Nationalism, Modernization, Globalization and Quebec

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This paper explores the effects of Modernization and Globalization paradigms on Quebec Nationalism.

This paper explores the effects of Modernization and Globalization paradigms on Quebec Nationalism.

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  • 1. The Influence Of Modernization & Globalization On Quebec Nationalism By Todd Julie For Professor Sanjay Jeram POL438 June 23, 2012 1
  • 2. Q: How have the successive developments, modernization and globalization,informed Francophone nationalism in the post-WWII period? 2
  • 3. I argue that modernization and later globalization built up and broke down successiveinstitutions that encouraged the transformation of elite Francophone classes, who thenproceeded to further shape and be shaped by those same institutions. More specifically, Iwill argue that modernization and globalization paradigms: 1) shaped the eliteFrancophone class, who moved, generally speaking, from religion to politics to businessas they moved from one paradigm to the next. 2) Shaped the societal institutions (bothQuébécois and Canadian) that shaped this elite. The leapfrog dynamic betweeninstitutional and political forces best allows us to understand the larger transformation ofQuebec nationalism. In historical view: Modernization first creates an educated elite,within existing Catholic educational institutions, then prompts them to craft new secularinstitutions (the welfare state), partner with others (labour unions) and create a modernQuébécois identity in order to fight against traditional barriers to their advancement.These “Quiet Revolution” political institutions create new elites who, encountering thelimitations of modernization, craft new economic institutions in step with globalization,breaking their bonds even further.In order to speak about modernization, globalization or elites, we must first define ourterms. For our purposes we understand Modernization as a state-centric mode and theoryof development that harnesses social, political and economic forces to this singular foci.In the post-WWII period this has meant the development by each state of its ownindustrial base, Keynesian economics and the welfare state. Unlike modernization,globalization is an internationally focused mode and theory of development that tends toplace limitations on state governments to ensure common and open terms of trade 3
  • 4. between countries. This has generally entailed the de-industrialization of rich countriesand the curtailment of the previous welfare state. In practice, both processes have been atwork throughout the post-war period. They have been separated here for the sake ofclarity. A case can be made for doing so because while they overlap in practice, theyhave been somewhat more separate as successively dominant theoretical paradigms forelite action. Our definition of elites is kept necessarily broad, in order to draw out larger,generalized transformations of Quebec nationalism. By elites, we mean only those in theeducated classes prominent enough to influence the direction of Quebec nationalism.Modernization created both a new middle class of industrial workers and a newprofessional class in Quebec1. McRoberts explains, "the conversion of Quebecnationalism to the goals of modernity was due to a multitude of changes in FrenchQuebec society . . . Urbanization, industrialization, the emergence of mass media, and inparticular, the rise of new social classes"2. Industrialization took place early in thetwentieth century in Quebec and the eventual institutional modernization of the QuietRevolution owes itself to this material change in the forces of production. While thesenew classes had been raised and educated within the old traditional structures of thechurch, the church alone could not provide modern employment opportunities for suchvast numbers of educated professionals. It also lost control of the labour movement asthe unions grew and moved their discourse to the secularized left3. Both these modernclasses, workers and elites, could see a common enemy in the Anglophone business1 Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” in Nations AndNationalism, 16 (3), 2010: 4322 McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle for National Unity (Toronto: Oxford UniversityPress, 1997) 323 Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432 4
  • 5. community. The province’s wealthy Anglophone minority exclusively occupied the toppositions in Quebec’s big businesses.Elite political influence and events played a crucial a role in the timing of the transitionfrom traditionalist to modern Quebec nationalism. French-Canadian nationalism has itsroots in traditional, ethno-cultural institutions. From the Quebec Act of 1775 (andbefore) up until the Quiet Revolution, the pillars of Francophone identity were the RomanCatholic Church, the Civil Code, the Seigniorial system of land holding and the Frenchlanguage. However, all that time a more modern liberal conception of the nation existedand tried repeatedly to take power. The Constitution Act of 1791 gave representativeassemblies to both Upper and Lower Canada and led to struggles for control of the housebetween Anglo