Case Study – Haiti 2010Timo LügeIDHA 39, Berlin  17.03.2013              1
Situation in Haiti before the quake Haiti: 9.7 million people Metro Port-au-Prince (PAP): 2.4 million people 80 % of al...
Political situation Violent political history Upcoming presidential elections Unpopular UN peacekeeping operation since...
2010 earthquake                  Photo: UNDP17.03.2013              4
2010 earthquake 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck near  capital Port-au-Prince More than 300,000 people were injured Clos...
17.03.2013   6
CasualtiesNumber of deaths according to different sources: Government of Haiti: 316,000 United Nations: 230,000 Group o...
Casualties 25% of civil servants in Port-au-Prince died 60% of Government and administrative buildings, 80% of schools ...
Logistical Challenges Haiti is an island The hub, Port-au-Prince, severely affected Airport not operational Harbours n...
Initial rapid response First Search and Rescue teams in Haiti 22     hours after the earthquake    First Red Cross teams...
Achievements: First six months 4 million people have received food aid 1.2 million people have access to safe water dail...
HealthFrom the 12th of January to the 31st of March: MSF carried out 11,749 operations and  treated 173,757 cases in tota...
But… Despite massive efforts, not enough Unequal distribution of aid:       • Port-au-Prince / rural areas       • Safe ...
Harmful aid – too many “helpers” Influx of thousands of “NGOs” No language skills or interpreters No previous experienc...
17.03.2013   15
17.03.2013   16
17.03.2013   17
Rubble 10 million cubic meters of rubble Rubble contains human remains In 2010, 2 million cubic meters were removed Ma...
Land titles / land disputes Available land at a premium after the earthquake Official land titles exists for only 5 % of...
Aid too focused on camps Rationale: Easier to serve people in camps Services concentrated in camps and not in  communiti...
17.03.2013   21
17.03.2013   22
17.03.2013   23
17.03.2013   24
Coordination challenges At the beginning only in English Meeting on the UN Logistics Base which only     allowed access ...
 Cluster leads and OCHA were not part of the  Coordination Support Committee or strategic  level Decisions not always ba...
Money Many pledges were not fulfilled Haitian government out of the loop and  without control over the funds History of...
New York Times, 23 December 201217.03.2013                               28
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission Charged with approving recovery projects which     could then be funded by the Haiti Re...
Communication                      Photo: Julien Goldstein, IFRC17.03.2013                               30
Communication Establishment of a cluster-like mechanism for     “Communication with Disaster Affected     Communities” (C...
Ushahidi17.03.2013              32
Open Street Map             12 January 2010   15 January201017.03.2013                                      33
17.03.2013   34
CholeraPhoto: Julien Goldstein, IFRC       17.03.2013                     35
Cholera Started in October 2010 Source: Nepalese peace keepers 648,000 people infected (MoH) 8,000 people died (MoH) ...
ElectionsPhoto: Andre Lambertson      17.03.2013                      37
Main problems of Haiti response Weak government Influx of too many unqualified actors Chronic poverty that increased vu...
Questions?17.03.2013                39
Thank you!Timo Lügetimo.luege@gmail.comTwitter: @timolueTel: +49 170 311 22 4317.03.2013               40
Upcoming SlideShare
Loading in...5
×

2010 Haiti earthquake response - case study

33,427

Published on

Case study highlighting achievement and failures of the international response to the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. This presentation was given during Fordham University's "International Diploma on Humanitarian Assistance".

Published in: Education
0 Comments
14 Likes
Statistics
Notes
  • Be the first to comment

No Downloads
Views
Total Views
33,427
On Slideshare
0
From Embeds
0
Number of Embeds
12
Actions
Shares
0
Downloads
0
Comments
0
Likes
14
Embeds 0
No embeds

No notes for slide

Transcript of "2010 Haiti earthquake response - case study "

