blockade, particularly in the face ofinspection prior to transiting to Taiwan ports. intervention by a major naval power.Beijing could also attempt the equivalent of a However, its ability to execute a blockadeblockade by declaring exercise or missile will improve steadily through 2020.closure areas in approaches to ports,effectively closing port access and diverting Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 50
  • 61. Taiwan Strait SAM & SRBM Coverage. This map depicts notional coverage based on the range of land and sea based missile systems, including advanced SAMs that China would likely employ in a Taiwan conflict. A single PLA Navy Destroyer is used to illustrate the range of sea-based SAM coverage. Actual air defense coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites. If deployed near the Taiwan Strait, the PMU2‟s extended range provides the PLA‟s SAM force with an offensive capability against Taiwan aircraft.Limited Force or Coercive Options. Beijing Air and Missile Campaign. Limited SRBMmight use a variety of disruptive, punitive, or attacks and precision strikes against airlethal military actions in a limited campaign defense systems, including air bases, radaragainst Taiwan, likely in conjunction with sites, missiles, space assets, andovert and clandestine economic and political communications facilities, could be conductedactivities. Such a campaign could include in an attempt to degrade Taiwan’s defenses,computer network or limited kinetic attacks neutralize Taiwan’s leadership, or break theagainst Taiwan’s political, military, and public’s will to fight.economic infrastructure to induce fear in Amphibious Invasion. Publicly availableTaiwan and degrade the populace’s PRC writings describe different operationalconfidence in the Taiwan leadership. concepts for amphibious invasion. The mostSimilarly, PLA special operations forces prominent of these, the Joint Island Landingcould infiltrate Taiwan and conduct attacks Campaign, envisions a complex operationagainst infrastructure or leadership targets. relying on coordinated, interlocking campaigns for logistics, air and naval support, and electronic warfare. The objective would Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 51
  • 62. be to break through or circumvent shore operational and political risk. It coulddefenses, establish and build a beachhead, galvanize the Taiwan populace and catalyze atransport personnel and materiel to designated strong international reaction. Operationally,landing sites in the north or south of Taiwan’s large-scale amphibious invasion is one of thewestern coastline, and launch attacks to seize most complicated military maneuvers.and occupy key targets and/or the entire Success depends upon air and sea superiority,island. rapid buildup and sustainment of supplies on shore, and uninterrupted support. An attemptThe PLA is capable of accomplishing various to invade Taiwan would strain China’samphibious operations short of a full-scale untested armed forces and invite internationalinvasion of Taiwan. With few overt military intervention. These stresses, combined withpreparations beyond routine training, China China’s combat force attrition and thecould launch an invasion of small, Taiwan- complexity of urban warfare andheld islands such as Pratas Reef or Itu Aba. A counterinsurgency (assuming a successfulPLA invasion of a medium-sized, defended, landing and breakout), make amphibiousoffshore island such as Mazu or Jinmen iswithin China’s capabilities. Such an invasion invasion of Taiwan a significant political and military risk. Taiwan’s investments to hardenwould demonstrate military capability and infrastructure and strengthen defensivepolitical resolve while achieving tangible capabilities could also decrease Beijing’sterritorial gain and simultaneously showing ability to achieve its objectives.some measure of restraint. However, thistype of operation involves significant Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 52
  • 63. CHAPTER SIX: U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTSOVERVIEWOver the past two decades, the PRC has tension when a working relationship is moststeadily transformed a poorly equipped, important. Over the long term, a fullyterrestrially focused military into a more functioning relationship should help bothcapable force that is assuming diverse parties develop a more acute awareness of themissions well beyond China’s shores. Given potential for cooperation and competition.this trajectory, the need for a robust U.S.- Speaking at the Shangri-la Dialogue in JuneChina military-to-military relationship that 2010, then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gatesbuilds trust and helps manage friction asserted that the Defense Department ―wantscontinues to grow. During their January 2011 what both Presidents Obama and Hu want:summit, U.S. President Barack Obama and sustained and reliable military-to-militaryPRC President Hu Jintao jointly affirmed that contacts at all levels that can help reducea ―healthy, stable, and reliable military-to- miscommunication, misunderstanding, andmilitary relationship is an essential part of the risks of miscalculation.‖[their] shared vision for a positive, The United States bases its contacts andcooperative, and comprehensive U.S. China exchanges with China’s military on therelationship.‖ Both sides have repeatedly principles of mutual respect, mutual trust,endorsed this objective. However, placing the reciprocity, mutual interest, continuousmilitary relationship on a firm foundation has dialogue, and mutual risk reduction. Theproven challenging. Department of Defense conducts them in aIn 2010, the PLA suspended military relations manner consistent with the provisions ofwith the United States for a second time since Section 1201 of the National Defense2008. The suspension on January 30, 2010 Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000came just one day after the U.S. Government [Public Law 106-65 (1999)], which provideapproved the sale of an arms package to the Secretary of Defense sufficient latitude toTaiwan. In response, MG Qian Lihua, develop a program of exchanges with ChinaDirector of the Ministry of Defense Foreign that supports U.S. national interests.Affairs Office (MND/FAO), noted the PLA―expresses grave indignation and strongly MILITARY RELATIONS IN 2010condemns such a move to grossly interfere in In September 2010, after Beijing expressed aChina’s internal affairs and harm China’s desire to resume military-to-military relations,national security interests.‖ Although the Deputy Assistant Secretary of DefenseUnited States and China maintained working (DASD) Michael Schiffer met with MG Qianlevel contact during the nine-month Lihua to lay the groundwork a series ofsuspension that followed, routine military-to- bilateral military engagements for late 2010military exchanges did not resume until the and early quarter of 2010. As a starting point, in mid-October 2010, theThe fundamental purpose for two countries to U.S. Pacific Command hosted a plenaryconduct military-to-military relations is to session of the Military Maritime Consultativegain a better understanding of how each side Agreement (MMCA) with China’s Ministrythinks about the role and use of military of National Defense in Honolulu, HI. Duringpower in achieving political and strategic the MMCA session, the two sides discussedobjectives. It is precisely during periods of Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 53