leaders and an emerging Francophone Petit Bourgeoisie in league withthe majority agrarian population of Lower Canada4. McRoberts describes how thesestruggles eventually led to a nationalist movement and in 1837, armed insurrection. Thedefeat of this rebellion led to the merging of the Canadas and a surprising cooperationbetween French and English Canadians5. Throughout confederation Quebec struggledwith the rest of Canada over the meaning of Canadian federalism. In the twentiethcentury the long hold on power of Premiere Maurice Duplessiss conservative UnionNationale (1936-1959, with a brief liberal interval during WWII) with its base intraditionalist rural Quebec, meant that the Quiet Revolution took place later than itotherwise might have. Duplessis rode to power on a platform of "faith, language, race"6 -a perfect example of pre-modern nationalism. However, new forces were emerging in4 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 55 Ibid., 6-96 Erk, Is Nationalism Left or Right, 432 5
  • 6. Quebec. The political alliance between the Francophone elite and the growing labourmovement finally secured a new conception of nationalism, based on modernization inQuebec7.Modernization recommended a particular kind of nationalism and elites would seek tomold their movement in this image. The earlier Duplessis government, while nationalistin a certain sense, was not ideologically animated by modernization theory and so, whileit guarded its own political rights, it did not seek to intervene in the social or economiclife of the province8. In 1960, with the election of the Quebec liberal party of JeanLesage, the new Francophone elite were in and they quickly began taking control of thesocial, economic an political life of the province9. Lesage articulated this new conceptionof the role of government perfectly. French Canadians, he said, "feel that in Quebecthere is a government that is able to play an irreplaceable role in the development of theircollective identity, their way of living, their civilization, their values"10. Francophonenationalism now gave way to Québécois nationalism, a territorially-based concept thatreflected the transfer of the reigns of the nationalist movement from a porous culturally-based movement that might exist beyond Quebec in other French speaking parts ofCanada, to a political one bound by Quebec provincial jurisdiction. Industrialmodernization, both in fact and as a commitment of the new elites, also required thecontinued influx of new immigrants to work in factories. Therefore Quebec nationalismcould no longer be based on ethnicity and became based primarily on language, which7 Ibid., 4328 Ibid., 4329 Beland, D. & Lecours, A., “The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism And Social Policy ReformIn Canada, The United Kingdom and Belgium” in Comparative Political Studies, Vol.38 No.6, 2005: 68510 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 34 6
  • 7. any new immigrant could learn. This meant the province would place extremeimportance on control of language laws. New immigrants had to be compelled to learnFrench or the nationalist project would be undermined. As Kenneth McRoberts says,"The central place of the Quebec government in the project of a modern francophonesociety gave a greatly expanded meaning to the claim that Quebec was not a provincelike the others"11. Lesage began calling the province LEtat du Quebec12 and elitenationalists would soon begin to push for some sort of constitutional protection of theirpolitical gains13.The nationalist government began to intervene in the Quebec economy, gearing ittowards the nationalist project. Hydro-Quebec was created in 1962 by nationalizing anumber of private electricity companies14. The government began to funnel public fundsinto institutions like the “Caisse de Depot et de placement”, which invested money from“Quebec pension funds, retirement insurance plans and various other public agencies”15and “la societe generale de financement” to invest heavily in Francophone businesses16.More than this, these agencies were tasked with modernizing Quebec’s industrialstructures17. Pierre Arbour describes how state intervention accelerated during the first11 Ibid., 3412 Ibid,, 3413 Ibid., 34-3514 Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism (Montreal: Robert Davies Publishing,1993) 2115 Ibid., 2016 Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan” in PacificAffairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001: 21517 Arbour, Quebec Inc., 21 7