  1. 1. Case Study – Haiti 2010Timo LügeIDHA 39, Berlin 17.03.2013 1
  2. 2. Situation in Haiti before the quake Haiti: 9.7 million people Metro Port-au-Prince (PAP): 2.4 million people 80 % of all economic activity in PAP 67 % of PAP population in “informal areas” Average living space in informal areas: 1,98 m2/person 30 % in PAP have access to sanitation 54 % in PAP have access to clean water Very prone to natural disasters (hurricanes, floods)17.03.2013 2
  3. 3. Political situation Violent political history Upcoming presidential elections Unpopular UN peacekeeping operation since 2004 (MINUSTAH) Recent food riots after food prices rose 40 % Remittances make up 20 % of GDP17.03.2013 3
  4. 4. 2010 earthquake Photo: UNDP17.03.2013 4
  5. 5. 2010 earthquake 7.0 magnitude earthquake struck near capital Port-au-Prince More than 300,000 people were injured Close to 200,000 houses were badly damaged and 100,000 were destroyed 1.5 million people were displaced17.03.2013 5
  6. 6. 17.03.2013 6
  7. 7. CasualtiesNumber of deaths according to different sources: Government of Haiti: 316,000 United Nations: 230,000 Group of US academics: 158,000 USAID: 85,000Compared with 2004 tsunami:230,000 deaths across 13 countries17.03.2013 7
  8. 8. Casualties 25% of civil servants in Port-au-Prince died 60% of Government and administrative buildings, 80% of schools in Port-au-Prince and 60% of schools in the South and West provinces were destroyed or damaged Over 600,000 people left their home in Port-au-Prince and stayed with host or own families 100,000 IDPs lived in camps that were at critical risk from storms and flooding Also: UN HQ destroyed and 115 UN staff dead17.03.2013 8
  9. 9. Logistical Challenges Haiti is an island The hub, Port-au-Prince, severely affected Airport not operational Harbours not operational-> Logistics pipeline through Santo Domingo17.03.2013 9
  10. 10. Initial rapid response First Search and Rescue teams in Haiti 22 hours after the earthquake First Red Cross teams 36 hours after the quake All large organisations show up quickly Stockpiles are quickly distributed US Air Force takes over airport; later criticised for prioritisation of flights17.03.2013 10
  11. 11. Achievements: First six months 4 million people have received food aid 1.2 million people have access to safe water daily 1.5 million people have received emergency shelter materials 2.1 million household Non-Food Items (NFIs) have been distributed 11,000 latrines have been installed 195,000 children have benefited from temporary learning spaces 550,000 children and pregnant/lactating women have received supplementary feeding 1 million people have benefited from Cash-for-Work programmes 5,900 people have been relocated from imminently dangerous locations 142,000 households have received agricultural inputs for spring planting Source: OCHA17.03.2013 11
  12. 12. HealthFrom the 12th of January to the 31st of March: MSF carried out 11,749 operations and treated 173,757 cases in total The International Red Cross Red Crescent Movement treated another 95,000 cases17.03.2013 12
  13. 13. But… Despite massive efforts, not enough Unequal distribution of aid: • Port-au-Prince / rural areas • Safe / unsafe areas of Port-au-Prince Unequal quality of aid No control/accountability mechanism for many new actors arriving17.03.2013 13
  14. 14. Harmful aid – too many “helpers” Influx of thousands of “NGOs” No language skills or interpreters No previous experience in developing countries or outside their country No “back office” (transportation, food, accommodation, materials), creating new case load for humanitarians No long-term strategy Help or grievous bodily harm? Lots of unwanted gifts in kind, i.e. junk17.03.2013 14
  15. 15. 17.03.2013 15
  16. 16. 17.03.2013 16
  17. 17. 17.03.2013 17
  18. 18. Rubble 10 million cubic meters of rubble Rubble contains human remains In 2010, 2 million cubic meters were removed Many residents didn’t want rubble removed w/o compensation or land title Nowhere to put the rubble Positive: quick assessment of buildings in Port- au-Prince17.03.2013 18
  19. 19. Land titles / land disputes Available land at a premium after the earthquake Official land titles exists for only 5 % of land Office holding these titles was destroyed Squatters are being evicted NGOs reluctant to build shelter on land where ownership is not clear Government owns 50 % of land yet made only two pieces of land available in first four months.17.03.2013 19
  20. 20. Aid too focused on camps Rationale: Easier to serve people in camps Services concentrated in camps and not in communities Families maintained “a presence” in (multiple) camps to access services even if they lived somewhere else Very uneven standards in different camps Not enough support for host families, particularly outside PAP17.03.2013 20
  21. 21. 17.03.2013 21
  22. 22. 17.03.2013 22
  23. 23. 17.03.2013 23
  24. 24. 17.03.2013 24
  25. 25. Coordination challenges At the beginning only in English Meeting on the UN Logistics Base which only allowed access to some Haitian authorities and Haitian NGOs were marginalised Coordinators received 1 email per second Too many actors Little experience in coordinating with the military17.03.2013 25
  26. 26.  Cluster leads and OCHA were not part of the Coordination Support Committee or strategic level Decisions not always based on humanitarian principles17.03.2013 26
  27. 27. Money Many pledges were not fulfilled Haitian government out of the loop and without control over the funds History of corruption meant most donors didn’t trust GoH Over 90 % of money went to international actors (UN, private sector, NGOs)17.03.2013 27
  28. 28. New York Times, 23 December 201217.03.2013 28
  29. 29. Interim Haiti Recovery Commission Charged with approving recovery projects which could then be funded by the Haiti Reconstruction Fund Led by Bill Clinton (UN Special Representative for Haiti) and Jean-Max Bellerive (Prime Minister) Partly created because donors didn’t trust GoH Completely dysfunctional Mandate ended in Oct 2011, not replaced yet17.03.2013 29
  30. 30. Communication Photo: Julien Goldstein, IFRC17.03.2013 30
  31. 31. Communication Establishment of a cluster-like mechanism for “Communication with Disaster Affected Communities” (CDAC) 39 million SMS sent by humanitarian organisations Over 900,000 calls to Red Cross hotline Dedicated radio and TV shows for beneficiaries Volunteer and Tech Community as new actor17.03.2013 31
  32. 32. Ushahidi17.03.2013 32
  33. 33. Open Street Map 12 January 2010 15 January201017.03.2013 33
  34. 34. 17.03.2013 34
  35. 35. CholeraPhoto: Julien Goldstein, IFRC 17.03.2013 35
  36. 36. Cholera Started in October 2010 Source: Nepalese peace keepers 648,000 people infected (MoH) 8,000 people died (MoH) Haiti has had twice as many cholera patients as all of Africa (MSF) UN rejects claims for compensation17.03.2013 36
  37. 37. ElectionsPhoto: Andre Lambertson 17.03.2013 37
  38. 38. Main problems of Haiti response Weak government Influx of too many unqualified actors Chronic poverty that increased vulnerability Lack of involvement of Haitian civil society Little experience with urban disasters Not enough support for IDPs and their families outside urban camps17.03.2013 38
  39. 39. Questions?17.03.2013 39
  40. 40. Thank you!Timo Lügetimo.luege@gmail.comTwitter: @timolueTel: +49 170 311 22 4317.03.2013 40

×