  • 64. issues of maritime safety, including a series of U.S. STRATEGY FOR MILITARYincreasingly close PLA intercepts of U.S. ENGAGEMENTaircraft operating in international airspace.On October 17, 2010, Secretary Gates and The complexity of the security environmentPRC Minister of National Defense, General both in the Asia-pacific region and globally,Liang Guanglie, met on the sidelines of the calls for a continuous dialogue between theASEAN Defense Ministerial Meeting in armed forces of the United States and China.Hanoi. General Liang invited Secretary Gates The U.S. position is that our engagement withto visit China in early 2011 and agreed to a China should expand cooperation in areas ofChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff mutual interest, provide a forum to candidlycounterpart visit with PLA Chief of the address areas of disagreement and improveGeneral Staff, General Chen Bingde. mutual understanding. The United States sees value in sustained and reliable military tiesOn December 10, 2010, Under Secretary of and regards the military relationship as anDefense for Policy Michèle Flournoy hosted integral component of a comprehensive U.S.-the 11th Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) in China relationship.Washington, D.C. with Deputy Chief of thePLA General Staff, General Ma Xiaotian. The U.S. Defense Department’s plan forDuring these talks, the two sides addressed military-to-military engagement with the PRCthe importance of moving beyond the on- supports the vision of a ―positive,again-off-again cycle that has characterized cooperative, and comprehensive U.S.-Chinathe relationship. They also discussed relationship for the 21st century,‖ that the U.S.potential opportunities to build trust and and PRC presidents jointly endorsed.expand cooperation, including a shared Sustained military engagement underpinsinterest in stability on the Korean Peninsula. U.S. policy objectives of promoting China’s development in a manner consistent withUnder Secretary Flournoy and General Ma international rules and norms and thatagreed to develop a framework for military- contributes to regional and global problem-to-military relations based on the seven-point solving. The U.S. National Defense Strategyconsensus established between then-Secretary emphasizes that U.S. defense interaction withGates and Vice Chairman of the Central China will be long-term and multi-Military Commission Xu Caihou in 2009. dimensional. The objective of this effort is toThis meeting also set the stage for Secretary mitigate near term challenges while pursuingGates’ visit to China and President Hu and enhancing U.S. national advantage overJintao’s subsequent visit to the United States January 2011. Our military-to-military engagement withThe resumption of dialogue in late 2010 China serves three general purposes inenabled the U.S. and PRC militaries to support of the broader relationship. First, itcandidly discuss a range of important topics, allows the U.S. and PRC militaries to buildincluding North Korea’s provocations; cooperative capacity. This is achievedconcerns related to Iran, Afghanistan, and through activities that enhance or facilitatePakistan; and transnational and strategic our ability to interact at a tactical orsecurity issues. Continuous dialogue, operational level. Second, our engagementparticularly at high levels, is an important fosters understanding of each others’ militaryplatform for developing common approaches institutions in ways that dispelto challenges in the international security misconceptions and encourage commonenvironment. ground for dialogue. Third, military engagement allows our senior-most leaders to address the global security environment and Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 54
  • 65. relevant challenges. This interaction can military develops the capability to deliverfacilitate common approaches to challenges medical and humanitarian assistance beyondand serves as a bridge to build more its immediate region, there will beproductive working relationships. opportunities for the United States and China to collaborate and share ―lessons learned‖OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES from these endeavors.IN U.S.-CHINA MILITARY-TO- The Department of Defense and China’sMILITARY RELATIONS Ministry of National Defense signed anPresident Obama reiterated in January 2011 archival arrangement in 2008 that, for the firstthat the United States welcomes a ―strong, time, gave the United States access to PLAprosperous, and successful China that plays a archives containing information regardinggreater role in world affairs.‖ China’s U.S. servicemen missing in China frommilitary modernization has created new World War II, the Korean War and the Coldopportunities for cooperation with the United War. As a result of this agreement, theStates, including peacekeeping efforts, Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office hashumanitarian and disaster relief, and counter- made slow but steady progress in accountingpiracy operations. At the same time, the for Americans missing in China. ArchivalPLA’s development remains a potential research led to the discovery of a U.S. Navysource of friction. crash site from the Korean War, and consequently, in February 2011, a U.S.The Asia-Pacific region is contending with an recovery operation supported byarray of challenges including rising powers, representatives from the PLA Archives.failing states, proliferation of nuclear andballistic missiles, extremist violence, and new The United States and China havetechnologies capable of disrupting critical opportunities to enhance tactical cooperation,arteries of global commerce. Secretary Gates communication, and trust through bilateralhas noted that ―confronting these tasks is not and multilateral exercises. Additionally,the task of any one nation acting alone.‖ reciprocal exchanges between mid-grade andChina’s growing economic and military junior officers and institutions of professionalcapability makes it a natural partner in efforts military education cultivate a generation ofto promote regional stability. It is the U.S. rising leaders on both sides who are adept atposition that inevitable differences on certain handling this increasingly complex and vitalissues should not prevent our cooperation in relationship. ADM Mullen noted in the U.S.those areas where we share common interests. Maritime Strategy, ―A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower,‖ that ―trust andIn early January 2011, Secretary Gates cooperation cannot be surged.‖ The skillstraveled to China at the invitation of PRC acquired through our peacetime interactionsMinister of National Defense, General Liang foster habits of cooperation and safeGuanglie. Speaking at a joint press event communication practices that mitigate riskwith General Liang, Secretary Gates noted and diffuse tensions.that even though we face obstacles to genuine―strategic understanding,‖ our two nations The pace and scope of China’s militaryhave many opportunities to build and improve development, combined with a relative lack ofon areas of bilateral cooperation. transparency, remains a point of concern in the United States and among our regionalChina’s growing capacity in areas of counter- allies and partners. In recent years China haspiracy, UN peace missions, and humanitarian demonstrated occasional signs ofaid and disaster relief opens new doors for assertiveness in Asia, particularly in thecooperation with the United States and the maritime domain. This trend has contributedinternational community. As the Chinese to friction between China and some of its Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 55