  • 8. term in office of the Parti Québécois 18. The imbalance in pay that had existed betweenAnglophones and Francophones within the province was overcome19Modernization ensured the social democratic character of Québécois nationalism. Intaking over the political, social, economic life in Quebec from more traditionalconservative elements the modernizing liberal elite also tied its new brand of Quebecnationalism to socially progressive policies20. Denis & Denis have found the rise ofnationalism and labour unions in Quebec to be intimately intertwined21 and the labourunion was itself an institutional product of modernization. Their power is based on massproduction, mass consumption, collective bargaining, Keynesian demand managementand the welfare state22. Cooperation was crucial for Quebec politicians in making theirinitial claim to represent the interests of the entire Québécois nation. In 1964 the Quebecgovernment’s new Labour Code was the envy of workers throughout the rest of Canada23.In the middle 70s, Quebec unions helped to create the Parti Québécois 24. Denis & Denisexplain, "government initially sought formulas that would enlist the aid of the labourmovement in their national economic efforts, offering in exchange to maintain the goal offull employment"25. During the Quiet Revolution Francophone elite power was based ondemocratically elected governments with the support of labour. However, they were not18 Ibid,, 2719 Hamilton, P., “Converging Nationalisms” in nationalism In Ethnic Politics, 10 (2004): 66820 Beland & Lecours, The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity, 68521 Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec” inLaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Pressesde l’Universite de Quebec,1995: 22222 Ibid., 21923 Ibid., 22024 Ibid., 21825 Ibid., 221 8
  • 9. yet firmly entrenched in business. Had they secured top positions in business beforegovernment, one wonders whether the result would still have been a social democraticnationalist movement.Modernization also created a much stronger conflict between French and English Canadain two important ways. Firstly, as McRoberts explains, "the older French-Canadiannationalism had been largely focused on private, church-based institutions. Thus thenation could be advanced in ways that did not impinge at all on the Canadian politicalorder"26. The commitment of both groups of elites to modernization theories ofdevelopment, meant that both pursued modern state building projects along the samepolitical, social and economic lines simultaneously27. Of course, each had in mind adifferent state that reflected their own power base. Secondly, each side thought of theissue in a slightly different context. The Canadian state defined itself in opposition toincreasing post-war American encroachment28. Since Quebec and Canada both definedthemselves in opposition to possible assimilation into a larger whole, both felt unity wasrequired at lower levels in the face of the larger threat. As a result, Quebec and thefederal government did not negotiate the question of Quebec nationalism with exclusivereference to one another but also in reference to their own specific concerns.Politicians at both the nationalist and federal level also brought their own specificunderstandings of modernization and nationalism to the table. The Pearson governmenthad flirted with a more asymmetrical, dualist approach to Quebecs demands. It enacted a26 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 3827 Ibid., 3828 Ibid., 37 9
  • 10. "contracting out formula" that allowed the Quebec government to take control of a seriesof social program policies that were the preserve of the federal government elsewhere inthe country29. Intellectuals in Quebec and English Canada pushed the idea of an English-Canadian nationalism that would have then allowed for cooperation with French-Canadian nationalism in a dualistic state30. However, these pleas were rejected with theelection of Pierre Trudeau. Prime Minister Trudeau continuously equated Quebecnationalism with its traditional, ethnicity-based roots and would not credit any notion ofmodern, liberally based nationalism. For him modernization was based on individualismand was explicitly non-national31. Trudeau sought to re-orient Francophone loyaltiestoward the Canadian state and away from the province of Quebec. His languagelegislation, establishing bilingualism within the federal government and across thecountry was emblematic of this32. Trudeau’s limited conception of the role he wouldallow the Quebec government would lead to nationalist elite conversion to the goal ofsecession33.Not only did Modernization encourage different reference points for each party, it alsoframed the competition in a particular way. As long as the competition was political, theexisting Canadian state possessed the obvious advantage of being an actual state. Withinthe Modernization framework, there was no greater authority. Quebec politicians couldmake league with the labour movement and ordinary French Canadians but there was no29 Ibid., 4230 Ibid., 5431 Ibid., 5932 Ibid., 65, 7933 McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And Racial Studies, Vol.2, No.3,1979: 313 10
  • 11. higher institution above the state they could appeal to. The federal government thuscontrolled the game. During the 1980 referendum the feds threatened hard financialbargaining and potential financial ruin in the case of Quebec secession34. They could alsoreach down to disrupt Quebec unity. Trudeaus multiculturalism policy was certainlyviewed in this light. Granting minority group rights threatened to turn Quebecnationalism into just one of many minority group concerns in Canada35. This problemwould plague Quebec nationalists who wanted secession from Canada. After defeat inthe 1995 secessionist referendum, Jacques Parizeau stated the referendum had failed dueto “money and the ethnic vote”36. Despite the offensive way Parizeau framed hisstatement it was largely true. The vote had been