A Cross Impact Scenario Model of Organisational Behaviour in Emergencies

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  • (C) Murray Turoff 2003 http://is.njit.edu/turoff
  • (C) Murray Turoff 2003 http://is.njit.edu/turoff


  • 1. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educational useallowed with attribution)11A Cross Impact Scenario Model ofOrganizational Behavior inEmergenciesMurray Turoffhttp:/is.njit.edu/turoffUse: murray.turoff@gmail.comFor slides and related papersPresented atISCRAM 2013, Baden Baden, GermanyMay 12-15, 2013
  • 2. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educational useallowed with attribution)222
  • 3. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)33Clear FailureofEmergencyPreparednessandManagementHow do wedeterminesuccess orfailure?Did we dothe best wecould?!
  • 4. The response must be comparable to the disaster!© Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)4
  • 5. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)5Summary Report EM literature 50’s-70’sTypes of Organizations in DisastersTasks/StructureExpected UnexpectedOld EstablishedExample: Police doingwhat they did beforethe disaster and/orin the same wayExtendingA group undertaking non-regulartasks like a constructioncompany using men andequipment to dig through debrisduring a rescue operationNew ExpandingExample: Groupexists on paper onlyuntil the disasterhappens, like the RedCross running ashelterEmergentA new group made up of peoplefrom many differentorganizations or organizationalunits, suddenly working togetherto tackle the crisis problems.Dynes, R. R. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1976) Organizational Communicationsand decision Making in Crises, Report series 17. Disaster Research Center,University of Delaware, Newark, DE, USA.
  • 6. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)6Established vs. Emergent Established Organization Line, Middle, and Upper Management Line takes Expected actions on Expected requests Line management passes unexpected requestsupward Middle Management analyses Unexpected Requests Upper Management decides on preferred actions forunexpected requests All the above takes time inappropriate for disasterresponse Emergent Organizations Authority to make unexpected decisions passesdown to Line Management Lateral Communications across line managementbecomes critical to problem solving Middle management augments line management Middle management takes on new roles to supportresponse with needed resources (people orequipment) Feedback established to determine correct orincorrect actions and decisions (situation awareness) Upper management seeks more resources All try to determine and correct errors and mistakes.
  • 7. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)7Cross Impact Model of the 1976 PaperSource Events and Assumptions I Probability of being true/false at start time andcan not be influenced by any events S1: Decision Plans: The organizations have detailed plans defining allrequests and responses. S2: Process Plans: The Plans define the roles and processes for sensingthe situation and developing collaborativeresponses. S3: Foresight of Threats The emergency taking place fits the description andscale in the existing emergency plans and priorpreparedness and mitigation activities by theorganizations. S4: Sensing Current Reality There is an established information andcommunication system for gathering and trackingthe effectiveness of responses to requests forservices, materials, and/or personnel to handle bothexpected and unexpected situations.
  • 8. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)8Source Events and Assumptions II S5: Continuous integration of EM professionals. There is free and on-going lateral communicationsabout plans, responses, and real or potentialproblems concerning emergencies by managers andprofessionals in different organizations ororganizational units. S6: Continuous integration of the public. There is the ability to integrate quickly individuals,social media, and other organizations into theEmergency Management Systems. S7: Ignoring Errors The organizations involved have a history of hidingerrors they have made in the past and notencouraging workers to expose them for correction. S8: Maximizing profit Mitigation and Risk Avoidance have been sacrificedas part of maximizing organizational profits orreducing costs such as maintenance.
  • 9. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)9Dynamic Events I: Events inplay during the response Can be influenced by the source events and otherdynamic events D1: Increased unexpected requests Unexpected requests for people, material, andservices far exceed the current capacity of theorganization. D2: Delegation of Authority Upper management passes the authority fordetermining the response to unexpected requests tothe line management and professionals. D3: Middle level role changes Middle management and professionals are draftedinto taking online management responsibilities. D4: Upper level role changes Upper management takes on the role of findingadditional resources for response functions. D5: Degrading Quality of response More than a third of the emergency requests receiveinadequate responses.
  • 10. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)10Dynamic Events II D6: Growing threat rigidity Individual stress via the threat rigiditysyndrome affects a significant number ofmanagers and professionals involved in theresponse process. D7: Collaborative Problem Solving Problem solving collaborative groups are ableto form to handle new problems when required,by networking those most concerned andknowledgeable. D8: Information overload problem Information overload is a growing problem. D9: Increasing Decision Making Load andDelay Delays between requests and responses growsignificantly with time. D10: Becoming Emergent Significant pressures (organizational stress)exist to make the organization more emergent.