  • 66. neighbors over disputed maritime territory in A sustained and reliable military relationshipthe East and South China Seas. is vital to managing these challenges and ensuring that they do not come to define theAdditionally, the United States and China relationship or escalate into a crisis. Ourcontinue to hold differing views over the military-to-military contacts should supportrights of coastal states in the waters and deterrence of conflict and lower the risk ofairspace beyond their territorial seas. In 2010 miscalculation by encouraging continuousseveral PLA fighter aircraft conducted dialogue based on open and substantiveunusually close intercepts of U.S. military discussion of strategic issues. Although PRCaircraft operating in international airspace. In leaders have repeatedly affirmed arecent years Chinese ships have also harassed commitment to a sustained and reliableU.S. military survey vessels operating beyond military-to-military relationship, they haveChina’s territorial seas. also linked continuation of engagement to ―respect‖ for China’s ―core interests.‖ Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 56
  • 67. SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA’S EVOLVING MARITIME STRATEGYTHE RISE OF CHINA’S MARITIMESECURITY INTERESTSHistorically a continental power, China subsided, Beijing turned its attention towardsincreasingly looks to the maritime domain as a range of other challenges, particularlya source of economic prosperity and national Taiwan, which it feared was drifting steadilysecurity. China’s evolving ―maritime toward a state of de jure independence.consciousness,‖ as reflected in senior-level The U.S. response in the 1995-96 Taiwanrhetoric and resource allocation, has Strait crisis underscored to Beijing thepotentially far reaching consequences in the potential challenge of U.S. militaryAsia Pacific region and beyond. Many PRC intervention and highlighted the importanceofficials and citizens view maritime power as of developing a modern navy, capable ofa prerequisite to becoming a ―great power.‖ conducting A2AD operations, or ―counter-This chapter addresses China’s attention to intervention operations‖ in the PLA’s lexicon.the maritime domain, with a particular focuson the security dimension. It identifies the Second, China’s expanding economiccatalysts influencing PRC thinking on interests, including both maritime commercemaritime interests and the steps China has and the exploitation of marine resources, havetaken to address these challenges, including affected Beijing’s perception of maritimenaval development, legislation, improving power as it relates to national interests.civilian maritime enforcement, and diplomatic Speaking in 2007, President Hu asserted that,initiatives. Finally, it addresses China’s ―to develop maritime issues is one of thespecific maritime interests and addresses how strategic tasks to boost our national economicChina’s posture could evolve in the future. development.‖ China looks to the oceans as a critical resource, providing fish andIn its 2010 ―China Ocean’s Development potentially large oil and gas reserves.Report,‖ China’s State OceanicAdministration (SOA) proclaimed, ―building The oceans also serve as a vital artery formaritime power is China’s historic task for trade and support China’s economic health,the 21st century, and the decade from 2010- with approximately ninety percent of China’s2020 is the key historic stage for realizing this imports and exports transiting by sea. A nettask.‖ Although China appears to lack an oil exporter until 1993, China now importsofficial maritime strategy, PRC officials, over half of the oil it consumes, over 80military strategists, and academics are percent of which transits the Malacca Straitfocused on the growing relevance of maritime and South China Sea. Additionally, China’spower to China’s interests. economic engine is concentrated in dense population centers along the country’s EastTHE EVOLUTION IN “MARITIME coast. Conflicts affecting these coastalCONSCIOUSNESS” regions would have far reaching consequences for China.Since the early 1980s, two important factorscatalyzed a transformation in Beijing’s EVOLVING NAVAL STRATEGYmaritime outlook. First, China’s geostrategicenvironment fundamentally shifted after the PLA General Liu Huaqing, who commandedCold War ended. As PRC concerns over a a poorly equipped and trained PLA Navymajor continental conflict, including the through most of the 1980s, and later served onpossibility of nuclear war with Russia, the CCP Politburo Standing Committee and Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 57
  • 68. as CMC Vice Chairman, advanced the cause developed nations made the PLA’s coastal-of naval modernization amid a strategic oriented Navy appear antiquated, inadequate,culture overwhelmingly dominated by the and vulnerable. PRC leaders subsequentlyPLA ground force. Until Liu instituted the directed the PLA to prepare to fight and winPLA Navy’s ―Offshore Defense‖ strategy in ―local wars under modern, high-tech1986, the PLA Navy was focused mainly on conditions.‖ The term ―high-tech‖ was later―resisting invasions and defending the replaced with ―informatized‖ to reflect thehomeland.‖ importance of network-centric warfare and information technology.Often referred to as the ―father of the modernChinese Navy,‖ Liu, who died in January In his 1992 address to the 14th Party2011, called for naval operations beyond the Congress, former President Jiang ZeminPRC littoral and appealed for the eventual articulated the need to protect China’sdevelopment of aircraft carriers. Years would evolving ―maritime interests.‖ During thepass before many of Liu’s proposals gained nearly two decades that followed, the PRCpolitical support; however, his ideas has pursued its maritime objectives throughfundamentally affected the way PRC naval development, legislation, civilianstrategists conceptualize maritime power and enforcement, and diplomacy. Ambitiousapproach maritime strategy. naval acquisition closed many of the capability gaps that defined China’s NavyAlthough not defined by specific boundaries, prior to and through the 1990s. China todayOffshore Defense is generally characterized possesses a limited ability to respond toby the maritime space within China’s maritime threats beyond the range of land-Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or based aviation. This includes limited powersometimes by the ―first island chain,‖ projection capability in the farther regions ofincluding the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, the South China Sea and western Pacific.and South China Sea. In recent years, the This progress has been slow, but has begun toPLA Navy has begun emphasizing missions accelerate as new systems come on line, andin the so-called ―far seas,‖ an area loosely China’s naval forces gain additionaldefined by the ―second island chain,‖ which experience in operations beyond the littoral.stretches from Northern Japan, through theNorthern Mariana Islands, through Guam. Civilian and military officials have underscored the economic impetus forConsideration of more distant contingencies advancing China’s maritime interests,has been accompanied by limited peacetime reflecting a perception that economic welfareoperations outside of this region, including and national security are increasingly linked.counter-piracy patrols, humanitarian and PLA Navy Commander Wu Shengli asserteddisaster relief and noncombatant evacuations. in 2006 that China requires a ―powerful navyThese peacetime operations have provided the to protect fishing, resource development andPLA with valuable operational experience. strategic passageways for energy.‖ This dimension is particularly important to theNEW SECURITY INTERESTS DRIVING CCP, which has built its legitimacy on theREQUIREMENTS promise of sustained development.In the early 1990s, the PRC watched with China’s maritime interests, includingconcern as more modern militaries adopted territorial and sovereignty disputes, resourcehigh technology weapons and platforms that interests, and critical SLOC dependencieswere changing the nature of modern warfare, remain heavily concentrated in Asia.including in the maritime domain. From the Consequently, China’s naval orientationperspective of many PRC strategists and retains a decidedly regional focus. However,military officials, military developments in the PLA is assuming more ―global‖ missions. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 58