extremely close and the immigrant votehad decided the issue37. The Prime Minister could also play provinces against oneanother. During the 1982 constitutional debate, Trudeau was able to detach the Quebecpremiere Rene Levesque from a provincial premier’s coalition and get an agreementsigned without Quebec’s ratification38. With this act, Trudeau locked in his specificunderstanding of modernization with the protection of individual rights over group rights.Globalization gave a wholly different cast to the nationalist struggle of elites by offeringthe appeal to the higher institutions that had been lacking under the modernizationparadigm. While the Quiet revolution had been conceived of along modernization theorylines, it had been frustrated in its more state-centric, constitutional aims. The FTA,34 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 15735 Kymlicka, W., “Citizenship, Communities And Identity In Canada” in Bickerton, J. & Gagnon, A.G.(ed.) Canadian Politics, Toronto: University Of Toronto Press Inc., 2009: 2636 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 23237 Ibid., 23038 Ibid., 165 11
  • 12. NAFTA and the WTO seemed to limit the federal government’s powers of interventionand offer financial security to Quebec in the case of a successful sovereignty referendum.The Belanger-Campeau report (a 1991 report by the Quebec National Assembly on thepolitics and constitutional future of Quebec39) even thought the FTA might increase thechances for sovereignty40. Further, provincial subsidies used to create "Quebec Inc.",were not immediately challenged by the FTA. Drover and Leung relate how “regulationson tariffs, subsidies and countervail applied initially only to the federal government”41.However elites understood that eventually the Quebec government would be restrained tosome extent, along with the federal government. It began to “give greater weight toprivate companies” and “placed increasing reliance on cooperative funds rather thandirect state support”42. Another transfer of power now occurred, from the Quietrevolution era political elite, to the new business elite of Quebec Inc.Globalization offered a new way towards sovereignty that harmonized with theascendancy of newly emergent Francophone business leaders in Quebec. During the firstyears of the Quiet revolution most elites took jobs within the provincial state and publicsector43. In the late 1960s, government jobs had begun to dry up, leading to calls to makeFrench the language of business in Quebec44. In the late 1970s the Francophone businessclass, created by the 1974 Bill 22 language legislation, came to maturity. Though bothgroups, political and business, continued to mutually support one another, the new39 LaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. & Weinroth, M.)(Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995) 15140 Drover & Leung, Taiwan & Quebec, 21441 Ibid., 21642 Ibid., 21643 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 9944 Ibid., 99-100 12
  • 13. business branch of the elite began to outgrow their provincial boundaries and look for away to expand into foreign markets. Writing in 1995, Andre Turcotte asserted "thesupport of a large portion of Quebecs political and business classes for continentalintegration is a reflection of their views on the new maturity of the Francophonesegments within those classes and the need for structural changes that would allow thosegroups to reach their objectives"45.Calls for privatization of state (Quebec)-owned businesses began to be heard, as earlierAmerican perceptions of public subsidization of Quebec companies became a barrier tofurther export growth. Globalization produced in elites a re-focusing away from thewelfare state, towards an almost exclusive focus on economics. A year after the FTA wassigned, a business roundtable chaired by Thomas Courchene provided a perfectunderstanding of the difference between the economic model pursued underGlobalization and its essential difference in regards to the earlier modernization program."Most economics-based competition models”, it was said, are “not trying to artificiallydefine markets, theyre looking at natural markets and making decisions on that basis"46.“Artificially” defining national markets had been the aim of government undermodernization. Under globalization, the state-centric focus of Quebec and federal eliteswould weaken significantly. This would urge a break with the elite’s former coalitionpartners, the labour unions.45 Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA” in LaChapelle,G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In North America, Quebec: Presses del’Universite de Quebec,1995: 24246 Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy & Universal Banking,Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989: 35 13