  • 11. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)11Outcome Events: probability of beingtrue at the end of the response Can be influenced by both the source anddynamic events Probability of being true or false at theend of the response period O1: Excessive Damages Damages greatly exceed original expectations. O2: Minimum Recovery Efforts Recovery activities are limited to replacingwhat existed before as opposed to improvingthe prior conditions. O3: Major Mitigation Efforts Major efforts at future mitigation will be anintegral part of the recovery. O4: Emergent Organizations for Recovery Emergent organizations continue into therecovery period.
  • 12. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)12Getting Estimates of the relationships All probabilities are initially .5 (maybe). A person is asked to indicate what he or shethings the probability is of each event. If they say it is greater then .5 we tell them toassume it is 0 and ask what impact that has onall the other events. If they say it is less then .5 we tell them toassume it is 1 and ask about the other events. They indicate a resulting new probability for eachevent unless they feel there is no influencerelationship. This will produce the greatest range of influence ofone event on the other. This may be an individuals model or acollaborative group model based on agreeing onthe events and the direction of influences for anyrelationship between two events.
  • 13. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)13Turner Stage Model (1976, page 381)Stage The Sequence of Events Associated with a Failure of ForesightI Nationally normal starting point: Initial culturally accepted beliefs aboutthe world and its hazards; Associated precautionary norms set out in laws,codes of practice, mores, and folkways.II Incubation period: The accumulation of an unnoticed set of events whichare at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards and the norms for theiravoidance.III Precipitating event: Forces itself to the attention and transforms generalperceptions of stage II.IV Onset: The immediate consequences of the collapse of cultural precautionsbecome apparentV Rescue and Salvage – first stage adjustment: Post collapse situation isrecognized in ad hoc adjustments which permit the work of rescue andsalvage to be started.VI Full cultural readjustment: An inquiry or assessment is carried out, andbeliefs and precautionary norms are adjusted to fit the newly gainedunderstanding of the world.
  • 14. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)14Features of FailuresStage Feature (comments)I Initial Beliefsand NormsFailure to comply with existing regulations (violation ofexisting precautions).II Incubationperiod1. Rigidities of belief and perception (Events unnoticed ormisunderstood because of erroneous assumptions)2. Decoy phenomena (Breaking up a complex problem intosimple problems for separate treatment; that often does notsolve the original problem)3. Information difficulties and noise (Difficulties of handlinginformation in complex situations)4. The involvement of strangers (people without the samecultural experiences and objectives)5. Failure to comply with discredited or out of date regulations(violations unnoticed because of cultural lag in formalprecautions)6. Minimizing of emergent danger (a reluctance to fear theworst outcome)7. Save immediate costs or raise profits while reducing safetyand increasing risk (added by Turoff).
  • 15. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)15Consequence of the Turner Stagesand Cross Impact Analysis Create two separate Cross Impact Model Stage I and II: Starting point and Incubationperiod Stage III to VI: Precipitating event, Onset,Rescue & Salvage (response), Full culturalreadjustment (recovery) The Outcome events of the first model canbe the source events for the second model Simple Integration of two models Can be applied to other complex problemsdivisible into a series of separate stages.
  • 16. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)16Lack of continuous oradequate Planning and MitigationHe took the wheel in a lashing roaringhurricaneAnd by what compass did he steer thecourseof the ship?"My policy is to have no policy," he saidinthe early months,And three years later, "I have beencontrolledby events.""The People, Yes" Carl SandburgMurray Turoff, Starr Roxanne Hiltz, Victor Bañuls, and Gerd Van Den Eede,Multiple Perspectives on Planning for Emergencies: An Introduction to theSpecial Issue on Planning and Foresight for Emergency Preparedness andManagement, Technological Forecasting and Social Change
  • 17. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)171717Problem of Multi Organizations ororganizational units trying to collaboratein planning or response
  • 18. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)18Organizational Monkeys
  • 19. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)19Organizational HierarchyNo hearproblemsNo SpeakproblemsNo Seeproblems
  • 20. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)20Chinese version: 4 monkeysLast one does nothing!Questions and Comments
  • 21. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)21Background articles I Turoff, M., White, C., Plotnick, L., Dynamic Emergency ResponseManagement for Large Scale Decision Making in Extreme HazardousEvents, in Burstein, F., Brezillon, P. and Zaslavsky, A., edt., (2010),Supporting Real Time Decision-Making: The Role of Context in DecisionSupport on the Move (Annals of Information Systems), Springer-VerlagNew York, Inc. Focuses on the decision problems of Emergency Managers Turoff, M., Hiltz, S.R.: The Future of Professional Communities ofPractice. In: Weinhardt, C., Luckner, S., Stößer, J. (eds.) WeB 2008.LNBIP, vol. 22, pp. 144-158. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg (2009) The problem information overload that faces emergency managers based upona Delphi for NIH on 37 EM practitioners (full report on my website). Turoff, M., Hiltz, S. R., White, C., Plotnick, L., Hendela, A., Xiang, Y.,The Past as the Future of Emergency Preparedness and Management,Journal of Information Systems for Crisis Response and Management,1(1), 12-28, January-March 2009. Introduces the concept of the “science of muddling through” and its similarityto “High Reliability Theory” in EM Turoff, M., Organizational Factors Inhibiting the design of EffectiveEmergency Management Information Systems, 45thHICSS January 2012,pp 402-411 A detailed examination of the BP disaster Van de Walle, B., Turoff, M. and Hiltz, S. R. eds. Information Systemsfor Emergency Management, In the Advances in ManagementInformation Systems monograph series (Editor-in-Chief: VladimirZwass). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc., 2010. A good reference book on the design of EMIS.