  • 69. This reflects the recognition that Chinese NEW “FIRSTS” FOR THE PLA NAVYeconomic interests, including commercialshipping and investment projects, along with The PLA Navy’s counter-piracy deploymentPRC citizens, are now located across the to the Gulf of Aden, which it has sustainedglobe. It also reflects a desire to cast China as since 2009, remains the most visiblea ―great power.‖ China’s leaders have offered manifestation of this policy shift under Huunambiguous guidance that the PLA Navy Jintao. Not including naval diplomacy, thewill play a growing role in protecting China’s Gulf of Aden mission marked China’s firstfar-flung interests. operational deployment of naval forces outside of regional waters. In SeptemberIn 2004, not long after assuming 2010, the PLA Navy’s hospital ship, ―PEACEChairmanship of the CMC, Hu Jintao ARK‖ conducted its first overseaspromulgated the ―Historic Missions of the humanitarian mission by visiting fiveArmed Forces in the New Period of the New countries in Asia and Africa.Century‖ (Xin Shiji Xin Jieduan Wojun LishiShiming), commonly referred to as the ―New Most recently, the PLA Navy participated inHistoric Missions.‖ In addition to reiterating its first noncombatant evacuation operationthe Armed Forces’ role in sustaining CCP (NEO). In February 2011, the PLA Navyrule, and protecting China’s sovereignty and deployed a JIANGKAI-II class frigate, whichterritorial integrity, the New Historic had been operating in the Gulf of Aden, toMissions highlight the PLA’s role in support its evacuation of PRC citizens fromsafeguarding China’s expanding ―national Libya. Although largely symbolic, thisinterests‖ and in ―ensuring world peace.‖ deployment enabled the PLA Navy to demonstrate a commitment to the protectionIn drawing a clear link between China’s of PRC citizens living and working overseas.economic interests and national security, theNew Historic Missions established a CHINA’S MARITIME INTERESTSjustification for missions beyond China’smaritime periphery. Although the PLA These increasingly ―diverse‖ missions haveremains focused on regional contingencies, not supplanted regional priorities. Thethe New Historic Missions imply that the Taiwan challenge remains the ―main strategicpursuit of China’s interests would not be direction‖ (zhuyao zhanlue fangxiang—constrained by geographic boundaries and 主要战略方向) for China’s armed forces,would evolve to meet a diverse array of particularly the Navy. Aside from Taiwan,challenges. China’s 2006 National Defense China faces several high priority maritimeWhite Paper expanded upon the New Historic challenges. First is strengthening andMissions, when it introduced the concept of gradually expanding China’s maritime buffer―diversified military tasks‖ (duoyanghua zone as a means to prevent foreign attack orjunshi renwu—多样化军事任务). This ―interference.‖ A second priority remainsemphasized the need for the PLA to prepare advancing China’s maritime territorial claims,not only for traditional military missions, but particularly the East and South China Seas.also military operations other than war Third, China is focused on the protection of(MOOTW). The PLA Navy has since regional sea lines of communicationfocused greater attention on counter-piracy, (SLOCs).HA/DR, and noncombatant evacuation Fourth, the PRC hopes to advance China’soperations (NEO). image as a ―great power,‖ and finally, China intends to deploy a survivable, sea-based nuclear deterrent in the foreseeable future. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 59
  • 70. Expanding the Maritime Periphery: China Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, andhas long regarded the Yellow Sea, East China Brunei. China’s ability to employ coercion inSea, and South China Sea as areas of unique these disputes has grown steadily in recentstrategic importance. From the perspective of years. China’s naval modernization, inBeijing, these so called ―near seas‖ constitute particular, is affecting security perceptionsa security buffer and hold potentially among rival South China Sea claimants.significant oil and gas resources. The PRC China is leveraging both civilian enforcementhas attempted to use legal pronouncements, and naval assets in pursuit of its territorialcivilian enforcement, and naval assets to objectives. In recent years, PRC naval shipsadvance PRC interests within this buffer zone. and civilian law enforcement agencies haveIn 1992, China’s National People’s Congress shown signs of greater assertiveness in thepassed the Law of Territorial Sea and region, occasionally triggering friction withContiguous Zones, which proclaimed the rival claimants. In the East China Sea, ChinaSouth China Sea as PRC ―historic waters.‖ faces a contentious dispute with Japan overBeijing has crafted a series of laws that codify maritime boundaries. Where this line isPRC claims to regional territory and proscribe drawn has implications for disputed territoryspecial restrictions on foreign activities in and subsea energy resources. In 2010,China’s EEZ. tensions between Tokyo and Beijing rose after a PRC fishing boat rammed a JapaneseAs the name implies, the Exclusive Economic Coast Guard vessel near the disputedZone affords states exclusive access to the Senkaku Islands.economic resources within a defined maritimespace, not exceeding 200 nautical miles from The PRC has increasingly sought to enforcethe coastal baseline. China has attempted to its broad maritime claims with civilian assetsapply security restrictions to the EEZ, which including the maritime police, the Borderare inconsistent with customary international Control Department (BCD), Maritime Safetylaw as reflected in UNCLOS. Attempts to Administration (MSA), State Oceanographicimpede or harass sovereign U.S. vessels and Administration (SOA), Fisheries Lawaircraft operating legally in China’s EEZ Enforcement Command (FLEC), and Coast(beyond China’s 12nm territorial seas) have Guard. Beijing wishes to present the issue ofrepeatedly created friction in the U.S.-China regional maritime territory as one of lawrelationship. enforcement rather than military rivalry. Beijing likely calculates that the employmentRegional Territorial Disputes: During the of naval assets in these matters raises the risk1930s and 1940s, the Republic of China of escalation, generates regional animosity,(ROC) began delineating essentially all of the and unnecessarily burdens the PLA NavySouth China Sea, including the Spratly and with non-military tasks. Compared toParacel Islands, within a nine-dashed line. developed countries, particularly Japan andAlthough preserving ambiguity on the nature the United States, China’s civilian maritimeof this claim, the PRC maintains that the agencies are poorly equipped and operated.territories within the dashed line and their However, they are improving steadily andadjacent waters belong to China. Different will play an increasingly critical function inportions of China’s expansive claim are China’s maritime enforcement efforts.disputed in whole or in part by Taiwan, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 60