  • 14. Whereas state-centric Modernization theory had encouraged a broad based nationalistmovement, with strong cooperation between elites and the labour unions, globalizationwould largely remove elite interest in union support. The Close identification of thenationalist Quebec government with globalization, represented by the Free TradeAgreements, would now lead it to abandon the labour unions, who had been importantpartners during the Quiet Revolution47. The Parti Québécois who had been created withthe support of the unions now turned their back on their socially progressive policies tofocus more exclusively on the economy. This re-orientation led not only to thetemporary loss of union support but also to a series of resignations within the partyitself48. Interestingly labour would return to “critical support”49 of the PQ, only insofar asthey returned to an officially sovereigntist position50. Increasingly the unions, who hadbeen so instrumental in the Quiet Revolution would find neither elite party, the PQ orQuebec liberals had any interest in negotiating for their support51. Along with labourunions, a significant portion of the Quebec electorate did not support the FTA and aneven larger share of the electorate didnt support NAFTA52. Hamilton asserts the Quebec“public” is generally supportive of free trade53. But his statistics, while showing a higherlevel of support than in the rest of Canada, indicate an evenly divided public at best54 andhe admits in his footnotes that removing elite opinion from this statistical free trade47 Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 21848 Ibid., 21849 Denis & Denis, Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations In Quebec, 21850 Ibid., 21851 Ibid., 235 The authors write that neither the PQ of the Parti liberale now “agrees to bargain for the unionssupport in return for signifigant concessions”52 Turcotte, Uneasy Allies, 25153 Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 66654 Ibid., 667 14
  • 15. support leaves one with opposition levels similar to those in the rest of the country55.This difference of opinion represents a fracturing of the social contract within Quebec.nationalism.At this point it is necessary to offer one important aside to our general line of argument.While globalization has created tension between the Québécois elite and the public onwhom they initially based their authority, the earlier, strong identification of Quebecnationalism with social democracy and the welfare state, has made these institutionsharder to dislodge. An example of this is Laczko’s finding that social democraticinstitutions are more popular in Quebec than elsewhere in North America. Even as thePQ government cut healthcare services in the 1990’s they attempted to portray these cutsas “more gentle and caring than those carried out in neighboring Ontario or Alberta”56.Popular support for programs associated with the Quiet revolution may put them in aslightly more defendable position. Nonetheless, the downward trend in labour’s positionis unmistakable.Quebec Politicians had begun re-structuring nationalism around the new Globalizationparadigm even before the signing of the FTA. The election of the Parti Québécois led toa mass exodus of Anglo-businesses from Quebec and this had an arguably positive effectfor elite Quebec nationalism. It concentrated Quebec politicians on reinforcingFrancophone ownership of Quebec businesses. To this end, Quebec became a leader in55 Ibid., 683 “20. It is among the nationalist elite that one finds greatest support for continentalism. Onestudy indicates that mass level data show similar levels of public opposition to free trade in Quebec asfound in the rest of Canada”56 Laczko, L., “Nationalism And Welfare State Attitudes” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2,2005 15
  • 16. financial de-regulation in order to create huge concentrations of financial capital thatcould then invest heavily in Francophone businesses. Many important Quebeccompanies became essentially "take over proof"57 because they were largely owned bythese mammoth-sized Francophone financial interests. The financial elite took over fromgovernment the task of meeting regularly to decide industrial policy for the province58.Interestingly enough, after the unsuccessful 1995 referendum (and a year after the signingof the North American Free Trade Agreement), Lucien Bouchard proclaimed thatQuebecers were tired of referendums and wanted the province to focus on getting itsfinances in order59. This sentiment was not shared by the unions (mentioned earlier) whomaintained support for the Parti Québécois only to the extent that they officiallycontinued to support sovereignty for Quebec, as well as “citizens groups and other socialforces . . . The PQ’s referendum success had been partly based on strong appeals to thisclientele”60. But for the nationalist elite, Globalization, initially justified in aid ofsovereignty, had made sovereignty less important.In fact, interest in sovereignty had declined on both sides of the Anglo-French divideamong the business classes. In his article Semantics and Sovereignty, Michael Keatingdocuments the shifting loyalties of elites across this divide: The issues of free trade and market integration are also tied up with class and sectoral issues and do not just hinge on the nationalist question. . . . There is no one position shared by political leaders and public opinion, but there does appear to be an electoral market for the new, emerging post-sovereigntist57 Courchene, Quebec Inc., 1158 Ibid., 4559 McRoberts, Misconceiving Canada, 232-23360 Ibid., 232 16