  • 22. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)22Background articles II Turoff, M., Chumer, M., Van de Walle, B., Yao, X., TheDesign of a Dynamic Emergency Response ManagementInformation System (DERMIS). Journal of InformationTechnology Theory and Application (JITTA), Volume 5,Number 4, Summer, 2004, pp. 1-36. (http://www.jitta.org). This paper has received considerable attention and is onmy website in both English and Chinese. Turoff, M., Chumer, M., Hiltz, R., Klashner, Robb, Alles,Michael, Vasarhelyi, M., Kogan, A., Assuring HomelandSecurity: Continuous Monitoring, Control, andAssurance of Emergency Preparedness, Lead article fora special issue on Emergency Preparedness for JITTA,Volume 6, Number 3, Fall 2004, 1-24. This discusses at length the concept of emergencypreparedness audits and provides more detail on the designof an EMIS system started in the prior article. Turner, B.A. (1976), The organizational and inter-organizational development of disasters, AdministrativeScience Quarterly 21: 378-397.http://difi.uniud.it/tl_files/utenti/crisci/Turner%201976.pdf1/29/2013. A classic and important paper.
  • 23. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)23Background Papers III Linstone, Harold & Turoff, Murray, Delphi: A brief lookbackward and forward, Technological Forecasting and socialChange, (2011), 2010.09.011 (in the special issue on the DelphiMethod). This issue of 21 papers covers the history of the methodsince the 1975 book on the Delphi Method available on mywebsite. Bañuls, Victor, and Murray Turoff, Scenario construction viaDelphi and Cross-impact analysis, Technological Forecastingand Social Change (2011), 2011.03.014. (example used is thesoftware development process) There is a growing set of articles on dynamic cross impactmodeling that allows any user create dynamic scenariomodels and get an analyses of their underlying influencefactors between any two events based upon their subjectiveprobability estimate. It can also allow a group to mergetheir estimates into a collaborative model. The group mayalso go through a collaborative process to develop theevents that are to be used in the model. You may contact me if you have trouble finding any of thesepapers. Email me at murray.turoff@gmail.com
  • 24. © Murray Turoff 2013 (Educationaluse allowed with attribution)24Background papers IV Banuls, V.A., Turoff, M., Hiltz, S.R., Collaborative scenario modeling inemergency management through cross-impact, TechnologicalForecasting and Social Change, For special issue on Planning in EM toappear early 2013 (paper available on TFSC website) This shows the collaborative estimation process and develops amodel of the results of a dirty bomb explosion in an urban areaduring the first 24 hours. The model contains source events thatare true or false at the beginning, the dynamic events during thedynamic period, the outcome events at the end of the period. Turoff, Murray, Gonzalez, J.J., Hiltz, S.R., Modeling OrganizationalBehavior in Emergencies, NOKOBIT 2012, Universitetet i Nordland,(Norway), November. ISBN 978-82-321-0185-6, pages 213-224. This is a design of a working model based upon early findings inthe period of 1950 – 1975 on why certain public or privateorganizations succeed for fail in their response to a disaster. Seethe next article. Dynes, R. R. and Quarantelli, E. L. (1976) OrganizationalCommunications and Decision Making in Crises, Report series 17,Disaster Research Center, University of Delaware Library, Newark,DE, USA.http://putnam.lib.udel.edu:8080/dspace/bitstream/handle/19716/1264/RS17.pdf?seq1/29/2013. Turoff, M., Hiltz, S. R., Bañuls, V. M., and Van Den Eede, G., MultiplePerspectives on Planning for Emergencies: An introduction to theSpecial Issue on planning and Foresight for Emergency Preparednessand Management. To appear in early 2013. Message me for a copy of this draft introduces the 15 papers and why they areimportant.