  • 71. Debating China’s Role in “Distant Seas” Around the time President Hu Jinto articulated the ―New Historic Missions‖ in 2004, Chinese officials and scholars began openly discussing the extent to which China should expand its maritime power. The term ―yuanhai fangwei‖ (远海防卫) which translates to ―distant/far sea defense,‖ began appearing with increasing frequency in Chinese publications. Authors associated with the Naval Research Institute (NRI) called the ―shift from offshore to open ocean naval operations‖ an ―inevitable historic choice‖ for China noting that naval power must ―match the expansion of China’s maritime interests.‖ Navy deployment trends in recent years underscore China’s interests in a limited ―far seas‖ capability. Some PRC commentators advocate a sustained shift from an ―Offshore Defense‖ strategy to ―Far Seas Defense.‖ Many others characterize Far Seas Defense as simply an extension or adjustment of the existing strategy, rather than a fundamental change. China’s 2010 Defense White Paper reiterated the PLA Navy’s commitment to its Offshore Defense strategy while acknowledging efforts to improve operational capabilities in far seas. Recently, several Navy officials and commentators have broached the once-taboo topic of overseas military basing. In late 2009, Rear Admiral Yin Zhuo (retired), attracted extensive international media attention when he suggested in an interview, that China requires a ―stable and permanent supply and repair base‖ to support its overseas counter-piracy activities. With an aircraft carrier program being realized over the next decade, the Navy may face even greater incentive to improve its support options. It is not clear if China will pursue traditional military ―bases,‖ suited for supporting distant combat operations, or a more limited set of logistical supply ―places,‖ that are better suited to peacetime deployments, such as counter-piracy and HA/DR.SEA LANE PROTECTION The PLA Navy’s ongoing effort in the Gulf of Aden underscores China’s strong interest inSince China’s emergence as a global protecting maritime commerce, from botheconomic actor, it has relied nearly traditional and non-traditional threats. Theexclusively on the United States as the United States welcomes China’s contributionguarantor of a safe and unrestricted maritime to maintaining the safety and security of thedomain. Approximately 90 percent of global maritime domain. This deploymentChina’s trade volume is conducted via underscores an area where mutual interest canmaritime transport and approximately 50 foster cooperation.percent of global merchant traffic passesthrough regional waters. GREAT POWER STATUSThis dependency has prompted greaterattention to SLOC protection missions. PRC China’s ambitious naval modernizationofficials have expressed particular concern remains a great source of pride for the PRCover the Strait of Malacca. Even with its public and leadership. China has deployed itsrecent advances in naval power, would face most modern ships to engage in navalgreat difficulty responding to threats to diplomacy and counter-piracy in a coalitionshipping in the far reaches of the South China environment. Many in China see naval powerSea, including the Strait of Malacca. as a prerequisite for great power status. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 61
  • 72. PRC officials and commentators occasionally capabilities… still have a relatively long waylament the fact that China is the only to go to catch up with that of the Westernpermanent member of the U.S. Security countries.‖Council without an aircraft carrier. The PLA China’s regional capabilities have improvedNavy’s anticipated deployment of aircraft significantly over the past two decades.carriers over the coming decade will likely However, in the near term, China would faceserve as a great source of national pride, great difficulty projecting military powerregardless of actual combat capability. beyond regional waters during a sustainedChina’s leaders have tapped into this conflict. China lacks overseas bases andnationalistic sentiment, contrasting China’s supply infrastructure, and despite some recentcurrent naval power with the late Qing progress, remains reliant on shore-basedDynasty, which was easily overwhelmed by defenses. Over time, China’s growingmore modern Japanese and Western naval involvement in international peacekeepingforces. On December 27, 2006, President Hu efforts, military diplomacy, counter-piracyJintao expressed confidence in China’s naval operations, humanitarian assistance anddevelopment, asserting to a group of PLA disaster relief, evacuation of Chinese citizensNavy officers that China was now ―a great from overseas trouble spots, and exercisemaritime power‖ (haiyang daguo), adding activity, will improve the PLA’s capability tothat the PRC must continue strengthening and operate at greater distances from themodernizing its Navy. mainland. This operational experience could eventually facilitate a ―global‖ militarySEA-BASED NUCLEAR FORCES presence, should China’s leadership pursue that course.China continues efforts to deploy a sea-basednuclear deterrent. Although the PLA Navy ASSESSING THE FUTUREhas received the JIN-class SSBN, it has facedrepeated challenges with the JL-2 weapons The evolution of China’s economic andsystem. The system did not reach an initial geostrategic interests has fundamentallyoperational capability (IOC) by 2010 as DoD altered Beijing’s view of maritime power.had anticipated. Once China overcomes Today, the PLA Navy and China’s civilianremaining technical hurdles, the PLA Navy maritime agencies are addressing gaps inwill be charged with protection of a nuclear regional capabilities while engaging in aasset. small number of peacetime operations beyond the region, where their capabilities remainOVERCOMING KEY CHALLENGES more limited. The expansion of missions reflects the availability of resources and theAlthough areas of PLA progress frequently PRC’s increasingly diverse interests.attract attention, lesser understood capabilitygaps remain. For example, the Gulf of Aden Beyond immediate regional interests, China’sdeployment has underscored the complexity expanding capabilities might facilitate greaterof distant operations to China’s military and attention to maritime challenges further intocivilian leadership. According to Rear the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In contrast toAdmiral Yin Zhuo, the Gulf of Aden mission a decade ago, many of China’s new navalhas ―shown the Navy’s equipment is not platforms can utilize space-basedparticularly suited to blue water operations... communications, advanced sensors, and area[and] our equipment, our technology, air-defense, enabling combat capability atespecially our level of information great distances from land. Current peacetimeinfrastructure and communication means, as deployments are providing PLA Navywell as our blue water deployment Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 62
  • 73. operators with valuable experience outside of China regarding the nature and scope of itsthe region. maritime ambitions could help mitigate suspicions and ensure that China’s maritimeThe establishment of overseas bases and the development becomes a source of globaldevelopment of more than a few aircraft stability rather than a source of friction.carriers might signal a trend towards more―global‖ missions. Greater openness from Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 63