  • 17. discourse, which has the potential to bridge the gap between nationalist and non-nationalist forces in both cases61In this statement and in other places throughout Keating’s article, we see that Free Tradedid not have the support of the working class section of the Parti Québécois any morethan the agreement had the support of unions in English Canada62. Here Quebec eliteswere in agreement with business elites in English Canada (and America), over and abovethe wishes of their lower income nationalist supporters. The switch in the federalgovernment, from Liberals to Conservatives, re-oriented government policy towardsQuebec63. With the election of business candidate Brian Mulroney, the federal willtowards building a unitary state in Canada had evaporated. Participating in a Canadiangovernment-business roundtable, Torrance J. Wylie commented in 1989, "The spirit ofMeech Lake . . . Changes the political environment in Canada and puts the provinces in avery important position vis-a-vis constitutional development, and social and economicpolicy"64. The Meech Lake accords had been seen by Quebec elites as a way to lock inthe successful de-regulatory reforms mentioned above. When that failed, free tradebecame another way of doing so65. The neutral Netherlands’ Journal Of Business Ethicsamusingly characterized support for the later NAFTA agreement in Quebec as “a case ofa joint government-business coalition against popular desires”66.61 Keating, M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-Sovereignty Stance? EvidenceFrom Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian Studies, 18. 2, 2005: 26662 Ibid., 264-26563 Courchene, Quebec Under Free Trade, 2764 Ibid., 2765 Hamilton, Converging Nationalisms, 667-66866 Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness & Directions” in JournalOf Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, No.16, 1997: 631 17
  • 18. As we have seen Modernization and Globalization favoured very different institutions.Elite Quebec nationalism used these institutions for its own ends. Paradoxicallyhowever, its ends and its identity were altered in turn by these different paradigms.Modernization, entailing the coordination of social, political and economic policy pushedelites towards the goal of an independent Quebec nation-state. In pursuing this end theywould partner themselves with ordinary Québécois in the labour movement and build alarge welfare state. Having achieved so much and yet failed in their quest forsovereignty, they would try a different tact in turning to Globalization. This newparadigm would alter the basis of their power and lead them to forsake their oldinstitutional partnership with the unions for free trade agreements that promised to limitfederal government intervention and increase their new business power. This cynicalreading of elite Quebec nationalism is perhaps balanced somewhat by the fact that labourand the welfare states identification, in the early modernization period, has at least madethese institutions stronger in Quebec than in Anglophone North America, though theirrelative decline under globalization is the same in Quebec as elsewhere. In examiningthe interrelation between these phenomenon; elitism, nationalism, modernization andGlobalization, we gain a deeper understanding of the true nature of each. For that reason,exploration of this topic should be of interest to Anglophones, Francophones and anyoneelse interested in real progressive reforms. 18
  • 19. Bibliography:Arbour, P., Quebec Inc. And The Temptation Of State Capitalism, Montreal: RobertDavies Publishing, 1993Beland,D. & Lecours, A., The Politics Of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism & SocialPolicy Reform In Canada, The United Kingdom & Belgium in Comparative PliticalStudies Vol. 38 No.6Courchene, T.(Ed.), Quebec Inc.: Foreign takeovers, Competition/Merger Policy &Universal Banking, Kingston: Queens University Press, 1989Denis, S. & Denis, R., “Trade Unionism And The State Of industrial Relations InQuebec” in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy InNorth America, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995Drover, G. & Leung, K.K., “Nationalism And Trade Liberalization In Quebec & Taiwan”in Pacific Affairs (Vol.74 No.2, 2001Erk, J., “Is Nationalism Left Or Right: Critical Junctures In Quebec Nationalism” inNations And Nationalism, 16 (3), 2010Keating,M., “Semantics And Sovereignty or, Is There A Coherent post-SovereigntyStance? Evidence From Quebec And Scotland” in British Journal Of Canadian StudiesLaForest, G., Trudeau And The End Of The Canadian Dream (Trans., Browne, P.L. &Weinroth, M.), Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1995McRoberts, K., “Internal Colonialism: The Case Of Quebec” in Ethnic And RacialStudies, Vol.2, No.3, 1979McRoberts, K., Misconceiving Canada: The Struggle For National Unity, Toronto:Oxford University Press, 1997Pasquero, J., “Business Ethics In National Identity In Quebec: Distinctiveness &Directions” in Journal Of Business Ethics, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers,No.16, 1997Turcotte, A., “Uneasy Allies: Quebecers, Canadians, Americans, Mexicans and NAFTA”in LaChapelle, G.(ed.) Quebec Under Free Trade: making public Policy In NorthAmerica, Quebec: Presses de l’Universite de Quebec,1995 19
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