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  • 75. SPECIAL TOPIC: CHINA’S MILITARY ENGAGEMENTThe PLA has increasingly engaged with training. PLA Navy port calls within Asiaforeign militaries over the past decade. At the and beyond the region have steadily increasedoperational level, military engagement since 2002. In 2010, the PLA maintained aprovides opportunities to share doctrine, regular presence in over 100 countries with attactics, techniques, and procedures with other least 300 attachés posted abroad, up from 201militaries, both modern and developing. At in 2002 and 220 in 2005. The number ofthe strategic level, military engagement countries with defense attachés in Beijing isallows Beijing to demonstrate its capabilities also increasing. As of 2010, 102 countriesand emerging role in the international system. had established military attaché offices in China, up from 79 countries in 1996.China’s military modernization has facilitatedcooperation in two key respects. First, PLA The PLA Navy’s counter-piracy role in themodernization has removed capability-based Gulf of Aden has provided opportunities toconstraints, allowing the PLA to operate with advance China’s image as a modern militarymore advanced forces and at greater distances that can act alongside other major worldfrom the PRC mainland. Just a decade ago, navies. PLA Navy port calls made both in thefor example, China’s sustained deployment to region and in transit to and from the Gulf ofthe Gulf of Aden and the many associated Aden reinforce China’s political, military, andforeign engagements would have proven economic ties with those countries.exceedingly difficult, if not impossible for China hosts foreign military officers asChina. students in its military academies. In OctoberSecond, Beijing takes pride in ―showing the 2009, foreign military students from over 70flag‖ with an increasingly modern array of countries observed the PLA exerciseplatforms, both imported and indigenously VANGUARD 2009, which included a livedesigned. The international fanfare fire demonstration. The first PLA exercisesurrounding the PLA Navy’s 60th Anniversary opened to observation by foreign militarycelebration in 2009 underscored the growing students was QIANFENG 2008, whichconfidence in China’s military development reportedly involved an armored brigadeand desire to showcase these achievements. conducting an offensive maneuver in a mountainous area.TRADITIONAL MILITARY The PLA’s first instance of a mixed trainingDIPLOMACY class with both Chinese and foreign officersSenior level visits and exchanges provide the culminated with a June 2009 graduationPRC with opportunities to increase military ceremony at the Air Force Command Collegeofficers’ international exposure, communicate (AFCC), which included 56 officers from theChina’s positions to foreign audiences, better air forces of 29 foreign countries and 12understand alternative world views, and officers from the PLA Air Force.advance foreign relations throughinterpersonal contacts and military assistance COMBINED EXERCISESprograms. The PLA participates in a growing number ofPLA engagement with foreign partners has bilateral and multilateral military exercisesgrown in tandem with China’s global profile, in areas such as counter-terrorism, mobilityenabling China’s military officers to observe operations, and logistics. The PLA gainsand study foreign military command operational insight by observing tactics,structures, unit formations, and operational Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 65
  • 76. command decision making, and equipment In January 2004, China had just 359used by more advanced militaries. peacekeepers deployed to eight UN peacekeeping missions, with no singleChina is eager to present these activities as contingent containing more than 70 troops.constructive, peaceful, and not directed Six years later, in January 2010, China hadagainst any other country. Many of the 2,131 peacekeepers (all non-combat)PLA’s exercises with foreign militaries are supporting 10 UN missions, with five separateconducted under the rubric of counter- contingents containing more than 200 troops.terrorism. Beijing has held exercises China is now the leading contributor ofbilaterally with Russia, India, Pakistan, peacekeeping personnel among the fiveThailand, Singapore, Australia, and permanent members of the UN Securitymultilaterally with the Shanghai Cooperation Council. PRC contributions have consisted ofOrganization and the various countries that civilian police; military observers; andparticipated in the Pakistan-hosted exercise engineering, logistics, and medical troops.AMAN-09. In 2010, the PLA conducted five China provided several rotations of over 100training exercises with foreign militaries,three of which were held in China. police officers to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).Additionally, China has invited foreign In 2010, China will shoulder approximatelymilitary observers and resident military $300 million of the UN peacekeeping budget.attachés to observe PLA exercises on at least China regards participation in UNsix occasions since 2003, enabling China to peacekeeping operations as serving multipleproject an overall national image of ―peaceful objectives, including improving China’sdevelopment‖ and increased military international standing and image,transparency. demonstrating support for internationalThe PLA Navy routinely conducts search and stability in troubled regions, providingrescue exercises with foreign militaries, opportunities to initiate and expandincluding exercises with Australia, the United intelligence collection, and enhancingKingdom, India, Pakistan, Japan, New relationships in the affected areas. BeijingZealand, Russia, Vietnam, and others. These has also demonstrated a growing willingnessexercises serve training purposes and build to deploy personnel on missions whererapport with foreign countries. conditions are more hazardous. After the 2006 death of a PRC peacekeeper in Lebanon,PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS for example, the PLA increased its troop contributions to the UN Interim Force inPrior to 2002, Beijing generally avoided Lebanon (UNIFIL). As of July 2010, Beijingparticipation in UN peacekeeping operations will be deploying over 400 members of the 7th(PKO), due to lingering skepticism of the Chinese Peacekeeping Troops to support theinternational system and a long-stated policy African Union-UN Mission in Sudan.of ―non-interference‖ in other countries’internal affairs. China’s participation from Highlighting PRC interest in PKO’s, China1991-1993 in the UN Transitional Authority opened the Ministry of National Defensein Cambodia marked a notable exception to (MND) Peacekeeping Center in July 2009, thethis policy. China’s attitude towards UN first PLA peacekeeping facility dedicated toPKOs has changed dramatically over the past professional training and internationaldecade, particularly since Hu Jintao exchange. Later in September 2010, thepromulgated the New Historic Missions in MND co-hosted with the UN the first senior2004. commanders’ training course on peacekeeping. Although China has yet to deploy combat troops for peacekeeping duty, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 66
  • 77. Beijing has openly discussed this as a future HA/DR operations, which were adopted inpossibility. July 2007. China has also learned that growing capabilityHUMANITARIAN and capacity can heighten foreignASSISTANCE/DISASTER RELIEF expectations for support. For example, inOver the past decade the PLA steadily August 2010, critics suggested that manyincreased its participation in international nations, including China, had reacted tooHA/DR missions. Investment in large slowly and inadequately to Pakistan’s massiveamphibious ships, a new hospital ship, long- flooding. Despite the close politicalrange transport aircraft, and improved relationship between Beijing and Islamabad,logistics has made this mission a practical China’s early contributions to the 2010reality. Since 2002, the PLA has contributed disaster response were small compared toto at least thirteen emergency relief operations those of other fourteen countries in China’s immediateregion as well as in Haiti during the aftermath ARMS SALESof the earthquake in January 2010. Like Beijing conducts arms sales to enhancePKOs, involvement in international HA/DR foreign relationships and generate revenue.enables China to present a positive face to its Although weighted more towards small armsmilitary development while simultaneously and ammunition, PRC arms sales also includeadvancing China’s image as a responsible the joint development or transfer of advancedglobal power. weapons systems. Chinese companies sellIn late 2010, PLA Navy’s new hospital ship primarily to developing countries wherePEACE ARK conducted the 88-day China’s lower-cost weapons and fewer―MISSION HARMONY-2010‖ deployment political constraints provide a competitiveto the Gulf of Aden to provide medical care to advantage. Arms sales also play a role inthe PLA Navy counter-piracy flotilla and to advancing trade relationships, particularlytreat needy residents in Djibouti, Kenya, where energy or valuable raw materials areTanzania, Seychelles, and Bangladesh. This concerned. For example, arms sales and othermission marked the PLA Navy’s first foreign forms of security assistance to Iran and Sudandeployment of a hospital ship. have deepened ties and helped to offset the cost of PRC energy imports. Arms sales playThe PLA’s humanitarian relief capability and an important role in China’s efforts tocapacity remains limited, but China is seeking influence cash-strapped countries, many ofto collaborate with regional partners to which do not have access to other sources ofimprove these capabilities. China and arms for either political or economic reasons.Indonesia drafted the ―Association of As the quality and range of PRC-producedSoutheast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional arms improves, Beijing will be increasinglyForum General Guidelines on Disaster Relief able to wield arms sales as an instrument ofCooperation‖ to steer the development of influence.Standard Operating Procedures for future Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 67
  • 78. PRC Arms Sales From 2005 to 2010, China sold approximately $11 billion worth of conventional weapons systems worldwide, ranging from general purpose materiel to major end items. PRC arms exports will likely increase in the coming years as China’s domestic defense industry improves. Although China’s defense industry is primarily oriented toward supplying the PLA, foreign arms sales are also important. Arms sales provide a means to cultivate relationships with important strategic partners, such as Pakistan, while generating revenue for its defense industry. PRC defense firms are marketing and selling arms throughout the world, with the bulk of their sales to Asia and the Middle East/North Africa. China is able to make gains in these markets because of modest improvements in quality of its equipment coupled with relatively low costs and favorable conditions for payment. PRC Worldwide Arms Sales. Arms sales for 2005-2010, by region.From 2005-2010, China sold approximately China is targeting niche markets, introducing$11 billion worth of conventional weapons weapons systems not offered by Russian orsystems worldwide. Pakistan remains Western suppliers. These systems includeChina’s primary customer for conventional GPS and GLOSNASS-equipped multipleweapons. Beijing engages in both arms sales rocket launcher systems and short-rangeand defense industrial cooperation with ballistic missiles that have been marketed andIslamabad. Sales to Islamabad have included sold to Middle East and African partners.the JF-17 fighter aircraft and associated The volume of PRC defense sales is stillproduction facilities; F-22P frigates with modest compared to the world’s leading armshelicopters; K-8 jet trainers; F-7 fighter sellers. However, interest in PRC arms willaircraft; early warning and control aircraft; likely increase in the future as China’stanks; air-to-air missiles; anti-ship cruise defense firms market and sell increasinglymissiles; missile technologies; and small arms sophisticated yet affordable arms. Chinaand ammunition. Sales to other countries offers generous repayment options andinclude fighter, transport, and jet trainer technology transfer to persuade otheraircraft; helicopters; tanks; air defense countries to purchase from PRC, including radar, rockets, militaryvehicles, patrol boats, missiles and missiletechnology; and small arms and ammunition. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 68
  • 79. Sales to Areas of Instability sanctions against Sudanese officials accused of atrocities. China continues toSeveral PRC entities continue to provide arms sell arms to Sudan despite the passage ofto customers in unstable regions. UN Security Council Resolutions 1556 Iran: China supported UN Security (2004) and 1591 (2005), both of which Council Resolutions 1737, 1747, 1803, ban the transfer of arms to Darfur. 1835, and 1929. China has stated that it is Between 2004 and 2006, when the committed to implementing resolution violence in Darfur was at its peak, 90 1929 and the other resolutions on Iran percent of small arms sales to Sudan were fully and faithfully, but China has also of PRC origin. The PRC argues that arms stated that it does not support sanctions sales constitute part of normal commercial beyond those contained in the UN relations, and that the arms supplied by resolutions. China has stated that it agrees Chinese companies were not meant for with the United States that a nuclear- use in Darfur. However, UN Group of armed Iran would pose a grave regional Experts and NGO reports have and international threat. The United demonstrated that Chinese arms have been States is continuing to work closely with used by the Sudanese government in China on this issue. A number of PRC combat operations in Darfur. transfers to Iran resulted in U.S. trade penalties and sanctions against entities in CONCLUSION China. Some weapons that PRC entities supplied to Iran were found to have been Beijing’s approach to international transferred to terrorist organizations in engagement has evolved with its perception Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a serious of its own interests in a dynamic security issue that the United States continues to environment. As China’s regional and monitor. international interests expand, so too will China’s impetus for additional engagement, Sudan: The PRC has at times used its especially in the areas of peacekeeping influence with the Sudanese government operations, HA/DR, and joint exercises. In to address in a positive way international addition to furthering PLA modernization, concerns over Darfur and to support the these engagements will likely be geared implementation of the Comprehensive toward building China’s political ties, Peace Agreement between North and assuaging fears about China’s rise, and South Sudan. However, China has sided expanding China’s international influence, with Khartoum at the UN Security particularly in Asia. Council, including blocking targeted Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 69
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  • 81. APPENDIX I: CHINA AND TAIWAN FORCES DATAMilitary and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 71
  • 82. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Ground Forces China Taiwan Total Taiwan Strait Area TotalPersonnel (Active) 1.25 million 400,000 130,000Group Armies 18 8 3Infantry Divisions 17 5 0Infantry Brigades 22 9 8Mechanized Infantry Divisions 6 2 0Mechanized Infantry Brigades 6 1 3Armor Divisions 9 4 0Armor Brigades 8 3 4Artillery Divisions 2 2 0Artillery Brigades 17 6 5Airborne Divisions 3 3 0Amphibious Divisions 2 2 0Amphibious Brigades 3 3 3Tanks 7,000 3,100 1,100Artillery Pieces 8,000 3,400 1,600Note: PLA active ground forces are organized into Group Armies. Infantry, armor, and artillery units areorganized into a combination of divisions and brigades deployed throughout the PLA’s seven MRs. Asignificant portion of these assets are deployed in the Taiwan Strait area, specifically the Nanjing,Guangzhou, and Jinan MRs. Taiwan has seven Defense Commands, three of which have Field Armies.Each Army contains an Artillery Command roughly equivalent to a brigade plus. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 72
  • 83. Major Ground Units Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 73
  • 84. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Naval Forces China Taiwan East and South Sea Total Total FleetsDestroyers 26 16 4Frigates 53 44 22Tank Landing Ships/ 27 25 12Amphibious Transport DockMedium Landing Ships 28 21 4Diesel Attack Submarines 49 33 4Nuclear Attack Submarines 5 2 0Coastal Patrol (Missile) 86 68 61Note: The PLA Navy has the largest force of principal combatants, submarines, and amphibious warfare ships inAsia. After years of neglect, the force of missile-armed patrol craft is also growing. In the event of a major Taiwanconflict, the East and South Sea Fleets would be expected to participate in direct action against the Taiwan Navy.The North Sea Fleet would be responsible primarily for protecting Beijing and the northern coast, but could providemission-critical assets to support other fleets. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 74
  • 85. Major Naval Units Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 75
  • 86. Taiwan Strait Military Balance, Air Forces China Taiwan Within range of Aircraft Total Total Taiwan Fighters 1,680 330 388 Bombers/Attack 620 160 22 Transport 450 40 21Note: The PLAAF and the PLA Navy have approximately 2,300 operational combat aircraft. Theseconsist of air defense and multi-role fighters, ground attack aircraft, fighter-bombers, and bombers.An additional 1,450 older fighters, bombers and trainers are employed for training and R&D. Thetwo air arms also possess approximately 450 transports and over 100 surveillance andreconnaissance aircraft with intelligence, surface search, and airborne early warning capabilities.The majority of PLAAF and PLA Navy aircraft are based in the eastern half of the country.Currently, 490 aircraft could conduct combat operations against Taiwan without refueling.However, this number could be significantly increased through any combination of aircraft forwarddeployment, decreased ordnance loads, or altered mission profiles. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 76
  • 87. Major Air Units Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 77
  • 88. China’s Missile ForceSystem Missiles Launchers Estimated RangeICBM 50-75 50-75 5,400-13,000+ kmIRBM 5-20 5-20 3,000+ kmMRBM 75-100 75-100 1,750+ kmSRBM 1,000-1,200 200-250 300-600 kmGLCM 200-500 40-55 1,500+ km Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 78
  • 89. APPENDIX II: MILITARY-TO-MILITARY EXCHANGESMilitary and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 79
  • 90. Bilateral and Multilateral Exercises Since 2005Year Exercise Name Type of Exercise Participants China-India Friendship 2005 Search and Rescue India China-Pakistan Friendship 2005 Search and Rescue Pakistan2005 China-Thailand Friendship 2005 Search and Rescue Thailand Peace Mission 2005 Counter-terrorism Russia Cooperation 2006 Counter-terrorism Tajikistan2006 Friendship 2006 Counter-terrorism Pakistan Unnamed Search and Rescue United States Aman (Peace) 2007 Search and Rescue Pakistan China-France Friendship 2007 Maritime France China-Spain Friendship 2007 Maritime Spain Cooperation 2007 Counter-terrorism Russia Hand-in-Hand 2007 Counter-terrorism India Russia, Kazakhstan, Peace Mission 2007 Counter-terrorism Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,2007 Uzbekistan Strike 2007 Counter-terrorism Thailand United States, France, Japan, Western Pacific Naval Symposium Search and Rescue Australia, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, ROK, Singapore Unnamed Maritime India Unnamed Search and Rescue Australia, New Zealand Hand-in-Hand 2008 Counter-terrorism India2008 Strike 2008 Counter-terrorism Thailand Hosted by Pakistan Aman (Peace) 2009 Maritime2009 (38 countries participated) Cooperation 2009 Counter-terrorism Singapore Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 80
  • 91. Country-Gate Sharp Sword 2009 Counter-terrorism Russia Peace Angel 2009 Medical Gabon Peacekeeping Peace Keeping Mission 2009 Mongolia Operations2009 Peace Mission 2009 Counter-terrorism Russia Peace Shield 2009 Counter-piracy Russia Unnamed Maritime Singapore Blue Strike/Blue Assault 2010 Counter-terrorism Thailand Cooperation 2010 Counter-terrorism Singapore Friendship 2010 Counter-terrorism Pakistan Ground Friendship Action 2010 Romania (Mountain Warfare) Peace Angel 2010 Medical Peru Russia, Kazakhstan, Peace Mission 2010 Counter-terrorism Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan2010 Strike 2010 Counter-terrorism Thailand Unnamed Search and Rescue Australia Unnamed Maritime New Zealand Unnamed Counter-Piracy South Korea Unnamed Search and Rescue Taiwan Unnamed Air Turkey Unnamed Ground Turkey Unnamed Search and Rescue VietnamChinese Involvement in bilateral and multilateral military exercises since 2005. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 81
  • 92. Countries Visited by Senior Chinese Military Leaders, 2005-2010 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Argentina Australia Argentina Bahrain Australia AngolaBangladesh Belarus Chile Belarus Bulgaria AustraliaCuba Burma Cuba Brazil Burma BrazilDenmark Cambodia Greece Brunei Finland ColombiaEgypt Denmark Japan Chile Germany CongoGermany France Kuwait Germany Japan EgyptIndia Hungary Kyrgyzstan Hungary New Zealand GermanyKazakhstan India Mongolia India North Korea IndonesiaNetherlands Laos Philippines Indonesia Pakistan KazakhstanPhilippines Malaysia Russia Italy Papua New Kenya GuineaRussia New Zealand South Korea Japan Macedonia RussiaSudan North Korea Thailand Nepal Mexico Serbia-Tajikistan Norway United States Norway Mongolia MontenegroTanzania Pakistan Uzbekistan Oman Namibia SingaporeTurkey Romania Vietnam Qatar New Zealand SlovakiaUruguay Russia Saudi Arabia North Korea South Korea Singapore Serbia- Pakistan Thailand Montenegro South Korea Romania Turkey Singapore Tajikistan Russia United States South Korea Thailand Serbia Vietnam Tajikistan United States Singapore Thailand Vietnam Tanzania United Arab Turkmenistan Emirates United Kingdom Venezuela Vietnam Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 82
  • 93. Senior Foreign Military Officials Visiting China in 2010Afghanistan Guyana QatarAlgeria India RwandaAngola Italy SerbiaAustralia Japan SingaporeAustria Laos SwitzerlandAzerbaijan Lebanon ThailandBelarus Macedonia TongaBolivia Montenegro TurkeyBurma Nepal UgandaCambodia New Zealand United Arab EmiratesCongo North Korea United KingdomCuba Norway VietnamEthiopia Oman ZambiaGhana Pakistan ZimbabweGreece PolandThis list includes visits by senior defense officials and chiefs of the armed services. It excludes visits associated withmultilateral military exercises. Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 83
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